Meinong studies

Desires matter. How are we to understand their intentionality? According to the main dogma, a desire is a disposition to act. In this article, I propose an alternative to this functionalist picture, which is inspired by the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, desire involves a specific manner of representing the world: deontic mode. Desiring a state of affairs, I propose, is representing it as what ought to be or, if one prefers, as what should be. Firstly, I present three principles of the semantics of desires that pertain to their satisfaction conditions, their world-to-mind direction of fit, and the idea that we desire what, we think, is not actual. Secondly, I examine the functionalist view in light of these features. Finally, I argue for the deontic mode conception: desire and ought-to-be fit like hand in glove. Consequently, desire’s intentionality is irreducible to desire’s functional role and calls for a first-person perspective taking modes seriously.

How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to
the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a
disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of desire
and argues for a deontic alternative, namely the view that desiring is
representing a state of affairs as what ought to be. Three lines of
criticism of the classical pictures of desire are provided. The first
concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world
should conform to our desires. The second concerns the “death of
desire” principle, i.e. the intuition that one cannot desire what one
represents as actual. The last pertains to desire’s role in
psychological explanations, i.e. the intuition that desires can explain
motivations and be explained by evaluations. Following these
criticisms, three positive arguments in favor of the deontic conception
are sketched.