Logical Possibility

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness?  If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity?  How do people react to being accused to talking nonsense themselves?  Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life?  In dream-reports perhaps?  Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs?  Or in certain jokes and hoaxes?  Are contradictions felt to be meaningless?  I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties.  First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others.  Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’).  To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless.  And often one is left guessing.

.Taking as my starting-point Cora Diamond’s paper ‘What nonsense might be’, I extend her ‘austere’ conception of nonsense to encompass the talking of nonsense.  We need to focus on the utterer as well as the utterance.  This brings out how difficult it is going to be to DIAGNOSE the talking of (philosophical) nonsense, without falling into the ‘sense that is senseless’ trap (PI, I, 500).  It is not clear to what extent Diamond sees the problem here.  I suggest that if there is a way round the difficulty, it will involve adopting a therapeutic approach.

I suggest that, although the nonsensicalist challenge (obviously) matters, it has, at least in its Wittgensteinian form, been widely ignored.  On the other hand, those who still adhere to nonsensicalism (mainly Wittgensteinians) have been equally remiss in their failure to examine its presuppositions.

In a well-known passage in the 'Big Typescript' Wittgenstein suggests that a philosopher’s unwillingness to renounce certain combinations of words as nonsensical arises from her seeing what she wants to see.  He seems to be postulating a combination of two problematic psychological phenomena: self-deception and illusions of meaning.  Accusations of self-deception in philosophy naturally invite counter-accusations of the genetic fallacy but, quite apart from that, there is, I argue, a special problem for Wittgenstein.  In examples of ‘normal’ self-deception someone believes what she wants to believe (sees what she wants to see) but what she believes (sees) has a content.  It makes sense, even though it might be false.  What is the analogue of this when it is nonsense that is in question?  Can the CONTENT OF A BELIEF be nonsensical?

It is widely alleged that metaphysical possibility is “absolute” possibility (Kripke [1980], Lewis [1986], Rosen [2006, 16], Stalnaker [2005, 203], Williamson [2016, 460]).  Indeed, this is arguably its metaphysical significance.  Kripke calls metaphysical necessity “necessity in the highest degree” ([1980, 99]).  Williamson calls metaphysical possibility the “maximal objective modality” [2016, 459].  Rosen says that “metaphysical possibility is the [most inclusive] sort of real possibility” ([2006, 16]).  And Stalnaker writes, “we can agree with Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and most others who allow themselves to talk about possible worlds at all, that metaphysical necessity is necessity in the widest sense [2003, 203].”  But what exactly does the thesis that metaphysical possibility is absolute amount to?  Is it true?  In this article, I argue that, assuming that the thesis is not merely terminological, and lacking in any metaphysical interest, it is an article of faith.  I conclude with the suggestion that metaphysical possibility may lack the metaphysical significance that is widely attributed to it.

There are certain 'hard cases' of weakness of will that seem to occur, indeed to be common, but are very difficult to give a non-paradoxical account of.  It is just not clear how they are possible.  This paper is largely an attempt to get them in focus.  What conditions must such weak-willed actions satisfy?  In what sense must they be intentional, for example?  And must the weak-willed agent thinks his action objectively worse than some alternative action open to him?  And must that alternative action actually be open to him?  The paper concludes by considering the condition that a clear case of weakness of will must be in certain sense non-procrastinatory and this turns out to be particularly difficult to satisfy.  Other explanations, ones that do not postulate weakness of will (though they may involve paradoxes of their own), always seem to be available.

Contents:

v. Logical Possibility and Natural Possibility
vi. Zombies
vii. Saul Kripke
viii. Chalmers & Goff: Conceivability to Possibility
ix. Two More Conceivings

One may think that only natural (or empirical) possibility is of interest to most people – both laypersons and experts. Indeed David Chalmers himself (sort of) states that himself. Yet logical (i.e., not natural) possibility still permeates Chalmers' entire work. And, as we shall see, so too does conceivability; which he strongly ties to logical possibility. Indeed Chalmers' references to natural possibility hardly make sense when taken out of the context of logical possibility. Thus both logical and natural possibility gain much of their purchase by being opposed to one another.

Chalmers himself sums up one major problem with logical possibility (this was touched upon in Part One) when he says that

“[t]here are a vast number of logically possible situations that are not naturally possible”.

That means that there must be mightily good philosophical (or scientific) reasons to spend time on a given logical possibility. (It's easy to believe that there are good reasons when, for example, consciousness is being discussed.) That is, surely it must pay philosophical dividends to do so. Having said that, there's a very large number of uninstantiated natural possibilities too.

So what, philosophically, can we draw out of natural (“although wildly improbable”) possibilities? Well, we can draw one thing out: that they're *naturally possible*. And that's enough for some philosophers. But what else? Well, at a superficial level, it shows us that all sorts of bizarre things are naturally possible. So if it's naturally possible that a monkey could type *Hamlet*, then it's also naturally possible that an ant could take over the world. Why? Because all it takes for something to be naturally possible is that it “conforms to the laws of our world”. So, as far as I can see, a Nietzschean super-ant does appear to conform to the laws of of our world. That is, this ant and its actions don't “violate[] the laws of nature of our world”.

Cook’s paper ‘Wittgenstein on privacy’, though published over fifty years ago, is still one of the most impressive attempts to take seriously what philosophical nonsense would have to be.  Cook argues that someone who says, ‘It is not even logically possible to feel another’s pain’ is experiencing ‘a queer sort of illusion, produced by seeing one pattern of grammar on analogy with another and quite different pattern of grammar’.  I argue that he has identified a genuine philosophical illusion, indeed a grammatical illusion, that is quite close to what nonsensicalists are postulating – but I am not sure that it is IDENTICAL with it.

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness?  If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity?  How do people react to being accused of talking nonsense themselves?  Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life?  In dream-reports perhaps?  Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs?  Or in certain jokes and hoaxes?  Are contradictions felt to be meaningless?  I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties.  First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others.  Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

Stuart Hampshire in his review of Gilbert Ryle’s 'Concept of Mind' draws a distinction between two ways of using psychological terms.  The simple ‘He doesn’t believe in life after death (or the coming revolution)’ has a different use and different implications from ‘He doesn’t REALLY believe in life after death (or the coming revolution)’.  I ask whether there is any similar distinction with regard to meaning:  ‘He didn’t mean anything by what he said’ as against ‘He didn’t REALLY mean anything by what he said’.

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness?  If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity?  How do people react to being accused of talking nonsense themselves?  Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life?  In dream-reports perhaps?  Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs?  Or in certain jokes and hoaxes?  Are contradictions felt to be meaningless?  I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties.  First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others.  Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

(I am sorry if Part Three seems rather fragmentary - a handful of questions left over from previous sections.  It really needs some kind of conclusion to draw the threads together, but for the moment inspiration eludes me.)

The question of whether or not our universe is deterministic remains of interest to both scientists and theologians. In this essay I argue that this question can be solved only by metaphysical decision and that no scientific evidence for either determinism or indeterminism will ever be conclusive. No finite being, no matter how powerful its cognitive abilities, will ever be able to establish the deterministic nature of the universe. The only being that would be capable of doing so would be one that is at once transcendent and immanent. Such a being is compatible with the God of the Christian tradition, which yields that a deterministic worldview is compatible with (yet does not necessarily lead to) a deterministic worldview. A more important point is that because science is never able to establish the determinism of our universe, it can never definitely rule out divine action except on metaphysical grounds.