Islamic Movement

Abstraksi Artikel ini mengelaborasi narasi tentang tumbuhnya kelas menengah Muslim baru pada masa Reformasi dan sikap mereka terhadap wacana pluralisme di media sosial. Kemunculan kelas menengah Muslim baru merupakan dampak dari stabilnya pertumbuhan ekonomi di Indonesia sejak 2001-2010 dalam bidang fesyen, kosmetik, perbankan, biro travel, budaya populer, wisata religi. Pada saat bersamaan muncul pemahaman akan adanya program liberalisasi pemikiran Islam di Indonesia khusunya pasca peristiwa 9/11 di Amerika Serikat. Program tersebut dijalankan dalam bentuk pewacanaan mengenai pluralisme agama, sekulerisme, kesetaraan gender. Dalam konteks ini, media sosial menjadi sarana persebaran gagasan oleh kelas menengah Muslim tentang bahaya sekulerisme, pluralisme, dan liberalisme (ideologi Barat). Di sisi lain mereka juga melakukan komodifikasi Islam dengan memperdagangkan fesyen, makanan, penerbitan dengan dalih untuk menyelamatkan generasi Muslim dari pengaruh ideologi Barat itu. Kata kunci: kelas menengah Muslim, wacana pluralisme, media sosial. Abstract This article elaborates on the narrative of a growing new Muslim middle class in the Reform era and their attitudes towards the discourse of pluralism in the new media such as social media. The emergence of the new Muslim middle class was a result of a stable economic growth in Indonesia since 2001-2010 who occupy the areas of fashion, cosmetics, banking, travel agencies, popular culture, and religious tourism. At the same time, an understanding of a liberal Islamic thought is developed through a particular program in Indonesia as a response to the post 9/11 in the United States. The program is administered through a discourse on religious pluralism, secularism, and gender equality (Western ideologies). In this context, social media serves as a means of disseminating ideas about the dangers of secularism, pluralism and liberalism brought by the Muslim middle class. On the other hand, they also commodify Islam by trading fashion, food, and publishing under the pretext of saving Muslims from the influence of the Western ideologies.

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บทความชิ้นนี้พยายามบันทึกความทรงจำของผู้ที่มีส่วนร่วมในกิจกรรมทางการเมืองครั้งสำคัญในฐานะที่เป็น “ตัวบท” ของประวัติศาสตร์การต่อรองของคนมลายูมุสลิมในจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ (หรือในอีกแง่หนึ่งคือ “ปาตานี” ในนัยทางประวัติศาสตร์) ด้วยวิธีการที่ไม่ใช้ความรุนแรง ผ่านเหตุการณ์ชุมนุมประท้วงที่จังหวัดยะลาเมื่อปี 2531 เพื่อเรียกร้องให้มีการอนุญาตนักศึกษาสตรีมุสลิมสามารถคลุมฮิญาบขณะกำลังศึกษาอยู่ในวิทยาลัยครูยะลาได้ บทความชิ้นนี้ยังพยายามจะแจกแจงให้เห็นกลยุทธ์ของการใช้วิธีการที่ไม่ใช้ความรุนแรงเข้าต่อรองกับอำนาจรัฐ ตลอดจนวิธีที่ชาวมลายูมุสลิมใช้ต่อรองกันภายในกล่มของพวกเขาเอง รวมไปถึงบรรยากาศทางการเมืองทั้งในระดับท้องถิ่นไปถึงสากลที่เปิดเอื้อต่อการทำงานความคิดต่อคนหนุ่มสาวในยุคสมัยดังกล่าว กระทั่งปรากฏเป็นปฏิบัติการเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองครั้งสำคัญที่สุดครั้งหนึ่งของชาวมลายูมุสลิมในประเทศไทย

The past ten years have witnessed the collapse of Palestinian political authority and leadership in East Jerusalem. Evidence suggests that the Islamic Movement is beginning to fill this vacuum from within Israel. This article examines the growing involvement of the Islamic Movement of Israel in Jerusalem, both in terms of discourse and specific facts on the ground. It explores how the al-Aqsa mosque has been employed, particularly by Shaykh Ra'id Salah, as a symbol for political empowerment, a site for public contestation, and a focus for religious renewal. It debates whether their presence should be perceived as a growing strategic threat, part of an Islamizing trend, or rather as a consequence of weak local leadership, the unintended consequences of the separation wall and the non-recognition of the Hamas government

Based on intense fieldwork inside the Islamic preaching-educational community of Fethullah Gülen in Istanbul, the paper explores the way Islamic sociability forms structure daily interactions and foster connectedeness among the religious brotherhood there. In a counterweight to what I see as an excess of emphasis that recent trends in the anthropology of Islam have put on notions of Islamic discipline and ethical self-fashioning, I offer an alternative perspective from which to look at how devout Muslims experience Islam and come to inhabit particular conceptions of self and personhood.

Keywords: sociability, Islam, self, community, embodiment.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) continues to generate headlines as it seeks to further entrench a self-proclaimed caliphate across the Levant. This vision is expansionist, and it is prosecuted through military conquest. Throughout its seized territory, ISIS has instituted what it claims to be Islamic rules of governance. The enforcement of Islamic penal law has led to the implementation of controversial punishments ranging from stoning to death of adulteress women to summary executions of apostate soldiers to amputations of guilty thieves to crucifixions for crimes that include sorcery and blasphemy. In a relatively recent publication following the international uproar over the taped beheading of American journalist James Foley, an ISIS-affiliated religious figurehead, Sheik Husayn ibn Mahmud, released an eight-page polemic entitled “The Question of Beheadings”.  The latter article constitutes a sustained response to the ensuing avalanche of criticism directed against ISIS, the crux of which asserted that the punishment of beheading—the taking of a sharp knife to the neck—has no religious basis. Seeking to counter this claim, Sheik Mahmud engages the text of the Qu’ran and hadiths (collections of deeds and saying attributed to Prophet Muhammad, 570-632 AD), as well as appealing to exegetical accounts of classical Muslim scholars (e.g., ibn Kathir, al-Suyuti, al-Qurtubi, al-Zamakshari etc.) to buttress his carefully crafted legal argument, ultimately finding sufficient support for the religious legitimacy of beheadings. The argument frames the act of beheading as being not only the long-standing practice of the Prophet Muhammad, his companions and successors throughout history, but also as a divinely mandated command.
This essay examines the crafting of a narrative from the legitimizing sources (i.e., the Qur’an and hadith).

تقدم هذه الورقة مراجعة لكتاب هام للباحثة بجامعة فلورنسا – إيطاليا نورا حملاجي صدر عن الجمعية الفلسطينية الأكاديمية للشؤون الدولية بالقدس عام 2003 بعنوان: تغيير النخبة في نظام سلطوي؛ احتواء الحركة الإسلامية في الجزائر، تتناول فيه بالبحث الكيفية التي برزت فيها النخبة الإسلامية الجديدة من "حمس" داخل النظام السياسي الجزائري عقب 1994 ومنطق تعامل النخبة العسكرية الحاكمة في الجزائر معها وموقعها من السلطة وتصوراتها لمستقبل هذه التجربة.

"In Aqaid e Azeem he try to explain " Sunni Islam" which has six articles of faith known as the six pillars of iman that all Sunni Muslims are united upon in belief,
Reality of one God Allah
Existence of angels of Allah
Authority of the books of Allah
Following the prophets of Allah
Preparation for and belief in the Day of Judgment
Supremacy of Allah’s will, i.e. belief in predestination good or bad is from Allah alone
He is disciple of Hazrat Shah Abdul Qadir Dehlvi and Hazrat Shah Abdul Aziz Dehlvi in reformist school of Hazrat Shah Waliullah Dehli .
He wrote in local language ( Haryanvi Urdu )."

By IRK Student, KIKRHS IIUM:
1) ENGKU MUHAMMAD IRFAN BIN ENGKU MUDA            (1528253)
2) MUHAMMAD HAAZIQ BIN SAUGI                                    (1610165)
3) WAN AHMAD SYAH BIN AB HALIM                                (1520253)
4) MUHAMMAD FAHEEM JEHNAE                                      (1327139)
5)MUHAMMAD AMIER BIN ROSTAM                                  (1513609)
6)MUHAMMAD AFIF DANIAL BIN AZMI                            (1622577)
7)MOHAMMAD KHALID BIN ABDUL KADIR JAILANI      (1518913)

INSTRUCTOR: Dr. ISMAIL BIN MAMAT

บทความชิ้นนี้ให้ความสำคัญกับเรื่องเล่า โดยมุ่งสำรวจดูผลกระทบของความรุนแรงร่วมสมัยที่ส่งผลให้ผลิตงานเขียนในโลกภาษาไทยเกี่ยวกับประวัติศาสตร์ “ปาตานี” ในแง่มุมต่างๆ ที่มักจำกัดกรอบไว้ในระยะเวลาอันไกลโพ้นและเต็มไปด้วยเรื่องเล่าความรุนแรง หลังจากนั้นจะพยายามพิจารณาพลวัตภายในสังคมมลายูปาตานีในประวัติศาสตร์ระยะใกล้ในห้วง 2 – 3 ทศวรรษที่ผ่านมาและความทรงจำเกี่ยวกับการต่อรองทางการเมืองระหว่างศูนย์กลางกรุงเทพฯ และชายขอบปาตานี รวมถึงการต่อรองระหว่างกลุ่มต่างๆ ภายในสังคมมลายูปาตานีเองผ่านเรื่องเล่าเกี่ยวกับประสบการณ์ของผู้ที่เคยเป็นตัวละครสำคัญในเหตุการณ์สำคัญที่ข้าพเจ้าเลือกเป็นกรณีศึกษา อันได้แก่ กรณีการเคลื่อนไหวเรียกร้องให้มีการแก้ระเบียบให้นักศึกษาสตรีสามารถสวมใส่ฮิญาบได้ในวิทยาลัยครูยะลาเมื่อปลายปี 2530 ถึงต้นปี 2531 และกรณีการเรียกร้องให้เพิกถอนทะเบียนโบราณสถานของมัสยิดกรือเซะตั้งแต่ห้วงปี 2530 - 2533

Despite many pessimistic expectations, the democratisation process in Indonesia has been progressing steadily over the past decade. The Indonesian political elite has crafted and stabilised a political transition mainly characterised by frequent, free and fair elections, peaceful rotations of power, effective elected officials and separation of powers, inclusive suffrage, freedom of expression, independence of the media and associational autonomy. In other words, within one decade, Indonesia has developed the main attributes of a democratic country, according to most theories of procedural democracy. However, the extent to which Indonesian democracy has been consolidated and institutionalised is another issue, which requires close examination and assessment. Does the Indonesian democracy fulfil or approximate the criteria stipulated by theorists of democratic consolidation? This article investigates the extent to which Indonesia has managed to advance its democratic transition and evaluates the prospects and challenges of democratic consolidation. In general, the article asserts that despite the persistence of a number of shortcomings, the steady progress of the Indonesian democratisation process and the consistent commitment of the principal political actors to the democratic rules of the game will likely lead to more institutionalised, policy-driven party politics and a gradual democratic consolidation in the foreseeable future.

Making a 'terrorist' creates an atmosphere of fear in a people, and through which the makers tries to achieve a particular political aim. Terrorism is defined and studied from the western perspective, and therefore, 'terrorists' are created or some is given image of terrorist to gain political aims by its 'fathers'. Hamas, a genuine resistance organization works for liberation of Palestine from Zionist colonial power, is depicted as terrorist by the West, and consequently, the whole resistance activities held in Palestine transform into 'terror operations'. Tying all 'terrorists' in one rope eases the process of terrorization of resistance movements which fight genuinely to liberate the land. Hamas and al-Qaida are different in respect of ends and means, where the former works for achieving a confined aim through legitimate ways while the latter does not. Though both refer all actions to Islam, differ in overall character; and therefore they should not be considered as allies.

The Islam Defense Action in Jakarta during November to December 2016 was the largest protest movement that ever been held in Indonesia and brought national concerns over political instability. Hudred thousands to milions of people overwhelmed the streets protesting the alleged blasphemy on Islam by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a candidate for the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election that has a close connection to President Joko Widodo. This article analyzes the outbreak of the protest movement as a depiction of the strategic influence of Islamic groups in the midst of political upheaval threat. The protest movement showed a struggle to defend their values, but on the other hand its political impact cannot be disclaimed. Above all of the phenomena, Islam Defense Action implies that religious sentiment still interacts with the politics and challenging the role of Islamic civil society toward Indonesia democracy transition in the post 2014.

One important phenomenon which has captured the public attention in post-New Order Indonesia is the public prominence of Salafi groups. 3 They successfully spread their dakwah (Islamic proselytization) by, among other things, extensively using modern technological media like television, radio, books, magazines, and the Internet. A number of studies on Salafism in Indonesia have focused on modern media usage by Salafis. Virtually all of them deal with the role of the Internet in the Salafi movement (for instance,

Hasan Al Banna melalui gerakan Ikhwanul Muslimun telah menginspirasi pembaharuan Islam pada abad ke-20. Corak pemikiran yang diketengahkannya adalah pemikiran Islam yang moderat, tidak berlebih-lebihan dan tidak pula serba memudahkan. Menjadi alternatif bagi pemikiran umum yang berkembang saat itu, yakni pemikiran sekularisme (memisahkan urusan agama dengan negara). Warisan terbesar Hasan Al Banna adalah jama’ah Ikhwanul Muslimun, yang didirikannya pada bulan Maret 1928 masehi, bertepatan dengan bulan Zulqa’idah 1347 hijriyah. Hasan Al Banna tewas ditembak pada 12 Februari 1949 di depan Kantor Pusat Pemuda Ikhwanul Muslimun, lewat sebuah perencanaan tingkat tinggi petinggi militer Mesir dikomandoi Mahmud Abdul Majid, seperti yang diungkap Fathi Yakan. Menjadi semakin menarik lagi, apabila pemikiran Hasan Al Banna ditinjau lebih dalam, untuk mengangkat gagasan-gagasan orisinilnya tentang perkembangan dan pergerakan keislaman, akan dipaparkan pemikiran-pemikiran Hasan Al Banna meliputi Islam, aqidah, hadits, fiqih, tasawuf dan tarekat, masalah-masalah khilafiyah, tarbiyah, ilmu pengetahuan, ekonomi, paham-paham ideologi, gender, jihad, politik, sistem pemerintahan, dan persoalan Khilafah.

“Bir Dönüşümün Eşiğinde Değiliz”,
Mecra’ya mülakat,
röp.: Taha Kılınç,
02 Haziran 2018,
<https://www.gzt.com/mecra/bir-donusumun-esiginde-degiliz-3388665>

İslâm dünyasını yakından takip eden Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ali Büyükkara’yla Müslümanların ahvalini, bugünü ve geleceğe dair perspektifleri konuştuk. Şehir Üniversitesi’nde görev yapan Prof. Dr. Büyükkara, “Çağdaş İslâmi Akımlar” adlı son kitabında İslâm dünyasının siyasi-fikrî panoramasını da ortaya koymuş bir isim aynı zamanda. Prof. Dr. Büyükkara’ya göre, herkesin hayalini kurduğu o “büyük dönüşüm süreci”nin henüz uzağındayız; kadere de pay bırakarak, sabırla çalışmaya devam etmek en doğru strateji.

When observing the Algerian Islamic movement during the last two decades, one is stunned by the transformations in the initial projects of this movement. At the beginning the main concern was the return to traditional forms in order to reorganize Algerian society, but the result was very different. This movement managed to assimilate the very modern system of organizing societies that is the democratic system. This movement is structured into legal parties and participates regularly in democratic elections, and forms coalitions with national parties Those political parties, whose programs advocated Islam as a solution, are now the defenders of secular solutions to political and economical problems, far from the idealistic project they first held.

Apriori attitude of Muslims toward democracy departs from the fundamental difference between the concept of a secular democracy (West) to the concept of political Islam that is on view on the holder of sovereignty. The concept of a secular democracy give sovereignty to the people, namely the sovereignty that is in the hands of the people because the voice of the people is the voice of the Lord, in terms of legal decisions are in the hands and the will of the people. This means the whole thing in a democracy is derived from (and is aimed at) and not from man to God Almighty. While the concept of Islamic sovereignty is entirely in the hands of God, and that the voice of the Lord should be the voice of the people. The implementation is that the law in secular democracy is a mutual agreement memorandum produced by the Constitution, while in Islam the law is given and is the duty of the Constitution to make it possible. The normative basis of every Muslim believes, that "sovereignty is the property of God", but the question is who represent the sovereignty?. In general there is nobody can claim divine authority or clerical disposition. For the Islamic movement that made democracy as a means of rallying cry, to enact a system of democracy does not mean to deny the sovereignty of God to set laws for man. The faithful calling for democracy in no way ever thought like that, because the fact that became the main target of the implementation of this system is the backlash against the ruling dictatorship, renunciation of power of the regime and the status quo of an arbitrary tyrant. Along with the number of studies about the relationship between the synthesis of Islam and democracy, the issue has now started shifting no longer concerns the compatibility of Islam with democracy, but rather how democracy can be built-in in the tradition of the Muslims, both in paradigmatic causal agent, of ethics, or epistemological. Because today only democracy that serve arena for Islamic political cause can be fought, so Islamic interests in the broad sense (social, economic, cultural and political) would be protected.