Georgia State University

Forthcoming Chapter in "Neurointerventions and the Law" with Oxford University Press ed. Nicole Vincent.
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Abstract: Current legal arguments for gay rights use gay primarily to refer to individuals that have same-sex erotic desires. However, as this chapter argues using a thought experiment based on a neurointervention that would alter the orientation of one’s erotic desires, the term gay should be understood in a broader sense to include a more diverse group of individuals, including some individuals that do not have same-sex erotic desires. For this reason, the current restrictive use of the term gay presumed in legal discourse doesn’t capture the entire gay community that we should want to extend rights to. To rectify this problem with the way that arguments for gay rights are being framed, this chapter suggests that we expand the use of the term gay in legal discourse to encompass a more heterogeneous population than the one picked out by same-sex-attracted individuals, and it explains some of the advantages of doing so.

Good corporate governance is an important step in building market confidence and encouraging more stable, long-term international investment flows. Many countries see better corporate governance practices as a way to improve economic dynamism and thus enhance overall economic performance. This paper sets out to further develop our understanding of corporate governance and its effects on corporate performance and economic performance. In doing so, it addresses some of the underlying factors that promote efficient corporate governance, and examines some of the economic implications associated with various corporate governance systems. I provide an framework for understanding how corporate governance can affect corporate performance. In the wake of a literature survey, I find that corporate governance matters for economic performance, insider ownership matters the most, outside ownership concentration destroys market value, direct ownership being superior to indirect.

We study the relationship between corporate governance and company performance. We consider five measures of corporate governance during the period 1998-2007. Given the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) during 2002, we separate the sample into pre-2002 and post-2002 periods to study how governance-performance relationships might have been impacted by this regulation.

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature: First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers,

Good corporate governance is an important step in building market confidence and encouraging more stable, long-term international investment flows. Many countries see better corporate governance practices as a way to improve economic dynamism and thus enhance overall economic performance. This paper sets out to further develop our understanding of corporate governance and its effects on corporate performance and economic performance. In doing so, it addresses some of the underlying factors that promote efficient corporate governance, and examines some of the economic implications associated with various corporate governance systems. I provide an framework for understanding how corporate governance can affect corporate performance. In the wake of a literature survey, I find that corporate governance matters for economic performance, insider ownership matters the most, outside ownership concentration destroys market value, direct ownership being superior to indirect.

We investigate whether accounting discretion is (i) abused by opportunistic managers who exploit lax governance structures, or (ii) used by managers in a manner consistent with efficient contracting and shareholder value-maximization. Prior research documents an association between accounting discretion and poor governance quality and concludes that such evidence is consistent with abuse of the latitude allowed by accounting rules. We argue that this interpretation may be premature because, if such association is indeed evidence of opportunism, we ought to observe subsequent poor performance, ceteris paribus.

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature: First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107-155.] and , What matters in corporate governance?, Working paper, Harvard Law School] indices, stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance. Second, contrary to claims in GIM and BCF, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. In several instances inferences regarding the (stock market) performance and governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance and (stock market) performance. Third, given poor firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, and board independence. However, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature: First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers,

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature: First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers,

Available online 4 April 2008 How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature: First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107–155.] and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell [Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., and Ferrell, A., 2004, What matters in corporate governance?, Working paper, Harvard Law School] indices, stock ownership of boardmembers, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance. Second, contrary to claims in...

Good corporate governance plays a crucial role in obtaining market confidence in supporting and facilitating the long-term international investment. Governments of many countries believe that the existence of best practices of corporate governance is a way to boost the economy and thus improve the performance of the national economy. In this article we intend to increase the understanding regarding corporate governance and the effects that good corporate governance has on company performance and on economic performance in general. In this paper we investigated which factors determine effective corporate governance. Also, we tried to provide a framework for understanding how a good or a bad corporate governance can affect corporate performance. After a literature review, we find that corporate governance matters for economic performance, insider ownership matters the most, outside ownership concentration destroys market value, direct ownership being superior to indirect.

My discourse argues for fluidity in defining ‘emerging’ as applied to markets or regions in international business. While the accepted definition focuses on nation-states, culture and/or geography, I hypothesize that practitioners should be conscious of the fluid boundary conditions that define emergence.

Researchers and practitioners all have stories to tell. With an expertise in our modern history, I want to share with you some stories from China and Ukraine that harness my twenty years of research and practice in the international sphere. Through them I hope to invigorate our conversation to better understand the protean nature of our notion of ‘emerging.’ Relying on our shared knowledge and experiences, we will explore how to cultivate “a stronger ethical awareness” as we face the emergence of state-owned and private companies from emerging markets [Loch, K., Spring 2016 EDB 9040 Syllabus, 2].

Ownership structure is considered to be of prime importance in corporate governance of a firm. The ownership structure significantly varies across the nations. The main focus of this chapter is twofold: firstly to see the impact of ownership structure on performance of the firm and secondly to investigate the relationship between stock market performance and ownership structure during the crisis period. Panel data analysis of CNX 200 companies has been done for the time period of 2006-2013.The study also takes into account the relationship between crisis period stock return and ownership structure. The results of this study reveal a positive relationship of promoter's shareholding with performance while a negative relationship of performance is found with the non-promoters shareholding. The regression of stock price performance on ownership variable gives a significant negative relationship during the crisis period.

Ownership structure is considered to be of prime importance in corporate governance of a firm. The ownership structure significantly varies across the nations. The main focus of this chapter is twofold: firstly to see the impact of ownership structure on performance of the firm and secondly to investigate the relationship between stock market performance and ownership structure during the crisis period. Panel data analysis of CNX 200 companies has been done for the time period of 2006-2013.The study also takes into account the relationship between crisis period stock return and ownership structure. The results of this study reveal a positive relationship of promoter's shareholding with performance while a negative relationship of performance is found with the non-promoters shareholding. The regression of stock price performance on ownership variable gives a significant negative relationship during the crisis period.

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature: First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers,

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature: First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM, 2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF, 2004) indices, stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance. Second, contrary to claims in GIM and BCF, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. In several instances inferences regarding the (stock market) performance and governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance and (stock market) performance. Third, given poor firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, and board independence. However, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance. The above results highlight the strategic importance of board incentives. Our recommendations on board incentives are consistent with the implications of Hermalin and Weisbach (2007).

Key points The 2017 Sci‐Hub judgement has, to date, proven unenforceable, and it appears that enforcing the 2019 OMICS judgement will similarly prove challenging. Business developments and changing expectations over sharing digital content may also undermine the impact of the ongoing cases against ResearchGate and Georgia State University. Stakeholders should consider these limitations when deciding how to resolve scholarly publishing disputes.

A large literature is concerned with analysis and empirical application of theories of decision making for environments with risky outcomes. Expected value theory has been known for centuries to be subject to critique by St. Petersburg paradox arguments. More recently, theories of risk aversion have been critiqued with calibration arguments applied to concave payoff transformations. This paper extends the calibration