Alexander Pfänder

In recent debates on empathy in various disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, psychopathology, cognitive sciences, neurophysiology, the discussion has focused on empathic experiences within the intersubjective context, either between two individuals or among groups. But this is only one side of the coin. Since ancient times, subject-object and even object-object relationships were described in a way that cultural anthropology has defined as “animation”, that rhetorics has named “personification”, and that we would today call “empathic”. The chapter aims at exploring these objectual implications of empathy. Pinotti particularly criticizes the projective “hydraulic” model of communicating vessels–from subject to object–which builds the hermeneutical mainstream paradigm of any theorization of such relationships. With recourse to alternative theoretical perspectives, such as Gestalt theory of expression, “realistic” phenomenology, and theory of symbolic forms, the author proposes a newfound characterological approach that engages with acknowledging the originary expressive and pathemic character of things in themselves, and therefore in defending the fundamentum in re of objectual empathy.

The present chapter aims at reconstructing Else Voiltänder's philosophical relationship with one of her teachers, Alexander Pfänder, and to another female student of him, Gerda Walther. Focusing on the phenomenology of sentiments, the author attempts to show the following claims. Voigtländer follows Pfänder in a considerably precise manner when she gives a general account of sentiments. However, in her analysis of particular sorts of sentiments, love and benevolence, Voigtländer proposes a view that is not found in her teacher. This idea is novel and significant because it calls for certain revisions or refinements of Pfänder's and Walther's ideas, respectively.

La volontà e la motivazione sono argomenti basici della filosofia  dell'azione, dell'ètica, della psicologia e dell'antropologia filosofica. Qui
s'intende presentare e discutere la rilevanza di Motivi e Motivazione di
Alexander Pfänder che dà un nuovo orientamento di analisi nel XX secolo partendo di un approccio fenomenologico della volontà. Pfänder identifica una classe di fenomeni della coscienza che sono quelli dell'inclinazione dell'io verso gli oggetti e manifesta metaforicamente i "movimenti" che si realizzano in questa relazione dell'io con l'oggetto dell'inclinazione (o di inclinazione negativa). Pfänder distingue il carattere cieco delle inclinazioni in generale dal carattere consapevole della volontà, poiché questa, come atto spirituale, si caratterizza dalla verifica dello stesso atto e possiede la consapevolezza di un progetto realizzabile e ad essere realizzato da un'azione propria. In questo senso l'atto di volontà motivato si distingue essenzialmente dell'inclinazione perché in ciò l'io ascolta internamente o spiritualmente una richiesta pratica che l'oggetto li propone, la riconosce, l'approva
cognoscitivamente e, infine, riconosce praticamente una condotta che si propone a realizzare in modo che ciò su cui si fondamenta l'atto di volontà è denominato motivo. La relazione di motivazione, infatti, sorge come critica al modello causalista perché codesto sarebbe insufficiente nel chiarimento e comprensione del senso delle azioni volontarie e libere della persona. La concezione di motivo influirà la fenomenologia di Husserl e di Stein, essendo potenziato da questi pensatori, ben come avrà impatto sull'ermeneutica fenomenologica.

Introduction If Johannes Daubert has been rightly nicknamed «the unknown phenomenologist» because, in spite of the influence he exerted upon several generations of Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists, he never published a «single line» and therefore could not be granted the honors he deserved, Maximilian Beck should be properly labeled «the forgotten phenomenologist».

In her „Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften“ (1923), Gerda Walther sets out to analyze the ontological, not the phenomenological nature of community. In other words, her method does not begin from the question of how a community appears in consciousness, but what constitutes the real being of communities. In approaching this historically under-appreciated text, I specifically focus on what sets Walther’s account of sociality apart from Husserl’s, which is the notion of a psychological, rather than transcendental or phenomenological “I”.
In this talk, I firstly present Walther’s approach to sociality, with her description of the embeddedness of immediate experience in the social feelings that have become part of the self as the focal point. Secondly, to gain a better sense of Walther’s historical place at the intersection of phenomenology, psychology and sociology I briefly sketch how her account differs from that of Husserl and how it is indebted to, but goes beyond the psychology of emotions of her Munich teacher Alexander Pfänder, specifically as laid out in his “Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen” (1913/16). Thirdly, I shortly reflect on Walther's relevance in Social Ontology.

Talk held at the 1st New Voices Conference - Women in the History of Philosophy on February 25th 2022.

From his philosophical beginnings Husserl was a careful, but critical reader of Hume’s work. His discussions of Hume form part of a wider appreciation of Hume in the German speaking world at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th Century. It is therefore unsurprising that the first work of Husserl’s philosophical breakthrough, the Logical Investigations, accommodates a number of Humean themes. Hume’s description of the self as a bundle of perceptions is one of them. But why did Husserl turn away from his original "Humean" view of the consciousness without the immanent self after the publication of the Logical Investigations? And how does his original concept of the ego-less consciousness compare to the early views of his teacher Franz Brentano, which formed the initial background of Husserl's descriptive psychology?

Pareciera que la mayor parte de los estudiosos de Pfänder (incluido el propio Husserl) se han centrado más en Motivos y motivación que en Fenomenología de la voluntad en la medida en que en esa obra se encuentra una clara delimitación de la esfera de los actos voluntarios frente a otro tipo de actos tendenciales como, por ejemplo, el desear. Sin embargo, la cuestión que este trabajo pretende plantear es, por un lado, una cuestión más general y, por otro lado, una cuestión más específica a la que, me parece, no se ha ofrecido suficiente atención. Me refiero a la cuestión de si aquello que hace de una tendencia una tendencia -y, por tanto, entre ellas al querer-es un elemento de naturaleza sentimental o no. Si se tratara de un elemento de naturaleza sentimental, entonces podría pensarse que toda tendencia no es sino un agregado de una vivencia representativa y un sentimiento. Emulando la terminología husserliana, podríamos decir que el "carácter de tendencia" de una vivencia tendencial sería, pues, de naturaleza sentimental. Si no fuera así, entonces las vivencias tendenciales serían un tipo propio de vivencias, diferentes de las representativas y de las sentimentales. Esta es, a mi juicio, una cuestión temática sumamente interesante. La reconstrucción de estas dos posiciones, defendidas por Pfänder respectivamente en Fenomenología de la voluntad e Introducción a la psicología puede arrojar alguna luz al esclarecimiento de una difícil pregunta, a saber, la referida a la relación existente entre intencionalidad afectiva e intencionalidad volitiva.

This book is the first to offer a full account of the philosophical work of Else Voigtländer. Locating the sources of her thought in the philosophy and psychology of the 19th and 20th centuries in figures such as Nietzsche and Lipps, the book uncovers and examines Voigtländer’s intellectual exchanges with both phenomenology and psychoanalysis. The major themes within her work are also considered in light of more recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, self, and sociality.

In Sein und Zeit und in anderen Werken hat M. Heidegger die Behauptung aufgestellt, daß Wahrheit keinen Bestand habe, bevor der Mensch Sein entdecke, bzw. unabhängig vom "Entdeckendsein des Daseins (= Menschen)". So hätte es z. B. die Wahrheit der Newton'schen Gesetze erst seit und durch Newton gegeben. ln konsequenter Weise behauptet Heidegger dann auch, daß der Selbstmörder mit seinem Dasein auch die Wahrheit auslösche. 1 Die Auffassung, daß Wahrheit in dem Sinne nur durch den menschlichen Geist bestehe, daß sie nur dank menschlichen Denkens dasei, ist weder auf Heideggers Kritik der Fassung der Wahrheit als Übereinstimmung (adaequatio) mit der Wirklichkeit, noch auf seine gesamte, m. E. im Subjektivismus des deutschen Idealismus tief verhaftete Position beschränkt. Vielmehr bietet sich diese Meinung als die scheinbar einzig natürliche jedem Philosophen dar, der nicht an übermenschliche Geister und Götter glaubt oder dieselben auch nur aus seiner Philosophie ausschalten möchte. Kein Materialist und Atheist, der etwa mit den Marxisten annimmt, daß es nur Materie und ihre Wirkungen und daß es jenseits der Geschichte 1 . Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (10. Auflage), (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1963), Paragraph 44c, S. 226 ff. Siehe besonders: "Alle Wahrheit ist gemäß deren wesenhafter daseinsmäßiger Seinsart relativ auf das Sein des Daseins. Ein Skeptiker kann nicht widerlegt werden, so wenig wie das Sein der Wahrheit 'bewiesen' werden kann. Der Skeptiker, wenn er faktisch ist, in der Weise der Negation der Wahrheit, braucht auch nicht widerlegt zu werden. Sofern er ist und sich in diesem Sein verstanden hat, hat er in der Verzweiflung des Selbstmords das Dasein und damit die Wahrheit ausgelöscht." (S. 227; 229) und eines an ökonomische und andere materielle Faktoren gebundenen menschlichen Denkens keine geistigen Vollzüge gebe, kann, so scheint es, konsequenterweise eine andere Position vertreten. Er wird nicht daran zweifeln, daß Wahrheit geschichtlich entstehe und stets im Prozeß des Entstehens begriffen sei, da es außer dem menschlichen, historischer Entfaltung unterworfenen kein anderes Denken gebe, das Träger der Wahrheit werden könnte.

La «Enciclopedia Virtual del Pensamiento Fenomenológico» es un proyecto orientado a generar investigación científica básica en torno a la fenomenología. Este proyecto tiene por sede la Universidad La Salle-México. El propósito de la «Enciclopedia» es facilitar el acceso a investigadores, profesores, alumnos e interesados en general en el pensamiento fenomenológico, tanto a nivel científico como a nivel histórico. Dado que es «Virtual» permitirá la actualización permanente de las discusiones, bibliografía, conceptos, corrientes y autores que pertenecen a la cultura fenomenológica; de esa manera pretende servir como una herramienta de acceso rápido a los interesados en iniciarse y/o profundizar en esta tradición filosófica. Es por lo anterior que la «Enciclopedia» será una base de datos selectiva cuyo propósito es ayudar a conocer el estado del arte de la disciplina fenomenológica a nivel nacional, iberoamericano e internacional. Todos los contenidos publicados en la «Enciclopedia Virtual del Pensamiento Fenomenológico» deberán ser originales y serán sometidos a un proceso de revisión por pares expertos, nacionales e internacionales, en el área y en los autores sobre los que cada uno de ellos versa. Introducción: Objetivo: Ofrecer una Enciclopedia especializada en fenomenología donde se expongan los conceptos fundamentales, la vida, la obra, la biografía, influencias, obras publicadas y póstumas, publicaciones generales, análisis de las obras del autor y algunas traducciones inéditas relacionadas con el movimiento Cómo participar: La «Enciclopedia» recibirá constantemente las aportaciones enviadas por los aspirantes siempre que se ajusten a las normas de publicación que en esta convocatoria se publican: • El participante debe considerar los siguientes rubros como temas a abordar en la «Enciclopedia»:

Koncis biografisk oversigt over fænomenologen Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966). HCM er ikke nogen pålidelig kilde til Edith Steins konversion og liv. HCM er en skarpsindig filosof, som livet igennem kæmper med megen modgang især lungesvaghed og elendig økonomi. Og hun har svært ved at begå sig blandt mennesker. I 1915 lægger hun sig ud med udgiverne af "Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung". I 1921 bliver hun optaget i "Schobdachervennerne", en yderliggående sekt af karismatisk pinsekirkelig tilsnit. I 1932 og 1936 forhindrer Edmund Husserl bag hendes ryg, at hun får tildelt et scholarship i England.
Det er beundringsværdigt, at hun får gennemført sit filosofiske værk, som det kunne være inspirerende at få taget stilling til også i nutiden.

Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irreducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these phenomenologists was not influenced as much by Husserl as by two important figures in the prehistory of phenomenology: their teacher Theodor Lipps, and – indirectly, through Lipps’ influence – Hermann Lotze. Second, I show that their account of self-consciousness takes the metaphysical realism underlying Lotze’s and Lipps’ views on the distinction between feeling and sensations seriously. I argue that this distinction played a central role in the development of many early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness.

PAPERS

1) Andrea Pinotti (Università degli Studi di Milano).

CUESTIONES DE CARÁCTER, EMPATÍA, EXPRESIÓN, ANALOGÍA.

Traducido del italiano por Miguel Alberti (Universidad Nacional de La Plata) y Eugenio Monjeau (Universidad de Buenos Aires).

Resumen: Desde su primera aparición a fines del siglo XVIII (Herder, Novalis) y, especialmente, durante su Edad de Oro entre fines del siglo XIX y comienzos del siglo XX (Vischer, Lipps), las teorías de la empatía (Einfühlung) interpretaron el viejo tópico de la animación de lo inanimado por medio de un modelo hidráulico: el de los vasos comunicantes. El sujeto humano llena el objeto vacío con sus sentimientos. El indefendible subjetivismo psicologista construido sobre la base de ese modelo fue criticado radicalmente, tanto por los teóricos de la Gestalt como por los fenomenólogos, que rechazaban la noción de proyección emocional y proponían en cambio que cada entidad, sea humana o no humana, tiene una expresividad particular. De todos modos, la noción de empatía no se vio refutada del todo por esas críticas, puesto que no se corresponde exactamente con el modelo hidráulico. En este ensayo intento mostrar que es posible una versión no subjetivista de la Einfühlung, por vía de la referencia a la caracterología analógica desarrollada en el círculo de la escuela de Lipps (Pfänder, Geiger, Klages).

QUESTIONS OF CHARACTER, EMPATHY, EXPRESSION, ANALOGY.

Abstract: Since their first appearance in the late 18th century (Herder, Novalis), and particularly during the golden age between the late 19th and the early 20th century (Vischer, Lipps), the theories of empathy (Einfühlung) have frequently interpreted the ancient issue of the animation of the inanimate on the basis of a hydraulic model of communicating vases: the human subject fills the void object with her/his feelings. The unsustainable psychologistic subjectivism underpinned by such model was radically criticized both by Gestalt theorists and phenomenologists, who rejected the idea of emotional projection and claimed the expressivity peculiar to any entity, both human and non-human. Nevertheless, the notion of empathy is not completely confuted by such criticism, for it does not completely coincide with the hydraulic model. In my paper I will try to show the possibility of a nonsubjectivistic version of the Einfühlung referring to the analogical characterology developed in the circle of Lipps’ school (Pfänder, Geiger, Klages).

2) Jorge Tomás García (Universidad de Murcia).

PLATÓN, ARISTÓTELES Y LA ESCUELA DE PINTURA DE SICIÓN.

Resumen: El establecimiento en Sición de una escuela de pintura en el s. V. a.C., basada en fuertes argumentos y principios matemáticos y científicos, constituye uno de los fenómenos artísticos capitales para la historia de la estética griega. La didáctica de la pintura que se llevó a cabo en Sición, a través de conceptos tales como la χρηστογραφία, supone el mejor ejemplo posible sobre el que se puede articular un discurso revelador de la estética de Platón y Aristóteles. Para el primero, la enseñanza del dibujo y la pintura no formaba parte de su programa mayéutico y educativo. Contra el pasado verismo platónico, el realismo aristotélico muestra la nueva intención de la pintura mediante la imitación de una realidad posible y verosímil.

PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE SICYONIAN SCHOOL OF PAINTING.

Abstract: The establishment in Sicyon of a painting school in s. V. BC, based on strong arguments and mathematical and scientific principles, is one of the artistic phenomena that are essential for the history of Greek aesthetic. The teaching of painting that was carried out at Sicyon, through concepts such as χρηστογραφία, is the best example to reveal the aesthetics of painting in Plato and Aristotle. To Plato, teaching drawing and painting was not part of his program and educational maieutic. A manner contrary to the opinion of Plato, Aristotle shows the new intention of painting by imitating reality possible and plausible.

The majority of Pfänder scholars (including Husserl himself) have focused more on Motives and Motivation than on the Phenomenology of Willing: in the former work there is a clear delimitation of the sphere of voluntary acts as opposed to other acts of striving, such as desiring. The question that I ask in this article is both more general and more specific, and is one which scholars have not paid sufficient attention to. I mean the question of whether what makes a striving into a striving—and thus also a willing—is an element that has the nature of a feeling or not. If it is such an element, one might get the idea that strivings are nothing more than an aggregate of a representative experience and a feeling. Emulating Husserlian terminology, we might say that the "character of striving" of an experience of striving would then have the nature of a feeling. If, however, that is not how things are, then experiences of striving would be a specific type of experience, different from experiences of representation and feeling. In my view, this is a highly interesting question. The reconstruction of these two positions, defended by Pfänder in the Phenomenology of Willing and Introduction to Psychology, respectively, casts light on a difficult question, i.e. that of the relationship between affective intentionality and the intentionality of the will