Hospitality and Toleration

Hospitality and Toleration Andrew Fiala Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Continuum of Toleration and Hospitality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Brute Tolerance, Brute Hospitality, and Moral Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mere Toleration, The Modus Vivendi, and Liberal Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Two Ways to Move from Toleration to Hospitality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Moral Argument Based in Existential Need and Compassion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Political Argument Based in a Cosmopolitan Political Ideal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary and Future Directions: The Task of Practical Wisdom and Enlightenment . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 5 8 12 12 13 17 17 Abstract This chapter describes the continuum between toleration as a negative idea and hospitality as a more positive or affirmative concept. It locates this discussion in historical sources including: ancient Greek, Christian, and early modern thought, including Kant. It further considers contemporary discussions of mere toleration as a modus vivendi, liberal toleration, and sources for thinking about hospitality in cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism. It explains the difference between toleration and hospitality, while noting that those who claim that toleration includes acceptance and positive recognition of difference would do better to use the term hospitality than toleration. The chapter concludes by considering two arguments in favor of hospitality: an existential argument about compassion and a political claim focused on emerging cosmopolitan norms. Keywords Toleration · Tolerance · Hospitality · Liberalism · Modus vivendi · Golden Rule · Cosmopolitanism A. Fiala (*) Department of Philosophy, California State University, Fresno, CA, USA e-mail: afi[email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Sardoĉ (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03227-2_35-1 1 2 A. Fiala Introduction There is a continuum between the negative focus of toleration and the more positive focus of hospitality. Toleration tells us what not to do: it tells us not to oppress, fight against, or censor. Toleration focuses on what can be called negative rights or negative liberty: toleration encourages us not to violate people’s rights or limit their liberty. It establishes a kind of negative peace, to borrow a concept from the literature on peace studies and pacifism, which prevents direct and overt violence or oppression (see Galtung 1964; Boersema 2017). Hospitality is positive: it tells us to welcome, support, and accept. Hospitality can be understood in terms of positive rights or positive liberty. It is part of the project of positive peace (see Fiala 2018). It encourages us to develop an affirmative and proactive kind of social interaction. However, hospitality remains at a distance from even more positive and affirmative values such as friendship, love, and the thick bonds of a homogeneous community. This chapter provides a structural account of the relation between toleration and hospitality. By locating toleration and hospitality on a continuum, it shows their interrelation. Toleration and hospitality, as described here, are primarily connected to social and political structures. But the concepts can also be understood in terms of virtue. We can stipulate a distinction here between structural (political) toleration and tolerance as a virtue. Although our ordinary language does not use these terms with precision, it is useful to use the term toleration to describe a situation or a condition in which tolerating occurs, while using the term tolerance to describe a virtue, disposition, or habit of tolerating. Toleration is something that exists in social relations and systems of political life – when there is disapproval or difference without overt conflict, violence, proscription, condemnation, or prohibition. Toleration often involves restraint on power organized hierarchically – as in the case of the state tolerating dissent. But there can also be a condition of mutual toleration: when each party has the capacity to fight against the other but chooses not to. In distinction from toleration as a political condition, tolerance as a virtue of individuals is a general disposition to be tolerant or a habit of responding tolerantly. This virtue is located among vices that fall on either side of the virtue: there can be too much tolerance (we might call this a lack of self-respect or self-assertion) and there can be too little tolerance (this is what we usually mean by intolerance). This distinction between political toleration and the virtue of tolerance has been made elsewhere (see Murphy 1997; Fiala 2003, 2005; Nys and Engeln 2008), but ordinary usage allows for substantial slippage and overlap between toleration and tolerance. Hospitality can also be understood in terms of the distinction between a condition/situation of hospitality and a virtue/disposition toward hospitableness. Understanding these ideas as virtues helps us see why we might locate them on a continuum. Virtues are interconnected. As Socrates suggested in Protagoras, “virtue is one”: there is (or there ought to be) a unity of the virtues (see Penner 1973). Tolerance, then, is not a stand-alone virtue; nor is hospitality. These virtues are connected with other virtues as well, which are coordinated by practical wisdom. At the social and political level, we ought to seek a similar coherence and integration in linking toleration and hospitality with other social and political values. Hospitality and Toleration 3 Throughout the essay, historical connections between toleration and hospitality will be discussed with reference to authors in the European tradition who developed these ideas as part of a more general view of political philosophy and the good life. In the ancient world, we see this in both Stoic and Christian sources. In the modern world, the link can be found in authors central to the liberal tradition, especially in the work of Kant, who links what he calls a “cosmopolitan right to hospitality” to a general concept of toleration. The Continuum of Toleration and Hospitality The toleration-hospitality continuum is described here in schematic fashion. This schema inevitably simplifies things. This simplification is useful for understanding the conceptual field. But we must note that this analysis does not suggest that there is a simple developmental schema running through the whole. Nor do these concepts occur discreetly and in separation. Nor are these the only values that matter in social and political life. The reality of life is more complicated than this schema allows. The conceptual foci are abstractions. Actual relationships and identities are more unstable than this representational schema allows. There are complex intersectional considerations that disrupt any simple representation of social and political life. And yet, we can gain clarity by considering such an abstract representational schema that looks like this. Primary conceptual framework Common values Political framework Moral framework Mere toleration Modus vivendi Liberal toleration Negative rights Enmity remains Shared political values Liberalism Minimal social contract Prudential self-interest Human rights Hospitality Positive rights Community Friendship and love Shared social values Shared moral values Inclusive multiculturalism Communitarianism Cosmopolitan humanity Shared tradition and ideal of the good life At one end of this continuum, we find “mere toleration.” This can be understood as a practical acceptance of co-existence, which develops as a modus vivendi, which is the primary framework for understanding the concept. Here the parties do not interfere with one another – but without agreeing about fundamental political values, moral norms, or metaphysical postulates. Mere toleration is a condition that can exist between individuals, parties, or peoples who remain enemies but who refrain from fighting based upon self-interest and strategic concerns. In political philosophy, this would be understood in terms of a rudimentary social contract, where the contract 4 A. Fiala develops in Hobbesian fashion from out of a state of war but only advances to the level of a very minimal agreement (a truce or a stalemate) aimed at avoiding war. Beyond mere toleration is “liberal toleration.” The primary conceptual focus of liberal toleration is the idea of negative rights. At this stage of the continuum, there is agreement in principle about basic values that establish the right to be tolerated. This basic political agreement includes some common understanding of liberty rights or rights that prevent interference. This agreement can be achieved through something like what Rawls describes as overlapping consensus or it can rest upon an even deeper common understanding of human nature, political normativity, or moral value. These shared moral values are understood in terms of something like basic/ universal human rights. With liberal toleration, enmity is overcome through some appeal to shared public and political values. But the liberal social relation remains thin: the parties share a common set of negative political values but are not engaged in a more affirmative process of recognizing difference and accepting the other; and in the private sphere there remain substantial differences of value about what Rawls calls comprehensive schemes. Beyond liberal toleration, we find “hospitality,” which is thicker – moving from negative rights to something like positive duties. Hospitality is based upon some common agreement about more positive norms of interaction: an agreement between hosts and guests. This idea of hospitable social relations has a cosmopolitan focus insofar as it establishes an ethical relation for welcoming strangers – even those who are not a party to the original social contract or members of the polity community. But hospitality is not only for the radical other who comes from a distant land, it is also a shared social act that cements local relationships among those who are different. The function of hospitality is to broaden social solidarity among those who exist within a social setting and, in the cosmopolitan version of hospitality, with strangers and new arrivals. The limit of cosmopolitan or multicultural hospitality is that since it is understood as establishing social relations among parties who remain strangers, this relation falls short of genuine friendship. In political philosophy, hospitality might be understood in relation to what I call here “inclusive multiculturalism,” which aims to welcome diversity in a positive and affirmative way but without requiring the homogeneity of a community of friends – say by setting up institutions in ways that provide for differential group rights and other ways that seek to include and affirm differences. Beyond hospitality and the multicultural/cosmopolitan social and political relation, we find “community,” which brings people together under a shared set of moral values and a common vision of the good life. This is what so-called communitarian philosophies aim at: a community of like-minded people who agree about morality and politics and who share a common tradition that gives meaning and purpose to life. This is an ideal of friendship and love, something like what Martin Luther King, Jr. called “the beloved community.” This is an ideal of deep and thick interconnection, which we will not discuss much here, except to point out that this ideal seems unattainable in a world of strangers that emphasizes liberty and negative rights. Hospitality and Toleration 5 Brute Tolerance, Brute Hospitality, and Moral Choice With this schematic continuum in place, let’s consider the conceptual field in more detail. We began by noting that toleration is negative. It is about what we ought not do when we do not like something. To tolerate is to put up with something we find unpleasant or disapprove of. While toleration is sometimes thought of as a simple capacity to endure, toleration as a political concept and in virtue ethics includes a stipulation about the capacity of an agent to reject, condemn, prohibit, destroy, or avoid the thing tolerated (as we shall see in a moment). But in a very simple sense, toleration is a physical capacity – something like fortitude, understood as the strength to withstand and survive. In this sense, which we might call brute tolerance, we say that people tolerate pain. This was the sense in which the Latin term tolerantia was first employed by Cicero and Seneca (see Forst 2013). In Letter 66, for example, Seneca connects tolerantia with other virtues, providing a list of Stoic virtues (Seneca 1917–1925): tranquillity, simplicity, generosity, constancy, equanimity, endurance (tranquillitas, simplicitas, liberalitas, constantia, aequanimitas, tolerantia). In this standard English translation (by Gummere), tolerantia is translated as endurance. This sort of endurance can be called brute tolerance because it is something that animals can do: they can exhibit fortitude and suffer bravely. Brute tolerance has more to do with physical capacity than with moral choice: some people are born with a capacity to endure pain, a capacity for physical strength and psychological fortitude, which can be developed with training. But brute tolerance is not yet tolerance as a moral virtue and political value. It is only when endurance is a matter of choice involving moral agency that toleration gains moral worth and political value. In the present essay, we are only concerned with the virtue of tolerance as directed toward others: tolerance not as a strength of inner fortitude but tolerance in social relations. And in the political sense, brute tolerance is of little value, except perhaps as the capacity of a group or polity to endure crises, wars, and disruptions. In the ancient world, a source for understanding the virtue of tolerance as oriented toward others can be found in Aristotle and in the later Stoics. Aristotle appears to have something like this in mind in Nicomachean Ethics, where he describes the virtue of agreeing and disagreeing in appropriate ways and in relation to qualities such as friendship and gentleness (Aristotle 1934, Book IV; see Avramenko and Promisel 2018). As is well-known, Aristotelian virtues are associated with vices of excess and deficiency. The vices associated with tolerance are, on the one hand, bitterness, harsh-temperedness quarrelsomeness, and intolerance, and on the other hand, obsequiousness, flattery, and conformism. While tolerance is not a primary virtue for Aristotle, it comes to be more important in the later Stoics. Marcus Aurelius, for example, provides an account of a moral form of tolerance that is especially poignant given his role as emperor (and that remains somewhat puzzling given his role in oppressing Christians and making war). Perhaps Marcus only has in mind a kind of tolerance among citizens and within the social sphere of the ruling class. At any rate, Marcus says, “Remember that all rational beings are created for one another; that toleration (anexesthai) is a part of justice; and that men are not intentional evildoers” (Aurelius 1969, 4.3). Although Marcus shares 6 A. Fiala the Stoic sense of the importance of developing the inner strength to bear and forbear (anexesthai kai apexesthai) pain and suffering, he also clearly links toleration to the need to endure and put up with the misdeeds of other people (see Aurelis 1969, 5.33). It is in this social sense that the complexity of toleration as a political value begins to unfold, including the so-called paradox of toleration, which we will describe below. Social or moral toleration must be freely chosen – and it is directed toward something we would otherwise not choose to affirm. Three conditions must be present to say that some thing or some person is being tolerated in this more complicated moral and political sense. 1. There must be a judgment of disapproval of the thing in question. 2. The person or institution that tolerates must have the capacity to act upon their disapproval. 3. The tolerating person or institution must choose to refrain from acting upon that disapproval. This means that it does not make much sense to say that powerless people or cowards are tolerant. An abused child does not tolerate her abusive parents: she has no choice but to submit to their abuse. But a loving parent may tolerate the misbehavior of a child: the parents could punish but choose not to. In the same way, it makes little sense to say that oppressed groups tolerate their oppression: they may have the brute fortitude to endure but they have no choice in the matter or capacity for resistance. In this regard, toleration is what those with the capacity for choice – and the power to act – do towards others, including those who lack that capacity. Toleration is in this sense hierarchical. The paradigm examples is what we mean when we say that the state tolerates dissent: the state has the power to quash dissent but it chooses not to exercise that power. This is what gives toleration a somewhat paradoxical appearance – called by some “the paradox of toleration” – and which is connected to the problem of whether we ought to tolerate the intolerant and in general why we should tolerate things we condemn (See: Williams 1996; Heyd 1996; Fiala 2005; Churchill 2007; Nys and Engeln 2008; Churchill 2015). One general response to this set of problems reminds us that there are a variety of values connected to toleration including the pragmatic desire to avoid violence, practical interest in positive relationship, general respect for liberty, or other sorts of affirmations of values such as of peace, kindness, civility, and so on. Hospitality can also be subjected to the kinds of distinctions and clarifications made above. Hospitality is a positive idea that creates duties of various sorts. Hospitality does not primarily tell us what we should not do (although it does tell us not to be inhospitable); rather, it tells us what we ought to do. To be hospitable is to welcome, include, and reach out to others. Hospitality is oriented toward a positive, active, and supportive set of attitudes, institutions, and behaviors. Hospitableness can be understood in nonmoral ways – as a kind of brute hospitality (to parallel our discussion of brute tolerance above). An ecosystem can be called hospitable, for example, when it is able to support life (we say, for example, that a Hospitality and Toleration 7 desert is inhospitable). There is a kind of passivity in such a description (of what we might call for symmetry’s sake, brute hospitality): an ecosystem does not do anything to support life. But hospitality in the human realm is active and engaging. Symbols of hospitality include reaching out to shake a hand, bowing to honor and receive another, opening a door, setting a place at the table, passing a plate of food, and so on. As an activity of moral agency, hospitality as a moral or political value also involves freedom and choice in the same sense that toleration does. It would not make sense to say that a conquered people are genuinely hospitable, when they have no choice in the matter. But with hospitality, the choice is not negative (as it is with toleration, which chooses not to act on a negative judgment). Rather, the choice of hospitality is positive: to reach out, to offer, to give, to support, to welcome, and to include. Hospitality can be understood in either a political or a moral (or virtue) sense. On the one hand, hospitality is used to describe a condition, structure, or institutional practice. A state, an institution (such as a school), or a person can show hospitality by helping to establish a condition in which people feel welcomed and included. Hotels and restaurants are said to be in the hospitality business, for example. On the other, hospitable names a virtue or a disposition (what we might call hospitableness). Hospitable people tend to be welcoming and inclusive. They choose to be this way; they think that it is good to be so; and they work to develop the habit of hospitality. The idea of hospitality as a moral and political value is found in many places in and in many traditions. A frequently cited source is the Old Testament book of Exodus. For example (Exodus 23:9): “You shall not oppress a stranger; you know the heart of a stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” The New Testament builds upon this and the command to love your neighbor as yourself to develop an ethic that includes the need to welcome strangers, care for the sick, feed the hungry, and so on. The parable of the Good Samaritan provides an exemplar (Luke chapter 10): the Samaritan goes out of his way to help a stranger who is injured on the Jericho road, healing his wounds and providing for his care (see discussion in Fiala 2016). The opposite of hospitality is hostility or enmity. It is worth noting that hospitality and hostility share a common root in the related Latin words hostis and hospis – which can mean host, guest, and enemy. Hospitality involves being a good host/ guest while hostility occurs when the host-guest relation is broken (see Sheringham and Daruwalla 2007; Derrida 2001; Friese 2009; Shepherd 2014). The complexity of the relationship between guest-host-enemy is of fundamental importance to ethics and to political philosophy. Derrida once said that “ethics is hospitality: ethics is thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality” (Derrida 2001, p. 17). There is substantial complexity behind this claim. But we might simplify this by suggesting that if ethics is about our relationship with “the other,” then hospitality ought to be a guiding value. Or to simplify even further, we might say that the Golden Rule, which demands that we love others as ourselves, is fundamentally about hospitality. The Golden Rule does not merely demand that we leave each other alone. Rather, it demands that we actively work to support our neighbors. 8 A. Fiala Mere Toleration, The Modus Vivendi, and Liberal Toleration Of course, this mention of the Golden Rule opens the question of who exactly counts as a neighbor. Hospitality and toleration have been extended in various ways to different groups of people in various relationships. Some people are hospitable to coreligionists, for example, while being intolerant of nonbelievers. This shows us that the concepts in question can be mixed in various ways in actual regimes. Repressive political regimes are generally both intolerant and inhospitable. But a regime can provide for legal toleration while still being inhospitable. Other regimes provide for official toleration, while also seeking to create conditions that are welcoming and inclusive. A person can be tolerant – in the sense that the person does not actively condemn others – but also inhospitable – insofar as the person does not actively welcome others. Ideally, a virtuous person would be both tolerant and hospitable. This way of describing a range of possible combinations of these values helps us begin to understand the difference between “mere toleration” and something more inclusive. Mere toleration in the political realm is simply leaving each other alone. There are a variety of reasons to leave one another alone, often including merely pragmatic or strategic consideration. Mere toleration need not even affirm liberty, as a basic and shared value which permits everyone including the minority to have basic rights, such as freedom of speech, conscience, and assembly. Toleration that affirms liberty is a central consideration of liberal democratic theory. Following John Rawls, we might stipulate that liberty is (or ought to be) a primary and shared value, arrived at through a kind of overlapping consensus (Rawls 1971). But even Rawls recognizes that there will be problems for this ideal, acknowledging that a merely pragmatic modus vivendi is different from overlapping consensus (Rawls 2005). Rawls thinks that a mere modus vivendi is unstable, since it depends upon a balance of forces that can shift; but he holds out the hope that a pragmatic modus vivendi may develop over time into an overlapping consensus. Indeed, Rawls suggests in places (Rawls 1987, 2005) that there may even be a back and forth movement between a mere modus vivendi and a more stable overlapping consensus. For example, in examining the historical development of the idea of toleration, Rawls asks, “how might it happen that over generations the initial acquiescence in a liberal conception of justice as a modus vivendi develops into a stable and enduring overlapping consensus?” (Rawls 1987, p. 18). His explanation is that our actual commitment to comprehensive doctrines is “loose” and subject to “slippage.” And over time, there is the possibility of development from modus vivendi to a more comprehensive liberal concept: “The conjecture, then, is that as citizens come to appreciate what a liberal conception does, they acquire an allegiance to it, an allegiance that becomes stronger over time” (Rawls 1987, p. 21). There is a sort of developmental narrative in Rawls’s theory, which might be rejected by critics who fail to see how or why we might develop beyond the kind of radical difference and residual enmity of the modus vivendi. While Rawls seeks something deeper than a merely pragmatic modus vivendi, scholars such as John Horton have suggested that this may be the best we can get in a world of division and difference. Horton describes his approach as a realist critique of liberal moralism. Hospitality and Toleration 9 His approach is grounded in self-interest and prudential concerns, and Horton admits that the modus vivendi is not a panacea for social conflict and that it will remain unstable (Horton 2010, 2011; see Jones 2017). Nonetheless Horton thinks the idea more accurately describes political reality. He says, “At the heart of the idea of a modus vivendi is the thought that the parties find the political order one that they are on the whole willing to work within, one that they are at least willing to put up with” (Horton 2019, p. 11). The point is that the parties can agree to get along, even if they do not agree about anything else. Horton notes that these parties will also likely disagree with the idea of value-pluralism (which we find in both liberalism and in inclusive multiculturalism): they can agree to disagree even if they think that they are right and that the other party is wrong and should properly either be converted or destroyed. That situation is basically one of mere toleration: we choose to leave alone that with which we disagree – and which we could continue to struggle against. In other words, enmity can remain even though parties grudgingly agree to tolerate one another. In such a situation, we are fairly far away from the idea of hospitality, which focuses on welcoming strangers who are not considered enemies. While Horton has suggested that toleration can be established under a modus vivendi, Newey has pointed out that this seems problematic. Newey emphasizes the negative judgment and capacity for negation as part of toleration, noting that if there is a mere modus vivendi, what seems to be lacking is the capacity for negation: the parties would like to eliminate one another but lack to the capacity to do so. As Newey explains, “If modus vivendi simply amounts to a stalemate between two sets of people, each of whom would rather they were able to impose their will on the other, it is hard to square with toleration. Each would prefer to enforce a monoculture on the other, and given this stance, neither seems to count as tolerant” (Newey 2017, p. 426). Horton has explained further that, despite this objection, a fairly robust sort of toleration can develop from out of a modus vivendi (Horton 2019). There are a variety of pragmatic reasons that divergent people would seek a tolerant modus vivendi. Horton explains, “there are myriad pragmatic reasons for seeking a modus vivendi, some of which will be rooted in the costs of repression and others in the benefits of a more congenial and constructive relationship than one based on simple domination. But there are also likely to be moral reasons” (Horton 2019, p. 9). The point is that there is no one prevailing reason which the parties need to agree to. Horton concludes, “The actual motivational resources available to support a modus vivendi in any given context will always be contingent and circumstantial” (Horton 2019, p. 10). There is more to be said about this fascinating and ongoing debate regarding liberal theory. If Horton is correct and a merely pragmatic modus vivendi is the best we can hope for, we have what I have called mere toleration: a grudging, realistic, or prudential recognition that toleration is useful for allowing for peaceful co-existence among persons and parties who expect not to be able to agree about much. It might be that this grudging acceptance is a result of a stalemate, as Newey suggests. In some actual cases, this is quite obvious: consider, for example, the set of “status quo” rules that govern access to holy sites in Jerusalem. Or it might be that the parties understand their own self-interest as involving something other than the pursuit of 10 A. Fiala intolerant domination. Perhaps they would rather trade with one another than continue to fight – in some version of an economic or capitalist theory of peace (see Fiala 2021). But whatever the reason, the development of mere toleration is to be applauded, at least as an antidote to violence and a source for a temporary kind of stability. Mere toleration is better than intolerance, hatred, and violence. But the begrudging and pragmatic nature of mere toleration helps to explain why mere toleration is often thought to be limited and negative. A merely pragmatic modus vivendi in which we agree to leave each other alone does not provide a source of hope for weaving together a tighter social fabric. This point is found in the first structural element of toleration that I mentioned at the outset: the negative judgment that leads to the choice of toleration. Mere toleration in a pragmatic modus vivendi begins with a negative judgment: we tolerate those things we do not approve of. Toleration occurs when we refrain from negating that thing. We allow it to exist. Newey points out that one of the reasons we allow the other to exist may be because of a stalemate or power dynamic. But this implies that if the power dynamic shifts, violent repression, and intolerance may reappear. And this way of describing things depends upon a remaining negative judgment. Thus, those who are merely tolerated will still feel the presence of a negative judgment and they may also feel the threat of potential violence, repression, and intolerance. One way of describing this is to point out that mere toleration falls short of fullfledged recognition (see Oberdieck 2001; Galeotti 2002; Fiala 2005, 2013). Groups or individuals who are merely tolerated may thus continue to feel rejected, despised, or threatened. They will feel unwelcomed and unaccepted. What is often desired is something more than mere toleration that moves toward recognition, acceptance, and inclusion as full members of a polity. This is where liberal toleration comes in and beyond that hospitality. Liberal toleration rests upon an agreement about basic rights of respect and recognition. It allows for inclusion as citizens and respect for fundamental equality of rights. This agreement develops by way of overlapping consensus in Rawls’s account and where each party shares a commitment to something like public reason. The parties no longer remain enemies. Instead they view each other as human persons with the right to be left alone and the right to pursue their own good in their own way. Liberal toleration represents a move beyond mere toleration. But a liberal polity can consist of individuals and groups who remain at a distance and thus a society that is not inclusive or accepting of difference. It is with the move to hospitality that we see the affirmation of something more positive: of welcoming and accepting the other in a way that goes beyond both mere toleration and liberal toleration. It is important to pause here to point out a terminological dispute that confuses matters. Some accounts of tolerance and toleration define it in a way that does not include a negative judgment. In 1995, the United Nations declared a year of celebration for tolerance, establishing November 16 of subsequent years as the International Day of Tolerance. In the documentation for this, the United Nations explains that tolerance is “respect, acceptance, and appreciation” of diverse cultures and ways of life (United Nations 1995). The UN further states that “tolerance is harmony in difference.” A wide range of popular discussions focus on the idea of Hospitality and Toleration 11 “teaching tolerance,” with the (incorrect) assumption that tolerance is the same as acceptance. And scholarship continues to equivocate between tolerance as mere allowance of difference and a more robust sense of tolerance as acceptance. For example, a 2016 report for the European Union says, “Tolerance, in its broadest sense, can be understood as accepting difference” (Van Driel et al. 2016, p. 18). Toleration and tolerance, as I have described them above do not require affirmation and acceptance: both mere toleration and liberal toleration remain more negative than that. Acceptance of difference is, using my terminology, a matter of hospitality – and is more closely associated with cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism than with liberalism or the minimal social contract of the modus vivendi. One of the issues that creates this terminological problem is a kind of equivocation about what exactly is being accepted. On the one hand, the idea of acceptance might be focused on overcoming any negative judgment toward the other. But on the other hand, perhaps all that we are being asked to accept is difference itself and the tolerant situation in which there is a negative judgment and remaining difference. In the first case, the use of the world tolerance is not appropriate: pure acceptance that overcomes the negative judgment is simply not tolerance as we’ve defined it here. But in the second case, we have something like liberal tolerance: we accept the common idea of liberty and respect for human persons, while allowing for differences to continue to exist. But it is likely that what the United Nations and the European Union have in mind is something more like hospitality and inclusion under a framework of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Given this complexity and difficulty, we can understand why there are those who suggest that toleration is insulting. For those who want full acceptance, tolerance is inadequate because it still contains the negative judgment. This idea can be traced back to Goethe, who said in an oft-quoted aphorism, “Tolerance should only be a temporary attitude. But with time it has to lead to recognition. To tolerate means to insult” (quoted in Weber 2016). Forst has explained that we ought to be more subtle than Goethe allowed. He explains that it is possible to imagine a “non-hierarchial form of mutual toleration that is not an ‘insult’ but represents a specific form of recognition” (Forst 2013, p. 329). The issue, as Forst describes it, is a matter of structural relations. Toleration becomes insulting when there is a status hierarchy or political power differential, toleration is granted to some subordinate or minority group. But if the status hierarchy were changed, the insulting nature of toleration would also change. As Forst points out, the goal might be something like mutual toleration. In this case – in a condition of mutual toleration, we agree to leave each other alone, as equals who prefer to remain at a distance from one another. Again, this may fall short of what is desired in more interconnected social relations, which aim at mutual recognition instead of mutual toleration. Recognition implies that there is some kind of positive respect and affirmative evaluation that goes beyond the negative judgment that is the basis of toleration. 12 A. Fiala Two Ways to Move from Toleration to Hospitality The way to move beyond mere begrudging co-existence is to supplement toleration with hospitality. In the real world, there are a variety of ways that this has been described and put into practice. Programs that emphasize acceptance, intercultural understanding, interfaith collaboration, and school inclusivity programs are ways of supplementing mere toleration. There is a complex cultural and pedagogical story to be told about how such efforts might be organized and whether and why such efforts are successful. But the focus of this paper is conceptual, not empirical. At the conceptual level, the question is what justifies the move beyond toleration, what leads us to go beyond the negative disengagement of toleration toward the positive engagement of hospitality. I mentioned that the call for hospitality has roots in religious traditions: we see it in religious texts, in the idea of the Golden Rule, and in the parable of the Good Samaritan. But given our discussion above, about the kind of radical diversity and remaining enmity that exists in the condition of modus vivendi, it seems obvious that calls for hospitality that are grounded within religious or ethical worldviews (within what Rawls would call comprehensive schemes) will not work to push us beyond a grudging modus vivendi. Perhaps calls for hospitality simply demand more than can be obtained in a world of strangers and enemies. Value pluralism and radical diversity may mean that toleration is the best we can hope for. But I will suggest an argument here that may be used to supplement toleration: a moral argument based in the existential needs of individuals and a political argument that aspires toward a kind of cosmopolitan humanity. These arguments would be rejected by a realist such as Horton; and they may demand more than is supportable by Rawlsian liberal theory which focuses on justification within the common norms of public reason within a polity. Such arguments thus move us beyond mere toleration and beyond Rawlsian liberalism. A Moral Argument Based in Existential Need and Compassion A moral argument for hospitality begins with the basic needs of common humanity, including the common human need to build and establish moral relations with other people. As one anthropological essay explains, “One of the principal functions of any act of hospitality is either (in the case of an existing relationship) to consolidate the recognition that hosts and guest already share the same moral universe or (in the case of a new relationship) to enable the construction of a moral universe to which both host and guest agree to belong” (Selwyn 2000, p. 19). Rituals and practices of hospitality reinforce shared social relations within social groups; they also help to welcome newcomers and build new social relations. This structural/functional analysis can be supplemented by an even more basic argument that is found in the ancient Hebrew texts (cited above) that point out that those who have been strangers will recognize the value of hospitality. Each of us has been a stranger and may be one again. We can imagine ourselves in the place of a stranger, a visitor, and a refugee. In Hospitality and Toleration 13 the parable of the Good Samaritan, this is explained in terms of compassion and the ability to see the need of the other. In Luke 10:33, Jesus explains that the Samaritan had compassion (splagchnizomai – in Latin, misercordia) that is based on seeing (oida from eido) the need of the injured man on the side of the road. Hospitality emerges as a human response to need. Trudy Conway explains this as follows: “hospitality is neither decreed and enforceable by law, nor formally codified in detailed rules of etiquette. The gracious welcoming of the stranger into one’s community is simply the humane response to the social other that makes civil society possible and renders diverse communities more livable” (Conway 2009, p. 5; see Derrida 2000). Conway grounds this in numerous examples of how basic rules of hospitality form the background of social relations in most of the world’s cultures. The basic rule of hospitality is a moral rule for individuals, a customary rule, that is not grounded in law. As I have argued elsewhere, it grows out of a kind of Golden Rule ethic (see Fiala 2016). The basic idea of loving your neighbor as yourself points to the idea of welcoming strangers in need, listening to their stories, and remaining open to their presence and personality. Not only is the host guided by the morality of compassion but the guest is also guided by a similar responsiveness. Hospitality also instructs guests not to be rude and obnoxious. The guest ought to be humble and grateful, just as the host ought to be generous and gracious. The norms of hospitality are either moral, religious, or customary norms found throughout the world’s traditions. As such they demand more than what the mere toleration of the modus vivendi allows and what the domestic liberalism of public reason allows. In the first case, enmity is presumed as a constant problem; in the second case, the liberal polity is understood as focused primarily on negative rights, equality, and procedural justice that is not amenable the project of need satisfaction, care ethics, or compassion. Despite these criticisms, the fact that the moral norm of hospitality tends to be found throughout the world’s traditions points us toward a cosmopolitan extension of the idea of hospitality. A Political Argument Based in a Cosmopolitan Political Ideal Moral hospitality is focused on relations among individuals. But this can be extended in ways that help inform political philosophy, social structures, and the legal system. I have already mentioned that inclusive multiculturalism can be understood in relation to the idea of welcoming strangers. Cosmopolitan political philosophy develops along similar lines. Kwame Anthony Appiah explains his idea of cosmopolitanism, for example, as an ethical and political idea for a “world of strangers.” He focuses our attention on the basic idea of kindness to strangers, which is one of the titles of one of the chapters in his book, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (Appiah 2006). Martha Nussbaum has more recently pointed out that the Stoic/Cynic tradition that gives rise to cosmopolitanism in the ancient world wanted to establish norms of respect for common humanity that extends to the wide world beyond the circles of social relations in which we live. She says of this idea of expanded circles of concern: “in general we should think of nobody as a stranger. . . 14 A. Fiala in the end, human beings have fully equal worth” (Nussbaum 2019, p. 78). This idea developed from its ancient roots in Stoic and Cynic philosophy, with additions from Christianity, toward further development in the idea of the law of peoples as found in the early modern period (see Baker 2013) and on toward discussions of global justice that push beyond liberalism toward the idea of a cosmopolitan redistributive system. This idea of cosmopolitan justice holds that hospitality is not merely a matter of individual charity but also that it is a matter of justice and right. Seyla Benhabib explains this in an essay on Kant’s idea of hospitality in relation to contemporary proponents of global justice: Hospitality is not to be understood as a virtue of sociability, as the kindness and generosity one may show to strangers who come to one’s land or who become dependent upon one’s act of kindness through circumstances of nature or history; hospitality is a right which belongs to all human beings insofar as we view them as potential participants in a world republic (Benhabib 2004b, p. 1783). This idea of hospitality as a right helps make the move beyond domestically oriented liberalism toward cosmopolitanism and the idea of a law of peoples that limits and regulates the behavior of states. We see this in Kant’s political philosophy. Kant’s discussion in Perpetual Peace occurs against the backdrop of European colonialism and in response to the problem of stateless persons and noncitizens. Kant points out that what he has in mind in discussing the right to hospitality is part of a positive argument for peace that goes beyond a mere cessation of hostility. The other two positive conditions for peace are the spread of republican government and the creation of an international federation of peace. Kant also brings in an oblique defense of the need for freedom of speech and a kind of toleration. What he calls a “secret” article of peace is that philosophers ought to be consulted (presumably so that the state can be enlightened about the morality of war). Kant explains that the state might secretly invite philosophers to comment but, “it will allow them to speak freely and publicly on the universal maxims of warfare and peacemaking” (Kant 1991b, p. 115). He continues, “the philosopher should be given a hearing.” And he concludes, “It is not expected that kings will philosophize or that philosophers will become kings. . . Kings or sovereign peoples should not, however, force the class of philosophers to disappear or to remain silent, but should allow them to speak publicly” (Kant 1991b, p. 115). In other words, the public use of reason ought to be encouraged as part of the project of bringing about peace, which is another way of saying that toleration of critical reason is part of the project of creating perpetual peace. Kant made this point again in the essay “What is Enlightenment?” where he called for something more than mere toleration. He explained that an enlightened prince would decline to accept the “presumptuous title of tolerance” (or the arrogant name of tolerance, hochmütigen Namen der Toleranz) (Kant 1991a, p. 58). Kant seems to think that the state ought to seek out enlightenment and consult with experts including philosophers who provide critical insight into the conduct of war, foreign policy, and violations of hospitality that undermine peace. Hospitality and Toleration 15 With toleration in the background as an assumption let us turn to Kant’s account of hospitality. Kant describes the third condition for peace as follows: “cosmopolitan right shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality” (Kant 1991b, p. 105). Kant explains that because the earth is finite, people will find themselves together with other people and must “necessarily tolerate (dulden) one another’s company” (Kant 1991b, p. 106). But hospitality appears to go a step further than a mere strategy of avoidance. Kant further explains, “Hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory” (Kant 1991b, 105). But he also suggests that visitors and guests have an obligation not to invade, exploit, and enslave. Kant focuses on the bad behavior of Western colonial powers who have been behaving “inhospitably” and “unjustly” in far-flung places by invading, enslaving, and exploiting native populations (Kant 1991b, 105–107; see Fiala 2014). World peace will develop when visitors and guests behave hospitably, which means respecting one another’s human rights broadly conceived – to be received with respect and to behave respectfully when welcomed. At issue here is not toleration, as understood in terms of a negative relation in which we leave one another alone. The question of hospitality arises, for Kant, because of the fact that aggressive Western powers violated the spirit of hospitality and created conditions that are disruptive of peace. The point is that Kant is describing norms for a world that is already interconnected – and in ways that extend far beyond a basic, grudging modus vivendi. The cosmopolitan idea of hospitality asks us to consider an interconnected world in which we need universal moral norms to help regulate the behavior of guests, hosts, visitors, trading parties, embassies, messengers, refugees, and those who offer asylum. We move beyond basic toleration as we circulate and move between and across borders in a world that has become even more mixed and interconnected in the centuries since Kant was writing. Toleration is a basic guide for what may not be done. But beyond toleration is a more positive claim about the right to be welcomed and treated with humanity (along with a claim about the need of political authority to seek out enlightenment by consulting those who offer critical insight). Kant’s view represents a progressive stage in the development of thinking about international law and the law of peoples, building upon previous work by Vitoria, Vattel, Grotius, and Pufendorf. It is important to note in reference to this historical development that the earlier European accounts of hospitality were offered in support of European colonialism. Francisco Vitoria, for example, discussed hospitality in the 1530s with regard to the right of Spanish colonization, which he grounded in an account of hospitality that he found in the “law of nations” – as outlined in the Christian tradition. Vitoria argued that there was a basic right of strangers to be received hospitably that was grounded in Biblical scripture and in Natural Law with roots extending back to Virgil’s Aenid. He concluded on this basis that “refusal to receive strangers and foreigners is wrong in itself” (Vitoria 1532, Third Section). Vitoria’s claim that the Spanish had a right to be greeted hospitably by the native American was warped by rapacious colonial policy, his basic idea of hospitality as a principle of international law was taken up and developed further. The warping of this idea is seen in Vitoria’s claim that when the natives refused 16 A. Fiala hospitality – and refused to allow the Spanish to proselytize and trade with them – the Spanish had a right to respond aggressively. These ideas were debated further by Las Casas, who offered a less cynical account of Indian hospitality, and others, culminating in Kant’s theory of hospitality. Kant reinterpreted the idea of hospitality that Vitoria and others had used to justify colonialism. Robert Wai concludes, “Kant clearly rejected the expansive interpretation of a cosmopolitan right of hospitality as a right to trade or a right to occupation. Kant accepted that a host society could have ethical reasons for refusing to trade with a foreigner” (Wai 2011, 164; also see Brown 2010). Kant’s discussion of hospitality could thus be read as an incipient critique or European colonialism (see Fiala 2014). While not denying that Kant remains a source of Eurocentrism and racism (see Park 2013), I mean that Kant seems to understand that nations, such as China and Japan, who behave inhospitably toward Western powers may be justified in doing so. He says that China and Japan have “wisely placed restrictions” on Europeans. And Kant criticizes the hypocrisy of colonial powers who “make endless ado about their piety, and who wish to be considered as chosen believers while they live on the fruits of iniquity.” This discussion reminds us that hospitality can be employed for ideological purposes – and that a genuinely cosmopolitan development of hospitality must be careful to avoid using hospitality as a wedge or a cudgel. Since Kant wrote, these ideas have developed further toward a more robust idea of international law, as embodied in treaties and in institutions such as the United Nations. There is a developed set of ideas about the importance of hospitality seen in ideas about the right to asylum, the rights of refugees, and underlying this, the question of a basic moral obligation to provide positive care and assistance for strangers in need (see Benhabib 2004a; Schott 2009; Meckstroth 2018). At a basic level, hospitality can be understood as a supplement to toleration which demands something more than merely leaving the other alone. It may also be thought of part of a continuum of development in which liberal ideas are extended in a cosmopolitan direction (we saw this above with regard to Rawls who seemed to imply a kind of developmental model that goes from modus vivendi to liberalism). This helps explain why contemporary theorists (mistakenly on my interpretation) describe toleration in more positive terms – as demanding positive recognition, affirmation, and acceptance: it is likely that what is being asked for is not merely toleration but rather hospitality and that the natural inclination of people who equivocate in this way is to simplify the continuum under the rubric of toleration. But Kant’s claim that tolerance remains arrogant provides us with a clue: beyond toleration is hospitality as a universal right as well as active consultation of alternative points of view in search of enlightenment. In subsequent discussions of cosmopolitanism, there is a remaining question of the scope of the idea: whether it is a moral ideal with thick universal roots or a merely a historical achievement developed through an empirical process of treaty formation, institution building, and so on (see Brown 2013). As I have discussed it here, cosmopolitan hospitality exists as an aspiration that aims to move beyond liberal political philosophy that is focused on the nation state. But it is possible that in the international arena we return to something like the modus vivendi approach. Perhaps Hospitality and Toleration 17 it is possible for domestic political arrangements to move from modus vivendi to liberal polity. But when the international arena is understood as a further iteration of the Hobbesian struggle, realists such as Horton may argue that international law and universal ideas about cosmopolitan right are merely forms of a modus vivendi which do not rest upon any deeper moral or metaphysical foundation. Summary and Future Directions: The Task of Practical Wisdom and Enlightenment Let’s return, in conclusion, to an Aristotlelian vantage point for understanding the continuum that connects toleration and hospitality. Aristotle reminds us that virtue is a mean. He also suggests that practical wisdom ought to lead to a unity of the virtues (see Telfer 1989). The virtue of tolerance falls, as a mean, between intolerant bitterness and obsequious flattery. Hospitality can also be analyzed in this way, with the virtue of hospitality located between inhospitable coldness and sycophantic deference. One can be entirely unwelcoming to strangers or too unctuous and submissive in welcoming everyone: one can refuse to welcome guests or one can allow guests to take advantage of welcoming kindness. When toleration and hospitality are understood in this Aristotelian way as virtues found in the mean, and in connection to the goal of finding a unity of the virtues, we can understand the difficult task of practical wisdom. We ought to aim to find a balance between tolerance and hospitality, while also seeking to integrate these virtues with other virtues including justice, self-control (sophrosyne), self-respect, courage, honesty, compassion, and wisdom itself. In this essay, I have shown how difficult this project is, given the complexity of both toleration and hospitality. We have seen that toleration and hospitality are interrelated and connected along a continuum. We have discussed how toleration is related to the idea of negative rights, while hospitality is related to the idea of positive rights. We have seen how hospitality and toleration are grounded in different theories of social and political philosophy and ethics. Different theories of politics, morality, and social life will integrate these values in different ways. Practical wisdom and enlightenment can be developed by thinking more carefully about how this integration ought to take place. 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