9
Law, Labour and Landscape in a Just Transition
.
Harvesting the Sun is a profitable cash crop, with no labour and no
maintenance.*1
[L]andscape is both a work and an erasure of work. It is therefore a social
relation of labour, even as it is something that is laboured over.2
9.1
Introduction
As interest in decarbonising the global economy deepens, there is growing scrutiny of the justice and equity considerations embedded within
attempts to overcome fossil fuel dependence.3 Given widespread recognition of the glaring injustices that flow from the disproportionate
impacts on marginalised peoples of climate change itself, the calls for
decarbonisation carry with them mounting pressure for an equitable
distribution of any resulting loss, displacement and privation.4
*
1
2
3
4
Excellent research assistance provided by Osgoode Hall Law School juris doctorate
students Christian Laidlaw, Rachel Zaurov and Davis Tessema.
Public testimony provided by R. and L. Cuthill on the Strathcona Energy Group solar
development project in Kawartha Lakes, Ontario. (Hardcopy on file with authors).
D. Mitchell, The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 6.
See for example R. Heffron and D. McCauley, ‘What is the “just transition”?’ (2018) 88
Geoforum 74; K. Jenkins, B. Sovacool and D. McCauley, ‘Humanizing sociotechnical
transitions through energy justice: An ethical framework for global transformative change’
(2018) 117 Energy Policy 66; M. Jefferson, ‘Renewable and low carbon technologies policy’
123 (2018) Energy Policy 367; N. Jones, ‘A scarcity of rare metals is hindering green
technologies’, Yale Environment 360, 18 November 2013.
See for example C. Church and A. Crawford, ‘Green conflict minerals: The fuels of conflict
in the transition to a low-carbon economy’ (2018) International Institute for Sustainable
Development 1, 2–3, 37, 39; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
United Nations Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform Goal 16, https://sdgs.un.org/
goals/goal16; B. Sen, Solar Energy Is an Equity Issue, Institute for Policy Studies, 27
April 2017.
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Unsurprisingly then, in Canada as elsewhere, justice concerns have
engulfed the rollout and scaling up of renewable energy generation,
especially in relation to wind turbine and solar panel technologies.5
The contestation often centres around competing demands on, and
visions for the future of, agricultural landscapes.
In this chapter, we explore these questions by examining justifications
offered for and against the siting of ground-mounted solar photovoltaic
technologies on agricultural lands in southern Ontario. The aim is to
critically situate these debates in relation to the idea of a ‘just transition’.6
Invoked within local, national and international policy and regulatory
spheres, ‘just transition’ promises to attend to the distributional effects
and disproportionate impacts of decarbonisation on workers and communities.7 A just transition entails a ‘host of strategies to transition whole
communities to build thriving economies that provide dignified, productive and ecologically sustainable livelihoods; democratic governance
and ecological resilience’.8
Arguments both for and against solar energy developments, we contend, hinge on specific and narrow understandings of work and labour in
the making and maintenance of landscapes. The ‘culture of progress,
productivity, and political economy’ that supports these narrow understandings remains, according to Povinelli, ‘unassailable’.9 Not
5
6
7
8
9
K. Shaw, S. D. Hill, A. D. Boyd, L. Monk, J. Reid and E. F. Einsiedel, ‘Conflicted or
constructive? Exploring community responses to new energy developments in Canada’
(2015) 8 Energy Research and Social Science 41; B. K. Sovacool, ‘Exploring and contextualizing public opposition to renewable electricity in the United States’ (2009) 1
Sustainability 702; P. Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Solar flares: How renewable energy is raising
hackles in rural Ontario – and across Canada’, Financial Post, 7 August 2015.
L. Temper, M. Walter, I. Rodriguez, A. Kothari and E. Turhan, ‘A perspective on radical
transformations to sustainability: Resistances, movements and alternatives’ (2018) 13
Sustainability Science 747; United Nations Research Institute for Social Development,
Mapping Just Transition(s) to a Low-Carbon World (Geneva: UNRISD, 2018).
Initially developed within the international labour movement, the idea of a just transition
turns on a principled claim about the need to equitably distribute the costs of shifting
away from fossil fuel reliance. Others have pointed out, however, that it is not only
workers who have made their livelihoods in the fossil fuel industry that have a ‘justice’
claim in relation to climate change: We must also consider what we owe to those who can
least afford to pay for more higher energy costs, and to those who have and will continue
to suffer the most from climate change’s impacts. D. Saxe, ‘10 principles for the transition
to a green economy’, Corporate Knights, 17 September 2019.
Climate Justice Alliance, Just Transition: A Framework for Change, https://
climatejusticealliance.org/just-transition/.
E. Povinelli, ‘Do rocks listen? The cultural politics of apprehending Australian aboriginal
labor’ (1995) 97(3) American Anthropologist 505, 505.
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surprisingly, ‘the cultural frameworks subtending political economy . . .
were long ago transmuted into neutral, natural and objective fact’, in no
small part through the work of international law.10 The body of modern
international law, as Chimni notes, takes ‘the alienation of human beings
from nature’ as a given.11 A premise of this chapter is that law continues
to structure the exclusion of labour in renewable energy landscapes, just
as it has long structured that exclusion in extractivist landscapes. Thus,
even as the modalities of energy generation change, the relationship
between labour and land – the imagination of landscapes – is still shaped
through the same stubborn and recalcitrant legal relations. Drawing on
Anghie’s formative text Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of
International Law,12 we contend that the force and mark of international
law on the landscape has not been one of linear, humanitarian progress,
but one borne of histories of enslavement and captivity or unfreedom
and the ongoing dispossession and denial of Indigenous lifeways.
Fervent opposition has been mounted against solar farms based on
arable land and food justice concerns.13 While a range of conceptual
approaches have been developed to frame this opposition, the generalised
claim of a ‘right to landscape’ is perhaps the most prevalent, if not the
most compelling.14 But the landscapes imagined in interventions against
solar projects are remarkably void of workers. Similarly, enthusiasm for
renewable energy is sometimes based on, as articulated in the epigraph,
the perceived absence of a need for work and labour in the new, green
economy. In the imagery of a post-carbon economy, people in communities are often imagined as freed from the demands of work, at least as
10
11
12
13
14
Ibid.
B. S. Chimni, ‘The past, present and future of international law: A critical third world
approach’ (2007) 8(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 499.
A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
R. Wheeler, ‘Reconciling windfarms with rural place identity: Exploring residents’ attitudes to existing sites’ (2017) 57:1 Sociologia Ruralis 110.
We conclude that this resistance, contrary to typical framings which dismiss it as
NIMBYism, has resonances with broader claims about environmental justice and may
signal larger structural shifts. We discuss this in D. Scott and A. Smith, ‘Sacrifice zones in
the green energy economy: Toward an environmental justice framework’ (2017) 62
McGill Law Journal 861. In addition to the landscape construct, which is deployed in a
range of ways, geographer Stewart Fast identifies other key interdisciplinary concepts
used to examine social responses to renewables, including place, distance decay and
territory. See S. Fast, ‘Social acceptance of renewable energy: Trends, concepts, and
geographies’ (2013) 7:12 Geography Compass 853.
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they manifest for many workers today in the form of long hours at little
pay, requiring crushing fossil-fuelled commutes.
Even the most progressive accounts of the transition, those organised
around the idea of a Green New Deal, envision a future in which people
work less and have more time for recreation. Where labour is a part of
the vision, it usually entails creating millions of good, high-wage jobs
through a green jobs plan. While we broadly embrace the politics of the
Green New Deal, we believe it is a failure of our collective imaginations to
envision the future of work and labour only in terms of ‘jobs’ and the
capitalist wage economy, rather than as a set of practices that can connect
people to land and landscapes.
Situating the contestation within critical theorising on landscape, we
mobilise geographer Mitchell’s labour theory of landscape as an articulation of the role of work and labour in shaping landscape, asking not
‘Whose Landscape?’ but ‘Landscape for Whom’?15 Like Carton, we turn
to Mitchell’s work to critically appreciate the socio-spatial dimensions of
landscape in capitalist relations.16 This includes recognition of the
ongoing contribution of workers, migrant (and other) farm workers to
the making and maintenance of agricultural landscapes, and to a range of
other workers in the social lifecycle of renewable energy developments.
Further, and more profoundly, we find that the right to landscape
claims also serve to maintain and validate narrow, conventional visions
of who can hold political and legal authority over the landscape. For ‘just
transition’ to intensify the forcefulness of its intervention, it must take on
board trenchant critiques related to work, labour and authority within
fossil capitalism and the settler colonial relation. Here again, we can see
law’s influence ‘underpinning and ordering these relations, both domestically and internationally’, in Pahuja’s words.17 This legal foundation
both reflects and simultaneously produces the same shallow notions of
who can hold political and legal authority. In the end, we find that the
erasure of workers’ material contributions underwrites the claims of
settler authority over agricultural lands and life found within both the
opposition to and support for renewable energy developments.
15
16
17
D. Mitchell, Lie of the Land, p. 6.
W. Carton, ‘Dancing to the rhythms of the fossil fuel landscape: Landscape inertia and
the temporal limits to market-based climate policy’ (2017) 49:1 Antipode 43.
R. Buchanan and S. Pahuja, ‘Legal imperialism: Empire’s invisible hand?’, in P. Pasavant
and J. Dean (eds.), Empire’s New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2003).
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9.2 Harvesting the Sun and the Competition for Agricultural Lands
The global energy renaissance is said to be well underway with solar,
wind and hydro now advanced as critical renewable sources through
which contemporary capitalist economies can pursue decarbonisation.
The story in southern Ontario is generally reflective of the global trend.18
The province is held out as a major node within an emergent ‘green’
national economy.19 However, the need for large surface areas for
ground-mounted solar panel technologies has meant that the push for
renewable energy development runs up against competing land uses,
with agriculture being the prevailing prior use. With Ontario’s estimated
need for lands repurposed for renewables said to range between 0.5 and
8.5 per cent,20 rural areas are gaining attention as a site of economic and
political struggle. These land use pressures have pitted the production of
agro-food against the generation of renewable energy.21
The process of ‘harvesting the sun’ is indispensable to both horticultural science and solar energy generation.22 It follows from human
reliance upon photosynthesis which, in transforming energy from
18
19
20
21
22
C. Croonenbroeck and J. Lowitzsch, ‘From fossil to renewable energy sources’, in J.
Lowitzsch (eds.), Energy Transition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
R. Blackwell, ‘Solar power surging to forefront of Canadian energy’, The Globe and Mail,
26 July 2014; R. Blackwell, ‘Going green: Does Ontario’s energy shift have the power to
sustain itself?’, The Globe and Mail, 10 July 2015.
K. Calvert, ‘Measuring and modelling the land-use intensity and land requirements of
utility-scale photovoltaic systems in the Canadian province of Ontario’ (2018) 62:2 The
Canadian Geographer 188. The estimate is contingent on several factors,. including a
generous rollout of rooftop solar panels.
This has produced pressure to ensure policy and regulatory regimes address the
encroachment of solar energy production on arable land. In other contexts, though not
well articulated in Canada, proposals aim at co-development of land units, what some
have taken to calling agrivoltaics, for both solar energy generation as well as for agri-food
usage. See for example C. Dupraz, H. Marrou, G. Talbot, L. Dufour, A. Nogier and Y.
Ferard, ‘Combining solar photovoltaic panels and food crops for optimising land use:
Towards new agrivoltaic schemes’ (2011) 36:10 Renewable Energy 2725; H. Dinesh and J.
M. Pearce, ‘The potential of agrivoltaic systems’ (2016) 54 Renewable and Sustainable
Energy Reviews 299. Others call for consideration of the conversion of degraded land or
‘arable land currently used for crops with known health hazards’, namely tobacco. R.
Krishnan and J. Pearce, ‘Economic impact of substituting solar photovoltaic electric
production for tobacco farming’ (2018) 72 Land Use Policy 503.
As Darrin Qualman reminds us, the sun is essential to fossil energy as well – a type of
energy that is the result of millions of years of solar capture. Tidal, geothermal, coal, oil
and gas all ultimately derive their energy from the sun, with nuclear energy being the only
source that does not derive its energy from the sun. D. Qualman, Civilization Critical:
Energy, Food, Nature, and the Future (Halifax: Fernwood, 2019)
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sunlight into chemical energy, is essential to the cultivation of crops for
food.23 The process also propels the production of renewable energy as
solar voltaic cells convert the sun’s energy for large-scale generation of
electricity. In their current incarnations, agro-food cultivation and solar
electricity generation both depend on the availability of wide expanses of
rural land.24 As land-indebted endeavours of an analogous kind, they are
seemingly placed in an uneasy relationship, which has culminated in
charged local disputes. While the siting of large-scale, non-renewable and
renewable energy developments has spawned considerable controversy in
a variety of contexts in recent decades,25 the challenge has been especially
acute when involving the conversion of ‘agricultural’ land to ‘non-agricultural’ purposes.26
Over a relatively short span of time, roughly from 2006 to 2014,
Ontario saw the introduction of about seventy large ground-level solar
projects covering vast tracts of land.27 Proponents raved about the
uncontroversial nature of solar generation, but in fact, plenty of controversy ensued.28 Broadly stated, we identify two types of interventions
typically made in conflicts over the use of agricultural lands for largescale solar energy generation. The first are campaigns in support of
repurposing agricultural lands for solar energy. A version of this intervention posits a ‘labour-and-maintenance free’ justification for pursuing
renewable energy projects. This was pitched specifically at the perceived
23
24
25
26
27
28
E. Hewett, I. Warrington and C. H. Hale, ‘Harvesting the Sun: A profile of world
horticulture’ (2012) 14 Scripta Horticultura. While there are differences between horticulture and agriculture, namely that the former deals with plant cultivation and the latter
with plant cultivation and animal husbandry, we have opted not to delineate between the
two.
P. McMichael, The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1994).
G. Walker, ‘Energy, land use and renewables: A changing agenda’ (1995) 12:1 Land Use
Policy 3.
The pressures of agricultural land conversion are indicative of shifts and trends in urban
development in recent decades in Canada and elsewhere. The incentives for repurposing
agricultural land for non-agricultural use are persistent and seemingly deepening. See for
example Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,
A Growing Concern: How to Keep Farmland in the Hands of Canadian Farmers,
Canada, March 2018; E. N. Elkind, ‘Harvesting clean energy: How California can deploy
large-scale renewable energy projects on appropriate farmland’, Center for Law, Energy
and the Environment, October 2011.
Blackwell, ‘Solar power surging to forefront of Canadian energy’.
Ibid.
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interests of farmers.29 Through the on-farm siting of ground-mounted
solar panels, farmers derive economic benefits in the form of income
generation and substitution as well as electricity cost reductions.30 In
Ontario, this was dependent on a provincial feed-in tariff regime that
provided above-market rates for renewable electricity fed back to the
grid.31 Farmers turned to the hosting of solar energy as a supplement or
substitute to income derived from conventional agricultural activities.32
For some agro-food growers, then, solar can be seen as one of a number
of available adaption or ‘survival strategies’, the most significant of which
were previously provided through ‘labour supply supports’, namely the
provisioning of migrant farm workers.33
The second set of interventions are campaigns mounted by local
residents against proposed solar panel installations based on arable land
and food justice concerns. This opposition is often grounded in a generalised ‘right to landscape’ claim.34
Residents mobilising ‘right to landscape’ claims are typically defending
a set of aesthetic values and articulating a connection to, and an affection
29
30
31
32
33
34
A. G. Tech, ‘Exploring the Potential of Solar Power Technology in Canadian Farms’,
Dairy and A. G. Tech NOW (10 November 2017).
The specific details of the agreements signed by growers with renewable energy companies are not widely known in the Canadian context. For a look outside of Canada, see
for example B. Frantál and A. Prousek, ‘It’s not right, but we do it. Exploring why and
how Czech farmers become renewable energy producers’ (2016) 87 Biomass and
Bioenergy 26.
The Green Energy Act, 2009, SO 2009, c 12, ss 5, 11. While the Large Renewable
Procurement program was cancelled in 2016, the FIT and microFIT programs remain
in place. See Ontario Ministry of Energy, ‘Ontario suspends large renewable energy
procurement’, Government of Ontario Newsroom, 27 September 2016. See also
Independent Electricity Service Operator, Feed-in Tariff Program, 19 December 2016.
Ontario Federation of Agriculture, Small Solar, 28 August 2019.
Our argument is not necessarily one of a direct substitution of renewable energy
generation income for labour supply supports through temporary labour migration.
But there is a sense that there are limited options on offer for agro-food growers in
contemporary farming. Nor, in this latter respect, is it that we seek to provide cover for
growers’ reliance on the highly troubling practices and relations of temporary migration.
M. Burt and R. Meyer-Robinson, Sowing the Seeds of Growth: Temporary Foreign
Workers in Agriculture (Ottawa: The Conference Board of Canada, 2016). In the face
of a supposedly declining agricultural labouring stock, temporary labour migration
produces a necessary and disposable labour force. Added to this are ongoing concerns
about poor or ineffectual farm income, loan and other supports.
Residents also mounted campaigns against wind turbines based on suspected health
effects. Scott and Smith, ‘Sacrifice zones in the green energy economy’, 861.
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for, the landscape, often seen as ‘theirs by right’.35 Certain academic
accounts mirror these arguments. Jefferson, writing in the context of
contemporary Britain, bemoans the ‘visually intrusive’ nature of renewable energy structures which ‘look out of place and undermine the beauty
of our rural landscapes’, displacing farming and ‘hijack[ing] a rural
environment’.36 His concern is that ‘rural landscapes [are] being
swamped and visually destroyed’.37 Calling for ‘stricter’ constraints on
the siting of renewal energy developments, Jefferson argues that ‘[a]
sustainable future requires us to preserve scenic values and protect . . .
rural landscapes’.38
When these claims were made in southwestern Ontario, they were
often characterised as not-in-my-backyard syndrome, or NIMBYism,
and were discredited, downplayed or disregarded, especially by
35
36
37
38
D. Mitchell, Lie of the Land, p. 264. It is possible to locate these articulations within
transnational mobilisations in support of the emerging idea of a ‘right to landscape’.
Various European Conventions over the past two decades have demonstrated growing
concern for landscape degradation and a desire for the safeguard of landscapes. In these
accounts, landscape pertains to ‘the expression of the relationship between people and
environment’ with a recognition of ‘landscape [as] a common good’ and ‘the right to the
landscape [as] a human necessity’. But, as mentioned, there has been very little work on
this kind of doctrinal approach to the ‘right to landscape’ situated within wider concerns
about ‘just transition’ and global environmental or climate justice. European Landscape
Convention, 20 October 2000, CETS 176. See also S. Egoz, J. Makhzoumi and G. Pungetti
(eds.), The Right to Landscape: Contesting Landscape and Human Rights (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2011).
M. Jefferson, ‘Safeguarding rural landscapes in the new era of energy transition to a low
carbon future’ (2018) 37 Energy Research and Social Science 191; D. Apostol, J. Palmer, M.
Pasqualetti, R. Smardon and R. Sullivan, The Renewable Energy Landscape: Preserving
Scenic Values in our Sustainable Future (London: Routledge, 2016); M. Pasqualetti,
‘Reading the changing energy landscape’, in S. Stemke and A. Dobbelsteen (eds.),
Sustainable Energy Landscapes (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2012), p. 11.
‘They cannot, of course, be banned altogether. But their positioning has to be carefully
considered and severely rationed, taking into account visual intrusion and optimal
location for their efficacy’: Ibid., 193.
Jefferson also objects to the use of the term ‘farm’ in relation to wind and solar projects.
He contends: ‘Onshore wind turbines are more appropriately termed “wind energy
developments” (as are offshore ones); solar panels stretching across agricultural land
better termed “solar mirrors” or “ground-mounted solar PV”. Seeking to hijack a rural
environment by use of the word “farm” should be opposed. Visual or acoustic intrusions
on the rural landscape should not be disguised by using a term which suggests merging
with the landscape – the reality is that this rarely occurs.’ Ibid., 192. Jefferson, in
lamenting the prominence of ‘the cultural landscape’ in academic accounts of renewable
energy generation, provides something of a contrasting perspective to our own.
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renewable energy enthusiasts.39 Elsewhere, we have argued that critical
scholars should, while not necessarily validating this kind of opposition,
interrogate the way in which these claims are received, with the aim of
developing a robust analysis of the distribution of benefits and burdens
associated with particular renewable energy projects.40 Our approach is based
on the belief that the global economy of renewable energy has its own
distributional effects or ‘sacrifice zones’. As Shaw and collaborators contend,
‘resistance is heightened when communities are asked to relinquish certain
landscape values or uses – to make sacrifices – in the absence of an institutional
infrastructure that they are confident will protect their interests and values over
the long term’.41 We agree, and believe the contention can be broadened and
extended. Here, with a view to ‘just transition’ and in the context of growing
interest in a Green New Deal, we consider the place of work and labour in the
justifications for and against renewables, arguing that the erasure of labour as
constitutive of the landscape is undermining our collective ability to imagine
new relationalities to and with landscapes. Further, we assert that the right to
landscape claim works not just in an attempt to ‘preserve’ a given landscape,
but also in many cases as an assertion of authority over it.42
Our discussion turns to address the justifications offered both for and
against renewables, demonstrating how each tends towards the erasure of
work and labour on the solar landscape.
9.3 Labour Erasure in Solar Landscapes
As described above, arguments in favour of solar projects on farmland
often invoke the idea that solar energy is a passive and profitable ‘cash
39
40
41
42
R. Ferguson and L. Ferenc, ‘McGuinty vows to stop wind-farm NIMBYs’, Toronto Star,
11 February 2009.
Our aim is to attend to those effects as they emerge, with a focus on social dynamics. We
posit that ‘labour’ is a crucial if under-explored dimension of these dynamics, and our
aim is to consider how racialisation and gender function within class relations of
settler capitalism.
Shaw et al, ‘Conflicted or constructive?, 41, 42.
Whereas other interventions call for reform of land use and spatial planning regulation as
a way of addressing oppositional claims and mitigating the land-use impacts of renewable
energy projects, our interest is not in developing institutional infrastructure to solidify
support for renewable energy projects. For a discussion on the limits of the prevailing
renewable energy legal regime in Ontario, see D. McRobert, J. Tennent-Riddell and C.
Walker, ‘Ontario’s Green Economy and Green Energy Act: Why a well-intentioned law is
mired in controversy and opposed by rural communities’ (2016) 7 Renewable Energy Law
and Policy Review 91.
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crop’ that can generate benefits for landowners without the need for
inputs of labour or maintenance. While work and labour are often seen
as ‘unnecessary’ to the generation of energy from renewables, as Altvater
demonstrates, it is considerably more complicated than this.
[S]olar energy flows, which power all processes of life on earth (plants,
animals and human beings), come in the form of solar radiation (light and
heat) without the need for any energy input by living beings on earth.
However, energy inputs are required for the transformation of solar
radiation into useful energy for humankind. The role of agriculture is a
telling example. Energy – i.e. the efforts of the farmer and his [sic] family
and workers . . . – is invested to obtain a higher return from the energy
contained in plants and livestock.43
Thus, while the job-creation potential of solar energy is hotly contested,
with interested parties spouting positions on all sides, it is clear that the
investment of labour in generating electricity from solar energy occurs in
a multitude of ways and under challenging conditions.44 First, there is the
manufacture of solar panels themselves and associated battery storage
capabilities. This requires inputs of precious and rare Earth metals, such
as cadmium, indium, gallium and silver, as well as selenium and tellurium among other metalloids, and incorporates fused quartz or silica,
aluminium and copper.45 The World Bank estimated that demand for
some of the minerals required for solar panels – including copper, iron,
lead, molybdenum, nickel and zinc – would increase by as much as
300 per cent over the next few decades if the international community
endeavours to keep the average global temperature increase within
43
44
45
E. Altvater, ‘The social and natural environment of fossil capitalism’ (2007) 43 Socialist
Register 37.
‘It’s just not that labor-intensive’, said Howard Axelrod, an engineer and economist
quoted in The New York Times in 2011. The article also mentions that SolarWorld, a
large producer of solar cells, was bragging to its investors that its labour expenses
constituted less than 10 per cent of its costs. In other settings, those same companies
tout the job-creation potential of their projects as they come under attack from more
conventional energy producers. M. Wald, ‘Solar power industry falls short of hopes in job
creation’, The New York Times, 25 October 2011.
K. MacLeod and B. Gómez, ‘Solar photovoltaic and energy storage in the electric grid’
(2017) Levin Sources 1, 7; Church and Crawford, ‘Green conflict minerals’, pp. 2–3, 37,
39. Solar photovoltaic technology increases the need for energy storage units, both in the
form of individual batteries for private use and on a large scale in electrical grids. This
leads to demand for the minerals in lithium-ion batteries such as aluminium, cobalt, iron,
lead, lithium, manganese, nickel and graphite. See Clean Energy Canada, Mining for
Clean Energy, June 2017.
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2 degrees Celsius.46 Aluminium, copper and certain other materials can
be obtained through scrap metal recycling,47 but most others are
obtained through mining.48 The extraction of nickel, as an example,
has been linked to violence and forced displacement in Guatemala.49
Further, some rare Earths mines have been called ‘sites of exploitation’
due to incidents of child labour in the Global South.50
Each of the recycling, mining and refining processes require labour
and make demands on workers that can threaten their health and safety.
In fact, significant occupational exposures to toxics are associated with
the production of photovoltaic panels. Whether handling a hazardous
substance like cadmium, subjecting quartz to high heat in a furnace, or
carrying out a range of other tasks in the manufacturing process, workers
face risks to their health and wellbeing in the production of solar panel
technologies.51 There are also real concerns about the durability of
renewable energy infrastructure and solar panel lifespans, which produce
the need for labour to handle their eventual disposal. In fact, as is now
becoming well-known, there are whole landscapes and many poor
people’s livelihoods in the Global South devoted to the processing of
technological wastes from the ‘green’ Global North.52
As Malm argues, ‘labour is the praxis by which the physical organisation of humans remains intact’.53 Where nature ‘formulates the most
basic corporeal needs’ of humans – those things we generate energy for,
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
D. L. P. Arrobas, K. L. Hund, M. S. McCormick, J. Ningthoujam and J. R. Drexhage, The
Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for a Low-Carbon Future (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2017).
MacLeod and Gómez note the challenge of mislabelling scrap recycling to avoid scrutiny
about production conditions as well as the continuing need for mining even as recycling
rates increase due to increased demand for key materials. Macleod and Gomez, ‘Solar
photovoltaic and energy storage in the electric grid’, 9, 12.
Temper et al., ‘A perspective on radical transformations to sustainability’, p. 747.
A. Kassam, ‘Guatemalan women take on Canada’s mining giants over “horrific human
rights abuses”’, The Guardian, 13 December 2017.
Z. Sclanger, ‘Apple wants to try to “stop mining the Earth altogether” to make your
iPhone’, Quartz, 20 April 2017.
S. Takeda, A. R. Keeley, S. Sakurai, S. Managi and C. B. Norris, ‘Are renewables as
friendly to humans as to the environment? A social life cycle assessment of renewable
electricity’ (2019) 11(5) Sustainability 1370.
K. Wang, J. Qian and L. Liu, ‘Understanding environmental pollutions of informal ewaste clustering in global south via multi-scalar regulatory frameworks: A case study of
Guiyu Town, China’ (2020) 17 International Journal of Environmental Research and
Public Health 2802.
A. Malm, The Progress of This Storm: Nature and Society in a Warming World (London:
Verso, 2018), p. 159.
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for instance to quell hunger or shivering – the ‘general form for meeting
them and staying alive is, of course, labour’.54 In Marx’s conception, ‘all
production is an appropriation of nature on the part of an individual
within and through a specific form of society’.55 The workers’ relation to
nature is therefore ‘mediated through her relations to other humans’, as
Malm puts it.56 But the form of those relations is ‘nowhere carved in
stone’.
An ‘essential legal relation’ that structures how humans labour in
contemporary settler capitalism is that of private property.57 If property
is indeed essential in settler capitalist societies, it owes its importance to
international law. It is useful here to appreciate the colonial basis of
international law and state sovereignty. From the sixteenth century
onwards, as per Anghie’s incisive intervention, the colonial encounter
provides the genesis for the emergent legal order and its enforcement of
the civilised–uncivilised dichotomy.58 To this, we would add that at the
centre of the colonial encounter is the ‘appropriation’ of worker, land and
resources. Neocleous invites us to see that Marx’s primitive
accumulation, understood as ‘the use of force and violence in separating
people from a means of subsistence other than the wage’, is itself an
indispensable and ongoing feature of international law.59 A point of
departure then relates to the role of law in disembodying labour and in
alienating labour from land. In this way, as Neocleous remarks, ‘to think
of international law as fundamental to the dispossession of peoples and
to the accumulation of capital that lies at the heart of colonisation is to
help us better grasp international law’s centrality to the global violence of
capital’.60
When applied to antagonisms over agricultural land use, as we argue
below, it becomes apparent that enthusiasm for renewable energy is
indebted to, not separate and apart from, prevailing modes of settler
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Ibid.
K. Marx, The Grundrisse (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 485–98.
Malm, Progress of This Storm, p. 160.
A. Stone, ‘The place of law in the Marxian structure–superstructure archetype’ (1985)
19:1 Law and Society Review 39. See also L. Godden, ‘Grounding law as cultural memory:
A proper account of property and native title in Australian law’ (2003) 19 The Australian
Feminist Law Journal 61.
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law.
M. Neocleous, ‘International law as primitive accumulation; or, the secret of systematic
colonization’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 941.
Ibid.
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capitalism. In Section 9.4, we detail the way that notions of white
propertied citizenship further structure the erasure of labour in the solar
landscape. Thus, it is not only in the discourse of proponents of solar
energy projects in southwestern Ontario that we find an erasure of labour
on the landscape, it is also in the discourse of those opposed to renewables on the agricultural landscape. In Section 9.4, we detail how the
‘right to landscape’ claims differentially obfuscate the labour and contributions of migrant farm workers.
9.4 Labour Makes Landscapes
Consideration of the social justice dimensions of landscape is well established within critical geography. Rejecting the understanding of landscape as a ‘naively given section of reality’, critical geographers have
focused on landscape’s encoding of social relations, practices and histories ‘driven by real people and their efforts’.61 In this way, ‘landscape is
infused with layers of historical and social meaning that help to comprise
its distinction and associations’.62 But, as Mitchell and Breitbach ask,
‘[w]hich social relations make landscape’s forms?’63
Here, we identify how ‘right to landscape’ claims tend to obfuscate
agro-food work and labour practices as well as relations. Mitchell’s labour
theory of landscape directs us to consider the role of work and labour in
shaping or producing landscape.64 Extending beyond mere consideration
of ‘alignments of technology and social practice’, the approach as we
apply it treats work and labour as, to borrow Amin’s words, ‘inseparable
from the scientific and technological knowledge proper to the period and
from the natural (ecological) circumstances in which it takes place’.65
Through this lens, we see how ‘labour, class and production, and with
61
62
63
64
65
D. Mitchell and C. Breitbach, Cultural Landscape: A Critical Introduction (New Jersey:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 211.
Ibid., p. 210.
Ibid., p. 211.
D. Mitchell, ‘New axioms for reading the landscape: paying attention to political economy
and social justice’, in J. Wescoat Jr. and D. Johnston (eds.), Political Economies of
Landscape Change (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), p. 20; A. Gough and D. Valisena,
‘From Factories in the Field to activist scholar: Don Mitchell reflects on intellectual
practice and the state of the university today’ (2018) 29 Capitalism Nature Socialism
51; D. Mitchell, ‘A relational approach to landscape and urbanism: The view from an
exclusive suburb’ (2017) 42 Landscape Research 277.
S. Amin, Three Essays on Marx’s Value Theory (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2013),
p. 12.
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this ‘exploitation and struggle’, continually make and remake landscapes.66 Claims surrounding the loss of landscape value – while they
may purport to be simply about aesthetics – as Mitchell has demonstrated in the agricultural fields of twentieth-century California, actually
function in profoundly exclusionary ways.67 Further, in line with how
international legal norms have served to disembody labour from land,
law separates people from ‘the environment’ and economy from ecology.
The starkly disembodied claims of those residents appealing to a ‘right to
landscape’ typically invoke a romanticised version of harvesting and
agricultural life that produces labour in racialised and gendered terms.
In southwestern Ontario, a core dimension of the residents’ landscape
claims turned on the perceived aesthetic impact of renewable energy
projects. In the words of one resident,
[Solar farms are] hideous. [The solar companies] are not doing anything
to buffer them visually. And people are asking, ‘what are you doing to our
beautiful county?’ No, we’re not going to stand for this. And to a lesser
extent there’s that same feeling with regard to industrial wind turbines.
They’re a blight on the landscape – that’s how people feel.68
As the resident continued,
It’s that people down here – what we see with respect to our landscape –
find the solar installations really ugly and intrusive. Like I said, they go in,
and they just totally scarify a gigantic piece of land and they dig up all the
topsoil and they put down all this gravel and then they throw down these
black panels and they all have a giant fence around them with razor wire
on the top. We have beautiful countryside down here . . . [so] there’s
resistance to that.69
But what does the invocation of a particular aesthetic attachment do?
As Lee Godden suggests, ‘[t]he vision of property as empty or idealised
“space” resonates with the ideal of modern western law’.70 For Godden,
referencing settler colonialism of Australia,
. . . law reads a particular cultural record into the Australian continent
through its distributive function: its power to allocate, to exclude, to
include within the physical landscape, to create boundaries and divisions
66
67
68
69
70
Mitchell and Breitbach, Cultural Landscape, p. 248.
Mitchell, Lie of the Land, p. 28.
Scott and Smith, ‘Sacrifice zones in the green energy economy’, 37.
Ibid., 38.
Godden, ‘Grounding law as cultural memory’, 67.
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and places of belonging . . . If law, rather than abstract right, ‘is a dogmatic
reconstruction of the material, if it is emblematic in taking hold of and in
instituting life’, then what it has instituted and largely continues to
institute is the ‘world that is ours’.71
Here, we argue that it emboldens an entitlement grounded in whiteness and propertied citizenship. It invokes the mythology of the ‘family
farm’, deeply ingrained into a sense of national belonging in Canada as a
white society. But in contemporary southwestern Ontario, where farm
work is increasingly undertaken by workers from the Caribbean, Mexico,
the Philippines and elsewhere who enter Canada under the temporary
labour migration regime, these claims incorporate the differential inclusion of racialised labouring bodies on the land.72 In this specific part of
Ontario, in fact, land use conflicts involving racialised migrant farmworkers have exposed residents’ willingness to employ ‘well-worn, racist
colonial tropes’ to secure their propertied interests.73 In one recent
example, in order to block a housing development for migrant farmworkers situated close to the farms, these residents mobilised to ensure
that their ‘lovely little hamlet’ remained ‘small and peaceful’.74 In other
words, residents seem to yearn for a right to a landscape that all but
marginalises or excludes racialised bodies.75
This is notwithstanding the centrality of migrant farmworkers to the
continued functioning of agricultural production in the current model of
temporary migration. The central importance of migrant labour to the
harvesting of crops is widely declared by growers throughout Ontario’s
agro-food sector. ‘Without international farm workers’, according to the
71
72
73
74
75
Ibid., 80.
Migrant labour is a categorical distinction deployed to mediate claims to scarce resources
and to produce the very idea of scarcity.
A. Smith, ‘The bunk house rules: A materialist approach to legal consciousness in the
context of migrant workers’ housing in Ontario’ (2015) 52 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 863,
890.
Ibid., 891.
Drawing on interesting articulations in the emerging interdisciplinary literature on the
notion of ‘foodscapes’, we highlight here the socio-spatial manifestations of health and
wellbeing that engage the ‘wider relations between people and their environments that
resonate in the cultures and practices surrounding food’. That is, as critiques foregrounding Indigenous food sovereignty have highlighted, we must be careful not to treat food
just as a ‘resource for sustenance (and social reproduction and individual expression) as
many might understand it in western contexts dominated by cultures of whiteness’.
Specifically, we must always keep in mind the ‘interweaving of people, place and wellbeing’. See R. Panelli and G. Tipa, ‘Beyond foodscapes: Considering geographies of
Indigenous well-being’ (2009) 15 Health and Place 455.
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Canadian Horticultural Council, ‘there would be no Canadian fruit and
vegetable production’.76 It is reasonable to expect that the deployment of
migrant labour in Ontario agro-food cultivation will continue into the
foreseeable future, as studies reliably identify a significant shortage in
non-migrant agricultural labour.77
Just as Mitchell found in California, the ‘right to landscape’ claims in
Ontario invite the erasure of the material contributions of migrant
farmworkers. What we see then is that temporary labour migration is
crucial to the work of making agricultural landscapes, but landscape
claims fail to work for those categorised as migrant labour. Migrant
labour remains captive or unfree labour in the anti-renewable energy
imaginary. A right to landscape conveys notions of belonging authorised
by whiteness, private property and national citizenship; not just to the
detriment of the racialised labouring bodies so central to agro-food
production, but in fact as a way of reproducing the racialised violence
of capitalist accumulation.
Ultimately, ‘spatially unjust landscape processes’ are bolstered through
naturalisation of landscape value.78 In absenting agricultural labouring
bodies, their socio-spatial practices, and their relations and struggles,
landscape claims shift focus away from the inequity of land use in line
with the extractivist devaluation of human labour that is inherent in the
transnational legal regimes of temporary labour migration. These claims
seemingly appropriate labour power all the while enforcing a racialised
logic of domination.79 In this respect, as Mitchell astutely puts it, ‘landscape is both a work and an erasure of work. It is therefore a social
relation of labour, even as it is something that is laboured over’.80
76
77
78
79
80
Canadian Horticultural Council, Heartbeat: A Celebration of International Farm
Workers, March 2019, www.hortcouncil.ca/en/heartbeat/; Greenhouse Canada,
‘Documentary celebrates migrant workers in Canada’, Greenhouse Canada, 28 May
2019: ‘“It’s only with the help of international farm workers that Canadian agriculture
stands a chance”, says the Canadian Horticultural Council.’
But for general critiques, see I. Angus and S. Butler, Too Many People? Population,
Immigration, and the Environmental Crisis (Chicago: Haymarket, 2011); J. Hultgren,
Border Walls Gone Green: Nature and Anti-Immigrant Politics in America (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).
Setten and Brown reference the need for ‘spatial sensitivity’ in evaluating landscape
claims. G. Setten and K. M. Brown, ‘Landscape and Social Justice’, in P. Howard, I.
Thompson, E. Waterton and M. Atha (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Landscape
Studies (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 243, 245, 248.
Mitchell, Lie of the Land, p. 28.
Ibid., p. 6. We begin to see how, as Herod put it in a slight reframing of Marx, ‘workers
make their own geographies but not under the conditions of their own choosing’. A.
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Finally, and further, articulated affections for agricultural landscapes
not only lack an accounting of industrial agriculture’s massive ecological
impacts, including the clearing of forests and poisoning of waters, but
also of the social structures of private property and enclosure emergent
within settler colonial dispossession. Here, though space precludes us
from pursuing the idea, we encourage a reckoning with the full complexity of agriculture as a mode of settler dispossession anchored around its
erasure of field-labouring bodies, from contemporary migrant workers to
indentured and enslaved workers who produced the value in colonial
commodities.
9.5 Landscape, Authority and Settler Presence
In this section, we link concerns about the use of arable land in solar
energy projects with the hidden labour relations of renewable development, situated within fossil capitalism in contemporary settler colonial
Canada. In addition to erasing work and labour, ‘right to landscape’
claims also tend to obfuscate social relations in ways related to the
imperatives of what Veracini terms the ‘the settler colonial present’.81
The push for renewables might also be seen as reflective of settler
demands and priorities that ultimately result in the continuing
displacement and dispossession of Indigenous communities from lands
and livelihoods.82 As opponents of solar projects mobilise attachments to
rural landscapes, we see expression of particular conceptions of agricultural land use forged on fossil capitalism, and settler colonial notions of
belonging and authority. In this respect, the labour-free notion of harvesting the sun also relies upon a claim to legitimate authority in the
settler colonial present.83
In a certain respect, while we are not unsympathetic to the sense of loss
expressed by certain rural residents, the contextualisation of the claims
within settler colonial relations should produce a different stance from
81
82
83
Herod, ‘Geography of Labour’, in Oxford Bibliographies (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014).
L. Veracini, The Settler Colonial Present (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
We have argued that reducing greenhouse gas emissions is now a critical settler-state
imperative producing a ‘voracious appetite for resources and land’ that is inherent not
only in fossil extractivism, but in the green energy economy as well. Scott and Smith,
‘Sacrifice zones in the green energy economy’.
A. Roy, ‘Paradigms of propertied citizenship. Transnational techniques of analysis’ (2003)
38 Urban Affairs Review 463.
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critical environmental justice scholars. It is clear that the pressing settlercolonial imperative of erasing and denying Indigenous jurisdiction continues to play a major role in structuring prevailing patterns of land use,
access and control in a variety of contexts. Examples from across Canada
in recent years illustrate the way in which Indigenous claims to land and
livelihood – such as those mobilised by the Treaty 8 Nations opposed to a
massive new hydroelectric dam proposed for Alberta known as the ‘Site
C’ dam, or those of the Labrador Land Defenders opposed to the Muskrat
Falls dam on their territories – are systematically ignored. Both projects
were billed as ‘clean’ energy initiatives and aggressively pursued by settler
governments over the clear objections of Indigenous peoples’ collective
claims for the preservation of a landscape that sustains their people.
These decisions effect not merely an undermining of an ecology upon
which life is lived, but of the working relations required for living.
Prevailing patterns of land use, access and control, therefore, constitute
both the means and the ends of settler law – as the mechanism by which
the fragile power is perpetuated, but also the end-goals of domination
over nature and the ‘other’.
Settler colonialism has meant that Indigenous peoples are dispossessed
‘based partly on the belief that they had not sufficiently extracted themselves from or productively engaged their environment’.84 As Povinelli
explains, colonial legal theorists believed that Indigenous peoples
did not own the land through which they moved because nothing had
been added and because the human subject who could not ‘add to’ and
‘transform’ the land had yet to be formed; the land remained empty (terra
nullius) of people, or more precisely, ‘unoccupied’ (as against occupation)
by fully human subjects and the civil nations they were able to create.85
And while some colonial legal theorists such as de Vitoria and Grotius
are said to have argued against these conclusions to a certain extent, they
still did so ‘within a theoretical framework . . . built upon western
concepts of what happens when humans act in the natural world’.86
Even today, as Povinelli astutely notes, we often rely on ‘Western notions
of human intentionality, subjectivity, and production embedded in the
very legal discourses [we] seek to oppose’.87 It is perhaps unsurprising,
84
85
86
87
Povinelli, ‘Do rocks listen?’, 506.
Ibid., 507.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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then, that we see these tensions rising to the surface in the debates over
renewable energy and the just transition.
Returning to the central example of settler claims of a ‘right to
landscape’ in southwestern Ontario, we can see that they constitute an
undermining of a range of livelihoods of Indigenous peoples and communities alongside the erasure of the exertions of migrant farm workers,
themselves displaced from lands, livelihoods and connections to landscapes elsewhere.88 Indigenous peoples and migrant workers alike are
alienated from dominant conceptions of community and culture and,
ultimately, belonging; they are, in Mitchell’s terms, ‘read out’ of the
landscape. Not only are racialised bodies and the efforts of migrant
workers anomalous within the dominant visions of rural space and
futurities, but Indigenous sovereignties are as well. The settler imperative
to displace and dispossess Indigenous peoples from lands and
livelihoods produces the ‘big’ lie of the land upon which all other lies
are carried out.89
9.6
Fossil Capitalism’s Enduring Energy Landscapes
There is, of course, a rich and lengthy history of contestations over land
use throughout the sordid saga of global capitalist development. The
large-scale forces of displacement and dispossession that were set in
motion several centuries ago and cleared the way for capitalist
accumulation on a global scale persist in contemporary affairs.90 These
persistent forces remain necessary to the ‘transformation of natural
riches into economic wealth’ and, as demonstrated in agricultural land
use disputes, support the continuation of fossil capitalism.91 Fossil energy
88
89
90
91
Indigenous children forced into residential schools were also forced to labour without
wages on nearby farms (in the case of boys) and as domestics (in the case of girls). B.
Schissel and T. Wotherspoon, The Legacy of School for Aboriginal People: Education,
Oppression, and Emancipation (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2003).
A. Smith, ‘Toward a critique of political economy of “sociolegality” in settler capitalist
Canada’, in M. Thomas, L. F. Vosko and O. Lyubchenko (eds.), Change and Continuity:
Canadian Political Economy in the New Millennium (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press,
2019).
Neocleous, ‘International law as primitive accumulation’.
Some have discussed ‘carbon colonialism’: see S. Batel and P. Devine-Wright, ‘Energy
colonialism and the role of the global in local responses to new energy infrastructures in
the UK: A critical and exploratory empirical analysis’ (2016) 49 Antipode 3.
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enjoys certain path dependencies in capitalist accumulation.92 The effects
are evident in its ‘omnipresent hardware’, including its ‘oil wells and coal
mines to road networks, harbours, airports, power stations, manufacturing facilities and the landscapes of industrial agriculture’, as well as
electricity and other infrastructure anchored in place from national grids
and high-voltage power lines to pipelines.93 The effects are also found in
prevailing regulatory regimes, such as land-use planning.94 All told, fossil
capitalism produces particular, spatially-fixed energy landscapes which
possess a ‘marked inertia’ in economic and political terms.95
This understanding complicates attempts to fashion agricultural land
use antagonisms according to the binaries of ‘food’ versus ‘fuel’, and even
‘fossil’ versus ‘green’. This is because the prevailing agro-food system and
emergent renewable energy developments are indebted to, and remain
dependent upon, fossil capital.96 Fossil fuels, such as petroleum, serve as
a key energy input in production, transportation and consumption of
92
93
94
95
96
G. C. Unruh, ‘Understanding carbon lock-in’ (2000) 28 Energy Policy 817; D. Carrington,
‘Fossil fuels subsidized by $10m a minute, says IMF’, The Guardian, 18 May 2015; N.
Beuret, ‘Counting carbon: Calculative activism and slippery infrastructure’ (2017) 49
Antipode 1164: ‘This paper investigates how the problem of climate change is constructed
as a global object of political action and how it functions to render politics into a matter
of calculative action, one that seeks – but fails – to take hold of a slippery
carbon infrastructure’.
D. Scott, ‘The networked infrastructure of fossil capitalism: Implications of the new
pipeline debates for environmental justice in Canada’ (2013) 43 Revue générale de droit
11; É. Pineault, ‘The capitalist pressure to extract, an ecological and political economy of
extreme oil in Canada’ (2018) 99 Studies in Political Economy 130; A. V. Carter and A.
Zalik, ‘Fossil capitalism and the rentier state: Toward a political ecology of Alberta’s oil
economy’, in L. E. Adkin (ed.), First World Petro-Politics: The Political Ecology and
Governance of Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), p. 52.
B. Dunn, ‘Preserving agricultural land for local food production: Policies from other
places as a guide to land use planning for Ontario’ (2013) Canadian Environmental Law
Association 1.
Scott, ‘Networked infrastructure of fossil capitalism’; Carton, ‘Dancing to the rhythms of
the fossil fuel landscape’, 46; Pasqualetti, ‘Reading the changing energy landscape’; G.
Bridge, S. Bouzarovski, M. Bradshaw and N. Eyre, ‘Geographies of energy transition:
Space, place and the low-carbon economy’ (2013) 53 Energy Policy 331.
As Altvater puts it, ‘[I]n contrast to solar radiation, which changes its intensity between
day and night and with the rhythms of the seasons, fossil energy can be used 24 hours a
day and 365 days a year with constant intensity, allowing the organization of production
processes independently of social time schedules, biological and other natural rhythms’.
But as he further explains, ‘One of the main advantages of fossil energy for capitalist
accumulation is the congruence of its physical properties with the socioeconomic and
political logics of capitalist development. In comparison with other energy sources fossil
energy fulfils almost perfectly the requirements of the capitalist process of accumulation.
It fits into capitalism’s societal relation to nature’: Altvater, ‘The social and natural
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both agro-food and solar panel energy, and in the latter respect in the
transmission of electricity through networks.97 The point in recognising
carbon indebtedness is not to downplay the real differences in the
rhythms and social and environmental effects of non-renewable and
renewable energy production.98 In an important respect, however, fossil
commodification is infused within the production of the solar energy
commodity – thus making the prospects of a renewable energy economy
problematically beholden to the fossil economy. We might think of this
as petrification of a different kind, and it produces a complex and pivotal
disaggregation challenge for a just transition.99
Attentiveness to the distributional effects of renewable energy generation requires coming to grips with settler capitalism. The settler capitalist ‘lie of the land’ is not of mere omission, but in fact of layered
displacements of the centrality of work, labour and livelihoods. Any
potential exhibited in a just transition framework will be realised only
97
98
99
environment of fossil capitalism’, 41. See also H. Wilhite, The Political Economy of Low
Carbon Transformation: Breaking the Habits of Capitalism (London: Routledge, 2016).
We might also include here consideration of the extractivist dimensions of renewable
energy, including the sourcing of minerals: see E. Dominish, N. Florin and S. Teske,
Responsible Minerals Sourcing for Renewable Energy (Sydney: Institute for Sustainable
Futures, 2019).
There are rhythmic differences in modes of energy generation. Some have made much
about the congruent nature of fossil fuel production to capitalist development. But the
rhythms of fossil fuel production did not arrive ready-made; they were forged and reforged through socio-technological processes and relations – and perhaps never fully
quieted. The particular rhythms of fossil fuel-based energy generation developed to
support capitalist value arithmetic; namely the commodification of labour and nature,
and have fuelled the ‘terrifying new math’ of the warming condition – increase in global
temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, gigatons of carbon dioxide that could be released
into the atmosphere before surpassing that temperature mark, and gigatons of fossil fuel
awaiting burning. The arithmetical analysis of capitalism’s biorhythms is proof of the
disastrous effects of human action on the planet. B. McKibben, ‘Global Warming’s
Terrifying New Math’, Rolling Stone, 19 July 2012.
Graham’s investigation of the relationship between the carbon extractive sector in
Canada and renewable energy generation is telling. A dimension of this relates to the
‘shapeshifting’ nature of capital, in this respect through the fusion of oil with renewable
energy capital – as a strategic move in which ‘“old villains” of the carbon economy have
fused and emerged as the “new heroes” of the green economy’. The strategy, while
seemingly calling forth ‘deference’ and ‘affirmation’, underwrites land-use conflict and
‘successive weakening of regulation’: N. Graham, ‘Canadian fossil capitalism, corporate
strategy, and post-carbon futures’ (2019) 56 Canadian Review of Sociology 224. See also
B. Garvey, E. A. Souza, M. R. Mendonça, C. V. dos Santos and F. V. P. Virginio, ‘The
mythical shapeshifting of capital and petrification of labour: Deepening conflict on the
agrofuel frontier’ (2019) 51 Antipode 1185.
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as the settler colonial dimensions of fossil capitalism are contested. The
challenge, then, is to consider the layered histories, patterns and relations
of living on the land, not only in specific places, but globally.100
We posit that work and labour provide crucial if under-explored
dimensions of the social relations of renewable energy development in
settler capitalist Canada. Exploring conflicts over solar energy and agricultural landscapes in the Global North, we have put forward an account
in which work and labour (including that performed in the North by
workers from the Global South) represent embodied practices of working
and living on the land. These everyday socio-spatial practices implicate
ordinary people in the making of landscapes and continuing relations of
settler capitalism, shaping how ‘we’ live together on the land, including
who belongs and who gets to decide.
9.7 Conclusion
The year 2020 came on the heels of what Naomi Klein called a ‘cascade of
large and militant climate mobilisations’.101 Klein argued that, in pursuing a just transition, ‘we can create hundreds of millions of good jobs
around the world, invest in the most systematically excluded communities and nations . . . [and] instill a sense of collective, higher purpose – a
set of concrete goals that we are all working toward together’.102 And yet,
the climate crisis, the transition to a post-carbon economy – and even the
COVID-19 pandemic – seem to be dividing us more and more.
In considering the right to landscape claims and accompanying perceptions of agricultural land use and life that have characterised the
controversies over solar installations in southern Ontario, we conclude
here that arguments both in favour and opposed to new solar power
projects tend to erase work and labour as they bolster settler authority
100
101
102
In this respect, we must consider the generation of renewable energy within wider
disparities, including ‘the global effects of first-world consumption’. M. Ryle and K.
Soper, ‘Introduction: the ecology of labour’ (2016) 20 Green Letters 119. Indeed, ‘solar
and wind energy industries are highly transnationalised and already inserted into global
patterns of accumulation’. J. Harris, ‘Going green to stay in the black: transnational
capitalism and renewable energy’ (2010) 52 Race and Class 62.
N. Klein, ‘The green new deal: A fight for our lives’, New York Review, 17 September
2019.
Ibid.
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and undermine Indigenous jurisdiction.103 Both accounts circulate
around presumed authority over agricultural landscapes, sidestepping
consideration of work, labour and livelihood, fossil capitalism and the
settler colonial relation. Where is the scope for ‘labour’ action and
subjectivity differently perceived?
As a response, it is clear that we must reject ‘modest re-arrangements
in modes of regulating and governing technology and social systems
which shift technology and regulation in lower carbon directions’ whenever those re-arrangements fail to disrupt the prevailing distributions of
economic and political power.104 We return our attention to ‘issues of
scale, control, sovereignty and democracy’ because ‘sustainability transformation must be defined not only by changes in resource use, i.e. a shift
from fossil to renewables, but also in how they are governed’.105 A ‘just
transition’ must be a deeper transformation that confronts the authority
to decide ‘landscapes for whom’?106
103
104
105
106
The matter of land back is not merely a matter of justice, rights or ‘reconciliation’;
Indigenous jurisdiction can indeed help mitigate the loss of biodiversity and climate
crisis: S. Pasternak and H. King, Land Back: A Yellowhead Institute Red Paper,
Yellowhead Institute, October 2019, p. 64.
P. Newell, ‘Trasformismo or transformation? The global political economy of energy
transitions’ (2017) 26 Review of International Political Economy 5. See also A. Stirling,
‘Transforming power: Social science and the politics of energy choices’ (2014) 1 Energy
Research and Social Sciences 83.
A. Scheidel, L. Temper, F. Demaria and J. Martiˊnez-Alier, ‘Ecological distribution
conflicts as forces for sustainability: An overview and conceptual framework’ (2018)
13 Sustainability Science 585, 594.
Ibid.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108667289.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108667289.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press