Virtuous and Vicious Anger: What Aristotle Has To Teach Us

Ancient Philosophy

This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle's account of anger yields a narcissistic passion bedevilled by illusions of self-sufficiency. The paper argues on behalf of Aristotle's valuing of anger within a virtuous and flourishing life, showing that and why Aristotle's account is neither narcissistic nor involves illusions of self-sufficiency. In so arguing a deeper appreciation of Aristotle's understanding of a self-sufficient life is reached, as are some interesting contrasts between Aristotle's understanding of anger, its connections to value and our own understanding of these matters.

Aristotle says that is not easy to lay out completely definitive rules about getting angry (ou gar hradion diorisai . . . orgisteon) He notes that this difficulty applies to:

Ratio (2002)

This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle’s account of anger yields a narcissistic passion bedevilled by illusions of self-sufficiency. The paper argues on behalf of Aristotle’s valuing of anger within a virtuous and flourishing life, showing that and why Aristotle’s account is neither narcissistic nor involves illusions of self-sufficiency. In so arguing a deeper appreciation of Aristotle’s understanding of a self-sufficient life is reached, as are some interesting contrasts between Aristotle's understanding of anger, its connections to value, and our own understanding of these matters.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2016

Aristotle and others suggest that a single virtue – ‘good temper’ – pertains specifically to anger. I argue that if good temper is a single virtue, it is constituted by aspects of a combination of other virtues. I present three categories of anger-relevant virtues – those that (potentially) dispose one to anger; those that delay, mitigate, and qualify anger; and those required for effortful anger control – and show how virtues in each category make distinct contributions to good temper. In addition to clarifying the relationship between anger and the virtues, my analysis has theoretical implications for virtue individuation more generally, and practical implications for character cultivation.

2014

I told my wrath, my wrath did end. I was angry with my foe: I told it not, my wrath did grow." 1 Anger is central to moral and legal decision-making. Angry individuals reason differently than people in a temperate state. Aristotle and the ancient Greeks understood anger's practical role in forensic argument and moral judgment-an intuition modern psychologists have largely confirmed. Psychological experiments show that people primed to anger will draw different inferences than people in a tranquil state of mind from the same factual circumstances. As Aristotle understood, our ability to reach conclusions about a set of facts is influenced by emotional processes such as anger. This article analyzes competing views of anger in contemporary moral philosophy. It uses cross-cutting psychological, biological, sociological, anthropological, historical and philosophical arguments about the experience and expression of anger to critically assess leading philosophical accounts of the role of anger in moral and judicial decision making.

While Aristotle’s moral philosophy does not have a fully articulated theory of retribution and punishment, his discussions of anger provide a fruitful and commonsensical way of understanding such matters. My paper will discuss several themes raised by Aristotle’s discussions, my main thesis being: if Aristotle is correct in his understanding of the relations between anger, retribution, and moral valuations, we can distinguish between rightful retribution, mere revenge, and even malice or cruelty. These distinctions will not be adequately captured in sets of rules, but rather require reference to character, judgement, and virtues. Affectivity will be an integral part of the proper moral response to wrongdoing, so that the difference between retribution and revenge, from an Aristotlean standpoint, will not reside in a putatively “objective” and affectless retribution and a purely subjective and affect-laden revenge. Although Aristotle does hold out the possibility of an affectless retribution, he does not view this as normal. Indeed, Aristotle views desiring that those who violate norms suffer some penalty to be an integral part of a good character. What is ultimately decisive for Aristotle, and what reins in retribution, allowing it to be distinguished from revenge or malice, are moral norms.

Virtues and Their Vices, 2014

This chapter presents an account of an angrily virtuous, or patient, person informed by research on emotion in empirical and philosophical psychology. It is argued that virtue for anger is determined by excellence and deficiency with respect to all three of anger’s psychological functions: appraisal, motivation, and communication. Many competing accounts of virtue for anger assess it by attention to just one function; it is argued that singular evaluations of a person’s anger will ignore important dimensions of anger that bear on virtue and vice. Thus, possessing excellence with respect to only one function of anger is insufficient for virtue. The account is also extended to the characteristic vices of anger: wrath and meekness.

The dark side. Philosophical reflections on the "negative emotions", 2021

Traditionally, anger tends to have a bad reputation because of its aggressive attitude, destructive tendency and inclination for conflict and violence. However one strand of ancient tradition considered it to be an energy that compels human beings to action, to reject injustice and to struggle for their dignity. The main aim of this chapter is to show the complexity of this multifaceted emotion from different perspectives, by comparing ancient and modern interpretations against the background of contemporary philosophical and empirical research. Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle provided the first conceptual pillars for any study of anger, linking it to the courage and dignity of the human being. Thomas Aquinas, too, recognized its positive role, when governed by reason. Descartes’ scientific attitude to the emotions, including anger, and the recognition of their utility for the individual body’s healthful survival, paved the way for all subsequent assessments of the affective sphere up to the present.

American Journal of Political Science

Aristotle's analysis in the Rhetoric of the intelligibility of passionately angry political speech is an urgently needed addition to the ongoing scholarly reassessment of his relevance to democratic practices. Aristotle shows his readers-both orators and their auditors, citizens who might both rule and be ruled-that anger is prone to exaggeration and distortion and is therefore liable to be amplified into hatred. He shows further though that if instead of simply being exaggerated, anger is taken "seriously," then a more sober and measured politics can ensue, one less destructive of a good legal order.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Although theorists disagree about precisely how to characterize the link between anger and moral judgment, that they are linked is routinely taken for granted in contemporary metaethics and philosophy of emotion. One problem with this assumption is that it ignores virtues like patience, which thinkers as different as Cassian, Śāntideva, and Maimonides have argued are characteristic of mature moral agents. The patient neither experience nor plan to experience anger in response to (at least some) wrongs. Nevertheless, we argue, they remain capable of judging such actions to be wrong. This indicates that a different account of the relationship between anger and moral judgment is required. We conclude by proposing one such account, showing how a metaethicist who was more attentive to the normative ethics of anger might set about reconstructing her position.