Trends and Transformations in World Politics

Trends and Transformations in World Politics Trends and Transformations in World Politics Edited by Özgür Tüfekçi and Rahman Dağ LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE Copyright © 2022 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Tüfekçi, Özgür, editor. | Dag, Rahman, editor. Title: Trends and transformations in world politics / edited by Özgür Tüfekçi and Rahman Dağ. Description: Lanham: Lexington Books, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021062024 (print) | LCCN 2021062025 (ebook) | ISBN 9781793650238 (cloth) | ISBN 9781793650245 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: International relations—Political aspects. | International relations—Economic aspects. | Geopolitics. Classification: LCC JZ1242 .T75 2022 (print) | LCC JZ1242 (ebook) | DDC 327.101—dc23/eng/20220204 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021062024 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021062025 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Contents Introduction Rahman Dağ and Özgür Tüfekçi 1 PART I 27 Chapter One: From Stasis to Change: The Structural Context of the Second Cold War Richard Sakwa 29 Chapter Two: NATO—The Urgent Need of Adaptation (Again) in a Changing World: Revitalization of Political Dimension, Southern Flank, and China Factor Luis Tomé 47 Chapter Three: Effect of Cases on the Rivalry Between National Sovereignty and Intervention Ekrem Ok & Özgür Tüfekçi 81 Chapter Four: The Bear has Taken the Honey: Predictability of Putin’s Russia Sónia Sénica 99 Chapter Five: How Eurasian Integration of China’s Belt and Road Initiative Defends a Multipolar World Order Andrew K P LEUNG 117 Chapter Six: Whither Global Governance? An Approach to the World Politics Özgür Tüfekçi and Rahman Dağ 137 v vi Contents PART II 151 Chapter Seven: Trends and Transformation in world Politics through the Eyes of the Leading IR Scholars Rahman Dağ and Özgür Tüfekçi 153 Conclusion Rahman Dağ and Özgür Tüfekçi 269 About the Editors and Contributors 281 22 Introduction Barnett, M. N., (1997). “Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, legitimacy, and the United Nations,” World Politics, 49(4), 526–51. Beeson, M., and Richard Higgott (2005). Hegemony, Institutionalism and US Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Comparative Historical Perspective. Third World Quarterly, 26(7), 1173–88. Bergesen, A. J., and Omar Lizardo (2004). “International Terrorism and the World-System,” Sociological Theory, 22(1), 38–52. Blechman, B. M., and Stephen Kaplan (1979). “U.S. Military Forces as a Political Instrument Since World War II,” Political Science Quarterly, 94(2), 193–209. 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It led to the Gulf War, which was a war waged by coalition forces from 35 nations led by the United States against Iraq. Chapter One From Stasis to Change The Structural Context of the Second Cold War Richard Sakwa The international system established in the post-war years is under unprecedented challenge, as are the various world orders that inhabit that system.1 The revolutionary power system that took shape in the form of the Soviet Union and its allies was one of those world orders, but its disintegration between 1989 and 1991 allowed the major alternative, the Atlantic power system, to bask in self-declared triumph. There was no post-Cold War peace settlement, and the uneasy arrangements established at that time are beginning to unravel. First, the era of the cold peace between 1918 and 2014 has given way to the onset of a second Cold War. The idea of a new Cold War is highly contested, but it is used here in the very specific context as an analogy between the first and the second world wars. Just as the Second World War differed in scope, regional context, key actors, and ideological configuration from the First World War, so, too, does the second Cold War differ from the first in these characteristics. Despite this, a new bipolarity is emerging, focused on Beijing and Washington, D.C., and Europe is once again divided. Second, just as was the first Cold War, the second is also about the conflicting views of world order as the US-led liberal international order (LIO) is challenged by the emergence of a putative anti-hegemonic alignment between Russia, China, and their allies in the emerging alternative architecture of world affairs—especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Third, the Atlantic power system is eroding, with the European Union (EU) striving for greater “strategic autonomy” and a greater geopolitical presence in world affairs, 29 From Stasis to Change 43 conflict to a minimum” (2006: 2). In the second decade of the twenty-first century, Russia reemerged as an active player in international affairs, and although still only barely in the top dozen countries economically, its impressive military reform and reequipment since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war allowed it to “punch above its weight.” Stasis and change now balance each other, and although the post-first Cold War order is unraveling, this has given rise to both a second Cold War and the emergence of an anti-hegemonic alignment. The question today is whether the latter can help transcend the former. Although the sinews of a post-Western world are emerging, notably in the form of SCO and BRICS, it remains to be seen whether these bodies and countries behind them will be able to sustain the multilateralism of the last seven decades and the international system in which they are embedded. Does the absence of the hegemon that provided the security and support for multilateralism represent a danger or an opportunity? The post-Western world may well assume the characteristics of the pre-Western international system, dominated by vast competing empires. National populist realism entails partial deglobalization. Equally, it would be the supreme irony if liberal internationalism and open markets were to be saved by the leaders of the anti-hegemonic alignment. This could herald a new age of post-hegemonic internationalism, but it could equally inaugurate a new era of zero-sum conflict, protectionism, a drive to the bottom in regulatory standards, and another three-decade-long Cold War. 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Russia in the Changing International System (2019) as well as my book The Lost Peace (forthcoming). Chapter Two NATO—The Urgent Need of Adaptation (Again) in a Changing World Revitalization of Political Dimension, Southern Flank, and China Factor Luis Tomé The ability to adapt to the geopolitical context and strategic circumstances is the reason for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) success and longevity. It was its adaptive capacity that enabled the Atlantic Alliance to succeed in the face of the Soviet threat while consolidating itself as a transatlantic community of security and values, supporting European integration, and favoring economic development and the well-being of all allies. It was also its adaptation to the post-Cold War “new order” that allowed it to counter those who said that the acronym NATO came to mean “No Alternative to Obsolescence.” It did so by embracing former opponents, developing a wide range of instruments and capabilities to address a wider and more diverse range of threats and risks; launching security missions and operations and crisis management mechanisms; projecting itself “out of area”; and fostering cooperative security with external partners. Thanks to its adaptive capacity, NATO remains the cornerstone of the security and defense of its current thirty member states and of the Euro-Atlantic security. And its contribution to the expansion of democracy in Europe, “European reunification,” international security, and the liberal international order is undeniable. 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They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them..” Article IV states that “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” See the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949. 3. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (2004); Albania and Croatia (2009); Montenegro (2017); and North Macedonia (2020). 4. Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 5. Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 6. The United Kingdom, Sweden, Portugal, Poland, Netherlands, Italy, Hungary, France, Spain, Denmark, and Germany. Chapter Three Effect of Cases on the Rivalry Between National Sovereignty and Intervention Ekrem Ok & Özgür Tüfekçi INTRODUCTION Humanitarian Intervention (HI) is one of the last decade’s outstanding concepts, and it has raised controversies, both when it happens and when it does not. With the end of the Cold War, politicians and academics have started to become interested in matters outside of the two superpowers’ competition. The international community has started to deal with issues that have previously been of low importance. The concept of HI is also among the issues that have started to be discussed more after the Cold War. It has emerged from this question: “Do human rights violations in a state concern other states?” And it refers to military intervention by a third country, group of countries, or international organization to the internal affairs of a country with human rights violations with or without consent of that country. As countries intervened for humanitarian purposes, the discussions on HI have become fiercer and sharper. As a result of these discussions, several opposing views have emerged, such as intervention versus sovereignty, intervention versus nonintervention, or human rights versus international order. Although it has different names, this debate is essentially between those who think serious human rights violations should require intervention and those who think they should not interfere with domestic affairs. In this study, we 81 Effect of Cases on the Rivalry Between National Sovereignty and Intervention 95 humanitarian concerns to conceal their interests. In other words, the problem of abuse harms confidence in the concept of HI. The support for noninterventionism, which started to rise with the 2003 Iraq intervention, reached its peak after the 2011 Libya intervention. At this stage, the question arises regarding whether the HI concept could increase in popularity again. We think that the concept of HI may rise again because the moral questions of today, which are the revealer of HI, are still valid and robust. Nevertheless, in order to rise, HI first needs a meticulous codification to handle the current problems. REFERENCES Ayoob, M., (2002). “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” The International Journal of Human Rights, 6(1), 81–102, https://doi.org/10.1080 /714003751. “Barack Obama: All US troops to leave Iraq in 2011,” BBC News, October 21, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-15410154. 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Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press). NOTES 1. The Peace of Westphalia was a series of peace treaties signed between May and October 1648 in the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Münster. The treaties ended the Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty Years’ War. Chapter Four The Bear has Taken the Honey Predictability of Putin’s Russia Sónia Sénica Proclaiming itself as a “sovereign democracy” with centralized and vertical leadership, Russia seeks to project the image of great global power at the international level and legitimize it at home. Being intrinsically linked to these two dimensions, international action derives from the political agenda determined internally under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin based on his vision for the country. The uniqueness of Russian politics and governance refers to a geographically vast country with varied ethnic specificities and latitudes, whose historical heritage is a strong, centralized, and personalized leadership. Repeatedly extolling Russian honor and patriotism in times of increased external tension, the Russian leadership seeks to legitimize itself and rely on a bureaucratic apparatus loyal to the president and an increasingly conservative civil society. Focusing on the glory of Russian history, language, and culture, the Russian leadership seeks to justify its external action in the face of international opposition. Under the motto of the need for stability, defense of sovereignty, and non-external interference, President Putin seeks to shield himself from possible attacks against the regime either by opening the path to constitutional reform with a plan of staying in power or by excluding from the political game any possible opponents who might challenge his leadership. 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Russia Politics and Society (New York: Routledge). The Bear has Taken the Honey 115 Sakwa, R., (2010a). “A Política Externa Russa Contextualizada” in Freire, M. R., ed., A Rússia de Putin, 11–27, (Lisboa: Almedina). Sakwa, R., (2010b). Communism in Russia: An Interpretative Essay (London: Palgrave Macmillan). Shearman, P., (1995). Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990 (London: Routledge). Slobodchikoff, M. O., (2014). Building Hegemonic Order Russia’s Way: Order, Stability, and Predictability in the Post-Soviet Space (London: Lexington Books). Smith, S., (1988). “Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview,” Review of International Studies, 12(1), 13–29. Snyder, R., Bruck, H., and Sapin, B., (2002). Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited), (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Surkov, V., “Surkov: In His Own Words,” The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2006, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116646992809753610. 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Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge). NOTES 1. Eurasianism emerged in the 1920s among Russian émigrés who believed that Russia belongs neither to the East nor to the West but is a civilization in its own right. Chapter Five How Eurasian Integration of China’s Belt and Road Initiative Defends a Multipolar World Order Andrew K P LEUNG In the face of “America First” hegemony, China advances its Belt and Road Initiative (B&R), integrated with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union in defense of a multipolar world order, which China has benefited from immensely during past decades. The B&R is designed as a key strategy to realize the Chinese dream of a historic renaissance, purging the national demon of the “century of humiliation” at the hands of foreign aggressors. The B&R is reinforced by China’s multifaceted footprints in western Europe, central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, South America, and the Arctic. This is happening as the world’s tectonic plates are shifting. Without forming a rigid geopolitical bloc reminiscent of the Cold War, China and Russia, as “continental powers,” are forming a marriage of convenience to rival a loose coalition of US-led Western “maritime powers.” In this “Game of Thrones,” the broader developing world, representing the “Rise of the Rest,” plays an important part. Rising from being a laggard, it now accounts for 60 percent of the world economy and is becoming a key contributor to global growth. As the largest developing country (in terms of per capita GDP and other measures), China is practitioner par excellence in cementing an intertwined, interconnected, interdependent, and digitized global production and value chain, encompassing many developed and developing countries. The world can no longer be easily bifurcated as the United States would like in order to isolate, exclude, and contain a rising China, which is now firmly branded as America’s overarching strategic rival. On the other hand, notwithstanding its rising clout, China struggles with worsening perceptions of its economic 117 132 Chapter Five Critical global issues, like climate change, water scarcity, ecological degradation, nuclear proliferation, cybersecurity, terrorism, and regional conflicts, cannot be resolved by any single country, no matter how powerful. This reality lends support to China’s espousal of a “Community of Common Destiny” for humanity (Zhang, 2018), allowing for shared interests, mutual respect, and inclusive diversity. While China is facing many headwinds pushing back against its “authoritarian” model, its “unfair” trade practices, and perceived drawbacks of the B&R, given wide support for multilateralism by many developed and developing countries, a super-globally-connected China is well paced to deepen and help improve the function of a multipolar world order against attempts to break it with a unipolar wrecking ball. REFERENCES BBAV Research (2012). “Emerging and Growth Leading Economies (EAGLES), Annual Report,” https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/mult/120215 _BBVAEAGLES_Annual_Report_tcm348-288784.pdf (accessed on January 24, 2020). 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The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press). How Eurasian Integration of China’s Belt and Road Initiative 133 Fulton, J., “For China, the Belt and Road Run Through the Middle East,” South China Morning Post, July 14, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy -defence/article/2155258/china-belt-and-road-run-through-middle-east (accessed January 24, 2020). Garcia-Herrero, A., and Xu, J., “China’s Investments In Africa: What The Data Really Say, And The Implications For Europe,” Forbes Online, July 24, 2019, https: / /www.forbes.com /sites /aliciagarciaherrero /2019 /07 /24 /chinas -investments -in -africa-what-the-data-really-says-and-the-implications-for-europe/#32b8f366661f (accessed on January 25, 2020). 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Sun, Y., “The political significance of China’s latest commitments to Africa,” Brookings Institution, September 12, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa -in-focus/2018/09/12/the-political-significance-of-chinas-latest-commitments-to -africa/ (accessed on January 25, 2020). Szczepanski, K., “Zheng He’s Treasure Ships,” ThoughtCo, August 7, 2019, https: //www.thoughtco.com/zheng-hes-treasure-ships-195235 (accessed on January 28, 2020). Wheatney, J., “Does investing in emerging markets still make sense?” Financial Times, July 16, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/0bd159f2-937b-11e9-aea1 -2b1d33ac3271 (accessed on January 24, 2020). Woetzel, J., “Bridging Global Infrastructure Gaps,” McKinsey & Co., June 4, 2016, https: / /www.mckinsey.com / ~ /media /McKinsey /Industries /Capital %20Projects %20and%20Infrastructure/Our%20Insights/Bridging%20global%20infrastructure %20gaps/Bridging-Global-Infrastructure-Gaps-In-Brief.ashx (accessed January 20, 2020). World Shipping Council, “Top 50 World Container Ports,” http://www.worldshipping. org/about-the-industry/global-trade/top-50-world-container-ports (accessed on January 19, 2020). How Eurasian Integration of China’s Belt and Road Initiative 135 Zhang, D., (2018). “The Concept of ‘Community of Common Destiny’ in China’s Diplomacy: Meaning, Motives and Implications,” Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies, 5(2), 196–207, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/app5.231 (accessed on January 26, 2020). NOTES 1. The Washington Consensus includes ten broad sets of relatively specific policy recommendations, including fiscal discipline, tax reform, market-based interest rates and exchange rates, trade and market access liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and protection of property rights. 2. Two Centenaries: (1) to become a relatively well-off country by 2021, the centenary of the Communist Party of China and (2) to become a “strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and modern socialist country” by 2049, the centenary of the People’s Republic of China. 3. “Made in China 2025” is a national plan announced in 2015 to upgrade China’s technology capabilities in order to lead in ten cutting-edge technologies by 2025— information technology, robotics, green energy, green vehicles, aerospace equipment, ocean engineering and high-tech ships, railway equipment, power equipment, new materials, medicine and medical devices, and agricultural machinery. 4. To view this map, please visit https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/156/162 /90/1535691275209.html. 5. For maps on the TEN-T, see the following: “Connection of NAPA ports to the TEN-T and Pan-European corridors,” https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Connection -of-NAPA-ports-to-the-TEN-T-and-Pan-European-corridors_fig1_347462105, as well as “Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T),” https://ec.europa.eu/transport /themes/infrastructure/ten-t_en). 6. For a map of existing and developing routes included in the Polar Silk Road, please visit https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-existing-and-developing -routes-included-in-Polar-Silk-Road-36_fig4_330643092). 7. The World Bank defines it as within the “middle-income range” countries with GDP per capita between $10,000 to $12,000 at constant (2011) prices. According to historical data, only a handful of developing countries managed to escape from getting stuck in this middle-income range. 8. RT Questions More, China overtakes US as world’s largest trading country, (February 11, 2013). reference is made to the number of countries having China as their largest trading partner, compared with the position of the United States. Information is available at https://www.rt.com/business/china-us-largest-trading -country-908/ (accessed on January 26, 2020). Chapter Six Whither Global Governance? An Approach to the World Politics Özgür Tüfekçi and Rahman Dağ The world has increasingly become more complex, more globalized, and more vulnerable in the twenty-first century. In this new global order, one should comprehend and explore political, economic, social, environmental, institutional, and cultural processes and changes globally. On the one hand, the international community has witnessed the gloomiest and darkest hours in recent world history because the existing global governance structures have deepened many political, structural, and moral crises. The absence of a strong international order has resulted in the 9/11 attacks, the 2003 war in Iraq, the 2007 global financial crisis, and the failure of the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen. On the other hand, world wealth has increased, and the social and economic well-being of many nations has improved. In this process, the roles of the nation-state and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become more intertwined. One can observe the critical role of international and transnational organizations in every issue area of international politics. International organizations (IOs) and global governance are important global instruments to make the world a more peaceful and better place, protect human lives, and improve the environment. In this sense, global governance has emerged as a “purposive system of rules that operate at the global level” (Biersteker, 2015: 158). In the meantime, globalization has become a subsidiary tool used to set a trend of intensification in economic, political, institutional, cultural, social, and digital relations among countries since the late twentieth century. It has been marked by increasing economic, environmental, and institutional interdependence and deepening economic integration between countries worldwide. The main trends of increasing economic integration are as follows: the internationalization of production, trade, and 137 148 Chapter Six UN to collect and interpret information needed further enhancement (Taylor, 2001: 349–50). It is unequivocal that the UN system needs improvements to provide well-functioning global governance. Nevertheless, improving the governance of the society of states could be carried out by the UN itself. Finding ways for the better governance of international society could take a long time, but surely states need to accept that their sovereignty has been altered. REFERENCES Archer, C., (2001). International Organisations, third edition (London: Routledge). Barnett, M., and Duvall, R., (2005). “Power in International Politics,” International Organization, 59(1), 39–75. Biersteker, T., (2015). “Global Governance” in Rotberg, R.I., ed., On Governance: What It Is, What It Measures and Its Policy Uses, (Waterloo: Center for International Governance Innovation) 135–50. Carayannis, E. G., Pirzadeh, A., and Popescu., D., (2012). Institutional Learning and Knowledge Transfer Across Epistemic Communities: New Tools of Global Governance (New York: Springer-Verlag). Carr, E. H., (1945). Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan). Commission on Global Governance. (1995). Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Emadi-Coffin, B., (2002). Rethinking International Organization: Deregulation and Global Governance (New York: Routledge). Forsythe, D. P., (2014). “Neoliberal Institutionalism” in Weiss, T., and Wilkinson, R., International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Routledge). Goldstein, J., and Pevehouse, J., (2014). International Relations, tenth edition (London: Pearson). Griffiths, M., and O’Callaghan, T., (2002). International Relations: The Key Concepts (London: Routledge). Griffiths, M., O’Callaghan, T., and Roach, S. C., (2008). International Relations: The Key Concepts, second edition (London: Routledge). Heywood, A., (2011). Global Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Hirst, P., and Thompson, G., (1996). Globalization in Question (Cambridge: Polity Press). Hohenstedt, M., (2017). The Usefulness of Neoliberal Institutionalism: Establishment of International Organizations (Munich: GRIN Publishing). Jervis, R., (1999). “Realism, Neo-liberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security, 24(1), 42–63. Keohane, R., and Nye, J., (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.). Keohane, R., (1989). International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press). Whither Global Governance? An Approach to the World Politics 149 Milner, H. V., and Moravcsik, A., (2009). Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Morgenthau, H., (2005). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education). Reimann, K. D., (2006). “A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs,” International Studies Quarterly, 50(1), 45–67. Rittberger, V., Zangl, B., and Kruck, A., (2011). International Organization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Rosenau, J. N., (1992). “Governance, Order and Change in World Politics,” in Rosenau, J. N., and Czempiel, E., eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1–29. Ruggie, J. G., (2004). “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain—Issues, Actors, and Practices,” European Journal of International Relations, 10(4), 499–531. Russett, B., and Oneal, J., (2001). Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company). Stavrianakis, A., (2012). “Missing the Target: NGOs, Global Civil Society and the Arms Trade,” Journal of International Relations and Development, 15(2), 224–49. Steffek, J., and Ferretti, M. P., (2009). “Accountability or ‘Good Decisions’? The Competing Goals of Civil Society Participation in International Governance,” Global Society, 23(1), 37–57. Stone, R. W., (2011). Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Sutch, P., and Elias, J., (2007). International Relations: The Basics (New York: Routledge). Taylor, P., (2001). “The United Nations and International Order,” in Baylis, J., and Smith, S., eds., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Weiss, T., and Wilkinson, R., (2014). International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Routledge). Young, O., (1994). International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). NOTES 1. The Napoleonic Wars were conflicts fought between France and a number of European nations between 1799 and 1815. Chapter Seven Trends and Transformation in world Politics through the Eyes of the Leading IR Scholars Rahman Dağ and Özgür Tüfekçi CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ANDREW LINKLATER1 Question: We would like to start asking about your view of the contemporary international community. In The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era, you argued that “Sovereign nation-states have been deeply exclusionary in their dealings with minority cultures and alien outsiders. And through globalization, the pacification of core areas of the world economy, and ethnic revolt, new forms of political community and citizenship have become possible.” Considering the lack of solidarity in the international community manifesting in, for instance, the cases of different political preferences between developed and developing countries, economic and political cracks among the developed countries, the refugee crisis, and the recent COVID-19 outbreak, do you still believe that such community is possible? Andrew Linklater: The argument was that the triple transformation of political community (more universalist, more sensitive to cultural differences, and more committed to the reduction of material inequalities) is an immanent possibility in modern societies. The emphasis was on normative ideals that are already anticipated by the development of modern conceptions of citizenship. The point was to highlight the positive qualities of those 153 Trends and Transformation in world Politics 157 loyalties to stress the resistance of many groups to any attempt to transfer powers to international organizations. The point has significance for understanding Brexit and the national-populist surge more generally with its focus on exercising greater power over events through the reassertion of state power and national loyalties. But hopes will be dashed. States will remain at the mercy of forces they cannot control without major advances in international cooperation. Many groups understand that, of course, but the problem of balancing national and international responsibilities and attachments remains unsolved. Question: Since you are one of the leading critical IR theorists, what do you think about the place of critical theory and the role of critical theorists in the world today? Andrew Linklater: Frankfurt School critical theory was an important influence on the normative position outlined earlier, but it has had little impact on the sociological perspective I have worked on over the last fifteen or so years. I have found richer resources in Eliasian process sociology. The relationship between critical theory and process sociology is enormously complicated. Elias was opposed to partisan investigation. He was a powerful advocate of what he called the “detour of detachment”—of research that was not driven by taking sides in contemporary social and political struggles. Not that Elias was indifferent to human conditions. It has been argued that a form of secular humanism underpins his perspective and that he was highly critical of nation-centered academic approaches and public policies given the problems affecting humanity as a whole. For Elias, detachment was integral to that humanism. Only by understanding more about uncontrolled social processes could people discover ways of alleviating misery and insecurity. Critical theory and process sociology are at odds in many respects, but they converge in important ways as argued in my forthcoming book on civilization and world order. All I will add is that process sociology provides means of analyzing the social world that go beyond critical theory and other approaches with which I am familiar. Thank you for your time and sincere answers. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ANDREW MORAVCSIK Question: Your research shows that you have quite an interest in liberal intergovernmentalism and liberal theories of IR. Many of your recent publications are associated with the EU. We would like to start our questions with what has Trends and Transformation in world Politics 161 a pro-Western government for which they would fight. It has subsequently provided tens of billions in foreign aid, signed major trade agreements, provided opportunity for migration (and remittances), adjusted energy policy, engaged in active diplomacy, enacted sanctions on Russia to support Ukraine, and provided support for democracy and the rule of law, which has now born fruit. Without these things, the country would long since have collapsed. In addition, the West has provided some military assistance, but this started some years after the transition and is smaller and less essential. Third, this Western support—with the exception of the military component—has come almost entirely from Europe. A recent study by the German Marshall Fund, in which I was involved, shows that about 90 percent of the aid, trade, sanctions, diplomacy, energy policy, and the rule of law activity—not to mention the initial inspiration—comes from Europe. Question: Global pandemic over coronavirus has shaken the liberal international order because most of the states are turning to their self-interests, and we have heard that third parties have confiscated several medical cargos. Could you please give us your insights about the future of the EU and the world after the pandemic? Andrew Moravcsik: Again, this question entirely misses the point. Self-interest is not the opposite of liberal international order, but its basis. Obviously, in the crisis, every state has (rightly) looked after its own medical interest. And perhaps here and there states made short-sighted decisions. Why not? After all, no international organization—even the EU—has jurisdiction over medical care. Underneath the surface, however, massive cooperation is going on among government officials, corporations, researchers and universities, and civil society groups. Question: We know that we cannot cover all your research and ideas, as they are too much to grasp within such a short interview. Could you please tell us about any issues that we might have missed but are quite important to you? Andrew Moravcsik: I work on many topics, including the need for rigorous qualitative and historical work using digital means, EU foreign policy, liberal theory, human rights policy, and even the sociology of classical music. All my work is on the web, and I would be pleased to answer questions on any topic. We would like to thank you for your sincere answers and time. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ANSSI PAASI Question: While we were going over your studies and research, it was impossible not to realize that you have been working at the same university since 1989. If you do not mind, could you please tell us what is the reason for Trends and Transformation in world Politics 175 CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR IRA WILLIAM ZARTMAN Question: Having looked at your teaching background, it is impossible not to realize that you have been at the center of conflicts in the world before or after these crises erupted. For instance, you worked and went around all Middle Eastern and North African countries. You’ve experienced these conflictual areas, breathed their air, and drunk their waters. Please, let me start with a personal question. What do you think is the most vital feature of the Middle East as a source of conflict eruption? If you do not mind, it is better for us if you could share some of your significant memories regarding the most vital feature of the Middle East as a source of conflicts in the region. William Zartman: The Middle East is people by one large family, riven with its component tribalism, a traditional segmentary system as the anthropologists write about, more prone to rivalry than to unity. What if they had united against a common enemy (another Semitic tribe)? Israel would be in the sea, like the crusaders, and they would have been free to fight among themselves, which they would have done with gusto. Question: To continue with the general question, in the Cold War era, almost every conflict had two sides in parallel with the international system. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, or Eastern Bloc, it is claimed that the multipolar world system has begun. Does it mean that, since the 1990s, national or regional conflicts have multiple parties naturally and that is why current conflicts are not easy to solve or cool down? William Zartman: It means that the Cold War contenders are unable to keep things simmering but not boiling, that the field is open for them to look for power vacua to occupy preemptively, and that middle powers can then pick their local parties (states and nonstates). It’s a fisherman’s holiday with no game warden. Question: This next question may complement the previous question. In your chapter titled “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments” in Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003), you basically argue that peace negotiations or processes can be commenced only when the warring parties feel that they do not get any result in this conflict. So there become two options, either the stalemate position continues or there is consent to form a negotiation table. In a multipolar world system, each warring party can easily replace their financially and politically supporting power with another one because there are alternatives to align with. The only thing warring parties do is to act accordingly. Thus, as long as there is a possibility of finding international support, how do you think that a stalemate would be possible? 178 Chapter Seven William Zartman: I would emphasize, as a continuation of the previous answer, that it is crucial and urgent for the Atlantic Alliance to restore its purpose and cooperation, and I am addressing not only the new US administration but also the herding cats of Europe. And it is equally crucial for the Pacific Rim to do the same, here addressing the US in the first place. That would be a great step toward dealing with the fragment conflicts problem and the world disorder. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR GERARD TOAL Question: Your educational background shows that you have experienced a remarkable journey via combining history and geography with a geopolitical approach toward post-Communist conflicts. Could you please share your experience of that journey with us? What is your primary motive to study these territories, and how did you end up combining the geographical study of nationalism with geopolitics? Gerard Toal: Thank you for the opportunity. As those who have read my work will know, or struggled to pronounce the Gaelic version of my name, I come from a borderland county in the Republic of Ireland. I grew up at the height of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Without really thinking about it, I gravitated toward the study of conflict regions, to borders and nationalism, and to the imperialist attitudes one often finds in such situations. It is, I suppose, an accident that the university where I started my academic life did not have a politics department. Unconsciously, my geographically shaped perspective found expression within the disciplines of geography and history. My primary motivation, to the extent that one can ever identify such a thing consciously, is to question the seemingly innate desire of people to claim territories for their own group to the exclusion of others. So much conflict is tragic in its impacts and consequences. There is injustice, and this should be brought to light, but I’ve always been wary of the allure of nationalism, or at least, I came to that position pretty quickly in university when new horizons of thinking were made available to me. Question: In one of your publications, you claim that the concept of the “Russian World” is controversial. How much credit do you give to the idea that Russian cultural, historical, and linguistic influence is quite influential in attracting people of the states that once were under the Soviet Union or Russian Empire? Gerard Toal: The collapse of the Soviet Union was a traumatic event for millions of people, liberating to be sure for many but also deeply disorienting for others. I remember attending a conference entitled “Eastern Europe, Trends and Transformation in world Politics 181 Gerard Toal: Well, there are certainly many who argue that Russia needs a strong state, just as there are many who argue that, as the central power in on the Eurasian landmass, it has an eternal geopolitics. I take both of these claims seriously as forms of discourse but don’t believe they are analytically correct. The constitution that Russia has is a result of choices that the political elite is making. Question: In one of the interviews you gave in 2012, you mentioned a global pandemic as one of the most significant geopolitical challenges for the world in the twenty-first century. Nowadays, we are experiencing such a challenge. What is your geopolitical projection on the post-COVID-19 world? Gerard Toal: Aye, one easy geopolitical question after another! Where to begin? I do think that COVID-19 is a profound structural shock to the system of global geopolitical competition. I am also convinced that this is a “critical juncture” in US-Chinese relations and that China is seeking to take advantage of the crisis to project power and influence across the world. The United States, by contrast, is in a terrible state, saddled with a disastrous president and manifestly failing state institutions. To many across the world, the United States is not a model world, the vanguard of modernity, but the system to avoid. There are two immediately crucial questions going forward: Who will develop the COVID-19 vaccine and garner credit for its distribution across the planet, thus saving millions of lives? And, will the United States renew itself in November 2020, presuming we get to have an election and Trump, seeing he is likely to lose, cancels it or overly cheats? I am biased in that I want the United States to rally and renew itself. Perhaps an emergent China will be a catalyst to it doing so in a positive constructive manner. But that may be wishful thinking, unfortunately. Question: Thank you for your time and sincere answers. It is not possible to cover all issues in an interview. Please add here any significant points or topics you think we have missed. Gerard Toal: Thank you for the opportunity. I hope Turkey is able to play a positive and constructive role in the collective security challenges we face across the planet. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR JOSEPH NYE Question: It is an honor to have a chance to conduct an interview with you. Looking at your academic career from undergraduate to now, it is apparent that you have gathered amply significant memories and experiences. Could you please share some of them with us that are quite determining to your career? 184 Chapter Seven Question: Thank you for your time and sincere answers. We do not want to miss what is essential to you if the previous questions do not cover it. Could you please elaborate on an issue by yourself as a closing question? Joseph Nye: Trump is famous for his slogan “America First.” All leaders have a responsibility to put their own country’s interests first, and Trump is not unique in that. The important moral choice is how broadly or narrowly a leader chooses to define those interests. But the United States responded to COVID-19 with an inclination toward short-term, zero-sum, competitive interpretations, with too little attention to institutions and cooperation. As I show in my new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, this administration has interpreted “America First” narrowly, stepping back from the long-term, enlightened self-interest that marked the American approach designed by FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower after 1945. The Marshall Plan is a good example of using a broad definition of the national interest. It was good for the United States’ interest in preventing the Soviet takeover of western Europe, but it was also good for Europe struggling to recover from the devastation of the Second World War. We can apply that model to the current COVID-19 crisis. Attacks by new viruses may come in waves. In 1918, an influenza epidemic killed more people than died in the horrors of the First World War. Many people thought it had ended when it abated in the summer, but the second wave in the fall of 1918 was more lethal than the first. There is much we still do not know about this new coronavirus, but we must be prepared for a multiyear battle. That will require sharing information; developing and producing therapies and vaccines; and preparing, manufacturing, and distributing medical supplies and equipment. It is quite possible that there will be seasonal surges of the virus between the Northern and Southern hemispheres. When the North thinks it has a respite, the virus (or a mutation) may fill a Southern reservoir only to spill northward with the change of seasons. We should have a COVID-19 Marshall plan for poor countries. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR KATHARYNE MITCHELL Question: Before moving on to substantive questions, we would like to ask you a personal question. It might seem to be a cliché, but we still wonder what made you want to study spatiality, multiculturalism, and neo-liberal citizenship? If possible, could you please share a couple of moments with us regarding your academic journey? Trends and Transformation in world Politics 191 CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR KNUD ERIK JØRGENSEN Question: We would like to start the interview with a general and common question. Could you please tell us about what has led you to study the EU from a constructivist perspective? It would be perfect if you could just share some of the moments and events in your academic career. Knud Erik Jørgensen: After a brief career detour, working in a municipality administration, I returned to Aarhus University in 1988 to do a PhD. I had secured external funding from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) to analyze Western Europe’s policies toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Having prepared, during the early 1980s, a somewhat long graduate thesis on the Polish opposition (KOR, Solidarnosc, etc.) within the framework of perspectives on social movements, I was new to the discipline of IR. I entered the discipline at a time when the keyword in world politics was CHANGE. The polish social movement Solidarnosc made a comeback, and other dissident groupings made it from dissidence to government offices. During the autumn of 1989, I prepared part of my thesis at Chatham House in London, listening to excellent speakers and their situation reports during the daytime, then taking the tube to my flat in Shepard’s Bush and finding out, upon arrival, that the situation in the meantime had changed. Gorbachev had launched the Perestroika and Glasnost renewal of the Soviet Union and in 1991, having jumped on a tank, Boris Yeltsin addressed the masses, announcing the end of the Soviet Union and the birth of Russia. Helmuth Kohn announced the reunification of Germany, and the European Commission launched the ambitious 1992 project aimed at creating what we know as the EU. Within the world of the discipline of IR, things were predominantly different, less change-oriented. When navigating the theoretical landscape at the time and selecting my theoretical framework, I took guidance from COPRI, specifically Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, who flirted with combinations of (reconstructed) neorealism and post-positivist approaches, including speech act theory. Hence, I pragmatically included a reconstructed neorealist framework in the thesis and continued to explore the post-positivist perspectives on the side. Not so much the poststructuralist approaches Wæver (and subsequently Lene Hansen) was attracted to, but the social constructivist middle ground, occupied at the time by Emanuel Adler, John Ruggie, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Alexander Wendt. They represented a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between ontology and epistemology, and while it was developed with a view to IR, 204 Chapter Seven Knud Erik Jørgensen: In my mind, there is fierce competition among several strong candidates. Should my prime concern be the combined effect on world politics of media conglomerates, bot farms, social media giants and companies such as Cambridge Analytica? Should it be resource scarcity and the multiple and seemingly successful exercises inland and ocean grabbing? Or should it be the irresponsible and seemingly unchecked international behavior of autocrats? I think my prime concern is the combined effect on world politics of these three factors. Thanks a lot for your time and sincere answers. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS Question: In your book The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (2005), you have examined three leading realist figures and come up with the concept of “wilful realism.” As you know, these three prominent thinkers had been influenced by their political and social surroundings. Thomas Hobbes lived in a conflictual environment where wars were all around, Rousseau experienced the eve of social upheaves leading to political transformations all over Europe and Morgenthau witnessed two world wars. We have to admit that the book is emphasizing a distinctive deal of realism, but we would like to ask about your personal experiences that led you to reexamine the core realist thinkers, at least mostly accepted ones. Have you had this thought in your mind since your college years or has something else triggered you to think in this way? Michael Williams: I suppose the first thing to say, which may help explain my views on realism, is that I did not begin life as a realist. On the contrary, I first encountered IR as a student of the renowned “critical” theorist RBJ Walker, and throughout my university studies, I was (and in many ways still am) critically inclined or oriented in my thinking about much of what passes as, or claims to be realism in politics. Politically, most of this period also corresponded with the so-called “second Cold War” and the Reagan administration’s foreign policy agenda, particularly its assertive nuclear strategy. In this context, certain kinds of realism—such as those associated with the strategist Colin Gray and his assertion that in nuclear conflicts, “victory is possible”—seemed to me part of the problem, not the solution. But one of the principles of critical thinking I admire is to try to understand the positions you disagree with as well as (or even better than) they understand themselves. So, I began to dig into “classical” realism as a means of assessing its followers, and the more I did so, the more I found a perspective whose depth seemed Trends and Transformation in world Politics 211 it represents a reaction against them and is connected to wider geopolitical shifts. The ways in which these dynamics play out over the next decade will be an important part of determining the shape of the emerging world order. Question: As you know, as a stage of securitization theory, you have reconsidered the concept of “extraordinary” in one of your latest articles in 2015, titled “Securitization as political theory: The politics of the extraordinary.” Your paper has a theoretical feature, but we would like to ask you a question regarding practice. Could you please tell us what you would say if somebody claimed that the increased number of conflicts all over the world is proving that extraordinary politics is already in place? Michael Williams: Security as the politics of the extraordinary has always been with us. Although it can seem that this kind of politics is on the increase, we also have to balance this perception against the fact that global awareness of extraordinary politics has never been higher. The sheer volume of information, often connected to the “spectacular” dynamics of modern media, means that it is necessary to be cautious about seeing an explosion of extraordinary politics, though this does not mean that its prevalence is not a matter of concern. Also, of course, we need to remember that extraordinary politics is not always negative: the breaking of existing norms that it implies can be a source of progress, even if its potential for violence needs always to be kept in mind. It seems to me that the greater explosion of extraordinary politics in a negative sense may lie in the risk-security domain, where we see a proliferation of exceptional measures that are less spectacular, more subtle, and un-coordinated, but that result in the increasing intrusion of marginally exceptional, unspectacular, and thus less visible and legally and democratically accountable, political practices across the globe. Question: We really do not want to lose an opportunity to get as many insights as from you, and before ending the interview, we would like to ask you if there is an issue we missed asking about but you think it is paramount. If there is, could you please tell us about it as closing comments? Michael Williams: I think I have probably said enough! Thanks for your excellent questions—and your remarkable patience. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR NICHOLAS ONUF Question: Before starting the interview, would you allow me to ask about your career adventure. You are known as one of the founding fathers of constructivism in IR. We wonder how and when did you decide to work on it? Any memories would be appreciated. Nicholas Onuf: Early in my scholarly career, I had focused on theoretical issues in International Law, including the time-honored question, 222 Chapter Seven of your readers. In my answers, I have not indulged my ongoing interest in providing constructivism with suitably robust philosophical foundations. Instead, I have tried to link constructivism to another longstanding interest of mine, which is the unfolding of the modern world over five centuries. My most recent book treats these two interests as converging projects, although the book says relatively about constructivism as an explicit frame of reference. In this interview, I have tried to remedy this oversight, at least with respect to the world situation as I see it today. As I wind down my scholarly career, this interview may indeed be my last stab at making sense of the world we have made for ourselves—the modern world. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR PETER M. HAAS Question: Before getting into the questions, if you do not mind, could you please share some of your memories that shaped your academic career and approach to IR? Peter M. Haas: I grew up in an academic household. My father raised me with an appreciation of history. My salient memory from college and graduate school was receiving the advice that the environment was not a major element of IR. I hope I’ve proven them wrong. The most significant eureka moment was when I was conducting my dissertation fieldwork around the Mediterranean. I had pretty much been trained as a historical materialist and expected to find that country’s concerns mirrored their exposure to marine pollution. My initial interviews, luckily, turned me into a constructivist when the response from environment ministers to my questions about their understandings of the environmental problems facing their country was “I don’t know, what do you think?” So, I realized that problems had to be framed and interpreted, they weren’t obvious. Question: Your research history shows that your focus on the concept of “epistemic communities” is extremely high, and also your case studies on how epistemic communities can construct internationally common policies either on environmental issues or potential conflicts. Based on your theoretical approach with the concept of the international order, how would you evaluate the US’s reluctance to be a part of global environmental issues in the last couple of years? Peter M. Haas: While top-level US pronouncements—particularly withdrawing from Paris and the current WHO shaming—run in the face of expert consensus, lower-level decision making in the United States remains informed by ecological norms and understandings. Midlevel scientists in the EPA and Commerce Departments continue to try to issue evidence-based assessments of global warming. Trends and Transformation in world Politics 225 Because we simply don’t know the trajectory of the virus, it is pointless to speculate deeply at this point about the future of the world order. As we know from responses to systemic shocks, the international community can either drop the ball (the 1930s) or respond collectively and effectively (the post-Second World War liberal world order). I would imagine that the WHO’s reputation will suffer, although Chinese behavior is consistent with prior behavior. A deeper concern is about the wider spread loss of support for multilateral institutions, including the WHO, UN, and WTO. There may well be a large transfer of responsibility for health care delivery to NGOs. We would like to thank you for your sincere answers. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR RICHARD SAKWA Question: Let me start with introductory questions. Could you please tell us about your personal background, where you grew up and went to high school, your degrees and how you ended up being a student of IR, and what were the cornerstone events or times that directed you to this end? Furthermore, what was the academic climate during your student years? Who were the intellectual influences on your thinking during those years? Richard Sakwa: I was born in Norfolk, England, in rather interesting circumstances. My father was a reservist officer in the Polish Army before the war, and in the end, after the defeat escaped to Palestine and joined General Anders’ Second Corp, which fought with the British Eighth Army in El Alamein, Tobruk, Sicily, Monte Casino and all the way up Italy to Bologna. At that point, as the war came to an end the whole mass of soldiers expected to take a train over the Alps back to Poland. However, that was not to be. Stories filtered back about what was going on. For example, my uncle Tadeusz (which is my middle name) served with the Home Army, and their unit leader managed to survive five years of German occupation, but he surfaced near Lublin in late 1944 and was promptly shot by the NKVD. In the end, my father, who by then had married my mother who was part of the French community in Alexandria, ended up as a refugee in England. They had planned to emigrate to Argentina and had even bought a plot of land in Santa Rosa on the River Plate, but the night before they were due to sail a mine bobbed into Alexandria harbor and damaged the ship. After living briefly in the shabby and war-damaged London the family took up a small farm in Norfolk. Hence my early years were shaped by war, an inadequate post-war settlement, displacement, and contingency. What if the mine had not damaged the ship? I would have ended up speaking Spanish and defending Las Malvinas, instead of supporting the rights of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands. Trends and Transformation in world Politics 233 In short, all that the crisis has done is demonstrated once again the intellectual and political bankruptcy of the post-Cold War international system and highlighted its dangerously militaristic turn. Question: Covering all your studies within a short time seems impossible, as there is a massive pile of original research. Therefore, we would like to leave the stage to you for any issue we might forget to ask, but you think it is important. If there is an issue you want to speak to, please enlighten us about it? Richard Sakwa: There are plenty of other issues we could talk about, but one very much on my mind at present is the cultural roots of the Second Cold War. The problem is as much civilizational as it is geostrategic. One central factor is the “exceptionalist” ideology in the US, which after 1945 became embedded in what Michael Glennon calls Trumanite “deep state,” a vast security apparatus that swallows up vast resources for no clear purpose other than the maintenance of US hegemony and leadership; while this very same “military-industrial complex,” against which Eisenhower warned in his farewell address in 1960, diverts resources away from making the US not only a powerful country but also more socially just and rich in all senses of the word. The exhaustion of the political West encourages Russia and China to develop alternative models of international politics. This emerging, although relatively diffuse, bipolarity will shape international politics and globalization for the foreseeable future. We would like to thank you for your sincere answers and time. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ROBERT JERVIS Question: Your conceptual and practical contribution to international politics is remarkable and inspiring. We wonder about your academic journey. To fill this wonder, could you please share some of your unforgettable moments or events that led you to the IR or motivate you to do more work? Robert Jervis: It was a combination of what was happening in the “real” world, reading that I did on my own, a gifted instructor, and a friendship with a leading scholar that set me on this path. Being born into a politically aware family in 1940, my early memories are filled with politics, especially international politics and the start of the Cold War. I was gripped by the question of how to respond to what most of us saw as Soviet expansionism, and particularly how force and threats could be used to protest our interests without leading to war. Readers of chapter three of Perception and Misperception in International Politics know that this question has never left me. While attending Oberlin College from 1958 to 1962 debates about the “missile gap” raged (only later would we learn that there was a gap—but one that favored 240 Chapter Seven rooted less in changes in material factors like the costs of war (although these indeed are important) than in the development of better ideas and a grasp of the interdependencies in the international system that require due respect for other state’s rights and interests and protection of the valuable weaker states and intermediary bodies. In my APSA presidential address, I took the middle ground that what I called the leading powers (the US, the states of western Europe, and Japan) formed what Karl Deutsch called a security community (a group of states that were not only at peace with each other, but among whom war was unthinkable) and that this was a real if limited form of progress. Let’s work toward building on and expanding it. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR SIMON DALBY Question: Taking this interview as an opportunity, we would like to hear, if you do not mind, about a moment or an event that has been paramount in your academic career. Simon Dalby: Perhaps the moment that sticks in my memory most is the one and only time I made a presentation at the United Nations. It was part of a panel presentation on climate and security back in the months prior to the Copenhagen Climate summit in 2009. After all, five of us presenters were finished the session was opened to comments from the national delegates. One refused to accept that climate change had anything to do with security, a second said the whole topic was mind-boggling. In response to my comment that if policymakers thought that it was appropriate to build fences around their states to keep people from moving, they weren’t thinking hard enough, another delegation got up and walked out. Their government was, in fact, building fences, although I had an entirely different fence in mind. I learned once again that day just how hard it is to get clear messages concerning academic research across to even sometimes sympathetic policy audiences, and the importance of thinking ahead about what is coming regardless of the reluctance of policymakers to hear what you are trying to say. Alas, as the COVID-19 pandemic teaches us all once again this isn’t a problem that has gone away since, and it remains a major difficulty in dealing with climate change and other environmental transformations. Question: There has been a significant number of discussions on the path that the world is taking in terms of the world system or international order. Your prominent work of Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics reemerged with a reprint edition in 2016, and we do not think that it is a coincidence because the early 1990s were at the edge of systemic change and now the discussion has resurfaced among the academics and politicians. Trends and Transformation in world Politics 245 these days, and this is a task that needs to be taken up by scholars, and crucially by university administrations and granting agencies; the questions of the twenty-first century are frequently not amenable to research grounded in nineteenth-century disciplines. Asking how questions are formulated, and what these formulations preclude is now an essential task for all scholarship that addresses the pressing issues of how the world is being dangerously transformed. But simply assuming that better research will provide the solution to complex problems isn’t enough either; confronting the power structures that have perpetuated human problems, rather than ensuring human security for many, is also a necessary part of our academic task and critical interventions in the policy and political debates in the aftermath of COVID-19 are unavoidable now. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR STEPHAN HAGGARD Question: The pile of your research shows that you have a quite interest in the political economy of Latin America and east Asia and seems that your recent publications are mostly associated with east Asia. We would like to start our questions with the following: What has directed you to research this region? Could you please share a couple of memories or events that led you to this path? Stephan Haggard: When I wrote my dissertation and first book, Pathways from the Periphery (1990), I was interested in the comparison between Latin American and east Asian political economies. But I spent more time for that book researching the east Asian cases, perhaps because I felt less was known about them. The work on the developmental state was emerging from Chalmers Johnson, Robert Wade, and Alice Amsden, but, to me, none of them addressed the political aspects of rapid growth in a satisfactory way. Since that time, however, I have not just worked on east Asia; I have also been interested in transitions to and from democratic rule (including in Turkey). My work with Robert Kaufman started by looking at the political economy of these questions (The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, 1995), before turning to the social policy consequences of democratization (in Development, Democracy and Welfare States, 2008). Most recently, Bob and I have returned to questions of democracy in two books with a more global focus: Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change (2016), and a forthcoming short book on Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World. I think my identification with east Asia also comes out of a very chance encounter with North Korea, that has developed into a prolonged fascination: 250 Chapter Seven other policies. With the benefit of hindsight, the great growth tragedies of the post-war period—outside of extreme autocracies and civil war cases—came as a result of financial crises. Question: This question might not seem to be related to your area of expertise, but as a prominent scholar in your field, you might have something to say about possible outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of the global political economy? Stephan Haggard: There are many obvious issues here, such as the need for better international cooperation around international public health. But the question is an embarrassing one because the American performance has been so scandalously bad. To me, this is actually a good way to wind up. The United States has exhibited many of the causal factors we associate with democratic backsliding over the last four years: an autocratic personality and a fawning party providing support. Yet deeper forces were also at work, including a deep polarization. The central debate in the United States at the moment is over the nature of that polarization. Was it economic, rooted in declining manufacturing and increasing inequality? Was it racial and ethnic, as I believe? And what role did social media technology play in making it all worse? It will take some time to rebuild the United States from four years of drift, and that includes with respect to the damage we inflicted on ourselves by mismanaging the pandemic. Question: We would like to thank you for your answers to the questions, and we want to give you a moment to make comments on anything we may have missed but you consider important. Stephan Haggard: I enjoyed our time together. Thanks for reaching out to me. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR TERRY NARDIN Question: We would like to start the interview with a biographical question. Could you please tell us about what led you to work on international political theory and the philosophy of international law? It would be perfect if you could share some moments in your academic career. Terry Nardin: I studied philosophy as an undergraduate at the University of Chicago and then at NYU but worries about nuclear war led me to become increasingly interested in international affairs. I had a charismatic teacher at NYU, Anthony Pearce, who introduced me to the field of IR via Thucydides, Machiavelli, Mackinder, Nehru, and other classics of international thought. As a graduate student, I learned about game theory and its application to IR by reading books like Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict and Anatol Rapoport’s Fights, Games, and Debates. After I started teaching, I got 258 Chapter Seven give us your insights about the future of the EU and perhaps the world after the pandemic? Terry Nardin: Sorry, no, that would be a prediction, which I’ve just said is futile. Sometimes disaster tears people apart and sometimes it brings them together. It is certainly one lesson of the pandemic that viruses do not respect national boundaries. We live in one world in relation to this and many other aspects of our increasingly unsustainable human order. It’s not clear to me that IR theory has much to contribute to figuring out how humanity is going to deal with the grave and multiplying challenges it faces. Question: We might not be able to cover all the issues which are important to you, so let us close by inviting you to share your biggest concern about world politics in our era. Terry Nardin: I hope you will forgive me for challenging the premises that underlie some of your questions. I hope that you can agree that it makes for unexpected and perhaps interesting answers. I’ve been teaching and writing for many decades now and am not the specialist in IR or political theory that I once was. As one ages, one sometimes outgrows the preoccupations of one’s discipline and even one’s younger self. You might say that my approach has become more multidisciplinary, but that is increasingly common across the academic world. The changes we call globalization might have contributed to this. For solutions to problems of world order, we now look beyond the disciplines of IR or political science. But also need to understand, not simply to act. And to understand the world, we need to look beyond the practical disciplines to history and philosophy, to the sciences and arts. Sometimes our concern with solving practical problems leads us to a narrow focus on what is important, as if the desire for knowledge is driven by curiosity rather than practical need were unimportant. But we won’t be better off if the liberal arts are dismissed as irrelevant in an age of existential challenges and are marginalized or even suppressed in the same economic advantage or political order. As for world politics, we must try to make it better, but we must also not give up on trying to make sense of it. We like to think we are actors, but often we are merely spectators, and it is hubris to think otherwise. CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR THOMAS G. WEISS Question: You have extensively contributed to global governance and United Nations literature. Your research is now among the must-read works for those who are studying IR. We would like to ask you what really triggered you to work on these issues and, importantly what really kept you working Conclusion Rahman Dağ and Özgür Tüfekçi A quest for transformation has existed since the day human beings adopted a collective way of life and since the formation of civilizations. There have been conflicts between individuals, communities, and tribes and between states and nations from small-scale conflicts to larger wars. As civilizations developed, science and technology progressed, and transportation and communication opportunities between countries increased, the world started to get smaller. The “interest” and “influence” areas of countries increased, so “aggressive” and “imperialist” ambitions grew. In addition, regional powers and countries formed defense and attack pacts among themselves against the common enemy. Countries that understood they could not mean anything “alone” no matter how strong they were tried to join their forces with other countries. While approximately eighteen million people lost their lives in the First World War, the Second World War caused the death of more than thirty-five million people. Two successive all-out wars, millions of wounded widows and orphans, ruined cities and destroyed civilizations, declining prosperity, poverty, hunger, and misery, resulted in massive extinction and socioeconomic conditions that hit rock bottom. This sad picture has been a good lesson for humanity. For this reason, with the new process that started in the 1950s, countries can no longer risk war easily and, instead, prefer to resolve conflicts through reconciliation as much as possible. Therefore, with the end of the Second World War, large-scale wars seemed to have ended. However, the conflict of interest will continue to exist as in the past. Only the face and nature of the wars have changed. Since then, humanity has experienced several trends and transformations. Terry Nardin’s answers to our questions remind us to admit that the international relations (IR) discipline might not be adequate to fully grasp world politics, which contains people, individuals, systems, states, and various actors and requires a multidisciplinary approach. The conceptual map for 269 About the Editors and Contributors Özgür Tüfekçi is associate professor of international relations at Karadeniz Technical University in Turkey. He is also founder and director-general of CESRAN International, a UK-based think tank (www.cesran.org). He holds a master’s degree in International Studies from the University of Sheffield and a PhD in Sociology and International Relations from Coventry University. His primary research interests are (Turkish) Eurasianism, nation-building, theories of nationalism, geopolitical studies, rising powers, and regionalism. He published a monograph titled The Foreign Policy of Modern Turkey: Power and the Ideology of Eurasianism (2017) and co-edited Domestic and Regional Uncertainties in the New Turkey (2017), Eurasian Politics and Society: Issues and Challenges (2017), and Politics of Conflict and Cooperation in Eurasia (2018). He is also the editor in chief of The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development. Rahman Dağ is associate professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Zonguldak Bulent Ecevit University. He obtained his bachelor’s degree from Istanbul Yeditepe University and then his master’s degree from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. He was awarded a doctorate of philosophy from the University of Exeter’s Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies. The core point of his thesis is the ideological roots of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist political movements determining the perceptions between them. In addition, he is now acting as head of the CESRAN International Turkey desk and works as an associate professor at Adiyaman University in Turkey. Richard Sakwa joined the University of Kent in 1987, was promoted to a professorship in 1996, and was head of the School of Politics and International Relations between 2001 and 2007. In 2010, he once again took over as head of school until 2014. While completing his doctorate on Moscow politics during the Russian Civil War (1918 to 1921), he spent a 281 282 About the Editors and Contributors year on the British Council scholarship at Moscow State University (1979 to 1980) and then worked for two years in Moscow in the Mir Science and Technology Publishing House. Before moving to Kent, he lectured at the University of Essex and the University of California, Santa Cruz. Sakwa is an associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House; honorary senior research fellow at the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Birmingham; and since September 2002, a member of Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences. Luis Tomé is a professor at the Autonoma University of Lisbon in Portugal, where he is currently director of the Department of International Relations and the Observatory of Foreign Relations. He has also been a visiting professor at the Portuguese Military University Institute, the National Defense University, and the Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Homeland Security, as well abroad at La Sapienza University of Rome, the Academy of Social Sciences and Technology in Angola, the East Timor National Defense Institute, and the Middle East Technical University in Turkey. From November 2015 to October 2017, Luis Tomé was special advisor for International Relations and Fighting Terrorism of the Portuguese minister of home affairs. Previously, he was a NATO-EAPC researcher for two years (author of the 2000 report “Russia and NATO’s Enlargement”) and advisor to the vice president of the European Parliament (1999 to 2004). Tomé earned a PhD in International Relations from the University of Coimbra, a master’s degree in Strategy from the Technical University of Lisbon, and a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from Autónoma University of Lisbon. His main areas of research and expertise are International Relations, Geopolitics, and Security Studies, with a particular focus on Euro-Atlantic, Asia-Pacific, and Eurasia regions. He is the author and co-author of a dozen books and numerous articles and essays. Luis Tomé has been a regular speaker at high-level conferences and workshops in the country and abroad and a frequent commentator on security and international politics for the media. Sónia Sénica is a researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations. She was coordinator of a research project at the Luso-American Development Foundation (2016), a participant in the course “Diplomatic Protocol” of the École Nationale d’Administration in Paris (2008), a postgraduate in “Theory and Diplomatic Practice” at the Lusíada University of Lisbon (2004), a participant in the course “Russia and the Contemporary World” at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign About the Editors and Contributors 283 Affairs in Moscow (2003), and guest lecturer with several participations in the national and international media. Andrew K. P. Leung is a prominent international and independent China strategist. Over forty years’ experience in senior Hong Kong government positions; twice handed over to Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam as director-general of social welfare and director-general London; China Futures fellow, Massachusetts Berkshire Publishing Group; brain trust member, IMD Lausanne Evian Group; Gerson Lehrman Group council member; Thomas Reuters expert; senior analyst with Wikistrat; elected member of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs; advisory board member, European Centre for e-Commerce and Internet Law; think tank research fellow, Beijing Normal University, Zhuhai Campus; visiting professor, London Metropolitan University Business School; honorary president, China Hong Kong Economic and Trading International Association; formerly governing council member, King’s College London; advisory board member, China Policy Institute of Nottingham University; and visiting professor, Sun Yat-sen University Business School (2005 to 2010). In the 1980s, he oversaw Hong Kong’s industrial transmigration into mainland China and helped launch the Quality Campaign and Technology Centre. He was invited by the US government for a month-long visit in 1990 to brief Fortune 50 CEOs personally, including one-on-ones with Steve Forbes of Forbes magazine, on China post-1989. In 2002, he was invited by Prince Andrew for a private briefing leading to HRH’s first official visit to China as UK’s ambassador for trade and investment. He advised on cross-cultural management in Lenovo’s take-over of IBM Computers, and he was invited as editor at large for an international consultancy on China’s energies. He is a regular contributor, commentator, and speaker on China at international conferences and an interviewee on prominent international TV channels worldwide, including BBC, Sky, CNN, ABC, Aljazeera, RT, TRT, Times Now, Chanel News Asia, CGTN, National Geographic, etc. His topics include trade, finance, economics, geopolitics, international relations, science and technology, sustainable industrial development, and green cities. He has graduate qualifications from the University of London, postgraduate qualifications from Cambridge University, PMD from the Harvard Business School, and solicitors’ qualifying examination certificate from the Law Society, London. He has been included in UK’s Who since 2002 and was awarded Silver Bauhinia Star (SBS) in July 2005 on Hong Kong Honors List. Ekrem Ok is the staff director of CESRAN International. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of Foreign Trade at Agri Ibrahim Cecen University in Turkey. He holds a master’s degree in international relations from the 284 About the Editors and Contributors Karadeniz Technical University in Turkey. He is also a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations at Karadeniz Technical University in Turkey. About the Editors and Contributors Özgür Tüfekçi is associate professor of international relations at Karadeniz Technical University in Turkey. He is also founder and director-general of CESRAN International, a UK-based think tank (www.cesran.org). He holds a master’s degree in International Studies from the University of Sheffield and a PhD in Sociology and International Relations from Coventry University. His primary research interests are (Turkish) Eurasianism, nation-building, theories of nationalism, geopolitical studies, rising powers, and regionalism. He published a monograph titled The Foreign Policy of Modern Turkey: Power and the Ideology of Eurasianism (2017) and co-edited Domestic and Regional Uncertainties in the New Turkey (2017), Eurasian Politics and Society: Issues and Challenges (2017), and Politics of Conflict and Cooperation in Eurasia (2018). He is also the editor in chief of The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development. Rahman Dağ is associate professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Zonguldak Bulent Ecevit University. He obtained his bachelor’s degree from Istanbul Yeditepe University and then his master’s degree from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. He was awarded a doctorate of philosophy from the University of Exeter’s Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies. The core point of his thesis is the ideological roots of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist political movements determining the perceptions between them. In addition, he is now acting as head of the CESRAN International Turkey desk and works as an associate professor at Adiyaman University in Turkey. Richard Sakwa joined the University of Kent in 1987, was promoted to a professorship in 1996, and was head of the School of Politics and International Relations between 2001 and 2007. In 2010, he once again took over as head of school until 2014. While completing his doctorate on Moscow politics during the Russian Civil War (1918 to 1921), he spent a 281 282 About the Editors and Contributors year on the British Council scholarship at Moscow State University (1979 to 1980) and then worked for two years in Moscow in the Mir Science and Technology Publishing House. Before moving to Kent, he lectured at the University of Essex and the University of California, Santa Cruz. Sakwa is an associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House; honorary senior research fellow at the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Birmingham; and since September 2002, a member of Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences. Luis Tomé is a professor at the Autonoma University of Lisbon in Portugal, where he is currently director of the Department of International Relations and the Observatory of Foreign Relations. He has also been a visiting professor at the Portuguese Military University Institute, the National Defense University, and the Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Homeland Security, as well abroad at La Sapienza University of Rome, the Academy of Social Sciences and Technology in Angola, the East Timor National Defense Institute, and the Middle East Technical University in Turkey. From November 2015 to October 2017, Luis Tomé was special advisor for International Relations and Fighting Terrorism of the Portuguese minister of home affairs. Previously, he was a NATO-EAPC researcher for two years (author of the 2000 report “Russia and NATO’s Enlargement”) and advisor to the vice president of the European Parliament (1999 to 2004). Tomé earned a PhD in International Relations from the University of Coimbra, a master’s degree in Strategy from the Technical University of Lisbon, and a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from Autónoma University of Lisbon. His main areas of research and expertise are International Relations, Geopolitics, and Security Studies, with a particular focus on Euro-Atlantic, Asia-Pacific, and Eurasia regions. He is the author and co-author of a dozen books and numerous articles and essays. Luis Tomé has been a regular speaker at high-level conferences and workshops in the country and abroad and a frequent commentator on security and international politics for the media. Sónia Sénica is a researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations. She was coordinator of a research project at the Luso-American Development Foundation (2016), a participant in the course “Diplomatic Protocol” of the École Nationale d’Administration in Paris (2008), a postgraduate in “Theory and Diplomatic Practice” at the Lusíada University of Lisbon (2004), a participant in the course “Russia and the Contemporary World” at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign About the Editors and Contributors 283 Affairs in Moscow (2003), and guest lecturer with several participations in the national and international media. Andrew K. P. Leung is a prominent international and independent China strategist. Over forty years’ experience in senior Hong Kong government positions; twice handed over to Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam as director-general of social welfare and director-general London; China Futures fellow, Massachusetts Berkshire Publishing Group; brain trust member, IMD Lausanne Evian Group; Gerson Lehrman Group council member; Thomas Reuters expert; senior analyst with Wikistrat; elected member of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs; advisory board member, European Centre for e-Commerce and Internet Law; think tank research fellow, Beijing Normal University, Zhuhai Campus; visiting professor, London Metropolitan University Business School; honorary president, China Hong Kong Economic and Trading International Association; formerly governing council member, King’s College London; advisory board member, China Policy Institute of Nottingham University; and visiting professor, Sun Yat-sen University Business School (2005 to 2010). In the 1980s, he oversaw Hong Kong’s industrial transmigration into mainland China and helped launch the Quality Campaign and Technology Centre. He was invited by the US government for a month-long visit in 1990 to brief Fortune 50 CEOs personally, including one-on-ones with Steve Forbes of Forbes magazine, on China post-1989. In 2002, he was invited by Prince Andrew for a private briefing leading to HRH’s first official visit to China as UK’s ambassador for trade and investment. He advised on cross-cultural management in Lenovo’s take-over of IBM Computers, and he was invited as editor at large for an international consultancy on China’s energies. He is a regular contributor, commentator, and speaker on China at international conferences and an interviewee on prominent international TV channels worldwide, including BBC, Sky, CNN, ABC, Aljazeera, RT, TRT, Times Now, Chanel News Asia, CGTN, National Geographic, etc. His topics include trade, finance, economics, geopolitics, international relations, science and technology, sustainable industrial development, and green cities. He has graduate qualifications from the University of London, postgraduate qualifications from Cambridge University, PMD from the Harvard Business School, and solicitors’ qualifying examination certificate from the Law Society, London. He has been included in UK’s Who since 2002 and was awarded Silver Bauhinia Star (SBS) in July 2005 on Hong Kong Honors List. Ekrem Ok is the staff director of CESRAN International. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of Foreign Trade at Agri Ibrahim Cecen University in Turkey. He holds a master’s degree in international relations from the 284 About the Editors and Contributors Karadeniz Technical University in Turkey. He is also a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations at Karadeniz Technical University in Turkey.