Russia and the World: the internal–external nexus.

This art icle was downloaded by: [ Universit y of Johannesburg] On: 22 April 2015, At : 01: 52 Publisher: Rout ledge I nform a Lt d Regist ered in England and Wales Regist ered Num ber: 1072954 Regist ered office: Mort im er House, 37- 41 Mort im er St reet , London W1T 3JH, UK South African Journal of International Affairs Publicat ion det ails, including inst ruct ions f or aut hors and subscript ion inf ormat ion: ht t p: / / www. t andf online. com/ loi/ rsaj 20 Russia and the world: the internal–external nexus Irina Filat ova a a UKZN, Sout h Af rica, and Nat ional Research Universit y – Higher School of Economics, Russia Published online: 03 Feb 2015. Click for updates To cite this article: Irina Filat ova (2015) Russia and t he world: t he int ernal–ext ernal nexus, Sout h Af rican Journal of Int ernat ional Af f airs, 22: 1, 133-137, DOI: 10. 1080/ 10220461. 2015. 1006991 To link to this article: ht t p: / / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 10220461. 2015. 1006991 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTI CLE Taylor & Francis m akes every effort t o ensure t he accuracy of all t he inform at ion ( t he “ Cont ent ” ) cont ained in t he publicat ions on our plat form . However, Taylor & Francis, our agent s, and our licensors m ake no represent at ions or warrant ies what soever as t o t he accuracy, com plet eness, or suit abilit y for any purpose of t he Cont ent . Any opinions and views expressed in t his publicat ion are t he opinions and views of t he aut hors, and are not t he views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. 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Term s & Downloaded by [University of Johannesburg] at 01:52 22 April 2015 Condit ions of access and use can be found at ht t p: / / www.t andfonline.com / page/ t erm sand- condit ions South African Journal of International Affairs 133 Downloaded by [University of Johannesburg] at 01:52 22 April 2015 Russia and the world: the internal–external nexus, edited by Natasha Kuhrt, London and New York, Routledge & University of Glasgow, 2013, 232 pp., US$150.00 (hardback), ISBN 978-0-415-81320-4 It is important to mention from the outset that, although the publisher states that this book was first published in 2013, all of its chapters were published in 2012 as articles in a special issue of Europe–Asia Studies (vol. 64, issue 3). The online version of this previous publication appeared on 2 April 2012, meaning that the material for it was collected, and the articles written, no later than 2011, when President Putin had not yet returned for his third term in office. By the same token the anti-Putin demonstrations had not yet happened, the opposition had not yet been squashed, the latest draconian laws against non-governmental organisations and the media and internet outlets had not yet been passed, and the Crimea had not yet been seized. This is, of course, a limitation: Medvedev’s interlude, when this collection of articles was written, was perceived at the time as a milder and more benevolent version of Putinism. This renders some observations and conclusions by the authors out-dated or simply wrong. Despite this, the book offers a vantage point for a retrospective analysis. It points to the roots of what is happening in Russia, enabling the reader to see the quantitative accumulation of policy moves and public perceptions that resulted in a qualitative change in 2014. The book is not about Russia’s foreign policy, as one might deduce from its title. Its overarching theme is the interconnectedness between internal developments in Russia and its foreign policy. As a general statement such a connection is a given. As a concrete analysis of different aspects of Russia’s policy this approach is rare if not entirely new. From Russian nationalism to perceptions of its energy, security and nuclear arms, the authors clearly show how this indivisible connection works in concrete areas, each of which is perceived as important by Russian foreign policy-makers: Europe, the Middle East, the Far East and the US. As Natasha Kuhrt, editor of the volume, rightly states, ‘opening up the “black box” of domestic politics seems more relevant than ever before in Putin’s Russia’. The book consists of 10 essays, presenting different aspects of Russia’s internal/ external policies, their dilemmas and connections. In view of its ‘internal–external nexus’ approach, it is appropriate that it should start with a seemingly ‘internal’ topic such as Russian nationalism. In his essay Luke, March discusses ‘three faces of Russian nationalism’: official, cultural and political. Official nationalism, in his view, consists of components such as the national idea as ideology, ‘sovereignty’ as independence from Western political and ideological influence (as in the notion of ‘sovereign democracy’) and secular (non-Orthodox Church) patriotism. March thinks that Western perceptions of Russian official nationalism are unjustly simplistic as they present Russia’s policy in this sphere as a replica of the Cold War. He argues that Eurasianism, an anti-Western expansionist doctrine, promoted by Aleksandr Dugin, a philosopher popular among the highest political and military elite as well as among the broader populace, is not often used by the government. In his view, Eurasianism for the Russian government is ‘just pragmatism – a recognition that Russia has a multi-vector policy with interests in both Europe and Asia’ (p. 18). The events of the last three years have proved March wrong. All of the elements of Eurasianism that March lists as ‘absent’ in Russia’s policy (‘the influence of “Russian civilisation”, determinist geo-politics, imperial expansion and inevitable conflict with the West’) are now vividly present. Downloaded by [University of Johannesburg] at 01:52 22 April 2015 134 Book Reviews March is much more convincing when he discusses ‘cultural nationalism’. The essay documents the accumulation of nationalist tendencies that burst into the open after the Russian occupation of the Crimea. March is correct in describing ‘political nationalism’, noting that the Russian authorities are ‘extremely ambivalent’ as their policies ‘aim both to repress and stimulate nationalism’(p. 24). Since the essay was written, Russian authorities have started to use nationalism more actively, as a powerful multipurpose political tool both at home and abroad. It remains to be seen how far they will be able to ride this tiger. James Headley’s contribution, ‘Is Russia out of step with European norms? Assessing Russia’s relationship to European identity, values and norms through the issue of self determination’, raises several philosophical issues, such as what European norms and identity are and who defines them, what European civilisation is and whether Russia is part of it or not. The author’s view is that the European Union (EU) cannot unilaterally pronounce its own norms as universally European, because non-members have to participate equally in working out what these norms are. Headley thinks that the notion of ‘Europe’ has been appropriated by the West, which creates ‘hierarchical inclusion’ in European integration ‘on Western terms’. Yet the EU’s definitions of Europeanness seem attractive enough to the majority of Europeans, and new member-states are happy to accept and maintain ‘Western terms’. However, Headley’s analysis of Russia’s and the EU’s approach to self-determination for national minorities is important both historically and as a matter of principle, particularly in view of recent events. The author’s conclusion is that ‘there is evidence of the search for common principles as well as pursuit of interests, which provides the potential for cooperation’ (p. 54). Until 2008, Russia, Headley argues, maintained the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in its international relations. It did not recognise the right of minorities to secede, ‘unless there is a mutually-agreed separation’. However, the independence of Kosovo under the supervision of Western states and without the approval of the United Nations, changed the status-quo. For the EU and the US, Kosovo was a unique case and not a precedent, but Russia saw it as a repudiation of the existing international order. Therefore, together with Russia, Headley accuses Europe of double standards, for it describes its own actions as motivated by moral principles and Russia’s actions as motivated by self-interest. Valentina Feclyunina’s essay discusses Russia’s image abroad in connection with its energy policy. Russia puts a lot of propaganda effort into creating the image of a reliable energy supplier, particularly in Europe, but sometimes, as Feclyunina writes, its policy moves defeat this objective. This happened, for example, during the 2009 crisis when Gazprom and Ukrainian Nafrogaz could not agree on payments and prices, and half of Europe was left without gas in the middle of winter (pipelines carrying Russian gas to Europe go through the territory of Ukraine). Does Russia use its energy resources as a political tool? It seems that the answer to this question is clear, as the official document entitled Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2020 (adopted in 2003) directly stated that Russia’s energy resources were ‘an instrument of domestic and foreign policies’. However, Feclyunina has her doubts, as she describes the 2009 fallout between Ukraine and Russia as having an economic rather than political background and thinks that the blame should go to both countries. Yet she recognises that Gazprom is not an independent and purely business player, and that the ‘geopolitics of oil and gas are becoming more important, to a significant extent in response to Russia’s disputes with Ukraine and Belarus’ (p. 65). If this was true in 2009, then the ‘geopolitics of oil and gas’ have certainly become Downloaded by [University of Johannesburg] at 01:52 22 April 2015 South African Journal of International Affairs 135 immeasurably more important now, in the situation of a de-facto war between Russia and Ukraine and of Western sanctions against Russia and Russian sanctions against the West. Natasha Kuhrt writes on Russia’s Far East in its Asian policy. This essay is particularly interesting in view of Russia’s recent multibillion dollar deal with China. Kuhrt shows the complexity of the problems of the region: underdevelopment, underpopulation, Chinese immigration and no clarity on policy. Should or could the region be fully economically ‘doubly integrated’ in both South East Asia’s and Central Russia’s economic orbits – or is it destined to remain a periphery of both? At the time when the article was written the problem was exacerbated by the oddity of Russia’s vision of its Eurasionism. The ‘Eurasian paradigm’, Kuhrt writes, ‘has always been ambivalent regarding the “Asian” component, reflecting the disdainful attitude to Asia as a secondary region of the world’ (p. 83). This paradigm has since changed. The further rise of China, the weakening of Europe and Russia’s fall-out with the West all converged to lead to an about-turn in Russia’s attitude towards Asia, particularly towards China. Russia’s ‘special relations’ with China are more important than ever before, but the question remains: will this deepening but unequal relationship turn Russia, and particularly its far-eastern region, into China’s raw materials appendage, or will it give a push to Russia’s stagnating economy? The essay ‘Nuclear weapons in Russian foreign policy’, by Jennifer Mathers, is somewhat contradictory. It is mainly an analysis of speeches and pronouncements by Putin (during his first two presidential terms) and by Medvedev on the issue of Russia’s nuclear arms. Mathers concludes that Russia is willing ‘to cooperate with the West and with the United States in particular to find mutually acceptable solutions’ (p. 123). She also quotes a number of Russian and Western political analysts who think that nuclear weapons for Russia are a matter of prestige, an ‘attribute of a great power’, or a deterrence force, rather than a means of aggression or warfare. This does not square up with Russia’s 2000 Military Doctrine, quoted by Mathers herself. In 2003 Putin declared that ‘in the context of current international practice (i.e. including the American doctrine of preventive military action – I.F.) Russia would reserve the right to consider preventive strikes with its nuclear weapons’ (pp. 113–114). The author does not discuss either Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine (her latest detailed materials date from 2009) or, of course, Putin’s new pronouncements as president from 2012. This is a pity, since despite the fact that the later Doctrine was created under Medvedev, the tone and letter of the two doctrines differ. Discussing military threats to Russia, for example, the 2010 Doctrine mentions ‘the creation (buildup) of groups of troops (forces) leading to the violation of the existing balance of forces, close to the Russian Federation’s state border and to the borders of its allies’.1 The new, 2014, Doctrine states that NATO enlargement is the most serious threat to the Russian Federation. And in the last few months not only Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the nationalist Liberal-Democratic Party, and Dmitri Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister, but also President Putin himself, have threatened to use nuclear weapons against the West. Aglaya Snetkov authors the essay on the inter-relationship between Russia’s state identity and its perceptions of internal and external security threats. She writes, correctly, that Russian notions of its strength as a state are ‘condensed around a state-centric model of government’ (p. 132). In the late 1990s and early 2000s Russia’s self-image was that of a weak state. For Russia’s government and for the majority of its population, a ‘small power Russia’ was an impossibility. ‘Russia has to be a great power, or it will be nothing’, as a researcher quoted by Snetkov, says (p. 133). At that time Russia’s security Downloaded by [University of Johannesburg] at 01:52 22 April 2015 136 Book Reviews concerns were centred on the internal terrorist threat. In the international arena it was prepared to co-operate with the West in its fight against terrorism. In the mid-2000s Russian perception of itself as a strong state emerged. The country was doing well economically and Chechnya was ‘pacified’. In this context a new conceptualisation of threat merged terrorism with any independent activity or challenge to the government’s authority and with influence from the West. A series of new antiterrorist acts were passed at that time, limiting media freedom and activities of nongovernmental organisations. Moreover, in Russia’s view, the actions of the West in Iraq and its support for the ‘coloured revolutions’, as well as NATO’s expansion to the East, not only undermined international antiterrorist efforts, but destabilised the system of international relations as a whole. The West is now perceived as an equal threat to Russia, alongside terrorism. The essay ‘Russia and the Middle East: a Cold War paradigm?’, by Roland Dannreuther, suggests that it is wrong to view Russian policies through a revived Cold War paradigm. During the Cold War the division of the world into spheres of interest by the two superpowers meant that there were few or no economic relations with the allies of the opposite side. Today, when confrontation with the West has become Russia’s overarching priority, it still maintains relations with some of the closest allies of the US in the Middle East. The author convincingly shows that the foundations of Russia’s relations with the Middle East have been politically and economically diverse, and that its policy in that region has been dictated by pragmatic considerations, rather than by ideology. Russia’s actions have been defined by the need to prevent the potential further radicalisation of its Moslem population and secessionism in the North Caucasus, by its economic interests, which include growing trade and cooperation with both Israel and some of the Arab states, by the need to secure its southern boarders and by its ambition to be seen as a responsible great power supporting international norms and attempting to maintain peace. Domitilla Sagramoso relates the history of the radicalisation of Islamic jamaats in the North Caucasus. Her study exhaustively shows how Russia’s actions, the collapse of statehood in the North Caucasus and external interventions led to the radicalisation of the Moslem population first in Chechnya, then in the neighbouring autonomous republics of Kabardino–Balkariya, Karachevo–Cherkessiya and Ingushetia. A peaceful religious movement based on strict Islamic Salafi principles was born in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the 1990s and early 2000s its various sections and organisations, inspired by foreign preachers of radical Islam and assisted by foreign jihadists, fought against corrupt local civilian authorities, supported by Russian troops. By the mid-2000s they developed into a radicalised rebel movement closely linked to jihadists abroad. In 2006 the Chechen resistance proclaimed Chechnya ‘a sovereign, independent Islamic legal state Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya’ (p. 191). The Chechen constitution was adjusted in line with Islamic law. On 21 November 2007 Dokku Umarov, a veteran Chechen fighter and leader, proclaimed the Caucasian Emirate in the North Caucasus, which meant the adoption of Sharia law along Salafi lines by the entire North Caucasian region. The new ‘state’ had become truly international: its leaders represented all of the republics drawn into the war. Jihad was proclaimed a duty of every devout Moslem. Sagramoso offers detailed accounts of the ideological transformation of the North Caucasian leaders and of the various trends and tendencies in the radicalisation of Islam in that region. She presents the views of foreign and local preachers of radical Islam and an overview of the global jihadist movement and its ideology. However, amazingly, she Downloaded by [University of Johannesburg] at 01:52 22 April 2015 South African Journal of International Affairs 137 does not take her story beyond 2007, that is, beyond the creation of the Emirate, although it is alive and active to this day. The last article by Ekaterina Braginskaya is a comparative analysis of state policy towards Moslems in Russia, Britain and France. The author outlines some distinct features of the situation of Moslem minorities in Russia. Unlike French and British Moslems, the Russian Moslem population is mostly native, not immigrant. There are several administrative and territorial units in which the Moslems are a majority, and some of these have a degree of autonomy. Russia has a centuries-long, turbulent and uneven history of relations with its Moslem population, but Braginskaya’s analysis of British and French policies towards the Moslem populations in these countries is not up to date: she does not take it beyond 2007, which means that neither the disillusionment with multiculturalism, nor France’s latest laws on displaying religious symbols and the controversy around these issues, are part of her essay. This book is a good resource for anyone interested in Russia and in the global geopolitical situation. However, few readers and even libraries in South Africa or Russia will be able to afford the price of this publication at US$150. The authors would be well advised to create a sequel to it in view of the latest developments and the birth of a new era both in Russia and in the globalised world; and if they want to be read anywhere except British and American universities they will need to cut the price of such a sequel. Note 1. ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, approved by Russian Federation presidential edict of 5 February 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf (accessed 11 January 2015). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2015.1006991 Irina Filatova UKZN, South Africa, and National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Russia Email: [email protected] © 2015 Irina Filatova Inside South Africa’s foreign policy. Diplomacy in Africa from Smuts to Mbeki, by John Siko, London: I.B. Taurus, 2014, 336 pp., ISBN 978-1-78076-831-1 Although a number of South African-based scholars have explored the making of the country’s foreign policy,1 it has been left to an American diplomat/academic to publish the fullest account of those who have influenced the making of South African foreign policy, before, and especially after, the transition to democracy. His book, which comes out of a doctoral thesis submitted to UNISA,2 is not, as its subtitle suggests, a study of South Africa’s diplomacy in Africa from Smuts to Mbeki.3 What Siko does is discuss those interested in the making of South African foreign policy, mainly in the years from 1994 to the end of the Mbeki presidency in 2008, but he also compares foreign policymaking before and after the transition to democracy and asks to what extent it has become more democratic since 1994.4 He draws heavily on 113 interviews he conducted in 2010–2011, over 100 of them in person. As one who has tried to interview some of