Israel's Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean

Israel’s Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean by Efraim Inbar A bout 90 percent of Israel’s foreign trade is carried out via the Mediterranean Sea, making freedom of navigation in this area critical for the Jewish state’s economic well-being. Moreover, the newly found gas fields offshore could transform Israel into an energy independent country and a significant exporter of gas, yet these developments are tied to its ability to secure free maritime passage and to defend About 90 percent of Israel’s foreign trade is carried out the discovered hydrocarbon fields. via the Mediterranean Sea. The East Mediterranean is also While the recent regional turmoil important in terms of energy transit. Close to 5 percent of has improved Israel’s strategic global oil supply and 15 percent of global liquefied natural environment by weakening its gas travels via the Suez Canal while Turkey hosts close to 6 percent of the global oil trade via the Bosporus Straits Arab foes, the East Mediterranean and two international pipelines. has become more problematic due to an increased Russian presence, Turkish activism, the potential for more terrorism and conflict over energy, and the advent of a Cypriot-Greek-Israeli axis. The erosion of the state order around the Mediterranean also brings to the fore Islamist forces with a clear anti-Western agenda, thus adding a civilizational dimension to the discord.1 1 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49. MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY Fall 2014 Inbar: Israel and the East Mediterranean / 1 The East Mediterranean Region The East Mediterranean is located east of the 20o meridian and includes the littoral states of Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Gaza (a de facto independent political unit), Egypt, Libya, and divided Cyprus. The region, which saw significant superpower competition during the Cold War, still has strategic significance. Indeed, the East Mediterranean is an arena from which it is possible to project force into the Middle East. Important East-West routes such as the Silk Road and the Suez Canal (the avenue to the Persian Gulf and India) are situated there. In addition, the sources for important international issues such as radical Islam, international terrorism and nuclear proliferation are embedded in its regional politics. The East Mediterranean is also important in terms of energy transit. Close to 5 percent of global oil supply and 15 percent of global liquefied natural gas travels via the Suez Canal while Turkey hosts close to 6 percent of the global oil trade via the Bosporus Straits and two international pipelines. The discovery of new oil and gas deposits off the coasts of Israel, Gaza, and Cyprus and potential for additional discoveries off Syria and Lebanon, is a promising energy development. ranean.2 Washington also managed the region through a web of alliances with regional powers. Most prominent were two trilateral relationships, which had their origins in the Cold War: U.S.-TurkeyIsrael and U.S.-Egypt-Israel.3 This security architecture has broken down. Hamas leader Ismail Haniya (left) meets with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. With the Islamist Erdoğan at its helm, Turkey supports Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot; helps Iran evade sanctions; assists Sunni Islamists moving into Syria; propagates anti-U.S. and anti-Semitic conspiracies while, at home, the regime displays increasing authoritarianism. Breakdown of the U.S. Security Architecture The naval presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet was unrivalled in the post-Cold War period, and Washington maintained military and political dominance in the East Mediter- 2 For more, see Seth Cropsey, Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Supremacy (New York: Overlook Duckworth, 2013). 3 Jon B. Alterman and Haim Malka, “Shifting Eastern Mediterranean Geometry,” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2012, pp. 111-25. MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY Fall 2014 Inbar: Israel and the East Mediterranean / 2 In n the post--Cold War era,, Ankara en ntered into a strrategic partneership with Jerrusalem, en ncouraged by y Washing gton.4 The fact that the two strongestt allies off the United States S in the t East Mediterranean M n cooperateed closely on o strategic and military y issues was w highly y significan nt for U.S S. interests in the region. Yet, thee rise of th he Islamist Justice an nd Develop pment Party y (Adalet ve v Kalkınmaa Partisi, AK KP) since itts electorall victory of Novembeer 2002 haas led to a reorientatiion in Turk kish foreign n policy which, un nder the AKP, haas distanced d itself from f the West and d developeed ambition ns to lead the Muslim m world.5 With W Recep p Tayyp Errdoğan at itts helm, Tu urkey supports Hamass, a Muslim m Brotherh hood offsho oot; helps Iran evade sanctions; assists Sunni S Islam mists moving g into Syriia and mullls an invasion of Syriaa; propagattes anti-U U.S. and anti-Semitic conspiraacies while the regim me display ys increasin ng authoritarianism at homee. Moreoveer, Turkey’s NATO partnership p has beco ome problem matic, particcularly afteer a Chinesse firm wass contracted d to build a 4 Efraim Inbar, I The Isra aeli-Turkish En ntente (London n: King’s College Meediterranean Program, P 2001)); p. Ofra Bengio, The Turkish-Israelli Relationship nging Ties off Middle Easstern Outsiderrs Chan (New w York: Palgrav ve, 2004). long-rrange air and anti-m missile ddefense 6 architeecture. Turkish ppolicy, fueled by Ottomaan and Islamisst impulses, hhas led to an activist approach tow ward the Midddle East and also to strrains in the relationshiip with Israael. This bbecame eviddent followiing the May 2010 attemppt by a Turrkish vessel,, the Mavi M Marmara, too break the Israeli naaval blockaade of Gazza. In Octtober 2010,, Turkey’s national security couuncil even iddentified Isrrael as one of the couuntry’s mainn threats in its official policy doccument, thhe “Red Book.” These devvelopments fractured one off the fouundations uppon which U.S. policcy has restted in the Eaast Mediterraanean. Stabilityy in the East Mediterrranean alsoo benefited ffrom the U.S S.-Egyptian--Israeli triaangle, whichh began whenn President Anwar Saddat decided iin the 1970s to switch too a proU.S S. orientatioon and subssequently too make peaace with Israael in 1979. Egypt, the largest Araab state, carrries much w weight in thhe East Meediterranean,, the Middlee East, and A Africa. Saddat’s successsor, Husni M Mubarak, conntinued the pro-U.S. staance during the post-Cold War era.. The conveergence of innterests amoong the Uniited States,, Egypt, aand Israel served amoong other things to m maintain thhe Pax Am mericana in thhe East Medditerranean. Yet, thhe U.S.-Egyyptian-Israeli relationnship has been undder strain since Muubarak’s ressignation inn February 2011. Egyypt’s militaary continueed its cooperation withh Israel to m maintain the military clauuses of 5 Rajan Menon M and S. En nders Wimbush, “The US an nd Turkeey: End of an Alliance?” Surrvival, Summeer 2007,, pp. 129-44; Efraim E Inbar, “Israeli-Turkis “ sh Tensiions and Theirr International Ramifications, R ,” Orbiss, Winter 2011, 2 pp. 135-9; 1 Ahmeet Davu utoğlu, Strateejik Derinlikk: Türkiye'niin Ulusllararası Konum mu (Istanbul: Küre K Yayınlarrı, 2001)). 6 T Tarik Ozuglu, “Turkey’s Erooding Committment to NATO: Froom Identity to Interestss,” The Washington Quarterly, Suummer 2012, ppp. 15364; Burak Egge Bekdil, “Alllies Intensify P Pressure on Turkey over China Missile Deaal,” The ws, Feb. 24, 20114, p. 8. Defense New MIDDLE EAST E QUART TERLY Fall 20 014 Inbar: Israel and the E East Mediterraanean / 3 the 1979 peace trreaty. But the Muslim M Bro otherhood, which w camee to power viia the ballot box, was very y reserved to oward relations with Israel, which th he Brotherho ood saw as a theologicaal aberration. Moreov ver, the Brotherhood d basically y held anti-U.S. sentim ments, which h were muted m som mewhat by realpolitik k requirem ments, prim marily the unexpected d 7 support lent it by the Obama adm ministration. The T Egyptian n army’s rem moval of th he Muslim Brotherhood d regime in n July 2013 further undermined u the t trilaterall relationship p since thee U.S. adm ministration regarded r th he move ass an “undemocratic” development d t. Washing gton even partially p su uspended itts assistance to Egypt in i October 2013, 2 causing g additionaal strain in reelations with h Cairo. Thiis came on n the heels of Presideent Obama’s cancellattion of the Bright B Star joint j military y exercise and the Pentagon’s wiithholding of o delivery of weapon systems. The T U.S. aid d flow has now been tied t to “cred dible progresss toward an a inclusive,, democraticcally-elected d, civilian governmen nt through h free and d 8 fair elecctions.” Isrraeli diplom matic effortts to conviince Washin ngton not to t act on itts democraatic, missio onary zeal were only y partially successfull.9 These deevelopmentts have hampered h potential for usefu ul cooperatiion between n Cairo, Jerrusalem, and d Washing gton. 7 Liad Porat, “The Musslim Brotherho ood and EgypttIsraell Peace,” Miideast Securitty and Policcy Studiies, no. 102, BESA Center for Strategiic Studiies, Ramat Gan n, Aug. 1, 2013 3. 8 Tally Helfont, “Slasheed US Aid to Egypt and th he or Futurre of the Bilatteral Relationss,” Institute fo Natio onal Strategic Studies, Wasshington, D.C C., Oct. 13, 1 2013. 9 Interview w with senior Israeli officcial, Jerusalem m, Apr. 7, 2013. MIDDLE EAST E QUART TERLY Fall 20 014 The turbuleence in the Arrab world since 2011 has also underscored the erosion in the U.S. pposition. This is partly ddue to the fforeign poliicy of the O Obama admiinistration thhat can be ccharacterizeed as a deliberate, “multilateral retrrenchment … designeed to curtaail the Uniited Statess’ overseaas committments, resttore its stannding in thee world, and shift burrdens onto global partnners.”10 It iis also part rtly due tto Washinngton’s connfused, conntradictory, and inconsiistent responnses to the unfolding eevents of thee Arab uprissings.11 Furrthermore, tthe ill-concceived pleddge of millitary action in Syria in rresponse to tthe use of chemical w weapons byy Assad annd the subbsequent poolitical acroobatics to avoid folllowing throuugh elicited m much ridiculle.12 This waas followed by the Novvember 20113 nuclear ddeal, hamm mered out beetween U.S S.-led P5+1 ggroup and Irran, that alloows the Islaamic Repubblic to coontinue enrriching urannium as w well as w weaponizationn and misssiles—the delivery ssystems—thaat has beeen viewed in the Eaast Mediterrranean (an d elsewheree) as a great diplomatic vvictory for Tehran. R Regional leeaders havee seen Waashington retreat frrom Iraq and Afgghanistan, enngage (or apppease) its ennemies Irann and Syria, and desert ffriendly ruleers. All 10 D Daniel W. Dreezner, “Does O Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Whhy We Need D Doctrines in U Uncertain Times,” Foreeign Affairs, Juuly/Aug. 2011,, p. 58. 11 E Eitan Gilboa, “The United States and thhe Arab Spring,” in E Efraim Inbar, ed., The Arab Spring, Democracy and Securrity: Domestiic and Regional Ramifications (London: Rooutledge, 2013), pp. 511-74. 12 E Eyal Zisser, ““The Failure oof Washingtonn’s Syria Policy,” Midddle East Quaarterly, Fall 20013, pp. 59-66. Inbar: Israel and the E East Mediterraanean / 4 China is an understandable strategic reason for the reinforcement of U.S. military presence in Asia. While little has been done to implement the Asia pivot, cuts in the U.S. defense budget clearly indicate that such a priority will be at the expense of Washington’s presence elsewhere, including the East Mediterranean. The U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean dwindled after the end of the Cold War and the mounting needs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.14 At the height of the Cold War, the Sixth Fleet regularly comprised one or two North of Israel, along the Mediterranean coast, sits aircraft carrier task forces; today Lebanon, a state dominated by the radical Shiite it consists of a command ship Hezbollah. Beirut has already laid claim to some of the and smaller vessels such as Israeli-found offshore gas fields, shown above. destroyers. While the U.S. military Moreover, Syria, an enemy of Israel and long-time ally is still capable of acting in the of Iran, exerts considerable influence in Lebanon. East Mediterranean, the general perception in the region is that the Obama administration lacks the have strengthened the general perception of a political will and skills to do so. weak and confused U.S. foreign policy. The possibility that European allies in Drained by the wars in Afghanistan NATO or the European Union will fill the and Iraq and blessed with new energy finds, U.S. position in the East Mediterranean is not Washington does not want to get dragged taken seriously. Europe is not a real strategic into additional conflicts in a Middle East actor since it lacks the necessary military that no longer seems central to its assets, a clear strategic vision, as well as the interests. As it edges toward energy political will to take up the U.S. role. Others, independence, Washington is apparently such as Russia, which has long maintained a losing interest in the East Mediterranean base in Syria, might. and the adjacent Middle East. This parallels Obama’s November 2011 announcement of the “rebalance to Asia” policy.13 The rise of 13 “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ toward Asia,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., Mar. 28, 2012. MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY Fall 2014 14 Seth Cropsey, “All Options Are Not on the Table: A Briefing on the US Mediterranean Fleet,” World Affairs Journal, Mar. 16, 2011; Steve Cohen, “America’s Incredible Shrinking Navy,” The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 20, 2014. Inbar: Israel and the East Mediterranean / 5 Grow wing Islamiist Presence P Elements of radical Islam are incrreasingly po owerful aro ound the East Mediterraanean basin.. The Muslim-m majority cou untries have difficulties d in n sustainin ng statist structures, allowing a fo or Islamist political fo orces to ex xercise everrgreater in nfluence. Ind deed, Islamiist tendenciees in Libya, Egypt, Gaaza, Lebanon n, Syria, and d Turkey all a threaten the currentt unrestricted d access to o the area by Israel and th he West. Libya L remains chaotic three yearrs after thee uprising against Mu u‘ammar allQaddafi. Such lack of o order may lead to th he a greateer disintegration of thee state and allow 1 f Muslim extremists.15 freedom of action for Libya’s eastern e neigh hbor, Egypt, is now ruled d again by y the military y, but it is premature to o concludee that the Islamist elemeents will play y only a secondary role in th he emerging g political system. Th hey still sen nd multitudees into thee streets of o Egyptian n cities to o destabilizze the new military reegime. Aparrt from the importan nt Mediterraanean portss, t Suez Can nal, a criticaal Egypt alsso controls the passagew way linking Europe to the Persian n Gulf and d the Far Easst that could d fall into th he hands of Islamists. Even E if the Egyptian E military is able to curtaill the Islamist forces at home, h its grip p over the Sinai Penin nsula is ten nuous. Undeer Gen. Abdel Fattah h al-Sisi, attempts to o dislodge the Sunni jihadists ro oaming Sinaai have incrreased, but full f Egyptian n sovereignty y has not been b restored d. This coulld lead to th he “Somalizzation” of th he peninsulaa, negatively y affecting g the safety of naval traade along th he Mediterranean, the approaches to the Suez a the Red d Sea. Neaarby Gaza is i Canal, and 15 Florencce Gaub, “A Libyan L Recipee for Disaster,,” Surviival, Feb.-Mar. 2014, pp. 101-20. MIDDLE EAST E QUART TERLY Fall 20 014 currentlly controlleed by Hamas,, a radical Isslamist organizzation alliedd with Iran. Containmennt of the Islaamist threatt from Gaza rremains a sserious challenge. North of Israel, along the Mediterrranean coaast, sits L Lebanon, a state dom minated by tthe radical S Shiite Hezboollah. It hass already laidd claim to soome of the IIsraelifouund offshoree gas fields. Moreover, Syria, an eenemy of Isrrael and longg-time ally oof Iran, exeerts consideerable influeence in Leebanon. Thee Assad regiime remainss in power, bbut any Syrrian successsor regime could be Isslamist andd anti-Westerrn. Further on the East Medditerraneaan coastlinee is AKP-ruled Turkkey. A com mbination oof Turkish nationalism m, neoOtt oman nosttalgia, andd Islamist-jjihadist imppulses has ppushed Ankkara away ffrom a proo-Western fooreign orienntation towaard an agggressive postture on severral regional issues. Turrkey is interrested in gaaining controol over the maritime gas fieldss in the eeastern Meediterranean,, which wouuld limit its energy deppendence onn Russia annd Iran andd help fulffill its ambiitions to seerve as an energy briddge to the West. Thiss puts Ankkara at logggerheads w with Nicosiaa and Jeruusalem, whiich share aan interest iin developinng the hyddrocarbon fields in their excclusive ecoonomic zonees and exportting gas to eenergythirrsty Europe. Indeed, Ankkara also fleexed its navval muscless by threaatening to escort flottillas trying to break thhe Israeli bloockade on G Gaza. West oof Turkey iss Greece, a democrratic, Westerrn state with a stake in the prootection of the Greekk Cypriots from Muuslim domination. Howeever, it has llimited millitary ability to parry thee Turkish chaallenge alonne and is wrracked by ecconomic prooblems. Maany East Mediterranean states also Inbar: Israel and the E East Mediterraanean / 6 would likely favor the return of Cyprus to Turkish (and Muslim) rule. This preference introduces a civilizational aspect to the emerging balance of power. A New Strategic Equation There is now a power vacuum in the East Mediterranean and Russian warships arrive at the Syrian port city of Tartus, January 8, an uncertain future. 2014. The Russians have retained a naval base at Tartus and have Several developments gradually increased fleet size and stepped up patrols in the East are noteworthy: a Mediterranean, roughly coinciding with the escalation of the Syrian civil war. Moscow also gained full access to a Cypriot port and recently resurgence of Russian announced the establishment of a Mediterranean naval task force “on a influence, the potential permanent basis.” for Turkish aggression, the emergence of an Israeli-Greek-Cypriot exercises. During his visit to the Black Sea axis, an enhanced terrorist threat, greater Iranian Fleet in February 2013, Defense Minister ability to project power in the region, and the Sergei Shoigu stressed that the potential for wars over gas fields. “Mediterranean region was the core of all Russia: The power vacuum makes it essential dangers to Russia’s national easier for Moscow to recapture some of its interests” and that continued fallout from the lost influence after the end of the Cold War. Arab upheavals increased the importance of While U.S. and European navies in the the region. Shortly after, he announced the region have steadily declined for years as this establishment of a naval task force in the theater has been considered of diminishing Mediterranean “on a permanent basis.”17 importance, Russia has retained its Tartus Moscow also gained full access to a naval base on the Syrian coast and has Cypriot port.18 A member of the European gradually improved its fleet size and stepped Union but not NATO, and painfully aware up patrols in the East Mediterranean, roughly that the West is not likely to offer a coinciding with the escalation of the Syrian 16 credible guarantee against potential civil war. Moscow’s new military footprint Turkish aggression, Nicosia has come to in the East Mediterranean has been underscored by multiple Russian naval 16 Thomas R. Fedyszyn, “The Russian Navy ‘Rebalances’ to the Mediterranean,” U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Dec. 2013. MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY Fall 2014 17 Ibid. 18 InCyprus.com, Jan. 11, 2014. Inbar: Israel and the East Mediterranean / 7 considerr Moscow w a power ab ble to provide a modicum m of deterrrence 19 against Ankara. A Russian R diplomaccy and maaterial support have also been b cruciall to keeping g Syria’s Bashar B al-A Assad in pow wer, making g Moscow a tacit allly of Iran n.20 No lesss importan nt, Russia haas increased d its leverag ge in Egyptt—the most important Arab A state— — following g the military coup. According A to o many rep ports, a larg ge arms deall, to the tun ne of U.S. $2-3 $ billion, and naval seervices at th he port of Alexandria, A were discusssed between n the two countries c at the t beginnin ng of 2014. If I these deaals do indeed d materialize, this would d representt an important change in Egyptian n policy. It is not cleear whether the Western n powers fully und derstand th he strategic nce of Eg gypt moving g closer to o significan Russia. Despite D its problems p with w Muslim m radicals at homee, Moscow w has also o maintain ned good reelations with h Hamas. In n contrast to most of the internationa i al commun nity, which h considerss Hamas a terrorist organizatio on, in 2006, the Russian n governm ment invited a Hamas delegation d to o 21 1 Moscow w for talks. In 2010, to ogether with h Turkey, Russia eveen called for f bringing g Hamas into the diplomattic process attemp ting to acchieve an I sraeli-Palesstinian agreem ment. 22 Finally, Ruussia— an enerrgy produceer—has shown interest iin the new wly discoverred offshoree energy fieldds.23 In Julyy 2012, Russsian presideent Vladimirr Putin visiited Israel too discuss thee gas fields, among oth er things. IIn Decembeer 2013, M Moscow signned a 25-year energy deeal with Syrria that opeens the way for its evenntual move innto the gass-rich East M Mediterraneann.24 Turkey:: The Russsian encroacchment hass been parralleled by greater T Turkish asseertiveness. Under ceertain condditions, Ankkara may bee tempted to capitalize on its connventional m military supperiority to force issuues by milittary action in several aarenas, inclluding the Aegean, Cyyprus, Syriaa, and, perh rhaps, Iraq. T The potentiaal disintegraation of Syrria and the possible esstablishment of an inddependent G Greater Kurrdistan couuld be inceentives forr Turkish interventionn. The colllapse of the AKP’s earllier foreign ppolicy, dubbbed “zero problems”” with Tuurkey’s neigghbors, couuld push A Ankara intoo open connfrontation. Aggressive Russian beehavior in C Crimea couldd reinforce ssuch tendenccies. Similarlly, Turkeyy’s appetitte for eneergy and asppiration to bbecome an energy briddge to Euroope could llead to aggrressive behhavior. Turkkish warships have haarassed vesssels prospeecting for oil and gas off Cypprus. 25 Cyprrus is also thhe main stattion for 19 Intervieews with senio or officials, Nicosia, Oct. 10 0, 2012. 22 T The Jerusalem Post, May 12, 2010. 20 he Russian Fleet in th he Zvi Magen, “Th Mediiterranean: Exeercise or Militaary Operation??” Institu ute for Naational Strattegic Studiess, Wash hington, D.C., Jan. J 29, 2013. 21 Igor Khrestin K and John Elliott, “R Russia and th he Midd dle East,” Mid ddle East Qua arterly, Winteer 2007,, pp. 21-7. MIDDLE EAST E QUART TERLY Fall 20 014 23 Thane Gustaffson, “Putin’s Petroleum Prroblem,” Foreign Affaairs, Nov./Dec. 2012, pp. 83-996. 24 U United Press Innternational, Jaan. 16, 2014. 25 For example, see, Gary L Lakes, “Oil, G Gas and Energy Secuurity,” Europeean Rim Poliicy and Investment C Council (ERPIIC, Larnaca, C Cyprus), Oct. 23, 20099. Inbar: Israel and the E East Mediterraanean / 8 a Turkish desired pipeline taking Levant Basin gas to Turkey for export to Europe. Ankara might even be tempted to complete its conquest of Cyprus, begun when it invaded and occupied the northern part of the island in 1974. Ankara has embarked on military modernization and has ambitious procurement plans. Turkish naval power is the largest in the East Mediterranean.26 In March 2012, then-navy commander Admiral Murat Bilgel outlined Turkey’s strategic objective “to operate not only in the littorals but also on the high seas,” with high seas referring to the East Mediterranean. The December 2013 decision to purchase a large 27,500-ton landing dock vessel capable of transporting multiple tanks, helicopters, and Greece’s George Papandreou (left) and Benjamin Netanyahu in Athens, August 2010. Turkey’s threats and actions have brought Israel and Greece closer together. Battling an economic crisis, Greece wants the new ties with Israel to boost tourism and investment, particularly in the gas industry, while deepening its military partnership with a powerful country in the region. more than a thousand troops, reflects its desire to project naval strength in the region.27 Israel, Cyprus, and Greece: Turkey’s threats and actions have brought Israel, Cyprus, and Greece closer together. Beyond blocking a revisionist Turkey and common interests in the area of energy security, the three states also share apprehensions about the East Mediterranean becoming an Islamic lake. Athens, Jerusalem, and Nicosia hope to coordinate the work of their lobbies in Washington to sensitize the U.S. administration to their concerns. Battling an economic crisis, Greece wants the new ties with Israel to boost tourism and investment, particularly in the gas industry, while deepening its military partnership with a powerful country in the region.28 Moreover, the emerging informal Israeli-Greek alliance has the potential to bring Israel closer to Europe and moderate some of the proPalestinian bias occasionally displayed by the European Union. Following Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Greece in August 2010, cooperation between the two countries has been broad and multifaceted, covering culture, tourism, and economics. One area of cooperation discussed was the possibility of creating a gas triangle—Israel-Cyprus-Greece—with Greece the hub of Israeli and Cypriot gas exports to the rest of Europe.29 Such a development could lessen the continent’s energy dependence on Russia.30 Another project that can further improve the ties between the countries is a proposed undersea 27The Jerusalem Post, Feb. 4, 2014. 28 Bloomberg News Service (New York), Aug. 2011. 26 “Turkey,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., Dec. 24, 2012, pp. 19-25. MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY Fall 2014 29 The Jerusalem Post, Sept. 10, 2013. 30 Ibid., Aug. 2, 2011. Inbar: Israel and the East Mediterranean / 9 electric power line between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. Currently Israel and Cyprus are isolated in terms of electricity and do not export or import almost any power. Israeli-Greek military cooperation has already manifested itself in a series of multinational—Greek, Israel, and United States—joint air and sea exercises under the names Noble Dina31 and Blue Flag (which included an Italian contingent).32 Greece also cooperated with Israel in July 2011 by preventing the departure of ships set to sail to Gaza.33 International terrorism: Developments in the Arab states of the East Mediterranean have increased the threat of international terrorism. As leaders lose their grip over state territory and borders become more porous, armed groups and terrorists gain greater freedom of action. Moreover, security services that dealt with terrorism have been negatively affected by domestic politics and have lost some of their efficiency. Sinai has turned into a transit route for Iranian weapons to Hamas and a base for terrorist attacks against Israel. Hamas has even set up rocket production lines in Sinai in an effort to protect its assets, believing Jerusalem would not strike targets inside Egypt for fear of undermining the bilateral relations.34 Syria has also become a haven for many Islamist groups as result of the civil war. Furthermore, as weakened or failed states lose control over their security apparatus, national arsenals of conventional and nonconventional arms have become vulnerable, which may result in the emergence of increasingly wellarmed, politically dissatisfied groups Salafi jihadist groups have reportedly attacked the Suez Canal several seeking to harm times. In 2013, an Egyptian court sentenced 26 members of an alleged Israel. For example, terrorist group to death over plans to target ships in the canal. In 2014, following the fall Egyptian authorities again tightened security around the canal following of Qaddafi, Libyan fears that Muslim Brotherhood supporters of Mohamed Morsi might SA-7 anti-air missiles attack ships in the waterway in protest over his trial. and anti-tank rocketpropelled grenades reached Hamas in Gaza.35 Similarly, in the event of a Syrian regime collapse, 31 The Times of Israel (Jerusalem), Mar. 25, 2014. 32 Arutz Sheva (Beit El and Petah Tikva), Nov. 25, 2013. 34 The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 11, 2011. 33Haaretz (Tel Aviv), July 2, 2011. 35 Reuters, Aug. 29, 2011. MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY Fall 2014 Inbar: Israel and the East Mediterranean / 10 Damascu us’s advanceed arsenal, inccluding chem mical weapons, shore-to o-ship missiles, air defense systems, and balllistic missiles of o all types could c end up in the hands h of Hezb bollah or other radical ellements.36 Finally, terrrorist activ vities could d adversely y affect the navigation through th he Suez Can nal, an impo ortant choke point. Salaffi jihadist groups hav ve attacked d the canaal 37 several tiimes already y. The T Iranian presence: p The T decline in n U.S. pow wer, the tim midity of thee Europeanss, and the turmoil in the Arab world hav ve facilitated Iranian en ncroachmentt of the Easst Mediterranean. Indeeed, Tehran’ss attempts to o boost its naval presen nce in the Mediterranean M n are part of an ambittious program to build a pable of pro ojecting pow wer far from m navy cap 38 Iran’s bo orders. Teh hran would liike to be able to supplly its Mediiterranean allies: a Syriaa, Hezbollaah in Lebano on, and Ham mas in Gazaa. Entering the Meditterranean allso enhancees Iran’s access a to Muslim M Baalkan statess, namely Albania, A Bossnia, and Ko osovo, giving g Tehran a clear stakee in the outtcome of th he Syrian civil war. Asssad’s hold on power is i f the “Shiite Crescen nt” from th he critical for Persian Gulf to thee Levant, which w would d enhance Iranian in nfluence in the Middle East and the East Mediterranean n. Tehran haas also beeen strengtheening naval cooperation n with Moscow, M viewed as a potentiaal 36 Defensee News (Spring gfield, Va.), Deec. 12, 2011. 37 USA To oday, Nov. 4, 2013. 2 38 Shaul Shay, “Iran’s New Strateg gic Horizons at a Sea,”” Arutz Sheva a, July 30, 2012; Agencce Francce-Presse, Jan. 17, 2013. MIDDLE EAST E QUART TERLY Fall 20 014 partner in efforts to limit and constrain U.S. 39 influencce. Wars overr gas fields: The disscovery of gas fields in thhe East Mediterrranean couuld potentiallyy escalate teensions in thhis increaasingly vol atile region.. Competingg claims to tthe gas fiellds by Israell’s former allly Turkey aas well as bby its neighbbor Lebanonn (still in a dde jure statte of war) hhave precipitated a buildup of navval forces in the Levant basin by a nnumber of sstates, includding Russia.. Israel’s weells and the naval preseence protectiing them also offer new w targets at sea to its llongstandingg, nonstatte enemies, H Hezbollah annd Hamas. Conscioous of these threats, thee Israel Deffense Forcess chief of staaff, Lt. Gen. Benny Ganntz, has appproved the nnavy’s plan to add fouur offshore ppatrol vessels.40 Israeli ddefense circcles hope thhat Israel’s expanding navy, com mbined withh continuouss improvem ment of landd and aair assets and incrreasing coooperation wiith Greece and Cyprus, will giv e pause to aany regionaal actor that would connsider turninng the Mediterranean Seea into the next greatt field of bbattle. Indeeed, the Israaeli navy is now preparring to defeend the gass field offshoore of Israel.41 The fuuture role oof Russia inn these devvelopments is not cleaar. Some annalysts beliieve that M Moscow is innterested priimarily in marketing the region’s energy riches. Seccuring gass reserves in the East Meediterranean will alsoo help M Moscow 39 M Michael Eisensstadt and Alonn Paz, “Iran’s E Evolving Maritime Prresence,” Poliicy Watch, noo. 2224, Washington Institute forr Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Mar. 133, 2014. 40 IIsrael Hayom ((Tel Aviv), Julyy 10, 2012. 41 D Defense News ((Springfield, V Va.), Feb. 27, 22012. Inbar: Issrael and the E East Mediterrannean / 11 safeguard its dominant position as a natural gas supplier to western Europe, which could be challenged by new competitors in the region. Yet, delays and disruptions in moving gas to Europe might further strengthen Russia’s role as a major energy supplier to Europe and keep prices high, which is beneficial for Moscow. Moreover, as the Ukraine crisis indicated, geopolitics still is a dominant factor in Russian decision-making. Conclusion Stability in the East Mediterranean can no longer be taken for granted as U.S. forces are retreating. Europe, an impotent international actor, cannot fill the resulting political vacuum. Russia under Putin is beefing up its naval presence. Growing Islamist freedom of action is threatening the region. Turkey, no longer a true ally of the West, has its own Mediterranean agenda and the military capability to project force to attain its goals. So far, the growing Russian assertiveness has not changed the course of Turkish foreign policy. The disruptive potential of failed states, the access of Iran to Mediterranean waters, and inter-state competition for energy resources are also destabilizing the region. But it is not clear whether the Western powers, particularly the United States, are aware of the possibility of losing the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea to Russia or radical Islam, or are MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY Fall 2014 preparing in any way to forestall such a scenario. U.S. naiveté and European gullibility could become extremely costly in strategic terms. The Israeli perspective on the East Mediterranean region is colored by its vital need to maintain the freedom of maritime routes for its foreign trade and to provide security for its newly found gas fields. While its strategic position has generally improved in the Middle East, Jerusalem sees deterioration in the environment in the East Mediterranean. A growing Russian presence and Turkish assertiveness are inimical to Israel’s interests. Developments along the shores of the East Mediterranean also decrease stability and enhance the likelihood of more Islamist challenges. In civilizational terms, the East Mediterranean has served as a point of contention in the past between Persia and the ancient Greeks and between the Ottomans and Venetians. It is the location where the struggle between East and West takes place. After the Cold War, the borders of the West moved eastward. Now, they could easily move in the other direction. Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and a Shilman-Ginsburg Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum. Inbar: Israel and the East Mediterranean / 12