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2010, Journal of Clinical Neuroscience
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4 pages
1 file
Friedrich Nietzsche developed dementia at the age of 44 years. It is generally assumed that the cause of his dementia was neurosyphilis or general pareisis of the insane (GPI). Others have proposed frontalbased meningioma as the underlying cause. We have reviewed Nietzsche's medical history and evaluated the evidence from the medical examinations he underwent by various physicians. We have viewed the possible diagnosis of GPI or meningioma in light of present neuro-ophthalmic understanding and found that Nietzsche did not have the neurological or neuro-ophthalmic symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of GPI. The anisocoria which was assumed to be Argyll Robertson pupil was present since he was six years of age. He did not have tongue tremor, lacked progressive motor features and lived at least 12 years following the onset of his neurological signs. Furthermore, the headaches that have been attributed to a frontal-based tumour were present since childhood and the pupil abnormality that has been interpreted as an ''afferent pupillary defect" had the characteristics of an abnormality of the efferent pupillary innervation. None of the medical records or photographs suggest there was any ocular misalignment. We concluded that neither diagnosis of GPI nor frontal-based meningioma is convincing. It is likely that Nietzsche suffered from migraines, his blindness in his right eye was a consequence of high progressive myopia associated with retinal degeneration, his anisocoria explained by unilateral tonic pupil, and his dementia by an underlying psychiatric disease.
Acta neurologica Belgica
Background : Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), one of the most profound and influential modern philosophers, suffered since his very childhood from severe migraine. At 44 he had a mental breakdown ending in a dementia with total physical dependence due to stroke. From the very beginning, Nietzsche's dementia was attributed to a neurosyphilitic infection. Recently, this tentative diagnosis has become controversial. Objective : To use historical accounts and original materials including correspondence, biographical data and medical papers to document the clinical characteristics of Nietzsche's illness and, by using this pathography, to discuss formerly proposed diagnoses and to provide and support a new diagnostic hypothesis. Materials : Original letters from Friedrich Nietzsche, descriptions by relatives and friends, and medical descriptions. Original German sources were investigated. Biographical papers published in medical journals were also consulted. Results : Nietzsche suffered from migraine without aura which started in his childhood. In the second half of his life he suffered from a psychiatric illness with depression. During his last years, a progressive cognitive decline evolved and ended in a profound dementia with stroke. He died from pneumonia in 1900. The family history includes a possible vascular-related mental illness in his father, who died from stroke at 36. Conclusions : Friedrich Nietzsche's disease consisted of migraine, psychiatric disturbances, cognitive decline with dementia, and stroke. Despite the prevalent opinion that neurosyphilis caused Nietzsche's illness, there is lack of evidence to support this diagnosis. Cerebral autosomal dominant arteriopathy with subcortical infarcts and leukoencephalopathy (CADASIL) accounts for all the signs and symptoms of Nietzsche's illness. This study adds new elements to the debate and controversy about Nietzsche's illness. We discuss former diagnoses, comment on the history of a diagnostic mistake, and integrate for the first time Nietzsche's medical problems.
Abstract The causes of Friedrich Nietzsche’s mental breakdown in early 1889 and of the subsequent slow decay to end-stage dementia along ten years will possibly remain open to debate. The diagnosis of syphilitic dementia paralytica, based only on medical anamnesis and physical examination, was considered indisputable by Otto Binswanger. On the other hand, taking into account recently described diseases, selectively collected evidence lend some support to alternative hypotheses: basal forebrain meningioma, CADASIL, MELAS and frontotemporal dementia. Keywords: 19th Century, history of medicine, neurosyphilis, diagnosis.
Arquivos de Neuro-Psiquiatria, 2015
The causes of Friedrich Nietzsche’s mental breakdown in early 1889 and of the subsequent slow decay to end-stage dementia along ten years will possibly remain open to debate. The diagnosis of syphilitic dementia paralytica, based only on medical anamnesis and physical examination, was considered indisputable by Otto Binswanger. On the other hand, taking into account recently described diseases, selectively collected evidence lend some support to alternative hypotheses: basal forebrain meningioma, CADASIL, MELAS and frontotemporal dementia.
Medicina Historica, 2018
A notorious episode took place in Turin in January, 1889: Nietzsche's mental breakdown. That very occurrence marks the start of the hospitalization of the philosopher in mental institutions: accompanied by his friend Franz Overbeck, he first went to Basel where he stayed only for a week (from the 10th to the 17th of January, 1889); he was then taken by his mother to Jena where he actually stayed for more than a year (from January 18th , 1889 to March 24th, 1890). The article will focus on the philosopher's diagnosis starting from his clinical records, passing though the hypotheses of his contemporaries, until some recent ones. The aim will be to overcome manichean and univocal positions both of madness and illness.
Journal of the History of the Neurosciences, 2013
There are some arguments that Friedrich Nietzsche suffered from the autosomal dominant vascular microangiopathy: Cerebral Autosomal Dominant Arteriopathy with Subcortical Infarcts and Leukoencephalopathy (CADASIL). Here, a hypothesis is formulated supporting that CADASIL presenting with symptoms of bipolar disorder and Gastaut-Geschwind syndrome would contribute to the increased insight and creativity of a philosopher whose perceptions and intuitions often bear out the results of modern neuroscience. Alterations of the brain default and reward networks would account for such an increased level of introspection and creativity. A new framework on approaching illness is proposed, which, in conformity with Nietzsche's positive view, outlines the enabling aspects of some otherwise highly disabling neuropsychiatric disorders.
Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 2018
At age 44, after suffering a breakdown in Turin, philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche was diagnosed with neurosyphilis. There was no necropsy on his body, so this medical diagnosis has been questioned over the time. We conducted a literature review on the medical diagnosis of Nietzsche, which emphasizes three genres of pathographies that emerged successively as alternatives explanations for Nietzsche's breakdown in Turin: (1) narratives about syphilis (" demoniac-pathological "); (2) narratives about functional psychosis (" heroic-prophetic "); (3) other narratives about organic diseases, other than syphilis (" scientific realistic "). The latter – which correspond to our study object in this work – undertake retrospective diagnostics, attempting to retrieve the " truth " underlying the disease and elucidate " Nietzsche's affair ". We inquire this detective-like impetus, currently taken to the extreme by " evidence-based medicine " , and we denounce its anachronism. Syphilis has become a scientific fact only after the death of Nietzsche. We conclude that the diagnosis he received is shown to be consistent with the nineteenth-century medical rationality and the syphilis status as a cultural fact at that time.
Nietzscheforschung, 2005
The reader who picks up Ecce homo for the first time will almost certainly be puzzled by the chapter titles, and by the discrepancy between them and the contents of the chapters. Under the title Why I am so wise, Nietzsche mainly talks about how ill he has been. Under the title Why I am so clever he writes a great deal about his sensitive stomach. And under the title Why I write such good books, his main concern seems to be to insult the German people. His stomach and his illness are in some way connected to his philosophical genius as well as to the things that he hates about Germany. One could say that his philosophical achievement is somehow related to his having found a cure to his indigestion. My aim with this paper is to examine what Nietzsche is doing by comparing his arguments to those of some representatives of a tradition in which this is a standard topos: the melancholy tradition. A central theme in Ecce homo is overcoming, ,Überwindung', and the illness that Nietzsche talks about is an example of this theme. Nietzsche describes himself as a decadent, but as a decadent who has overcome decadence. He hints at being prone to pity, but claims to have purged himself of this last sin. He presents himself as a man with a long history of illness, but with a healthy instinct which has enabled him to cure himself. This theme is not limited to Ecce homo: one could argue that overcoming is the central theme in Nietzsche's philosophy. 1 Nietzsche suggests that modern man, especially in Germany, suffers from an illness from which he himself suffered but has managed to cure himself. It manifests itself as lethargy (,Trägheit') but by keeping it in shackles, by overcoming it, the result may be works of genius. The leading scholars seem to implicitly regard this illness as a metaphor. Giorgio Colli, for example, identifies decadence as "il suo problema centrale". 2 Elisabeth Kuhn regards nihilism (with decadence and pessimism as variations) as the 1 As does indeed one of the most prominent Nietzsche scholars: Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche.
Nietzsche at the Jena Psychiatric Clinic for the Care and Cure of the Insane: A Case of Misunderstood Evolutionary Development by Thomas Steinbuch What happened to Nietzsche in Turin? What was the nature of his breakdown? Did he even have a mental breakdown in any sense defined by clinical psychiatry? Julian Young concluded that Nietzsche’s breakdown was entirely psychological, having accepted that the cases for syphilis and/or a brain tumor as possible causes have been disproved. According to Young, Nietzsche’s “later Dionysianism” was symptomatic of clinical mania. Mazzino Montinari states that Nietzsche’s Dankbarkeit for his whole life, which he declared in the epigraph to Ecce Homo, gradually became megalomania and casts a backward shadow on Ecce Homo and the late correspondence as Wahnsinnschriften. The thesis of my paper is that at Jena, Nietzsche was still faithful to his project of self-overcoming, which was a project of evolutionary development of ein Mehr of life. The diagnosis of clinical mania does not explain what happened to him. As is clear from Ecce Homo Wise/4 and 5, for himself, Nietzsche’s program of self-overcoming meant the mastery of the mood disorder of compulsive renunciation and retaliation he inherited from his father. In the focus of current research in evolutionary biology, his self-overcoming can be seen as evolutionary development. Nietzsche’s inherited mood disorder meant that he inherited epigenetic gene regulation for genes controlling hormone levels for some hormones. The epigenetics for his inherited mood disorder could have formed in utero as his father’s deteriorating condition from the brain disease that took his life when Nietzsche was only four years and ten months old could have onset many years earlier and created environmental stress that induced composition or overexpression for those genes. Nietzsche’s self-overcoming was an evolutionary development in the sense of recoding his epigenome to correct the “bad” inheritance from his father. Although Nietzsche did have some kind of breakdown, of course, an inner core of clarity and fidelity to his project remained intact at Jena which we can understand today as evolutionary development, and this complicates interpreting his breakdown in clinical terms. My documentation is based on the patient records kept on Nietzsche at Jena. The report of April 1, 1889 records Nietzsche’s stating that he achieved his “thoroughgoing redemption.” His thoroughgoing redemption at Jena was the fulfilment of an on-going self-development as per the program of redemption set out in the sections of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “The Truth-Seer” and “On Redemption.” Humanity is in limbs and fragments as if on a battle field or butcher’s table, but we can redeem our history by willing recurrence. He has guessed the riddle of his own existence and taught himself the discipline of willing recurrence. A few months earlier, in the last major revision to Ecce Homo, Nietzsche confessed that his mother and sister were still to him his deepest objection to his doctrine of willing eternal recurrence. I believe that at Jena, Nietzsche successfully willed the recurrence of his mother and sister, overcoming the deepest renunciation against them for authorizing his commitment to achieve his thoroughgoing redemption. Mental illness is a myth, as has been argued by Thomas Szasz in America and Félix Guattari in France. We know now that the reality behind the myth is transcriptional regulation of genetic information by chemical management of the enzymes that condense or uncoil DNA to express the genes they hold, and this can be the root cause of psycho-biological problems. These patterns are heritable and reversible. At Jena, by willing the recurrence of his mother and sister Nietzsche reversed the inherited epigenetic markers that were the biogenesis of his mood disorder of renunciation. It explodes the myth of his mental illness that he did so and identifies the Mehr of life he achieved by his thoroughgoing redemption as an evolutionary development instead of as being clinical mania. Nietzsche’s breakdown was a kind of intellectual suicide in the face of an extended observation of species-level evolutionary stasis. In Neo-Darwinism, species level non-evolution is hard to assess. The effect of selection is adaptation, and Neo-Darwinism treats the concept of adaptation in terms of fitness as an extensional concept in population genetics. But there are other ways to think about adaptation, and Nietzsche’s claim of non-evolutionary stasis is easier to reconstruct in terms of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. For Nietzsche, adaptation is not just survival but the success of life in growing in power against resistances in the environment above and beyond survival. Nature selects for power, and evolution is the development of power. In Nietzsche’s theory, the will to power seeks a resistance in the environment and interprets whether a resistance is equal, as is necessary. Engaging a resistance above or below equal cannot evolve power (and thus the will to power cannot manifest itself as domination). Nietzschean evolution means the development of the psychology of power. As he defines it in The Antichrist, we have the feeling of power growing, the feeling of resistance overcome. We can thus assess whether we are further evolving a psychology of power by observing ourselves. Nietzsche’s Kulturkritik is the extensive observation of evolutionary stasis at the species level as the observation of the psychology of power renunciation, in particular in Humanism’s “morality of equality.” It was truly a horrible visu. He bangs his elbows on the piano discordantly out of tune as only a human being can be out of tune. But in this midst of this nightmare vision, he individually furthered the evolution of a psychology of power in himself, ein Mehr of life, but this was not clinical mania. But as for Nietzsche’s culminating idea, the idea of Over-Humanity, the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis has little to say. Over-Humanity will be a consolidation of the Mehr of life that comes of individual acts of self-overcoming of renunciation. Each ones’ self-created Mehr of life shall bind together with others in a forward inheritance channel to make a new species. Our fragmented state as a species cannot be undone, but it can become an opportunity for mastering the power renouncing psychology that has resulted by willing recurrence. By this argument, Nietzsche’s concept of the Over-Human aligns with some contemporary conceptions of the Posthuman. KEYWORDS: Nietzsche’s Breakdown, Epigenetic Inheritance, Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, “morality of equality,” Dionysianism. Biography Thomas Steinbuch received his Ph.D in Philosophy in 1981 from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA. He has published a book on Nietzsche, A Commentary on Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo, University Press of America, 1994. Recently, he has addressed the New Nietzsche Society, the American Philosophical Association, The World Congress of Philosophy, Beyond Humanism Series Conferences, 6, 7 and 8, and the Sadykov Readings at Kazan Federal University, Russia, Series II and III. His work aims to reconstruct Nietzsche’s theory of evolution in light of the flexibility afforded by the contemporary shift away from gene centrism, externalism and gradualism that dominated the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis that has led to the Extended Synthesis. He is Associate Professor of Rhetoric and University Advisor on Academic Research at Zhejiang University of Science and Technology, P.R. China. He co-teaches a course at ZUST, Nietzsche’s Theory of Evolution in Contemporary Focus with Professor Wu Zhihong of the University of Kiel, Germany, and the School of Biological and Chemical Engineering, ZUST. He maintains a blogsite: steinbuchonnietzsche.com, and his papers can be downloaded at http://ZUST.academia.edu/ThomasSteinbuch. .
2019
Otto Rank was the only member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society who had a Ph.D. in Philosophy, and this was reflected in his work. Taking this as a starting point, we may have a better understanding of what Rank denominated as illusion, which has always led to a problematic approach. We try to see the question of the illusion by means of Friedrich Nietzsche, who considered the appearance as unavoidable. Taking into consideration its meaning in Nietzsche’s philosophy, we must understand that the problem was not a struggle on overcoming the appearances of the world in search of an essence that would be elsewhere, which presupposes redemption in a future world, or in science—which, according to Nietzsche, can only describe the world, failing in providing meaning. Therefore, Nietzsche values the pre-Socratic Greece, which dared to live the appearance as appearance, which was made possible by the aesthetic phenomenon. Art was shaped as a fusion of the Dionysian with the Apollonian, wh...
Publications of the English Goethe Society, 2008
This article re-evaluates Nietzsche's view of Goethe by analyzing the function and significance of the term "Goethe" in Nietzsche’s writings. While Nietzsche's attitude to Goethe is indisputably complex, it is argued here that the image of Goethe presented in Nietzsche's writings is the exception which proves the rule that his engagements with historical figures are characterized by deliberate ambivalence and/or violent shifts in attitude. While Nietzsche's view of Goethe is not wholly uncritical, the ambivalence which characterizes Nietzsche's intellectual (and emotional) encounters with other outstanding figures in Western culture is largely absent from his engagement with Goethe. Throughout Nietzsche's writings, Goethe is associated in invariably positive ways with diagnoses of cultural health and sickness, notably with Nietzsche's assessments of Greek antiquity, "Erziehung", Classicism and Romanticism, Christianity, Wagner, decadence, the "German question", Napoleon, "Lebensbejahung", and the symbolic figure of Dionysus. Increasingly and obsessively, however, Goethe comes to be linked in Nietzsche's mind with exemplary physical and mental health, to the extent that he presents Goethe as both a promise of the posited "Übermensch" and as an idealized self-projection or self-affirmation.
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