Tibet, Buddhist Philosophy in

Matthew T. Kapstein École Pratique des Hautes Études, PSL Research University, France, and the University of Chicago, USA Introduction ere is no Tibetan term equivalent to our expression “philosophy,” though distinctions as that between “followers of reason” (rigs pa’i rjes ’brangs) and “followers of faith” (dad pa’i rjes ’brangs) mark out areas of thought and practice that overlap with Western conceptions of philosophy as opposed to faith, mysticism, etc. Accordingly, some scholars favor a narrow denition of Tibetan philosophy, stressing those traditions emphasizing formal debate and works concerning Buddhist logic and epistemology (Sanskrit: PRAMĀN.A; Tibetan: tshad ma),  (Tibetan: dbu ma), philosophical systems (Sanskrit: siddhānta; Tibetan: grub mtha’), and similar topics. Others note, however, that important philosophical issues are addressed in works emanating from outside of the debate schools, especially within the contemplative traditions of the “Great Seal” (Mahāmudrā; refer to Roberts 2011) and “Great Perfection” (Dzogchen [rdzogs chen]; see   [   ]; see, for instance, Guenther 1989). Traditional Tibetan philosophy is oen characterized as scholastic in that its literary form privileges comments and glosses (in Tibetan called mchan bu, “annotation,” or ’grel pa, “commentary”), comparable to scholia, on the works of past masters, and favors logically rigorous methods in the organization and presentation of arguments (Cabezón 1998). e majority of the texts studied on the basis of such annotated versions are Indian Buddhist treatises, especially the writings  ,  ,  and Śāntideva; Maitreya,  and of     . , and Vasubandhu;  and ; and  , . Tibetan philosophy thus has a strongly hermeneutical dimension, concerned with the interpretation of Indian Buddhist thought, and so aspiring to penetrate the thought of the Buddha himself. Historical outline Beginnings to c. 1350 e rst Tibetan monastery and college was founded at Samyé (Bsam yas), Central Tibet, under Emperor Tri Songdetsen (Khri Srong lde’u btsan, 742–c. 797), who adopted Buddhism as his state religion in about 762. Samyé became the major center for the translation of Indian Buddhist works, including philosophical texts, into Tibetan. e extensive body of translation, mostly from Sanskrit, but also from Chinese, completed during the late eighth and early ninth centuries had important e Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro (Editors-in-Chief). © 2021 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2021 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. DOI: 10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389 Printed by [Matthew Kapstein - Wiley Online Library- 2602:0306:BD2F:DE00:DCA0:DF23:D220:75CF- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389] on [24/11/2021]. Tibet, Buddhist Philosophy in 2 TIBET, BUDDHIST PHILOSOPH Y IN Printed by [Matthew Kapstein - Wiley Online Library- 2602:0306:BD2F:DE00:DCA0:DF23:D220:75CF- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389] on [24/11/2021]. ramications for subsequent Tibetan intellectual developments, for the enterprise involved creating a standardized translation vocabulary, including hundreds of neologisms, as the Tibetans favored coinages in their own language over loanwords. Etymological explanations of this new terminology, based on denitions drawn from Indian Buddhist commentaries and codied in Tibetan in a ninth-century lexicon, played a signicant role in later Tibetan commentarial writing (Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 72–76). Special grammatical forms were stipulated to represent features of Sanskrit grammar – for instance, the use of the particle phyir to mimic the Sanskrit ablative case when employed to indicate logical reason (“because … ”) – as well as other technical conventions. e form of written Tibetan that thus arose was characterized by precision of vocabulary and usage, and has remained the primary medium for Tibetan philosophical expression to the present. e earliest Tibetan philosophical work still preserved – the Bka’ yang dag pa’i tshad ma (Proof of the authentic scriptures) attributed to King Tri Songdetsen and certainly a product of his court – demonstrates that these developments were well advanced before the close of the eighth century (Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 119–123). Samyé was the site for a famous confrontation between Indian Buddhist learning, represented by the philosopher Kamalaśı̄la, and Chinese Chan (see /), represented by the meditation master Moheyan, an event now referred to as the “Samyé Debate.” At stake was the conict of “sudden vs. gradual” as it is known in contemporary Buddhist studies: is a buddha’s enlightenment to be achieved through arduous eorts over many lifetimes, as the Indian mainstream held, or is it the product of immediate insight, as was taught by some Chan exponents? Subsequent Tibetan tradition mostly armed the gradualist position, and doctrines thought to entail the “Chinese monk’s view” were generally rejected as dangerously antinomian. ough later Tibetan Buddhist philosophy would be primarily grounded in the renewed infusion of Indian learning into Tibet from the eleventh century on, developments at Samyé and other Buddhist centers during the late rst millennium had an appreciable legacy in later times. Scholarship on the Samyé debate and the diusion of Chan in Tibet has now grown to considerable proportions (Ruegg 1989; Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 142–150; Schaik 2015). With the ninth-century fall of the Tibetan Empire and the decline in monastic patronage that this entailed, the development of learning in Tibet slowed until the late tenth century, when a revival of Buddhist activity began. During this time Tibetan Buddhism began to crystallize in the form of particular lineages, orders, and schools. e distinctions among them were not primarily philosophical, though philosophical dispute came to play a role in sectarian rivalry and self-denition. Of the main Buddhist orders, the Nyingmapa (Rnying ma pa) claimed to represent the forms of Buddhism rst introduced into Tibet under the old Tibetan, though it was also inuenced by renewal and reform from the eleventh century on. e Bön TIBET, BUDDHIST PHILOSOPH Y IN 3 Printed by [Matthew Kapstein - Wiley Online Library- 2602:0306:BD2F:DE00:DCA0:DF23:D220:75CF- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389] on [24/11/2021]. (Bon) religion, though oen thought of as the autochthonous, pre-Buddhist religion, is, in its institutional dimensions, a distinctive, “indigenized” Buddhism that also developed beginning in about the eleventh century. Both Nyingmapa and Bön hold the highest expression of wisdom to be the contemplative tradition known as Great Perfection (rdzogs chen), whose teaching, focusing upon the subtle intuition of the nature of the mind (sems nyid), or awareness (rig pa), was to become a source of sustained controversy. e proponents of the Great Perfection elaborated a sophisticated phenomenology, drawing on elements of   (Tibetan: rnal ’byor spyod pa),  (Tibetan: dbu ma), and eso teric Buddhist thought, in which mind as the ground of experience (gzhi’i gnas lugs), transcending specic determinations, is analyzed in relation to the apparent experiences grounded upon it (gzhi snang) and the modes of their presentation (snang tshul). Opposition to the Great Perfection teachings was widespread, however, oen deriding them as a resurrection of the Chinese Chan notion of sudden enlightenment. Nevertheless, several of Tibet’s preeminent thinkers, including Rongzompa (eleventh century),  (1308–1364), and Mipam Namgyel (1846–1912), were advocates of this tradition. e so-called “modern” (gsar ma) schools were based primarily on post-tenthcentury infusions of Indian Buddhism. Among them, the Kadampa (Bka’ gdams pa) stressed the ethical education of Mahāyāna Buddhism, following the model of the Indian sage and scholar Atiśa, who taught in Tibet from 1042 until his death in 1055 (Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 176–183). e foundation of his system, which remains authoritative for all Tibetan Buddhist traditions, was the cultivation of compassion (snying rje), understood as empathy towards all creatures together with the motivation to assuage their suerings, ultimately by guiding them to the Buddha’s enlightenment. Atiśa’s ethical vision was complemented by Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions of contemplation and insight, particularly as expounded in the Madhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna and his successors. e conception of Madhyamaka as the pinnacle of Buddhist philosophy became normative for Tibetan thought. Tibetan philosophy therefore stresses the interpretation of, and dispute concerning, its particular doctrines, in particular the two truths (bden gnyis, Sanskrit: satyadvaya) of supercial appearance (kun rdzob, Sanskrit: sam.vr.ti) and the ultimate, or absolute (don dam, Sanskrit: paramārtha) as well as their interrelation (see    ). One eleventh-century translator, Patsab Nyima-drak (Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, 1055–c. 1045), especially promoted the works of Candrakı̄rti, whose approach to Madhyamaka came to be thought of as a distinct school, Prāsaṅgika (Tibetan: thal ’g yur ba), referring to its reliance on indirect proof (prasa ṅga), and contrasted with other trends in Madhyamaka that were described as Svātantrika (Tibetan: rang rgyud pa), “propounding autonomous proof.” e latter, represented primarily by the thinkers Bhāviveka and Śāntaraks.ita, was thought to have armed that the ultimate reality, emptiness (Sanskrit: ŚŪNYATĀ), could be positively demonstrated from evident premises. e Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction would become one of the most intensively debated topics in Tibetan thought (Dreyfus and McClintock 2003). 4 TIBET, BUDDHIST PHILOSOPH Y IN Printed by [Matthew Kapstein - Wiley Online Library- 2602:0306:BD2F:DE00:DCA0:DF23:D220:75CF- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389] on [24/11/2021]. Philosophically, the major new center founded during the eleventh century was Sangpu (Gsang phu), established in 1071 by Atiśa’s disciple Ngok Lekpé Sherab (Rngog Legs pa’i shes rab) and was expanded to include a philosophical college under his nephew, the translator Ngok Loden Sherab (Rngog Blo ldan shes rab, 1059–1109; Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 380–384). e translations and commentarial notes of the latter grounded the curriculum, which strongly emphasized the writings of Dharmakı̄rti, as well as the practice of debate described in them. Under Ngok and his successors, notably Chapa Chöki Senggé (Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, 1109–1169), ve major subject areas were dened, which would remain the main departments of Tibetan monastic education: logic and epistemology (Sanskrit: pram ān.a; Tibetan: tshad ma); “Perfection of Wisdom” (Sanskrit: Prajñāpāramitā; Tibetan: sher phyin); Madhyamaka; Abhidharma (Tibetan: chos mngon pa; see /); and the Buddhist Monastic Code, or Vinaya (Tibetan: ’dul ba). e program of study at Sangpu, emphasizing pedagogy based on debate, was adopted within all traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, though some schools nevertheless privileged exegesis over debate. e twin pillars of Tibetan monastic education – debate and textual explication – inevitably informed Tibetan philosophical writing as well; for the guiding principle was to demonstrate the accord of one’s ideas with both scripture (lung) and reason (rigs pa). Among the other orders, the Sakyapa (Sa skya pa), though distinguished initially by its expertise in esoteric Buddhist ritual and yoga, became prominent philosophically from the early thirteenth century on, thanks notably to the impetus of  . .  (Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 384–397), a multifaceted scholar who contributed to the renement of Tibetan investigations of Dharmakı̄rti’s system of logic and epistemology. His interests in Indian literature and methods of textual analysis also inuenced the subsequent development of Tibetan scholarship. e rise of the Sakyapa as Tibet’s preeminent political power during the period of Mongol overlordship (c. 1258–1350) enhanced the prestige of their traditions of learning, which came to dominate Tibetan scholasticism during the fourteenth century. eirs was not a narrow dogmatism, however, and we nd thinkers of the age exploring a wide range of views. One of the leading masters, Remdawa (Red mda’ ba, 1349–1412), for instance, composed a “Proof of Idealism” (rnam rig sgrub pa), opposing the Madhyamaka philosophy, with which, like most thinkers, he was otherwise aliated. e Kagyüpa (Bka’ brgyud pa), similarly Tantric in its early orientations, as represented by the translator Marpa (c. 1012–1097) and the poet-saint Milarepa (1040–1123), produced many notable thinkers as well. eir philosophical turn becomes evident during the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, when the Kagyüpa became Tibet’s politically dominant religious order and were therefore implicated in the administration of the colleges. Kagyüpa teachers were particularly concerned to clarify the foundations of their chief contemplative teaching, the “Great Seal,” which, like the Great Perfection, had been sometimes castigated (notably by Sakya Pan.d.ita), as a thinly disguised revision of Chan meditation. Among prominent Kagyüpa thinkers, the ird Karmapa hierarch, Rangjung Dorjé (Rang byung rdo rje, 1284–1339; Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 420–424), was particularly TIBET, BUDDHIST PHILOSOPH Y IN 5 Later developments e last of the major Tibetan Buddhist orders to emerge was the Gelukpa (Dge lugs pa), founded in the eenth century among the followers of the brilliant and charismatic teacher Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). Under the Dalai Lamas, from the seventeenth century on, the Gelukpa came to dominate Tibetan religious and political aairs, including monastic education and the production of philosophical writing.  Lozang Drakpa (Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419; Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 507–522) contributed to aspects of Tibetan Buddhism as diverse as monastic discipline, education, ritual, and pilgrimage, as well as philosophy and doctrine. His penetrating examinations of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka led to innovative approaches to these schools of thought, which have remained both inuential and, for some, controversial. Tsongkhapa was sharply critical of “extrinsic emptiness” and insisted on the philosophical authority of Candrakı̄rti’s approach to Madhyamaka, which he considered to have been severely misunderstood by his Tibetan predecessors. Several of the issues on which he focused – such as the status of the concepts of a “ground consciousness” (see ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA) and of “self-presenting awareness” (see SVASAM. VEDANA/SVASAM.VITTI), both of which, he argued, Candrakı̄rti had rejected denitively – were important not only for Yogācāra and its allied philosophical Printed by [Matthew Kapstein - Wiley Online Library- 2602:0306:BD2F:DE00:DCA0:DF23:D220:75CF- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389] on [24/11/2021]. noteworthy; in his treatment of the doctrine of - (Brunnhölzl 2009), he is sometimes regarded as a precursor of the controversial Dölpopa Sherab Gyeltsen (see below), who numbered among his students. Another protégé, Butön Rinchen-drup (Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub, 1290–1364; Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 400–409), though best known for his Tantric commentaries and his role in cataloguing the Buddhist canon, deserves the attention of students of philosophy both for his works on doctrinal interpretation and his impact on Tibetan ways of organizing and categorizing scriptural knowledge.    (Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1364; Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 409–415), perhaps the most contested thinker in the history of Tibetan Buddhist traditions, is famed for his innovation of the “extrinsic emptiness” (gzhan stong; ; see also Sheehy and Mathes 2019) approach to Mahāyāna thought, which became the hallmark of his order, the Jonangpa. His teaching, inspired by the doctrines of Buddha-nature and those of the esoteric tantras, held that while relative reality was, in accord with mainstream Madhymaka teaching, intrinsically empty, the absolute was empty only insomuch as it was empty of all that pertains to the relative. is conception, which provoked sustained dispute, came to be considered in some circles virtually as a heresy. e leading doctrinal author within the Nyingmapa order,  , was also closely connected to the circle of the ird Karmapa, and particularly concerned to explore the relations among Madhyamaka, the problem of Buddha-nature, and his favored contemplative tradition, the Great Perfection. 6 TIBET, BUDDHIST PHILOSOPH Y IN Printed by [Matthew Kapstein - Wiley Online Library- 2602:0306:BD2F:DE00:DCA0:DF23:D220:75CF- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389] on [24/11/2021]. systems, but in the contemplative traditions as well, for which reason his ideas in these areas came to be sharply contested by several schools, but above all by the Sakyapa and Kagyüpa. Some argued that Tsongkhapa’s radically eliminationist approach to such concepts amounted in eect to a form of nihilism. In this regard, his teaching was sometimes seen as the opposing pendant to Dölpopa’s theory of “extrinsic emptiness,” which was faulted for implying a commitment to an eternal, substantial reality, much like the Hindu Brahman. ree notable critics were the Sakyapas Serdok Panchen (Gser mdog pan. chen, 1428–1507; Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 373–380), and    (Go rams pa Bsod nams seng ge, 1429–1489), and the Eighth Karmapa hierarch Mikyö Dorjé (Mikyö Dorjé, 1507–1554; Goldeld et al. 2006). Tsongkhapa’s views, however, were defended and developed by a succession of talented adherents, including his immediate disciples Gyeltsab-jé (Rgyal tshab rje, 1364–1432) and Khedrup-jé (Mkhas grub rje, 1385–1438). e critics just mentioned were answered at length by the noted commentator Sera Jetsün (Se-rwa Rje-btsun, 1469–1544). Gelukpa scholasticism has been productive of commentary, polemics addressed to opposing schools, and debate among the Gelukpa themselves, whose major colleges oen divided over subtle matters of doctrine. Aer the sixteenth century, the creation of new Gelukpa monastic colleges in the northeastern province, Amdo, the promulgation of Gelukpa teaching among the Mongols, and the consolidation of Tibetan political authority under the Dalai Lamas contributed to the expansion of the order and its system of monastic education. is trend was reinforced during the eighteenth century, when China’s Manchu rulers lent their support to the Gelukpa virtually establishing it as a state religion. Several leading masters from eighteenth-century Amdo were particularly notable for their broad philosophical interests and three, in particular, produced impressive syntheses of the Buddhist philosophical systems. Jamyang Zhepa (’Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa, 1648–1721), the founder of Labrang Monastery in Gansu, authored the Great Exposition of Philosophical Systems (Grub mtha’ chen mo), a text notable for its criticisms of Tsongkhapa’s opponents (Hopkins 2004). Changkya Rölpé Dorjé (Lcang-skya Rol-pa’i rdo-rje, 1717–1786), the guru of China’s Qianlong emperor, composed the Exposition of Philosophical Systems Beatifying the Axis Mundi (Grub mtha’ lhun po mdzes rgyan), which avoids intra-Tibetan disputes in favor of a return to the Indian sources. And Changkya’s disciple Tuken Chöki Nyima (u’u bkwan Chos kyi nyi ma, 1737–1802) surveyed the properly Tibetan systems of Buddhism together with aspects of both Indian and Chinese philosophies (uken 2009; Schaeer, Kapstein, and Tuttle 2013, 644–650). Beginning in the eighteenth century, the eastern region of Kham saw important new trends that have become collectively known as the “eclectic” or “nonpartisan” (ris med) movement. One of the most prominent leaders of this development was Jamgön Kongtrül Lodrö Tayé (’Jam mgon Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas, 1813–1899), a prolic gure whose oeuvre, including both his own writings and those he edited, amounted to well over 100 large Tibetan volumes. ough more an encyclopedist than a philosopher, his major treatise, the Treasury Embracing All TIBET, BUDDHIST PHILOSOPH Y IN 7 Aspects of philosophical education e importance for Tibetan thought of precise philosophical vocabulary and conventions of usage has been mentioned above. Mastery of these was the foundation of Tibetan education, which was conducted by means of textual explication and the practice of debate. e schools diered in the degree of emphasis they accorded to these approaches, but well-rounded scholars were expected to master skills of textual exegesis, composition, and dispute with respect to the ve subjects listed earlier, and methodologies in each of these areas were investigated. Tibetan philosophical practice was thus grounded in scriptural hermeneutics and the knowledge of logic instilled through training in debate. Mnemotechnics was of great importance as well, and students were expected to commit to memory the major texts studied (Dreyfus 2003). Although works of Indian Buddhist logic and epistemology were translated into Tibetan during the eighth and ninth centuries, this area did not take hold until the eleventh century, when Sangpu emerged as a center. One of the hallmarks of pramān.a studies in Tibet was the pedagogical role of debate, later a specialty of the Gelukpa order, though the colleges of all orders practiced debate to varying degrees. e recent discovery and publication of manuscript sources originating at Sangpu and other monastic colleges during the twelh to thirteenth centuries have begun to permit specialists to rene knowledge of the historical development of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy during that period. e debate curriculum (bsdus grwa), sometimes credited to Chapa Chöki Senggé, was built on elementary logical principles and their application to a range of conceptual and categorical frameworks. Arguments were formulated according to the rule of “implication-reason” (thal phyir), whereby the consequent was expressed in a statement of implication, followed by the declaration of the warranting reason: “it is implied that a pot [a stock example of a middle-sized physical object] is perishable, because it is fabricated.” e respondent to the argument might either accept it as stated, object, or demand clarication, for instance to determine why the proponent asserts “being fabricated” to entail “perishability.” is reasoning was to be pushed until proponent or respondent was cornered into arming an absurdity or a conclusion commanding consensus was reached. Printed by [Matthew Kapstein - Wiley Online Library- 2602:0306:BD2F:DE00:DCA0:DF23:D220:75CF- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389] on [24/11/2021]. Knowledge (Shes bya kun khyab mdzod), includes considerable material of interest on Buddhist philosophy in Tibet (Jamgön Kongtrül 2007). He favored, too, a revival of the “extrinsic-emptiness” teaching of the Jonangpa. e Nyingmapa scholiast Mipam Namgyel was also closely associated with the nonpartisan movement. With growing interaction between Tibetan Buddhism and non-Tibetan societies following China’s mid-twentieth-century takeover of Tibet, traditionally educated Tibetans have become increasingly engaged in dialogue with Western science and philosophy. e best-known example is the present Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935), some of whose works, based on his discussions in these areas, may serve to introduce the current state of play herein (Dalai Lama 1999, 2005). 8 TIBET, BUDDHIST PHILOSOPH Y IN Printed by [Matthew Kapstein - Wiley Online Library- 2602:0306:BD2F:DE00:DCA0:DF23:D220:75CF- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389] on [24/11/2021]. e simplicity of the “implication-reason” form was employed to generate complex arguments in respect to topics including negation and armation, exclusion and inclusion, causal relations, essence and attribute, universal and particular, perception, inference, denition, etc. e entire range of traditional Buddhist categorical schemes, as taught in the Abhidharma, came into play, and, in the manner of a game of multidimensional chess, practitioners of the debate logic were expected to navigate among the distinctive categories elaborated in the various Indian Buddhist philosophical schools, in attempting to tease out hidden contradictions in an opponent’s position. Although the logic employed by the Tibetans is readily amenable to formalization, it is always in fact interpreted and semantic considerations cannot be altogether eliminated from it. Tibetan hermeneutics emphasized interpretive frameworks also derived from Indian sources. ese included the allocation of the scriptures (Sanskrit: s ūtra; Tibetan: mdo) attributed to the Buddha to the “three wheels” of the teaching according to whether their assertions were determined to be of “provisional” or “denitive” signicance, and the classication of the treatises (Sanskrit: śāstra; Tibetan: bstan bcos) by later Indian Buddhist authors in terms of four major philosophical systems. e rst of the three wheels included scriptures teaching the early Buddhist doctrines relating to the “Four Noble Truths” of suering, its origination, its cessation, and the way leading to that cessation. e second concerned the “Perfection of Wisdom” (Sanskrit: Prajñāpāramitā; Tibetan: Sher phyin) and related scriptures, emphasizing the universal “emptiness” (Sanskrit: śūnyatā; Tibetan: stong pa nyid) of things. e third and nal wheel of the teaching was particularly abstruse, and was said to propose the “excellent disclosure” of ultimate reality. e scriptures associated with this dispensation tended to stress themes such as the pristine essence of mind, or consciousness, light and radiance, and an inherent quality, called “Buddha-nature,” possessed by all living beings and establishing within them the potential to be awakened as Buddhas. While some emphasized scriptural authority as the measure by which to determine which scriptures were to be taken as denitive or not, others held that reliance upon scripture alone to resolve problems of scriptural interpretation was inevitably circular. Natural reason was required to arbitrate the apparent contradictions of sacred texts. e four major philosophical systems – Vaibhās.ika  , , Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka – are treated separately in the present volumes. In Tibet, they were studied primarily in connection with the ve subject areas mentioned above, though there was also an important genre of philosophical writing, called Drupta (grub mtha’, “proven ends,” Sanskrit: siddhānta), that was devoted to synthetic accounts of the systems. As noted earlier, thinkers in eighteenth-century Amdo particularly contributed to such works. Despite the range of Indian Buddhist philosophical traditions known in Tibet, the works of Dharmakı̄rti and Candrakı̄rti generally held pride of place. e logical and epistemological teachings of the former were touchstones for reection focusing upon conventional reality, language, perception, and conceptual activity. TIBET, BUDDHIST PHILOSOPH Y IN 9  See also: /; ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA;  ; ;  ; ; /; ; ;   ;   ;   (   ); ;  ; ; ; PRAM ĀN.A;   . . ;  ; ŚŪNYAT Ā; SVASAM.VEDANA/SVASAM.VITTI; . ;   ;  ;    ;   REFERENCES Brunnhölzl, Karl, trans. 2009. Luminous Heart: e ird Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. Cabezón, José Ignacio, ed. 1998. Scholasticism: Cross-cultural and Comparative Perspectives. Albany: State University of New York Press. Dalai Lama, His Holiness the. 1999. Ethics for the New Millennium. New York: Riverhead Books. Dalai Lama, His Holiness the. 2005. e Universe in a Single Atom: e Convergence of Science and Spirituality. New York: Broadway Books. Dreyfus, Georges B.J. 2003. e Sound of Two Hands Clapping: e Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. Dreyfus, Georges B.J., and Sara L. McClintock, eds. 2003. e Sv ātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Dierence Does a Dierence Make? Boston: Wisdom. Goldeld, Ari, Jules Levinson, Jim Scott, and Birgit Scott, trans. 2006. e Moon of Wisdom: Chapter Six of Chandrakı̄rti’s “Entering the Middle Way” With Commentary from the Eighth Karmapa. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. Guenther, Herbert V. 1989. From Reductionism to Creativity: Rdzogs-chen and the New Sciences of Mind. Boston: Shambhala. Hopkins, Jerey. 2004. Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba’s “Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality.” Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. Jamgön Kongtrül. 2007. e Treasury of Knowledge, Book 6, Part 3: Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy. Translated by Elizabeth M. Callahan. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. Roberts, Peter Alan, trans. 2011. Mah āmudrā and Related Instructions: Core Teachings of the Kagyü Schools. Library of Tibetan Classics 5. Boston: Wisdom. Ruegg, David Seyfort. 1989. Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective: On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet. London: School of Oriental and African Studies. Schaeer, Kurtis R., Matthew T. Kapstein, and Gray Tuttle, eds. 2013. Sources of Tibetan Tradition. New York: Columbia University Press. Schaik, Sam van. 2015. Tibetan Zen: Discovering a Lost Tradition. Boston: Snow Lion. Printed by [Matthew Kapstein - Wiley Online Library- 2602:0306:BD2F:DE00:DCA0:DF23:D220:75CF- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389] on [24/11/2021]. e approach to Madhyamaka thought advanced by the latter, however, was regarded as the surest path to follow in pursuit of the absolute. Some thinkers, most famously Dölpopa, dissented from the privileging of pramān.a and Candrakı̄rtian Madhyamaka, favoring instead the conception of “Buddha-nature” as oering the hermeneutical key to the doctrine. Much of the dynamic of Buddhist philosophy in Tibet stemmed from the tensions among these three ways of thought. 10 TIBET, BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY IN FURTHER READING Dreyfus, Georges. 1997. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakı̄rti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. Albany: State University of New York Press. Kapstein, Matthew T. 2011. “Buddhist ought in Tibet: An Historical Introduction.” In e Oxford Handbook of World Philosophies, edited by William Edelglass and Jay L. Gareld, 244–262. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Liberman, Kenneth. 2004. Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture: An Ethnomethodological Inquiry into Formal Reasoning. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleeld. Ruegg, David Seyfort. 2000. ree Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 50. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien. Printed by [Matthew Kapstein - Wiley Online Library- 2602:0306:BD2F:DE00:DCA0:DF23:D220:75CF- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0389] on [24/11/2021]. Sheehy, Michael R., and Klaus-Dieter, Mathes 2019. e Other Emptiness: Rethinking the Zhentong Buddhist Discourse in Tibet. Albany: State University of New York Press. uken Losang Chökyi Nyima. 2009. e Crystal Mirror of Philosophical Systems: A Tibetan Study of Asian Religious ought. Translated by Geshé Lhundub Sopa, edited by Roger R. Jackson. e Library of Tibetan Classics. Boston: Wisdom.