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Bentham's way to democracy

2009, History of European Ideas

This work, based on a thesis defended in 2004, is an evidence of a growing interest in the study of Benthamite utilitarianism in France. The author is also a member of the Centre Bentham, formed in 2003 for ''the translation, commentary on and diffusion'' of Bentham's thought, and which has organised several events dedicated to utilitarianism. de Champs' object is to ''ascertain the extent to which the constitutional writings of Bentham are fed by contemporary events and debates'' (p. 32); more specifically, both to study the ''external factors'' (p. 31) that contributed to the modification of Bentham's political conceptions and present those elements ''interior to [his] philosophical system'' (p. 31) which can explain such modification. This dual strategy places de Champs directly in line of descent from Elie Halé vywhose work is subject to extensive critical discussion-as well as in relation to the more recent work of J.-P. Clé ro. She does not share Halé vy's perspective: she rather demonstrates that the democratic dimension is ''at the heart of the Benthamite project'' (p. 30), whereas Halé vy 1 wrote of Bentham's conversion to the democratic principle ''brought about by the milieu'' in which he lived. By contrast, and following the approach set out in the work of Clé ro, de Champs lays emphasis throughout her work on the importance of the theory of fictions in understanding Bentham's political theory. The book has seven chapters arranged chronologically, an approach that allows the reader to gradually identify the elements that will lead Bentham to defend a democratic ré gime. Following the first chapter devoted to methodological issues detailing the ''principles of the science of legislation'' (pp. 35-7), Bentham's political writings are placed in historical perspective, from the first of such writing in 1776 (Ch. II) to the Constitutional Code which is presented as the ''culmination of Bentham's political reflection'' (p. 309). Ch. III (pp. 137-72) outlines the early writings (from the 1780s) devoted to constitutional law as a way of introducing a number of concepts that Bentham will eventually organise into a coherent structure; these writings in particular quite explicitly support the necessity of ''limits to the power of the sovereign legislator'' (pp. 170, 172). de Champs then turns to a discussion of two important moments in Bentham's life. The first of these concerns his position with respect to the French Revolution (Ch. IV): while Bentham's initial enthusiasm turns to criticism when faced with the terror, this period is nonetheless presented as having been at the origin of ''the development of his thought built on strong principles'' (p. 218). de Champs consequently adopts a more nuanced position than Halé vy, who presented Bentham's option for democracy during this period as a ''pause'' in his thought, and demonstrates instead that the positions adopted by Bentham at this time ''were inscribed in a constitutional thought whose principles had already been posed'' (p. 218). The second important moment concerns Bentham's radical engagement (Ch. V). Here de Champs argues that there is a dual failure, showing firstly that the 1832 Reform Act is not a response to radical agitation (p. 252), and secondly that ''philosophical radicalism'' is to a great extent an entity that postdates Bentham's death'' (p. 262). The following chapter (Ch. VI) also deals with failure: having clarified what making a constitution means in Bentham's sense, de Champs presents his varied efforts to gain acceptance for the drafts which he had written in response to requests from Spain, Portugal, Greece and various countries in South America. Unfortunately, de Champs notes, ''Bentham's correspondents [who had written to him asking for advice and assistance] are never in a position to influence constitutional developments'' (p. 270). If these aborted efforts did not entirely discourage Bentham, as is shown by the editorial work on the Constitutional Code from 1822 to 1830 2 , they do lead him to leave blank the name of the country which will adopt the code to which he was devoting all his effort (pp. 275, 306). But as de Champs emphasises, it was that ''universalist character'' of the Code which condemned it to its fate of non-adoption: ''Even the prospect of a universal code seemed to contradict the nationalist aspirations of the revolutions of

From liberty to security

Rawls' 1971 critique of classical utilitarianism turned in particular on the inability of utilitarianism to take account of liberty: ''whenever a society sets out to maximize the sum of intrinsic value or the net balance of the satisfaction of interests, it is liable to find that the denial of liberty for some is justified in the name of this single end''. 3 Without referring to this critique, de Champs however invites us to moderate it: she emphasises the importance of liberty for Bentham and returns to the notion of liberty that he embraced. Of course, this topic has already been addressed by several commentators on Bentham. 4 But the pages devoted by de Champs to this point highlight the central importance of the Benthamite conception of liberty, illuminating Bentham's statement that ''The Definition of Liberty is one of the corner stones of my system'' (quoted p. 119). Indeed, the continuity in Bentham's political principles can be demonstrated via the conception of liberty that he developed very early, and also via its corollary, security.

de Champs demonstrates that, from his very first political writings, Bentham developed an argument ''articulated around two axes: the refutation of the postulates of natural law, and the rejection of theories of positive liberty'' (p. 107). He adopts in contrast a negative theory of liberty as an ''absence of restraint and constraint'' (cited p. 117):

Following Bentham's argument, the existence of a political society organised by laws would be incompatible with the maintenance of liberty. . . . Bentham lends the term [liberty] an absolute sense. He opposes those who make liberty an ideal to be achieved through political society (p. 117).

Having done this, Bentham places himself in continuity with the position adopted by Hobbes, sharing with him the idea that it is ''false ideas of liberty [which] have produced 'civil discord and revolution''' (p. 118). But he goes further than Hobbes, understanding by liberty not only the absence of obstacles, but also the absence of constraint (p. 119). The difference is important, for it leads to the assertion that there is an incompatibility between the law, which establishes constraints, and liberty: which is ''not something produced by law''. Two consequences follow from this.

The first is well-known. It involves a compelling criticism of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which ''in sacralising liberty . . . left no place for coercive laws which will have to be adopted. The principles formulated in the Declaration cannot therefore be used in the framing of laws'' (p. 205). This criticism also demonstrates the fact that, for Bentham, the constitution is only a law like any other (p. 202) and, as such, is not at all immutable: to think otherwise would be a ''direct invitation to rebellion'' (p. 206). Every law has to allow the maximisation of the collective interest; but ''how might we know today with any certainty which laws will be good in the future?'' (p. 202).

The second consequence involves a ''terminological reorientation before being able to resolve the incompatibility of liberty and the law'' (p. 121). Bentham ''redefines'' political liberty as ''security'', leading him to declare that ''in a State, Political Liberty depends upon the limitation of powers that one person holds over another'' (cited p. 122). It can be noted how close this is to the conception adopted some years later by John Stuart Mill. Bentham derives from this conception the entirety of his future political programme; as de Champs emphasises (p. 122) it can indeed be read both as an affirmation of the necessity to ensure the ''security of all in respect of the exercise of powers on the part of every other citizen'', and of the indispensable ''limitation of power held by those with charge of the governed''. It is through this second reading that the entire Benthamite political project stands revealed; beginning with his writings on the French Revolution the theme of a ''sinister interest'' is elaborated, becoming ''the pivot of a utilitarian analysis of the mechanisms of government'' (p. 233); it is this for instance that dictates Bentham's position in regard to annual mandates for deputies (cf. p. 191), which explains his insistence on the role of public opinion, ''the only check'' to ''the pernicious exercise of the power of government'' (Bentham 1830, p. 36;quoted by de Champs p. 294;cf. pp. 191, 315f.) or again, which leads him to defend the freedom of the press. de Champs explores this first theme in Ch. II, which is devoted to Bentham's first political writings. But it is in fact echoed in the following chapters, especially where the discussion touches on the general interest: making ''sinister interest'' vanish involves privileging the general interest in respect of the particular interest of a group, the rulers. A second theme central to de Champs' book can be seen emerging from this, that of the ''transition from individual to collective happiness'' which is ''at the heart of Bentham's constitutional writings'' (p. 337).

The transition from individual happiness to collective happiness

Conceived in a purely additive fashion, the notion of a collective interest quite logically leads to the defence of democracy: as de Champs states, ''the arithmetical conception of the community's interest naturally entails democratic principles'' (p. 186). But, she adds, this initial intuition needs elaborating in two respects.

The first relates to the existence in Bentham's writings of a second definition of collective interest: ''the interest of the community is assured if certain values are present'' (p. 184). 5 Among these values is ''security'', which involves the defence of private property in particular. In conformity with this second definition, Bentham initially restricts the right to vote to those who are proprietors (p. 188); subsequently ''he concludes that the defence of private property was an expectation of all enlightened persons who owned no property. This property-based limitation of the right to suffrage vanished'' (p. 188). Only those who were illiterate were henceforth denied the vote. As a consequence, de Champs concludes, the ''harmonisation'' of these two conceptions of utility only led Bentham ''to the conclusion that universal suffrage is the most likely way of meeting the goals of government with regard to utility'' (p. 187). But this conclusion would have merited some discussion and associated elaboration:

(i) What justifies the existence of such ''expectations'' on the part of individual guided by their own personal interest (p. 88)? Is it the hope of becoming a property-owner? (ii) To what extent is the hypothesis of the existence of ''expectations'' held by ''enlightened persons owning no property'' compatible with the description of the poor in the Benthamite world? Is it not indeed the fear of a social revolt by the destitute which can be found at the root of the defence of the principle of assistance to the indigent. 6 (iii) Why are women ultimately excluded from the vote in the Constitutional Code? 7 Does Bentham think them incapable of appreciating the ''expectations of enlightened persons owning no property''? Or must this development on his part be linked to British legislation which deprived married women of all rights of possession with respect to their own goods and chattels? 8 (iv) Since it is up to political powers to secure the strength of property, why should one not consider an enlightened prince to be a more effective governor than a person elected by democratic process? In other words, should Bentham's (democratic) solution rather be presented as a resolution of the fact that there are two different definitions of the general interest? Does it not show that there is a hierarchy between the two definitions, the additive conception of collective interest dominating the other?