Bentham's way to democracy

History of European Ideas 35 (2009) 112–115 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect History of European Ideas journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/histeuroideas Review essay Bentham’s way to democracy ‘La déontologie politique’ ou la pensée constitutionnelle de Jeremy Bentham, Emmanuelle de Champs (Ed.), Genève– Paris, Librairie Droz (2008). pp. 387, ISBN number: 978-2-600-01171-6 This work, based on a thesis defended in 2004, is an evidence of a growing interest in the study of Benthamite utilitarianism in France. The author is also a member of the Centre Bentham, formed in 2003 for ‘‘the translation, commentary on and diffusion’’ of Bentham’s thought, and which has organised several events dedicated to utilitarianism. de Champs’ object is to ‘‘ascertain the extent to which the constitutional writings of Bentham are fed by contemporary events and debates’’ (p. 32); more specifically, both to study the ‘‘external factors’’ (p. 31) that contributed to the modification of Bentham’s political conceptions and present those elements ‘‘interior to [his] philosophical system’’ (p. 31) which can explain such modification. This dual strategy places de Champs directly in line of descent from Elie Halévy – whose work is subject to extensive critical discussion – as well as in relation to the more recent work of J.-P. Cléro. She does not share Halévy’s perspective: she rather demonstrates that the democratic dimension is ‘‘at the heart of the Benthamite project’’ (p. 30), whereas Halévy1 wrote of Bentham’s conversion to the democratic principle ‘‘brought about by the milieu’’ in which he lived. By contrast, and following the approach set out in the work of Cléro, de Champs lays emphasis throughout her work on the importance of the theory of fictions in understanding Bentham’s political theory. The book has seven chapters arranged chronologically, an approach that allows the reader to gradually identify the elements that will lead Bentham to defend a democratic régime. Following the first chapter devoted to methodological issues detailing the ‘‘principles of the science of legislation’’ (pp. 35–7), Bentham’s political writings are placed in historical perspective, from the first of such writing in 1776 (Ch. II) to the Constitutional Code which is presented as the ‘‘culmination of Bentham’s political reflection’’ (p. 309). Ch. III (pp. 137–72) outlines the early writings (from the 1780s) devoted to constitutional law as a way of introducing a number of concepts that Bentham will eventually organise into a coherent structure; these writings in particular quite explicitly support the necessity of ‘‘limits to the power of the sovereign legislator’’ (pp. 170, 172). de Champs then turns to a discussion of two important moments in Bentham’s life. The first of these concerns his position with respect to the French Revolution (Ch. IV): while Bentham’s initial enthusiasm turns to criticism when faced with the terror, this period is nonetheless presented as having been at the origin of ‘‘the development of his thought built on strong principles’’ (p. 218). de Champs consequently adopts a more nuanced position than Halévy, who presented Bentham’s option for democracy during this period as a ‘‘pause’’ in his thought, and demonstrates instead that the positions adopted by Bentham at this time ‘‘were inscribed in a constitutional thought whose principles had already been posed’’ (p. 218). The second important moment concerns Bentham’s radical engagement (Ch. V). Here de Champs argues that there is a dual failure, showing firstly that the 1832 Reform Act is not a response to radical agitation (p. 252), and secondly that ‘‘philosophical radicalism’’ is to a great extent an entity that postdates Bentham’s death’’ (p. 262). The following chapter (Ch. VI) also deals with failure: having clarified what making a constitution means in Bentham’s sense, de Champs presents his varied efforts to gain acceptance for the drafts which he had written in response to requests from Spain, Portugal, Greece and various countries in South America. Unfortunately, de Champs notes, ‘‘Bentham’s correspondents [who had written to him asking for advice and assistance] are never in a position to influence constitutional developments’’ (p. 270). If these aborted efforts did not entirely discourage Bentham, as is shown by the editorial work on the Constitutional Code from 1822 to 18302, they do lead him to leave blank the name of the country which will adopt the code to which he was devoting all his effort (pp. 275, 306). But as de Champs emphasises, it was that ‘‘universalist character’’ of the Code which condemned it to its fate of non-adoption: ‘‘Even the prospect of a universal code seemed to contradict the nationalist aspirations of the revolutions of 1 Elie Halévy, La formation du radicalisme philosophique, 3 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1901/1995), vol. II, 136. J. Bentham [1830], Constitutional Code. Volume I, ed. F. Rosen, J.H. Burns, in J. Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 2 0191-6599/$ – see front matter ß 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2008.10.002 Review essay / History of European Ideas 35 (2009) 112–115 113 the first third of the nineteenth century. . . . The idea of a code common to many countries seemed closer to the internationalist ideal of the Enlightenment than to the emergent aspirations of the nineteenth century’’ (p. 275). Following the final chapter devoted to a brief analysis of the substance of the Code, the book finishes with a few pages conclusion (pp. 359–62) which emphasise the singularity of Bentham’s ‘‘political, social and moral project which had little in common with the world to which contemporary reformers aspired and the justifications that they put forward’’ (p. 262). If this chronological account of Bentham’s political thought allows us to place this firmly within his system of utility (p. 12), it does not entirely do full justice to the arguments advanced by de Champs. A more thematic structure would have had the advantage of shedding more light on this and avoiding a sense of repetition, or by contrast, a sense that some ideas are insufficiently elaborated. This would have made possible the examination of the importance of sympathy, whose ‘‘prime role’’ in ‘‘accounting for the social construction of individual interests’’ is stated (p. 361) but to which only a very few pages are devoted in the early part of the book (pp. 84–8). Another example suggests the sense of repetition: the critique of the Declaration of the Rights of Man is first outlined following p. 110, but is then taken up again on page 197 and the following pages. The general thesis concerning continuity in the thought of Bentham would have gained from more thematic presentation. The reader can really only be surprised at the way that the Constitutional Code is presented as a ‘‘aboutissement’’ [achievement] of Bentham’s political thought (p. 309) – as if it were a linear process – while, in that volume, Bentham backtracks on a number of democratic issues that he had previously defended: women are excluded from the vote, the principle of the annual renewal of electoral mandates is revoked (p. 316), and the process of removing the elected from office becomes so ‘‘difficult and complex’’ that it renders electors incapable of directly controlling ‘‘the content of laws and . . . their application’’ (p. 317). If no explanation is given of these developments, the reader must conclude that the continuity – or better, coherence – between Bentham’s political principles and his utilitarian philosophy has to be sought somewhere other than in the concrete measures that he sometimes defended. These are the basic elements that will be taken up here. More exactly, I think that there are two especially interesting elements which, together, are the real strength of the interpretation that Emmanuelle de Champs has put forward. 1. From liberty to security Rawls’ 1971 critique of classical utilitarianism turned in particular on the inability of utilitarianism to take account of liberty: ‘‘whenever a society sets out to maximize the sum of intrinsic value or the net balance of the satisfaction of interests, it is liable to find that the denial of liberty for some is justified in the name of this single end’’.3 Without referring to this critique, de Champs however invites us to moderate it: she emphasises the importance of liberty for Bentham and returns to the notion of liberty that he embraced. Of course, this topic has already been addressed by several commentators on Bentham.4 But the pages devoted by de Champs to this point highlight the central importance of the Benthamite conception of liberty, illuminating Bentham’s statement that ‘‘The Definition of Liberty is one of the corner stones of my system’’ (quoted p. 119). Indeed, the continuity in Bentham’s political principles can be demonstrated via the conception of liberty that he developed very early, and also via its corollary, security. de Champs demonstrates that, from his very first political writings, Bentham developed an argument ‘‘articulated around two axes: the refutation of the postulates of natural law, and the rejection of theories of positive liberty’’ (p. 107). He adopts in contrast a negative theory of liberty as an ‘‘absence of restraint and constraint’’ (cited p. 117): Following Bentham’s argument, the existence of a political society organised by laws would be incompatible with the maintenance of liberty. . . . Bentham lends the term [liberty] an absolute sense. He opposes those who make liberty an ideal to be achieved through political society (p. 117). Having done this, Bentham places himself in continuity with the position adopted by Hobbes, sharing with him the idea that it is ‘‘false ideas of liberty [which] have produced ‘civil discord and revolution’’’ (p. 118). But he goes further than Hobbes, understanding by liberty not only the absence of obstacles, but also the absence of constraint (p. 119). The difference is important, for it leads to the assertion that there is an incompatibility between the law, which establishes constraints, and liberty: which is ‘‘not something produced by law’’. Two consequences follow from this. The first is well-known. It involves a compelling criticism of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which ‘‘in sacralising liberty . . . left no place for coercive laws which will have to be adopted. The principles formulated in the Declaration cannot therefore be used in the framing of laws’’ (p. 205). This criticism also demonstrates the fact that, for Bentham, the constitution is only a law like any other (p. 202) and, as such, is not at all immutable: to think otherwise would be a ‘‘direct invitation to rebellion’’ (p. 206). Every law has to allow the maximisation of the collective interest; but ‘‘how might we know today with any certainty which laws will be good in the future?’’ (p. 202). The second consequence involves a ‘‘terminological reorientation before being able to resolve the incompatibility of liberty and the law’’ (p. 121). Bentham ‘‘redefines’’ political liberty as ‘‘security’’, leading him to declare that ‘‘in a State, Political Liberty depends upon the limitation of powers that one person holds over another’’ (cited p. 122). It can be noted 3 John Rawls [1971], A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Revised Ed., 1999), 185. See especially David Long, Bentham on Liberty (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1977). See also Werner Stark, ‘Liberty and Equality or: Jeremy Bentham as an Economist’, The Economic Journal 51 (201) (Apr. 1941), 56–79. 4 114 Review essay / History of European Ideas 35 (2009) 112–115 how close this is to the conception adopted some years later by John Stuart Mill. Bentham derives from this conception the entirety of his future political programme; as de Champs emphasises (p. 122) it can indeed be read both as an affirmation of the necessity to ensure the ‘‘security of all in respect of the exercise of powers on the part of every other citizen’’, and of the indispensable ‘‘limitation of power held by those with charge of the governed’’. It is through this second reading that the entire Benthamite political project stands revealed; beginning with his writings on the French Revolution the theme of a ‘‘sinister interest’’ is elaborated, becoming ‘‘the pivot of a utilitarian analysis of the mechanisms of government’’ (p. 233); it is this for instance that dictates Bentham’s position in regard to annual mandates for deputies (cf. p. 191), which explains his insistence on the role of public opinion, ‘‘the only check’’ to ‘‘the pernicious exercise of the power of government’’ (Bentham 1830, p. 36; quoted by de Champs p. 294; cf. pp. 191, 315f.) or again, which leads him to defend the freedom of the press. de Champs explores this first theme in Ch. II, which is devoted to Bentham’s first political writings. But it is in fact echoed in the following chapters, especially where the discussion touches on the general interest: making ‘‘sinister interest’’ vanish involves privileging the general interest in respect of the particular interest of a group, the rulers. A second theme central to de Champs’ book can be seen emerging from this, that of the ‘‘transition from individual to collective happiness’’ which is ‘‘at the heart of Bentham’s constitutional writings’’ (p. 337). 2. The transition from individual happiness to collective happiness Conceived in a purely additive fashion, the notion of a collective interest quite logically leads to the defence of democracy: as de Champs states, ‘‘the arithmetical conception of the community’s interest naturally entails democratic principles’’ (p. 186). But, she adds, this initial intuition needs elaborating in two respects. The first relates to the existence in Bentham’s writings of a second definition of collective interest: ‘‘the interest of the community is assured if certain values are present’’ (p. 184).5 Among these values is ‘‘security’’, which involves the defence of private property in particular. In conformity with this second definition, Bentham initially restricts the right to vote to those who are proprietors (p. 188); subsequently ‘‘he concludes that the defence of private property was an expectation of all enlightened persons who owned no property. This property-based limitation of the right to suffrage vanished’’ (p. 188). Only those who were illiterate were henceforth denied the vote. As a consequence, de Champs concludes, the ‘‘harmonisation’’ of these two conceptions of utility only led Bentham ‘‘to the conclusion that universal suffrage is the most likely way of meeting the goals of government with regard to utility’’ (p. 187). But this conclusion would have merited some discussion and associated elaboration: (i) What justifies the existence of such ‘‘expectations’’ on the part of individual guided by their own personal interest (p. 88)? Is it the hope of becoming a property-owner? (ii) To what extent is the hypothesis of the existence of ‘‘expectations’’ held by ‘‘enlightened persons owning no property’’ compatible with the description of the poor in the Benthamite world? Is it not indeed the fear of a social revolt by the destitute which can be found at the root of the defence of the principle of assistance to the indigent.6 (iii) Why are women ultimately excluded from the vote in the Constitutional Code?7 Does Bentham think them incapable of appreciating the ‘‘expectations of enlightened persons owning no property’’? Or must this development on his part be linked to British legislation which deprived married women of all rights of possession with respect to their own goods and chattels?8 (iv) Since it is up to political powers to secure the strength of property, why should one not consider an enlightened prince to be a more effective governor than a person elected by democratic process? In other words, should Bentham’s (democratic) solution rather be presented as a resolution of the fact that there are two different definitions of the general interest? Does it not show that there is a hierarchy between the two definitions, the additive conception of collective interest dominating the other? 5 See for instance Jeremy Bentham [1830], Constitutional Code, 137: ‘‘The same uncontrovertible ends of all good government, I once more acknowledge accordingly, and in these few words bring together and recapitulate: – Greatest happiness of greatest number maximized; national subsistence, abundance, security, and equality maximized, official aptitude maximized: expense, in all shapes, minimized.’’ 6 Jeremy Bentham [1796], Writings on the Poor Laws. Volume 1, ed. M. Quinn, in J. Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 10. The absence of any economic argument in the book perhaps explains why this question ultimately remains unaddressed by the author. This absence is to be regretted, for it seems to me that, if Bentham cannot be properly regarded as an economist, it is nonetheless difficult to entirely separate his political thought from economic positions, especially in respects of the definition of collective utility in terms of intermediate objectives (abundance and subsistence being economic ends). But on this point de Champs seems to hold to Mill’s position, to which she refers ‘‘when underlining . . . the importance of political economy in the constitution of ‘Philosophical Radicalism’. John Stuart Mill testifies to the divergence between Bentham’s ideas and those of his ‘disciples’. Political economy, especially, attracted little of Bentham’s attention during the latter part of his life, even though economic science was formalised in the works of Ricardo’’ (p. 249). 7 There is no real consensus about the exact position of Bentham concerning women’s rights: though Léa Campos Boralevi (Bentham and the Oppressed, Berlin New York: de Gruyter, 1984, 23), like Miriam Williford (‘Bentham on the Rights of Women’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 36 (1) (Jan.–Mar. 1975), 167– 76), calls him the ‘‘father of feminism’’, Terence Ball has qualified this designation as ‘‘myth’’ (‘Was Bentham a feminism?’, The Bentham Newsletter, 4 (May), 26–32). 8 On Married Women’s Property Laws in nineteenth century England, see for instance Mary Lyndon Shanley, ‘Suffrage, Protective labor Legislation, and Married Women’s Property Laws in England’, Signs 1 (1) (1986), 62–77 and Maxine Berg, ‘Women’s Property and the Industrial Revolution’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 24 (2) (1993), 333–50. Review essay / History of European Ideas 35 (2009) 112–115 115 A second element affects the initial intuition that there is a strong link between Bentham’s definition of the general interest and of democracy. This element is based upon the notion of ‘‘condition in life’’ (p. 348). This notion creates an intermediary level between individual and collective interest: individuals belonging to the same ‘‘condition’’ or status share ‘‘sectarian interests’’ or ‘‘group interests’’ (p. 87). This community of interest is shown by the expression of sentiments of sympathy which ‘‘permit the establishment of connections between individuals’’ (p. 86); but it is equally at the root of the emergence of a ‘‘sinister interest’’: ‘‘following a natural inclination towards sympathy, families and social groups have a tendency to form around common interests and seek to promote these to the detriment of the interests of others’’ (p. 87). Every political régime comes up against this intermediate level of interest which produces that ‘‘endemic evil’’ which is ‘‘corruption’’: in conformity with the principle of utility, de Champs, continues, ‘‘corruption has to be formed according to the ‘means’ and ‘ends’ . . . of legitimate government. Bentham talks of corruption when ‘means’, and in particular, ‘recompenses’ are used as ‘ends’ contrary to the greatest happiness of the greatest number, that is, when they favour the adverse interests of the rulers’’ (p. 235). Hence it is the business of the legislator to create institutions that limit – or prevent – corruption. If this analysis in terms of intermediate groups illuminates Bentham’s political project, it also undermines the caricature of the Benthamite utilitarian as an individual who is, in Veblen’s words, ‘‘a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact’’.9 The analysis offered here draws attention to the complexity of the calculation of utility, since ‘‘as members of a group individuals are exposed to the influence of interests other than their strictly personal interests’’ (p. 357). de Champs hardly develops this point (see pp. 350–53), even though it gives rise to quite original analysis on the part of Bentham, especially regarding the way in which one should act upon the behaviour of civil servants.10 This is certainly touched upon, but only in passing, so that many questions remain. Likewise, we can ponder what led Bentham to advocate the publication of the names of deserving civil servants instead of giving them a decoration (p. 351). And nothing is said about the ‘‘system of compensation’’ noted on p. 352 ‘‘to reduce the disappointment produced by the economies that he [Bentham] proposed for the salaries of civil servants [salaires officiels]’’. A more searching study of the alleged behaviour of the members of certain groups within the administration and the political sphere would have made it possible to pose these questions and outline a response. To conclude, it must be said that the 387 pages that make up de Champs’ book are remarkably well-written and easy to read. She displays a profound knowledge of Bentham’s texts, frequently making use of his correspondence and manuscripts. These are, in addition, regularly compared with the edition published by Etienne Dumont, seeking to retrieve the ‘‘true’’ Bentham (p. 18) who must not be confused with the ‘‘excessive conservative’’ one (p. 271) popularised by the translations made by Dumont. Reference to the secondary literature is also generous. From a formal point of view, apart from some misprints, one can only regret that the index is incomplete, since it for the most part does not cover the footnotes. But this takes nothing away from the interest of the book. Nathalie Sigot LED, University of Paris 8, Saint-Denis, France ESC School of Management, Lille, France E-mail address: [email protected] Available online 12 December 2008 9 Thorstein Veblen, ‘Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?’, Quartely Journal of Economics 12 (1898), 373–397, 389. See Christophe Chauvet, Les apports de Jeremy Bentham à l’analyse économique de l’Etat. Prélude à une théorie de la bureaucratie, PhD dissertation (University of Picardie, 2006). On Bentham’s theory of wages with regard to the public sector, see also Nathalie Sigot, ‘Jeremy Bentham on Private and Public Wages and Employment: the Civil Servants, the Poor, and the Indigent’, ed. L.S. Moss, Joseph A. Schumpeter, Historian of Economics (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 196–218. 10