Review of "Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will

Mind 124(493): 347-351, 2015

2013

For David Hodgson, human beings must be free—in some sense adequate to ground personal responsibility—and it becomes the work of his book to demonstrate how. The premises he starts with, however, simply do not lead to the conclusion he would like us to draw. Or they do not without smuggling in a trainload of assumptions all along the way. Hence, although the project sets out with great promise, the reader is left with little more than a sort of “free-will-of-the-gaps.”

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2012

ing those consequences, which is an intuitionist, not a consequentialist picture.' (p. 105.) Otherwise, Dancy claims, the consequentialist's argument '(these consequences would be best, so they ought to be done, so I ought to produce them) moves from a premise about some consequences to a conclusion about an agent without any visible rationale.' (p. 100.) I confess that, at times, I found the details of the paper a little hard to follow (but that may, of course, be a fault with this reader rather than the paper). Nevertheless, I also found much of it persuasive and thought-provoking, and do feel that it deserves another reading, and clearly one doesn't need to have a particular interest in Pritchard to be interested in a barrage of arguments against consequentialism. Similarly, one doesn't need to be a Ross scholar to be interested in Michael J. Zimmerman's expansion and defence of Ross's argument that 'though suffering can be deserved, punishment cannot be justified on this basis.' Although I am broadly sympathetic to retributive theories of punishment, this paper gave me plenty of reason to reconsider, and even if I wasn't fully persuaded by the paper, I do think it presents arguments that retributivists will need to take seriously. Ultimately, I have not been able to discuss all of the papers in the collection, and the ones I have focused on may well be a reflection of my particular interests, and not necessarily a reflection of the quality of the work. Overall though, this collection will undoubtedly be of interest to those interested in this particular period in the history of moral philosophy. In addition, it also deserves to reach a wider audience and the collection did convince me that many of these philosophers are deserving of more attention from the contemporary mainstream.

2008

It is argued that free will is a highly problematic concept, even if no form of determinism is assumed. Free will is an illusion, requiring that one would suspend knowledge about oneself. This illusion is, however, essential to rational decision making and can be justified from an evolutionary viewpoint. * The content of this note is probably not new. I will be grateful for references. I am grateful to Ilana Arbel and Arik Roginsky for comments.

International Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, (IJHSSE), volume 10, Issue 6, pp. 25-29 , 2023

As we know, there is a difference between a simple wish and the will of an individual. Not only a concrete action is required in order to alleviate the impact of various factors that inhibit the former before it becomes ‘will’, but also a deep level of human consciousness. It implies conscientious motivation, clear goals, etc. My paper introduces some of the elements instrumental in the leap from the wish to the human will. As the issue of Free Will shall be central to the paper because when I say ‘human will’ I refer to ‘free will’, I have to mention that I adopt a pragmatic perspective on this notion. I. e. even though, as quantum physics tell us, any decision we make is conditioned by realities pertaining to it, we do not think of this state of affair when we carry out our activities – at least not always. Because of that we feel free – free enough to be able to function according to social norms.

The plain person' s view, as per Hodgson, is that free will is causally efficacious in the lived world.

Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia

The long dispute between incompatibilists (namely, the advocates of the contemporary version of the illusory nature of freedom) and compatibilists is further exemplified in the discussion between Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett. In this article, I try to add to the discussion by outlining a concept of free will linked to five operating conditions and put forward a proposal for its operationalization and quantifi-cation. The idea is to empirically and pragmatically define free will as needed for moral blame and legal liability, while separating this from the debate on global determinism, local determinism, automatisms and priming phenomena on a psychological level. This is made possible by weakening the claims of de-terminisms and psychological automatisms, based on the latest research, and by giving a well-outlined definition of free will as I want to defend it.

THE CONCEPT OF FREE WILL, 2024

The debate over free will—whether it is an illusion or a genuine aspect of human experience—has long intrigued philosophers, scientists, and the general public. This essay explores the complex interplay between free will and various theoretical models, including determinism and stochastic theories. We begin by defining free will, clarifying it as the ability to make choices unconstrained by external factors, and distinguishing it from related concepts such as autonomy and agency. We then delve into deterministic models, which argue that every event, including human actions, is the result of preceding causes, and discuss how these models challenge traditional notions of moral responsibility. In contrast, stochastic models introduce the idea of randomness and uncertainty into the equation. By examining quantum mechanics—where particles behave probabilistically rather than deterministically—we investigate whether quantum indeterminacy offers a pathway to free will. The observer effect in quantum mechanics, which suggests that observation can influence outcomes, is explored as a potential link between consciousness and free will, though its implications remain speculative. We further consider consciousness and its role in decision-making, discussing the concept of qualia and how it might suggest a degree of autonomy within complex systems. The essay also addresses emergent properties—phenomena that arise from complex interactions and cannot be solely explained by their components—as a possible framework for understanding free will. Through real-life examples, such as legal cases and everyday decision-making, we illustrate the practical implications of the free will debate. We also engage with counterarguments from neuroscience, including findings on subconscious decision-making, to provide a balanced perspective. Prominent philosophical views, from Kant’s advocacy of free will for moral responsibility to Spinoza’s deterministic outlook, are examined to enrich the discussion. In conclusion, this essay reflects on the broader implications of the free will debate for our understanding of morality and human behavior. It emphasizes the importance of continued research in neuroscience, physics, and philosophy to address this enduring question and enhance our grasp of human agency.

In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or function must it play? Are agents morally responsible for actions and behaviors that are carried out automatically or without conscious control or guidance? Are they morally responsible for actions, judgments, and attitudes that are the result of implicit biases or situational features of their surroundings of which they are unaware? What about the actions of somnambulists or cases of extreme sleepwalking where consciousness is largely absent? Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and free will is imperative if we want to evaluate the various arguments for and against free will. For example, do compatibilist reasons- responsive and deep self accounts require consciousness? If so, are they threatened by recent developments in the behavior, cognitive, and neurosciences? What about libertarian accounts of free will? What powers, if any, do they impart to consciousness and are they consistent with our best scientific theories about the world? In this survey piece, I will outline and assess several distinct views on the relationship between consciousness and free will.

Social Theory and Practice, 2009

at Austin. He is the author of seven books and over sixty articles on the philosophy of mind and action, ethics, the theory of value and philosophy of religion, including Free Will and Values (1985), Through the Moral Maze: Searching for Absolute Values in a Pluralistic World (1994), The Signifi cance of Free Will (1996), A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (2005), and a lecture series on audio and video tape entitled The Quest for Meaning: Values, Ethics, and the Modern Experience. He is editor of The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2002) and of Free Will (Blackwell, 2002). The recipient of fi fteen major teaching awards at the University of Texas, he was named an inaugural member of the University's Academy of Distinguished Teachers in 1995.