Response to Thomas Flint

WILLIAM HASKER RESPONSE TO THOMAS FLINT (Received 19 July 1990) I'll begin my response with Tom Flint's suggestion that the strategy of my book was to show that "there are [only] two accounts compatible with a libertarian view of freedom which stand a real chance of offering a coherent account of God's providential activity within the world -the Molinist picture, according to which God's providence and foreknowledge are dependent upon his middle knowledge, and Hasker's alternative, according to which middle knowledge is impossible, foreknowledge is incompatible with freedom, and God has no choice but to take risks in his endeavors to guide the free beings he has created." This is not, in fact, a strategy I consciously adopted in writing the book; the thesis Flint attributes to me is not one I set out to prove. Yet I am willing to acknowledge that he has identified one of the deepest motifs of the work. There are, to be sure, two other theories -- divine timelessness, and "simple foreknowledge" (foreknowledge without middle knowledge) -- which at one level are about equal to Molinism in coherence and intelligibility. But these theories run into difficulty when we ask why it is important for God to have comprehensive knowledge of the future. Pretty clearly, the answer to this must be cashed out in terms of the doctrine of divine providence: God's knowledge is important because it enables him to guide, direct, and control the course of events in ways that would otherwise be impossible. I claim to have shown, however (and here I think Flint agrees with me), that simple foreknowledge and divine timelessness offer no help whatever for our understanding of God's providential action in the world. If this is true, then these theories are indeed threatened with incoherence: they maintain the theological importance of a strong doctrine concerning God's knowledge of the future, yet present that doctrine in a form which makes it theologically useless! Or, to put the point in a more positive way: If you are committed to a "strong" view of providence, Philosophical Studies 60:117-- 126, 1990. 9 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 118 WILLIAM HASKER according to which, down to the smallest detail, "things are as they are because God knowingly decided to create such a world," and yet you also wish to maintain a libertarian conception of free will -- if this is what you want, then Molinism is the only game in town. I have argued, however, that Molinism cannot be correct, so we must now turn to T o m Flint's criticism of one of my arguments against middle knowledge. I want to acknowledge here that the argument as presented in the book owes a great deal to an earlier, regrettably unpublished, critique by Professor Flint. 1 And I must also congratulate him for his accurate paraphrase and simplification of an argument which, in its original version, is both lengthy and formidably complex. His ability to do this attests to the depth and care of his study of that argument -- and this, in turn, assures us that his criticisms of the argument are worthy of our closest attention. H e acknowledges the argument to be valid, and he correctly identifies three premises upon which it depends. But he has serious reservations about at least two of the three premises. Let us, then, consider first his discussion of my premise (2) Counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental features of the world than are particular facts. (Hence, worlds which differ from the actual world with regard to factual content are closer than those which differ from it with regard to counterfactuals of freedom.) As Flint observes, one part of my strategy is to argue to (2) from the conjunction of (a) Counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental features of the world than are counterfactuals backed by laws of nature, and Co) Counterfactuals backed by laws of nature are more fundamental features of the world than are particular facts. Before examining this point in detail, let me note that (as I pointed out in my book) my argument doesn't strictly require anything as strong as (a). For it is evident that laws of nature, and the counterfactuals RESPONSE TO THOMAS FLINT 119 based on them, are far m o r e fundamental than are particular facts. So if it turned out that counterfactuals of freedom are about on a par with natural-law counterfactuals in this regard, or even that they are slightly less fundamental than natural-law counterfactuals (which means, let's recall, that worlds in which the "more fundamental" feature is altered are "farther" from the actual world than those in which the less fundamental feature is altered), my premise (2) would still be secure. Nevertheless, I do think (a) is true, and that it survives Flint's efforts at counter-argument. I don't have time to consider all the things Flint says about this, but I shall try to touch u p o n the m o r e important points. His concluding counter-example, cleverly adapted from my 'ink-bottle" illustration, comes very close to begging the question outright. It's quite true that in normal contexts, where the theory of middle knowledge is not in question, we tend to assume that possible worlds in which free agents m a k e different choices than they make in the actual world may nevertheless be quite close to the actual world. But of course, the precise point presently in dispute is, what difference do middle knowledge, and counterfactuals of freedom, make to this assumption? To ignore this point, and to appeal to our everyday intuitions as if counterfactuals of freedom m a k e no difference at all, is not a helpful strategy of argumentation. Let's now turn our attention to the argument for (a) 2 which maintains that we now know with virtual certainty that the fundamental laws of nature are probabilistic rather than strictly deterministic; thus, the counterfactuals backed by the laws of nature ... are in fact would-probably conditionals rather than true necessitation conditionals. Surely, however, necessitation conditionals (such as the counterfactuals of freedom are supposed to be) have to be weighted more heavily than "would-probably" conditionals in determining the relative closeness of possible worlds (GTK, p. 47). Contrary to what Flifit supposes, the force of this argument does not depend in any essential way on the use of Pollock's term, "necessitation conditionals," to designate the type of conditionals of which counterfactuals of freedom are a subclass. The difference between counterfactuals of freedom and would-probably conditionals is no mere matter of nomenclature; it cuts right to the logical bone. To see this, consider that Robert A d a m s has p r o p o s e d (and I follow him in this) that when predictions are m a d e of the future free actions of human beings, the 120 WILLIAM HASKER conditionals relied upon are would-probably conditionals: thus, the conditional If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city (see I Sam. 23: 11) is glossed as If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would probably besiege the city. Such would-probably conditionals are grounded in the subject's propensity to act in a certain way, in the light of his character and circumstances, but (given that the agent chooses freely) they provide no guarantee that the agent will so act. This proposal, needless to say, is entirely unacceptable to Molinists such as Professor Flint; for their purposes, the counterfactuals which are known to God must provide an ironclad guarantee that the subject will behave as indicated. Wouldprobably conditionals can be true and yet have true antecedents and false consequents in the actual world, 3 but this is absolutely impossible for counterfactuals of freedom. The greater strength of necessitation conditionals as compared with would-probably conditionals is a simple matter of logical fact, and Flint has not countered this argument at all. Let me now turn to Flint's discussion of my "power entailment principle," (3) If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q" and "Q" is false, then it is in A's power to bring it about that Q. This principle, and others like it, play a role not only in the argument against middle knowledge, but in the argument for the incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will, as well as in other important philosophical arguments. (Similar principles are sometimes referred to as "transfer-of-necessity principles.") Now, is there good reason to think (3) is true? At one point in God, Time, and Knowledge I claim that the principle is "self-evident"; it's possible, though not to my mind certain, that I overreached in claiming so much. It does, in fact, seem self-evident to me, but it does not seem self-evident to Tom Flint, which certainly argues against any general RESPONSE TO THOMAS FLINT 121 claim of self-evidence. Still, his disagreement may not be conclusive here. For he claims to find the formula in question quite obscure and ambiguous; in view of this, it's entirely possible that Flint, up until now, has failed to clearly apprehend the proposition I take to be expressed by (3). But if he has failed to clearly apprehend that proposition, then he is not is a good position to judge whether or not it is self-evident. So perhaps it remains open to us to hope for him that, once he does clearly apprehend the proposition in question, he will also see that it is self-evident. But what is the proposition (3) expresses? Flint's problems seem to center around the notion of "bringing about," but I can't do much more on this point than repeat what I've already said. In my view, (i) A brings about B 4 is intermediate in strength between (ii) A causes B and (iii) A occurs, and if A were to occur, B would occur. I take it to be evident that (i) is stronger than (iii) -- the latter, which I term the "counterfactural dependence relation" is remarkably weak; many philosophers seem to see in it much more than is actually there. (i) is, on the other hand, weaker than (ii); every instance of causing is an instance of bringing about, but the converse does not hold. One example of bringing about which is not causal comes from Jaegwon Kim: When Socrates' jailor caused him to drink the hemlock, he both caused and brought about Socrates' death; he also, by the same action, brought about Xantippe's becoming a widow. But the link between the jailor's action and Xantippe's widowhood is not "causal" in the relevant sense -- no conceivable form of causal isolation for Xantippe could have prevented her from becoming a widow. Another example concerns the truth of propositions: By reading this paper I bring it about that "Hasker will read a paper tomorrow" was true yesterday, but I don't think I cause that proposition to have been true yesterday. Beyond this, it can be said that "bringing about" is a relation which is transitive, asymmetrical, and irreflexive, such that what is brought about 122 WILLIAM HASKER obtains in consequence of that which brings it about. (These formal features are shared by both bringing about and causation; counterfactual dependence, on the other hand, is nontransitive, nonsymmetrical, and reflexive.) Now I have to say that it seems to me that these explanations are sufficiently clear that I am able to grasp propositions (such as (3)) involving the notion of "bringing about," and in some cases (again, such as (3)) to see that those propositions are true. If Flint has in mind some specific ambiguity involving this notion, then I would ask him to tell us what the ambiguity is so that it can be addressed. His general remarks about a "vast and largely uncharted land" between causal and counterfactual power do not strike me as particularly helpful. But what reason is there to think that (3) is true -- beyond, that is, the (eminently disputable) appeal to self-evidence? There is, for one thing, the fact that plausible counter-examples to (3) have failed to emerge, despite vigorous scrutiny by a number of philosophers. I am excluding, to be sure, putative counter-examples drawn from the theories of divine foreknowledge and middle knowledge. If philosophers who hold such theories choose to take the theories as absolute presuppositions, and on that basis to reject any principles (such as (3)) which might threaten them, they do obtain thereby a certain kind of invulnerability for their theories. But such invulnerability is, to my mind, purchased at a high price. Are there additional, positive reasons to think that (3) is true? Here I will offer, for your consideration, a modest elaboration of an argument which is briefly suggested in the book (GTK, p. 113). Let us agree that, for any proposition "P," a P-world is some possible world in which "P" is true. Then for an agent to bring it about that "P" is true just is for her to bring it about that some P-world is actual. 5 And the agent's having it in her power to bring it about that "P" is true just is her having it in her power to bring it about that some P-world is actual. Now, if "P" entails "Q," it follows that every P-world is also a Q-world. Does it also follow, on these assumptions, that the agent has it in her power to bring it about that some Q-world is actual? Not necessarily. For "Q" may already be true -- it may, that is, be true independently of anything the agent could do. And if that is so, then she does not bring it about that RESPONSE TO THOMAS FLINT 123 "Q" is true by any of her actions, nor does she have the power to do so. But suppose that "Q" is not true -- which is to say, suppose that the actual world is not a Q-world. In that case, for her to bring it about that some P-world is actual, would be for her to bring it about that some Q-world is actual, and her having the power to do the former just is her having the power to do the latter. Which is to say: If she has it in her power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q" and "Q" is false, then she has it in her power to bring it about that Q. Q.E.D. In closing, I would like to say something about the overall picture of God's knowledge and providential action which emerges from my argument -- a picture which Professor Flint finds disturbingly unorthodox. I have some sympathy with that reaction; the view is not one I have adopted easily or without prolonged reflection. Still, I might point out that the separate elements in my view are not in themselves unfamiliar or in any way unorthodox. The denial that God, in time, has knowledge of the temporal future is something I share with Boethius, Anselm, Aquinas, and in our own time with Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann, and a host of others. On the other hand, the denial that God is timelessly eternal is also shared by many. And in disbelieving in middle knowledge, I take it I agree with a distinct majority of all those theistic philosophers who have seriously considered that question. Admittedly, in combining all of these positions, and in drawing the consequence that God has only limited knowledge of the future, I find myself in a minority position which runs counter to a great deal of the theological tradition. At that point, I must simply admit that the tradition, while invaluable as a guide, is not infallible and cannot always be followed in every detail. As to whether a position like mine is available to an orthodox Roman Catholic, this is a question on which I have no authority to pronounce. I will remark, though, that a number of generally orthodox Catholics seem to differ with Tom Flint over this point. I don't, to be sure, particularly like some of the ways in which my position has been characterized. Flint's description of God, according to my view, as the "bookie than which none greater can be conceived" suggests an alarming attitude towards the necessity of taking risks. What would we make of a parent who proclaimed her absolute unwillingness 124 WILLIAM HASKER to take any risks at all in raising her children? Such a parental regimen might not be absolutely the worst possible, but it would surely be deadly for the child - - indeed, has been deadly in all too m a n y cases. T o be sure, some of our parental risk-taking stems f r o m our unavoidable, though partial, ignorance about circumstances and about our o w n children's character and development. A n d G o d is altogether free of such ignorance as that. But the other part of the risk, is simply that which is inevitable as we give our children their o w n lives to lead and then watch, hope, and pray as they lead t h e m - - and that risk even G o d cannot avoid, without b e c o m i n g - - shall we say, the "manipulator than which n o n e greater can be conceived." In o r d e r to further characterize m y position, I beg leave to quote a passage f r o m the book: God has complete, detailed, and utterly intimate knowledge of the entirety of the past and the present. He also, of course, knows the inward constitution, tendencies, and powers of each entity in the fullest measure. And, finally he has full knowledge of his own purposes, and of how they may best be carried out. Everything God does is informed by the totality of this knowledge; the guidance he gives, if he chooses to give it, is wisdom pure and unalloyed . . . . Whatever God needs to do, he has the power to do; whatever he sees is best to do happens forthwith. And if we trust him, we can also trust his purposes, for they culminate in the kingdom of God, which is our happiness and shalom. And now I ask, is this not enough? If God is like this, is he not worthy of our most entire devotion? And if we hesitate to agree to this, is the hesitation because a God so described would truly be unworthy, or is it because of our attachment to a theory? (GTK, p. 192) Professor Flint, of course, does have his theory, and he is fully entitled to it. Middle knowledge affords to G o d the resources he needs to avoid all risks and surprises. But is this truly a gain for o u r understanding of G o d and his ways? I've hinted already that risk-taking, so far f r o m being an unmitigated evil, is actually a necessary element in the g o o d life. It is m o r e than understandable that, o v e r w h e l m e d as we sometimes are by the u n c o n trollable risks in o u r own lives, we should wish to r e m o v e risk-taking altogether f r o m G o d ' s life. But that this impulse is understandable does not m e a n that it is wise or that it leads us towards truth. Nor, I think, is it truly ennobling to h u m a n beings to regard our most exalted achievements merely as the "expected print-out f r o m the divine programming." RESPONSE TO THOMAS FLINT 125 But the most devastating implications of middle knowledge are those w h i c h a r i s e as w e c o n t e m p l a t e t h e p h e n o m e n a o f evil. " T h i n g s a r e as t h e y a r e , " w e a r e t o l d , b e c a u s e , in every detail, " G o d k n o w i n g l y d e c i d e d to c r e a t e s u c h a w o r l d . " V e r y c o m f o r t i n g , n o d o u b t - - u n t i l w e a r e r e m a i n d e d j u s t w h a t s o m e o f t h o s e " d e t a i l s " i n v o l v e . T o b e sure, t h e r e a l i t y o f evil c a n b e o v e r w h e l m i n g o n a n y v i e w . B u t is it r e a l l y h e l p f u l to b e t o l d t h a t f o r e a c h i n s t a n c e o f h o r r e n d o u s evil, f r o m t h e H o l o c a u s t to t h e "killing f i e l d s " o f C a m b o d i a to t h e A r m e n i a n earthquake, God p l a n n e d in p r e c i s e d e t a i l t h a t t h i n g s s h o u l d b e just so a n d n o t o t h e r wise? Many philosophers, Will Defense, have come misreading the lesson of Plantinga's Free to suppose that middle knowledge is a v a l u a b l e asset t o t h e t h e i s t w h o s e e k s to r e s p o n d to t h e p r o b l e m o f evil. T h e truth, it s e e m s to m e , is v e r y m u c h to t h e c o n t r a r y . NOTES "Hasker's 'Refutation' of Middle Knowledge." 2 I relegate to a note Flint's response to my argument that, given that God performs miracles, "some counterfactuals backed by laws of nature have counterexamples in the actual world itself, and therefore also in possible worlds as close to the actual world as you please." Ffint replies, "it seems to me t h a t . . , what is true in rather extraordinary circumstances gives us no reason to think that the same holds in ordinary circumstances" (p. 10). I counter that, at most, Flint shows that counterfactuals backed by laws of nature plus God's intention not to intervene are as fundamental as counterfactuals of freedom. This, however, has no clear bearing on the binding force of natural-law counterfactuals taken just by themselves, which is what the argument is about. There may, however, be another way out tor the Molinist at this point. Many theists are inclined to say that natural laws, when correctly understood, contain an implicit "boundary condition" to the effect that the law prescribes what will occur absent interference by a supernatural being. When a miracle does occur, one could then say that the counterfactual which has been violated was not in fact backed by the corresponding law of nature; since the boundary conditions have been breached, the law in question no longer applies. If this way of understanding laws of nature can be upheld, my argument would be neutralized. 3 That is to say, the antecedent may be true and the proposition embedded in the "would probably" clause false. It will still be the case, of course, that the "would probably" clause as a whole is true. 4 This formula speaks of events as bringing about other events, whereas (3) speaks of persons as bringing about events. (3), then, involves the notion of "agent causation," a notion which both Flint and I accept as meaningful and as describing an important feature of our world. The link between the two uses of "bringing about" is forged by saying that a person brings about an event just in case that person's performance of some action brings about the event. s She does not, however, bring it about with respect to some particular P-world, that 126 WILLIAM HASKER that world is actual. Which particular P-world is actual depends on many, many future events, only a few of which will be under the agent's control. The correct formula is: A brings it about that (Ew) (w is a P-world & w is actual) rather than (Ew) (w is a P-world & A brings it about that w is actual). Notre Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion Huntington College Huntington, IN 46750 USA