Sociocultural Aspects of Transition

Citation: Maldini, Pero (2007): Sociocultural Aspects of Transition, in: Maldini, Pero / Vidović, Davorka (eds.): Transition in Central and Eastern European Countries: Experiences and future perspectives, Centar za politološka istraživanja, Zagreb, pp. 63-76 Pero MAldini Socio-CulturalAspectsofTransition Introduction Establishment of democratic regimes in former authoritarian societies has emphasized the importance and vitality of democracy and marked large social, political and cultural changes. But, in spite of institutional and normative constitution of democracy and its general acceptability in almost all transitional societies, there are obvious and great differences in the attained democratic range within various postcommunist societies. Instead of transformation process and democratic consolidation in many transition societies, one can often find undemocratic political practice with certain retrograde processes, contrary to democratic transformation of society. Such experiences indicate that transition is not unambiguous and predictable process of social development which necessarily leads towards democratic regime, and also that normative-institutional democratic constitution is not sufficient to make a political regime democratic. Therefore, democratic legitimacy and the efficient functioning of a democratic system are key issues for the process of democratic consolidation in post-communist societies. Namely, socioeconomic factors (economic development, social modernization) were often emphasized as necessary prerequisites for success of transitional process, nevertheless, they are neither sufficient, nor give answers to questions about reasons for democratic success (or failure) of a particular society.1 1 E.g., why some post-communist societies have, initially, shorter economic degree and go considerable farther in transitional processes, than those with the higher starting economic 88 Pero Maldini It seems that sociocultural factors (social values, patterns of the predominant political culture) in transitional societies significantly determine development and existence of a democratic political system. Numerous researches draw attention to similar indicators, investigating relative success and failure of democracy in different societies in respect to their cultural tradition.2 Moreover, structural analyses of relations between political culture and political system have conclusive evidence about the strong dependence of democratization process on political-cultural preconditions.3 Socio-cultural factors and political system Stable democracy development does not depend only on governmental and political structures, but also on subjective orientations of citizens towards the political system, the political culture.4 So, de2 3 4 degree where the quasi-democratic authoritarian regime has been established? See: Almond and Verba, 2000; Dalton, 2006; Diamond, 1999; Eckstein, 1992; Fuchs and Roller, 1998; Huntington, 1991; Huntington, 1996; Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Abramson, 1994; Jacobs, Müller and Pickel, 2003; Pye, 1965; Pye, 2003; Verba, 1965; Vujčić, 2001. Since 1981 researching World Value Survey, Inglehart has brought out new proofs about the congruence of widespread political attitudes and democratic stabilities. In 1993 Putnam, researching development of regional governments in Italy, has witnessed more impressively for the benefit of cultural theories. He has affirmed that cultural traditions of explored regions have been significantly opposed: the cooperative political style of the north, on the contrary is hierarchical tradition of the south, and this is, on the other hand, most powerful performance predictor of their political authority. Indeed, Putnam has shown that cultural factors are more influential than economic differences among regions, and also that cultural patterns reflect historical patterns of civil engagement. The concept of political culture connects the psychological aspect (political attitudes, political orientations and the behavior based on them, and the social functioning as a characteristic of an individual) and sociological aspect (social implications of political attitudes, political orientations and their influence on the individual). By the concept, the synthesis of the collective historical heritage of political system and personal political heritage and experiences of individual as the member of the society is realized. So, political culture presents and explains subjective side of politics. The political culture as series of social values, beliefs and attitudes about the political system (processes and objects) and its function, determines the political behavior and political relations among social protagonists. That’s where the distinction starts between the subjective aspect of political culture (values, beliefs and attitudes) and the objective aspect of political culture (the political behavior of social actors). Socio-Cultural Aspects of Transition 89 mocratization, as the central transitional process, can be observed as a consequence of interrelationship between political structure and political culture. If there is no sufficient congruence, or, in other words, if the political culture does not support the democratic system, the possibilities are reduced for the system holding and succeeding as a democratic one. This leads us to one of the key relations: interdependence of political system performance and socio-cultural factors, i.e. the relationship of political culture and political structure. How much is the culture determinant of structure, the relation has the equal reverse function, and the influence is reciprocal. The structure of a democratic system consists of certain patterns and roles (procedures), having different relations in the production of collective binding decisions. The classic functionalist theory has described institutions as the system of roles (functions) which have strategic importance for the social system. Institutional patterns form the outline of the social system. They define liberal democracy as institutions of representation and party contest, and that is regulated by the law. However, besides the legally formalized roles, democracy functions according to “informal” rules and standards, valid in public, and supported by social actors, or in other words, according to the political culture of society. That is where one can follow differentiation between normatively-institutionally founded democracy and an efficient democratic system. Therefore, the degree of consents between institutional standards and social reality can be determined as the criterion for the efficacy of democracy. The political culture of democracy may be determined on two levels. The first level consists of structural relevant values which are codified by social norms (laws). Another level is the conviction of society for these values implementation. Common for both levels is a commitment to these values which are actually central for the conception of political culture. Therefore, the political culture of democracy consists of implemented and institutionalized values (when values present the desirable type of democracy). What is said for the political culture, applies to the political structure, as well. The first level of 90 Pero Maldini political structure consists of roles, joined together with social norms (laws). This level presents the implemented political structure. As much as this structure has been legitimized by the society, so much the political structure has been institutionalized. Accordingly, the political structure of democracy consists of applied and institutionalized roles. These roles present normative expectations which concern activities of political actors. Political Culture and democratic transition There is great importance of this relation in the analysis of transitional societies. Namely, it is about societies of development discontinuity, characterized by normative-institutional change, as well as cultural change. Each of these changes has its own dynamics which, as a rule, in many aspects has no correspondence with another one. Cultures and structures do not change parallel: when one institutional structure disappears and another is established, the old cultural patterns have been functioning long after that, and as a rule, not corresponding with changes and requirements of the new system. So, the new structure is not able to be consolidated, because citizens function consistently in according to the old cultural patterns. Incongruence of culture and structure appears as the main problem of transitional societies, because the democratic legitimacy becomes doubtful, thereby, same happened with succeeded democratic consolidation, in some cases even with viability of democratic regime. So, development of democracy has not been conditioned only by objective factors like the economic development, neither by the autonomous will of political actors. Essentially, it has been formed by political culture, manifested as the dominating social value orientation. It could be said that the importance of socio-cultural factors has been more emphasized in transitional societies (because democratization has been taking place there in different conditions, more influenced by exogenous, and less endogenous elements of modernization) than Socio-Cultural Aspects of Transition 91 in established democracies (where democracy is more the product of endogenous development, and less of outer influences). Therefore, the level of democratization cannot be measured only on the basis of structural factors which are already supposed in the established democracies, as they are the product of the long-lasting, organic, in other words, endogenous development, and therefore, corresponding with the political culture, which is not the case in transitional societies. General support to democracy has been widespread almost everywhere, so the citizens in transitional societies express opinions about the desirability of democracy as well as the citizens in the most developed democracies. Nevertheless, these desirable values are often superficial and do not necessarily reflect a real commitment for the key democratic standards. Therefore, the claim that the open support to democracy on the individual level is reliable measure of democratic qualities of institutions (Seligson, 2002: 275; Muller and Seligson, 1994: 646) appears as wrong on the social level.5 Namely, in order to present the connection between the political culture and democratic institutions, attitudes on the individual level must be gathered on the social level, as democracy is characteristic of societies, not individuals. Data research on this base indicates that the political culture which emphasizes self-expression, tolerance, trust, life satisfaction, and participation orientations, plays an important role in the efficient democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2003: 14-15; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005 b: 244). These orientations are important for development of democratic institutions, because if the values of tolerance, trust and participation are not rooted deeper, chances for the efficient democracy on the social level will be weak, in spite of the generally expressed support to democracy. 5 The individual support to democracy has been determined considerably higher by instrumental motives than normative obligations to democratic values. People with strong selfexpression will always choose democracy rather than autocracy. But, there is a large number of people supporting democracy for the reason of expected performance, even when prominence of self-expression is weak. Therefore, the open support to democracy is a weak indicator of intrinsic support, as the open support has been stimulated by the instrumental motivation (Inglehart and Welzel, 2003: 73). 92 Pero Maldini In the relationship of political culture and democracy it is necessary to distinguish stability of democracy and levels of democracy as separated dimensions. Dimension of stability is about internal coherence and resistance of democratic regime to the obstruction. Socio-cultural factors, which have an essential influence on keeping up democratic institutions, are attitudes, just as it is the belief in the possibility of influence on political decisions (subjective political competence), the feel of addiction to political system (acceptance of democratic regime as desirable) and belief that basically one can trust in fellow-citizens (interpersonal trust).6 Societies with the high level of these civic culture attitudes are more likely to accept democracy sooner, and keep it stable, in comparison to the societies with the low level, regardless of socioeconomic factors like the degree of economic development.7 Therefore, democratic stability requires the culture which will support democracy. Acceptance of democratic values and standards as well as democratic procedures is the base of democratic legitimacy. It is in the very base of democratic regime stability and its efficient functioning, so it will keep it stable even in the crisis and the reduced system performance. The level of democracy indicates the democratization degree of a society, i.e., the quality of democratic political system performance in 6 7 Democracy in practice functions through the peaceful collective action of the groups of citizens. As the peaceful collective action has been founded in the spirit of cooperation, from institutional possibilities of peaceful collective action which enables the democratic order it can be expected to promote interpersonal trust. It is the important integral part of the civil political culture and has positive and statistically significant effect on the democratic stability. The research results confirm that societies with relatively high levels of interpersonal trust and life satisfaction want to have democratic institutions in significantly greater number in relation to societies with lower levels; therefore the presence of this factor is very important for development of democratic regime (Inglehart, 1990: 45). The research results (obtained on wide research samples) strongly support the claim that the stability of democracy depends on attitudes of civil culture. There are many examples which can show how deep-rooted democratic values and civil culture are important. So, for instance, India with its half a century long formal democracy has no efficient democratic system, unlike Czech, which after half a century of totalitarianism today has moved furthest in democratization. Whether democratic institutions would survive or not throughout good or hard times, depends on deep-rooted cultural devotion among citizens towards democracy and its institutions. Weimar’s Germany has had the democratic constitution like every other democracy, but democratic standards did not take root and institutions became unstable during the crisis (see: Inglehart, Welzel and Klingemann, 2001: 7-8; Branchy, Inglehart and Leblang, 1996: 680, 686). Socio-Cultural Aspects of Transition 93 realization of proclaimed democratic values (freedom, equality, civil rights), with respect to democratic procedure and government responsibility. The levels of democracy are measurable and comparable (in certain periods of time and among different societies). Many structural studies, as the measure of the level of democracy, use the criterion of minimal (formal) democracy. However, such reducing is the cause of the poor insight into social relations as a whole and it escapes the objective evaluation to the efficacy of democracy within particular society. With respect to the actors’ (political elite’s) key role in transitional processes, there is a need to say, nevertheless, that their action is not quite autonomous, as in regard to preferences of citizens, as well in regard to the culture. Namely, political elite doesn’t not operate in the vacuum. The choice of their strategies has been structured by institutions where they operate, while political behavior and actions are essentially influenced by their socio-cultural and political heritage. Actors do not respond to situations directly, but they respond through indirect orientations. Orientations towards the action are general dispositions of actors who function particularly on their bases in certain situation. Such general dispositions structure the action. If actors are without them or if orientations have wrong form or if they are inconsistent, actions will be missed, baseless and anomous. It should be mentioned that orientations are not attitudes (orientations are general, and attitudes are special; attitudes inherently come from orientations which are expressed through attitudes). Orientations change and they are not direct subjective reflections of objective conditions. They are not acquired automatically, but must be learned, a process which continues through the activity of the outer socialization factors (Eckstein, 1988: 791).8 8 Although structural approaches do not refuse the importance of political socialization, what makes them separated from the culturalists is the question of the late life learning or resocialization. In relation to this subject, culturalists start from the assumption of cumulative socialization. That means two things: first, although learning concerns the learning process of the whole life, early learning (actually all previous learning) is taken as a specific filter of later learning: early learning conditioning later learning and this influence cannot be neglected. 94 Pero Maldini Democratic resocialization This socialization moment is important because it determines the ability and extent of acceptance of social changes, especially under circumstances of a strong social discontinuity, such as the democratic transition of post-communist societies. Hence, suitable cultural adjustment (the sociocultural adaptation) is necessary for development of democracy, in fact democratic re-socialization which, primarily, supposes the following and accepting of values of civic culture (because of their correspondence to sustainability and function of a democratic regime). However, is that re-socialization possible and to what extent, considering predominant pre-civic and authoritarian political heritage of transitional societies? Is the socio-cultural complex acquired through the socialization a barrier to democratic re-socialization? Although strongly present, however, it seems that this sociocultural filter is not necessarily a determinant factor. Namely, the influence of institutional learning in the framework of a new political system can relativize the cultural inertia. It is about the process of development and adoption of democratic values in societies without experience of democratic system after exposing to the democratic institutions performance. The process previews the development of three key qualities of citizenship which underlie most of the democratic values: restraint, self-reliance and corresponding societal ideals. Citizens will develop restraint and self-reliance under specific circumstances only, namely, they have to be exposed to the influence of institutions which encourage development of these citizen qualities, while societal ideals ensure justification where a particular system of political and economic procedures are more acceptable than other alternatives (Rohrschneider, 2003: 49; Werlin and Eckstein, 1990: 252). That way, the influence of political relations through the process of institutional learning can overcome barriers towards democratic development created by the influence of cultural inertia and socialization effects. The role of political elite in designing of a political system and the management of political activity is crucial, because democratic re- Socio-Cultural Aspects of Transition 95 socialization will continue as the process of socio-cultural adaptation to the new democratic regime only depending on the system performance and democratic qualities of political elite (theirs political style). Conclusion Political culture and democracy structure create the normative order in mutual combination. Two levels of institutionalization exist within this normative order: the first is implementation of democratic values and democracy structures by the law (democratic constitutions, the state of law); another level is the general consensus within society around the democratic values (the conviction) and structure of democracy (the political trust and support to the system, legitimacy). Viability and stability of democracy depend on the culture and structure congruence, or in other words, on the degree of implementation of primary culture and structure elements of democracy and the degree of the general support for democracy among citizens. In the transitional context, characterized by development discontinuity, incongruence of political culture and political system (structure) expresses itself as the main problem. Dynamics and contents of cultural changes do not correspond to structural changes, whereupon the new political system does not succeed in democratic consolidation. As a result of that, socio-cultural prerequisites (especially the political culture) are placed as the key factors on which democratic consolidation and efficacy of political systems in transitional societies are dependent. Creation and development process of a missing civic culture can be characterized as the process of democratic re-socialization. Democratic re-socialization takes place as certain socio-cultural adaptation, in other words, as a gradual adopting of democratic values and sociocultural patterns of civic culture, and thereby, as the process of overcoming of characteristic incongruence between culture and structure. Primarily, it goes on through the process of institutional learning on two basic levels: the individual level (acquiring personal experience 96 Pero Maldini with the democratic performance through the exposure to the system institutions performance and social actors; citizens adopt and develop democratic values under the circumstances of exposure to the operation of democratic institutions which encourage development of citizenship qualities) and the social level (acquiring experience with the performance of democracy through exposure of political elite, but also the entire society to the activity of the external, international actors). Political elite lead and direct democratic processes, led by (or are under the influence of) collective preferences and expectations, while their political style (the ruling practice) is essentially characterized by their socio-cultural heritage and political culture. So, the sociocultural factors determine the strength of political movements for democracy, as well as the strength of liberal reformers among political elite. They act as the social power which directs collective actions in the direction which will enable democratic solutions. Therefore, it is not possible to understand democratic changes within transitional societies without this crucial intermediation role of sociocultural factors, especially political culture. 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