The Frontier Policy

The Frontier Policy Saeeda*, Muhammad Waqas†, Khalil ur Rehman‡ Abstract Historically, for a millennium the invaders of Hindustan would start from Central Asia, secure the Afghan Plateau as a strategic base and roll into Peshawar Valley through Khyber Pass, then cross the Indus River—and via Punjab—they would then wheel north into North India to establish empires. A secure Afghan Plateau was critical for the throne in Delhi. The frontier of the empire was kept secure through a strategy that historians call ‘Mughal Era Frontier Policy’. Then the British disembarked on the southern coast of Hindustan. The Battle of Plassey proved decisive. Consequently, the British strategy tiptoed towards Delhi, as also the East India Company. After securing Delhi in 1804, besides defeating Ranjit Singh and the crushing of 1857 uprising, British took serious administrative and strategic measures to implement the ‘Frontier Policy’. The policy in its essence was a ‘three-fold frontier’ with Czarist Russia as an adversary across the Amu River. Pakistan, on its creation, inherited the ‘Frontier Policy’ of British India and became a member of SEATO and CENTO, whereby Americans had a base at Badabher. The later Pak-US involvement in Afghanistan against the former Soviet Union and the post-9/11 War on Terror partnership were also in the context of Frontier Policy. The war has since transitioned from the War on Terror to the great power competition. Pakistan too has moved from the Frontier Policy to the New Frontier Policy. In the process, Pakistan and Russia have forged a new strategic partnership. A transactional relationship is not an alternative for an entente, especially in an era of great-power competition. Lastly, no inductive research has been done on the New Frontier Policy of Pakistan towards Russia. This paper will add to the knowledge on the subject with empiric-analytic reason as a method to analyse. Keywords: frontier policy, great-game, new-great game, new-frontier policy. Introduction The modern nation-state system and its foreign policy principles are based on an awareness that functions on the basis of nation-state and national interest. Foreign policies have declaratory and operational aspects. The former is posturing; whereas the latter is from the Real World. Multiple factors shape foreign policy that internally include the government, political elite, culture, economy, geography and demography of a country, while externally it involves foreign threats, political vacuums and changes in the balance of power (Donaldson et al, 2014: 3). The variable of geography is central to any nation-state and its foreign policy, because national interest is rooted in tangible geography, not in an intangible idea. Moreover, foreign policy unfolds in a given strategic environment. It has an ambiance in which decision makers breathe, and make decisions. It is both science and art. It is holistic. The levels of foreign policy analysis are individual, sub-systemic and systemic in the greater context of nation-state system. Foreign policy is local, regional plus global in a globalized world. The states select policies that suit their needs at a particular time (Palmer & Clifton, 2006: 5). Foreign policy is dynamic and dynamics keep changing with a change in a given strategic environment, especially between nuclear powers. * PhD Scholar Area Study Centre (Russia, China and Central Asia), University of Peshawar, Lecturer Jinnah College for Women, University of Peshawar. † PhD Scholar Area Study Centre (Russia, China and Central Asia), University of Peshawar, ‡ Assistant Professor Area Study Centre (Russia, China and Central Asia), University of Peshawar. The Frontier Policy Saeeda, Waqas, Khalil Pakistan, on its creation, faced countless challenges on the internal and external fronts. The problems with India in the east continue to this day with Kashmir dispute as a potential nuclear flashpoint. And the initial hitches with Afghanistan are now burdened with the problems of decades old Afghan war. The developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan are so connected that the two are lumped together as an AfPak region (Saikal, 2014: 59), though wrongly. The first Afghan challenge came in 1956 when Kabul questioned the legality of the British era Durand Line, which is the internationally recognized Pak-Afghan border since 1947. The validity was challenged on the ground that the British insincerely divided the people without any consideration to race or language. Pakistan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs rejected the Afghan understanding of history and elucidated it as ‘a proposition that admits no discussion and Durand Line has been, is, and will continue to be the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan’ (Chowdhury, 1956: 53). The perceptions remain intact, whereas the reality revolved around the idea of continuity in foreign policy—sandwiched between—the nation-state of Pakistan and its colonialist predecessor i.e., British India. The British left behind a two-fold legacy with ‘hegemony’ going to India which it is pursuing to this day, while Pakistan got its share of inheritance in the form of ‘Frontier Policy’ that endured as its focus until the mid-2018. Then a perceptual paradigm shift took place in the Pakistani perception towards Russia. A new awareness emerged that is forging a warm and meaningful relationship with Russia. Moreover, British before leaving the sub-continent left the transfer of power tainted with Kashmir dispute—over which wars have been fought—still manifesting itself. The great tragedy of Kashmir’s contested fate in the inelegant partition of 1947 sets the brooding tone of Pakistan’s foreign policy since 1949 (Wayne, 1978: 158). Kashmir continues to be the centre of gravity of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Structurally, both India and Pakistan were not like new nation-states, rather the two were and still are burdened with the imperial legacies of the bygone centuries and have been living with it since last seven decades. Historically, the Indians had never guessed how much the killings and the crisis in Kashmir would embitter relationship (Singh, 2009: 458). The Indian bifurcation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into two union-territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, plus the repealing of the Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution (The Constitution of India, 2019), implying annexation, displayed the Indian hegemonic bent, not to mention the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization order and the domicile issue. The overloaded circuitry of relationship is now linked with a headway on Kashmir and the final resolution of the dispute. Besides, the Sino-Indian conflict over McMahon Line, rooted again in the British legacy, flared-up too up in the mountains. The clashes in the Karakoram and Himalayan Ranges indicated The Dialogue 135 Volume 16 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2021 The Frontier Policy Saeeda, Waqas, Khalil the Sino-Indian conflict of interests, as opposed to the Sino-Pak convergence of interests. The British Frontier Policy Legacy The idea of frontiers is vital in statecraft. It remains intact despite globalization. The frontiers were also important for the British in 19th century India. It led to the Frontier Policy for two centuries. One could argue and make a very plausible case that Pakistan is the legatee of Mughal frontier policy, but the more direct continuities are clearly with the imperial pattern worked out in the mid-19thcentury (Embree, 1978: 2). The important aspect was the awareness that British India needed not one but three frontiers. Lord Curzon seems first to have used the phrase, ‘the threefold frontier’ (Curzon, 1907: 4). Though, the elaboration of the idea of three-fold frontier, as a concept, was done by the influential British statesmen Sir Henry Rawlinson,§ and Sir Alfred Lyall.** Both were prominent in the British policy and decision-making circles, and had a grip over the understanding of the importance of frontiers for nations. The perception was that India needed a ‘Frontier of Separation’, and not a ‘Frontier of Contact’, in the context of expanding Czarist and British Empires in India and Central Asia. For Rawlinson, the important fact was the simultaneous expansion of the Indian and Russian Empires, so that ‘instead of two empires being divided by half the continent of Asia, as of old, there is now intervening between their political frontiers a mere narrow strip of territory, a few hundred miles across’ (Rawlinson, 1875: 141). The contact had to be avoided. The Russians coming into contact with Indians, mainly the Muslims, was a dangerous proposition for the British. This was the point to which Rawlinson often returned, emphasizing that the Muslims of North India especially had an undying hatred of the British (Rawlinson, 1875). The operationalization of ‘Frontier of Separation’ required barriers and buffers, and most of all formal agreements and obligations. For Sir Alfred Lyall, the true frontier was not coterminous with the limits of territory actually administered by the Government of British India (Lyall, 1891: 315). Further west of the administered territory was the ‘frontier of influence’ which in the perception of administrators was vital for the security of British India. The political influence required an exercise of authority and power in this frontier region, but not an administrative control. And the forward edge of this frontier had to be a demarcated boundary. The then Durand Line which in 1947 became Pak-Afghan border is demarcated; whereas, McMahon Line between China and India § Sir Henry Rawlinson (1810-1895), who went to India in 1827, was later a member of parliament. He served in the India Council and had, in addition to these posts, a forum for his views as President of the Royal Asiatic Society and Royal Geographic Society. ** Sir Alfred Lyall (1835-1911), was Foreign Secretary of the Government of India and Lieutenant General of the North-West Provinces. The Dialogue 136 Volume 16 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2021 The Frontier Policy Saeeda, Waqas, Khalil is delimited.††Beyond the demarcated the then Durand Line was the protectorate State of Afghanistan as the third frontier. Historically, the PakAfghan problems are rooted in the legacy of the British Frontier Policy i.e., ‘the three-fold frontier’. The burden of the legacy continues to afflict the region and beyond. Afghanistan remains a regional strategic-turf with far reaching extra-regional implications. The British Foreign Policy Legacy Other than the Frontier Policy, an additional aspect of the British legacy impacting Pakistan is the 19th century British foreign policy. This foreign policy connection is an indirect one, as opposed to the direct connection of the Frontier Policy. The primary legate of the 19th century British foreign policy is India and the result has been that Pakistan is affected by this imperial legacy in foreign policy, as mediated by the new Government of India (Embree, 1978: 15). The foreign policy of 19thcentury British India was of a state with strong centre and tremendous resources plus an administrative and security apparatus at its disposal. The strategic and economic domination of the surrounding countries and turning them into protectorate states was understandable in the context of imperialist expansion of the British India. The British expanded and benefited to the tune of $45 trillion by monopolizing trade and commerce (Hickel, 2018), not to mention the loot, plunder and exploitation. The first characteristic of that British foreign policy can be labelled as ‘expansionism’, a tendency to move outward from the original base in Bengal until all the sub-continent was brought under the influence of the Government of British India (Hickel, 2018). The expansion of the British Indian Empire and ‘the search for frontier’ took British deep into the northwest mountains that resulted in the birth of Frontier Policy. Sir Thomas Holdich, with an extensive experience of northwest mountains, said ‘peace could only be assured by a boundary that put a definite edge to the national horizon, so as to limit unauthorized expansion and trespass’ (Holdich, 1916: z). The impact of that 19th century British foreign policy legacy remains till to date. Pakistan has been living with it for over seven decades. The second characteristic of the foreign policy of the Government of British India in the 19thcentury followed logically from the first: an unwillingness to permit genuinely independent countries on the borders of the territory actually administered, and that the continuities of history are not easily altered (Embree, 1978: 16). ††Demarcation means boundary marked on the map as well as on the ground, while a delimited state-line is marked only on the map. Legally, demarcation line is the line where the jurisdiction of one begins and the other ends, see Sir A. Henry McMahon, “International Boundaries,” Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 84(1935):4. Also see Rumley v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 40 N.M. 183, 190 (N.M. 1936). https://casetext.com/case/rumley-v-middle-rio-grande-conservancydist?q=Rumley%20v.%20Middle%20rio%20grande%20conservancy&p=1&tab=keyword &jxs=&sort=relevance&type=caseaccessed on 31 December2019. The Dialogue 137 Volume 16 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2021 The Frontier Policy Saeeda, Waqas, Khalil This may not be explicitly mentioned in the official documents of British India, but the policy of the three-fold frontier and the irrefutable wars and annexations were explicit enough for the historians to infer the hegemonic British policy. It is also adequate to establish linkages and connections with the post-partition hegemonic policies of the new Government of India, over the decades, towards Maldives, Tibet, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Yet another manifestation of an intended hegemony was the implied annexation of Jammu and Kashmir, plus Ladakh by repealing the constitutional clauses, in addition to the annexations after the partition in 1947 i.e., the states of Hyderabad Deccan, Junagarh and Mizoram etc. Pakistan lives with the realities that link it with the great transformations that took place in the 19th century British India (Embree, 1978: 17). Still, the paradigm shift transpired. The New Frontier Policy The foreign policy of the former Soviet Union towards South Asia had three conflicts at its roots that included animosity with Washington and Beijing, plus Afghanistan. Also, the Taliban government in Afghanistan was a source of serious friction between Pakistan and the Russian Federation. Earlier, for the defence of British India and later Pakistan, a Russian invasion of Afghanistan was the biggest threat to the stability and dominance of British interests over the Russians in Central Asia (Alam, 2019). Britain and Russia perceived Central Asia as a strategic-turf for the Great Game they played between themselves in the 19th century. Pakistan inherited this problem as the British exited the scene in 1947, and ever since, Pakistan’s army has relied on the old British Indian army policy of garrisoning the ‘Frontier’ (Alam, 2019). Thus, the Frontier Policy worked during the Cold War and afterwards. However, it became clear by mid-2018 that Pakistan has reversed the almost 200-years-old British era Frontier Policy and replaced it with the New Frontier Policy. The historical perception, initially British and later Pakistani, perceiving Russians as adversaries was replaced with a new Pakistani perception perceiving Russians as strategic partners. Pakistan’s erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were merged into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and elections too were held. Additionally, the relationship with Russia warmed, impacting positively in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The things have come full circle. The Pak-Russian relationship is ascending to a higher level of reach and grasp; economically, strategically, and culturally. The idea of power continues to flow in the reverse direction, as opposed to the Mughal era. So far, the five military exercises between the Special Forces of Pakistan and Russia (Russian troops land in Pakistan to participate in ‘Druzhba 5’ exercise, 2020), the acquisition of Russian gunships (Gady, 2018), military deals and the intelligence cooperation are indicators of a ripening strategic relationship. The training of Pakistani armed forces The Dialogue 138 Volume 16 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2021 The Frontier Policy Saeeda, Waqas, Khalil officers in the Russian military institutions is an additional, compared to the US International Military Education and Training Programme (IMET). Plus, the $10.3 billion agreements signed between the two countries in the various fields in November 2019 indicated the new strategic partnership (Bhutta, 2019). Pakistan has also signed an off-shore gas-pipeline deal with Russia (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2018-2019: 121). The energy cooperation and trade will further expand and cement the relationship. The Russo-Pak security interests are converging south of Amu River and west of Indus in Afghanistan. The strategic-entente forged in the greater context of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is autonomous and strategically meaningful. Russia joining the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with a naval base on the Pakistani coastline will be a strategic-icing on the cake in the gestalt context of the New Frontier Policy. Pakistanis, Chinese, Russians, Iranians, Turks and the Central Asians have the same strategic perception, as opposed to the Indo-US. It is a widely accepted fact in American military circles that the Russians and the Iranians are following the Pakistani policy of supporting the Afghan Taliban (Alam, 2019). The Pak-Russian paradigm shifts are rooted in the US occupation of Afghanistan. Americans in the region had to be tackled by forging a new awareness, plus a new transformation and becoming. Still, the inevitability that the Iranians will back the Northern Alliance (NA) after the US military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the possibility remains. And the assassination of Qasim Soleimani (Crowley et al, 2020) and the killing of ‘D’ Andrea’ (Coll, 2018) and associates in the ‘E-11 Bombardier crash’ (IFP Editorial Staff, 2020), altered the strategic environment from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea. The American presence in Afghanistan was perceived as a threat for the security of Pakistan, China and Russia, so the coming together of the three over Afghanistan. For Afghanistan after 9/11 had become a vital part of American schemes of worldwide power projection, a foothold for the United States to challenge Russia and China in the 21st century (Coll, 2018: 375). The Russian overtures began in 2002 when the Indo-Pak armies were squared-off against each other in Kashmir. President Putin during his visit to Kazakhstan in a speech at Almaty in 2002 offered to host both Pakistan and India to negotiate reducing tensions and draw-down of the troops concentrated on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir (Traynor et al, 2002). Subsequently, President Musharraf of Pakistan visited Moscow (2003) and the visit resulted in a strategically meaningful intelligence cooperation that goes on to this day. The strategic agreement between Pakistan and Uzbekistan followed in 2005, after Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were encouraged by the Russians to begin cooperation with the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Following which Pakistan signed an agreement with Uzbekistan on fighting terrorism (Pakistan pledges to fight Uzbek terrorists, 2005). The Dialogue 139 Volume 16 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2021 The Frontier Policy Saeeda, Waqas, Khalil Pakistan has since developed meaningful relations with the CARs. The CARs are also a major potential market for Pakistani agricultural and industrial products, along with Pakistan’s interest in the import of oil and gas from Central Asia (Baumer, 2018: 233). Besides, the landlocked Central Asian fossil-carbon exporters sought export opportunities in the energy hungry and emerging countries like Pakistan and India as well as an access to the Indian Ocean (Baumer, 2018: 233). Pakistan has assured Uzbekistan of complete access to Pakistani ports (Syed, 2021a: 1). The reversal of the adversarial relationship between Pakistan and Russia is now complete and both are cooperating in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Afghan Taliban in August 2018 made a first public visit to Uzbekistan to discuss the security in the region (Mackenzie, 2018). Also, the Russian diplomacy compered peace talks at Moscow by hosting the Afghan Taliban and others (Roth, 2018). Subsequently, Russia held a meeting of ‘extended troika’ on the peaceful settlement in Afghanistan at Moscow (Syed, 2021b: 14). Russia and Pakistan have forged a strategic relationship that will impact the world in general and the region in particular. Pakistan can learn a lot from Russians, especially their wisdom and hybrid warfare skills. More interesting will be Russia becoming part of CPEC to expand the finale to the Indian Ocean where the New Great Game will come to an end. The finale of the New Great Game is irreversible. The basis of these developments are the transformed Pakistani and Russian perceptions. All the signs and symbols are pointing in the direction of the New Frontier Policy. The decades-old animosity is gone. A paradigm shift has happened. Kremlin is all praise for the efforts of Pakistan Army against terrorism. Russians know how to play it. The floating-away of Pakistan from America is evident, despite the US-Taliban Doha Agreement. Earlier, Pakistan had cautioned the US to quickly clinch the deal with the Taliban. The need to have tribal-areas is buried, and the post-elections political process is already in place after the merger of the erstwhile FATA (The Constitution of Pakistan, 2018). Additional economic and administrative reforms will take time, though geo-politically and geo-strategically it is settled. Still, Pakistan must guard against a major instigated backlash in the erstwhile FATA and Balochistan. For the tactical violence, west of Indus continues with no let-up in sight. The many cooks in the broth makes it murky too. The uncertainty persists and the murkiness remains. Conclusion The problem in the north-west was complex. It is not different today. The threat of induced reaction remains. British handled the mixture operationally, administratively, diplomatically and with wisdom. The perception was that ‘no man who has read a page of Indian history will ever prophecy about the frontier’ (Swinson, 1967: 344). The idea behind the imperial effort was to have an ideal strategic-frontier in the north-west The Dialogue 140 Volume 16 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2021 The Frontier Policy Saeeda, Waqas, Khalil of India. Pakistan too, since decades has been struggling with the idea of stable strategic-frontiers, both in the east and west. For, Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace, of life or death to the nations (Davies, 1975: 1), e.g., the Kashmir dispute. The British were also conscious of the fact that the frontier had to be in harmony with the political, ethnic and geographical realities of the region. The British felt threatened from Russia but the German challenge led to an agreement on Central Asia in 1907. The NorthWest Frontier of British India was between the Russians in Central Asia and the British in India; what can be stated without any fear of contradiction that the most prolific cause of strife between nations has been this vexed question of frontiers (Davies, 1975: 1). It is true-plus for Pakistan in this post-truth era. Pakistan with its back towards India in the east, as a result of following the Frontier Policy in the west for seven decades, has paid the price in blood and treasure including the domestic disharmony. Pakistan literally lived with the Frontier Policy for decades, and at great costs. No more, for the paradigm shift has taken place for the reasons of history and in the context of new realignments taking place in the realm of Eurasian competition between the great powers. The strategic-equation in gestation is the Indo-US-JapanAustralia, as opposed to the China-Pakistan-Iran-Russia. If the west of Indus and Afghanistan is settled strategically and politically, Pakistan will be free to face India in the east, not to mention the benefits resulting from the enterprises with China, Russia, Iran and CARs. The Indian pursuit of hegemony in South Asia continues. The Indo-Pak strategic struggle is central to it. Also, it now involves nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The jury is still out. India has pushed the envelope by the war in Kashmir. The two nuclear-armed nations are just one big trigger event away from war (Kugelman, 2019). The Indian constitutional move, in the context of Kashmir dispute, has ensured the continuing competition between India and Pakistan. Likewise, in Afghanistan and elsewhere as well. And the Indian strategic relationship with America has got on better and better (India, US ink $3 billion defense deals, negotiations on for trade deal, 2020). India is anchored in the legacy of British imperial foreign policy. India will have to be at peace with itself first, before it is at peace with its neighbours. Psychologically, India has not been able to break the shackles of one thousand years of subjugation. What’s more, India and its Afghan allies were dismayed over the idea of American withdrawal from Afghanistan. The expectations remained that the Americans will not withdraw. The pause in the US-Taliban negotiations by President Trump created a situation before the talks were resumed and the resultant Doha Truce-Agreement. And whereas the Indo-US-Israeli nexus is a challenge for Pakistan, ‘curious is the deal between the Saudi Aramco and the Indian The Dialogue 141 Volume 16 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2021 The Frontier Policy Saeeda, Waqas, Khalil Reliance’ (Khan, 2019). The less said about the Saudi and Emeriti callousness towards the Palestinians and Kashmiris, the better it is. Iran, India and the US had supported the NA operationally and financially in the civil-war of the 1990s. The Indo-US support base for the NA and National Directorate of Security (NDS) of Afghanistan is much stronger compared to the 1990s. Nevertheless, Iran is on the opposite side of the equation, though it refused to attend the Sino-Pak-Russian-American meeting at Beijing that recognized Pakistan’s centrality to the Afghan conflict. The declining of the invitation to attend the Beijing meeting was an indicator of Iran keeping all the options open in the event of American withdrawal. The assassination of the Iranian commander Qasim Soleimani sparked deep concerns about the prospects of the peace process in Afghanistan (Naila & Hussein, 2020). Afghans of all shades and colours, since long, have prepared themselves for the post-American civil war. The trickiest of all is the intraAfghan dialogue. If the intra Afghan-dialogue fails, it will be worse than what happened in the 1990s. The idea that a regional-power can harmonize divergent interests of great powers is a diplomatic and strategic puzzle. It is a challenge in a tough neighbourhood entailing cautious optimism. And as the plot thickens, Pakistan is not banking on others’ prudence. It hopes for the best, but is prepared for the worst. Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan are converging with China and Russia. India, other than the political, intelligence, military and cultural investments, has $3 billion commercial investments in Afghanistan. ‘Connect Central Asia’ is its Structural Framework via Iran and Afghanistan. The Indian investment in the Iranian Port of Chabahar is meant to link with Central Asia. India, NDS and the NA are resisting the Taliban reality in Afghanistan. For the compromises were humbling for the US and quite unsettling for its Afghan allies (Bishara, 2020). In Real World, diplomacy relies on the balance of forces on ground. However, the big question after the Biden Administration declared to review the deal with the Taliban is: Why Americans negotiated with the Taliban? Americans definitely wanted to understand their enemy better. And the new American proposal asking Turkey to hold a regional conference on Afghanistan under the UN has the potential to hinder the peace process. Besides, the feuding political leadership in Kabul makes it extremely difficult to reach a political settlement. The optics too are discouraging in the midst of a high-stakes poker. To triangulate truce into peace is a geo-political and geo-strategic challenge. The undertones are not satisfactory. The nuances are elusive. The trust deficit persists. The strategic and operational environment is provocative. The provocations are many and daily. The violence is unceasing. The hypothesis remains that the conflict in Afghanistan will go on until the emergence of a victor. 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