Sino Vietnamese Relations and Issues

Tallinn University School of Governance, Law, and Society International Relations Sino-Vietnamese Relations and Issues Gizem ASLANYÜREK India and China in the World Politics RIR.7010 Terry McDonald Tallinn 2020 Introduction China and Vietnam are sharing great historical background and common heritage. For almost ten centuries from 3 B.C. to 1000 A.D., China was controlling the Vietnamese land with the direct rule China, and assimilated culture and intervened land by China as well. However, even though this long occupation Vietnamese nation could maintain their nationalistic ideology and seek for the full independence from China. “To the Vietnamese, the years of Chinese rule and domination is a reminder of Vietnam’s weakness and vulnerability vis-a-vis its huge neighbor” states (Ang, 2002). This indicates the asymmetric relation of both countries and the difficulties Vietnam has been facing. The most prominent feature of this relation comes from the conjunction of geographical proximity. Additionally, the nature of China, different ideological configurations, and the external influence on the region, such as the USA as the most important actor have increased the tension during the history and yet main conflict topic of Southeast Asian islands issue has not been resolved. Therefore, interplay of history, and geopolitical and geo-economics maneuvers have contributed to the tension and the cooperation between both countries at the same time which can be potentially destructive and constructive, depends on the management capabilities of both countries. The first torch has been fired between the two countries with the war had begun with Chinese attack on Vietnamese land. The bilateral relationship deteriorated from one of “comradeships plus brotherhood” to one between “the most direct and most dangerous enemies.” (Cheng, 2011). During the high tension of history between the two countries, there is a very prominent period that initiated the normalization process and negotiations has become the major objective of the resolution. The secret meeting between General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee (VCPCC) Nguyen Van Linh, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Do Muoi, and advisor to the VCPCC Pham Van Dong went to Chengdu in China to meet their counterparts, Chinese Communist Party (CPC) General Secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng has initiated the path for normalization and cooperation. Even though they have not resolved all conflicts, at least, they managed to settle the land border and maritime border conflict. However, increasing anti-Chinese demonstrations in Vietnam, and unresolved biggest conflict area the islands dispute continues to maintain the tension high. Nonetheless, the normalization and cooperation period has shifted the focus on the relation from military action to strategic considerations such as economic and development factors which significantly have become more prominent. From Political Role to the Conflict When we look at the Chinese-Vietnamese conflict, it is crucial to put Chinese historical and moral background into the consider to be able to analyze the situation more objectively. According to Harnish, Bersick, and Gottwald (2016), hard choices and changes between conflicting domestic and external expectations characterized the PRC’s regional and international role behavior. They assume that many Chinese role of the conflicts roots in allocation of values and resources and international order which refers to the USA at that time as the center stage of international institutions. The first role seeking attempts initiate during the reform period of Maoist where China is also seeking for the primarily domestic and regional stability. Afterwards, the split of Soviet Union led a revolutionary policy role concept which aims to develop the bipolar social structure to prevent the super power’s influence upon region. This political maneuver was followed with economic implementations is called export-driven economy which led the integration to liberal economic order. Another and most important challenge for China was increasing dependency on international order which utilize mostly by the Western powers to influence the other regions. Therefore, this growing dependence on a more volatile post-Cold War international environment pushed China to have relative diffusion to influence and shape the foreign events more independently which is also crucial to maintain the legitimacy of the government domestically speaking (Sebastian Harnisch, 2016). Emerging powers such as China, regularly face role conflicts because roles ascribed by others and roles actually held by China demand contradicting role behavior (Thies, 2013). As a result of this international situation led China to facilitate more major gains and stabilize and balance the Chinese international order and the US-led international order (Oksenberg, 1999). Therefore, China claimed the great power, developing country status with various forms of Chinese exceptionalism (Zhang 2013a) not only domestic level but also regional and international level which caused to set several diverse partners ended up in conflict such as Vietnam. The conflict between Vietnam and China coincides with post-Cold War period of Chinese development and role seeking attempts as explained above. While China was forming its role, it also sought to expand the controlling areas related with crucial crossways, seas, territories or resources. The conflict between China and Vietnam initiated with border conflict along with Hanoi in 1979, which also China attacked the Paracel Islands during the 1970s. Besides this first attempt, the attacks kept continuing to another country located in the disputed area. Regarding this, it is appropriate to say that the dispute has begun as a result of the sovereignty issue. As the main conflict area with Vietnam is the control of island and sea road, this topic also involves into the South China Sea dispute. There are three main subjects which cause the dispute among the South China Sea countries such as sovereignty claims, natural resources, and control which means the military activities and naval presence (Dutton, 2011). The first territory claim has begun between China and Vietnam for the Paracel Island located approximately 150 miles southwest of Hainan Island which is also claimed both countries, and the Spratly Islands located around 700 miles south of the Chinese mainland also claimed by both countries (Hyer, 2018). In 1992 in order to clarify the Chinese claims of sovereignty over all the islands, China enacted the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone which specify the features of the islands which is called U-shaped line with the involvement of the Pratas Islands, the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands and reasons why they belong to China based on China’s historical background (Dutton, 2011). The main reason behind this territorial claim lies down Chinese economic interests. According to the statistical research (2011), in 2009 China became the second largest oil consumer after the USA and its consumption is likely to double by 2030 and would make China the world’s largest oil consumer. In 2010, China important 66% of its oil from the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Angola. For this reason, it has been diversifying its energy supplies to reduce its dependence on oil imports and has sought to increase offshore production (Administration, 2011). Moreover, Vietnam is the major oil producer by Petro Vietnam state-based oil company which is producing 26% of Vietnam's total production (News, 2011). The territorial sovereignty and sea control claims have a jurisdictional background which is derived from the general provisions of the 1983 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, the territorial claims firstly had undermined the jurisdictional provisions for decades. China has occupied the disputed areas and rejected the international law provisions follow in the wake as administerial power. One of the biggest reasons this opposition to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is the regression of the great power's both military and administrative factors in particular Russia and the USA (Hyer, 2018). Moreover, Chinese intention to be regional power by Chinese regional integration and administrative power upon the asserted territories and sea, and the regression of the great powers from the disputed sea has opened a free path for China to show military activity and establish naval presence. USA recently has stepped up its military activity and naval presence in the region with the discourse of freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019) as a representative of UNCLOS in order to consolidate and to ensure the existence of exclusive economic zone which means common usage of the South China Sea. The alter casting attempt of Chinese weaker and stronger partners has led China to designate pattern of counter-role, ranging from acceptance to outright defiance (Sebastian Harnisch, 2016), which still keeps the conflict ongoing between Vietnam and China as the biggest obstacle for cooperation. Normalization with Cooperation Before the cooperation began, the first attempt was to normalize relations and reduce the tension level to be able to adjust to the current situation of the international politics and order at that time particularly from Chinese side as China has been aiming to increase its regional and global power and present different approach of super power objectives. Even though the strategic and theoretical part will be covered in theory chapter, it has to be said that Chinese great shift from hard power structure to soft power with more diplomacy and negotiations attempt underlies with the understanding of globalization and change in the intention of stronger countries all over the world with more liberal moral orders. First time in January 1989, the Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem visited China to discuss the Cambodian issue (Moreau, 1989, p.38). It continued with the socialist countries leaders meeting in October 1989 that Vietnam stated “hoped to improve relations with China as soon as possible.” The major restoration of good friendship and neighborliness along with construction of mutual trust has initiated after 1990s (Yu, 2003). Government in an attempt to define the relation respectively released 6 Joint Declarations in 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1999, and 2000 through 219 visits continuously. In 1994 Jiang Zemin as Party general secretary and state president visited Hanoi and set the principles of bilateral relationship with the quote of “clarify the direction, proceed step by step, accord priority to the macro-situation, and consult in a friendly manner” (Guanxi, 1994). The second and more comprehensive period of cooperation started in 1999 with the SinoVietnamese Joint Statement signed by general secretaries to set new principles of bilateral relations with the quote of “long-term stability, facing the future, good-neighborliness and friendship, and comprehensive cooperation” (Ribao, 1999). When Jiang visited Hanoi in February 2002, he elaborated: “In the development of Sino-Vietnamese relations, mutual trust is the foundation, long-term stability is the prerequisite, good-neighborliness and friendship are the guarantees, comprehensive cooperation is the linkage, and mutual development and prosperity are the objectives”. At the end of 1999, the definition of the permanent border treaty was concluded, and one year later the border treaty defines the Beibu Gulf border was signed along with fishery cooperation decision. In 2000, during the visit of Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong to China, they announced the comprehensive cooperation in the new century (Ribao, 2000). The last focus on cooperation was economy. The ideological background of being two largest socialist country, the cultural proximity and heritage, and the resolution of some initial conflicts such as border dispute has eased the economic cooperation between the two countries. On the other hand, impressive growth of Chinese economy and its reforms and opening to the global level promised a potential alternative model to Vietnam. In 1991, China has changed its foreign policy discourses along with the Chinese exceptionalism through the respect to independence and autonomy, complete equality, mutual respect, and mutual non-interference with the declaration of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Guanxi, 1994). Economic exchanges and bilateral trade rapidly improved the normalization and cooperation process. Trade increased from $32.23 million in 1991 to $2.466 billion in 2000, surpassing the target of $2 billion set by the premiers of the two governments in 1998 in Beijing (Zhongheng, 2002). Moreover, Chinese corporations invested over 80 projects in Vietnam which cost around $180 million that even China offered interest-free loans amounting around $45 million. This expansion through trade and economic exchange supported with infrastructures. By the beginning of the millennium, China was able to spread the mutual trust with very reasonable degree. On the other hand, during these implementations, Vietnam’s rapid economic development enabled to establish a regional role which can form an encounter to China although the asymmetric situation is very visible in the region. After the Vietnamese membership of ASEAN, economic openness to the world has given the advantage to Vietnam to be able to settle economic agreements, mutual tradeship and economic competence. Therefore, China where is seeking to maintain its realpolitik by altering the political economy strategies has had to follow the cooperation and negotiation as a tool to impact on the region. Finally, in 2009, China and Vietnam have permanently concluded the border agreement which the period until 2010 was designated as the year of China-Vietnam friendship. It is crucial to note that all these cooperation negotiations and implementations has been done during the USA’s recession period where there was no any external impact on the region. Therefore, after this period, the realization of the Chinese increasing influence on the region and Chinese attempt to control the South China Sea and islands has led the USA existence in the region through FONOP operations along with UN Security Council Law that requires Economic Exclusive Zone in the particular area. Moreover, the ongoing disputes such as islands and sea controlling have also created an objection between China and Vietnam to form fully diplomatic relations with mutual trust. Vietnam’s political proximity to the USA also has provoked China to establish more naval presence to utilize the hard power. In this case, it is hard to say that maintain the good friendship and neighborliness policy was fully accomplished, instead the political proximity gap has increased. However, Chinese big infrastructure initiation The Belt and Road Initiative has opened a new page in terms of cooperation. Currently, Vietnam is the part of the project and willing to cooperate with China due to the great advantages of the project. On the other hand, it is still vague the level of cooperation that China and Vietnam can pursue to unresolved, big conflicts between them. At a certain point, Vietnam cannot afford the full rivalry with China due to geographical structure and Chinese economic success, but at the same time Vietnam cannot also afford to fully depend on the cooperation with China to improve its political position and economy due to the mutual distrust. Theory of Combined Asymmetry with Chinese Exceptionalism As Womack (2010, 3-4) argues the asymmetric theory has three dimensions which first asymmetric relations are resilient as stated “even though by definition the smaller side cannot be an equal challenger to the larger, it is far more difficult than the differences in capacity would suggest for the larger side to force its will on the smaller. The reason is that, in a conflict, the smaller side is mortally threatened and thus can mobilize its entire strength, while the larger side is engaged in a “small war” for limited objectives and can be frustrated by the cost of persistence”. Therefore, the asymmetric difference between China and Vietnam is visible in terms of magnitude and scale. Second, the creation of the perspective differs mentioned as “the larger side has less to gain or lose in the relationship, and usually has more important concerns, both foreign and domestic. The smaller side is more exposed to opportunities and risks and has less control over the relationship.” Third, the asymmetry creates different attention as larger side is more attentive to the specific situation whereas weaker party has no that much intention. As Womack argues (2010, 4) “the larger side will tend to operate in terms of strategic relationships of friendship, normalcy, or hostility, while the smaller will be more agile and less trusting of the overall climate of the relationship”. The objectives of the asymmetric theory are clearly visible in the Sino-Vietnamese relations where China has less to lose than Vietnam but also Vietnam maintains its strategic importance for China. Firstly, Vietnam as sharing long conflict history, apart from the other Southeast Asian countries seen as the major buffer against the Chinese hegemony (Strasakova, 2017). This creates the importance for China to keep the diplomatic relations with Vietnam functional in order to stable relations with ASEAN and stability in general in the region. Moreover, Vietnam is the third most populous country in the region which also opens the path to Southeast Asia for China. So, keep the relations on track in terms of good friendship and neighborliness with negotiations, agreements and cooperation do not only advantage through Chinese claims over Vietnam, but also it creates potential for China to influence the whole region. Furthermore, due to similar economic conditions, low transportation cost, and consumer cultures, Vietnam plays an important role in China’s economic and energy security (Dosch and Vuving 2008, 1718). Chinese foreign policy toward Vietnam seeks to boost the economic cooperation and encourage Vietnam give preferential treatment to Chinese products and business, encourage Hanoi to pursue Chinese policies and interests such as Taiwan and terrorism in Xinjiang and so on, safeguard its interests in territorial disputes with Vietnam with special emphasis on the South China Sea, and more importantly keep Vietnam away from other external actors particularly the USA (Dosch and Vuving 2008, 17-18) which are the reason China pursue visa-vis relation and seek to maintain Vietnam in China’s orbit to ease the control without damaging the mutual trust. On the other hand, Vietnam’s relation with China is still uncertain. Even though, on the one hand, China is a worthy model to follow, on the other hand, it has been always perceived the threat to survival of Vietnam. As Kaplan points out the “Vietnamese fear of China is profound precisely because Vietnam cannot escape from the embrace of its gargantuan northern neighbor, whose population is fifteen times that of Vietnam. Vietnamese know that geography dictates the terms of their relationship with China: they may win the battle, but then they are off to Beijing to pay tribute” (Kaplan 2014, 56). As Vietnam has an important position in Chinese economy, China has a crucial role as well in the economic development of Vietnam which creates mutual interest and a reason to cooperate, and also Vietnam needs China to maintain its own legitimacy by bandwagoning (Vuving, 2008). Asymmetric relation that China relies on the cooperation with Vietnam due to the reasons mentioned above, can be related with Chinese exceptionalism as well. Chinese exceptionalism is basically based on the Chinese foreign policy discourses which are derived from historical experience, national image, and political and cultural traditions (Zhang, 2011). It is seen as a more defense-oriented mindset and foreign policy in the past decades in terms of neoTianxiaism which means "all under heaven”. Neo-Tianxiaism indicates the Chinese heaven with the rhetoric of peaceful development and harmonious world. Regarding described above, this is based on the discourse of Sinocentrism, simply China's centrality and superiority (Zhang, 2011). When we link the Sinocentrism and Tianxiaism, it shows the background of Confucian moral authority (administrative control) over the known world (the tianxia) as they identify themselves as the "Son of Heaven" which means China is the culturally, morally, materially recognized center of the world and superior. There are also newly emerged foreign policy discourses as great power reformism, benevolent pacifism, and harmonious inclusionism which refer the peaceful rise of China. Great power reformism implies China as a great power status with unique qualities. At this point, China shows Western theory and practices as a philosophy need to be surpassed and strive for a peaceful and harmonious world with the win-win strategy rather than the zero-sum game. To wrap up, contemporary Chinese rhetoric has shifted to more peaceful discourse which seeks for negotiation and cooperation to maintain stability in the region in general. Therefore, the features of the asymmetric theory and Chinese exceptionalism overlapping in terms of Chinese interest to pursue its rising without any regional or external interruption by not repeating the same mistakes previous powerful countries did during the rising power process. Future Projections The Belt and Road Initiative: The cooperation and Chinese giant infrastructure project and its benefits to Vietnam is the crucial future prospect to evaluate as after the normalization period the cooperation had a boost. China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner currently. In 2001, bilateral trade amounted to $3 billion, but it exceeded almost $40 billion by 2012, and reached almost $96 billion in 2015 (Thayer, 2016). Vietnam imports more goods from China than from any other country: mainly machinery, refined oil and steel, cotton, fertilizer, pesticides, electronics, leather and a large number of various kinds of consumer goods (Strasakova, 2017). Vietnam also supplies China with unrefined oil, coal and rubber (Kaplan 2014, 63). Not only Vietnam is willing to cooperate with China, but also China is willing to cooperate clearly as strategy to reorient the Chinese domestic economy structure by developing connectivity and cooperation (Strasakova, 2017). Discussions on Vietnam ś inclusion into China's planned Maritime Silk Road Initiative (within the BRI) took place for the first time during Prime Minister's Li Keqiang's visit to Hanoi in late 2013, during which the two sides pledged to further boost their economic relations (Hiebert 2015, 10). Both sides have agreed to construct Chineseinvested industrial zone in Vietnam and implement trade corridor. On the occasion, Hu noted that the BRI initiative would bring “new momentum to bilateral relations and create a broader platform for cooperation” (Chinadaily.com.cn, 2015). In addition, Xi Jinping pushed for a stronger partnership between China and Vietnam to be achieved through the full implementation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), upgrading the China- ASEAN free trade agreement, and making progress on trade negotiations with the RCEP. (Sutter and Huang 2016, 68). Currently, the expansion of Sino-Vietnamese relations and cooperation with possible outcomes cannot be evaluated yet due to the uncertainty of the project as well but this project enhanced the ties and plays an important role to decrease the tension for ongoing conflict subject. Therefore, as Le Hong Hiep already pointed out (2013, 346) Beijing cannot resort to taking advantage of imposing economic sanctions on Vietnam, as it would involve potential costs damaging the economies of China’s southern provinces as well as industries exporting to Vietnam. So, the project provides an accurate area for potential cooperation in the future. It is accurate to say that as long as there will not be any Chinese hard power policies replacing the economic strategies, the cooperation and the relation between both countries will continue. Hedging: According to Womack, there are two measures, how to neutralize potential conflict in the asymmetrical relationship. One is embedded in proper formulation of the conflicting issues. As he argues if “the problem is formulated in terms of common interests, then the two states are more likely to work side by side” (Womack 2006, 90). The second method of neutralizing conflicting issues is to create joint commissions of experts to hand common problems in order to institutionalize and routinize unforeseen problems (Womack 2006, 90) which means that in order to resolve the problems building confidence and good intention is necessary. As he also states, “commonsense expectations are set by what is familiar and what has happened before” (2016). So, actually cooperation with China and also balancing Chinese power with external powers is Vietnam’s ongoing strategy in order to improve the economic structure and possible increase of Vietnamese vulnerability due to vis-a-vis China. Vietnam is expecting to strengthen its trade with the U.S., to furnish high protection of Vietnam’s principal export articles, to provide a stronger competitive position in industries, where China’s competitive edge was growing weaker, to enable high domestic protection as well as enlarge the country’s principal production clusters (Petri, Plummer and Zhai 2011, 51). Moreover, also reducing the high reliance on the US, Vietnam is participating in the talks of FTA between ASEAN which FTA partners (Japan, China, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, and India) are known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that pursues the economic collaboration. Conclusion The tension between China and Vietnam derives from very old history of disputes which is still the fiercest conflict in Southeast Asian region. However, along with the changes in the power politics during post-cold War, Chinese foreign policy intentions have changed. Firstly, the aim of seeking independence and survive in the Western-dominated, realist world order has shifted to be the power who dominate the world with the changes in the world order and international politics. Therefore, according to a new strategy of China, it initiated to seek for cooperation and good relations particularly in its region and neighboring countries who also hold a crucial position both geopolitically and geo economically. Due to the shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics, the matter of developing the economic structure has become the prominent aim for almost all countries. Regarding this, Vietnam also has begun to seek for improving the economic structure and have some crucial role in the international position. Therefore, Vietnam is also aware of the necessity to cooperate with China without a full hostility between which led the normalization and cooperation period. Even though this period was the initiation of the cooperation, currently, cooperation enhanced to greater level in terms of softening the tension and balancing the great power for Vietnam. Lastly, the Belt and Road Initiative has provided the boost of economic cooperation and political relations to deepen. The cooperation and interests of both countries have mutual interest regarding the asymmetric theory which both countries aim to benefit from each other without neglecting the mutual distrust. At this point, the balancing strategy occurs from Vietnamese side by having close relations with the USA as well. References Administration, E. (2011). China and BP Energy Outlook 2030. U.S. Energy Information Administration. Ang, C. G. (2002). Vietnam-China relations since the end of the cold war. Nanyang Technological University. Cheng, J. (2011). Sino-Vietnamese Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century. Asian Survey, vol.51, no.2, pp.379-405. Chinadaily.com.cn. (2015). 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