Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws

J Value Inquiry (2013) 47:67–85 DOI 10.1007/s10790-013-9384-y Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws Noriaki Iwasa Published online: 16 July 2013  Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 1 Introduction Immanuel Kant’s moral thesis is that reason alone must identify moral laws.1 Examining various interpretations of his ethics, this essay shows that the thesis fails. G. W. F. Hegel criticizes Kant’s Formula of Universal Law as an empty formalism. I argue that Christine Korsgaard’s Logical Contradiction Interpretation and Practical Contradiction Interpretation cannot identify certain immoral actions. I also argue that under certain conditions, some immoral actions pass Barbara Herman’s contradiction in conception test and contradiction in will test. I show that Kenneth Westphal’s paired use of Kant’s universalization test cannot reject the immoral actions which pass those interpretations and tests. Although those schemes refute what Allen Wood calls a stronger form of the formalism charge, they are not free from a weaker form of it. Some philosophers try to avoid both forms of the formalism charge in the following ways: First, some underline the roles of Kant’s other formulas such as the Formulas of Humanity, Autonomy, and the Kingdom of Ends. Second, some interpret the Formula of Universal Law teleologically. Third, some claim that a maxim must be something all those potentially affected by it can rationally accept. Fourth, Robert Louden introduces the empirical to evaluate a maxim. I show that all those attempts introduce heteronomy into Kant’s ethics. On the third response, I also show that from the fact that all those potentially affected accept a maxim, it does not follow that it is morally right. It is impossible to avoid the formalism charge without making his ethics heteronomous. Thus, Kant’s ethics is either empty or heteronomous. Either way it fails to identify moral laws by reason alone. 1 In this essay, reason means practical reason in Kant’s sense. N. Iwasa (&) Center for General Education, University of Tokushima, Tokushima, Tokushima 770-8502, Japan e-mail: [email protected] 123 68 N. Iwasa 2 Kant’s Moral Thesis In the Groundwork, Kant distinguishes between autonomy and heteronomy of the will. The former is ‘‘the property the will has of being a law to itself (independently of every property belonging to the object of volition)’’ (G 4:440/87).2 On the other hand, according to the latter, ‘‘the will does not give itself the law, but the object does so in virtue of its relation to the will’’ (G 4:441/88). In Kant’s view, ‘‘the will is nothing but practical reason’’ (G 4:412/36). Therefore, moral laws which depend on objects other than practical reason (the will) are heteronomous. According to Kant, heteronomous principles ‘‘are either empirical or rational. The first kind, drawn from the principle of happiness, are based either on natural, or on moral, feeling. The second kind, drawn from the principle of perfection, are based either on the rational concept of perfection as a possible effect of our will or else on the concept of a self-existent perfection (God’s will) as a determining cause of our will’’ (G 4:441–42/89–90). Based on the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy, Kant claims that the ‘‘principle of autonomy is the sole principle of ethics’’ (G 4:440/88). He says, ‘‘This much only is certain: the law is not valid for us because it interests us (for this is heteronomy and makes practical reason depend on sensibility—that is to say, on an underlying feeling—in which case practical reason could never give us moral law); the law interests us because it is valid for us as men in virtue of having sprung from our will as intelligence and so from our proper self’’ (G 4:460–61/123). Thus, Kant thinks that practical reason alone should give us moral laws, that is, reason alone must identify moral laws. This essay does not examine the adequacy of this interpretation. Although other interpretations may be possible,3 the essay assumes that this is his moral thesis, and examines whether he succeeds in this point. 2 Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (London: Routledge, 2005). The first and the second page numbers respectively refer to that of the Academy edition and that of the second edition published in Kant’s lifetime. 3 For example, Kant may not hold the thesis consistently in his works. In his essay ‘‘Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality’’ (often referred to as the ‘‘Prize Essay’’), Kant praises Francis Hutcheson’s idea that moral feeling is the source of morality. But in the Prize Essay, Kant’s discussion ends inconclusively. He says, ‘‘it has yet to be determined whether it is merely the faculty of cognition, or whether it is feeling (the first inner ground of the faculty of desire) which decides its first principles [the first principle of practical philosophy].’’ Immanuel Kant, ‘‘Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality,’’ in Theoretical philosophy, 1755–1770, ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2:300. The pagination is that of the Academy edition. J. B. Schneewind claims that ‘‘Kant cannot conceive of morality except in a world structured as the Divine Corporation structures it.’’ J. B. Schneewind, ‘‘The Divine Corporation and the History of Ethics,’’ in Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, ed. Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 190. As we will see, Robert Louden’s interpretation denies that Kant holds the thesis. Henry Allison severs ‘‘the analytic connection between autonomy and moral willing,’’ so that ‘‘even heteronomous willing turns out to involve a certain kind of autonomy.’’ Henry E. Allison, Kant’s theory of freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 95. Also, John Rawls thinks that Kant is engaging in ‘‘[p]hilosophy as defense,’’ not grounding the moral law, but defending it from possible attacks. John Rawls, ‘‘Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,’’ in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 528. 123 Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws 69 3 The Formalism Charge Kant’s first principle, the Formula of Universal Law, is as follows: ‘‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’’ (G 4:421/52). In the Philosophy of Right, G. W. F. Hegel criticizes the formula, calling it ‘‘an empty formalism.’’ Kant preaches ‘‘duty for duty’s sake.’’ He defines duty ‘‘as absence of contradiction, as formal correspondence with itself.’’ According to Hegel, ‘‘if a duty is to be willed merely as a duty and not because of its content, it is a formal identity which necessarily excludes every content and determination.’’ Therefore, ‘‘it is possible to justify any wrong or immoral mode of action’’ by the Formula of Universal Law. Hegel thinks that we need to ‘‘bring in material from outside and thereby arrive at particular duties.’’ For example, to condemn theft or murder, we need to establish the idea that ‘‘property and human life should exist and be respected.’’ Hegel says, ‘‘a contradiction must be a contradiction with something, that is, with a content which is already fundamentally present as an established principle.’’4 John Stuart Mill also makes a similar remark on the Formula of Universal Law: ‘‘when he [Kant] begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct.’’5 Thus, the Formula of Universal Law, because of its lack of content, could justify so-called immoral actions under certain conditions. Many philosophers try to defend Kant’s ethics against the formalism charge. In the next three sections, I will show that some defenses are still not free from some form of the formalism charge. First, let us see Christine Korsgaard’s defense. 4 Korsgaard’s Three Interpretations Christine Korsgaard specifies three different interpretations of contradiction in the Formula of Universal Law: logical, teleological, and practical. Korsgaard finds serious problems with the first two interpretations and argues for the Practical Contradiction Interpretation. Korsgaard also distinguishes between natural actions and conventional ones. While the former and their efficacy ‘‘depend only on the laws of nature,’’ the latter and their efficacy depend on conventional practice. For example, killing belongs to natural actions, and promising belongs to conventional actions.6 According to the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, ‘‘there is something like a logical impossibility in the universalization of the maxim, or in the system of nature 4 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), sec. 135. 5 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), chap. 1, para. 4. 6 Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 85. 123 70 N. Iwasa in which the maxim is a natural law: if the maxim were universalized, the action or policy that it proposes would be inconceivable.’’7 Korsgaard points out that this interpretation accounts well for immoral conventional actions such as false promising. Because if everyone makes a false promise, no one would believe a promise, thus promising becomes meaningless. Korsgaard points out, however, that the interpretation does not account well for immoral natural actions like acts of violence. According to the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation, ‘‘it would be contradictory to will your maxim as a law for a system of nature teleologically conceived: either you are acting against some natural purpose, or your maxim could not be a teleological law. The maxim is inconsistent with a systematic harmony of purposes, or with the principle that any organ, instinct, or action-type has a natural purpose for which it must be the one best suited.’’8 An advantage of this interpretation over the Logical Contradiction Interpretation is that it accounts for not only immoral conventional actions but immoral natural actions. For Korsgaard, a trouble with this interpretation is that ‘‘such purposes may have nothing to do with what the agent wants or ought rationally to want, or even with what any human being wants.’’9 Besides, the interpretation makes Kant’s ethics heteronomous. I will discuss this problem later. According to the Practical Contradiction Interpretation, ‘‘the contradiction is that your maxim would be self-defeating if universalized: your action would become ineffectual for the achievement of your purpose if everyone (tried to) use it for that purpose. Since you propose to use that action for that purpose at the same time as you propose to universalize the maxim, you in effect will the thwarting of your own purpose.’’10 This interpretation reveals ‘‘actions whose efficacy in achieving their purposes depends upon their being exceptional,’’ that is, it ‘‘reveals unfairness, deception, and cheating.’’11 Korsgaard contrasts the Logical and Practical Contradiction Interpretations. On the former, ‘‘the contradiction arises because the agent wills to engage in a conventional action, but he also wills a state of affairs in which that kind of action will no longer exist.’’ On the latter, ‘‘the contradiction arises because the agent wills to engage in a conventional action, but he also wills a state of affairs in which the action will no longer work.’’ Korsgaard says, ‘‘the two views are readily confused, because the reason the action no longer works is because it no longer exists. But on the Practical Contradiction Interpretation it is the failure of efficacy, not the nonexistence, that really matters.’’12 7 Ibid., p. 78. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., p. 92. 10 Ibid., p. 78. 11 Ibid., p. 92. Onora O’Neill’s response to the formalism charge is similar to the Practical Contradiction Interpretation. See Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 155–160, 215–216. 12 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, p. 97. 123 Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws 71 Korsgaard holds that, unlike the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation can handle a borderline case between conventional and natural actions like stealing and some wholly natural actions like securing a job by killing a rival. For example, let us consider the following maxim of taking another’s property by violence: ‘‘Whenever I want another’s property, I will take it by violence.’’ Although genuine property might disappear if everyone takes whatever he wants by violence all the time, there is not necessarily a logical impossibility in universalizing this maxim. Therefore, the Logical Contradiction Interpretation is not enough to handle the maxim. But according to the Practical Contradiction Interpretation, ‘‘[t]he use of violent natural means for achieving ends cannot be universalized because that would leave us insecure in the possession of these goods, and without that security these goods are no good to us at all.’’13 How should we evaluate Korsgaard’s discussion on the Formula of Universal Law? From the viewpoint of the formalism charge, I put the Logical and Practical Contradiction Interpretations into the same category and contrast them with the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation. Allen Wood distinguishes between stronger and weaker forms of the formalism charge. The stronger form holds that the Formula of Universal Law ‘‘can make no distinction between good and evil and are unable to exclude any action whatever as morally wrong.’’ The weaker form holds that the formula ‘‘cannot give us a completely satisfactory account of our duties.’’14 In other words, the weaker form holds that although the formula can identify some immoral actions, it cannot identify all immoral actions. Both the Logical and Practical Contradiction Interpretations refute the stronger form of the formalism charge, but they are not free from the weaker form of it. Although the Practical Contradiction Interpretation can identify more immoral actions than the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, there are still certain immoral actions which the former cannot identify. Korsgaard admits that the Practical Contradiction Interpretation cannot handle certain natural actions like ‘‘killing for revenge, or out of hatred’’ and suicide—actions which aim not at ‘‘some enduring condition’’ but at ‘‘the immediate result.’’15 For example, a maxim of vengeful killing would be as follows: ‘‘Whenever I am harmed by another, I will kill the person.’’ Here we cannot say that ‘‘the vengeful killer wants to kill and get away with it—he wants not to be killed in turn himself, so he cannot universalize his vengeful maxim,’’ because we do not know his mind.16 If the killer does not mind being killed in turn, universalizing the maxim does not thwart his purpose. In this case, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation cannot identify the action as immoral. Regarding suicide, a maxim would be as follows: ‘‘Whenever I am in misery, I will commit suicide to be released from it.’’ Korsgaard says, ‘‘the suicide’s purpose, if it is release from his own misery, will not be thwarted by universal 13 Ibid., p. 99. 14 Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 154. 15 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, p. 100. 16 Ibid., p. 105n27. 123 72 N. Iwasa practice.’’17 There is a question of whether suicide really releases one from his misery. If suicide does not release him from his misery after death, the maxim is wrong. But if it does, Korsgaard’s remark is valid. In this case, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation cannot identify the action as immoral. Among the three interpretations, only the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation can avoid both forms of the formalism charge because so-called immoral conventional and natural actions are against the systematic harmony of natural and human purposes. Later, I will examine Ping-cheung Lo’s teleological interpretation. Before that, let us see Barbara Herman’s and Kenneth Westphal’s answers to the formalism charge. 5 Herman’s Two Tests To provide a strong interpretation of the Formula of Universal Law, Barbara Herman directs her attention to Kant’s distinction between the contradiction in conception and the contradiction in will. According to the former, a ‘‘maxim cannot even be conceived as a universal law of nature without contradiction, let alone be willed as what ought to become one.’’ According to the latter, ‘‘we do not find this inner impossibility, but it is still impossible to will that…[a] maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself’’ (G 4:424/57). Herman applies this distinction to Korsgaard’s Practical Contradiction Interpretation. According to Herman, the practical interpretation of the contradiction in conception is as follows: ‘‘in the imagined world, the universalized maxim subverts the original maxim’s ability to serve our purpose.’’ On the other hand, the practical interpretation of the contradiction in will is as follows: ‘‘maxims will be impermissible if, when willed a universal law, they conflict with purposes that we must as rational beings also will.’’18 Here an agent’s purpose does not have to be stated in a maxim. If a universalized maxim conflicts with any purpose he wills, a contradiction arises. With this distinction in mind, Herman examines ‘‘a maxim of convenience killing’’: ‘‘To kill whenever that is necessary to get what I want.’’19 She writes, If everyone killed as they judged it useful, we would have an unpleasant state of affairs. Population numbers would be small and shrinking; everyone would live in fear. These are bad consequences all right. Still a world that looks like this is conceivable: Hobbes described it in some detail. And if there is nothing inconceivable or contradictory in thinking of a world that contains a Hobbesian law of killing, it looks as though we must conclude that the CC [contradiction in conception] test does not reject the maxim of killing. 17 Ibid., p. 100. 18 Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 137. 19 Ibid., p. 117. 123 Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws 73 Therefore, Herman thinks that if the Formula of Universal Law is to reject convenience killing, it has to do so through the contradiction in will test.20 She says, ‘‘could it be rational for me to will that a Hobbesian world come into existence? The answer seems to be no—given that I am a being with all kinds of purposes, the insecurity I introduce through my willing of a universal killing maxim would (as a psychological fact?) render all but the most minimal purposes futile.’’21 Herman also writes, A maxim of convenience killing would pass the CW [contradiction in will] test only if the agent could guarantee that the willed universal principle of indifference to life cannot conflict with what else he must will, if he wills at all. No human rational agent can guarantee this. Since I must will, as I can, that others take my existence as a limiting condition on their actions, the maxim of convenience killing is rejected. One cannot will the universalized killing maxim and acknowledge the conditions of human agency.22 As Herman points out, the maxim of convenience killing does not pass the contradiction in will test, as long as an agent wills something whose realization depends on his being alive. But what if an agent wills nothing whose realization depends on his being alive? Let us consider a different maxim: ‘‘Whenever I find a person, I will kill him to realize a humanless world.’’ If an agent wills this maxim and nothing which conflicts with it, it passes the contradiction in will test. Even if the maxim becomes a universal law of nature and there will be nobody to kill, this is not a contradiction. This is because the aim of the maxim is not killing in itself, but realizing a humanless world. The state where there is nobody to kill does not thwart the agent’s purpose, but rather fulfills it. Therefore, no contradiction arises. Even if the agent is killed, it contributes to realizing a humanless world. Of course, if the maxim becomes a universal law of nature, the world population will continue to decrease until a humanless world is realized. Some might claim that if the maxim becomes a universal law of nature, there will be nobody to will it. But this is not a contradiction even in a practical sense, because the agent’s purpose is to realize a humanless world where nobody wills it. This is not the only immoral maxim which passes the contradiction in will test under certain conditions. One can create the following formula: ‘‘Whenever there is an opportunity, I will X and will not care about any consequence of universalizing this action.’’ Here X can be such as ‘‘hit others,’’ ‘‘do graffiti,’’ ‘‘litter,’’ and so on. For example, let us consider the maxim of hitting others: ‘‘Whenever there is an opportunity, I will hit others and will not care about any consequence of universalizing this action.’’ This maxim passes the contradiction in will test because universalizing the maxim does not ‘‘conflict with purposes that we must as rational beings also will.’’23 There cannot be such a conflict because the statement ‘‘I…will 20 Ibid., p. 118. 21 Ibid., pp. 119–120. 22 Ibid., p. 121. 23 Ibid., p. 137. 123 74 N. Iwasa not care about any consequence of universalizing this action’’ leaves no room for such a conflict in the first place. The maxim of vengeful killing in the previous section also passes the contradiction in will test if an agent wills the maxim and nothing which conflicts with it. As we saw, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation can identify more immoral actions than the Logical Contradiction Interpretation. In the former, the contradiction in will test can identify more immoral actions than the contradiction in conception test. Yet the contradiction in will test still cannot identify some immoral actions under certain conditions. Although those interpretations and tests refute the stronger form of the formalism charge, they are not free from the weaker form of it. 6 Westphal’s Paired Use of Kant’s Universalization Test To answer the formalism charge, Kenneth Westphal proposes using Kant’s universalization test twice. ‘‘The first step is to test the agent’s maxim against its universalized counterpart; the second is to test the negation of the agent’s maxim against its universalized counterpart.’’ Westphal systematizes this as follows: if the intention expressed in one’s maxim is consistent with that expressed in its universalized counterpart, and if the intention expressed by the negation of one’s maxim is consistent with its universalized counterpart, then the original maxim is permissible. Likewise, if the intention expressed in one’s maxim is inconsistent with that expressed in its universalized counterpart, and if the intention expressed by the negation of one’s maxim is inconsistent with its universalized counterpart…, then the original maxim is permissible. If instead the intention expressed in one’s maxim is consistent with that expressed in its universalized counterpart, but the intention expressed by the negation of one’s maxim is inconsistent with its universalized counterpart, then the original maxim is obligatory. If the intention expressed in one’s maxim is inconsistent with that expressed in its universalized counterpart, but the intention expressed by the negation of one’s maxim is consistent with its universalized counterpart, then the original maxim is prohibited.24 Can this scheme reject the immoral actions which pass Korsgaard’s Logical and Practical Contradiction Interpretations and Herman’s contradiction in conception and contradiction in will tests? Let us consider the maxim of hitting others in the previous section: ‘‘Whenever there is an opportunity, I will hit others and will not care about any consequence of universalizing this action.’’ The intention expressed in this maxim is consistent with that expressed in its universalized counterpart. The negation of the maxim is as follows: ‘‘Whenever there is an opportunity, I will not hit others and will care about any consequence of universalizing this action.’’ The intention expressed by this maxim is consistent with its universalized counterpart. 24 Kenneth R. Westphal, ‘‘Practical Reason: Categorical Imperative, Maxims, Laws,’’ in Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts, ed. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (Durham, UK: Acumen, 2011), p. 113. 123 Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws 75 Therefore, in Westphal’s scheme, the maxim of hitting others is permissible. Similarly, in his scheme, the maxim of doing graffiti and the maxim of littering in the previous section are also permissible. In his scheme, a maxim is either permissible or obligatory as longs as the intention expressed in the maxim is consistent with that expressed in its universalized counterpart. Thus, his scheme cannot reject the immoral actions which pass Korsgaard’s Logical and Practical Contradiction Interpretations and Herman’s contradiction in conception and contradiction in will tests. Although his scheme refutes the stronger form of the formalism charge, it is still not free from the weaker form of it. Some might think that although reason cannot always identify moral laws, it sometimes can. But even if so, we need to distinguish between the cases where reason can identify moral laws and the cases where it cannot. Some standard is necessary to distinguish between them. This standard must be different from reason, because reason itself cannot distinguish between them. It follows that reason alone cannot identify moral laws. Some philosophers try to avoid both forms of the formalism charge in the following ways: First, some underline the roles of Kant’s other formulas such as the Formulas of Humanity, Autonomy, and the Kingdom of Ends. Second, some interpret the Formula of Universal Law teleologically. Third, some claim that a maxim must be something all those potentially affected by it can rationally accept. Fourth, Robert Louden introduces the empirical to evaluate a maxim. In the following sections, I will examine those attempts. I will show that despite those attempts, the idea that reason alone cannot identify moral laws is still valid. 7 Lo’s Teleological Interpretation Ping-cheung Lo thinks that a teleological interpretation can defend Kant’s ethics from the formalism charge. But Kant’s following statements seemingly reject the interpretation: First, a categorical imperative ‘‘declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to some purpose—that is, even without any further end’’ (G 4:415/40). Second, a categorical imperative ‘‘is concerned, not with the matter of the action and its presumed results, but with its form and with the principle from which it follows’’ (G 4:416/43). Lo mentions Kant’s distinction between two kinds of ends: subjective and objective. According to Kant, subjective ends ‘‘are based on impulsions,’’ while objective ends ‘‘depend on motives valid for every rational being’’ (G 4:427/63–64). Then Lo presents his teleological interpretation as follows: ‘‘it is only the presence of a subjective end which will make the imperative which enjoins it become hypothetical or conditional.’’ So ‘‘the difference between a hypothetical and a categorical imperative is not a matter of whether it has an end or not. The real distinction between them is a matter of conditional or unconditional binding force.’’25 Also, ‘‘for Kant formal is not equivalent to empty. A formal moral law is 25 Ping-cheung Lo, ‘‘A Critical Reevaluation of the Alleged ‘Empty Formalism’ of Kantian Ethics,’’ Ethics, Vol. 91, No. 2 (1981): p. 186. 123 76 N. Iwasa only empty of subjective ends, but not of an objective end. The idea of formal by no means excludes any content at all.’’ Similarly, according to Lo, when Kant states that a categorical imperative must ‘‘abstract from all objects’’ (G 4:441/89), it does not mean that a categorical imperative should not have any end at all. Lo claims that we should interpret the word objects as ‘‘all objects of the faculty of desire’’ (G 4:400/13), or ‘‘an object as the effect of my proposed action’’ (G 4:400/14), which is only a subjective end. In the Groundwork, Kant uses the expression ‘‘a selfexistent end’’ as opposed to ‘‘an end to be produced’’ (G 4:437/82). According Lo, the former is an objective end and the latter a subjective one.26 Lo thinks that ‘‘an end of an action can be something already existing,’’ and therefore ‘‘[a] ‘teleological’ categorical imperative’’ is conceptually possible.27 Lo underlines the role of Kant’s second principle. The second principle, the Formula of Humanity, is as follows: ‘‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’’ (G 4:429/66–67). This principle is teleological, yet Lo says that ‘‘the ‘telos’ in this case is not something to be brought about, but is some already existing, rational nature.’’28 Kant is famous as a firm believer in ‘‘duty for duty’s sake.’’29 In fact, Kant claims that an action has its moral worth only if one does it ‘‘from the motive of duty’’ (G 4:398/10), or only if one does it ‘‘out of reverence for the [moral] law’’ (G 4:400/ 14). In other words, the moral worth consists in the maxim itself (G 4:399/13). By contrast, Kant claims that an action done from inclination, ‘‘however right and however amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth’’ (G 4:398/10). Kant opposes the idea that the moral worth of an action consists in ‘‘the purpose to be attained by it’’ (G 4:399/13), ‘‘the effect hoped for from the action,’’ or ‘‘the ends which can be brought about by such an action’’ (G 4:400/14). Kant seems to claim that there should be no end in performing one’s duties. However, Lo says, ‘‘By bearing in mind the distinction made by Kant between subjective, producible ends and an objective, self-existent end, it is obvious that it is only the former that are rejected by Kant here.’’ In Lo’s view, Kant does not exclude an objective end from performing one’s duties. Lo remarks, ‘‘in performing our duties, we should perform them for the sake of rational nature or humanity. In other words, ‘duties for the sake of humanity,’ rather than duty for duty’s sake, is the real Kantian view of duty.’’30 Lo points out that Kant’s other works also contain his moral teleology. In section 84 of the Critique of Judgment, ‘‘On the Final Purpose of the Existence of a World, i.e., of Creation Itself,’’ Kant writes, Now about man, as a moral being, (and so about any other rational being in the world), we cannot go on to ask: For what [end] (quem in finem) does he exist? 26 Ibid., p. 187. 27 Ibid., p. 189. 28 Ibid., p. 193. 29 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, sec. 135. 30 Ibid., p. 196. 123 Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws 77 His existence itself has the highest purpose within it; and to this purpose he can subject all of nature as far as he is able, or at least he must not consider himself subjected to any influence of nature in opposition to that purpose.…Only in man, and even in him only as moral subject, do we find unconditioned legislation regarding purposes. It is this legislation, therefore, which alone enables man to be a final purpose to which all of nature is teleologically subordinated.31 Kant’s last lecture on ethics also shows his moral teleology. He says, ‘‘The final destiny of the human race is moral perfection, so far as it is accomplished through human freedom.…The universal end of mankind is the highest moral perfection.’’32 Given various teleological passages including these, Lo remarks, ‘‘my teleological interpretation of Kantian ethics is not only logically consistent with his Weltanschauung but is in fact quite harmonious with it.’’33 Lo points out that those who criticize Kant’s ethics for its ‘‘empty formalism’’ pay attention only to the Formula of Universal Law and ignore the Formulas of Humanity and Autonomy. Lo claims that this is un-Kantian because Kant straightforwardly formulates the Formula of Humanity in the Groundwork and carefully applies it in the Doctrine of Virtue. Lo thinks that the Formula of Humanity ‘‘is a practicable criterion for determining moral rightness or wrongness of our actions, and is by no means barren.’’34 8 The Formula of Humanity Is Heteronomous It is a general understanding that Kant draws the Formula of Humanity from reason alone. However, an examination reveals that this is not the case. Let us see Kant’s derivation of the formula. Rational nature exists as an end in itself. This is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence: it is therefore so far a subjective principle of human actions. But it is also the way in which every other rational being conceives his existence on the same rational ground which is valid also for me; hence it is at the same time an objective principle, from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws for the will. (G 4:429/66) One can summarize Kant’s derivation as follows: (a) I regard myself as an end. (b) Every other rational being also regards himself as an end on the same rational ground which is valid for me. (c) I must treat every rational being as an end. Kant 31 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 5:435–436. The pagination is that of the Academy edition. 32 Immanuel Kant, ‘‘Of the Final Destiny of the Human Race,’’ in Lectures on Ethics, ed. Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 27:470. The pagination is that of the Academy edition. 33 Lo, ‘‘A Critical Reevaluation of the Alleged ‘Empty Formalism’ of Kantian Ethics,’’ p. 197. 34 Ibid., pp. 197–198. 123 78 N. Iwasa holds that the premises (a) and (b) are true. Therefore, he thinks it reasonable to draw the conclusion (c). My focus is not on drawing the conclusion (c) from the premises (a) and (b), but on the premises (a) and (b) themselves. Are those premises true? I can regard myself simply as a means. For example, I can regard myself not as an end, but simply as a means for realizing God’s will on earth. In this case, I subject myself to the heteronomous law, and there is nothing contradictory about it. Similarly, every other rational being can also regard himself simply as a means. The premises (a) and (b) cannot be justified by reason alone. Since Kant draws the conclusion (c) from the rationally unjustifiable premises, the Formula of Humanity is heteronomous. Therefore, introducing the formula to evaluate a maxim makes Kant’s ethics heteronomous. 9 The Formulas of Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends Are Heteronomous Kant’s third principle, the Formula of Autonomy, is ‘‘the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law.’’ Kant draws this principle from a combination of the Formulas of Universal Law and Humanity. He says, ‘‘the ground for every enactment of practical law lies objectively in the rule and in the form of universality which (according to our first principle) makes the rule capable of being a law (and indeed a law of nature); subjectively, however, it lies in the end; but (according to our second principle) the subject of all ends is to be found in every rational being as an end in himself’’ (G 4:431/70). Kant’s Formula of the Kingdom of Ends is the following: ‘‘Act on the maxims of a member who makes universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends’’ (G 4:439/84). Its derivation is as follows: For rational beings all stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in himself. But by so doing there arises a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws—that is, a kingdom. Since these laws are directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom can be called a kingdom of ends (which is admittedly only an Ideal). (G 4:433/74–75) Clearly, the Formulas of Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends rest on the Formula of Humanity. As we saw in the previous section, the Formula of Humanity is heteronomous. So the Formulas of Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends are also heteronomous. Therefore, introducing the Formula of Autonomy or the Kingdom of Ends to evaluate a maxim makes Kant’s ethics heteronomous. 10 Heteronomy in Teleological Interpretations In this section, I show that teleological interpretations are heteronomous. Peter Steinberger writes, 123 Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws 79 a maxim cannot be universalized if doing so would, under normal and predictable circumstances, tend to destroy the systematic harmony of purposes. But it is difficult to see that this really gets us anywhere. For it may be that someone would want to destroy the systematic harmony of purposes. One cannot argue that it would be immoral to do so since, presumably, the criterion of morality is provided precisely by the categorical imperative, the interpretation of which we are now seeking. To prove that one should not destroy the systematic harmony of purposes would require the application of the idea of the categorical imperative which cannot, therefore, presuppose that one should not destroy the systematic harmony of purposes. If one nonetheless insists that such a systematic harmony has some kind of moral primacy, then the categorical imperative ceases to be categorical and becomes, instead, a hypothetical imperative: if one seeks to sustain the systematic harmony of purposes, then one should do A or refrain from doing B. Hypothetical imperatives may indeed be important for Kant, but their recommendations are, by definition, not categorical.35 Here Steinberger points out a problem of teleological interpretation: by introducing ‘‘the systematic harmony of purposes’’ to evaluate a maxim, the categorical imperative becomes a hypothetical one. The ‘‘systematic harmony of purposes’’ is heteronomous. Some might think that such formulas as the Formulas of Humanity, Autonomy, and the Kingdom of Ends justify ‘‘the systematic harmony of purposes.’’ Yet, as we saw, those formulas are heteronomous. So even if those formulas justify ‘‘the systematic harmony of purposes,’’ it is still heteronomous. Steinberger’s claim is still valid. Therefore, introducing the teleological end to evaluate a maxim makes Kant’s ethics heteronomous. The same applies to John Rawls’s appeal to teleology to avoid the formalism charge. Rawls puts Kant’s fourth example of failed maxims in the Groundwork as follows: ‘‘I am not to do anything in order to help others when they are in need, or to assist them in distress, unless at the time it is rational for me to do so, in view of my own interests.’’36 Kant thinks that this maxim fails to pass the contradiction in will test. [A]lthough it is possible that a universal law of nature could subsist in harmony with this maxim, yet it is impossible to will that such a principle should hold everywhere as a law of nature. For a will which decided in this way would be in conflict with itself, since many a situation might arise in which the man needed love and sympathy from others, and in which, by such a law of nature sprung from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the help he wants for himself. (G 4:423/56–57) 35 Peter J. Steinberger, ‘‘The Standard View of the Categorical Imperative,’’ Kant-Studien, Vol. 90, No. 1 (1999): p. 98. 36 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 172. 123 80 N. Iwasa But Rawls finds this account inadequate. He writes, situations may arise in any associated adjusted social world in which we very much want not to help others, unless the precept involved is quite trivial. Our circumstances may be such that doing so is extremely inconvenient, given our current plans. Once again, by a law originating from our own will, we would have prevented ourselves from doing what we very much want. The general difficulty is this: in any adjusted social world, all moral precepts will oppose our settled intentions and plans and natural desires on at least some occasions; in those cases they will be contrary to our will. Indeed, one role of moral norms is to provide precisely such opposition as the situation requires.37 Thus, the maxim can still pass the contradiction in will test. Rawls suggests that a way to avoid the maxim of indifference is to introduce Kant’s idea of ‘‘one’s true needs’’ (MM 6:393, 432)38 into an agent’s will. Rawls mentions two types of ‘‘one’s true needs’’: ‘‘the need for security and order in society, required to remove the state of war, and the need for those conditions necessary to develop and exercise our capacity for rationality in order to advance our happiness.’’ Rawls thinks that these two needs are enough ‘‘to reject any maxim of indifference and to endorse an acceptable maxim of mutual aid.’’39 Instead of the maxim of indifference, Rawls proposes Kant’s ‘‘maxim of common interest’’ (MM 6:453), which Rawls puts as follows: ‘‘I am to help others in order that their true needs be met when I am in a position to do so, but not to the extent that I become needy myself.’’40 Kant thinks that this ‘‘is a universal duty of human beings,’’ because they are ‘‘fellowmen, that is, rational beings with needs, united by nature in one dwelling place so that they can help one another’’ (MM 6:453). Rawls believes that this revision does not compromise the essence of Kant’s doctrine.41 Yet the idea of ‘‘one’s true needs’’ is heteronomous. Some might think, for example, that if one dies of hunger, he can no longer exercise rationality, thus ‘‘one’s true needs’’ are necessary conditions for him to exercise rationality. But if the soul is immortal, he may still be able to exercise rationality after death. Reason alone cannot prove that ‘‘one’s true needs’’ are necessary conditions for him to exercise rationality. Therefore, introducing the idea of ‘‘one’s true needs’’ makes Kant’s ethics heteronomous. The objective end on which Lo focuses is also heteronomous. As we saw, the Formulas of Humanity, Autonomy, and the Kingdom of Ends are heteronomous. So even if those formulas justify the end, it is still heteronomous. Thus, teleological interpretations introduce heteronomy into Kant’s ethics. 37 Ibid., p. 173. 38 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The pagination is that of the Academy edition. 39 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, p. 234. 40 Ibid., p. 174. 41 Ibid., p. 174n. 123 Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws 81 11 The Universal Rational Acceptability Argument Paul Guyer mentions another defense of Kant against the formalism charge. Guyer says, ‘‘Kant’s conception of the fundamental principle of morality does not ignore all differences of need among individuals and reduce them to faceless, interchangeable commodities, but treats all individuals alike only in the sense that the rationally acceptable needs of each must be equally considered in all actions affecting them.’’ Guyer thinks that treating humanity as an end is ‘‘the requirement that one pursue only courses of action to which all those potentially affected by them, with all their differences yet in their common status as rational agents, could rationally consent.’’ We saw that the Formula of Humanity is heteronomous. Here let us separate the idea of ‘‘universal rational acceptability’’42 from the formula, and introduce the idea independently to evaluate a maxim. If we introduce the idea, we can exclude socalled immoral maxims, such as the maxim of realizing a humanless world and the maxim of hitting others, from the categorical imperative, because all other rational agents would not accept such maxims. However, the ‘‘universal rational acceptability’’ does not make it possible to draw contentful moral laws from reason alone. First, universal rational acceptance of a maxim may not occur. Second, even if it occurs, we cannot rationally accept a maxim without some common moral ground, such as moral belief, moral sentiment, desire, and so on. For example, if we rationally accept a maxim which rejects abortion, there must be some common moral ground on which our acceptance is based, such as the personhood of the human embryo or fetus, an aversion to killing, and so on. Such a ground is rationally unjustifiable, and therefore heteronomous. As we saw, the Formulas of Humanity, Autonomy, and the Kingdom of Ends are heteronomous. So even if those formulas justify such a ground, it is still heteronomous. Thus, introducing the ‘‘universal rational acceptability’’ leads to the situation where universal rational acceptance does not occur, or the situation where Kant’s ethics becomes heteronomous. Besides, from the fact that all those potentially affected accept a maxim, it does not follow that it is morally right. Agreement does not guarantee truth and moral rightness. Let us consider the following example: Suppose we were in an era when there was no heliocentric theory. There we would agree on the geocentric theory. In this case, does the agreement make the theory true? From the fact that people agree, it does not follow that what they agree on is true or morally right. Nicholas Rescher argues that ‘‘consensuality neither constitutes a conceptually inherent part of the definition of truth, nor yet affords a workable test-criterion of truth.’’43 Rescher writes, 42 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 21. Jürgen Habermas’s and Karl-Otto Apel’s discourse ethics also feature the same idea. On Habermas’s discourse ethics, see Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). 43 Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 46–47. Albrecht Wellmer also argues that rational consensus cannot work as a standard of 123 82 N. Iwasa Consensus, after all, is a matter of the substance of people’s views and hinges crucially on such variable matters as evidence, methodological commitments, and ‘climate of opinion’. Consensus in the community of inquirers, is a matter of how people think about things on the basis of the evidence at their disposal. And in a complex world such consilience of data is more than we can generally expect. It is clearly problematic to contend that whenever there is a fact of the matter, people are bound to acquire enough of the right sort of evidence to find it out.44 This shows the limits of the consensus theory of truth. Consensus depends on evidence available to us at a given moment. But there is no guarantee that the evidence fully represents the nature of reality. Since the evidence for rational consensus is only physical (as opposed to metaphysical) one, and since metaphysics may be a crucial basis for morality, there is always a possibility that the evidence is incomplete. The same applies to methodological commitments. There is no guarantee that the methods we employ are perfect for analyzing things. The same is true with the ‘‘climate of opinion.’’ It may be biased. Since consensus depends on those unreliable bases, ‘‘even where consensus exists, it may not be meaningful: the agreement at issue may be no more than an agreement in folly. Clearly, people can agree on incorrect beliefs and on inappropriate (or counter-productive) values or courses of action.’’45 Agreement does not guarantee truth and moral rightness. Therefore, ‘‘[e]ven where consensus exists we are well advised to take it with a grain of salt.’’46 Inversely, even if something does not gain consensus, it may still be true or morally right. For example, although Galileo Galilei’s belief in Nicolaus Copernicus’s heliocentric theory could not gain consensus in his time, it can still be true. Rescher says, ‘‘An insistence upon the achievement of consensus just is not an instrument indispensable to the pursuit of truth—an enterprise that can and does exist and flourish in the absence of consensus.’’47 From this, and from the idea that agreement does not guarantee truth and moral rightness, it follows that agreement has nothing to do with truth and moral rightness. Then why do we feel something valid after agreement? This is because, in our world, agreement makes what we agree on valid in a practical sense. For example, in democracy, agreement plays a huge role in approving various policies and legislation. In business, agreement makes a contract valid, and a violation of it usually leads to legal or social punishment. In academia, presenting their theories, Footnote 43 continued truth. See Albrecht Wellmer, Ethik und Dialog: Elemente des moralischen Urteils bei Kant und in der Diskursethik, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999), pp. 69–81. 44 Rescher, Pluralism, p. 51. 45 Ibid., p. 56. 46 Ibid., p. 60. Agreement plays a crucial role in social contract theories such as Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract, and Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. The idea that agreement does not guarantee truth and moral rightness applies to those theories too. 47 Ibid., p. 62. 123 Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws 83 scholars seek agreement from others. The wider agreement a theory gains, the stronger it will become. Thus, agreement often produces force on a practical level. I call this force practical validity, as opposed to philosophical validity, which is truth or moral rightness. Something we feel valid after agreement is practical validity, not philosophical one. Because practical validity is so powerful in our daily life, some feel as if it represents truth or moral rightness. They conflate practical validity with philosophical one. Although there may be cases where they coincide, they are different ideas. We should make a clear distinction between them. Some might think that my writing this essay also seeks agreement from others. People would come to agree with me when they consider my claims true. I repeat, however, their agreement does not make my claims true. If my claims are true, there is already something other than agreement that makes them true. Karl-Otto Apel tries to overcome the problem of human fallibility. He recognizes that human knowledge is fallible, so that agreement within a real communication community is also fallible. Therefore, on top of a ‘‘real community of communication,’’ which consists of ‘‘persons who are alive today and capable of discourse,’’ Apel introduces a counterfactual ‘‘unlimited community of communication,’’ which consists of ‘‘persons who it may be presumed will exist someday.’’48 Apel holds that agreement within the unlimited community is the sufficient condition for truth and validity. Franklin Gamwell criticizes the idea as follows: Precisely because the indefinite character of the community prevents the controlling influence of arbitrary choice, it is true that any claim to which all subjects could assent must command their assent. But the fallible character of each member subject means that the indefinite community itself could never identify that to which it could give its assent. Given this fallibility, it is forever possible that the community will not assent to anything. Hence, the question remains: What identifies understandings that command the assent of all subjects? What is the sufficient condition of validity?49 Even if Apel’s theory is right, we cannot identify something true or valid unless we have answers to those questions. Thus, the unlimited community alone cannot be the sufficient condition for identifying something true or valid. Gamwell says, ‘‘Because a true understanding is true, it can only be defined in terms of a necessary effect of the act of self-expression.’’50 We cannot define it ‘‘in terms of a state of affairs that can never be realized’’ or is ‘‘a mere possibility.’’51 To identify something true or valid, we need an actual condition for them, not a mere possibility. 48 Karl-Otto Apel, ‘‘Macroethics, Responsibility for the Future, and the Crisis of Technological Society: Reflections on Hans Jonas,’’ in Karl-Otto Apel: Selected Essays, Vol. 2, Ethics and the Theory of Rationality, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996), p. 236. 49 Franklin I. Gamwell, The Divine Good: Modern Moral Theory and the Necessity of God (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1996), p. 152. 50 Franklin I. Gamwell, Democracy on Purpose: Justice and the Reality of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), pp. 171–172. 51 Ibid., p. 171. 123 84 N. Iwasa Some claim that a maxim must be something all those potentially affected by it can rationally accept. But, as we saw, introducing the ‘‘universal rational acceptability’’ leads to the situation where universal rational acceptance does not occur, or the situation where Kant’s ethics becomes heteronomous. Besides, from the fact that all those potentially affected accept a maxim, it does not follow that it is morally right. 12 Louden’s Impure Ethics Argument According to Robert Louden, Kant ‘‘strongly endorses the claim that moral theory is inapplicable to the human situation (indeed, to any situation) without a massive infusion of relevant empirical knowledge.’’ Louden explores ‘‘the morally relevant aspects of Kant’s work on education, anthropology, aesthetics, religion, and history.’’52 According to Louden, an empirical, impure part of Kant’s ethics overturns the formalism charge in the following ways: (1) ‘‘Moral education.’’ Kant admits that ‘‘human beings must be educated slowly into morality.’’ (2) ‘‘Institutional supports.’’ Kant agrees with the idea that ‘‘human beings throughout their lives need a variety of well-functioning institutional supports in order to achieve moral community.’’ (3) ‘‘Judgment.’’ Kant ‘‘recognizes the importance of experientially honed judgment skills in moving from abstract principles to individual cases.’’53 (4) ‘‘An ‘ought’ that will become an ‘is.’…Kantian moral ideals are not cut off from the world to which they are to be applied. Rather, they obligate human agents to first understand the world around them before seeking to moralize it.’’54 Louden’s approach refutes the formalism charge because so-called immoral maxims are unacceptable from the empirical viewpoint. However, his approach introduces the empirical, which is heteronomous. This makes Kant’s ethics heteronomous. 13 Conclusion As we saw, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation can identify more immoral actions than the Logical Contradiction Interpretation. In the former, the contradiction in will test can identify more immoral actions than the contradiction in conception test. Yet the contradiction in will test still cannot identify some immoral actions under certain conditions. Westphal’s paired use of Kant’s universalization test cannot reject the immoral actions which pass those interpretations and tests. Although those schemes refute the stronger form of the formalism charge, they are not free from the weaker form of it. 52 Robert B. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 168. 53 Ibid., p. 169. 54 Ibid., pp. 169–170. 123 Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws 85 Some philosophers try to avoid both forms of the formalism charge in the following ways: First, some underline the roles of Kant’s other formulas such as the Formulas of Humanity, Autonomy, and the Kingdom of Ends. Second, some interpret the Formula of Universal Law teleologically. Third, some claim that a maxim must be something all those potentially affected by it can rationally accept. Fourth, Louden introduces the empirical to evaluate a maxim. All those attempts introduce heteronomy into Kant’s ethics.55 Besides, on the third response, from the fact that all those potentially affected accept a maxim, it does not follow that it is morally right. It is impossible to avoid the formalism charge without making his ethics heteronomous. Those who think it possible need to show how to do it. Thus, Kant’s ethics is either empty or heteronomous. Either way it fails to identify moral laws by reason alone. Then what is necessary to identify moral laws? To answer this, we need to examine other candidates such as a moral sense, moral sentiments, and the divine. I discuss them elsewhere.56 Acknowledgments I would like to thank three anonymous reviewers and John Hacker-Wright, Editorin-Chief of the Journal of Value Inquiry, for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay. 55 According to Agrippa’s trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads to either infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. Elsewhere I examine various responses to the trilemma, and show that it applies at least to rational justification of contentful moral beliefs. See Noriaki Iwasa, ‘‘Moral Applicability of Agrippa’s Trilemma,’’ Croatian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 37 (2013). The trilemma applies to, but not limited to, the following: the premises (a) and (b) in section 8, ‘‘the systematic harmony of purposes,’’ ‘‘one’s true needs,’’ and the objective end in section 10, some common moral ground and the idea that agreement guarantees truth and moral rightness in section 11, the empirical in section 12, and Kant’s moral thesis that reason alone must identify moral laws. According to the trilemma, they are rationally unjustifiable. Therefore, introducing any one of them to evaluate a maxim makes Kant’s ethics heteronomous. 56 Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, I show that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. See Noriaki Iwasa, ‘‘Sentimentalism and Metaphysical Beliefs,’’ Prolegomena, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2010); Noriaki Iwasa, ‘‘Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem,’’ Croatian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 33 (2011); Noriaki Iwasa, ‘‘On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism,’’ Prolegomena, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2013). Regarding the divine, I develop standards for grading religions including various forms of spiritualism. See Noriaki Iwasa, ‘‘Grading Religions,’’ Sophia, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2011). 123