Land matters in South Sudan

Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa Changing Practices and Rights to Land Current African Issues No. 65 Edited by: Opira Otto Aida Isinika Herman Musahara CURRENT AFRICAN ISSUES No. 65 LAND TENURE DYNAMICS IN EAST AFRICA Changing Practices and Rights to Land Edited by Opira Otto, Aida Isinika and Herman Musahara NORDISKA AFRIKAINSITUTET The Nordic Africa Institute UPPSALA 2019 INDEXING TERMS: Land tenure Land ownership Land acquisition Farmers Women’s rights Agricultural development Urbanization East Africa Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa : Changing Practices and Rights to Land Current African Issues No 65 Edited by Opira Otto, Aida Isinika and Herman Musahara ISSN 0280-2171 ISBN 978-91-7106-830-9 ISBN 978-91-7106-831-6 print-on-demand version pdf e-book © 2019 The authors and the Nordic Africa Institute Production editor: Henrik Alfredsson, the Nordic Africa Institute Layout: Marianne Engblom, Ateljé Idé, and Henrik Alfredsson Language editor: James Middleton Print on demand: Lightning Source UK Ltd. Front cover: Farmer working in a field, Kapchorwa district, Mbale, Uganda, November 2011 – © FAO Matthias Mugisha The Nordic Africa Institute (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet) conducts independent, policy-relevant research, provides analysis and informs decision-making, advancing research-based knowledge of contemporary Africa. The opinions expressed in this volume are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Nordic Africa Institute. This work is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Licence. Details regarding permitted usage can be found at www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 This work is freely available in open access, you can download it online via the NAI web site, www.nai.uu.se, where you can also purchase print edition copies. Contents Contributors .................................................................................................. 5 Preface ........................................................................................................... 9 Acknowledgment ........................................................................................ 13 1. Introduction, by Opira Otto .................................................................... 17 2. When customary land tenure meets land markets: Sustainability of customary land tenure in Tanzania, by Aida C. Isinika, Yefred Myenzi and Elibariki Msuya ......................... 29 3. Securing peasants’ land rights through dispossession of the landed rich in Uganda, by Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale .................... 49 4. Land matters in South Sudan, by Ole Frahm ...................................... 69 5. Effects of large-scale land acquisitions by local elites on small-holder farmers’ access in Tanzania, by Hosea Mpogole ....... 89 6. From male to joint land ownership: The effect on women’s possibilities of using land titles as collateral in Rwanda, by Jeannette Bayisenge ...................................................................... 103 7. The benefits for women from land commodification – a critical reflection, by Mary Ssonko Nabacwa .............................. 123 8. Is agriculture a generational problem?: The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in northern Uganda, by David Ross Olanya............................................................................ 141 9. Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya, by Leah Onyango ...................................................................... 163 10. Crossroads at the Rural–Urban Interface: The Dilemma of Tenure Types and Land Use Controls in Housing provision and Urban Development in Kenyan Cities, by Jack Abuya ........................ 185 11. Our Inheritance: Impacts of Land Distribution on Geita Communities in Tanzania, by Godfrey T. Walalaze ............................ 199 12. Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda: Qualitative reflections on environmental sustainability and inclusion, by Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara .......................................... 219 Index ............................................................................................................ 238 About the Current African Issues (CAI) Series ........................................ 248 Contributors | 5 Contributors Jack Abuya is a Lecturer and Researcher in the School of Planning and Architecture, Maseno University, Kenya. Before then he lectured in the Urban Management Masters Programme at the Ethiopian Civil Service University College, Addis Ababa - Ethiopia. He has also worked in Public Service as the Director of Town Planning and Deputy Director of Social Services and Housing in Kisumu City Council, Kenya. His current research areas of focus include: Urban Management and Governance, Disaster Management, Urban and Regional Planning, Land administration, Housing and Water Resource Management. Leah Akinyi Onyango got her PhD in Planning from Maseno University in 2008. She has since been extensively involved in multidisciplinary research. Leah has also been a consultant for various organizations in the areas of monitoring and evaluation, community engagement, natural resource management, strategic planning, poverty studies, climate change, and policy analysis. She has been Chairman in the department of Urban and Regional Planning of Maseno University from 2011 to date. As a teacher, she has supervised both masters and PhD candidates and has published widely on topics such as property rights, poverty and policy. Jeannette Bayisenge is a Senior Lecturer and Acting Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Rwanda. She holds a PhD degree in Social Work with research focus on women and land rights from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden; and a Master’s degree in Development Cooperation with specialization in Women and Development from Ewha Woman’s University in Seoul- South Korea. Jeannette’s teaching and research interests are in the areas of gender and development. The research interests have expanded to include land’s rights and gender, women and youth’s access to land and rural livelihoods, as well as land tenure reforms and land related conflicts. Claude Bizimana holds a Master’s Degree in Agricultural Economics from the University of Natal in South Africa, and has over 20 years’ experience working in high learning institutions. Claude currently leads the Rwanda Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System initiative, supported by the International Food Policy Research Institute to provide strategic analysis and operational information for stakeholders involved with agricultural and rural development in Rwanda, help improve the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources’ policy design process and ensure successful implementation of Rwanda’s agricultural sector strategy and investment. Mr. Bizimana also heads the Rwanda Chapter of the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa. 6 | Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa Ole Frahm is a researcher of international affairs. His research focuses mainly on post-conflict state building, nationalism, human rights governance, and democratization and land rights. He has experience in teaching and researching in Germany, Algeria, Turkey, Switzerland and the UK. Currently, he works as research fellow at the Centre for Governance and Culture in Europe of the St Gallen University and investigates Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the wider Black Sea region. Additionally, he writes analysis reports for among others the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and teaches at the Leuphana University in Lüneburg. Aida Cuthbert Isinika is a Professor of Agricultural Economics at the Institute of Continuing Education (ICE), Sokoine University of Agriculture in Tanzania. The ICE is responsible for coordinating outreach and continuing education programmes across the university. She is the current editor of the Journal of Continuing Education and Extension. Aida is involved in teaching production economics at the undergraduate and post-graduate level. This includes supervising students at both levels in their research activities. Earlier in her carrier she worked in the field as a District Agricultural Officer, and in the recent past (2008 - 2010) she coordinated an Agricultural Programme for value chain development under Oxfam (GB) Tanzania. She has over forty years of working experience in the field of agriculture in rural development; and has produced more than 30 journal publications and chapters in books, focusing on production, productivity and resource use efficiency. In relation to land her interest has been on; equity and efficiency in land administration, land markets, and gender. Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale holds a PhD from Makerere University, and has 19 years of experience in Research and teaching public policy planning, development planning, conflict management to name a few. Fredrick is an experienced trainer in varied research methodologies. His broader research interests fall within the scope of the state, people and natural resources; as such, he has coordinated numerous research programs in the realm of Natural Resources Management, Political Economy of Food Management, the Politics of social protection and child learning in post conflict northern Uganda, and the Politics and Political economy of minerals and mining in Uganda. He is currently a Principal Research Fellow at the Development Research and Social Policy Analysis Centre. He is author of several articles in refereed journals, books and policy forums. Hosea Mpogole is a senior lecturer, founder and director of the Centre for Entrepreneurship and Innovation (CEI) of the University of Iringa - Tanzania. He holds a PhD in agricultural economics from Sokoine University of Agriculture. Hosea has over fifteen years of teaching and research experience. He has published several research papers in agricultural economics, urban transport systems, entrepreneurship, ICT for development (ICT4D), and mathematics education. Contributors | 7 Elibariki Msuya is a Senior Lecturer of economics, at Sokoine University of agriculture, School of Agricultural Economics and Business Studies (SAEBS). His research interests include development of smallholder farmers to unlock their potentials. He has published more than 15 journal articles and chapters in books addressing various aspects of smallholder agriculture. The most recent being ‘Farmer’s response to agricultural input subsidy’ in the book on “Agriculture, diversification and gender in Rural Africa.” Published by Oxford University Press. Herman Musahara holds a PhD in Development Studies from the University of Western Cape in South Africa. He is an Associate Professor in the School of Economics and Director of Consultancy Services at the University of Rwanda. Herman was until 2016, the Acting Executive Director of the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He also acted as the Vice Rector Academics and Research of the former National University of Rwanda between 2011 - April 2014. Apart from teaching Development Economics, Poverty Analysis and Research Methodology at post graduate level, Herman has researched, consulted and published in several fields of the social sciences including poverty analysis, human development, land and land use, governance, post conflict transitions, entrepreneurship, value chains and agricultural development. Yefred Myenzi holds a Master’s degree in Political Science and Public Administration from the University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. For the past two decades since 1998, he worked for community development as Government Administrative Officer, Programme Officer and Executive Director of the Land Rights Research and Resources Institute before his recent appointment as District Council Executive Director in Simanjiro District. He has undertaken research, advocacy and public engagement interventions on a wide range of issues including land rights, natural resources governance and public policy analysis. The author is an experienced community facilitator, trainer and mentor for novice graduates who join civil and public servicer for their first time. He is also the founder, regular contributor and editor of ARDHI NI UHAI newsletter an analytical magazine of the Land Rights Research and Research Institute in Tanzania. Theophile Niyonzima has a PhD from the Department of Human and Economic Geography, University of Goteborg - Sweden in 2009. His research focus is on land use dynamics and population pressure in Rwanda. He is currently a Senior Lecturer of Geography and environmental management at the University of Rwanda where he teaches geography and environmental management courses at both undergraduate and post graduate levels. Theophile also coordinates the MSc program in Geo-Information Science for Environment and sustainable Development. He also has been a Team Leader of Environment and Innovation sub-programs in the University of Rwanda -Sweden capacity building program. 8 | Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa Birasa Nyamulinda has over ten years of experience of teaching and consulting services at the University of Rwanda. However, since 2015, he has been working with BRAC-Africa as Country Coordinator and researcher in Rwanda for a research project entitled “Balancing unpaid care work and paid work: successes, challenges and lessons for women’s economic empowerment programmes and policies”. Birasa also worked with Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) linking smallholder farmers to niche markets and processors. David Ross Olanya holds a Master’s degree in Public Policy from the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, The American University in Cairo, Egypt. He earned Postgraduate Certificates from Trade Policy Centre in Africa (Arusha) in 2009 and the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University, The Hague, Netherlands in 2014. His research focuses on land tenure, use and management, water politics; and has published widely on these topics. Some of his notable publications are: Land-Water-Security Nexus (BRILL, 2017), Dams, Water and Accountability (Routledge, 2016), Governance, Aid and Institutional Traps (UCT, 2016), Will Uganda Succumb to the Resource Curse? (Elsevier, 2015) and Asian Capitalism, the New Enclosures in Uganda (Routledge, 2014) and African Land Grabs (NAI, 2012). Opira Otto is an academic and rural development practitioner with a PhD in Rural Development from the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. As a researcher at the Department of Urban and Rural Development at Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), he conducts research on agricultural commercialisation and how markets work in practice in rural East Africa. Opira has a wide range of interests and engagements in East Africa’s social and economic progress, rural transformation and agripreneurship. Consequently, established and coordinates the APOPO Trust – Uganda, an organisation that endeavours to improve the quality of life among rural poor, especially smallholder farmers, women and youth in northern Uganda. Opira also teaches a number of courses at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Mary Ssonko Nabachwa is an Associate Professor of Gender and Development, and Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences at the Uganda Christian University. She is also a Research Associate of Makerere Institute of Social Research. Mary holds a PhD in Development Studies from the University of Wales, Swansea, UK. Her research interest is on women’s benefits of land commodification in the different types of land ownership in Uganda. Godfrey Walalaze is a Lutheran ordained minister, Assistant Lecturer and Director Institute of Justice and Peace (IJP) at Sebastian Kolowa Memorial University, Tanzania. He has worked with Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), where he coordinated and wrote a report on mining in northern Tanzania. Reverend Walalaze also coordinated the Land Justice for Sustainable Peace International Conference 2013. He has continuously been involved and have passion for the world of Economic Justice and Peaceful coexistence. Godfrey holds a Master degree in Philosophy of Religion. Otto, Isinika and Musaharai (eds) | 9 Preface L and is a critical factor for the peasant farm regimes that are dominant in East Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Land is not only of economic importance for rural people’s livelihoods, but is also of social, cultural and symbolic importance (Amanor, 2011; Ståhl, 2015; Otto and Ståhl, 2015). Women play the most important role in peasant farming – growing food for the household, but also selling it to generate income (Isinika and Kikwa, 2015). However, over the years peasant farming and livestock rearing have been threatened by colonialism (Boahen, 2003; Mamdani, 2018); post-independence interventions by the nation state (including the nationalisation of land); and, since the early 1980s, strategies of economic liberalization – including private property regimes. In the latter case, these measures have been forced on Africa by the World Bank, international financial institutions and external donor agencies as conditions for continued development assistance and loans (Havnevik, 1987; Havnevik et al., 2007). In recent decades, African land has become a global target for foreign investments in energy and food for export (Matondi et al., 2011; FAO, 2013). In addition, domestic elites have increasingly been taking control of both rural land and land on the periphery of growing cities. Most often external investors also take control of water sources to sustain large-scale mechanized agricultural production (Olanya, 2012; Tvedt and Oestigaard, 2016). These processes have led to the increased dispossession and alienation of peasant farmers from their land (in both rural and urban settings) and of livestock-rearing peoples from their pastures. All this undermines household food security, weakens the social fabric of communities, increases conflicts over land and water and accelerates migration to urban areas (Bryceson et al., 2000). A survey of land holdings in Malawi, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia, found that 25 per cent of small-scale farming households were approaching landlessness (Jayne et al., 2010). This challenges the frequent claim that there is high availability of unused or underused land in Africa. The analysis of land tenure in East Africa – the focus of this book – is important for us to understand the evolution of production conditions among rural people, the dynamics of the processes and mechanisms that lead to land dispossession, and the shape of the contestations and conflicts that are generated. Although customary tenure systems have historically been the norm – ensuring the redistribution and multi-use of land across seasons for the survival of rural clans and communities – colonization, nation-building and globalization have, over the years, brought both freehold and state monopoly on land, as well as private ownership systems. Several chapters in this book demonstrate that the changes have not extinguished the customary tenure systems, but have dynamically modified them in relation to various pressures, both internal (inequality and population growth) and external (state intervention, villagization, creation of forest and wildlife reserves, large-scale invest- 10 | Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa ments, etc.) (see also Berry, 1993; Hammar, 2014; Skarstein, 2015). One may argue that the survival (albeit in modified form) of customary tenure systems in many parts of East Africa indicates that the external economic and political penetration and intervention did not exploit peasant and livestock-rearing people to the extent of destroying their identify and culture and forcing them off their land. That said, these processes have been intensifying over recent decades, leading to an acceleration in migration from rural to urban spaces (Kay, 1975; Mothander, 2017). After an interesting introduction, the chapters deal with the major issues relating to the historical and current land tenure changes in five East African countries – Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The meeting between customary tenure and the market is considered for the case of Tanzania (chapter 2) and the topic of traditional notions of political organization and state power is taken up in a chapter on Uganda (chapter 3). As regards land tenure connected with urbanization, that issue is dealt with in relation to urban spatial growth, legal pluralism and urban poverty in two chapters that focus on Kenya (chapters 9 and 10). The introduction of land titles and the commodification of land, together with the implications of this for the ability of women to access loans and gain other benefits, are analysed for Rwanda and Uganda (chapters 6 and 7). The theme of external investments in agriculture, by both local elites and foreign investors, and the impacts on peasant land access are scrutinized in chapters on Tanzania (chapters 5 and 11) and partly in chapter 4 on South Sudan. This chapter also deals with contestation over land and the shaping of conflicts. The role of state intervention through a large land-use consolidation programme and the implications for water use and environmental sustainability are addressed in the case of Rwanda (chapter 12). The remaining chapter (chapter 8) discusses migration and the negative status of agriculture in society, in particular among young people in northern Uganda. Land tenure dynamics relating to livestock rearing is addressed in passing in several chapters. Importantly, this book reveals the variation in the historical socio-cultural trajectories of East African countries, gives insights into agriculture and land and into how land tenure is shaped dynamically over time by internal and external causes and influences. Most chapters have a strong empirical base, and many chapters provide important insights into laws (both historic and current) and policies that connect to land tenure in the region. The book is based on presentations at two workshops: one in Tanzania in May 2013 (in cooperation with REPOA, Policy Research for Development, Dar es Salaam, and Sokoine University of Agriculture) and the other in Kampala, Uganda, in October of the same year. The workshops were funded by Sida, the Swedish International Development Agency and the Nordic Africa Institute. Opira Otto, the workshop organizer, was joined on the editorial team of the book by senior Professor Aida Isinika of Sokoine University of Agriculture and Herman Musahara, currently a professor at the National University of Rwanda, Butare. Kjell Havnevik Professor emeritus, University of Agder, Norway Otto, Isinika and Musaharai (eds) | 11 References Amanor, Koigi, 2011, land Governance in Africa. How historical context has shaped key contemporary issues relating to policy on land. International Land Coalition Framing the Debate Series no. 1, Rome. Berry, Sara, 1993, No Condition is Permanent. The University of Wisconsin Press. Boahen, Adu A., 2003, African Perspectives on Colonialism. John Hopskins Press. Bryceson, Deborah et al., 2000, Disappearing Peasantries? Rural Labour in Africa, Asia and Latin-America. ITDG Publishing, London. FAO, 2013, Trends and Impacts of Foreign Investments in Developing Country Agriculture. Evidence from Case Studies. Rome. Hammar, Amanda, ed., 2014, Displacement Economies in Africa – Paradoxes of Crisis and Creativity. AfricaNOW series, Nordic Africa Institute and ZED Books, London and New York. Havnevik, Kjell, ed., 1987, The IMF and the World Bank in Africa – conditionalities and impacts. The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala. Havnevik, Kjell, Deborah Bryceson, Lars-Erik Birgegård, Prosper Matondi and Atakilte Beyene, eds., 2007, African Agriculture and the World Bank – Develoment or Impoverishment? Policy Dialogue No. 1, the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala. Isinika, Aida and Anna Kikwa, 2015, “Promoting gender equality on land issues in Tanzania: How far have we come. In Ståhl, ed., 2015, p. 87–97. Jayne, T.S., D. Mather and E. Mghenyi, 2010, “Principle Challenges Confronting Smallholder Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa”. World Development, Vol 38:10m pp. 1384–1398. Kay, Geoffrey, 1975, Development and Underdevelopment. A Marxist Analysis. Mac Millan Press. Mamdani, Mahood, 2018, Citizen and Subject – Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. New Edition. Princeton University Press. Matondi, Prosper, Kjell Havnevik and Atakilte Beyene, 2011, Biofuels, Land Grabbing and Food Security in Africa. AfricaNOW Series, the Nordic Africa Institute and Zed Books, London and New York. Mothander, Bjørn, 2017 (in Swedish), I Hendelsarnas Centrum – en essa om Lozi-folket i Zambia och dess kung, Litungan av Barotseland, samt om de store omvalvningarna i sødra Afrika under 1800-tallet. (translation: In the Center of history – an essay about the Lozi people in Zambia and their king, the Litunga of Barotseland and the great transformations in southern Africa during the 19th century.) Published by B. Mothander, Stockholm. Olanya, David, 2012, “From Global Land Grabbing for Biofuels to Acquistions of African Water for Commercial Agriculture.” Current African Issues, No. 50, Nordic Africa Institute. Otto, Opira and Michael Ståhl, 2015, “Private of customary – whither land tenure in East Africa?” In Ståhl, ed., 2015, pp. 134 –152. 12 | Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa Skarstein, Rune 2015, “Primitive Accumulation: Concept, Simliarities, Varieties.” In Havnevik, Kjell, Terje Oestigaard, Eva Tobisson and Tea Virtanan, eds., Framing African Development – Challenging the Concepts. Brill, Leiden and Boston. Ståhl, Michael, ed., 2015, Looking back, looking forward – land, agriculture and society in East Africa. Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala. Tvedt, Terje and Terje Oestigaard, 2016, Water and Food – From Hunter-Gatherers to Global Production in Africa. A History of Water Series III, Volume 3. I. B. Tauris, London and New York. Otto, Isinika and Musaharai (eds) | 13 Acknowledgement T his book is the conclusion of many years of efforts involving many individuals researching land issues in Eastern Africa. Most of the contributions featured in this publications were presented at workshops in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania and Kampala, Uganda. The editors wish to thank the Nordic Africa Institute – Uppsala for the support provided to producing this book; especially, Terje Østigård for the exceptional support which kept this project together. Furthermore, this book would not have been possible without the friendly and academic support of a number of colleagues of whom we want to mention Kjell Havnevik, Tekeste Negash, Michael Ståhl and Mats Hårsmar. Lastly, as editors we would like to express our gratitude to all contributors for their outstanding cooperation throughout the project, in particular, during the final months. At one point, the going was very tough, but we persevered. A sincere appreciation to Henrik Alfredsson for his invaluable guidance in the process of making this book, and the two anonymous reviewers. Uppsala, Dar-es-Salaam and Kigali, October 2018 Opira Otto, Aida Isinika and Herman Musahara The borderlands between Uganda and Rwanda, June 2014. Photo: Guenter Guni, istock. Citizenship is increasingly being contested in relation to land rights and ‘belonging’ Chapter 1, page 17 SOUTH SUDAN UGANDA KENYA RWANDA TANZANIA 1. Introduction Opira Otto This book presents recent studies looking at the dynamics of land tenure and tenure reforms in East Africa. The focus of the book is on Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. By selecting these countries, the book is able to show the variation in the dynamics related to land tenure and explain how this relates to historical and more contemporary issues. Agriculture remains the main source of livelihoods for most rural people in East Africa. Farming is dominated by smallholders, the majority of whom are women, and their tenure and access rights to land are important for reducing rural poverty, enhancing food security and stimulating agricultural development in the region. Therefore, secure tenure is one of the most critical challenges to the development of sustainable agriculture in East Africa. In an effort to understand the land question and its variation across the region, this book analyses reforms, their context and dynamics. Researchers, policymakers and land rights activists from East Africa and Europe participated in two workshops in East Africa in 2013, which were organised by the Nordic Africa Institute in cooperation with the Sokoine University of Agriculture and REPOA (Policy Research for Development) in Tanzania. The first one took place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in May 2013 and the second in Kampala, Uganda, in October 2013. Participants presented ongoing research and activities that could shed light on the dynamics related to land tenure and land tenure reforms, including their consequences for development and the development discourse. In order to share the insights and knowledge emerging at the two workshops, selected papers from them were further developed and are presented as book chapters in this volume. This introductory chapter presents the rationale for writing the book and will examine some of the major topics that came out of the papers presented at the workshops and the ensuing discussions. Map: Istock 1.1 Main arguments of the book The land question in East Africa has received growing attention in recent years, largely because of concern over persistent rural poverty, food insecurity, changing land practices and rights to land. Yet there is a need for a deeper understanding of the dynamic character and variation of land rights and access to land in the region. This is reflected in the growing incidence of land conflicts, both between different scales of agriculture and between agriculture and livestock rearing. In Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda, citizenship is increasingly being contested in relation to land rights and ‘belonging’. In addition, the land question has become a global issue due to increases in domestic and 18 | Opira Otto external investments in land for various reasons, including large scale commercial agriculture, mining, tourism, natural resources conservation and property development. The emergence and intensification of these issues and associated conflicts suggest the need for critical reflection on the region’s land issues. The current debates and available research literature on land in East Africa tend to be conceptually loose and inadequate to capture current land issues and their variation across the region. This book presents concrete analyses based on empirical studies that can give a more precise insight and understanding of the dynamics of land tenure, land reforms and their effects on development in East Africa. Access to land and tenure security The book argues that land tenure security represents a primary condition for rural livelihoods in the region. Even though countries in the region have implemented various land reforms since the 1980s, the reforms have been inadequate to resolve contestation over land, and thus create security of tenure that could generate positive agrarian outcomes. In spite of the reforms, access to land and water resources, and the rights of the local populace to own, use and/or transfer land remains problematic up to the present day. Policymakers are unable to provide solutions that can enhance security of tenure in the region. The implication of this reality is taken up in the book also in the light of new pressures on land by rapid population growth and the emergence of rich and powerful investors, both domestic and foreign. To unravel an understanding of the roots of land conflicts in the countries in focus requires thorough insights into complex social and political contradictions, which have their bases in colonial and post-colonial land policies, as well as from the region’s post-independence development trajectories, especially with regard to land rights of poor rural dwellers. The book shows that that the neoliberal economic and political regimes that have developed in East Africa since the 1980s have not been able to deliver land reforms that address the growing inequality and major incidence of poverty in the region. The book questions the nature of popular demands for land reforms, land use changes, and the extent to which the state is addressing the emergent land question and it is dynamic. Available empirical data presented in the book indicate trends of rural land concentration, and a tendency for rural populations to be alienated from their land by an increasing number of large-scale agrarian ventures anchored in domestic and external elites and state agents. This trend is aided by the increasing complication of land rights and access in a context where traditional inheritance and access rights are still alive. Also, changes in land tenure in recent years, based on new tenure policies, do not address historically unequal gender access to land and means of production. Increasing urbanisation The book argues that rapid urbanisation in the region is partially a reflection of a solution to agrarian complexity, in which the land question is critical. Growing pressure on Chapter 1 – Introduction | 19 land for urban livelihoods is manifested in the proliferation of slums in urban and peri-urban areas. Although a diversification in rural economic activities has taken place since the onset of structural adjustment in the 1980s, this has not substituted for rural households’ dependence for their basic social reproduction on land. Hence, inadequate access to land has led to marginalisation of rural smallholders, which is manifested in increased displacement and migrations to urban areas. Also, changes in land use systems of the region since the introduction of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s have reinforced inequalities in land access and control and thus generated new land conflicts. These dynamics indicate that the East African land question has to be conceptualised in relation to existing struggles for access to land and its secure use, as well as struggles to reclaim alienated land rights in peri-urban areas. Land conflicts and their resolution The book examines the land question in the context of wider struggles over land that contains minerals and other valuable resources, and the control of land rights by foreign capital and state and domestic elites. Thus, as the monetary value of land has increased – based on various aspects such as the natural resources it supports, its use by a growing number of tourists, increased concern for the climatic effects of forest degradation, bio-technology and new minerals – intervention in and control over land by foreign and local investors has also increased. In some cases, this development has led to civil wars, large flows of migration, within and between countries, and involuntary displacements. Land conflicts also reflect gender and other social cleavages, and subordinated power relations, characteristic of the post-colonial African state. Pressures for the growing commercialisation of land reflects both external and foreign interests in land and natural resources, as well as increasing internal class struggle among the indigenous ruling or capitalist classes. The book shows that land policy reform in East Africa tends to promote and reinforce inequality in access to and control over land, including across gender and ethnic lines. Therefore, this book can contribute to the spread of knowledge about the dynamics of the land question that may push East African governments to improve the content and implementation of their land policies. The book provides a spectrum of recent and current studies on important land issues and their variation across countries in the region. It deals with many cross-cutting themes that have a bearing on land use and land tenure including land governance, policymaking and gender rights relating to land, impacts on youth and migration from rural areas, and legal issues pertaining to land ownership and land administration. The chapters show that there is need for concern about land rights and land use, and their relation to community conflicts across on ethnic and gender lines. 20 | Opira Otto 1.2 Organisation of the book In chapter 2, “When customary land tenure meets land markets: sustainability of customary land tenure in Tanzania”, Aida Isinika, Yefred Myenzi and Elibariki Msuya provide a lucid account of the sustainability of customary land tenure in Tanzania’s market-driven economy. They show how the British colonial government in 1923 adopted a dual land tenure system in Tanganyika, which accommodated formal leasehold and customary land tenure systems. However, coexistence of the two systems has always faced challenges. Prior to independence, the main challenge was the perceived inferior status of customary tenure by government officials and law enforcement institutions, including the legal system, which led to unwarranted appropriation of customary land to serve the interests of various entities in the formal leaseholding system. After independence, appropriation of customary land continued to provide land for national parks, game reserves, villagisation, expanding urban centres and other national interests. More recently, following the economic liberalisation efforts of the 1980s, expanding land markets and land grabs in the name of investment have continued to undermine and threaten the sustainability of customary land tenure. Land markets continue to evolve, but most land transactions face asymmetry of information and skewed market power relations between buyers and sellers of land. Meanwhile, procedures for formalising land rights remain complex and expensive, and are not well adapted to the needs of rural people, implying many elements of market failure in the evolving land markets. The chapter therefore examines emerging challenges facing rural land markets in Tanzania as they penetrate deeper into rural areas, where customary land tenure remains dominant but under siege. In chapter 3, “Securing peasants’ land rights through dispossession of the landed rich in Uganda”, Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale provides a highly erudite account of land in post-colonial Uganda. He blames the colonial administrative arrangement of using land as a basis for reward – in the case of those who cooperated – or deprivation – in the case of those who resisted – as the reason for the current land mess in the country. Kisekka-Ntale offers a historical insight of how land was used as a criterion for remuneration of chiefs who helped to spread the British colonial imprint. Focusing on perceptions of and debates surrounding amendments to the 1998 Land Act, he argues that traditional notions of political organisation are often in conflict with the sovereignty notions of state power. He focuses on issues of power relations between the traditional landowners (in particular the Buganda kingdom) and the state (central government) as they play out in the peasant space; hence, grapple with questions over which institutional setting would best govern the land resources. In chapter 4, “Land matters in South Sudan”, Ole Frahm examines how contestation over land ownership and belonging to the land have shaped lines of conflict in the world’s newest state, South Sudan. He argues that the South Sudanese government has actively, if unwittingly, worsened the situation by enacting community-based land legislation that pushes people to exclude others from their group and what they claim as their soil. This has ignited a debate over federalism and decentralisation with severe Chapter 1 – Introduction | 21 overtones of ethnic cleansing. At the same time, land has become an increasingly valuable asset both for the state in its attempt to diversify away from oil revenues, and for individuals and groups eager to cash in. He further contends that the alleged foreign grab is a chimera that may change once the ongoing fighting in the country subsides. Therefore, highlighting and understanding how much and in what way land matters will not only be of academic interest but will lay out a map of sources of potential future conflicts in the country. In chapter 5, “Effects of large-scale land acquisitions by local elites on smallholder farmers’ access in Tanzania”, Hosea Mpogole contends that Tanzanian smallholder farmers need secure land, water and other resource rights for their livelihoods. However, debates are ongoing about large-scale land acquisition (land grabbing), which undermines smallholder farmers’ access and rights to secure land, water and other natural resources in Tanzania. Land grabbing is often perceived as the acquisition of land by foreign investors. The role of local investors is not highlighted. Mpogole explores existing literature to establish evidence regarding the prevalence and impact of land acquisitions by local elites on smallholders’ access to land and implications for agricultural production for these farmers. He also provides recommendations on managing land acquisitions by local elites in order to control land concentration and growing inequalities. In chapter 6, “From male to joint land ownership in Rwanda: The effect on women’s possibilities of using land titles as collateral in Rwanda”, Jeannette Bayisenge examines the effects of joint land ownership on women’s possibilities to use land titles as collateral in Rwanda. Through a systematic land registration and titling programme piloted in 2006 and expanded to the whole country in 2009, a large number of women got land titles either jointly with their husbands or independently. Bayisenge critically explores the effect of this programme on women’s access to land by focusing on the use of land titles as collateral to get loans. Her study of 880 women in Musanze district, reveals that, despite a large number of women getting land certificates, only a limited number of them have managed to request credits using land titles, especially group credits through associations and cooperatives or small loans through the system of ubwisungane magirirane. Furthermore, the findings show that some respondents end up using borrowed money to meet immediate needs rather than using it for income-generating activities. Bayisenge concludes that the use of land titles to get loans is not as straightforward as some researchers and international organisations have claimed. Women show reluctance to take credits due to a number of factors: fear of inability to pay back the loan, unequal power relations, and lack of information on loan request procedures. In chapter 7, “A critical reflection on women’s benefits from land commodification in Uganda”, Mary Ssonko Nabacwa claims that the commodification of land was at the centre of Uganda’s land reform of the 1990s. Driven by international discourses of privatisation, the government of Uganda believed that commercialisation of land through market and/or non-market channels was central in expediting land access to productive, poor producers; and once the economic environment was right, the reform would lead to the development of the financial markets that rely on the use of land as collateral. The 1998 Land Act reinforced principles in the 1995 Constitution that land 22 | Opira Otto in Uganda belongs to the citizens of Uganda and will be vested in them in accordance with the land tenure systems provided for by the constitution. Ssonko Nabacwa argues that the government of Uganda enacted the 1998 Land Act with the intention of having a uniform freehold system that mainly promoted individual land ownership and a free land market, while recognising the rights of vulnerable groups. But she points out that since its enactment, many development actors have had differing perspectives on the Act, especially the parts that touches on gender. Ssonko Nabacwa concludes that the 1998 Land Act has failed to ensure women’s rights and in particular women’s ownership of land. This chapter therefore provides a critical reflection on the benefits to women of land commodification, including access, utilisation and control. In chapter 8, “Is agriculture a generational problem?: The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in Northern Uganda”, David Ross Olanya demonstrates that although agriculture employs 80 percent of Ugandans and provides livelihoods to the majority of the rural population, the sector has continued to suffer from workforce loss, financial transfers, investments, asset creation and demographic changes in favour of urban areas. He argues that the diminishing youth population’s perception of agriculture undermines the contemporary food sovereignty discourse. The increasing preference for the new way of life in urban areas undermines any effort either at national and local levels to increase food production to meet increasing demand. Olanya shows that the youth in Northern Uganda consider agriculture to be the last resort for employment; and feel that agriculture is meant for those who have failed to achieve elsewhere in life. Hence, with increasing youth unemployment, agriculture becomes a solution for a generation when it offers a possible alternative to formal urban employment. He concludes that the negative perceptions among youths in agriculture arise due to inadequate attention by the state to emphasise and support the relevance of smallholder farmers, youth and gender dimensions in agriculture, particularly by providing secure access to land, longterm finance, and marketing and entrepreneurial training in agriculture. In chapter 9, “Crossroads at the rural-urban ”, Jack Abuya investigates the implications of land tenure types in the control and management of urban spatial growth and housing delivery in Kenyan cities against the backdrop of rapid urbanisation. Taking Kisumu and Malindi in Kenya as case study areas, he uses social surveys and spatial analysis to determine that the different tenure systems in both cities influence different land use patterns, especially in the provision of housing. Abuya reveals that both insecure tenure and plurality of tenure present unique challenges in housing development, especially at the rural-urban interface. This is particularly manifested in the development of slum settlements arising from unfeasible land subdivisions, disincentives to housing self-improvements for fear of eviction, and weak enforcement of urban planning standards. He recommends that efforts be put in place to regularise security of tenure in slum settlements in order to provide incentives for increased household investments in durable and socially accepted housing. Furthermore, proper and enforceable land use plans, buttressed by clear land tenure regimes, should be designed for the development of urban fringes as towns continue to grow spatially outwards. Chapter 1 – Introduction | 23 In chapter 10, “Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya”, Leah Onyango reveals that because of the rate of urbanisation in the city of Kisumu, conversion of land use from agricultural to residential is taking place in ways that do not correspond to existing legal and institutional arrangements. This has led to unplanned settlements where both statutory and customary land rights are applied. Hence, communities that were traditionally subsistence farmers can no longer farm and are forced to seek alternative livelihoods, failing which they join the urban poor. Onyango argues that increased demand for land leads to subdivision and sale, leaving families with no land inheritance for their sons, thus denying them a traditional right. Much of the development control literature has focused on statutory land rights. Policy needs to address the social disorder created by rapid urbanisation and the dominance of statutory rights over customary rights. She concludes that whereas market forces have increased security of tenure for those with statutory rights in Kisumu, insecurity of tenure for those relying on customary rights has increased, thus explaining the rise of the urban poor in cities. In chapter 11, “Our inheritance: Impacts of land distribution on Geita communities in Tanzania”, Godfrey Walalaze claims that land is the sole God-given inheritance for communities. He argues that the uncontrolled manner in which Tanzania has offered investment licences to foreign investors in the past two decades has led to investors’ companies making claims of land possession without considering the plight of those who have lived for years on that same land. Walalaze explores the socio-economic relationships of Geita community members based on existing practices of land distribution, eviction from and compensation for land, and pursues a biblical perspective in relation to land access, distribution and ownership in the country. He reveals that poor implementation of policies and laws has gravely affected the Geita communities’ livelihood and imposed detrimental effects to their economy, social networks, cultural settings, spiritual connectivity and identity. He concludes that to implement evictions, regulations 12 and 16–19 of the Village Land Regulation 2001 should be followed as the basis for proper and rightful eviction. Furthermore, compensation should be emphasised not as a merit but a prerequisite of eviction. Humanitarian processes should also be followed in the course of eviction and compensation in order to ensure that poor and vulnerable community members are protected. In chapter 12, “Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda”, Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara make qualitative reflections on environmental sustainability and inclusion in Rwanda within the context of the of the country’s Land Use Consolidation (LUC) policy. The LUC policy promotes six priority crops (rice, wheat, beans, Irish potatoes, maize and soya beans) that are grown on adjacent plots of land with government support through improved seeds, fertilisers, irrigation and mechanisation. Niyonzima et al. claim that LUC has recorded tremendous success in boosting yields, such that officially Rwanda has achieved food security. Despite this success, however, there are still questions to answer and gaps to fill when it comes to environmental sustainability and inclusiveness. Hence, using qualitative 24 | Opira Otto narratives and the outcomes of a qualitative survey, the authors use water and rice to tease out these issues. They conclude that there is so far no explicit assessment of environmental sustainability and inclusiveness. Thus, they underline the importance of an environmental impact assessment of LUC, with policy lessons for Rwanda and East Africa in general. They also stress that a programme of this import, involving huge economic and social investment, needs to be deliberately inclusive and sustainable. Map illustration: Henrik Alfredsson, the Nordic Africa Institute. EGYPT RE DS EA SUDAN Atb ar a r ve Ri Khartoum 0 200 Kilometres 400 Bl 600 ue ERITREA Ni le W hi e te Nil NILE RIVER BASSIN Lake Tana Sob at R ive r Addis Ababa ETHIOPIA SOUTH SUDAN Juba DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Lake Albert Lake Turkana UGANDA KENYA Kampala Lake Victoria Nairobi RWANDA BURUNDI TANZANIA INDIAN OCEAN Lake Sulunga Dodoma R Lake Tanganyika ji River uf Lake Malawi (Lake Nyasa) Dar es-Salaam Zanzibar, Tanzania, May 2017. Photo: Africanway, istock. Sometimes, villagers sell their land to avoid land alienation by the government Chapter 2, page 40 2. When customary land tenure meets land markets: Sustainability of customary land tenure in Tanzania Aida C. Isinika, Yefred Myenzi and Elibariki Msuya 2.1 Introduction The political economy and legal perspective of land tenure in mainland Tanzania (hereafter referred to as Tanzania for simplicity) has been widely discussed (URT, 1994, pp. 7–24; Shivji, 2009, pp. 6–113; Sungusia, 2003, pp. 1–5).There is, however, a paucity of information regarding land markets in Tanzania despite growing evidence of their fast expansion (Katundu, Makungu & Mteti, 2013, p. 1) reaching deeper into rural areas threatening the livelihoods of customary land tenure holders. Tanzania follows a dual land tenure system that recognises statutory and customary land tenure. All land is public, the radical title being vested in the president who holds the land in trust on behalf of all citizens. The British in 1923 established dual land tenure, which defined two land tenure systems that coexist: statutory land tenure for land holders of granted rights of occupancy, who were issued freehold and leasehold titles; and customary land tenure, providing loosely defined deemed rights of occupancy. The former could subsequently be traded in formal land markets, while the latter continued to provide the stock of land that fed into formal land markets through alienation by the governor to provide land for large-scale farming, conservation, expanding urban centres and other areas of public interests. Meanwhile, customary tenure itself has been dynamic, evolving towards more individualisation, with more flexibility to accommodate many changes including bequeathing land to female heirs, and allowing land sales to buyers outside the community, clan or family (Isinika & Mutabazi, 2010, p. 146; Koda, 2000, p. 3), mostly in informal land markets. The Presidential Commission on Land Matters (hereafter referred to as the Land Commission) observed that: customary laws of various communities in Tanzania recognize exchange in land among members of the community. Restrictions are placed in ways of exchange 30 | Aida C. Isinika, Yefred Myenzi and Elibariki Msuya involving outsiders, ranging from prohibition to sale, contingent on fulfilment of certain conditions...to avoid the possibility of land being alienated to outsiders. This recognizes the double principle of the land being vested in the community the occupier has rights (akin to ownership) in perpetuity (URT, 1994, p. 89) This arrangement provides security of tenure under African customary land tenure (Owarage, 2012, p. 1), as well as investment security of tenure (Pinckney & Kimuyu, 1994, p. 1). The rate of land transfer from customary to statutory ownership status varies, progressing towards full transfer as population pressure increases. In Malawi, Takane (2007, p. 29) reported flexible land transaction practices, depending on the intensity of land scarcity among other things. Since the mid-1980s the rush for land has accelerated, fuelled by a land policy environment that promotes individualisation through titling and registration; and global demand for land to address food and fuel insecurity, conservation and tourism under what has been called the second scramble for land in Africa (Moyo & Yeros, 2011, cited by Katundu et al., 2013, p. 1). There is an ongoing debate to examine the role and nature of customary land in land markets (URT, 1994, pp. 116-121; Pinckney & Kimuyu, 1994, p. 1).The analysis provides compelling evidence that land sales and rentals within the customary land tenure framework are growing, which calls for coordinated management of such markets to minimise market failure, which is currently evident. The evolving land market in Tanzania is characterised by many elements of market failure, including: asymmetry of information between sellers and buyers; excessive involvement of the government bureaucracy in terms of approval processes; and land being allocated to investors below prevailing market price leading to speculative demand for land on the pretext of investment by presumed investors (Sundet, 2004, p.122). This means the land markets in Tanzania are far from perfect, since institutional factors related to land administration come into play in determining the price for land. Nevertheless, transfer of land from one owner to another continues within the prevailing incomplete land markets. This chapter examines the challenges for customary landholders in the face of growing land markets, as well as government policies and institutions that favour and promote individualised land tenure to facilitate economic liberalisation. What are the impacts of these changes on customary landholders? There is increasing evidence that under the growing land markets, dispossession of customary land continues unimpaired, assisted by misinformed land owners as well as coercion by land administrators and corrupt local leaders (Katundu et al., 2013, pp. 1-2; Mwami & Kamata, 2011, p. 36–38). These trends have led to unwarranted land conflicts, landlessness, loss of life and undue suffering, especially among customary landholders. For these reasons, there have been strong arguments in favour of protecting customary land tenure for the sake of preserving the right to livelihoods (Olenasha, 2004, p. 1; URT, 1994, p. 152; Barumbe, 2010, p. 135; Olengurumwa, 2010, p. 1).Others advocate for a balance between promoting marketbased efficiency and ensuring sustainable livelihoods (Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006, p. 1). Meanwhile, land tenure systems, being dynamic, continually Chapter 2 – When customary land tenure meets land markets | 31 adjust according to policy and institutional changes around them. This chapter uses case studies to highlight the need for improving policy, administrative and legal institutions that govern land markets in order to improve coordination and monitoring as land markets continue to evolve. 2.2 Why should we care about customary land? Separation of use and proprietary rights and restrictions of transfer imposed by customary land tenure, sometimes provide quite robust security of tenure to all land users within a community, clan or family (Migot-Atholla, Place, & Oluoch-Kosura, 1994, p. 5; Owarage, 2012, p. 1). It has also been argued, however, that as land becomes scarcer, customary tenure will evolve towards individualisation (Deininger & Jin, 2003, p. 1); further, that formalisation of customary land rights with clearly defined use rights will facilitate the conversion of customary land into commercial and individualised land holdings. Others, such as Kojo & Moyo (2008, p. 4), have countered that such conversion only happens because accumulation of land by commercial farming and other investors involves abuse by state administration and political regimes, which collude with the owners of capital. Moreover, the superiority of individualised land holdings in terms of land productivity, security of tenure and access to credit lacks strong empirical evidence in the African context (Migot-Adholla & Bruce. 1994, p. 138). Such findings strengthen the position of advocates for sustaining customary land rights. In mainland Tanzania, customary land has been romanticised politically, but has been marginalised practice. Under direction from the League of Nations, the British attempted to uphold customary land rights under the Land Ordinance of 1923, which guided land tenure in the country until 2001 when the Land Acts of 19991 became operational. Some would argue, however, that the 1923 ordinance continues to influence land tenure in the country to this day, since the 1999 Land Act retained many elements of the ordinance (Sundet 2004, p. 129). In practice, however, customary land tenure was constantly marginalised under British rule and even after independence. In 1962, Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanganyika, pointed out the positive and negative aspects of customary tenure in support of the government’s move to abolish nyalubanja, a semi-feudal system of land ownership. He argued that, “Unconditional or freehold ownership leads to speculation and parasitism.” (Nyerere, 1992, cited in URT, 1994, p. 17). His government would later apply the condition of ‘use’ to alienate customary land for allocation to ujamaa villages, public institutions and other public interests.2 Tanzania remains largely agrarian, with up to 75 percent of the population deriving their livelihoods from farming and livestock keeping (URT, 2009, p. 24), even as the rural 1 2 Act No. 4 on general land and Act No. 5 on village land. The term “ujamaa” originates from the Kiswahili word “jamaa”, which means a close kin. In practice ujamaa has been translated to mean communalism, i.e. living as a community, sharing and being collectively responsive to each others’ needs. 32 | Aida C. Isinika, Yefred Myenzi and Elibariki Msuya population has declined to about 70 percent (URT, 2012, p. 9). The pace of labour absorption from agriculture into other sectors (industry, services) is slow, which means that agriculture will remain the leading employer for the foreseeable future, even as the share of agriculture in gross domestic product (GDP) is declining. Some of the production systems (pastoralists, hunters and gatherers, fishers) depend entirely on communal land. As such, many arguments have been presented for protecting such land to ensure landholders’ right to a way of life of their choice (Olengurumwa, 2010, p. 1; Olenasha, 2004, p. 2). Farming is the source of employment for many by choice or for lack of better alternatives. Examples exist among farmers where transfer of customary land to formal and informal land markets by selling or dispossession has increased food insecurity, poverty and land conflicts. The dispossessed and displaced have failed to secure better land than they owned before (Hakiardhi, 2011, p. 71; Katundu et al., 2013, p. 22). 2.2.1 Protecting customary land from land markets The Land Commission presented examples to show that customary laws allow exchange of land, and the practice has been widespread (URT, 1994, pp. 89–93). Transactions involving customary land are often informal and frequently witnessed by elders. Such sales in effect take land out of the stock of customary land and into individualised tenure. Efforts to promote efficient land markets and improved land productivity through individualisation by titling and registration were first made by the British colonial government in 1958, following recommendations by the Royal Land Commission (1953-1955). A government paper was developed to review the land tenure policy in favour of freehold titles, arguing that customary tenure had been too slow to keep pace with economic advancements (URT, 1994; Shivji, 2009, p. 108). But the reform never took place because it was strongly opposed by TANU activities (Sungusia, 2003, pp. 2–3; URT, 1994, p. 16; Hakiardhi, 2011, p. 9)3. Mwalimu Nyerere4 in one of his speeches (Mali ya Taifa)5 strongly argued against land commoditisation, warning that “if we allow land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would only be a few Africans possessing land in Tanganyika” (Nyerere, 1973, p. 55). Considering the pace of land market growth in the past two decades, it would seem that this prophecy has come to pass.“Tanzania land sold cheap to foreigners” read a headline in a local daily newspaper (Tanzania land sold cheap to foreigners, 2013).This article was based on empirical evidence from a study that was conducted in six districts of Tanzania to assess the nature and magnitude of land acquisition in the country and identify key actors, trends and drivers of land acquisitions (Katundu et al., 2013, pp. 3–4). Among other things, the study established that: 3 4 5 TANU stands for Tanganyika African National Union, the political party that fought for and won independence for Tanzania Mainland in 1961. Julius Kambarage Nyerere was the first president of Tanganyika, the founder of the nation, who had trained professionally as a teacher and hence was popularly referred to as mwalimu, Kiswahili for teacher. Mali ya taifa is a term in Kiswahili that means ‘national property’. Chapter 2 – When customary land tenure meets land markets | 33 • • • Land acquisition and accumulation are dominated by foreign companies and acquisition cost is very low. Export-oriented foreign direct investment has not contributed to poverty reduction nor improved the living conditions of the rural people. The myth that Tanzania is country with a land surplus has fuelled the current land rush, increasing land crises and the cost of purchasing land. It has also contributed to land shortage and resulted in famine. These findings confirm similar arguments that have been reiterated by activists and researchers for a long time (Shivji, 2009, p. 139; Barumbe, 2010, p. 152). These outcomes contradict the political stance espoused by TANU activists and Nyerere just before independence. It was argued then that TANU would support a system whereby members of society would be entitled to a piece of land to use. Current policies on land reflect a policy shift since the mid-1980s, which reversed socialist policies of the previous 25 years since independence, to embrace capitalist, market-based policies in order to facilitate economic transformation. It should be noted, however, that marginalisation of customary tenure landholders and abuse of their land rights has happened throughout the post-independence period, more so during the socialist period (URT, 1994, pp. 81–93), as reflected in the case studies discussed in this chapter. 2.3 Post-independence marginalisation of customary land tenure Post-independence euphoria probably masked the need at the time to question the broad ramifications of Government Paper No.2 of 1962, which facilitated land tenure reform in Tanganyika (URT, 1994, p. 18). Land reform in this case assumed a broad meaning, involving changing laws, regulations and customs in relation to land ownership. Two main changes occurred at that time: freehold titles were converted to leaseholds for 99 years; and the customary feudal land tenure system (nyarubanja) was abolished. Two aspects that did not change have continued to undermine the rights of customary landowners and the sustainability of such rights, during the socialist period, and even now under the market economy. First, the radical title was now vested in the president, who used it on various occasions to alienate customary land to non-market and market landowners in the name of the national interest. Second, the authority for land management being placed on the administrative bodies has been the subject of wide interpretation of customary law, leading to abuse and corruption. 34 | Aida C. Isinika, Yefred Myenzi and Elibariki Msuya 2.3.1 The socialist period Loss of customary land to formal land markets Following the Arusha Declaration6 (1967), the socialist period witnessed a significant decline of customary land as it was transformed into other land use forms. Applicants for leasehold titles now included a growing number of an emerging local middle class, hence applications for and issuance of statutory land titles increased. Customary landholders therefore continued to yield to expanding urban land markets. The report of the Land Commission (URT, 1994, p. 106) cited the case of the Capital Development Authority (CDA) in Dodoma, which as a planning area in 1987 acquired outright occupancy over 276,910 hectares for 99 years, subsuming the deemed rights of occupancy over residential, agricultural and grazing land of residents in 32 villages, involving over 50,000 people at the time. This move also ignored existing granted rights of occupancy titles, and led to overlapping administrative authorities over the lands within Dodoma municipality, involving CDA, and Dodoma Municipal Council (URT, 1994, p107) Initial trust that was expressed by the people, welcoming CDA with positive expectations, soon turned to frustration as CDA consistently ignored their customary rights. This view is reflected by of many residents of villages surrounding Dodoma, who testified before the Land Commission. Some of the testimonies are quoted here to reflect their expectations and subsequent frustration. The people of Miyuji village accepted CDA with open arms. But, what we see is different from our expectations… apart from CDA being deceitful to the people of Miyuji, it serves no useful purpose in Dodoma. CDA… hould be abolished (URT, 1994, p 110)7 Other villagers similarly expressed their anger and frustration regarding CDA’s takeover of their land. Some of them vowed to resist such moves, while others expressed disbelief and a sense of helplessness in the face of such injustice. They expected CDA to respect customary rights over their farms (mgunda) (URT, 1994, pp. 109–110). Such views reflect the low level of understanding among customary landholders that once a peri-urban area is declared a planning jurisdiction, customary rights are in effect extinguished. These views among rural people or those living in peri-urban areas are currently experienced and expressed by rural residents in relation to land grabbing by ‘investors’ in a market economy. 6 7 The Arusha Declaration is a landmark statement that was made by the first president of Tanzania, stipulating basic the political inclination of the country from a market economy since independence in 1961 to a socialist orientation guided by principles of ujamaa or rural communalism The CDA was eventually dissolved on May 16th 2017 by the 5th President of the United Republic of Tanzania, John Pombe Magufuli citing confusion between CDA and Dodoma Municipality in service provision and conflict between the two institutions. The Citizen Newspaper; 16th May 2017. http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Magufuli-dissolves-CDA-as-Dodoma-Municipal-Council-takes-charge/1840340-3928064-xowo5bz/index.html. Cited 3rd January 2018. Chapter 2 – When customary land tenure meets land markets | 35 Loss of customary land to satisfy policy agenda The Land Commission documented further evidence involving loss of customary land to mushrooming government entities, which established agricultural and ranching activities, drawing most of the land from customary land by encroachment or alienation. The nationalist sentiment prevailing at the time espoused the notion of land as national property (mali ya taifa), serving public interest for national projects (mradi wa taifa). The Land Commission observed that in many cases land was taken over administratively with or without consultation or the consent of communities concerned (URT, 1994, p. 20). Some of the land inevitably found its way to formal and informal land markets, when the projects eventually ended or were abandoned. Villagisation (1974-1976) was the culmination of a process that began in 1968, enticing people to move to villages voluntarily. When persuasion did not work, force was used, relocating a large number of farmers and pastoralists to new villages so that people could work together, using better technology to accelerate development (Nyerere, 1968, p. 334). In many cases there was administrative allocation of land to villages, on land that already had rightful owners by deemed and granted rights of occupancy, resulting in unprecedented violation of the Land Ordinance of 1923. Such actions infringed the rights of customary landholders. After 1985, following the retirement of Mwalimu Nyerere, the architect of ujamaa and the Arusha Declaration, there was a major policy change; the market economy was embraced. The political environment was now more relaxed in relation to land, providing room for some of the customary landholders who lost their land to ujamaa villages to assert their rights in court. In such claims, three main arguments have been presented in favour of the plaints: • • • • the villagisation programme did not have any legislative basis; the Rural Land Act (no. 14 of 1973) was never invoked as a means for implementing the villagisation programme; the act did not empower anybody to extinguish anybody else’s deemed right of occupancy; and the act could not be construed to encompass forcible expropriation of land without an opportunity to be heard and compensation (Lobulu, 1998, p. 2). Shivji (2009, p. 113) has argued further that the Ujamaa Village Act (no. 21 of 1975) did not provide for land tenure changes, it only provided for delimiting the territorial jurisdiction of villages to facilitate their registration. Moreover, the customary land rights of the plaintiffs were not extinguished under the Land Acquisition Act (No. 4 of 1967). The villagers scored successes for some of the initial litigations to claim their land rights. Subsequent litigations were, however, characterised by delays of the legal process, presumably to frustrate the plaintiffs and give mixed rulings reflecting different perspectives of reasoning in relation to holders of deemed rights of occupancy (Barume, 1998, pp. 127–128, 133, 151-152; Lobulu, 1998, p. 7).This was presumably done to protect village leaders, as well as party and government leaders who had acquired land for themselves in the guise of villagisation. Such land inevitably found its way into formal and informal land markets because it could be sold. 36 | Aida C. Isinika, Yefred Myenzi and Elibariki Msuya The courts leaned openly in favour of the government and the owners of capital. Between 1981 and 1989 court cases were filed by the Bargaig of Manyara region (formerly in Arusha region) against the government (NAFCO)8 claiming loss of land for residential areas, pastures, holy shrines, graveyards, as well as sources of water and salt for humans and animals. The case was dismissed on the grounds that the government had priority to achieve food security and other overriding national interests (Barume, 1998, p. 124). Another similar case involved Mulbadaw village council and 67 others versus NAFCO; the court vacillated, ruling in favour of the villagers at the High Court, but then reversing its decision in favour of NAFCO at the Court of Appeal, on the grounds that the Mulbadaw village council could not own land because there was no evidence of any allocation to it by the District Development Council. Moreover, none of the villagers who testified could be said to have held customary tenure because they had not established that they were natives (Baume 1998: p. 124). This controversial ruling has been the subject of much academic discussion regarding the court’s unwillingness to challenge faulty government decisions and therefore avoid making landmark decisions (Baume, 2010, p. 151; Lobulu, 2010, p. 7). Where customary rights were acknowledged by the courts, they ducked awarding compensation to the plaintiffs, arguing that compensation could only be paid for unexhausted improvement, a view that has been challenged (Lobulu, 1998, p. 5).The court’s decision infringed customary land rights, particularly as they related to pastoralists upon eviction, since they could not demonstrate unexhausted improvement from grazing land that was left for a while to rejuvenate. To protect the legacy of ujamaa and villagisation, and avoid a reversal of land acquisition under villagisation, in 1987 the government, using the Lands Act of 1973 and Government Notice No. 88 attempted to extinguish the customary rights of 106 villages in the Arusha region. Another act followed in 1989 to cover villages in Hanang district. When this move was challenged in court, the chief justice froze all cases on land, practically extinguishing all customary land rights of the affected villagers (Barume, 1998, p. 150; Lobulu, 2010, p. 4). The ujamaa epoch is generally characterised by a legal framework and institutions for land administration, represented by unwarranted land appropriation, multiple allocations and therefore multiple claims, which fuelled conflict, and loss of livelihoods. The examples presented above demonstrate the extent to which the legal institutions during this epoch failed to protect natives’ rights as provided by the Land Ordinance of 1923. Collaboration between the government bureaucracy and the owners of capital through the power of the courts has been observed to continue under the market economy in the name of facilitating economic development, thereby threatening the rights and livelihoods of customary landholders (Hakiardhi, 2011, p. 12). 8 NAFCO is a government parastatal established in 1973 for producing food (grain). In 1968, the Bassotu wheat complex was established, eventually covering 10,000 acres spread over seven farms (Setchet, Gawal, Gaidegamond, Waret, Jurand, Mulbadaw and Bassotu), covering 12 percent of Hanang district. Chapter 2 – When customary land tenure meets land markets | 37 2.3.2 Promoting a market economy Since the 1980s, there has been renewed interest in land acquisition. Three factors have accelerated the transfer of customary land to formal and informal land markets. These include economic liberalisation, a food crisis and a fuel crisis. The government has responded by facilitating a legal and institutional environment that simplifies the rate of transferring land from customary tenure to formal land markets (Hakiardhi, 2011, pp. 12–15; Mwami & Kamata, 2011, pp. 9–12). At the same time informal land transactions that are not officially recorded are continuing at an alarming rate (Katundu et al., 2013, pp. 21–23; Hakiardhi, 2011, pp. 26–27).The National Land Policy of 1997 (URT, 1997) and land laws were enacted in 1999, with amendments in 2002 and 2004, to make land available for investment in large-scale farming, ranching and tourism; and using land to mortgage. The land laws of 1999 define three categories of land: general (public) land, reserved land and village land. Customary land falls under village land and has been targeted by government institutions to facilitate land acquisition by investors (Hakiardhi, 2011, p. 10). Village land is then categorised as communal, vacant and customary land. A village may obtain title for land that falls within its jurisdiction after fulfilling conditions for land use planning and surveying to demarcate boundaries. Thereafter, a village may issue derivative land rights to applicants, including investors (local and foreign), who will obtain customary rights of occupancy (CCRO) to holdings not exceeding 200 hectares. Holders of CCRO may use the land to enter into joint ventures with interested investors or to mortgage. The law provides room for transferring village land to land markets via two provisions. First, the president may transfer any area that belongs to a village to any other category of land in the public interest, including investment (Nshalla, 2008 cited in Hakiardhi, 2011, p. 10) or application by investors that exceeded 200 hectares. Second, the Village Land Act provides for investors to obtain land from village land and obtain derivative land rights. The law also encourages individualisation of village land since owners can secure derivative land rights from their customary land, opening such land up for transaction in land markets. Administrative and legal institutions to facilitate these processes have been set up including the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), local government authorities and village councils, and village assemblies (Hakiardhi, 2011, pp. 13–15).The government also supports formalisation of property, including land under customary tenure, to provide more secure tenure and access to credit. In the case of agriculture, there are policies for coordination and facilitation. These include: the Agricultural Sector Development Programme, for coordination; Tanzania Agricultural Food Security Investment Programme,9 for resource mobilisation; KILIMO KWANZA (Agriculture First), for planning and coordinating between the government and private sector; and most recently the Southern Agricultural Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), to facilitate agricultural transformation in the south of Tanzania by attracting foreign direct investment (URT, 2009, p. 16). 9 Under the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme, a component of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). 38 | Aida C. Isinika, Yefred Myenzi and Elibariki Msuya However, evidence on the ground does not support these aspirations because most investments have been directed at extractive industries (Msuya, 2007, p. 7; URT, 2009, p. 16). SAGCOT is specifically designed for investment in agriculture to “foster inclusive commercially successful agribusiness that will benefit the region’s small scale farmers and in so doing improve food security, reduce poverty and ensure environment sustainability” (SAGCOT, no date). Such objectives sound good; they are reminiscent of what other investors have promised in the past, but never delivered. The programme covers some of the areas in the Rufiji basin, which have already experienced a number of land conflicts (crop farmers versus pastoralists; investors versus villagers), creating a considerable level of animosity among villagers towards investors. The SAGCOT initiative should therefore learn from such past experiences to avoid history being repeated and creating further scepticism among villagers. In the past, land acquisition has been characterised by cohesion, non-adherence to procedures, corruption, unfair compensation and unfulfilled promises. In the guise of a market economy, the market for land is evolving without the basic characteristics of an efficient market (full information about prices, supply and demand; large numbers of buyers and sellers; free entry and exit). On the contrary, there is ample evidence to illustrate that land sales to foreign and local investors have been going on using deceit, persuasion and coercion as necessary, basically amounting to land grabbing (Mwami & Kamata, 2011, pp. 30–36, Katundu et al., 2013, p. 18) or the second wave of a scramble for land in Africa, which is driven by the neoliberal agenda of accumulation by land dispossession and labour devaluation (Hakiardhi, 2011, pp. 6–9; Shivji, 2009, p. 113; Kojo, 2008, p. 13). There is also ample evidence to show that government officials have been active agents in facilitating these land deals, demonstrating collusion between the ruling class and the owners of capital under neoliberalism. The administrative upper hand and a centralising land administrative framework within which the bureaucracy and legal system operate (Sundet, 2004, p. 3) makes it easier for such collusion to happen. Facilitation of land deals by the bureaucracy has been summarised by Mwami & Kamata (2011, pp. 9–12) as involving: • • • • the government encouraging investors to come in the country, assuring them that there is plenty of wasteland; coercing consent among rural people to accept and welcome investors by providing land, on the argument that investment is good and necessary for development; state agencies such as TIC, the Rufiji Basin Development Authority and district councils acting as agents for foreign investors; and the state shielding investors against the people. Such collaboration between investors and the ruling class makes it easy and cheap to acquire land in Tanzania (Katundu et al., 2013, p. 16). The Tanzania Investment Council (TIC) required only about USD 3 as service fees compared to USD 238 in Kenya. Many services that relate to land acquisition were charged for in Kenya, but they were Chapter 2 – When customary land tenure meets land markets | 39 obtained for free in Tanzania. For all the services, Katundu et al. (2013, p 16–17) were obtained, an average fee equivalent to USD 55 was required in Tanzania compared to USD 1,600 in Kenya. At the village level, there are other drivers that accelerate the sale of land. Local investors have equally been exploitative (Hakiardhi, 2011, p. 26). 2.3.3 The nature of village land acquisitions In Tanzania, there is an illusion that there is plenty of available land that can be acquired by investors. Findings by Katundu et al. (2013, p. 13) have shown that investors have accrued large areas, ranging from 200 to 400,000 hectares each. Some 47 investors own 2,022,438 hectares (2,022 square kilometres). The TIC maintains a database (land bank) that indicates regions, districts and villages where land is available. The land bank draws from general land and village land. Within a village there is open land, common land and customary land. If investors are directed to secure land from within a village, they are expected to negotiate with respective village leaders and land owners. Considering the large areas requested by investors, they often have to negotiate with more than one village, which can be complex. In Kilolo district, an investor set out to acquire 30,000 hectares. The district could only provide 6,000 hectares within 11 villages. Only five of the villages obliged, but plans for surveying and formalising the granted right of occupancy proceeded that also covered the other six villages. This fuelled multiple land conflicts, which have not been resolved yet (Hakiardhi, 2011, cited by Katundu et al., 2013). Under the same illusion of having ample land, some villages have not been keen to verify their total land area vis-à-vis their needs, before approving land for investors. They also do not take a keen interest in monitoring land demarcation to ensure investors or their agents do not exceed agreed acreage. In Kilolo village, Iringa region, an investor exceeded the agreed boundary, in effect annexing customary land belonging to villagers, who did not attend the meeting to define the investor’s boundaries. The affected farmers lived in another village (Kidabaga), but they owned land in Kilolo village, Kilolo District. Minutes of the village assembly did not record the agreed acreage. The process of trying to restore the aggrieved villagers’ land claims has been frustrating (Hakiardhi, 2011, p. 28–42). Such problems occur due to weaknesses in the process for land acquisition. The land law stipulates that at the village level, applications for land from local and foreign investors must go through the village government, and be sanctioned by the village assembly. There is, however, much malpractice involving land sales at this level including corruption and lack of transparency. For these reasons, land sales are done in secrecy regarding valuation for compensation and other matters (Katundu et al., 2013, p. 35), which exacerbates information asymmetry against sellers. Sometimes investors, with support from government officials, have simply ignored the rights of customary landholders even when the affected have complained. Where villages have resisted, pressure has been applied for them to oblige, or their complaints have been ignored until land acquisition processes have reached advanced stages. In Rufiji district, regional officials threatened to blacklist from future development projects any village that resisted demands to provide land to an investor (Mwami & Kamata, 2011, p. 37). 40 | Aida C. Isinika, Yefred Myenzi and Elibariki Msuya The illusion of ample land has prompted district officials to direct many investors to the same villages presumed to have surplus land. Village leaders feel pressured to oblige. Only in a few cases have villagers and their leaders refused to provide land to investors on the basis of their own future needs. Under the false illusion of ample land, some villages have used their land as a source of income, selling mostly to local investors. Sometimes, villagers sell their land to avoid land alienation by the government to investors and other public interests. To minimise the occurrence of reckless land sales, some parents and clans are now bequeathing land with restrictions not to sell. In some cases, family members have had to buy back land that has been sold. These experiences are consistent with observations reported by the Land Commission (URT, 1994, p. 93). In addition, village leaders are enticed to sell land to investors who promise future employment, contributions to social services and compensation for their land. In many cases, however, such promises have not been kept, thereby frustrating the villagers and even rendering them destitute (Mwami & Kamata, 2011, pp. 52–54).The promise of employment has turned out to be a meagre minimum rural wage at most, in exchange for long hours of work, leading to increased food insecurity and poverty (Hakiardhi, 2011, pp. 68–69). The villagers’ disillusionment is represented by the chair of Nyamwange village, as cited by Mwami & Kamata (2011, p. 47):“we thought investors would be the answer to our capital needs… when they come they give good words, written on paper, but in reality they are conmen.” The villagers’ understanding regarding the implications of land sales is sometimes guided by their limited understanding about the implications of land being transferred from one category to another. When an investor acquires land in a village, and secures a granted right of occupancy, the land is transferred to general land to facilitate granting the title. When villagers are not satisfied with compensation, or the land remains undeveloped, they tend to think that their original rights could easily be restored. Such requests are reflected in Kiwalamo village in Kilolo district, where the villagers’ customary land was wrongly included by the leadership and villagers of Kidabaga for transfer to the investor via sale. While their rights were acknowledged by the local leaders, but restoring their rights has proved very difficult (Hakiardhi, 2011, pp. 40–53). In the Rufiji basin, residents of Nyamwange village had expected to continue using fish ponds located within 5,000 hectares they had sold to an investor. They sent a letter to the permanent secretary for lands to reclaim their land citing un-procedural acquisition, since no compensation was paid and the land had not been developed. The case of Nyamwange village represents the power villagers can exercise when they have the right information, under good leadership and strong local organisation. Similar local-level organisations’ efforts to reclaim land rights have been recorded in other parts of the world (Gingembre, 2015, p. 1; Fairbairn et al. 2015, p. 661). In Tanzania, the power of organisation to resist coercive forces in land transfers has been recently demonstrated in a case involving three villages within Loliondo game controlled area. The villages are contesting a government attempt to set aside 1,500 square kilometres (out of 4,000) for strict conservation use, leaving 2,500 hectares available for villages that have been allowed to conduct limited human activity within Chapter 2 – When customary land tenure meets land markets | 41 the controlled areas. According to the minister of natural resources and tourism, “the land belongs to the government, which has decided to apportion its land to facilitate shifting the boundary of the game controlled area in an attempt to fend off encroaching human activity.” The pastoralists protested against the government’s decision, arguing that their customary rights were being infringed in favour of the investor. The pastoralists removed beacons establishing the new boundary; they subsequently sought an audience with the president. The prime minister has since halted government’s plan, promising to look for a solution on the matter.10 The problem of Loliondo continues to seesaw between the bureaucracy and organised local people. All the examples presented in this study point to a trend that is depleting customary land through formal and land markets. This trend is driven by many factors. In some cases, transactions involve willing buyers and willing sellers, but their decisions – mostly those of sellers – may not be rational because they are not based on full information regarding the market clearing price for their land, and the supply of land for their own present and future generations’ needs. Different forms of manipulation, including threats and deceit, have been used to dupe villages into selling. Land transactions in informal markets have also not been transparent. The situation of land markets in other African countries is not very different. Pinckney & Kimuyu (1994, p. 1) established that state policies did not cause any significant difference in the land markets in Kenya and Tanzania. Registered land could be lost if it was mortgaged and one failed to repay the loan in time. However, the loose definition of rights and their interpretation has facilitated serious abuse of customary rights holders, especially in the case of pastoral, fishing, hunting and gathering communities. For this reason, calls have been made to address the shortfalls currently contained in policy, legal and administrative frameworks and institutions. In this respect, Chimhowu & Woodhouse (2006, p. 1) have argued for recognition of specific characteristics of customary land markets, in particular, commodity transfer of land within the framework of customary tenure. This is essential for promoting successful pro-poor policies by facilitating transparency in land markets. Considering all these challenges, and the unique role of land in the livelihoods of the agrarian population, who have witnessed many years of their land rights being denied, recommendations have been made to include land matters in the new constitution (URT, 1994, p. 214; Shivji, 2009, p. 136; Myenzi, 2006, p. 12), to give due legitimacy to land and provide protection against short-term political expediency. Moreover, the move would ensure that the public participate in any potential changes addressing land. These recommendations are very timely, since Tanzania is currently in the process of a constitutional review. A chapter on land and natural resources has been added and the draft constitution awaits a referendum vote by the general public, which has been deferred to a future date. 10 Loliondo land conflict in perspective (2013). 42 | Aida C. Isinika, Yefred Myenzi and Elibariki Msuya 2.4 Conclusion The Land Commission (URT, 1994, p. 90) expressed concern regarding unregulated growing sales of customary land. The commission also cautioned against the need for precautionary actions to protect the rights of customary land rights holders, to avoid situations akin to what happened in Zimbabwe and South Africa where natives were displaced and dispossessed of their land as using statutory laws that did not necessarily conform to prevailing customary tenure as perceived by natives. Discussions in this paper have demonstrated that land markets have been and continue to be a reality in Tanzania. The pace at which land markets are growing has attained unprecedented levels, driven by the market economy. It is argued by land activists that such demand will continue to grow as a continuation of the grand project of accumulation by neoliberals and exploitation designed to serve their own interests. There is also growing local demand for land from a growing population. Customary landowners have been and will remain key players in the land markets of Tanzania, market shortcomings notwithstanding. While one cannot stop the trend in sales of customary land, the argument is made for supporting customary landowners by way of information and organisation, so that their participation in land markets is not driven by faulty assumptions, uninformed decisions or unequal relations. Chapter 2 – When customary land tenure meets land markets | 43 References Barumbe, Albert Kwokwo (2010). Land rights of indigenous peoples in Africa: With special focus on Central and Southern Africa (IWGIA Document 115). Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). Chimhowu, Admos,& Woodhouse, Phil (2006). Customary vs private property rights? Dynamics and trajectories of vernacular land markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Agrarian Change, Volume 6, Issue 3, 346–371. Deininger, Klaus, & Jin, Songiqing (2003). Tenure security and land related investment: Evidence from Ethiopia. Retrieved from https://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/refs.cgi. Fairbairn, Madeleine; Fox, Jonathan; Isakson, S.; Ryan, Levien; Michael, Peluso; Nancy Razavi Shahra; Scoones Ian & Sivaramakrishnan, K. (2014). Introduction: New directions in agrarian political economy. Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(5), 653–666. Retrieved from www.tandfonline.com/r/fjps-41-5. Gingembre, M. (2015). Resistance or participation? Fighting against corporate land access amid political uncertainty in Madagascar. Journal of Peasant Studies,Volume 42, Issue 3–4,561– 584. Retrieved from www.tandfonline.com/r/fjps-41-5. Hakiardhi (2011). Accumulation by land dispossession and labour devaluation in Tanzania. Ecoprint Ltd. Isinika, A. C.,& M. Mutabazi (2010). Gender dimension of land conflicts: Examples from Njombe and Maswa Districts in Tanzania. In Kjell Havnevik, & Aida C. Isinika (Eds.). Tanzania in Transition: From Nyerere to Mkapa (p. 137–157). Mkuki na Nyota. Katundu, Mangasini, Makungu, Innocent M. A., & Mteti, Shakila H. (2013, March 18–20). Nature and magnitude of land acquisition: Analyzing role of different actors, key trends and drivers in land acquisitions. Paper presented at the international conference on the political economy of agricultural policy in Africa, held at the Roodevallei Hotel, Pretoria, South Africa, organised by Future Agricultural Consortium. Koda, Bertha Omary (2000). The gender dimension of land rights in Tanzania. A case study of Mshindo village, same district (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Dar es Salaam. Kojo, Sebastian Amanor & Moyo, Sam (2008). Land and sustainable development in Africa. London and New York: Z Books. Lobulu, Ben (1998). Dispossession and land tenure in Tanzania. What hope from the Courts? CSQ Issue 22(4). Loliondo land conflict in perspective: change, resentment from stakeholders (2013, April 20). 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Land grabbing in a post investment period and popular reactions in Rufiji river basin (HAKIARHDI Occasional Paper No.3). Ecoprint Ltd. Myenzi, Yefred (2006). Land privatisation in Tanzania: The state of the art. Implications and lessons for policy and practice. Paper presented during national symposium on land in Tanzania, organized by Oxfam Joint Livelihoods Initiative for Tanzania, Protea Courtyard Hotel, Dar es Salaam. Nyerere, J. K. (1968, February 21). Implementing rural socialism. Speech made at the occasion to open the TANU Youth League (University of Dar es Salaam branch). In Nyerere, J. K. (1973). Freedom and Development. Oxford University Press. Olenasha W. T. (2004). Reforming land tenure in Tanzania: for whose benefit? (Unpublished draft report of the critical analysis of the Land Acts of 1999, Dar es Salaam.) Retrieved from http://www.oicrf.org/pdf.asp?method=download&email= &ID=8792& submitted=Get+document. Olengurumwa, Onesmo P. K. (2010, February 14–16). 1990’s Tanzania land laws reforms and its impact on the pastoral land tenure. Paper presented during the pastoral week. Arusha, Tanzania. Owarage, Norah (2012). Conflict in Uganda’s Land Tenure System. African Portal: A project of the Africa Initiative. Backgrounder No. 26, May 2012. Accessed from www.africaportal. org, 26th April 2013. Pinckney, Thomas C., & Kimuyu, Peter (1994). Land tenure reform in East Africa: Good, bad or unimportant? Journal of African Economics 3(1), 1–28. Sundet, G. (2004). The politics of land in Tanzania. Retrieved from www.google.co.tz/url?sa=......landportal.info.. =bv.94455598, d.ZGU. Shivji, Issa. (2009). Where is Uhuru? : Reflections on the struggle for democracy in Africa. Godwin R. Murunga (Ed.). Pambazuka Press. Sungusia H. G. (2003). The Nyerere Doctrine of land value and the enactment of the Land Act (1999). (Unpublished research paper). University of Dar es Salaam. Takane, Tsutumo (2007). Customary land tenure, inheritance rules and smallholder farmers in Malawi (Discussion paper. Institute of Developing Economies). Retrieved from http:// www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Downlaod104.html). Tanzania land sold cheap to foreigners (2013, June. p. 6–12). The African, Issue No. AW4447, p.1. Chapter 2 – When customary land tenure meets land markets | 45 The Citizen Newspaper; 16th May 2017. http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Magufuli-dissolves-CDA-as-Dodoma-Municipal-Council-takes-charge/1840340-3928064-xowo5bz/index. html. Cited January 3rd 2018 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) (1994). The report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, Volume I. Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development in Cooperation with The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. United Republic of Tanzania – URT (2009). Poverty and human development report, 2009. REPOA-Tanzania. United Republic of Tanzania – URT (2012). Poverty and human development report, 2011. REPOA-Tanzania. Kisoro, Uganda, December 2008. Photo: Andrey Gudkov, istock. Why does the state choose to institutionalise conflicting reforms to the extent of creating institutional dysfunction? Chapter 3, page 61 3. Securing peasants’ land rights through dispossession of the landed rich in Uganda Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale 3.1 Background This chapter sets out to analyse state-peasant relations and narratives as they play out in the political space in Uganda. In many developing countries, rural families comprise a substantial majority of the population. For these families, land represents a fundamental asset: it is a primary source of income, security, and status. But almost half of these rural families – some 230 million households – either lack any access to land or a secure stake in the land they cultivate. As a result, acute poverty and related problems of hunger, social unrest and environmental degradation persist. Many African states undertake land reforms to secure the rights of peasants. However, many a time this rationality is in conflict with the outcomes of the reforms. Land rights generically entail questions of land use, ownership, access and transfer. Securing peasant land rights is therefore geared towards improving issues of land ownership and access as a way of improving their wellbeing, given that the peasantry depends predominantly on land to eke out a living. This article examines the place of peasants and how it informs our understanding of notions of state power in the context of the 1998 Land Act as amended (2010) in Uganda. Scholarship suggests that political relations between the peasantry and the state can be understood using the concepts of engagement and disengagement. Four forms are recognised. The first is state-sponsored engagement, whereby state elites try to regulate behaviour through authoritative means. The second is state-sponsored disengagement, referring to withdrawal of state elites who encounter limitations to public authority. The third form is society-sponsored engagement, which refers to collective action by citizens, in this case by peasants attempting to gain control of state power. Finally, societysponsored disengagement refers to actions by ordinary citizens to withdraw from the realms of state authority (Bratton, 1994). The choice to engage in or disengage from political action is conditioned by the actor’s access to power. Citizens question their relations with the state and experience a sense of disenfranchisement under three conditions: when citizens believe the govern- 50 | Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale ment is using its power against them or not helping them; when citizens find policies to be ineffective, inefficient or otherwise problematic; and when citizens do not feel they are part of government, or feel ignored or misunderstood by government (King & Stivers, 1998). Many post-colonial states are perceived to be weak and command no legitimacy in the eyes of the population (Hailey & Robinson, 1994). In many countries, the state rarely engages peasants in mutually advantageous situations. This has resulted in wholesale peasant disengagement from the state (Bratton, 1994; Moore, 1998). For the most part, interactions between the state and peasants have amounted to reciprocal disengagement rather than joint engagement. Often state-peasant relations are an ongoing struggle with many dimensions, which have long-term historical origins (Moore, 1998). However, state-peasant relations should not be viewed in overly combative terms because, quite often, either side seeks and finds ways of accommodation. Often, the state may dominate, with willing acquiescence from the peasants. Similarly, peasants may assert their claims by staking non-negotiable demands and sticking to them (Bratton, 1994). One of the major issues that peasant stakes mainly rely on this land. In peasant society, land is more than just another factor of production that has its price; it is the long-term security of the family against the hazards of life and it is part of the social status of the family within the village or community (Ellis, 1993). To take someone’s land is to rob them of what makes them who they are. In trying to understand state-peasant relations, important questions come to the fore. What defines who is a peasant and what is the position of the peasantry in society? What is their role in the wider social strata? Peasant scholarship (Wolf, 1966; Shanin, 1971; Mintz, 1974; Ellis, 1993) has stressed the inferior social, political and economic status of peasants as a central component of their definition. The scholarship points to the subordinate relationship peasants have in relation to a group of controlling outsiders (people outside the social strata of peasantry). The idea of subordination implies unequal status, coercion of one social group by another and unequal access to political power. It also points to economic exploitation by those with, and sometimes in, power (Ellis, 1993). Wolf (1966) posited that peasants are a group of rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers. Peasants can therefore be termed as households that derive their livelihoods mainly from agriculture, use mainly family labour in farm production, and are characterised by partial engagement in input and output markets, which are often incomplete (Ellis, 1993). All peasant strata – whether they hire or sell their labour power, rent land or any implement of labour, lend or borrow money – share one central characteristic that makes them all peasants: they own some productive property and participate to some degree in the labour process on the land (Mamdani, 1996). What, then, distinguishes peasantry from other forms of coercion (for example, relations between overlords and serfs under feudalism)? It is only when cultivators are integrated into a society with a state – that is, when they become subject to the demands and sanctions of power-holders outside of their social stratum – that we can appropriately speak of peasantry (Wolf, 1966). Chapter 3 – Securing peasants’ land rights | 51 Peasants also exist within the exercise of unequal political and, subsequently, economic power under capitalist state operations. In that regard, where someone exercises an effective superior domain over a cultivator, the cultivator must produce a fund for rent. It is this production of a fund for rent that critically distinguishes the peasant from other cultivators (Wolf, 1966). This results in the transfer of wealth from one section of the population to another. The peasant’s loss is the power-holder’s gain, because the fund for rent provided by the peasant is part of the fund of power on which the controller may draw. There are different ways by which this fund for rent is produced and siphoned from the peasants into the hands of the controlling group (state). These can include indirect taxation on farm inputs or outputs. In some countries, export taxes on commodities produced by peasants have constituted a major mechanism by which income is transferred from the peasants to the state. Moreover, in the context of most African societies with large agrarian populations, the state may not have the material basis to survive unless it extracts large surpluses from its peasant populations (Kasfir, 1986). The transitions that have occurred since the establishment of colonial states in Africa are generally seen to have evolved from tribal to peasant or quasi-peasant forms of agriculture (Klein, 1980). This process of “peasantrization”, as Post (1972) put it, is one by which cultivators who had primarily produced agricultural goods for their own use on communally possessed land were either compelled to produce or drawn into the production of agricultural commodities that they did not consume themselves. Within this process, various features of the transition from tribal cultivation to peasant farming, such as the transformation of modes of possession and distribution of land, became a direct effect of incorporation into the world economy. These features included, but were not limited to: a shift from division of labour based on kinship to other forms; a shift from pre-market forms of distribution and exchange to the operation of the market principle; and a shift from communal land ownership, with group or individual use, to individual ownership (Post, 1972). This, however, is not to ignore the fact that even before African producers became involved in production for the world market, they were being separated from their means of production (Copans in Klein, 1980). A pre-colonial peasantry existed, produced a surplus and was involved in the exchange of goods. Thus, colonial, post-colonial and capitalist peasant struggles cannot be understood in isolation from these pre-colonial processes, because capitalist peasantries are not the direct product of colonial peasantries (Copans, in Klein 1980, p 77–104). In analysing statepeasant relations, it is tempting to assume that peasants are always victims and powerless prey of strong states. It is tempting to believe that the dog is powerless and passive. However, peasants are not weak or passive; they are able to define their room for manoeuvre when necessary, and challenge the monopolisation of power by political elites. Thus, some would argue that if peasants decide to organise, power can be aggregated beyond the reach of the state and used as a counterbalance to excessive political centralisation. It is worth mentioning that the weak have weapons with which they can challenge elites, define their own spaces for manoeuvre and mould authority within the limits 52 | Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale of their abilities (Sithole, 2003). It is this salient weapon – herein examined or assessed in terms of political capital based on voter numbers – that has mainly influenced land reform, which targets the process of securing peasants’ land rights in Uganda (and which is normally just paid lip service). Let us, then, look at the trends in land reform in the country. 3.2 Institutionalisation of peasant land rights Land reform remains a central issue in the politics of Uganda, and a critical defining factor of relations between the state and peasants. Communal areas have long been acknowledged as the stronghold of the ruling political party. This section focuses on the rise in dissatisfaction levels over the 2010 land reform programme and explores how relations between the state and peasants play in the land debate. It asks the following questions. Why is it important to analyse state-peasant relations on the basis of land reforms? And is there a correlation between the two? The twentieth century witnessed the forward thrust of capitalism and the incorporation of Uganda into the world economy. While incorporation has been achieved, the agricultural sector remains predominantly peasant (Mutemba in Klein, 1980). Post-independence land reform in Uganda began with president Idi Amin’s nationalisation of the land decree in 1975. The 1995 Constitution abolished the 1975 Land Reform Decree and restored the systems of land tenure that were in existence at independence. These were re-stated as customary land tenure, freehold tenure, leasehold tenure and mailo tenure.11 The constitution also made new changes in relationships between the state and landowners in Uganda. It declared that land in Uganda would henceforth belong to the citizens of Uganda and be vested in them in accordance with the land tenure systems outlined above. It set up a new system of land administration consisting of land boards in every district. These were later strengthened in the 1998 Land Act. The need to guarantee security of tenure and security of land rights was advanced as the cardinal reason for the 1998 Land Act. President Yoweri Museveni, one of the advocates for the 1998 Land Act, argued that securing peasant land rights would enhance agricultural production as well as making peasants’ access to credit possible. However, instead of doing this, the 1998 Land Act complicated matters by institutionalising competing claims on land. In this instance, the act gives security of tenure to tenants through certificates of occupancy, while at the same time leaving landlords with legal title to the 11 Mailo is the Luganda version of the English word Mile. This mode of land ownership is not a traditional system of land holding in Uganda rather, it was founded on English feudal systems. It was established under the 1900 Buganda Agreement. It was based the settlement between the British Protectorate administration represented by Sir Harry Johnstone on the one hand, and the existing leadership in Buganda (at the time) represented by elders and chiefs – on the other hand. In 1900, Sir Harry Johnston, as Her Majesty’s Special Commissioner in Uganda, entered into a historic agreement with the Kabaka’s regents- Stanislus Mugwanya, Zakaria Kisingiri and Apollo Kaggwa, and Chiefs of Buganda. Chapter 3 – Securing peasants’ land rights | 53 same land. What advocates of peasants’ rights did not envisage was that securing property rights over land would not create an automatic impact on increased agricultural productivity, especially from the side of those willing to finance agricultural development? Indeed, more than ten years after the institutionalisation of the 1998 Land Act there have been no incentives for banks to invest in peasant agriculture. It is no secret that the contradictions created by the 1998 Land Act are in part the cause. In the social context, it ought to be pointed out that the 1998 Land Act failed to appreciate the role played by local institutions in resource management and therefore security of tenure (Ostrom, Feeny and Hartmut, 1993). Further, as Bromley & Cornea (1989) pointed out, a more lasting solution can be arrived at by focusing on what forms of tenure institutions could provide greater security. It is thus important to find out if it is individualised tenure or indigenous tenure, in what forms land resources can be managed, and by whom and for whom? Is it the community, the chiefs, local community or individuals? In that respect, in his evaluation of the 1998 Land Act and tenure reform in Uganda, Okuku (2006) has argued that if individuals are to believe that existing institutions protect their rights in land, then it is not the legislation of rules but their institutionalisation that provides a source of security in land rights. But he is quick to add that security in land tenure does not imply that everybody has secure land rights protected by the institutions. This is because in some instances institutions are not neutral; they only tend to reflect power relations in a given society. It is in this regard that the 1998 Land Act failed the neutrality test by handing too much power to peasants by formalising and confirming their ownership over the land they had occupied as tenants for the past twelve years. Such tenants are only required to pay annual rent of UGX 1,000 (equivalent to USD 0.30) for a complete year, irrespective of the size of the plot of land occupied. 3.3 Making sense of the land reform debates after 2010 In a free market economy, it is perceived that rapid economic progress generates gross inequalities, the greatest victims of which in society are the weak, the poor and subsistence producers. Those perceived to be poor or weak are most unlikely to benefit from national development processes, unless they are recognised by institutional arrangements and provided for in the institutional development agenda. Hence, blind adherence to the market as a basis for national transformation will always lead to extreme inequality and displacement of the poor from the land. Therefore, following Museveni’s repeated pronouncements regarding his dissatisfaction with the 1998 Land Act, the central government proposed several changes to be made in the same act. It has been argued that such changes would stem the rampant evictions that are currently going on in the country (see, for example, Daily Monitor, 2009a, FIAN, 2007). Museveni’s argument was that he wanted to introduce a modern, national system of land ownership. But the amendments are regarded with widespread suspicion. 54 | Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale However, for the purposes of this paper five critical clauses will be scrutinised. The justification for doing this lies in the contribution of the clauses to stirring the current land debate. To begin with, Section 35 of the 2010 Land Amendment Act points out that landowners who wish to sell their interest in land shall give the first option of buying to tenants. Where owners sell without giving tenants the first option to buy, then that sale is invalid and the registrar will not make a transfer in that regard. In any case, tenants have three months to refuse or commence negotiations. After that, they have another three months to negotiate or refer the matter to a mediator, who may give the parties another three months to negotiate. The same section seeks to enable tenants by occupancy to acquire titles, regardless of the way they entered or began occupying the land.12 The law also requires that where the land boards have not determined annual ground rent, the minister of lands may determine it, and it shall be paid not immediately, but within two years. Critics, however, argue that if the land boards or minister of lands come in to determine rent payable in respect of land owned by private individuals, would that not amount to deprivation of the owner’s right or interest in the property? The existence of overlapping rights in the case of mailo land, have created a land use deadlock between statutory tenants (kibanja holders) and registered land owners (mailo/native freehold owners) as provided for under the 1998 Land Act and the new amendments. In fact, a study by Deninger & Ayalew (2006) affirmed that mailo landholders’ economic opportunities as well as patterns of growth are positively influenced by changes in relative transaction costs attributable to information that helps clarify their property rights. However, the definition and protective rights accorded to bona fide occupants in the Act is construed by landlords as too restrictive, resulting in rampant forced evictions. It can therefore be argued that the recognition of bona fide peasants under the 1998 Land Act and subsequent 2010 reforms is a background to the state authorities diluting the power of the landed class’ and ought to be viewed as part of a wider effort to increase the political and social power of the peasants. Section 43 of the 2010 Land Amendment Act states that tenants by occupancy may assign, sublet or subdivide the tenancy with the consent of owners; but where the latter refuse, tenants instead of appealing to the Land Tribunal may appeal to the lands minister. In effect, this erodes the registered owners’ power and control over land and vests all powers in the minister. Similarly, Section 33 states that where tenants apply for a certificate of occupancy from landlords, the Land Tribunal will determine that the certificate be issued. But if the committee does not grant consent within six months, then tenants shall, instead of appealing to the Land Tribunal, appeal to the minister of lands who shall grant the consent and the certificate shall be endorsed on the landlords’ certificate of title by the registrar. 12 Replacing the Uganda Land Commission and district land boards with community land boards, community land tribunals and the Uganda Land Authority, which would control all the land in Uganda. Chapter 3 – Securing peasants’ land rights | 55 In light of the above, Mamdani (2013) has pointed out that this must, however, be seen as a move in a negative direction, since it ignores a key lesson in Uganda’s history particularly in Buganda’s. For example, the Bataka movement in Buganda forced the colonial state to introduce the 1928 Busulu and Envujjo13 Law as a way to guarantee security of tenure for peasants. Yet the 1998 Land Act and the subsequent 2010 reforms weakened all available safeguards for both peasant tenants and the landlords. Whereas the experience of Buganda shows that it is security of tenure for direct producers – and not freehold – that was key to the growth of commodity production in Buganda, the 1998 act and 2010 reforms presume that key to commodity production in Uganda is the free flow of capital in rural areas (Mamdani 2013, p. 3). 3.4 Land reforms and the dispossession of the landed rich Karl Marx used the term primitive accumulation, or more precisely dispossession to refer to primary extraction, whereby capital accumulation was a result of forcible dispossession of primary producers. When this is put into our contemporary debate it depicts a notion that uses formal institutions to legitimise private accumulation through dispossession of others, whether rich (accumulation from above) or poor (accumulation from below). How is this possible? Accumulation or dispossession from above is linked to poor people’s use of formal institutions to grab land by playing victims off against landlords’ (pitting victims against landlords, in competition with one another). On the other hand, accumulation and/or dispossession from below looks at the processes of unfair acquisition of land as property, as well as primary extractions from land itself. In the case of Uganda, accumulation from below has in most cases been characterised by complete seizure of rights and evictions of those occupying the land. Indeed, the 2010 land amendment law reform was predicated on mass evictions of squatter peasants. The landed rich, mostly residing in Buganda, in central Uganda, emerged as the strongest opponents to the 1998 Land Act amendments. They argued that the 2010 amendments were geared towards helping the peasants and offering them security of tenure, yet in actual sense weakening the position of the landlords. According to this analysis, the amendments undermined their constitutional rights on land and severely devalued land; hence, the amendments constrained landlords and their power over land. A greater part of the problem lay in existing institutional contradictions relating to ownership and user rights, a situation created by the 1998 Land Act. 13 The acrimonious relationship between landowners (mailo owners) and tenants brought about conflicts in the mailo system led to the enactment of the Busuulu and Envujjo law of 1928 provided the tenant cultivators with security on land and set a limit on the fees which they were required to pay to the mailo owner. This law was instrumental in preventing the development of a landless peasant class. It was enacted as a result of complaints from tenants over the land lord’s increase in the rate of busuulu and envujjo (rent) payable. Under this law, the rates were standardized and restricted and the peasants could not be forced off their bibanja without an order of Court. 56 | Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale Map of Uganda. Derived from a United Nations map. The act complicated the above situation by offering tenants security of tenure through certificates of occupancy, while leaving the landowners with the real ownership (legal land titles). One key informant revealed that the law has been interpreted by the land-holding class as a long-term government plan to rob them of the wealth contained in the many square kilometres of land they own. Hence, in some instances, this has created Chapter 3 – Securing peasants’ land rights | 57 an unfriendly relationship between tenants and their landlords, with some landlords preferring to sell off their land, including that occupied by long-term tenants. Another key informant sounded the same fears when he pointed out that: “ More protection given to tenants by the 2010 amendment has created more conflicts on land between the landlords and the tenants. It has also made financial institutions confused on whom to lend money given the competing interests“. Another key informant pointed out that the new wave of reforms has galvanised peasants and emboldened them to prefer to eliminate registered landlords. For example, since 2010 more landlords have been violently attacked and killed by peasant tenants. In 2012, over five landlords were reportedly killed in Kayunga district in central Uganda (see Kayunga: a hot bed of land wrangles. The Monitor 5th July 2013). In effect, the reforms have also led to a new wave of localised land grabbing, this time by peasants using falsified proof of occupancy. Many such claims were even sanctioned by former minister of state for lands Aida Nantaba, who chose to side with the peasants in most of the land conflicts. According to a newspaper article: “Nantaba has won over the hearts of many of the peasants who she has protected from eviction or restored their occupancy. But the Minister has also been loathed by landlords, who accuse her of inciting the tenants against them” In light of the above, it is logical to suggest that the state has chosen a path of institutional conflict There are numerous examples of how formal institutions collude with local councils and tenants to defraud landlords of their land in the name of protecting tenants. Cases are recorded in the where state agents were involved in acts of extortion as one Key Informant pointed out: “Some unscrupulous individuals will pretend to have occupied a piece of land for more than two decades yet [actually] they occupied the land three weeks ago”. By claiming to have stayed a long time on a particular piece of land, one can claim ownership rights and enormous compensation from the landlord. Others choose to sell the land as if it were personal land for their own personal profit. Here the local council colludes with tenants to sell landlords’ property and the state in many cases supports the transaction. In light of the above observations, it is right to argue that the 2010 amendment has resulted in numerous forceful evictions, leaving numerous people landless as landlords have sought ways of averting potential dispossession. In that respect, it is observable that amending the law created an institutional lacuna. It gave the tenants protection, through duality of ownership, and certificates of occupancy, while leaving the landlords as the title holders. This has not stemmed the evictions. Since 2010, tenants have in fact become more vulnerable The amendments have created tension between peasants and the landlords, a situation that was perceived to cause more evictions. What has made the 2010 land reform question even more complicated are the numerous state-aided evictions. This has become a major point of concern and contention 58 | Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale in the country. For instance, a 2008 study undertaken by the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) revealed that many peasants were evicted from their land by the state, in some instances without due compensation. For example, Pater Baleke Kayiira, a peasant farmer, together with another 2,000 inhabitants in Madudu, Mubende district, were harshly displaced from their ancestral plots with the help of the army and their land was offered to a German coffee production company, Neumman Kaffee Gruppe. The above state-inspired peasant evictions invite our curiosity to question whether there is collaboration between the state, the military and foreign capital. This curiosity is raised in view of the emerging cooperation framework between global capital and the G8. Commonly known as the Cooperation Framework, the agreement is part of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, a partnership between the G8, a number of African governments, transnational corporations and domestic companies. Here, Uganda is not alone. In 2013, Côte d’Ivoire promised to reform its land laws and make other policy changes to facilitate private investment in agriculture. In exchange, the country would get hundreds of millions of dollars in donor assistance from eight foreign companies and their local partners, who invested nearly USD 800 million in the development of massive rice farms (Grain 2013, p. 2). In view of the above, it can be adduced that through alliances like the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, land reforms such as the 2010 reforms in Uganda could be seen as pathway to transfer control over land from strong landlords to peasants and from peasants to foreign capital. Again, evictions by the state continued to be reported even after the passing of the new land law, which was supposed to prevent evictions of peasants. For instance, after signing the land law, in 2010, over 1,500 families were forcefully evicted, on the president’s orders, in Kitambi sub-county, Mubende district (Museveni Okays Eviction, 2010). The government argued that these families had settled on a forest reserve and by law were required to move. But residents in the area argued that the suspected presence of gold deposits in the area was behind the government’s orders to drive them away, as was reported by the member of the Lukiiko (Buganda Parliament) representing Kyaggwe county, Sevume Musoke. He said that Museveni and other top government officials were buying land in his area to resettle pastoralists, most of whom were from Western Uganda. Musoke argued that none of the affected families were compensated. This was at variance with the arguments advanced by the central government. The above scenario has since led to another debate, about ethnicity, pastoralists, power and mobility. It has also sparked off a debate about pastoralists marginalising farmers, especially in Buganda, and undermining the spirit of assimilation. For instance, Muchunguzi (2013) has indicated that Bahima pastoralists from Western Uganda have continued to move further into other parts of the country, including the central part of the cattle corridor, in Kiboga, Mubende, Luwero, Nakasongora, Masindi and parts of Kayunga. Muchunguzi (2013) has argued that the recent trends, however, indicate an increasing individualisation of the land in these areas, since these areas are within close proximity of markets for livestock and livestock by-products. They have recently been infiltrated by speculative livestock keepers, who have bought and fenced off rangelands. This new development has pushed pastoralists further towards the northern Chapter 3 – Securing peasants’ land rights | 59 shores of Lake Kyoga, especially in the eastern and western parts. In particular, the areas of Masindi, southern Apach and Lira, southwestern Kaberamaido and Soroti have significantly been an attractive destination for these pastoralists. Muchunguzi (2013, p. 150) has, however, pointed out that while Bahima and Baruli pastoralists have a historical stake in some of these regions, the recently renewed claims over land especially in Kiboga, Mubende, Luwero, Nakasongora, Masindi and parts of Kayunga in central Uganda are in many ways linked to the 2010 reforms. Lwanga-Lunyiigo (2007) has pointed out that although Buganda has assimilated people from other neighbourhoods, giving them settlements and kiganda names, and in effect making them “Baganda“, emerging trends demonstrate that these non-Baganda are no longer interested in becoming Baganda anymore. Their main interest is to acquire land and create enclaves of their ethnic groups in Buganda. These new enclaves have also been renamed after their places of origin or after their ancestors, such as Garuga in Busiro county, replacing the Kiganda name Mbiru. It is also a common feature to see roads in residential areas in Buganda named with non-Kiganda names. To many Baganda, this is humiliating and has been openly protested against through speech and Kiganda proverbs, music and folklore. 3.5 Locating the debate in the wider context: Exploring peasantry, prebendalism and patrimonialism African governments, Uganda included, suffer from fragmented institutions of resource governance. It is manifested in the concurrent existence of formal and traditional resource management institutions. This creates parallel institutional systems, which perpetuate competing ethnic and state citizenships in resource access, appropriation and utilisation (Ndegwa, 1997). At the heart of this are two competing domains: prebendalism and patrimonialism. Prebendalism, as used by Max Weber, is a concept that has been used to characterise the intensive and persistent struggle to control and exploit offices of the state (Wolf, 1966). In this way, politics is fundamentally about the struggle for control over decision-making rights over the allocation of scarce resources. Prebendalism encompasses malignant ethnicity as a mask of class privilege and as the most viable means of mass mobilisation. According to the theory, state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kinsfolk (Joseph, 1987). In this regard, the central government becomes a magnet for all facets of political and economic life, consuming the attention of traders, farmers, traditional rulers and politically motivated individuals. However, patrimonialism connotes a system where control over land is placed in the hands of lords who inherit the rights to the domain as members of kinship groups or lineages. Weber classified it as a top-down approach to the exercise of power, compara- 60 | Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale ble to the ideal type of western European feudalism, with a basis of legitimate authority outside of the central ruler’s authority. Using twelfth century France or England as examples, it consisted of the knightly aristocracy. Traditional bureaucratic patrimonial forms of government eventually gave way to modern capitalist bureaucratic rationalism as the main principle of both government and governance. The growth of capitalism brought about evolution into a mercantile domain, whereby land was treated as a commodity that could be sold, and asserted rights over land and to collect tribute, normally called rent. The mercantile domain, as opposed to the two preceding domains, viewed land as the private property of a landowner, an entity to be bought and sold. Polanyi (1957) argued that such a view of land is a legal fiction, since land is part of nature; it is just as it is and is not a commodity that is produced and put on sale. How do the above elucidations feed into the land reforms in contemporary Uganda? As noted by Weber, 1957, patrimonial domains thrived based on the degree to which their exercise was surrounded by the ‘ceremonial.’ Weber’s ideal types, describing the cultural variations with which this compliance with authority could be constructed, attempted to examine how the dominated understood, participated in, and even celebrated, their domination. Going well beyond Marx’s ideas of mystification or false consciousness, Weber tried to catalogue the diverse ways in which the legitimate exercise of power could be culturally framed. For example, in the case of Uganda we can argue that the need for control over land by the landed is premised on the need to maintain reciprocal relations between landlords and their tenants. As Weber (1957) argued, the personalised relationship between lord and peasant helped to soften the sentiments of the two parties towards one another and to symbolise the reciprocity that was conceived as the foundation of their relationship. Homans, (1960) cited in Wolf (1966), gave further credence to this by arguing that the ceremonial glory of the monarch reflected upon all those who laboured in his service and carried out his orders, and that such ceremonial glory would serve to balance the asymmetric relationship between peasant and power-holder by compensating the peasant ritually. This is especially true among the Baganda, as reflected by the numerous titles given to the Kabaka (king) such as Ssabasajja (men of all men), Nnamunswa (queen bee), Magulu Nyondo (legs of a hammer). This also weaves into nuances of gunsinze (‘I am guilty’) and ‘asiimye’ (‘he has honoured’) whenever peasants pay homage to the palace by bringing a gift or when the king chooses to meet them, respectively. To the ordinary person, it would be for the Kabaka to say thank you, since he had received gifts, but under the cultural implications of his acceptance of their gifts, he is doing his subjects a great honour. Hanson (2003) has therefore cautioned that, while interpreting certain aspects of land in Buganda, attention should be paid to the importance of love to power and the history of allegiance and gift giving, as it suggests the followers assent to power and being ruled. Hanson further says that the ritual embedment into the patrimonial domain surrounds the figure of the power-holder with ritual value, thus underlining the legitimacy of his domain against the latent counterclaims of those upon whom such domain Chapter 3 – Securing peasants’ land rights | 61 was exercised. It would be credible to say, therefore, that the arguments over land, especially in Buganda, reflect the disharmony between the needs of the centre and those of the traditional institution, as they compete for legitimacy in the eyes of the peasants. The state, in line with Marx’s ideas of mystification or false consciousness, argues that the kingdom is suppressing peasants by owning large tracts of land, in the guise of culture, and therefore is making them poor squatters. Weber’s ideal types, describing the cultural variations with which this compliance with authority could be constructed, attempted to examine how the dominated understood, participated in, and even celebrated, their domination. The state’s argument therefore ignores the latent authority and ritual fulfilment that the peasants feel as a result of being subjects of the landlord. It would also be insightful to trace the motivations of the central state in wanting to secure the land rights of the peasants. Museveni argues that he wants to see industrialisation take place, and therefore commercialisation of agriculture is important, thus his push to create a mercantile domain, a market in land to spur on industrialisation (Land debate, 2008). It is, however, hard to see this happening, given competing interests on land by tenants and landlords. Giving tenants certificates of occupancy, while at the same time leaving the landlords with titles over the land, creates stagnation, because neither tenants nor landlords can effectively claim the land as security when they need loans from financial institutions to carry out developments on the land. As Wolf (1966) argued, although the mercantile domain is relevant to the way the peasant ecosystem is organised, providing the pattern for social relations, it is the way the pattern is utilised by power-holders that is decisive in shaping the profile of the total system. As such, the mercantile domain may be used to keep cultivation technically stagnant, and to maintain ‘paleotechnic’ peasant ecotypes, while drawing off whatever funds of rent and profit the peasants are capable of generating under these conditions. In this regard, the 2010 reforms produced a political dilemma where a market in land would require the audacious step of disconnecting peasants from the ownership of land, and transforming them into paid workers through the agency of capital. This raises the risk, especially for the state and political regime, since it would in the short run inflame the peasants, but at the same time would allow money to circulate in the rural economy. Conversely, Uganda can borrow a leaf from the enclosure movement (Humphries, 1990) in Britain during the sixteenth century, where tenants were stripped of user rights, but at the same time reunited to the same land as paid labourers through the agency of capital. In this way, landlords are transformed into agricultural capitalists, who are able to adopt new production technologies to increase output, and tenants are turned into a paid labourer. This, however, would be a bold step, since it is politically detrimental to the state, but in the long term would lead to economic development (Humphries, 1990). However, it is difficult to see such a scenario taking place, since the state needs to maintain the prebendal relationships that it has with both peasants and Buganda kingdom. In this regard, one can argue that maintaining the controversy over land is one way of the state controlling the bargaining chips with the other actors. Allowing 62 | Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale traditional landlords to control land would be surrendering some power, since most peasants on the land are farmers; it would therefore mean that the kingship makes more sense to them than the political establishment at central level. As Marx and Engels (1848) argue, it is in the interest of the ruling capitalist elite that the poor are kept poor, by extracting any surplus value from the peasants and keeping them in a state where they have to accept handouts; more so in Africa, where many regimes lack democratic credentials and controlling the flow of resources is essential to the control of dissenting views. 3.5 Conclusion We have discussed the two levels of contestation in the contemporary land debate: those of the tenants and the landed, juxtaposed with the Beneficiaries of contestation – the peasants. In an effort to understand the arguments in favour of the land reforms, we have noted that the central state is motivated by a different mind-set, which governs its thinking and in turn explains the anticipated goals. For instance, state-engineered reforms are perceived to be geared to amassing political support, which the peasants provide, while at the same time reducing the influence and role of the rich landlords. However, the landed gentry want the status quo maintained, and this arises from the need to maintain reciprocal obligations and loyalty from the peasantry, as a source of power to not only counter state domination, but also enhance bargaining power. The above viewpoint demonstrates that although there are different levels of actors, there is consensus that the land reforms present an institutional lacuna regarding their intended outputs. The ultimate question that occurs is why then does the state choose to institutionalise conflicting reforms to the extent of creating institutional dysfunction? 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Leiden: Koninkklijk Brill N.V. Lwanga-Lunyiigo, S. (2007). The Struggle for Land Buganda. Kampala, p. Wavah Books Ltd. Mamdani, M. (2013). The Contemporary Ugandan Discourse on Customary Tenure: Some Theoretical Considerations (MISR Working Paper). Kampala: Makerere Institute of Social Research. Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848) The Communist Manifesto. Progress Publishers: Moscow. Mintz, S.W. (1974). Caribbean horizons. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co. Moore, D. “Subaltern struggles and the politics of place: Re-mapping resistance in Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands” Cultural Anthropology. 13(3) (1998): 344–376. Chapter 3 – Securing peasants’ land rights | 65 Muchunguzi, C. (2013). Responding to Crisis. The Adaptive Responses of Bahima pastoralists in search for Livelihood Resources Along the Uganda Cattle Corridor (Unpublished doctoral thesis). Mbarara University of Science and Technology. Museveni Okays Eviction of 1,500 Mubende homes (2010, January 11–13). The Observer. Mutibwa, P. (2008). The Buganda Factor in Uganda’s Politics. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. Ndegwa, S. (1997). “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Movements In Kenya Politics”. The American Political Science Review, 91(3): 599–616. Okuku, J. A. (2006). The Land Act (1998) and the Land Tenure Reform in Uganda. Africa Development, 41(1), 1–26. Oloka-Onyango, J. (1997). The Question of Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politics. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 15(2), 173–189. Onyango-Obbo, C. (2008, 20th May). Mengo arrests; Knee jerk reaction or planned move? Growing Friction-Kampala. The Monitor. Ostrom, E. V., Feeny, D., & Hartmut, P. (1993). Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives and Choice. San Francisco, CA: The California Institute for Contemporary Studies Press. Polanyi, K. (1957). The great transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Post, K and P. Wright. (1989). Socialism and Underdevelopment. London: Routledge. Ray, B. C. (1991). Myth, Ritual and Kingship in Buganda. New York: Oxford University Press. Reid, R. (2002). Political Power in Pre-colonial Buganda Economy, Society and Warfare in the 19th Century. London: James Currey. Richards, A. (1964). Authority Patterns in Traditional Buganda. In L. A. Fallers (Ed.). The King’s Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of Independence. London: Oxford University Press. Roscoe, J. (1904). The Baganda: An Account of their native Customs and Beliefs. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc. Saul, J. S., & Woods, R. (1971). African Peasants. In T. Shanin (Ed.). Peasants and Peasant Societies. London: Penguin. Shanin, T (1971). Peasants as a Political Factor. In Teeador Shanin(ed) Peasants and Peasant Societies (238-263). Middlex: Penguin Sithole, B (1999). Use and Access to Dambos in Communal lands in Zimbabwe: Institutional considerations. Ph.D Thesis. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Sithole, B, B. Campbell, D. Dore and W. Kozanayi (2003). Narratives on Land: State-Peasant Relations over Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe. African Studies Quarterly, 7(2&3). Retrieved from http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2a4.htm. Twaddle, M. (1993). Kakungulu and the Creation of Uganda, 1868–1928. London: James Curry Weber, M. (1957). The theory of social and economic organisation. New York: Oxford University Press. Aerial view of landscape in South Sudan, February 2013. Photo: Marc Nim, istock. The much-hyped phenomenon of the international land grab, for which neighbouring Ethiopia tends to be the poster-child, is so far but a paper tiger in South Sudan. Chapter 4, page 79 68 Wolf, E. R. (1966). Peasant. Englewood Cliffs, NJ Peasants: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 4. Land matters in South Sudan Ole Frahm 4.1 Introduction Land matters. The world over, ownership of land and access to land are key determinants of people’s place in the world, in the state, in the community. Likewise, contestation over rightful ownership of land and protests over expropriation of land are two of the most certain predictors over violent conflict from Guangzhou to São Paulo. This is no different in the world’s newest state, South Sudan, which less than three years after its independence plunged into a civil war between different factions of the former rebel/ liberation army from which it is yet to emerge. Those loyal to President Salva Kiir, as well as the rebel battalions that loosely follow his former deputy Riek Machar, fight as much over control of land and what lies underneath that land as they do over the levers of the nascent state’s formal institutions. Yet, much as during the decades-long interlinked civil wars in Sudan from the early 1980s, all the way to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, which paved the way for their country’s independence in 2011, most South Sudanese are not only keenly aware of their place of origin, but also appear eager to eventually return once a lasting peace deal has been agreed upon. And issues of land ownership, land use and land sales are sure to crop up again, once the next uneasy power-sharing deal (the previous one having collapsed in July 2016) is worked out by delegations in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Kampala or Khartoum. South Sudan, in spite of its tender age, therefore constitutes a fascinating case study of land regulations and disputes related to land that in some areas is a mirror image of similar developments in other sub-Saharan African countries, yet in other areas follows a highly eclectic development trajectory. There are several ways in which land and the way the state and society arrange its distribution and legal status substantially affect South Sudan’s peculiar trajectory in building a state, a collective identity and a nation state on the territory of South Sudan. The underlying basis for most of the secondary effects is that ownership of the vast majority of arable land is communal, which directly impacts on economic growth strategy of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and, in turn, the state’s propensity to engage in large-scale land deals with (foreign) investors. However, communal land ownership also contributes to an increasingly contentious politics of belonging that manifests itself, among other things, in conflicts over community boundaries and in the dangerous ethnicisation and exclusionary rhetoric that accompany the ongoing debate about an extension of federalism in the state’s governance. 70 | Ole Frahm 4.2 Land as a community resource As with many other areas of the present-day state structure, the organisation, distribution and regulation of ownership of and rights over land in South Sudan are an amalgamation of indigenous traditions, with laws and decrees dating from the period of British colonial rule and the times of independent Sudan governed from Khartoum. After conquering and de facto colonising Sudan at the turn of the twentieth century, the British maintained a policy in both northern and southern Sudan that gave control over land to local communities. Moreover, the British also left internal regulation – for example, adjudication of land disputes – to the purview of local sheiks or chiefs. Following independence in 1956, the Sudanese state maintained this status quo until Gen. Gaafar Nimeiry seized power in 1969. His ill-fated ambition was to turn Sudan into the breadbasket of the Arab world. The 1970 Unregistered Land Act enabled the state to massively expand mechanised farming, which enriched private investors while expropriating pastoralists’ land. In the course of the growing prominence of Islamist thought in Sudan’s political discourse, culminating in the 1989 coup d’état that brought Gen. Omar el-Bashir to power as the head of a radical Islamist regime, the state’s usurpation of allegedly unoccupied land was increasingly justified on the grounds that all land belonged to God and that the government acted as God’s earthly caretaker. In southern Sudan, which until the onset of the second civil war (1983-2005) had predominantly resisted successive waves of Christian and later Muslim proselytisation, land was traditionally a community resource and land rights were communitarian. Moreover, since Sudan’s independence, southern Sudan had only experienced a brief interlude of peace during the time of the Southern Regional Government (1972-1983) and otherwise had been the site of persistent fighting, which precluded the extension of formal state institutions and implementation of laws passed thousands of kilometres away in the capital. Thus, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), during its long liberation struggle against successive governments in Khartoum and other movements in the south, did not have the resources or political will to expend substantial energy and manpower on civil administration in the areas under its control and declared land a community resource. The secondary benefit to this approach was that it could be construed as a gesture towards the people the SPLM claimed to be fighting for (Johnson, 2011) – even if in actual fact Southern Sudanese civilians were regularly victimised by all parties to the conflict. 4.3 Communal versus private land ownership The fact that this notion that all land belongs to the community (already enshrined in the SPLM’s New Sudan Laws of 2003) survived the seminal shift of the CPA between the SPLM and the National Congress Party-led government in Khartoum is testament both to the concept’s popularity and to the inertia and lack of competent personnel Chapter 4 –Land matters in South Sudan | 71 in charge of drafting laws in South Sudan. Be that as it may, the GRSS acknowledges traditional communal land rights both in the Interim Constitution of 2005 and in the Land Act of 2009. In spite of legal recognition, however, there is intrinsic conflict between communal land ownership favoured by rural populations and traditional authorities and private ownership of land advocated by the GRSS, local government and some development practitioners (Forojalla & Galla, 2010, A5). While the majority of land is deemed communal land, the Land Act actually institutes a three-tier system of land-ownership of community, private and public land holdings. As such, land that is neither communally owned nor private belongs to the state. This regulatory framework in fact borrows substantially from revised land legislation in Uganda (1998) and Tanzania (1999) (Wily, 2010, p. 17), South Sudan’s regional neighbours and fellow Nile riparian states. The fact that much of the legislation is copied is indicative of the lack of concern paid to the formalisation of land ownership during the CPA period after 2005. Likewise, the fact that it is common knowledge in South Sudan’s capital Juba that the Local Government Act – which also establishes the principle of community ownership of land – was written by a member of a foreign development agency does not by itself disqualify the document, but it sheds light on the degree of ownership or rather lack thereof the South Sudanese government shows with respect to the act’s provisions. The persistent duality of legal norms of land ownership can be traced all the way to contemporary customary courts in South Sudan, where Cherry Leonardi (2013, p. 205) witnessed the “enduring tension between individual and collective property rights and between private ownership and kinship obligations – tensions which had if anything increased as the opportunities to purchase private property had also expanded”. 4.4 Land in South Sudan’s economic growth strategy Oil is by far and away South Sudan’s most valuable asset. Throughout the CPA period, between 2005 and 2011, and continuing after independence, the GRSS’s budget has relied on oil revenue for up to 98 percent of its income. This extreme reliance on a single commodity not only runs the risk of falling prey to often-volatile world market prices for crude oil, but also makes the oil-producing areas of South Sudan a prized commodity worth fighting over. Most of the oil fields straddle the current border between Sudan and South Sudan – a border that has yet to be fully delineated, let alone demarcated – and have been sites of conflict and forced displacement ever since Chevron confirmed oil discoveries in the 1970s. In Unity state, for instance, Dinka were forced from their traditional homelands and replaced by Misseriya tribes allied to the National Congress Party (NCP) regime (ICG, 2011, p. 20). Apart from the initial outbreak of violence in Juba, in the first years of the civil war most of the fighting between rebels and troops loyal to the government occurred in close proximity to the oilfields. 72 | Ole Frahm 4.4.1 When the oil runs out the land will still be there Already prior to independence, the government’s growth strategy had aimed to reduce its dependence on oil and emphasised the need to concentrate on agricultural production in order to achieve broad-based growth. It was, however, the standoff with Sudan over oil transit fees that truly triggered a rethink in government circles in Juba. In February 2012, Juba accused Khartoum of stealing oil and decided to halt exports through the pipeline to Port Sudan. The conflict, which culminated in April 2012 when troops from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the SPLM’s military wing, and fighters from Sudan attacked and briefly held the contested Heglig oilfields, nearly bankrupted the state. Given that the only export route for South Sudan’s oil runs through Sudan and lack of funding has so far derailed the planned construction of an alternative pipeline to Lamu in Kenya, this has led to a renewed focus on the country’s second-most valuable asset: arable land. On the one hand, ministers and other spokespeople are trying to reverse the rapid growth of South Sudan’s urban population and have appealed to citizens to engage in farming to help feed the nation. Since these appeals have fallen on deaf ears, as for most young South Sudanese (especially returnees) agricultural labour only constitutes a last resort – as a fallback option, all else having failed – the government has focused on the second pillar: foreign investment in the agricultural sector. 4.4.2 Acting against the Land Act For this very reason, the GRSS is not overly content with the present Land Act, itself passed in 2009. Instead, the Land Act is treated as a provisional document because the government is extremely keen to invite foreign investors into the country, above all into the agricultural sector, which has been identified as the best hope of diversifying the economy and by extension the state’s revenue stream. But a major obstacle to convincing investors – apart from the volatile security situation – has been insecurity of land rights. A high-ranking official involved in drafting what is supposed to become the new and revised Land Act pointed out that even if land belongs to communities that does not mean that they are free to do what they want with it: “If you don’t use it [the land], then the government can appropriate the land and lease it to foreign investors”.14 His proposal is to give the national government authority over public land and to carry out zoning in order to define how the various parts of the land ought to be used. At the same time, the almost complete lack of institutional capacity at community, county and even state levels, as well as the fact that many South Sudanese are not fully aware of their rights, could lead to abuses of the system. First of all, as ownership is based on customary law and tradition, most land has not yet been officially registered. There is also the problem of enforcement of ownership rights; in a case that is more the rule than the exception, in 2006 armed herders in Maridi County refused to return 14 Interview in Juba, 18 October 2013. Chapter 4 –Land matters in South Sudan | 73 land they had seized from farmers by threatening the county commissioner with the cattle-owner’s name, a high-ranking SPLA commander (Ashkenazi, Farha, Isikozlu, Radeke, & Rush, 2008, p. 21). Furthermore, while the law states that local communities have to be consulted and compensated when land is sold to external investors, in practice government officials in combination with investors and, possibly, traditional authorities, should not find it difficult “to ride roughshod over local rights” (Wily, 2010, p. 18). An investment scheme by a Norwegian company that plans to plant trees in Tindilo payam (sub-county) in Central Equatoria as part of a carbon credit scheme was, for instance, hampered by the lack of communication between the local community and those handling the development from the South Sudanese side who all resided in Juba (Deng, 2013, pp. 14–16). 4.5 Large-scale land deals The age of blank spaces on (European) maps of Africa was deemed to be over for over a century, nor were there supposed to be any blank spaces filled with erroneous inventions, like the Kong Mountains that were said to traverse a sizable part of West Africa. Alas, in contemporary South Sudan something similar has been happening. While the country has been mapped by satellites – including those sponsored by the anti-genocide non-governmental organisation The Enough Project – and a much-criticised census in 2008 has revealed an at least semi-accurate idea of where people live, South Sudan is nonetheless home to a large phantom enclave of foreign-owned, or rather investor-leased, plots of land. Such an enclave is what the Oakland Institute purported to have uncovered when David Deng in 2011 analysed all the publicly available contracts that involved the sale or long-term lease of land to foreign investors. Legally, land can only be leased not sold to foreigners; the maximum period of a lease is 99 years. According to the report’s findings, in the country’s short lifespan South Sudan had already managed to sell or lease around 8 percent of its territory, an area equivalent in size to the entire country of Rwanda (Oakland Institute, 2011, p. 3). And there is anecdotal evidence of large-scale land sales by individuals like the son of late militia leader Paulino Matiep, who during the 1990s and early 2000s played a key part in displacing residents from oilfields. While it is unclear whether large-scale agricultural investments are undertaken with a genuine eye on development or as speculative holdings that count on rising property values, what is clear is the South Sudanese government’s lack of capacity to oversee these investments, which may trigger domestic conflict in the mid- to long-term. Apart from in Juba, land is generally very cheap and has frequently changed hands based on cash payments, as “[t]he key people in large-scale land sales or leases are state governors, to whom the [GRSS] has delegated land issues at this stage of political development” (Keulertz, 2012, p. 8). And there is plentiful evidence that “military units occupy land illegally, and uniformed personnel engage in illegal extraction activities” (Ashkenazi et al. 2008, p. 17). 74 | Ole Frahm 4.5.1 Land grabs – spectre or phantom? But scepticism abounds with regard to these claims.15 When you zoom in from the far-away perspective of paper contracts to an actual shot of the place in question, the Rwanda-sized, non-contiguous plot dissolves into something much more modest. While it is currently impossible or, more precisely, anything but a priority for South Sudanese or international observers alike to go looking for evidence of land leases being realised on the ground (e.g. by fencing in, by planting or even just by putting up a sign declaring ownership), evidence from before the outbreak of internecine fighting on 15 December 2013 suggests a rather one-sided picture. Hardly any of the deals mentioned in Deng’s report have had any repercussions on the territories allegedly leased or sold, and several contracts are said to have been declared null and void.16 To some extent, the publicity brought by Deng’s report has alerted affected communities, which have staged protests that have included threats to use violence against any would-be investors if they were to try to take possession of their purchases. Pearce (2012, pp. 44–46) mentions the case of two investors, one British and the other American, who in 2008 signed a 49-year lease for 600,000 hectares of land in Central Equatoria only to find out that the chiefs with whom they had negotiated did not have the requisite authority and later denied involvement altogether as public anger mounted against the contract. In turn, to cope with the outrage and public displays of discontent in the streets of Juba, where delegations came to protest against the sale of their land unbeknownst to them, a moratorium on further sales and leases of land to investors was declared in 2012, supposedly to allow for legal clarification and the passing of a new framework for transactions in land. Alas, the principle of communal land ownership is not only challenged by land deals, but also indirectly by way of laws regulating natural resource exploitation. The Petroleum Act 2012, for instance, grants the government the right to expropriate land and sell it to investors if doing so serves an unspecified public interest. The same holds true for the contemporaneously signed Mining Act, which retroactively restricts the legal ownership rights set out in the Land Act. As these acts indicate, the present moratorium on land sales should be seen less as a change of course or change of mind on the part of the government than as an intermediary stalling measure. Even before the ongoing civil war, the South Sudanese state was hardly present in many parts of the territory, especially in rural counties far from state capitals. “At the local level, the government often consists of little more than a handful of overstretched employees, working out of thatched-roofed buildings with no power, vehicles, communication, or regular salaries” (Mailer & Poole, 2010, p. 21). 15 16 I would like to thank Andreas Hirblinger from the University of Cambridge for first alerting me to these doubts at the European Conference on African Studies in Lisbon in June 2013. Interview with an official involved in regulating land holdings in South Sudan, Juba, 18 October 2013; interview with a member of the South Sudan Law Society, Juba, 24 October 2013. Chapter 4 –Land matters in South Sudan | 75 Hence, in order to be able to project power at all, politicians in Juba had to rely on alliances with local stakeholders, typically the chiefs, while in exchange refraining from meddling in communities’ internal affairs. Therefore, the decision to let the issue rest for the time being is also testament to actual power relations in local government and the reach or lack thereof of the South Sudanese state apparatus. And this inability to project power also cuts the other way: the government of South Sudan appears neither willing nor able to ensure that in those few instances where investors have actually arrived on the ground – for example, the Al Ain Wildlife Corporation from the United Arab Emirates, which has leased 1.68 million hectares in Boma National Park (Johnson, 2013) – that they will actually keep their promises to provide social benefits to local residents. 4.5.2 Belonging and not belonging to the land Green growth, if tackled the right way, may indeed be a viable option for South Sudan’s economy: a labour-intensive sector, with massive potential in a region bereft of sufficient arable land. Yet, it must not be forgotten or overlooked that people value their land for more than the financial returns they get. Juba’s real estate bubble may have altered conceptions of land as the large number of court cases surrounding ownership of land in the capital indicates. In many other parts of what in spite of rapid urbanisation remains a primarily rural country, attachment to land is an emotional bond that plays a key part in defining individual as well as group identity. Thus, the rise of debates over autochthony and the politics of belonging – i.e. the question of who rightly belongs to the national community and who does not – represent a truly novel development that has gripped an increasing number of African states in the past 20-odd years (Geschiere, 2009). Autochthony here refers to the indigenous, original, native (and therefore rightful) inhabitants, a loaded concept that becomes more complicated still by processes of urbanisation and migration that characterise many African countries in the present. For many parts of the continent, the introduction of property rights and other privileges that are tied to ‘being autochthonous’ have therefore created a rupture as “land and land rights play an important role in the politics of belonging in Africa due to the fact that rights to land are intimately tied to membership in specific communities” (Lentz, 2007, p. 37). A soil filled with identity… It is, however, not only the national community that excludes rather than includes potential members. Sub-national and local communities do much the same in deciding who is ‘one of us’ and who is not. On the local level, interest in autochthony and ‘being indigenous’ stem from a search for prosperity and security of land tenure amid underdevelopment and the state’s inability to provide services. Hence, functional concerns and, above all, competing claims over land encourage politicisation of identity as a means to protect and promote claims to ethnic terroir (Bates, 2008, p. 133). This mixture of emotional and utilitarian motives also appears to be at work in land matters in South Sudan. 76 | Ole Frahm As an individual’s identity is strongly linked to his or her ancestors – contemporary Nuer, for instance, generally know 12 generations of their patrilinear ancestors – and ancestors, though invisible, are still part of the family and community and “have favourite dwelling places, like shrines, cattle byres, houses, etc.” (Kamwaria & Katola, 2012, p. 51), the place and land where the ancestors lived is of great importance to most South Sudanese. According to this logic of collective as opposed to individual belonging, most returnees who fled the region during the war were adamant they had to return to a particular place in Southern Sudan, their place of origin, which was tied up with the ability to legitimately access resources, most notably land (Hovil, 2010, pp. 19–20). But on the ground, allocation of land to returnees proceeded much slower than necessary, which (along with the hardship of rural life) has driven many returnees into towns. … and a soil filled with cash The most prominent example of a clash between different conceptions of belonging and its implications for access to land occurs, however, right in the sprawling capital Juba, which is also the capital of Central Equatoria state. It has had to cope with a massive rise in the number of inhabitants since it became the capital of South Sudan in 2005. As a result, market prices for land have soared. A study from 2008 found that in the three years after independence, “the cost of a class three plot (20 x 20) [went] up from USD 400 in 2005 to USD 10,000–15,000 in 2008” (Pantuliano, Buchanan-Smith, Murphy, & Mosel, 2008, p. 29). While the local Bari community insisted on customary rights to land, and were supported by the (non-Bari) Central Equatoria government as a means to limit the central government’s influence, the GRSS laid claim to plots based on the language of development and the overriding imperative of building institutions for the new state. As Badiey (2013) has shown, these disputes and mutually conflicting discourses were also present among the common people: as Juba’s diverse residents disputed plots of land in the town’s contested neighbourhoods, invoking their plight as victims of the war, their role as vanguard of the liberation movement, their superior education and skills, or their residency in Juba during the difficult war years, they too made claims that reflected competing visions of the state and of citizenship. (p. 60) Far from relegating land disputes to a place of lower priority, the Land Act has actually exacerbated local conflict over land, while adding importance to individuals’ and groups’ assertions of identity and belonging. Sureau (2013) told of the case of Lucy who had been living in Torit, the capital of Eastern Equatoria, since the mid-1990s, but had her plot seized because she was originally from a village 40 kilometres away and did not belong to the supposedly original community of the Latuko. In the Sobat Basin, on the other hand, different Nuer clans (Jikany and Lou) spent much of the later stages of the second civil war fighting against each other, which glossed over the fact that both had effectively colonised land that used to be settled by the Anuak, displaced to refugee camps or to Ethiopia. Another example is the area around Yei, where many Chapter 4 –Land matters in South Sudan | 77 mostly Dinka internally displaced people settled on land deserted by the fleeing local population, and many soldiers later on refused to cede occupied land to the original owners. In Yei, as elsewhere, courts and police have shown great “reluctance to deal with land-grabbing by serving and former soldiers” (Martin & Sluga, 2011, p. 29). Similar stories have emerged from Jonglei, where many Dinka who were displaced there during the war use a narrative of victimhood (and the backing of the SPLA) to lay claim to the land. Thus, communal land ownership has led to a situation in which both sides in a dispute over land now present (pseudo-)historical narratives that highlight that their group was there first (Rolandsen, 2009, p. 23). To give an example, in a dispute over whether Kasengor payam belonged to Eastern Equatoria or to Jonglei, the representative for Kapoeta East county recounted the local Jie community’s migrations from the fourteenth century all the way until 1935, when they “were forced to relocate to Boma after the intervention of the Italian administration”, in order to prove they belonged in his county (Bosco, 2014). 4.5.3 Community boundaries as points of contention and identity formation South Sudan’s internal boundaries also constitute a major point of friction. The lack of demarcation of internal borders between states and counties (ICG, 2011, p. 21) and insecurity over rights, ownership and status of vital resources such as land and water contribute to conflicts among South Sudanese citizens (Forojalla & Galla, 2010, A18). For instance, the three states Lakes, Warrap and Unity are engaged in border disputes over ownership of valuable grazing land and wells, and the absence of cartographic material further exacerbates these disputes. Furthermore, since 2002 most counties, payams (sub-counties) and bomas (villages) have been subdivided, not only creating new institutions of local government, but also forcing the, on occasion, contentious issue of border demarcation (Rolandsen, 2009, p. 24). In Eastern Equatoria, for example, intense pressure from local communities drove the state government to increase the number of payams from 53 to 75. Counties and payams are multiplying because communities seek to be directly represented and also hope to gain employment and profit in other ways from having their own administrative unit. A typical point of contention in rural South Sudan is when communities are spread across different counties. In 2004, for example, a local peace conference in Central Equatoria between the Lokoya and Olo’bu peoples mentioned the fact that the Lokoya were split over Juba county and Torit county as a major source of friction (Ojil, 2004, p. 5). The anticipated legalisation and thus fixing of communal land rights inherent in the Land Act of 2009 has also contributed to conflicts between communities over the demarcation of communal boundaries – a struggle that often shifts to the centre as local parties seek support from associates in the government in Juba. Thus, in 2013 youths from Duk county in Jonglei appealed to the governor in Bor to halt attempts by youths 78 | Ole Frahm from neighbouring Uror county to annex parts of Duk county. A 2013 report by the humanitarian NGO Oxfam likewise pointed out how some conflicts over resources among agro-pastoralist communities in Warrap and Lakes states were sparked off and driven by newly created administrative boundaries that cut through highly valued and valuable land (Kircher 2013, p. 10). South Sudan political map. Based on United Nations Map. 4.6 Federalism and ethnic exclusivism The downside to the model of ethnic federalism – embodied by Ethiopia in its constitutional design, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in actual matter of fact – is that it lays the ideological groundwork for the exclusion and, in the last resort, expulsion of all ‘aliens’ (i.e. all those not deemed to belong by the dominant group). In the shadow of the strongly ethnicised war that is still being waged in parts of South Sudan, a longstanding debate over the federal structure of the state has been reignited. Innocuous as the question of federalism or decentralisation may at first appear, it carries with it the very real threat of ethnic cleansing. Regionalism in its South Sudanese manifestation is intricately linked to ethnicity. This applies in particular to Equatorian regionalism, which in many respects is tantamount to a multi-ethnic coalition of smaller ethnic groups that seek to counter the Chapter 4 –Land matters in South Sudan | 79 (perceived) preponderance of larger ethnic groups (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Zande) in the South Sudanese state. Up until the outbreak of the second civil war in 1983, the three Equatorian states in the south of South Sudan (Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria) used to constitute one of the three regions of Southern Sudan and were already home to anti-Dinka sentiments in the 1970s (Johnson, 2011, pp. 67–68). These sentiments were exacerbated by the civil war from 1983, in which the SPLA came to be portrayed as a Dinka army. A large part of the population of Greater Equatoria fled to Uganda when the SPLA advanced towards and eventually conquered swathes of Equatoria in the mid-1990s (Branch & Mampilly, 2005, p. 5). In a parallel development, many cattle-herding Dinka escaped the fighting further north and settled in parts of Equatoria, so “that some local Equatorians believed that the SPLA was not there to liberate them from Khartoum, but to take over their territory” (Sudd Institute, 2013, p. 8). While there had been isolated comments during the CPA period, the debate on federalism truly got underway in 2011, when a conference of the three Equatorian governors who called for a federalist system of governance, stirred strong emotions and responses. After having died down somewhat in the intervening years, the federalism debate reignited in 2014, with a host of speeches and opinion pieces that, like the governor of Central Equatoria State, voiced their support for federalism to be included in the permanent constitution. Instead of stymieing the issue, President Kiir’s unilateral measure in 2015 to disband the ten federal states and create 28 new states in their place has in fact exacerbated the debate over the future shape of a post-war South Sudan (Schomerus & Aalen, 2016). The reason why the debate on federalism matters to this analysis of land matters in South Sudan is that beyond the rhetoric of more accountable government and a better division of resources is a longstanding grievance among many Equatorians. Dinka who had been displaced to Equatoria during the war frequently refused to relinquish their new abodes after the peace agreement in 2005 – often their original land had also been usurped by others – and there was a pervasive sense that the SPLA stood behind the Dinka in land disputes with former owners (Walraet, 2008). The often unspoken but nonetheless widespread assumption about a federal system of government is that it would create de facto ethnic homelands and, as a consequence, force all Dinka to pack up and leave their land in Equatoria and return north to Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile – a very worrying prospect considering the current civil war has yet to be concluded. 4.7 Conclusion The picture that emerges from a closer look at the land question in South Sudan and all it entails is – unfortunately and probably inevitably – still blurred. Yet, what is unmistakably evident is how much land matters for every level of society and, in fact, the very ideas of nation and statehood. Land matters in South Sudan for the value it generates on the market and for its inherent value to origin and thus identity; land is 80 | Ole Frahm thus a matter of both profit and identity for individuals, communities and the state. Belonging to a specific plot of land, either large or small, is a vital determinant of people’s identity, in particular in a setting where the majority of the population have suffered displacement at least once in their lifetime. At the same time, arable and urban land is increasingly also a source of wealth for communities and their chiefs, as well as for the government for whom land looks like a sustainable long-term alternative to its present-day dependence on oil revenue. Given these high stakes, the GRSS has not only done little to clarify and simplify matters, but its policies and overall approach have, on the contrary, stoked discontent and conflict surrounding ownership of and control over land on the local level. In a predominantly rural country, with scarcely any infrastructure and weak state presence, such conflicts can easily spiral out of control. By granting ownership of most land to communities, the Land Act has forced people to self-define as a community against other communities that are excluded from their land. Thus, the GRSS’s landmark legislation commodifies the soil and raises its spiritual and monetary value for those who lay claim to it. Border fights and contentious haggling over rightful ownership are almost inevitable consequences, especially in a country where guns and traumatic experiences of past violence are found in abundance. The much-hyped phenomenon of the international land grab, for which neighbouring Ethiopia tends to be the poster-child, is so far but a paper tiger in South Sudan. But that may well change once a semblance of stability has returned if and when the civil war comes to an end. After years of fighting, significant disruptions to oil production and skyrocketing inflation, the rent-seeking elites in Juba are starved for cash to maintain their rule and lifestyle, while on the other side global demand for South Sudan’s (potential) agricultural produce from cattle to grain remains high. Lastly, the ongoing debate on federalism in South Sudan, which builds on ethnic exclusivity and forced exclusion from land, carries in it the seeds of future conflict over who controls and gets to live on the country’s land. If the aim is to create and foster a national identity and loyalty among its citizens that transcend and supersede regional, ethnic or family loyalties and identities, then the people of South Sudan ought to make sure that these seeds never enter their country’s fertile soils. Chapter 4 –Land matters in South Sudan | 81 References Ashkenazi, M., Farha, J., Isikozlu, E., Radeke, H., & Rush, P. (2008). Services, Return and Security in Four Counties in Southern Sudan. Bonn: International Center for Conversion. Badiey, N. (2013). The Strategic Instrumentalisation of Land Tenure in ‘Statebuilding’: The Case of Juba, South Sudan. Africa. 83(1), 57–77. Bates, R. H. (2008). When things fell apart: state failure in late-century Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bosco, I. (2014, April 29). Equatoria warns Jonglei over Kasengor district ownership. Sudan Tribune. Retrieved from http://sudantribune.com/spip.php? Branch, A., & Mampilly, Z. C. (2005). Winning the War, but Losing the Peace? The Dilemma of SPLM/A Civil Administration and the Tasks Ahead. Journal of Modern African Studies, 43(1), 1–20. Deng, D. K. (2013). ‘Land belongs to the community’: Demystifying the ‘global land grab’ in Southern Sudan (Working Paper 4). The Hague: Land Deal Politics Initiative. Forojalla, S. B. & Galla, K. C. (2010). Scoping Paper. In USAID (Ed.) Land tenure issues in Southern Sudan: Key findings and recommendations for Southern Sudan land policy. Sudan: USAID. Geschiere, P. (2009). The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Hovil, L. (2010). Hoping for peace, afraid of war: the dilemmas of repatriation and belonging on the borders of Uganda and South Sudan (Research Paper 196). New Issues in Refugee Research. Geneva: UNHCR. ICG (2011). Compounding Instability in Unity State (Africa Report 179). Brussels: International Crisis Group (ICG). Johnson, D. H. (2011). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars: Peace or Truce. Oxford: James Currey. Johnson, J. (2013, March 26). More cases of land grabs in South Sudan in South Sudan. South Sudan News Agency. Retrieved from http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/ articles/more-cases-of-land-grabs-in-south-sudan. Kamwaria, A., & Katola, M. (2012). The Role of African Traditional Religion, Culture and World-View in the Context of Post-War Healing among the Dinka Community of Southern Sudan. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 2(21), 49–55. Keulertz, M. (2012). Drivers and actors in large-scale farmland acquisitions in Sudan (Working Paper 10). The Hague: Land Deal Politics Initiative. Kircher, I. (2013). Challenges to Security, Livelihoods, and Gender Justice in South Sudan: The situation of Dinka agro-pastoralist communities in Lakes and Warrap States. Oxford: Oxfam Research Reports. 82 | Ole Frahm Lentz, C. (2007). Land and the politics of belonging in Africa. In Chabal, P., Engel, U., & De Haan, L. (Eds.) African Alternatives. Leiden: Brill. Leonardi, C. (2013). Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship, Community and State. Woodbridge: James Currey. Mailer, M., & Poole, L. (2010). Rescuing the Peace in Southern Sudan (Joint NGO Briefing). Oxfam International. Martin, E., & Sluga, N. (2011). Sanctuary in the city? Urban displacement and vulnerability in Yei, South Sudan (Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper). London: Overseas Development Institute. Ojil, B. C. (2004). Report on Peace and Reconciliation Conference of the Lokoya and the Olu’bo Communities of East Bank. Nimule, South Sudan. Pantuliano, S., Buchanan-Smith, M., Murphy, P., & Mosel, I. (2008). The Long Road Home: Opportunities and Obstacles to the Reintegration of IDPs and refugees returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas. Report of Phase II: Conflict urbanisation and land (Humanitarian Policy Group Report). London: Overseas Development Institute. Pearce, F. (2012). The Land Grabbers: The New Fight over Who Owns the Earth. London: Eden Project Books. Rolandsen, Ø. H. (2009). Land, Security and Peace Building in the Southern Sudan (PRIO Paper). Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Schomerus, M., & Aalen, L. (2016) Considering the state: Perspectives on South Sudan’s subdivision and federalism debate (Report). London: Overseas Development Institute. Sudd Institute (2013). Peace and Reconciliation in South Sudan: A Conversation for Justice and Stability (Special Report). Juba. Sureau, T. (2013). New forms of exclusion in Torit: Contestation over urban land. In E. Grawert (Ed.). Forging Two Nations: Insights on Sudan and South Sudan. Addis Ababa: OSSREA. The Oakland Institute (2011). Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Country Report: South Sudan. Oakland: The Oakland Institute. Walraet, A. (2008). Governance, violence and the struggle for economic regulation in South Sudan: the case of Budi County (Eastern Equatoria). Afrika Focus, 21(2), 53–70. Wily, L. A. (2010). Making Peace Impossible? Failure to Honour the Land Obligations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Central Sudan (Resource Paper). Tanzania. Photo: C. Mungai, CCAFS. Land acquisitions by domestic investors, elites and politically powerful people may be more serious than large-scale foreign investments. Chapter 5, page 96 Tanzania political map. Derived from a United Nations map. 5. Effects of large-scale land acquisitions by local elites on smallholder farmers’ access in Tanzania Hosea Mpogole 5.1 Introduction Tanzania is an agrarian country, with over 70 percent of its population living in rural areas (URT, 2014). These rural people are mainly smallholder farmers, deriving their livelihoods from agriculture and pastoralism (Mpogole, Mlambiti & Kadigi, 2012; Sulle & Nelson, 2009). From these agricultural activities smallholder farmers are responsible for about 90 percent of the entire national food production (Sulle & Nelson, 2009). Food is produced on land that is mostly acquired through inheritance from parents or ancestors. This inherited land is the main asset that smallholder farmers own. Land is the key resource that defines the identity and livelihood of rural people, their food security and prospects for economic development (Cotula, Toulmin, & Quan, 2006; Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, & Keeley, 2009; Respikius, Dismas, & Haule, 2013). Considering such land-based identity and derived economic activities, access to land for rural people is a primary requirement (Cotula et al., 2006; Respikius et al., 2013). Meanwhile, the development of investment promotion policy has attracted foreign and local investors, mainly in biofuels, agriculture, tourism and hunting (Nelson, Sulle & Lekaita, 2012). These investments have increased demand and competition for land and water at the expense of smallholder farmers, pastoralists and indigenous people (Liversage, 2011). Land acquisition by foreign investors is well documented in terms of location, size applied, size granted, value, and type of investment made or planned (Sulle & Nelson, 2009). Nonetheless, land acquisition by local elites17 has not been discussed with due attention by researchers, non-governmental organisations, activists and the international community. Focusing on foreign land acquisitions misses the many domestic elites 17 For the purposes of this paper, ‘local elites’ refers to local investors, rich people, and politically powerful and influential individuals 88 | Hosea Mpogole involved (Cotula et al., 2009; Liversage, 2011), some of whom acquire such land only for speculative purposes, hoping to find an interested investor to partner with or sell the land to. Only a few studies have superficially discussed some deals where domestic elites are involved (e.g. Respikius et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 2012). Those few documented domestic land deals are the ones that have attracted public attention due to pronounced conflicts. Due to limited research and discussion there is a knowledge gap about what is actually transpiring in domestic land deals in Tanzania. This chapter aims to stimulate discussions about land acquisitions by local elites in Tanzania. It draws from existing literature and limited available evidence in an endeavour to explore the prevalence and impact of land acquisitions by domestic elites on smallholders’ access to and implications for agricultural production for these farmers. The chapter gives recommendations on managing acquisitions by local elites to control land concentration and growing inequalities. It starts by discussing a historical review of land tenure systems in Tanzania, reforms and governing legislations and policies. 5.2 Land tenure systems and reforms in Tanzania In the pre-colonial era, Tanganyika18 was mostly dominated by chiefdoms based on tribal groups. Back then, land was owned by tribal chiefs and clanships. Although Odgaard (2002) pointed out that access to land in Tanzania has not been much of a problem as far as history has it, Nyagava (1999) observes that there were various conflicts and fights between and among chiefdoms over land and territories; for example, fights between the Wahehe and Wabena, and between the Wahehe and Wangoni between the 1860s to 1880s all revolved around control over land and/or territories. It is documented that in pre-colonial times, the chief was vested with full authority over his entire territory, although various clans owned some land within a particular chiefdom (Odgaard, 2002). During the colonial era, part of land ownership shifted into the hands of colonial rulers, although some chiefdoms and clanships continued to own land (Odgaard, 2002; Okoth-Ogendo, 1999). However, customary landholders were regarded as tenants of the state as they were inferior to statutory and common-law tenure (Benschop, 2002). This dual land tenure system was possible because, until then, Tanganyika had ample land, perhaps prompting Odgaard (2002) to note that there were then no problems of land accessibility. In 1885, the Germans issued an imperial decree that all land, whether occupied or not, would be treated as unowned crown land and was vested in the empire except for claims of ownership by private persons, chiefs or native communities that could be proved either by documentation or by the fact of cultivation or possession. Based on this decree, a distinction was made between claims and rights of occupancy, 18 Tanzania is a union between two countries, namely Tanganyika (now called Tanzania mainland) and Zanzibar [Unguja and Pemba Islands]. Tanganyika and Zanzibar were united in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania Chapter 5 – Effects of large-scale land acquisitions | 89 where claims were to be proved by documentation, while occupations were to be proved by the fact of cultivation and possession. After the First World War, Germany had been defeated and Tanganyika was placed under protectorate, to be ruled by the British on behalf of the League of Nations, which was established after the war (Benschop, 2002). The British passed land tenure legislation in 1923 known as the Land Ordinance Cap. 113. This ordinance declared all land as public, which was vested in the control of a governor, except for the title or interest in land lawfully acquired before the commencement of the ordinance (Odgaard, 2002). The Land Ordinance Cap. 113 introduced a land tenure system called Right of Occupancy, which was either a granted or a deemed right. The granted one was statutory, while the deemed right was customary in accordance with native laws and customs. However, no legal security of tenure existed for customary land rights (Benschop, 2002). The land tenure system of Tanganyika continued to be guided by the Land Ordinance even after independence, with minor changes as outlined below. In the post-independence era, the Land Ordinance of 1923 largely remained in force, with a few exceptions that occurred in 1963, as follows: • • • • All land was declared public, with ownership being vested in the president, on behalf of all citizens of Tanganyika (and later Tanzania); Freehold titles were converted to leasehold for a maximum of 99 years; The role of chiefs that was somewhat spared from colonial intervention on matters related to land administration ceased, being replaced by village authorities; and The Nyalubanja19 feudal system was formally abolished. In 1967, the Arusha Declaration came in, announcing the nationalisation of private properties above a certain value, and this included land, mostly involving developed farm estates. Nationalisation of land and other property was done in order to implement the policy of socialism and self-reliance that came in to force in 1967. According to Shivji (1998, cited in Sulle & Nelson, 2009, p. 37), the socialist policies adopted in 1967 facilitated greater central authority over land. Through this process, private rights were nationalised, while customary land institutions were weakened by the villagisation operations of the mid-1970s. During this period, the majority of rural Tanzanians were relocated without formally reconciling their forced movements with existing patterns of land rights and tenure (Sulle & Nelson, 2009). In the established ‘ujamaa villages’ public land was identified on which village members could farm together and share the proceeds. The village government also had authority to allocate land within its boundaries to villagers as well outsiders who applied for it. 19 In some parts of Tanganyika, chiefs were commonly known as nyalubanja. The Nyalubanja owned the land. Some land could be given to people of the ruling class, while the rest lived as tenants. See also Lwamayanga (2008, pp. 85–90). 90 | Hosea Mpogole 5.3 Land reforms, legislation and policies During the first 35 years of independence, the government did not introduce major reforms or amendments to the inherited Land Ordinance and supporting legislation. The marginal reforms, which were introduced in 1963 as mentioned above, aimed to reduce ownership of land from being perpetual to a definite period with a maximum term of 99 years. However, according to Benschop (2002), the 99-year leasehold title was seen as the superior form of land tenure that was mostly allocated to foreign immigrants. After the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and villagisation operations of the mid 1970s, Tanzania faced a serious economic crisis in early 1980s. This crisis forced the government to sign the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that would allow for a free market and private sector-led economy. The free market economy increased competition for resources and land was no exception. During this period, investors embarked on buying and registering private lands. Those investors increased competition for land and pastures (Odgaard, 2002; Igoe, 2003), which increased land conflicts, as by then there was no national policy to guide land tenure issues (Respikius et al., 2013). Following the increased competition and pressure over land, a National Land Policy was formulated in 1995, paving the way for the enactment of two major pieces of legislation: the Land Act, No. 4 of 1999, along with its Land (Amendment) Act of 2004; and the Village Land Act, No. 5 of 1999. The Land Act stipulates three categories of public land as: (1) reserved land, (2) village land, and (3) general land. Under general land, the right of occupancy or leasehold may be granted. Village land is administered at grassroots level by village councils, for which a customary certificate of right of occupancy (CCRO) may be granted to the holder. Reserved land includes all land that is set aside for various purposes including forest, wildlife conservation, marine parks, and public recreation and utilities. This land is managed and administered by sectoral government agencies (German, Schoneveld & Mwangi, 2011). General land includes all land that is neither village nor reserved, and all unoccupied and/or unused village land. This general land is managed and administered by the Ministry of Lands and is regulated under the provisions of the Land Act No. 4 of 1999. In either case, non-citizens are restricted from holding land unless it is for investment purposes. Although exact data on proportions of reserved, general and village land are not readily available, German et al. (2011) have estimated that village land accounts for about 70 percent of the total land in Tanzania. Reserved land accounts for about 28 percent, while general land accounts for only about 2 percent, which is mainly urban. Only about 2 percent of rural land and about 20 percent of urban land carries titles, or has potential for titles (Kironde, 2009). This implies that about 70 percent of land in Tanzania is in unregistered, although it might be in use. Most unregistered land, which is the main target of investors, belongs to villages. Targeting unregistered village land implies that land will be transferred from the hands of smallholder farmers, whose livelihoods depend on it, into the hands of investors (Collier & Dercon, 2013). Chapter 5 – Effects of large-scale land acquisitions | 91 5.3.1 Views on large-scale land acquisitions by investors The literature indicates the presence of contradictory views on the transfer of land from smallholder farmers to large investors. Some authors, such as Lugoe (2007) and Collier & Dercon (2013), have viewed land acquisition as an essential process in promoting agricultural investment and productivity. In this process, land is transferred from the hands of less productive smallholder farmers to investors, who are perceived as more efficient (Cotula et al., 2006; Collier & Dercon, 2013). According to Collier & Dercon (2013), the development model for Africa should be revisited because a focus on smallholder agriculture for growth has not proved successful. They argue that smallholder farmers have not chosen to be entrepreneurs, but are farming by default. Hence, leaving the single most important sector of the economy almost exclusively to peasants will threaten the performance of agriculture in Africa, thereby limiting growth, and agriculture is then unlikely to bring about large-scale poverty reduction. The proponents of land transfer from smallholder farmers to investors in the promotion of agribusiness fail to address key issues such as those posed by Sulle & Nelson (2009). According to Sulle & Nelson (2009), the ultimate impact on the livelihoods of dispossessed people is not always certain. They question whether one-off payments for land compensation are satisfactory in the long run. Another commonly held view is that smallholder farm production is the major means of securing livelihoods and food for the rural population as well as the entire population (Myenzi, 2005; Kamata, 2008; Sosovele, 2010). As mentioned above, statistics show that smallholder farmers account for about 90 percent of all food production in Tanzania. This being the case, smallholder farmers cannot simply be marginalised and displaced from their customary land. According to Cotula et al. (2006), even where agriculture is becoming less important, with the growth of alternative sources of income, secure land rights provide a valuable source of income for investment, access to water, and retirement or security in cases of unemployment. It is argued that family farming remains the backbone of rural livelihoods in many parts of the developing world, and has proved to be dynamic, responsive to change and an important source of investment in agriculture (Cotula et al., 2006). The proponents of smallholder production, such as Myenzi (2005) and Kamata (2008), have argued that the land reforms in Tanzania – in particular the Land Act of 1999, Village Land Act of 1999 and subsequent enactments including the Land (Amendment) Act of 2004 – were all geared towards a neoliberal agenda of land privatisation in Tanzania. It is further argued that the neoliberal agenda, in the long run, entails achieving a privatised land tenure system in which smallholder farmers and pastoralists will be separated from their means of production, which may further fuel conflicts and instability. The privatised land tenure systems will mark a change in who owns the land and what grows on it (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2010). According to the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (2010), there are ongoing debates about the severity of the potential impacts of large-scale land acquisition by investors, and whether they will deliver on their promises of social and 92 | Hosea Mpogole economic development, poverty alleviation, and improved access to food, or whether they are just one-sided deals designed to primarily benefit foreign investors and domestic elites. 5.4 Prevalence of domestic land deals in Tanzania Large-scale land acquisition in Tanzania, as in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, has been widely documented. Land acquisition takes different forms, with diverse actors. The main actors are foreign investors and local elites (Cotula et al., 2006). Those investors and local elites acquire large pieces of land for investment; others, for speculative purposes. According to Cotula et al. (2009), large-scale land acquisition is characterised by: rising land-based investments; large-scale land claims, especially on higher-value land; dominance of the private sector; and dominance of foreign investments. Existing literature widely discusses large-scale land acquisition by foreign investors, including: Msuya (2007); Cotula et al. (2009); Sulle & Nelson (2009); Hakiardhi (2010); Sosovele (2010); Liversage (2011); Massay (2012); Nelson et al. (2012); and Mahonge (2013), to mention but a few. These studies document issues about land deals and the amount of land that has been or is in the process of being acquired by foreign investors, and the consequences for local communities. For instance, Hakiardhi (2010) has observed that: • • • • • Land is acquired by investors without consent from villagers; Land that is acquired is not transparently measured for compensation; There is an uninformed expansion in the areas surrounding the acquired land; There is a serious lack of knowledge of the legal procedures and implications of village land transfers (Massay, 2012; Sosovele, 2010; Sulle & Nelson, 2009; Respikius et al., 2013); and There is a serious dearth of information about land rights among villagers (Massay, 2012; Sulle & Nelson, 2009; Respikius et al., 2013). In the aftermath, there have been complaints from villagers demanding the return of their farms. They argue that investors came as saviours or liberators, but later changed villagers into casual labourers (Hakiardhi, 2010). According to Hakiardhi (2010), some villagers were heard to say: we request our farms to be returned to us and not to be paid anything; because from the beginning we didn’t intend to give it to the investor. Besides those farms is what we depend on to sustain our livelihoods and those of our families (p. 33) A few studies have superficially discussed land acquisitions by local elites, pointing out that domestic elites are playing a major role in land acquisitions. However, this phenomenon has so far received negligible national and international attention (Cotula et Chapter 5 – Effects of large-scale land acquisitions | 93 al., 2009). According to Massay (2012), Nelson et al. (2012) and Respikius et al. (2013), the amount of land acquired by local elites is not documented and the actual process of land acquisition through village government deviates from the land policy. For instance, Nelson et al. (2012) has found that there is serious land grabbing by local elites in the rural hinterland of Kiteto district in Manyara region. Bribes are often paid to village leaders in order to acquire land. For instance, Sosovele (2010) has argued that a combination of ignorance, bribery and poverty make local people and/or village leaders sign off land transfer agreements. Also, collusion between village and district officials in land sales and allocation is pronounced (Nelson et al., 2012). It is also noted that: some district officials, as well as national elites and officials from Dar es Salaam, have notably been amongst the parties acquiring large areas of land amounting to several hundred hectares out of Maasai or Akie communal territories (ibid., p. 18) The use of bribes in land acquisitions by local elites has also been observed in Mikese ward in Morogoro region (Respikius et al., 2013). Respikius et al. (2013) argue that there are various modes of land acquisition in rural areas, including inheritance, land allocation by village government, purchase and rental. However, for over a decade, many villages did not allocate land to smallholder farmers due to land purchases by wealthy people from outside the ward. This phenomenon increased land value beyond the means of many local villagers. It was observed further that village government leaders were not willing to allocate land to local peasants because they received little in return (ibid.). This is not surprising, because Kamanga (2008, cited in Sulle & Nelson, 2009, p. 45) contends that the pattern of acquisition of land by investors can barely be described as transparent, coherent or entirely consistent with applicable laws and policy directives. While a few cases of land acquisition by local elites have been documented, anecdotal evidence indicates that there is large-scale land acquisition in various places including the southern highlands of Tanzania, where huge chunks of land are being acquired by local elites for tree planting (Masasi, 2013). Over time, this can reduce the amount of land available to smallholder farmers, consequently threatening the food security of the rural population as well as their livelihoods in general. 5.5 Implications of domestic deals on smallholders’ access to land The impact of large-scale land acquisition by foreign investors has widely been discussed. Although it takes a different form from acquisition by domestic elites, the impact remains the same. Most land acquisitions are done in the name of investment (Massay, 2012). It is claimed that large investments in land are beneficial to villages, as they provide employment opportunities and employ inclusive agricultural business models, which should also benefit small-scale farmers and raise productivity (Collier & Dercon, 94 | Hosea Mpogole 2013; Karlsson, 2012; Massay, 2012; Liversage, 2011; Sulle & Nelson, 2009; Cotula et al., 2009; Msuya, 2007). According to many, large-scale land acquisition for investment may both enhance and compromise the food security and livelihoods of smallholder farmers (Cotula et al., 2009; Karlsson, 2012). So far, positive impacts have been observed in investments where smallholder farmers are directly linked to out-grower schemes (Liversage, 2011; Karlsson, 2012; Mahonge, 2013). In Morogoro region, for example, Karlsson (2012) observed increased cash incomes and productivity through effective sugarcane out-grower schemes. In those schemes, processing companies were involved in provision of extension services and transportation of sugarcane to factories, as well as investing in infrastructure for education, health facilities and road improvement in the area. Other studies, however, do not find a significant impact of out-grower schemes; for example, Massay (2012) and Nelson et al. (2012). Massay (2012) observed that in the Rufiji river basin, villagers were lured there by investors and they identified health, education, water, milling machines and road services to be provided by the company for support in return for the land acquired from the government. Also, investors promised to support villagers to conduct modern agriculture and provide a market for their produce, something that was never realised. Nelson et al. (2012) similarly observed that many investments in biofuel did not mature due to the financial crisis and poor performance of jatropha in trial plantations. It is argued that the biofuel investment boom of 2005–2008 was highly speculative and poorly researched. Investors lacked clear business plans, adequate financing, and agronomic expertise in the Tanzanian context. As such, the jatropha boom for the most part ended before it ever really started (ibid.). Large-scale land acquisitions may result in local people losing access to resources that they depend on for their food security (Cotula et al., 2009; Liversage, 2011). According to Cotula et al. (2009), the perception of land abundance should be treated with care because in many cases, land is already being used or claimed, yet existing land uses and claims go unrecognised because land users are marginalised. Even in countries where some land is available, large-scale land allocations may still result in displacement as demand focuses on higher-value lands. In the process of land acquisitions by investors, it is observed that poorer and less politically powerful groups are often dispossessed of the land on which they farm (Cotula et al., 2006). Cotula et al. (ibid.) have argued that governments claim ownership of land, with customary use rights recognised only when land is not sought by other more powerful interests. Investors and local elites tend to safeguard their land by property rights (CCRO for village land or right of occupancy for general land), which are superior to undocumented customary rights. In addition to property rights, investors and elites safeguard their land by physically fencing it. This denies smallholder farmers access not only to land, but more importantly to water for their household needs and livestock. Smallholder farmers also lose access to wild fruits, wild vegetables and firewood, which are a source of income and food to some rural people. Another implicit thing that smallholder farmers lose is access to pathways. It should be understood that in rural areas, there are no paved roads leading to smallholder Chapter 5 – Effects of large-scale land acquisitions | 95 farms. Traditionally, smallholder farmers have developed their own paths (quite often shortcuts) to their fields. In the event that an investor purchases some land and fences it in it implies that smallholder farmers will have to walk longer distances to go around the fenced areas to get to their fields, or to get water or wood. The effects of land acquisitions by local elites, while seemingly new, were long foreseen by Mwalimu20 Julius K. Nyerere, the first president of the United Republic of Tanzania Nyerere (1966, as cited in Hakiardhi, 2010) noted: even if there were no rich foreigners in this country, there would emerge rich and clever Tanganyikans. If we allow land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would only be a few Africans possessing land in Tanganyika and all the others would be tenants (p.10) It is then equally important to manage land acquisitions by local elites, as is the case with foreign investors. The eventual effect of land acquisition by both local and foreign investors is to extinguish customary land rights, which implies less access to land for smallholder farmers. Even in cases where local rights have been transparently extinguished and compensation is paid, it is important to answer the question posed by Sulle & Nelson (2009): what is the ultimate impact on the livelihoods of the dispossessed people? Another question is, is a one-off payment for land compensation likely to be satisfactory in the long run? From the foregoing discussion and according to Cotula et al. (2009), there is a need to explore what business models are favourable to both smallholder farmers and investors in a more secure land tenure system. These would range from plantations to contract farming, purchase agreements, policy incentives, joint ventures and out-grower schemes. Under joint ventures, investors contribute the start-up capital and villagers contribute the land. This way the investors’ share relates to the start-up capital and the villagers’ share relates to the value of the land. 5.6 Conclusion While there is growing concern about the negative impacts on local people from foreign investors, the arguments and evidence presented in this paper show that land acquisitions by domestic investors, elites and politically powerful people may be more serious than large-scale foreign investments. If not managed, land acquisitions by local investors and elites will result in land concentration and growing inequalities. Since the amount and processes of land deals by local investors, elites and politically powerful people are not clearly documented, there is a need for a comprehensive empirical study to deter20 Mwalimu means teacher. The first president of Tanganyika and the United Republic of Tanzania, Julius Kambarage Nyerere who was a teacher by profession was commonly called Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere. 96 | Hosea Mpogole mine the extent of the prevalence and impact of such transactions. There is also a need to conduct awareness-raising programmes to educate smallholder farmers about their land rights and legal procedures, and the implications of uncoordinated land transfers. Chapter 5 – Effects of large-scale land acquisitions | 97 References Benschop, M. (2002). Rights and Reality: Are women’s equal rights to land, housing and property implemented in East Africa? (pp. 41–49). United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-Habitat. Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (2010). Foreign Land Deals and Human Rights: Case Studies on Agricultural and Biofuel Investment. New York: NYU School of Law. Collier, P., & Dercon, S. (2013). African agriculture in 50 years: Smallholders in a rapidly changing world? Economic and Social Development Department, FAO. Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R., & Keeley, J. (2009). Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa. London/Rome: IIED/FAO/ IFAD. Cotula, L., Toulmin, C., & Quan, J. (2006, October 8–13). Policies and practices for securing and improving access to land (TS 71). Global Land Tenure – Challenges and Innovations, Munich, Germany. German, L., Schoneveld, G., & Mwangi, E. (2011). Contemporary processes of large-scale land acquisition by investors: case studies from sub-Saharan Africa (Occasional Paper 68). Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR. Hakiardhi (2010). Accumulation by land dispossession and labour devaluation in Tanzania: The case of biofuel and forestry investments in Kilwa and Kilolo. Dar es Salaam: Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (LARRI/Hakiardhi). Igoe, J. (2003). Scaling up Civil Society: Donor Money, NGOs and the Pastoralists Land Rights in Tanzania. Development and Change 34(5), 863–885. Kamata, N. (2008, February 13). Land rights and neoliberal agenda in Tanzania. Presentation to the Centre for Environmental Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Karlsson, J. (2012). What have different actors done to increase the benefits of commercial agriculture investments for poor people? Stockholm: Sida’s Help Desk for Environment and Climate Change. Kironde J. M. L. (2009, March 9–10). Improving Land Sector Governance in Africa: The case of Tanzania. Paper prepared for the workshop on land governance in support of the MDGs responding to new challenges. Washington, DC: FIG International Federation of Surveyors. Liversage, H. (2011). Responding to ‘land grabbing’ and promoting responsible investment in agriculture. Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Lugoe, F. (2007, July 27). Tanzania’s experience with land administration and land policy reforms: Women’s land rights. The Guardian. Lwamayanga, C. (2008). Constancy and Change: the living processes and skills in vernacular architecture of Kagera region – Tanzania (Doctoral dissertation, pp. 85–90). Oslo School of Architecture and Design. 98 | Hosea Mpogole Mahonge, C. P. I. (2013). Transforming traditional land governance systems and coping with land deal transactions in Tanzania. The Hague: ISS – Land Deal Politics Initiative. Massay, G. E. (2012, October 26–27). Energy and food demands, drivers of land grab: A case of Rufiji River Basin in Tanzania. Paper presented at CEFA ONLUS International Conference on Land, a Common Good; Natural Resource Management, Agricultural Policies and Cooperation in the area of Land Grabbing. Bologna: CEFA ONLUS. Masasi, M. J. (2013). Small scale tree farmers and income generating activities under INCOMET project in Vikula and Nundwe Villages in Mufindi District (Unpublished MBA dissertation). Iringa, Tanzania: University of Iringa. Mpogole, H. Mlambiti, M. E., & Kadigi, R. M. J. (2012). Round potato (Solanum tuberosum) production in southern highlands of Tanzania: Are smallholder farmers becoming commercial? Journal of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, 4(8), 385–391. Msuya, E. (2007). The impact of foreign direct investment on agricultural productivity and poverty reduction in Tanzania (Paper No. 3671). Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). Myenzi, Y. (2005). Implications of the recent land reforms in Tanzania on the land rights of small producers. Paper prepared for internal reflections and discussion. Dar es Salaam: Land Rights Research and Resources Institute. Nelson, F., Sulle, E., & Lekaita, E. (2012, October 17–19). Land Grabbing and Political Transformation in Tanzania. Paper presented to the Global Land Grabbing II Conference. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. Nyagava, S. I. (1999). A History of the Bena to 1914. Iringa, Tanzania: Iringa University College. Odgaard, R. (2002). Scrambling for land in Tanzania: Processes of formalisation and legitimisation of land rights. The European Journal of Development Research, 14(2), 71–88. Okoth-Ogendo, H. W. O. (1999, February 16–19). Land policy development in East Africa: A survey of recent trends. A Regional Overview Paper for the DFID Workshop on ‘Land Rights and Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Sunningdale Park Conference Centre, Berkshire, UK. Respikius, M., Dismas, M., & Haule, S. C. (2013). Land acquisition and livelihoods in rural areas of Morogoro District of Tanzania: Policy and Practice. African Journal of Social Sciences, 3(1), 56–62. Sosovele, H. (2010). Policy challenges related to biofuel development in Tanzania. Africa Spectrum, 45(1), 117–129. Sulle, E., & Nelson, F. (2009). Biofuels, Land Access and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania. London: IIED. URT (2014). Basic Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile: Key findings on 2012 population and housing census. Dar es Salaam: United Republic of Tanzania (URT). Open Field Day in Bugesera District, Rwanda, June 2018. Photo: T.Muchaba, CCAFS. In patriarchal societies, where unequal gender relations prevail, micro-credit systems may not always work in women’s favour. Chapter 6, page 116 Rwanda political map. Derived from a United Nations map. Rwanda. Rural and urban population by provinces and country total. 17 % 83 % Population Size 2 500 000 Rwanda Total Population 10,5 million 2 000 000 1 500 000 1 000 000 24 % 91 % 88 % 91 % 93 % 500 000 0 Kigali City Southern Province Western Province Northern Province Eastern Province Rural population Urban population Source: Rwanda 4th Population and Housing Census, 2012 (NISR) 6. From male to joint land ownership: The effect on women’s possibilities of using land titles as collateral in Rwanda Jeannette Bayisenge 6.1 Introduction Various studies report that Rwanda has made advances in the effort to strengthen women’s land rights in comparison with other countries in the region. A committed government and a new body of gender-sensitive laws and policies offer a promising future to women (Daley, Dore-Weeks & Umuhoza, 2010; McAuslan, 2010; Bayisenge, 2015). In 2007, the Government of Rwanda (GoR), with the help of development agencies including the World Bank, Department for International Development (DFID) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as a number of non-governmental organisations, both national and international, piloted a programme of land registration and titling (LRT) that expanded to the whole country in 2009 (MINITERE, DFID and HTSPE, 2007). Through this programme, a high number of women have secured land titles either jointly with their husbands or independently. This chapter explores the effect of the LRT programme on women’s access to land in Rwanda by focusing on the use of land titles as collateral to get loans. In order to achieve this aim, the following research questions were posed: 1. To what extent have women gained access to land through the LRT programme? 2. What is the level of requests for and use of land titles as collateral among women? 3. What are the attitudes of women with regards to the use of land titles to get credit? The possibilities of using land titles to secure loans from banks and other financial institutions is one of the threefold outcomes of the LRT programmes that have been for long proclaimed by different researchers and international organisations such as the World Bank. They claim that formalisation of land tenure rights would encourage investment in agriculture due to increased security of tenure, efficient land markets, and use of land titles as collateral to gain access to loans for agricultural and non-agricultural investment, (Place, Roth & Hazell et al., 1994; De Soto, 2001; Deininger & Feder, 2009). 104 | Jeannette Bayisenge Looking at the LRT programme from a gender perspective, it was believable that women who were previously discriminated against in relation to property ownership (FAO, 2006; Levit & Verchick, 2006) would also benefit from formalised land tenure rights. Some studies have proved that strengthening women’s land rights through the LRT programme has led to positives outcomes, such as increased bargaining power and welfare (Agarwal, 1994, 2003; Deere & León, 2001; Holden & Bezu, 2013; FAO, 2006). However, this evidence has been shown to be very dispersed, contextualised and scant (Jackson, 2003; Deininger & Feder, 2009; Bayisenge, Höjer & Espling, 2014). In several parts of the world, the relationship between LRT programmes and positive outcomes has failed to materialise. The expectations related to access to credit using land titles as guarantees, have mostly failed to materialise in many countries around the world. In Rwanda, several studies have been conducted looking at the possibilities of this programme and the new body of land laws and policies regulating it in strengthening women’s land rights (Brown & Uvuza, 2006; Daley et al., 2010; McAuslan, 2010, Bayisenge et al., 2014; Bayisenge, 2015). Nonetheless, very few studies have looked at the actual full LRT programme and so far, to the best of my knowledge, no research has exclusively investigated on the women’s use of land titles to gain loans. In this respect, this chapter constitutes an attempt to start filling that gap. 6.2 Theoretical perspectives The discussion about access to credit using land titles as a guarantee in this section mainly focuses on failed cases; not because this chapter aims to review only the literature around that area, but because successful cases in this regard are very limited (Deininger & Feder, 2009). Mitchell (2004) presented the example of Egypt, where a property ownership system introduced in 1850s led to disappointing results. Also, the case of Kenya (Okoth-Ogendo, 1976) has shown how programmes of private ownership started in 1950s have failed to boost economic development through access to credit. Public and private financial institutions have been reluctant to offer credit to small farmers on the pretext that smallholders are a ‘bad risk’. The proclaimed slogan that land titles would lead to access to credit has been successful only among those who were able to provide substantial collateral, such as houses, salaries and other formal or personal property, than among those with land titles only. Davison (1988) argued on the same lines that a land reform plan in Kenya in the 1950s – the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 – directly and indirectly affected women’s access to land because land titles were given to male heads of households, hence ownership was vested in men. As a result, women lost usufruct rights they had previously acquired though lineage tenure and their capacity to gain access to credit, as only very few held land in their names. In patriarchal societies where unequal gender relations are prevailing, micro-credit systems may not always work in women’s favour. The resources acquired by women may be appropriated by men and the situation may also generate domestic violence (Connell, 2009). Chapter 6 – From male to joint land ownership | 105 Not only has the failure of LRT programmes been reported on the African continent, but also in countries from other continents around the world. Deininger and Feder (2009) gave examples of countries in Latin America where these programmes did not function well, such as in Paraguay, Guatemala and Peru, etc.; and where no credit effect was found at all, as in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In the same connection, Gilbert (2002) said that in Bogotá, Colombia, legal title made little or no difference to the availability of formal finance. In Peru, where formal titles have led to increased security of tenure and probability of investment, it was found that a large part of such investments was financed out of pocket rather than through credit (Deininger & Feder 2009). For Gilbert (2002), possession of legal title might be constrained by factors such as the location of the land (for example, people living in zones identified as risky may not get credit), alternative use of land and identity of the original owner. The hope attached to the possibilities of land titles in changing the lives of the poor that was disappearing due to the lack of empirical evidence was revived by a publication by the most influential Peruvian economist, Hernando De Soto. His book, The mystery of capital: Why capitalism Triumphs in the west and fails Everywhere else, published in 2000, has, as Nyamu-Musembi (2006, pp. 7–8) said: “breathed life into previously discredited theories on land rights… and efficiency, and enabled… the debate to proceed as if the negative lessons learned from African experiments …never happened”. De Soto’s main argument was that people in most countries outside the West keep their properties (land, houses) outside the market economy because these properties are not registered, and hence they are trapped in non-marketable forms. He considers their wealth to be “dead capital”, lying outside the economy and unable to be used to gain credit. His ideas gained support among the whole international community, including a number of development agencies (World Bank, FAO, USAID, etc.), and scientific researchers. However, because of the persistent failure of empirical evidence, many researchers, including World Bank research staff such as Klaus Deininger and independent researchers (Mitchell, 2004; Bromley, 2008), challenged the applicability of De Soto’s ideas. Their dissenting view is that even with land titles smallholders and low-income households find themselves excluded from access to credit (Mitchell, 2004; World Bank, FAO & IFAD, 2009). For that reason it would be hard to believe that women who form the majority of these categories would benefit from the system (FAO, 2011). Poor families may find themselves reluctant to use their land as a guarantee to get credit when it is the only source of livelihoods they have. They fear that their land could be confiscated if they fail to make repayment. They prefer to obtain credit from informal networks where land is not used as a guarantee, instead of risking the family land for credit (Gilbert, 2002; Nyamu-Musembi, 2006; World Bank et al., 2009). Bromley (2008) saw in the advocacy of land titles in developing countries the persistent Western policy of prescribing solutions to poor countries. Land title is not always 106 | Jeannette Bayisenge necessary. Van Den Brink, Thomas, Binswanger, & Byamugisha (2006) insisted on considering circumstances to see if LRT programmes really are the best solution. 6.3 Land tenure reform and women’s land rights in Rwanda As in many other developing countries, in Rwanda land was inherited by sons from their fathers until the enactment of the new body of land related laws that started with the inheritance law in 1999. Girls were not allowed to inherit their parents’ property and married women did not have ownership rights to marital land. Worse still, widows only held usufruct rights until their children (their sons) were mature enough to take over. If a woman did not have children before her husband died, if she decided to leave she was not allowed to claim any land; she could only do so by staying in the family and marrying one of her husband’s brothers (RoR-MINIRENA, 2004; Daley et al., 2010). Due to the consequences of the 1994 genocide and other scourges of war, and HIV/AIDS, many women and young girls were left on their own as heads of households and needed to support themselves. Additionally, more women than men depended on land without having ownership of the land from which they got their livelihoods (82 percent of women against 61 percent men working in agriculture; RoR-NISR, 2012b). The GoR realised that this discrimination could not last and elaborated laws in order to address the issue of unequal access to land in Rwanda. The new body of land-related laws and policies elaborated are the inheritance law enacted in 1999, the Rwandan Constitution of 2003 as amended in 2015, the National Land Policy of 2004, and the Organic Land Law of 2013. In addition to these key documents, a number of decrees, and procedural and administrative regulations have subsequently been elaborated. The whole legal framework explicitly supports equality between men and women. The Rwanda Constitution of 2003 forbids any kind of discrimination based on gender. Through the constitution, the GoR commits itself to ensuring equal rights between Rwandans, and between women and men, without prejudice to the principles of gender equality and complementarity in national development. In this context, the succession law applies gender equality and extends the principle to equal inheritance rights, and rights to marital property to women and daughters who previously were denied such rights. Article 4 of the Organic Land Law and the second general principle of the National Land Policy endorse the principle of gender equality and apply it to land rights. However, these laws have limitations especially with regards to women’s rights to marital property. They only recognise equal rights of women whose marriages are legally recognised (officially registered) and not those in consensual and polygamous relationships (Constitution of Rwanda 2003, Art. 26 and Organic Land Law, Art. 36). In the past few years, the GoR has been taking measures to raise awareness about and simplify existing administrative marriage procedures to allow many couples to register Chapter 6 – From male to joint land ownership | 107 their marriages. However, studies continue to show that there are still couples who have not responded positively to the GoR initiative, and new cases of non-registered marriages continue to crop up (GMO, 2011; Bayisenge, 2015). The efforts of the GoR to strengthen women’s access to property and equitable land access for all Rwandans culminated in the implementation of the LRT programme. In total, 10.3 million land parcels were recorded countrywide. Gender-disaggregated LRT programme figures from 2012 showed that 81 percent of land was owned jointly by men and women (ibid.), 11 percent was owned by women only and 6 percent by men only (Gillingham & Buckle, 2014). Therefore, this chapter aims to explore the use of land titles among women. The microfinance sector is developing in Rwanda. The acceleration of the LRT programme is also one of the strategies to allow those with titles to be able use them as collateral (NISR, 2013). The findings of a 2012 Finscope report (ibid.) showed that the proportion of adults who borrowed money was still limited and the majority of them used informal mechanisms such as local rotating saving and credits groups, commonly known as ibimina in Kinyarwanda, churches, community-based organisations, family and friends. The report also found that the majority of those who borrowed money used it for non-productive activities, such as meeting basic needs, paying medical fees or taking care of other emergencies such as funeral arrangements. According to a report by the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) in collaboration with Gender Monitoring Office (GMO) and UN Women (NISR, 2012), a large number of the population are not willing to borrow money. The main reason presented in the 2012 Finscope report was the fear of not being able to pay it back. Considering gender, women are less likely to ask for credit than men. Since a microcredit system is developing in Rwanda and the LRT programme is thought to increase both men and women’s capacities to access credit, the present study therefore attempts to explore the use of the land titles by women in securing credit in Rwanda. 6.4 Methodology The empirical findings presented in this chapter are extracted from a study conducted in Musanze from November 2012 to January 2013. Musanze is one of the 30 districts of Rwanda and is located in Northern Province. As with the general trend in Rwanda, the population in Musanze is young, rural and people predominantly depend on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods (RoR-NISR, 2014). The study was mainly explorative integrating qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative data were collected through semi-structured individual interviews with staff at different levels of administration, as well as Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with women members of cooperatives. Women from six cooperatives participated in the discussions and in the presentation of the findings; the names of cooperatives were camouflaged in order to keep anonymity. Participants in individual semi-structured interviews and FGD were purposively selected on the basis of their ability to provide information about the topic. 108 | Jeannette Bayisenge Quantitative data were obtained from women from 480 agricultural rural households, and 477 questionnaires were successfully distributed and completed. Respondents were not fully randomly selected, in part because there was no available dataset to allow a full random sampling, but also in order to choose women from different backgrounds. The target group comprised women of at least 18 years of age, of different economic, social and marital statuses, with different age groups. For ethical reasons, wherever possible, the names of associations and participants have been disguised to ensure anonymity of the respondents. Survey data were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, while qualitative data were transcribed verbatim and translated from Kinyarwanda into English by the researcher. To facilitate the analysis, the qualitative data were categorised following themes identified through a review of the literature and relevant theoretical perspectives, together with new themes that emerged through the data collection process. The data collected covered a wide range of aspects. Therefore, although a general picture of women’s access to land in Rwanda was given, the emphasis in this chapter was put on the possibilities of the use of land titles as collateral among the respondents. The importance of other aspects touching on women’s access to land are not ignored, but are dealt with in separate articles.21 6.5 Evidence from the field 6.5.1 Women’s access to land through the LRT programme This study focuses on women from agricultural rural households. As shown in the findings, almost all respondents (99.2 percent) came from households that own any land. Furthermore, 97.9 percent of households have registered their land and 75 percent of them have already collected their land certificates. The number of women with land certificates is 87 percent. Slightly above 50 percent of all women, and 80 percent of those who are married, have joint titles. Regarding where the families get land, the findings show that 91.1 percent got their land from umunani (inheritance). Although the family’s land area decreases due to gradual sharing of land from parents to children, umunani is still the main way the local population comes to own land. It is worth noting that the land we are referring to here is not necessarily land individually owned by women respondents, but land belonging to their families or households. The second most common means of owning land, accounting for 54.5 percent of the respondents, is through purchase, especially in urban areas. A few people (4 percent) rented land, while (2.5 percent) said that they got land from the 21 Aspects related to the experiences of women with regard to their knowledge and attitudes about land-related laws, their control of land and its produce, conflicts related to land claims and issues of polygamous and consensual relationships. Chapter 6 – From male to joint land ownership | 109 state. Before 1994, the state had permanently allocated some vacant land to individuals. Similarly, since 1994, there has been land sharing organised by the state especially in 1997. However, another portion of respondents (0.2 percent) said that they did not own any land. The land they use is rented from individuals, associations and the state. They keep the land as usufructory property. 6.5.2 Credit among the respondents This study reveals that only nearly one in five of the respondents have asked for credits from financial institutions; and among those who asked for loans, 76.8 percent of them have used land as a guarantee. To examine the relationship that may exist between asking for credits and other variables – such as education, age, marital status, religion and location – a cross-tabulation analysis was used, as shown in table 6.122 below: Total 20% All 477 persons 80% Education No primary school 15% Primary school 31% 85% 69% 327 persons 150 persons Education 2 Illiterate Litterate 12% 199 persons*** 88% 278 persons 74% 26% Age Young (18–35) Adult (36–65) Old (66+) 19% 223 persons** 81% 24% 217 persons 76% 100% 37 persons Income Under povertyline 14% Above povertyline 86% 24% 179 persons* 214 persons 76% Marital status Married now Not married 24% 12% 76% 88% Asked for credit 22 301 persons** 176 persons Didn't ask for credit The calculation for poverty line used here is for 2011. The poverty line for 2011 was USD 194 (equivalent to RWF 117,773.52 at the April 2012 exchange rate: USD 1 = RWF 607.08). In government reports it was raised to RWF 118,000. 110 | Jeannette Bayisenge Joint titles within households Yes No 27% 253 persons*** 73% 12% 224 persons 88% Head of housholds Female Male 14% 153 persons** 86% 24% 301 persons 76% Religion Roman Catholic 24% Protestants 20% Seven-day Adv. 11% 237 persons* 76% 80% 89% 118 persons 120 persons Member of cooperative Yes No 30% 189 persons*** 70% 14% 288 persons 86% Leadership position in local administration Yes No 36%64% 59 persons** 18% 82% 418 persons Participation in public meetings Yes No 74% 26% 14% 86% Asked for credit 236 persons** 241 persons Didn't ask for credit Table 6.1. Request for credits in relation to other variables. Source: Own survey data. Statistical significance at *p 0.01<0.05, **p 0.001<0.01, ***p <0.001 Among 95 respondents who requested a loan, 73 (76 percent) of them have used land as collateral. According to the findings in table 6.1, use of loans is more than double among educated respondents compared to illiterate ones. This is the same case for those with who have titles compared to those who do not, and among members of cooperatives as against those who are not. All four variables (education, joint titles, membership of cooperative and location) proved to be statistically highly significant when checked against requests for credit. Other variables such as age, marital status, having a leadership position in the local administration, and participation in community activities came out as statistically significant when checked against requests for credits. Requests for loans are higher among the group of 36–65 years of age compared to the younger group of 18–35 years of age), and nobody belongs to the group of elders (66 years of age and above). Similarly, use of credit seems to be higher among those who have husbands compared to those who are separated, divorced or widowed. Participation in public activities and having a leadership position increase the likelihood of requesting loans among Chapter 6 – From male to joint land ownership | 111 respondents. Although the results for income and religion are not very significant, they show that requests for credits increase with the income, and are more common among Roman Catholics, followed by Protestants and lower among Seventh-day Adventists. 6.5.3 Sources of credits Comparing sources of credits, results from qualitative data show that the majority of participants in FGD got credits from their saving and credits groups. The second most common source of credit listed was Umurenge SACCO, followed by , banks, ibimina, RIM, CARE, and Compassion (the charity organisation of the Lutheran church in Rwanda). Although the findings show that the majority of those who obtained credit used land as collateral, a number of women got small loans without providing any guarantee because they requested them from their saving groups. As the majority of these associations base their activity on the system referred to as ubwisugane magirirane (mutual support), being a member is a sufficient guarantee. In other words, membership in these groups serves as a guarantee and the whole group arranges repayment on behalf of any member who fails to pay back a loan. There were respondents who used land together with their salary as a guarantee, while others used other kinds of property such as houses, cattle, etc. In FGD with women members of cooperative E in Nyange sector, the majority of those who had credit acquired it as a group through their cooperatives, and none of the women had used land titles, because in their sector the process of issuing them had just started at the time of the survey. The same case applied to the women from cooperative F in Remera sector and cooperative C in Kinigi sector who only got group credit from Umurenge SACCO through their cooperatives. In Kinigi sector women from cooperative C admitted that they preferred group credit because not only did they consider using land titles to get credit as something that is unlikely to happen, but also feared ubwisungane magirirane because they predicted that one might fail to pay and be a burden to the whole group. In their view, if they had to choose between two bad options (i.e. ubwisungane magirirane and use of title) to get credit, they would choose ubwisungane magirirane, because they say that it is quite impossible to successfully use joint titles to get credit, as the man will be the one to use and control the money borrowed. Although they think it is difficult for women to use a joint title to get credit, they do not wish to have independent titles while still married, as they think this could be source of conflict within the family. In Busogo, women from cooperative A said that they preferred ubwisungane magirirane rather than using their land or property as a guarantee since they feared not being able to make repayments and losing the little they owned. In cooperative D in Muko sector, some women had already used land titles and one of them had used a land title three times to get credit. In Gashaki sector, women from cooperative B said that although they had not yet used the land titles they recently received as a guarantee, and many did not know that it was possible to use them, they asserted that they had been using their land as a guarantee even before they got the land titles. The process involved giving a full description of 112 | Jeannette Bayisenge the plot to the lending institutions. The institutions deployed their credit officer to visit the plot, estimate its value and decide whether it was worth the loans requested. In interviews, key informants said that people were using land as collateral even before the LRT programme, but the programme had facilitated the process. The deputy coordinator of CNF in Gataraga sector, who was also in charge of credit in Umurenge SACCO in the same sector, explained: before the issuance of land titles, when a person wanted to use his/her land or any other kind of immovable property like a house, forest, etc. as a guarantee, he came here and presented his/her request and then we set the date to visit the property. Once we were happy with it we requested him/her to get signatures of all local leaders from umudugudu to the sector level certifying that the property belongs to him/her. After getting all the signatures, the owner was also required to pay RwF 21,000 and bring a notarized proof before they coming back to us and get the loans. But the current practice is that, after I visit the plot, the owner only goes to the sector office to register his/her property used as collateral. The owners are no longer required to pay any fees. They come immediately to us with their land titles. We keep the originals until they finish to pay back the loans. Regarding the limited use of credit among the respondents, in the interview with different key informants, most coordinators of CNF at sector level and sector land officers reaffirmed that in rural areas women had not started to be actively involved in borrowing money, except those who were members of associations or cooperatives. All registered cooperatives had accounts in Umurenge SACCO and members requested credit in groups in the name of their associations. Those who had individually managed to request credits belonged to the category of well-off people with jobs or businesses, and the majority of them lived in urban areas. In both Gataraga and Kinigi sectors, key informants said that there were quite a number of people who had used their land titles as collateral. However, as noted above, these mostly fell into the category of well-off people, and men appeared to request loans more often than women. 6.5.4 Main reasons for borrowing The reasons that pushed the respondents to borrow money can be grouped into two main categories. Firstly, they needed to invest money in income-generating activities. As the findings show, the majority of those who required loans used land as a guarantee. Likewise, it emerged that the majority of the activities for which the money was used were mainly related to agriculture. In this regard, the respondents used the money to buy manure, to buy and rent land, and to grow different kinds of crops such as fruits, Irish potatoes and maize. They also invested their borrowed money in raising domestic animals, such as cows, pigs and sheep. Other respondents managed to repair their houses or construct new ones. Others managed to invest money in other areas of business such as starting a small trade; for example, buying a motorcycle as a taxi, and sewing. Secondly, there are respondents who borrowed money to meet different immediate Chapter 6 – From male to joint land ownership | 113 needs, like buying food for their children, paying for school fees and health insurance, and meeting medical expenses for a sick child. It might be hard for the borrower to pay it back if the money was used in non-productive activities. 6.5.5 Reasons for not using land as a guarantee A comparison of loan requests shows that nearly one in seven respondents had requested credit or a loan. Using a land title as a guarantee appears to have been the main means of obtaining loans. Asked if in the future they would consider using their land as collateral, 36.7 percent replied “yes”, 40.3 percent said “no”, while 23.1 per cent said that they did not know. From qualitative data, respondents explained why they did not show any interest in requesting credit, especially if using land as collateral. Their answers can be grouped into different themes, as follows. Fear of inability to pay back credit The main reason why respondents did not take credit was because they were worried that they would not be able to repay it. For some, the fear was based on their own previous bad experiences with regards to credit. One of them said, “I cannot do it again. It has been so difficult to repay the previous credits”. Other respondents were reluctant to take credit because of their colleagues, neighbours, friends and children who failed to make repayment. One respondent added, “I cannot do that, my children asked for credits and they sold their property because they failed to pay back”. The main reason for their fear was that if they failed to repay the money, they might lose even the little they had when the lenders decided to sell their land. To express their attitudes about obtaining credits, they used Kinyarwanda expressions such as: Uririra byinshi ukabura na duke wari ufite (‘You grasp all and you end up losing all’); Nzarya duke ryame kare (‘The less greedy, the safer you live’); Hari benshi nabonye bisenyera (‘I saw that asking for loans has been destructive to many’). There were women who just viewed loans negatively without explaining why. They simply said that they did not like taking credit at all and swore that they could not take credit, unless they do so by accident. They instead preferred to find money in another way. Unequal power relations Many women did not take credit because of lack of confidence. They thought that lenders could not give them money. One said, ‘I cannot ask credit on my own’. Moreover, they thought that it was their husbands who should make the decision. One of the women said, ‘I don’t know if my husband can accept this’. Another added, ‘It is my husband who should decide on that’. The study also revealed some cases where the decision to ask for a loan was jointly taken by the husband and the wife, but once the loan was given, management became a problem. One woman provided a personal account, according to which she used the loans she had obtained to meet her basic household needs instead of starting a small business as she had planned. This was due to the fact that her husband stopped taking care of their household: 114 | Jeannette Bayisenge I have a joint title with my husband. When I told him that I wished to ask for a loan he was very happy with the idea. We went together, as both my signature and his were needed to get a loan. I got RwF 100,000. After obtaining the money, my husband completely stopped taking care of the family. He said that I was already rich enough to meet all the needs of the family. Now my business has failed and I do not have money to pay back the credit, and my husband is not willing to help me, though we jointly signed on the loan agreement (FGD: One of the participants from Cooperative A in Busogo Sector) Other women also admitted having experienced similar situations. They declared that some men dodged their family responsibilities once their wives became members of women’s associations. The main reason was that some men believed that, with money, women should take their turn to meet their families’ needs. Besides, there were also issues of unequal power relations, not necessarily between husband and wife. Some women thought that they were not eligible to get credits because they thought that this was meant for young people, educated people and those with a lot of money for example. Lack of awareness Lack of awareness was another reason why women were reluctant to get a loan. They said that nobody had informed them about the use of credit and, hence, they did not know how to go through all the procedures. Lastly, some respondents said that they could not ask for credit using land as a guarantee, because they did not have land; they did not need loans; or they did not have any incomegenerating activities in mind. 6.6 Conclusion The aim of this chapter was to explore the effect of the LRT programme on women’s access to land in Rwanda by focusing on the use of land titles as collateral to get loans. The findings showed that through this programme a large number of women have owned land titles either independently or jointly with their husbands. However, only a limited number of them obtained credit and the majority of those who managed to do so used land as collateral. It is worth mentioning that it emerged in the focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews with key informants that the majority of women who secured credit submitted their requests in groups through their associations or cooperatives. Some of them also got individual small loans from their associations through the system of ubwisungane magirirane, where no guarantee is needed except being a member of an association or cooperative. In principle, women who manage to secure loans individually from formal financial institutions are those with a certain standard of living. According to the results of the study, some respondents invested the credit funds in income-generating activities, while others used the money borrowed to meet their Chapter 6 – From male to joint land ownership | 115 immediate needs. Both women in FGD and key informants agreed to the fact that the use of land as collateral was not conditional to the issuance of land titles because people had been using their land even before the land registration process. As they said, only the loan procedures changed. Before the official land registration, the procedures were complicated, very long and costly; but with registered titles, the process has become very simple and people do not have to pay any fees. Furthermore, respondents were asked to express the reasons for their reluctance to ask for credits. The first main reason they reported was fear of losing their mortgaged property if they failed to repay the loan. They referred either to their own previous bad experiences or to repayment failures of their colleagues, friends, neighbours and even children. This corroborated the findings from studies by Gilbert (2002), Nyamu-Musembi (2006), World Bank et al. (2009) conducted in Latin America, Asia and other parts of Africa. The second main reason was lack of confidence and unequal power relations. Some women thought that they could not get credit on their own and others said that it was their husbands who should decide on the use of the credit. This is the reason why, when considering requests for credit among married and unmarried respondents, use of credit looks more frequent among those living with husbands. Similarly, women with joint titles are more likely to take out a loan than those who have independent titles. One could expect to find higher rates of use of credit among women with independent titles because they independently take decisions about their land. In contrast, the findings of the study show that women lack the confidence to engage in business on their own. Another obstacle could be that independent women, such as widows, divorced and separated women, etc. are more likely to lack other assets that could constitute an additional guarantee. Furthermore, compared to married women, the fear of losing the little they own if they fail to pay back the loan may be higher among them because they are thinking of their children. Some women think that some categories of people such as the educated, the young or the rich are more eligible for credit. The same trend emerged from the survey data, where the intersection of different social categories subjected some women to disadvantaged positions compared to others. The use of credit was found to be higher among educated women, those with joint titles, members of women’s associations and married women. The third main reason was lack of information. Respondents reported that they did not have enough information about the procedures to follow when asking for a loan. 6.6.1 What can be learnt from the findings? The findings from this study make it clear that the proclaimed belief that land titles would lead to access to credit is true only when many other conditions are put together. These findings corroborate what other researchers such as Mitchell (2004) and World Bank et al. (2009) found. Even with land titles, smallholders and low-income households find themselves excluded from access to credit either because of the fear of losing the only source of livelihood they have if they fail to pay the money back, or because financial institutions are reluctant to offer credit to low-income households without substantial 116 | Jeannette Bayisenge collateral. Unfortunately, the majority of women around the world are among the categories of vulnerable people with limited access to resources (Rao, 2007; Mapp, 2011). The study highlights the efforts of the GoR in strengthening women’s land rights, where a great number of them got land titles. However, the findings also show women’s reluctance to use these titles to get loans due to other reasons including unequal power relations between husbands and wives. This issue can be analysed in two ways. On one hand, the challenge of unequal power relations is linked to and influenced by gender relations that are strongly entrenched in social and cultural norms based on male supremacy. These norms often act more powerfully than formal laws in everyday life. This leads to women’s lack of confidence, as many women in this study revealed that their husbands decided whether to take loans or not. On the other hand, this study revealed cases of men who dodged their family responsibilities, thinking that with the policy of strengthening the rights of women, including increasing their financial capacity, it was women’s turn to meet their families’ needs. This became a big challenge for women who used the loans obtained to meet families’ basic needs instead of using them as planned. These findings are not surprising looking at what scholars such as Connell (2009) have written. In patriarchal societies, where unequal gender relations prevail, micro-credit systems may not always work in women’s favour. The resources acquired by women may be used in unplanned ways or are appropriated by men, and the situation may also generate domestic violence. Consequently, the process of implementing new gender-sensitive laws and policies that affect social relations will always be challenging, and changes proposed by policies may be very difficult to translate into action. The implication for policymakers and implementers is a gradual integration of new laws and policies that should be sensitive to local context and go hand in hand with continuous sensitisation among local people (beneficiaries) through public education and awareness programmes about women’s rights and gender equality in general. Chapter 6 – From male to joint land ownership | 117 References Agarwal, B. (1994). Gender and Command over Property: A Critical Gap in Economic Analysis and Policy in South Asia. 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Photo: mbrand85/Shutterstock The result is what may be termed as ‘withinhousehold land grabbing’, where children and wives are displaced by husbands to sell land. Chapter 7, page 133 Map of Uganda. Derived from a United Nations map. 7. The benefits for women from land commodification – a critical reflection Mary Ssonko Nabacwa 7.1 Introduction Commodification of land is nested in the modernisation discourse, which links land problems to the internal systems of poor land management and administrative systems, including reliance on customs, ownership and governance systems that are backward and cannot ensure progression. The modernisation discourse is woven into poverty and gender ideals by arguing that changes in customary land ownership to registered individually owned land with protection of women’s land rights will bring economic prosperity and ensure social justice through an increase in use of land as collateral, increased secure agricultural production and a land market free of encumbrances (Bazaaraki, 2002; Stern, 2003; Byamugisha, 2013). In the Ugandan context, Minister for Lands, Housing and Urban Development Daudi Migereko clearly showed this discourse when he said that “The [land] titles will enable all of us to participate in the modern economy and truly use our land as a bankable asset” (Uganda Land Alliance, 2014). The quotation clearly illustrates how gender and modernisation discourses are closely woven together. Land is the most important resource in Uganda because it is the key to agricultural input, a basic source of livelihoods, providing employment, and which most people depend on. Land is also a social asset, crucial for cultural identity that may guarantee an individual political power and participation in local decision making. In Uganda, however, as elsewhere in the world, unequal access to land is one of the most important forms of economic inequality between men and women, and has consequences for women as social and political actors. Research shows that women provide 70 to 80 percent of all agricultural labour and over 90 percent of all labour involving food crop production. Women’s access to other natural resources on land, such as water, firewood and forest products, is also crucial for food security and income for households, yet they own only 16 percent of the land. Women’s right to land is therefore a critical factor in economic wellbeing and social status empowerment; and, indeed, is a mechanism that connects grassroots women to national development (Women’s Land Rights Movement, 2013). The presumption by those who embed women’s land rights into the modernisation discourse is that within a patriarchal system, a woman’s right to use land depends on 124 | Mary Ssonko Nabacwa her relationship to a male, usually a father, brother, son or – most often – husband. This implies that that the woman’s rights are assured to the extent that she remains married or linked to her matrimonially extended family. Widows are prevented from remarrying especially if she intends to reside in the same house that she stayed in with her late husband. Remarriage is permitted through widow inheritance (remarriage of a widow by one her late husband’s relatives). The presumption is that land belongs to the clan and remarriage to one of her late husband’s relatives will ensure that the clan does not loose the land and it also prevents the loss of her access to the land and her livelihood (ibid.). By and large, the rights that women have are user rights that can be erased depending on changes in social status. Parents expect their daughters to get a share of their husbands’ estates; husbands expect their wives to receive a share from their parents’ estate (ibid.), a situation that most often renders women landless. There are no legal provisions that prevent women from owning land, but neither are there concrete legal provisions to change the status quo in which only around 16 percent of women own land. The above sentiments can be situated in Naila Kabeer’s capital and social relations gender theory, which in part states that social systems such as family and kinship structures determine women’s entitlements both to commodities and the means to secure such commodities (Kabeer, 1989, 1995, 1999). She asserts that women in essence have no choice or do not have a free choice in such contexts because their experiences are dependent on the social systems that determine their entitlements. The fact that there are no legal provisions that prevent women from owning land means that there is a probable reproduction of household-level social relations in other institutions such as the state and the market (Kabeer, 1999). The critical argument here is that women’s agency is determined by patriarchal institutional principles of resource allocation and management, including use, access and control. In essence, women’s positioning in these patriarchal institutions affects their agency in relation to land. Since positioning is not only about being a man or woman, it means that the other forces that are at play may include class and ethnicity. The government of Uganda and its development partners, particularly the World Bank and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development policy statements on land can be identified with Kabeer’s capital and social relations gender theory in that they have been woven into poverty and gender, as illustrated by Makhtar Diop, the World Bank Group, Africa Region Vice President’s foreword in Byamugisha (2013, p xv): “few development challenges in Africa are as pressing and controversial as land ownership and its persistent gap between rich and poor communities”. Women are especially vulnerable. They make up 70 percent of Africa’s farmers and yet, for the most part, are locked out of land ownership by customary laws. Without title to the land they farm, women are unable to raise the money needed to improve their small harvests or to raise living standards. This injurious legacy perpetuates poverty and blights the lives of women who are the backbone of Africa’s farming, present and future. These arguments are then used to justify the need to reform land laws and institutions, with the presumption that this will foster economic growth. As a result of these Chapter 7 – The benefits for women from land commodification | 125 processes, the economic value attached to land in Uganda, particularly by the government, cannot be underestimated. Land is presumed to be the key asset that many poor can use to get out of poverty. To foster the commodification of land, efforts have focused on the enactment of a land law and developing a land sector strategy, a national land policy and land information systems. The key concern for this paper then is how women have benefited from this land commodification process. 7.2 The Land Act The Land Act regulates Land tenure in Uganda. The tenure that is provided for includes freehold, mailo land and customary land. During the process of the enactment of the Land Act, there was a lot of advocacy in relation to women’s land rights. The Land Act provided for redistributive reform in favour of women through the need for spousal consent prior to the sale of the land for the family’s survival. The Land Act in Sections 38(a) and 39 requires that before any transaction can be carried out on land on which a family resides or from which it derives sustenance, the spouse should be consulted and must give her consent. The Land Act also stipulates, in accordance with the constitution, that any customary practices that deny women or children the use of any land shall be null and void. While at face value the provision for the need for consent to sell family land is progressive from a gender perspective, it has not necessarily protected women’s land interests. The spousal consent provision is out of reach for many Ugandan women. It is unrealistic in the sense that most Ugandans cohabit and thus have no legal claims on their partner’s property. The law does not prohibit spouses from registering their family home in both their names, but neither does it provide for co-ownership of land and hence it is not compulsory for the home to be registered in the names of both partners. In essence, the person in whose name the title is registered remains the principal owner. By and large, the husband, who is most often the household head, is the owner. In instances where women are owners, they end up doing the same thing as men and prevent their spouses from taking their land. This state of affairs may be linked to the fact that Uganda is still a patriarchal society. Gender relations mean that men control women, creating a state of insecurity in spousal land relations on two levels. On the first level, lineage is based on clans that are continued by the male children. Children in patriarchal contexts are named after the father’s clans because ‘they are seen as his children’. In this regard, a man feels safe passing on his property, including, land to his male children because it is presumed that boys will keep the property within the family, unlike daughters who are married off to other clans. In Uganda, most tribes promote inter-clan marriages meaning that the girl is unlikely to produce children that are of her clan. On the second level, the presumption is that polygamy is acceptable for men. It is generally contextually acceptable for a man to have either a second wife or mistress with whom he may have children. Women in polygamous relationships are cautious 126 | Mary Ssonko Nabacwa not to share their property with their husbands, lest the husbands transfer property to a co-wife and her children or sale it and use the proceeds to acquire more wives and children. The reality of patriarchy in these two dimensions has been played out in terms of parliament’s failure to come to a decision on a domestic relations bill, which would have provided clear legal guidelines on domestic relations including division of property and land in polygamous relations. This state of affairs is compounded by the by reality that over 60 percent of spousal relations are illegal. Partners cohabit and these are definitely out of reach of the legal provisions. It may suffice to argue that neoliberalism, which calls for commodification of land, has intersected with patriarchy to inhibit the protection of women’s land rights. This argument is based on the assertion that the non-approval of the co-ownership clause is linked to the fact that the need to seek consent from a spouse for sale or mortgaging of land may delay land transactions and prevent the use of land as collateral at banks. Some spouses, especially women, may refuse or delay consent. In essence, it will have a negative effect on banking and land as a commodity. The second argument to back up the presumption that the nexus between patriarchy and neoliberalism disadvantages women is based on the presumption that is embedded in the Land Act, that is, certification of customary land. The Land Act (The Republic of Uganda, 1998) provides for the conversion of customary land into individual certificates. Again, at face value the conversion of customary land into individual certificates seems a positive move. It is presumed that implementation of such a clause would enhance women’s land rights and their claims over their spouses’ land rights by either ensuring that their names are included on the forms at the time of application for the conversion or ensuring the availability of a certificate that the woman can lay claim to. The reality is that elites and the rich, mostly men, have fenced off and registered large pieces of land in their own names without the knowledge of some of those who had claims on the same land. Some communities, such as Paboo Sub-county in Amuru district, are resisting investors taking over land and this has been demonstrated through the undressing of elderly women before central government officials – Lands Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs (Daily Monitor, 18th April, 2015). According to residents of Amuru district, the disputed land is communal ancestral land not a game reserve of the Uganda Wildlife Authority. Communal land has limited documentary evidence of ownership and is hence prone to land conflicts. President Yoweri Museveni has noted that “most of the customary land system, under which 80 percent of the land falls, still remains unrecorded, and is insecure and not accessible to the land market” (Uganda Land Alliance, 2014). Adoko and Levine (2005a, p. 5) have argued that the government’s recognition of customary tenure is about facilitating “the privatisation of land, to enable the growth of a land market, and the acquisition of land by investors”. The issue is that while the one hand government recognises the need to register customary land, on the other hand the owners of customary land feel that since customary land is legally recognised by law, there is no need of acquiring a certificate of registration(ibid.) According to Adoko and Levine (2005a) assert that the issuance of individual certificates to customary landowners is a disruption of Chapter 7 – The benefits for women from land commodification | 127 an already disrupted cultural land administration system that has led to the erosion of the social and legal obligations that were held by clan leaders for the public good. In essence, individual customary land certificates are increasing women’s insecurity on land, a situation that is compounded by the negation of the customary provisions of land ownership and the piecemeal implementation of the consent clause. Customary land protects the user rights of both men and women more than the current individualised system that is fostered by the state. The point that Adoko and Levine (2005) are putting forward is that the patriarchal systems under the customary land laws before the 1995 Land Act were more favourable to women than the current individualised customary land tenure promoted through the acquisition of certificates of registration. In customary law, a woman’s rights to land were guaranteed, either through her own family (until marriage) or through her husband’s family (on marriage). These rights would be respected even on the death of her husband. If a man marries more that one wife, the elders of his family would ensure that all the women he has married have their land tights secured so that these women can provide for themselves and there children through farming. The women had no right to sell the land, but neither did their husband, so there was actually little difference in practice between her rights and those of her husband as far as land for subsistence was concerned (Adoko and Levine, 2005b, p. 13). Interestingly, though, Adoko and Levine (2005b) allude to the discourse of the activists for women’s land rights who call for the reform of the customary land system for gender equality, this is not to say that the traditional system guaranteed gender equality. A woman’s claim to land still relied on other people: her parents, until she married, and thereupon her husband, and if he died, on her (i.e. his) children. This meant that she was always dependent on someone. There was an in-built assumption that every girl would marry, and so would leave her parents’ clan and join a new one. Unmarried women were traditionally rare, and although they held rights to farm their parents’ land, their inheritance rights were not clear (ibid., p. 11). Women rights activists view customary land laws as non-protective of women’s land rights, and prefer modernised, individualised modes of land ownership that they presume are more protective of women’s land rights. Adoko and Levine’s (2005b) arguments are in contrast with the arguments of Byamugisha (2013, p. 1) that suggest, “the vast majority of women who are primary subsistence producers are locked out of land ownership by customary laws”. Indeed, there are also other lines of thought that suggest that traditional land use has been the cause of the failure to develop a land market and credit system for rapid income growth for the rural and urban masses interested in agriculture. Customary land use has been characterised essentially as ‘communal’ and ‘usufruct’, thus temporary and not conducive to individual entrepreneurship, which is largely credited with the rapid economic revolution in Europe in the 17th century. For this reason, policymakers have long assumed that instituting individualised freehold tenure, accompanied with a universal titling system, is the key to development, as it would result in increased security and efficiency for land users (Adoko and Levine, 2005b). What is evident is that land reforms have taken advantage of the argument that customary land systems are not progressive – or modern, for that matter – and need 128 | Mary Ssonko Nabacwa transforming. Embedded in these modernisation discourses are allusions to the fact that modern systems will ensure women’s land rights if law and policy provisions for gender equity and equality are embedded in the land transformation and commodification agendas. It is evident that individualised land systems are prone to many technical difficulties that may not ensure women’s rights, as is the case with customary land systems. The Uganda Land Alliance (2014, p. 3) has stated that, in the defence of transforming customary tenure systems, the president of Uganda has noted that “the poor and vulnerable people may lose out on their land rights because they cannot afford the cost of the expensive litigation that results from land disputes and conflicts”. Other technical issues in relation to the modernised land tenure system are that it is prone to bureaucracy, corruption and costs. Seeking legal redress is very low due to lack of knowledge, high costs, corruption, and distance to the courts among others. The reality in various parts of Uganda shows that women face land related challenges, which include limited economic alternatives to agriculture; continued pressure on the informal sector from investors whom the government feels are more likely to pay taxes; lack of means to purchase land from the market; and most often acting as witnesses to their husbands’ land purchases. The reality is that a few women are purchasing land, but this is more complicated for married women. Social pressure presumes that married women should not own land and that those who try to do so are more often viewed as disloyal to their husbands (Gärber, 2013). These findings are in agreement with Kabeer’s capital and social relations gender theory, which argues that patriarchy-based institutions of marriage constrain women’s ability to participate in the land market either through lack of financial resources or by constraining their choice to buy and sell (Kabeer, 1989). Legal provisions have not been able to deal with this complex context because, as discussed earlier, legislators and the state apparatus are also active actors in these patriarchal systems, which they keep alive through non-legislation, non-action or non-decision making on fundamental changes that could ensure women’s benefits from land commodification. However, this cannot be overemphasised, as scholars of power (Weedon, 1987; Giddens, 1993) have stated that power is not a zero-sum game. The Women’s Land Rights Movement has demonstrated women’s continued advocacy for women’s land rights and a very slow but progressive realisation that, women should own land in their individual capacity. It is important to observe that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that implementation of the Land Act provisions in relation to customary land tenure will result in the realisation of women’s land ownership rights. Two issues, at least, are evident in the Ugandan context: “In general, customary practices in some areas of the country continue to override statutory law in recognition and enforcement of land rights, abating unnoticed land grabbing at family level” (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2013, p. 23). In principle, land legislations are embedded in modernisation philosophies that emphasise individualised statutorily recognised land ownership patterns as good and progressive, and the degradation of customary modes of land ownership, which are presumed to be bad and non-progressive, including in the protection of women’s land rights. Chapter 7 – The benefits for women from land commodification | 129 At the crossroads, then, is the question whether relevant land systems can accommodate the interests of land commodification on the one side and the social interests of ensuring social protection of family members on the other. The challenge that is facing the Ugandan government is embedded in the minister of lands’ statement in 2014, when he said that land reforms should focus on changing mind-sets, to “stop looking at land as a cultural and social commodity but as an economic commodity” (Uganda Land Alliance, 2014). It is also important to examine the extent to which women are participating in the sale or prevention of sale of family land because, by and large, the discourses in relation to women’s land rights jar with the commodification discourse to the extent that the focus is more about ensuring women’s security of title to land, particularly at moments of sale of family land by their spouses. In this context, the gendered socio-economic relations between the landowner, use of land and regulatory bodies are very critical. Media reports in the oil-rich Bullisa region, and in Uganda more widely, point to women’s ignorance regarding land markets and the value of land itself. A policy brief by FOWODE (2012) suggested that women farmers cannot access land because of the costs involved, cultural norms and overlapping land rights. The same policy brief seems to suggest that women have smaller pieces of land that they mainly use for subsistence agriculture, which inhibits their participation in land markets and their use of land as collateral. The policy brief also suggests that a comparison of male- and female-headed households points to the fact that female-headed households are more likely to dispose of land, due to lack of income, to meet their basic needs. There is need for empirical evidence to show the extent to which women’s rights are more protected by customs than by current legal provisions. The fundamental question is whether a reversal of customary land management systems is sustainable, taking into account the destruction of the social fabric of the clan structure and relationships. In other words, to what extent has the Land Act protected women’s land interests or not, for that matter. The need for empirical studies is necessitated by claims by scholars such as Levine and Adoko that shortcomings in the implementation of the Land Act may be marginalising rather than protecting women’s land rights, at least in the case of the Acholi region in Northern Uganda (Adoko & Levine, 2005b). Since the presumption is that the Land Act is promoting commercialisation in cognisance of equity and social justice, it is worth investigating the emerging gender equities or gender inequities, which have hardly been documented. While the available literature focuses on what is not working, there are other issues that require further investigation, including whether there any positive results for women from land commodification. Pursuit of evidence on gender and the Land Act may be justified by the fact that resource investments were made for non-governmental organisation (NGO) advocacy to campaign for women’s land ownership. Some of the sentiments in support of women’s land rights by NGOs have been hypothetical. But, 15 years of the Land Act was passed, there is need for concrete evidence to illustrate the perceived positive and negative impacts of the two sides of the debate, promoting land commodification versus retaining customary land tenure. The resettlement processes 130 | Mary Ssonko Nabacwa in Northern Uganda necessitate evidence of the benefits to women of land commodification to justify investments in acquiring certificates of registration. 7.3 Land governance in Uganda Understanding the implications for women of commodification of land requires an understanding of land governance in Uganda. Gender-responsive land governance systems are needed to ensure women’s rights to land. Effective and efficient land governance processes, let alone gender-sensitive ones, in a way have eluded Uganda for the past 15 years, partly due to limited implementation of the land law. Issues of relevance in relation to land governance include traditional institutions in land matters, and enactment of the National Land Policy and land sector strategy. These issues and their implications for women’s land rights are discussed below. 7.3.1 Traditional institutions in the administration of land matters Adoko & Levine (2005a) extensively discussed land administration and the judicial process. They argued that customary judicial systems are more accountable and are more likely to take into account the multiple interests in land than formal court systems. The major challenge, as pointed out by Sekandi (n.d.), is the functioning of land administration and justice systems. In Uganda, in spite of the elaborate administration and dispute settlement mechanism set up under the Land Act, there is very little room provided for the involvement of traditional institutions. Land tribunals may pass on to traditional authorities the cases they think fall within their jurisdiction, but this can only be done at the discretion of the tribunals. The same applies to the administrative set up. The act only provides that: the parish committee may, in the exercise of its functions in relation to application for a certificate of customary ownership refer any matter to any customary institution habitually accepted within the parish as an institution with functions over land for its advice and, where relevant, use it with or without adaptations (ibid.) The question then is, are district land boards more likely to deliver equity than the customary land administrators? At this material time, as earlier discussed, both are prone to technical difficulties that may have led to the introduction of presidentialism in the administration of equity and justice for vulnerable groups including women. This is why the president of Uganda, introduced an alternative office (the directorate of land matters office) attached to State House- the office of the president that is assisting him in land administration. There is limited evidence, to suggest that the office is assisting poor tenants in getting some form of pseudo-justice, a semblance of the judicial justice. Whatever the effects of the office, the process raises a number of questions. Why did the government form new land administrative units and ignore existing systems that Chapter 7 – The benefits for women from land commodification | 131 are embedded in the Land Act? Does the president’s office have the necessary technical and financial capacity to administer justice and equity in relation to land and how sustainable is such an initiative? Lack of funds has been identified as the major hindrance to the functioning of land governance structures. Could the president’s actions be a manifestation of broader problems, both legal and technical, in relation to ensuring equity and justice using the current legal and structural provisions? On the basis of the above questions, it is difficult to draw conclusions, with limited evidence of the functionality of the institutions that are charged with implementing the Land Act provisions that would ensure at least a minimal level of equity, particularly at family level. 7.3.2 National Land Policy The Uganda National Land Policy 2013 focus on the following key issues: 1. Land must be productively used and sustainably managed to ensure increased contribution of land to economic productivity and commercial competitiveness by shifting policy emphasis from land ownership to land development; 2. As has been demonstrated throughout the world, land is at the centre of poverty reduction in Uganda and must be secured in order to encourage investments that contribute to sustainable poverty eradication; and 3. Access to land must reflect equity and justice; access, control and management of land as an important human rights and social justice issue. The key question in relation to the National Land Policy is how have concerns for equity been embedded in the policy and what are the practical implications of the same? At the launch of the National Land Policy in June 2014, the Minister of Lands, Housing and Urban Development noted that his ministry was, among other things, to focus in the next three years on “[protecting] and improving women’s access and secure rights to land.” Section 4 of the policy clearly articulates that, “women are unable to own or inherit land due to restrictive practices under customary land tenure or are not economically endowed to purchase land rights in the market”.23 The government commits itself to: 1. by legislation, protect the right to inheritance and ownership of land for women and girls; and 2. ensure that men and women enjoy equal rights to land before marriage, in marriage and at succession without discrimination. It is envisaged that the above commitments will be achieved through regulating customary laws and practices in access to and ownership of land; redressing gender inequality on inheritance and ownership of land in statutory laws; and ensuring that women are 23 Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2013, p. 23 132 | Mary Ssonko Nabacwa integrated in decision-making structures and processes, in access to and use of land (ibid, p. 24). It is too early to judge the implications of the policy, but what is evident at this material time is that the government has clearly articulated its commitment to protect women’s land rights amid the commodification of land. The extent to which these two processes can work together – that is, land commodification on one side and protection of women’s land rights on the other – may need further empirical analysis. 7.3.3 Land and the Private Sector Competitive Project II Property registration, including of land, remains a major impediment to national development. There is a lack of information on land and property markets. Issues of land access and marketing are most complicated in relation to customary land. The land component of the Private Sector Competitive Project (PSCP) II focused on decentralisation of land administration and improvement of market access and related benefits. The aim of the project, which ended in 2013, was to create efficient and corruption-free land administration and land information systems to facilitate the creation of an effective land market; and positively impact enterprise creation and poverty reduction by supporting customary landowners and mailo title holders in Uganda’s rural communities to register their land assets. Security of tenure, it was believed, would encourage productivity-augmenting investments, thus ensuring food opportunities and reducing rural poverty. It was also presumed that the process for delivering land services would become more appealing to the public through the land information systems, which were expected to reduce corruption (Ahene, 2006). However, as noted in the previous sections of this chapter, proponents of customary land argue that registered land is easier to transfer through sales, thereby reducing the stock of customary land that is freely available for women to use. In essence, land registration increased land insecurity for women, and not land security as presented by these government- and donor-funded projects. The biggest challenge in the government land discourse is the relationship between land commodification and poverty eradication. Reality has shown, however, that such a project just embeds modernisation ideals into government discourses, with limited benefits to the poor. This is because projects can only provide limited benefits due to reliance on limited project funds that can only do so much. For example, the funds for PSCP II assisted in demonstrating the possibility of low-cost titling of land in three the districts of Mbale, Ntungamo and Iganga out of over 120 districts. It is not clear if the government of Uganda can raise enough money to cover the whole country. Even after implementation of the project, over 80 percent of land is still owned customarily, demonstrating either limited appreciation of titled land or ignorance of the relevance of titled land. However, the World Bank has argued that only 5 percent of rural land is registered and only 18 percent countrywide, leaving the vast majority of landholders vulnerable to land grabbing, a high level of land disputes and an inefficient land administration system that lacks transparency, a dysfunctional land use planning system and unplanned urban settlements. It is also important to observe that the project has Chapter 7 – The benefits for women from land commodification | 133 committed itself to develop a gender strategy that will promote gender equity in land registration (World Bank, 2013). Key areas for project III include the need to register communal land in the north and east, registration of over 15 million individual land parcels in the country, and documentation of land rights in the country. The key issue here is to examine the arguments by the World Bank and the government versus the lived realities of limited land registration, particularly in the rural areas. Land grabbing is one of the major offshoots of land commodification in Africa. The encouragement of investment in Africa gained a new form of momentum during the 1980s, with the introduction of structural adjustment policies. In this regard, African countries have been working to improve the investment context and climate. Land commodification is one of the ways of improving the investment climate. Land is characterised as a secure investment. But, Africa contains 60 percent of the world’s unused arable land – African land is a hot commodity. Foreign investors are scrambling for Africa’s farmland. The pace of purchase or lease of Africa’s land is so furious that it is now referred to as a land grab. Of the 83.2 million hectares of land earmarked for agricultural investment worldwide, 56.2 million hectares are in Africa. Uganda has leased a total of 868,000 hectares to investors from China, Egypt, Singapore and India (Awiti, 2012). Land grabbing is linked to: speculative demand for land encouraged by good long-term prospects of macroeconomic stability; land tenure insecurity caused by uncertainty; lack of awareness of property rights; and absence of legal institutional designs supporting rural and urban planning, development management and strategies for resolving land conflicts. Land grabbing has also been fuelled by the speculative increase in the value of land in areas that are deemed to have minerals and oil, and historical communal and land ownership systems that may at times lack proof of ownership (Ahene, n.d.). This situation is even worse for women, who in terms of family relations either belong to their matrimonial or premarital homes. It is also true, that with poverty, land is used as the quickest means of security for financial access, either through its loan or sale. The result is what may be termed as ‘within-household land grabbing’, where children and wives are displaced by husbands to sell land. At times, the man may move the family to a new location or, in the worst-case scenario, abandon family members. The past 15 years of implementing the Land Act have not necessarily altered the legal and administrative hurdles to land acquisition or sale, and hence have fostered corruption that in turn intensifies land grabbing. As already noted, there are no clear mechanisms to enforce the consent clause. The effects of within-household land grabbing cannot be underestimated and these have implications for food security (Gärber, 2013). These are more likely to affect women and children. In urban areas, land grabbing has mainly been around wetlands and slums. Lack of security of tenure is mainly linked to ignorance regarding land law or illegal settlement and political peddling. Land grabbing in urban areas displaces families, with greater negative effects for women, children and disabled people. For example, a disabled man, with his two wives and about 10 children, had to travel over 150 kilometres to Kampala Central Police 134 | Mary Ssonko Nabacwa Station to ask for police assistance to resolve his land grabbing case. The problem is that the most of the available analysis focuses on the downside of land grabbing. Is it possible that some categories of women are benefiting from land grabbing? What are these benefits? There was contestation over land grabbing studies done by one NGO in Uganda that was nearly closed as a result of this study. Specifically, it is worth exploring the gendered and ethnic implications of land markets. Land grabbing also poses another question: does inequality – including gender inequality – matter if there is positive progress? 7.3.4 Large-scale agriculture versus smallholder agriculture The last issue to think through in relation to women’s benefits from land commodification is the issue of large-scale agriculture versus smallholder agriculture. The agricultural sector in Uganda is predominantly subsistence farming, wherein the major part is used for household consumption. Hence, it is no wonder that government policy appears to promote commercialisation of agriculture, thereby encouraging commercial land pressure for large-scale farming in the guise of promoting rural investment and poverty eradication. Most women are small-scale farmers and the emergence of largescale farming can easily ignore them. The other issue is that most of the economies in Uganda and Africa in general are resource extracting. It would make sense to invest in small-scale farmers, but by and large the focus is on giving access to land to large-scale farmers, sometimes at the expense of small-scale farmers, who are mostly women. 7.4 Conclusion Most literature paints a gloomy picture in relation to women and commodification of land. This chapter points to several statements of intent as illustrated in the Land Act, National Land Policy and land transformation projects of the Ministry of Lands. The questions that remain unanswered by this paper include the following: a) Has land commodification been a raw deal for women?; b) What are the positive gendered outcomes of land commodification, beyond statements of intent by the government?; c) What can be done differently to ensure gender equity in land matters? Chapter 7 – The benefits for women from land commodification | 135 References Adoko, J., & Levine, S. (2005a). Land Rights, Where we are and Where we need to go: A review of the situation of land rights in Apac District in Uganda, and of opportunities for land rights protection work, based on the work of LEMU in 2003–2004. Kampala: Land Equity Movement in Uganda. Adoko, J., & Levine, S. (2005b). A Land Market for Poverty Eradication? A case study of the impact of Uganda’s Land Acts on policy hopes for development and poverty eradication. Kampala: Land Equity Movement in Uganda. Ahene, R. (2006). Moving from Analysis to Action: Land in the Uganda Private Sector Competitiveness Project II. World Bank / Private Sector Foundation: Kampala Uganda. Ahene, R. (n.d.). Commercial Pressure on Land and Land Grabbing in Uganda. https://www. yumpu.com/en/document/view/40377795/commercial-pressure-on-land-and-land-grabbing-in- Uganda. Last accessed 17/1/2018 Awiti, A. (2012). Africa’s land grabs: A disaster in waiting: The scramble for Africa’s farmland could have catastrophic consequences. Third World Resurgence No. 263, July 2012, p 6 in https://www.twn.my/title2/resurgence/2012/263/eco2.htm last accessed 16/1/2018 Bazaaraki, N. (2002). Politics, Legal Reform and Resource Rights in Uganda. Paper presented at the Panel on the Changing Political Economy of Land in Africa at the conference on the theme Africa in the New Millennium held at the Nile International Conference Centre, 9th–12 December, Kampala, Uganda. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.195.2954&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Last accessed 17/1/2018. Byamugisha, Frank F. K.. 2013. Securing Africa’s Land for Shared Prosperity: A Program to Scale Up Reforms and Investments. Africa Development Forum Series;. Washington, DC: Agence Française de Développement and the World Bank. World Bank. https://openknowledge. worldbank.org/handle/10986/13837 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.” Daily Monitor, 18th April, 2015. Women undress before Migereko, General Aronda (www.monitor.co.ug) Last accessed 12th, January 2017. FOWODE, (2012). Gender Policy Brief for Uganda’s Agricultural Sector. Kampala. Gärber, B. (2013). Women’s Land Rights and Tenure Security in Uganda: Experiences from Mbale, Apac and Ntugamo, Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift fur Kritische Afrikastudies, Vol. 13(24), 1–32. Giddens, A. (1993). The Giddens Reader. P. Cassell (Ed.). Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. Kabeer, N. (1989). Monitoring Poverty as if Gender mattered: A Methodology for Rural Bangladesh (IDS Discussion Paper 255). Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS). Kabeer, N. (1999). Resources, Agency and Achievement: Reflections on the measurement of Women’s Empowerment. Development and Change 1999, Vol. 30(3), 435–464. Kabeer, N. (1998). The power to choose: Bangladesh Women and Labour Market Decisions in London and Dhaka, mimeographed, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS). 136 | Mary Ssonko Nabacwa Kabeer, N. (1995). Reversed realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development thought (2nd ed.). London: Verso. Kabeer, N. (1996). Agency, Well-being and Inequality: Reflections on the Gender Dimensions of Poverty. IDS Bulletin 1996, Vol. 27(1), 11–21. Kabeer, N., & Subrahmanian, R. (1996). Institutions, Relations and outcomes Framework and tools for Gender Aware planning (IDS Discussion paper 357). Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS). Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (2013). The Uganda National Land Policy. Kampala, Uganda. Ssekandi, F. (n.d.). Social, Political and Equity Aspects of Land and Property Rights. https:// www.academia.edu/33909707/Social_Political_and_Equity_Aspects_of_Land_and_Property_Rights Last Accessed 17/1/2018 Stern, N. H. (2003). Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction. (World Bank Policy Research Report No. 26384, pp. ix–xi). Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press. Republic of Uganda (1998). Land Act. (Ch 227). Kampala: Uganda Republic of Uganda (1995). The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Kampala, Uganda. Uganda Land Alliance (2014, April–June). How Do Clans Deliver Justice? (Quarterly Newsletter). Kampala, Uganda Weedon, C. (1987). Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory. Basil: Blackwell Publishers. Women’s Land Rights Movement (2013, June). Biannual Newsletter, Volume 3. Kampala, Uganda. World Bank (2013). International Development Association appraisal document on a proposed credit to the Republic of Uganda for Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project. Financial and Private Sector Development, AFCEI, Africa Region. http://documents. worldbank.org/ curated/pt/409061468308685658/text/751720PAD0P13000900IDA0R20130009601.txt Last accessed 17/1/2018 A couple planting groundnuts in Nwoya District, Uganda. Photo:Mariola Acosta. Research Fellow IITA/CCAFS, Flickr In the case of Northern Uganda, where access to land is easier, the problem has to do with aspiration because the young rarely value being farmers. Chapter 8, page 153 1. 2. 3. 4. Acholi Maracha Koboke Yumbe Moyo 5. 6. 7. 8. Adjumani Arua Zombo Nebbi Karamoja 13. Pader 14. Gulu 15. Nwoya 9. Amuru 10. Lamwo 11. Kitgum 12. Agago 16. Kaabong 17. Kotido 18. Abim 19. Napek 20. Nakapiripirit 21. Amudat 22. Moroto Lango 23. Oyam 24. Apac 25. Amolatar 26. Dokolo 27. Alebtong 28. Otuke 29. Lira 30. Kole 3 2 4 5 1 6 16 10 11 9 NORTHERN REGION 13 17 12 14 18 7 15 8 28 30 23 WE ST ER Lake Edward (Rutanzige) ON 19 27 26 24 NR EG I Lake Albert (Mwitanzige) 29 22 20 21 25 Lake Kyoga CENTRAL REGION EASTERN REGION Lake Victoria (Victoria Nyanza) Map of Uganda's Northern Region. The region, which has a population of 7.2 million, according to the 2014 census, is divided into four sub-regions (West Nile, Acholi, Karamoja and Lango) and 30 districts. Map illustration: Henrik Alfredsson, the Nordic Africa Institute. West Nile 8. Is agriculture a generational problem? The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in northern Uganda David Ross Olanya, Gulu University, Uganda 8.1 Introduction Although agriculture is now key for the success of the Sustainable Development Goals in Uganda, the general perception among development economists up to today has remained negative, and agriculture is still considered a residual employer as people move upwards in the course of economic transformation. This chapter revisits some of the main factors fuelling negative perceptions regarding agriculture among the youth, and how these young men and women consider their future leadership in food production business in Northern Uganda. Central to this argument is the emerging trend of engaging youths in part-time agricultural employment, which allows them to live in urban areas in search of better social services, but returns them to farming. Contrary to the popular belief that promoting smallholding farming generates employment for the youth, the youth themselves may not be interested in agriculture per se, unless the government creates a proactive policy that changes their perception so that they become the future generation of farmers after they have tried other urban-based opportunities. Unfortunately, this reminds us about the history of agricultural transformation in developing countries, which is dominated by the development discourse of structural transformation, that is associated with a declining contribution of agriculture as a share of gross national product, as well as a declining labour force (Eicher & Staatz, 1984 [1990], p. 4). This perspective on agricultural structural change was articulated by lucid theorists (Lewis, 1954; Hirschman, 1958), in which capitalist industry was given more attention while agriculture was given little attention in the process of economic and social transformation. In the context of a developing country, the dominant consensus was that the rural labour surpluses were supposed to be transferred as industrialisation progressed. In fact, the economic development theorists had influenced development thinking in developing countries, putting more emphasis on industrial development, thereby marginalising the agricultural sector. 142 | David Ross Olanya Regrettably, structural adjustment policies dismantled the elaborate system of institutions that provided smallholder farmers with access to land, credit, insurance, inputs and cooperative organisations (World Bank, 2008, p. 138), leaving many smallholders exposed to extensive market failures, and leading to high transaction costs, risks and service gaps. It was through the Washington Consensus that developing countries were prescribed with directives for: 1. reducing direct state involvement in markets; 2. providing incentives for private enterprises and investments; and 3. emphasis on states to focus on providing public goods, so as to drive down the cost of market transactions (Dechenne, 2008). Those who tried the ‘green revolution’ route, to move from labour-based to capital-intensive agriculture and involving technology transfers in poor countries, especially Asia, did have relative success in staple food production during the 1950s and 1960s. In African countries, the green revolution failed in some respects, especially in relation to wheat, and for rice in non-irrigated areas, and even in irrigated areas because it created problems such as salination and a decline in the water table. But there is also general consensus in the literature to show that the green revolution achieved productivity gains for rice, enabling many Asian countries to achieve food self-sufficiency and even to become net exporters. The success of many countries in Asia, that achieved the green revolution, was a milestone, because they ignored neoclassical principles propagated by the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), on which the Washington Consensus was based. For example, successful Asian countries provided subsidies but managed them to minimise efficiency loss. In this respect, the green revolution involved improvements in high-quality crop varieties, fertilisers, machinery and irrigation, promoted through support from technically more advanced or wealthier countries. Key to the green revolution’s agenda was growing staple foods such as cereals (maize, wheat and rice) to feed increasing populations of both humans and livestock. However, the green revolution failed due to a number of factors, such as offering assistance not based on performance criteria, but the political loyalty of recipients; lack of adequate credits and poor delivery systems for required inputs; non-availability of permeable soils; lack of effective management; and political interference (Byerlee & Eicher, 1997). The low level of agriculture, was due to national policies that undervalued it both institutionally and technically exogenous (Eicher & Staatz, 1984 [1990]). Surprisingly, developed countries maintained agricultural subsidies, while the externally induced structural adjustment programmes weakened state capacity and encouraged African governments to repay ballooning debts by diverting resources from food production to cash crops, even as they faced falling commodity prices (UNDP, 2012). It is therefore not surprising that structural transformation of agriculture did not succeed in poor countries. Three-quarters of poor people in developing countries still live in rural areas, and most of them depend directly or indirectly on the agricultural sector. Moreover, agriculture provides more than 75 percent of labour force employ- Chapter 8 – The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in northern Uganda | 143 ment (World Bank, 2008). In addition, declining investment in agriculture is making younger workers seek formal employment in non-agricultural sectors. High rates of rural underemployment and unemployment will continue to drive an exodus of the youngest and most productive segment of the rural labour force (IFAD, 2007). The presence of non-functional credit markets and low income levels from agriculture, as well as fluctuating weather conditions or volatile prices, are factors reinforcing negative perception of youth in agriculture (FAO, 2011, p. 20). Without enough incentives, profitable opportunities and attractive environments, the exodus of youth from rural areas will continue due to limited assets, especially in land, markets and finance, as well as limited education and skills training. Limited employment options fuel the exodus further. Could the youth be groomed to become future farmers to feed the global population that is projected to reach 9.2 billion people by 2050? To achieve this calls for investing in the rural youth of today as farmers of tomorrow, they need to be supported to improve agricultural productivity and attain food security within households and at national level. Such initiatives should improve rural economies, which should in turn stem the rate of rural-urban migration. State institutions should support young farmers to access production assets such as land, credit and training. The increasing rural-urban migration has a significant impact on rural employment, workforce loss, financial transfers, investments, asset acquisitions and demographic changes. The success of the capital accumulation and skills of these migrants does not necessarily lead to productive investments in their places of origin, but depends on factors such as level of education, living conditions, the intention of returning, characteristics of households and access to local assets; and social, economic and ecological contexts (IFAD, 2007). Africa’s economies continue at an average annual economic growth rate of 5 percent after 2007–2008 global economic crisis, the continent has become the world’s second fastest-growing region. Meanwhile, the world is facing a worsening youth unemployment crisis. Young people are three times more likely to be unemployed than adults and over 75 million youth worldwide are looking for work (ILO, 2012). The ‘scarred’ generation of youth is facing a dangerous mixed scenario of high employment, increased inactivity and precarious work in developed countries, as well as persistently high in developing countries (ILO, 2012). Given the increasing number of workers, by 2035 the African labour force will be larger than China’s (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). How, therefore, do we ensure that Africa benefits from this imminent demographic dividend? It is further reported that the median age on the continent is 20 years old (and the median age of African leaders is 62) (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). This chapter explores how to deal with the ‘lost generation’ in post-civil war Northern Uganda. The conditions of agriculture have been associated with urban bias, starving agriculture of resources in many poor countries. This is because the ruling elites generally originate from, or identify themselves with, the non-rural environment, and also because policymakers believe in investment in industry (Thirlwall, 2006, p. 20). In poor countries, their economies are dominated by agriculture and petty services. Most of those working on the land in poor countries are small-scale landholders and tenant farmers (with no land rights or incentives to increase output) or landless labourers (selling their labour in a daily 144 | David Ross Olanya labour market). Developing countries contain a huge reservoir of surplus labour. However, the population explosion has been characterised by unemployment in both rural and urban areas. This chapter is based on a review of relevant policies and documents on youth engagement in agriculture in relation to their aspirations and perceptions. 8.2 Conceptualising research on aspirations This chapter is concerned with negative feeling towards agriculture and how the youth consider their future within a context of increasing unemployment in Uganda. Youth aspirations play an important role in influencing how young people make life choices, how they think and feel about themselves, and ultimately their life choices (Schaefer & Meece, 2009). Hence, the aspirations of rural youth and the factors contributing to their formation should not only be of interest to the youth, their families and community, but they should also attract the interest of agriculture and rural development agents (Leavy & Smith, 2010). Aspirations can be defined as “an individual’s desire to obtain a status, object or goal such as a particular occupation or level of education” (MacBrayne, 1987, p. 1). However, expectations reflect an individual’s estimation of the likeliness of obtaining those goals, plans, ambitions or dreams whereas aspirations are described as “the behavioural realisation of the goals” (ibid). Aspirations reflect the ability to set up future goals while being inspired by the present to work towards these goals (Morrison & Akerman, 2008, p. 3). This definition relates to the pragmatic dimension to the formation of aspiration rather than idealistic goal pursuit (Schaefer & Meece, 2009, p. 3). Pragmatism or rationality is therefore embodied in the definition of aspirations as a future goal in which an individual is willing to invest time, money and effort, based on the belief that individuals assess opportunities, constraints and risks, making efficient choices to “maximize satisfactions and minimize dissatisfactions” (Sherwood, 1989). Aspiration is an “an individual’s desire to obtain a status objective or goals in a particular occupations or [level of education] education” (MacBrayne, 1987; Hansen & Mclntire, 1989). Since it is future oriented, it can be realised or remain a dream (Sherwood, 1989). Research has shown that parents aspire for their children to have better careers than their own, and children aspire for better jobs than their parents do (Behnke, Piercy, & Diversi, 2004). Youth from rural backgrounds, however, find it very hard to achieve occupations outside farming. This is because youth from farming backgrounds have low levels of occupational achievement on the job market (Haller, 1958). Yet, youth aspirations diminish when it comes to agriculture. As noted by Furlong & Biggart (1999), aspirations can be understood in two main approaches: a) developmental approaches, where individuals seek careers that are compatible with their self-conceptions; and b) opportunity structure approaches, where it is assumed that few individuals fulfil their aspirations, so the focus shifts to occupational opportunities in a given context. Chapter 8 – The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in northern Uganda | 145 From a different perspective, occupation aspirations can be formed through ‘circumscription’ and ‘compromise’ (Armstrong & Crombie, 2000, p. 83). In circumscription, individuals limit their occupational aspirations to a zone of acceptable alternatives; while in compromise, aspiration is based on their perception of being able to access an occupation or based on their experience. Aspirations are personal and dynamic. Social class, socio-economic status and income have been identified as correlating with aspirations, with higher levels of education being related to higher levels of aspirations. Gender also determines aspirations, both in terms of how aspirations are formed and how they evolve over time (Leavy & Smith, 2010, p. 6). Studies have also revealed that parents, mentors and peer groups play a key role in aspiration formation. For example, there is a strong relationship between the aspiration of parents and those of the children themselves (Morrison & Akerman, 2008). These aspirations can be assessed in terms of inter-generational relations and migration of youth. The aspirations of young people are often framed within expectations placed upon them by their families and kinship networks, which in turn are influenced by gender-based societal customs and norms (Whitehead, Hashim & Iversen, 2007). Aspirations tend to be formed early in childhood but shaped and modified over time by environmental factors and experience. Expectations generally decline with age, while aspirations remain high (MacBrayne, 1987). Similarly, aspirations of youth are generally higher than their expectations, but aspirations tend to decline as children mature into young adults. The decline is particularly influenced by multiple barriers. Over time, young people become more aware of the obstacles they face; they may lower their aspirations, especially when facing multiple barriers to success (Morrison & Akerman, 2008). There is no agreed definition of youth. In terms of growth, it is normally taken as a transition from childhood to adulthood, including aspects of sexual maturity and growing social and economic autonomy from parents (Bennell, 2007). To be considered as a youth differs across countries. The United Nations defines youth as a section of a population aged 15–24 years, while the Commonwealth states consider youths as those aged 15–29. In Uganda, the National Youth Policy defines youth as all young persons, female and male, aged 12–30 years. This is a period of great emotional, physical and psychological changes that require societal support for safe passage from adolescence to full adulthood (Government of Uganda, 2001). Youth is viewed from a development perspective as future social and human capital. Youth in this case is considered as generational, a social construct to distinguish and separate youth from other social groups, particularly in relation to division, differences and other categorisations within social groupings. This chapter considers the separation of youth from adult (Jones, 2009) and youth from a generational perspective. 8.3 Migration issues It is well documented by development economists that rural-urban migrations are a product of push and pull factors (Lewis, 1954; Harris & Todaro, 1970). According to 146 | David Ross Olanya Lewis (1954), migration transfers labour from labour-surplus rural areas to labour-deficit urban areas until balance is reached. This later developed into the Todaro-Harris model, postulating that migrants often assess various market opportunities in rural and urban areas and select one that maximises their expected gains. This model helps to explain how rising urban unemployment due to rural-urban migration can be redressed through urban-rural employment. Empirical studies have shown that economic push factors (lack of rural credit, unemployment and rural poverty) are the most important factors. In other cases, however, economic pull factors, which include perception of high wages from urban employment, may be the most dominant (Thirlwall, 2006). Push factors have to do with limited job opportunities in rural areas and a greater desire to move, fostered by improved education and telecommunications. Pull factors relate to the development of urban industrial activities that offer higher wages than rural counterparts. Even if the youth are unemployed for part of the year, they are better off in towns than in rural areas. This chapter examines the declining level of youth engagement in agriculture as a generational problem. Instead of looking at factors fuelling negative perceptions among young men and women, and how young men and women are considering their futures, proactive interventions are necessary to revitalise the agricultural sector so that rural youths perceive tangible employment options. Indeed, the future of the youth as future farmers can be determined by their aspirations and perceptions. In a developing country, small-scale agriculture contributes the biggest source of employment (White, 2012). But, why should rural youths reject farming as a future activity? This calls for understanding the youth from their own perspective. The national youth policy is to view youth as future-oriented – in terms of human capital and as a condition necessary for transition. This involves transitions from childhood to employment, from bad behaviour to responsible citizens. Even though the problems facing youth are structural, and need structural solutions, under a neoliberal regime governments are not supposed to spend on youth programmes and the youth are left to improvise their own survival. The policy has shifted from genuine employment generation to an increasing emphasis on the promotion of entrepreneurship skills, which are reflected in most national youth policies. It is a kind of do-it-yourself employment strategy for the young (World Bank, 2006; White, 2012). But agriculture is not attractive to the youth due to a number of factors, including: 1. de-skilling of rural youth, and downgrading of farming and rural life; 2. chronic government neglect of small-scale agriculture and rural infrastructure; and 3. difficulty in getting access to land while still young. The reluctance of young people to engage in agriculture could be due to the long period of waiting to have independent control over land after inheriting it from the older generation. In most agrarian societies, older generations control land using customary laws. The new trend in youth transition is that migration is not always permanent; it is now being practiced as cyclical, part-time migration. The youth may be smarter Chapter 8 – The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in northern Uganda | 147 farmers than the older generation, since they are able to provide capital for improving agriculture. Then the question remains, how can they be made smarter future farmers. 8.3.1 Empirical findings elsewhere in Africa This chapter explains the attitudes of youths towards agriculture and their future engagement in agriculture. It intends to show how youths’ aspirations in urban-based employment may not translate to the fulfilment of expectations. It is also argued that youths’ high aspirations do not necessarily lead to high outcomes. As shown by Tafere and Woldehanna, 2012, youth in Africa are reluctant to pursue agriculture-based livelihoods, yet most development activism sees the youth as farmers of tomorrow. This raises serious questions about how to achieve food sovereignty in Africa. This empirical study from Ethiopia has shown that parents who are agriculturalists prefer their children to work in sectors other than agriculture. This is because parents experience occupational challenges in farming. Hence, they often prefer their children to be in non-agricultural occupations, since they offer higher returns than agriculture. In addition, occupational aspirations change with the level of education. Another study conducted on farms in South Africa with adolescent girls showed that they preferred professional success and material wealth, a happy marriage and children outside non-rural youth. Life on the farm was regarded as low status, with low wages, alcohol abuse, gossip and jealousy among farm workers, lack of privacy, boredom and social isolation (Kritzinger, 2002). Farming therefore offers low wages, on top of social challenges such as living and working conditions. In Tanzania, the finding was that “many [youth] regard farming as a ‘dirty activity’ due to lack of proper facilities. This has resulted from the fact that agriculture is regarded as an employer of the last resort to the young people” (Juma, 2007, p. 2). Agriculture is unappealing to young people because it does not bring status, regardless of economic outcomes. In the case of Tanzania, farming is seen as a dirty activity, and Juma’s research showed that farming is an employer of the last resort. In general, some of these attitudes include: • • • • Most young people have no interest in agriculture; it is not in their own visions of their future, which is often echoed by their parents. Agriculture is not considered to be delivering the types of lifestyles and status that young people desire and expect. The incomes and working conditions might not be attractive to the youth. Agriculture is regarded as a poor person’s activity, a onedimensional conception of what is means to be poor, marginalised and disadvantaged. Agriculture cannot deliver the prospect of upward mobility and a livelihood to attract young people into or retain them in agriculture. Having a higher-level educational is not relevant to being a small-scale farmer. Agriculture is often seen as a last resort, something to do if you fail: in school, as migrants in town or abroad, in non-farm businesses. Or it may not even be an option at all (Leavy, 2013). 148 | David Ross Olanya Economic, social and environmental factors reduce rural youth involvement in agricultural production (Adekunle, Oladipo, Adisa, & Fatoye, 2009). Economic factors may include inadequate credit facilities, low farming profit margins, and lack of agricultural insurance, initial capital and production inputs. Social factors are public perceptions about farming and the parental influence on moving out of agriculture. Environmental factors are not limited to inadequate land, continuous poor harvests and soil degradation. However, economic factors were the most dominant constraint. The importance in prestige in the formation and fulfilment of aspirations is being reflected in migration where, along with economic security and social mobility, potential for status enhancement via occupation and income is also considered (Leavy & Smith, 2010). Hence, agriculture may not appeal in terms of bringing status, regardless of the economic outcomes (Rao, 2009). In this case, the youth’s aspirations do not depend on economic opportunities, but prestige plays a role also. When it comes to gender and inter-generational relationships, they have a critical influence on the acquisition of status and prestige through occupational routes. Women’s migration increases their autonomy and confidence. 8.4 Youth employment and engagement in agriculture in Northern Uganda In order to come up with information on youth engagement in agriculture, national data were drawn from the Uganda National Panel Survey 2005/06 and 2009/10 to examine the extent of youth engagement in agriculture, with specific reference to Northern Uganda as the focus of attention, with interviews conducted. The intention was to re-evaluate the challenges as a national problem by treating agriculture as a generational problem that needs adequate state attention. It is documented that young people constitute 70 percent of the total African population currently under the age of 30 (UNECA & AUC, 2010). However, evidence suggests that many young people are choosing not to pursue livelihoods in agriculture. Nonetheless, 65 percent of Africa’s population, on average, are living and working in rural areas, two-thirds of whom work in agriculture mainly as family farmers (Leavy & Smith, 2010). In the context of Uganda, the National Youth Policy was formulated to enhance the youth’s participation in overall development processes and improve their quality of life. The strategic policy is on: 1. advocacy for increased effective youth representation and participation in key positions of decision making, leadership and management at all levels of government and in civil society; 2. advocacy for the review and harmonisation of the National Youth Council Statute Chapter 8 – The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in northern Uganda | 149 1993, the Local Government Act 1997 and the Decentralisation Policy to support Youth Council Structures and other youth programmes; 3. strengthening and promoting youth networks at all levels; 4. promoting and supporting youth institutions for peace and conflict resolution; and 5. advocating for realisation of the rights of youths with disabilities and ensuring their participation in all youth programmes. When it comes to the National Youth Policy, although in place, it has not done much to support the youth or provide sufficient resources in agriculture. The Youth Enterprise Scheme is still insufficient to meet the need of the youth in agricultural production. Instead, the youth favour urban-based engagement in search of better social amenities (health and education), employment and/or business opportunities. In general, poverty and unemployment are major problems of the youth and these are due to a combination of factors such as: lack of employment skills; lack of access to land and capital; lack of existing programmes targeting informal sector; lack of experience and apprenticeship skills; negative attitudes of the youth towards agriculture; lack of a comprehensive employment policy; and negative cultural attitudes such as gender discrimination. Despite the long history of forming the National Youth Council in 1993, to engage the youth in national policy, the youth have not gained much in terms of national agricultural financing that specifically supports them (Banks and Sulaiman, 2012). The National Agricultural Advisory Services is an agricultural service that should have addressed youth aspiration in agriculture. Unfortunately, the youth are not given special priority, hence their social exclusion. The Youth Venture Capital, through public-private partners, was to provide UGX 25 billion in capital finance to the youth as long as they had a viable project to pursue. However, banking requirements excluded many youth from the programme. In a similar effort, the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund was supposed to restore productivity in the post-war reconstruction, promoting self-employment under the Youth Opportunity Program, however, this programme did not help youths to engage in agriculture although the intervention was to increase incomes and skills (AAU, DRT, & UNNGOF, 2012). Indeed, Uganda has the world’s youngest population with over 78 percent of the population below the age of 30. As a result, it faces the highest youth unemployment in Africa. The country’s youth unemployment stands at 80 percent in 2011 and 70 percent of the youth live on less than USD 2 a day. Yet, the majority of the population continue to work in agriculture, accounting for 80 percent of the total population (International Youth Foundation, 2011). As noted above, the youngest population of 78 percent below age 30, 52 percent is 15 years and below has high fertility level in the country is 6.2 births per female person (UBOS, 2012). To the World Bank (2011), this youngest population bring very high youth dependency ratio (World Bank, 2011). As shown in table 8.2, youth engagement in agriculture was reduced from 73.2 percent in 2005/06, to 64 percent in 2009/10, while the service sector increased youth employment from 19.5 percent to 27.3 percent in the same period. 150 | David Ross Olanya From the analysis in table 8.1, the greatest percentage of the youth are engaged in agriculture, although the trend was declining. Whereas agriculture is a paramount source of livelihood to the youth, the youth prefer to engage in the service industry. Table 8.1 2005/06 2009/10 Age group Age group Broad sector 18–30 31–59 Both 22–34 35–63 Both Agriculture 73.2 71.6 72.3 64.2 68.2 66.6 Industry 7.3 5.8 6.5 8.5 6.8 7.5 Services 19.5 22.5 21.3 27.3 25.0 26.0 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 Table 8.1 Cohort of youth engagement in agriculture. Source: Ahaibwe, Mbowa & Lwanga (2013) In addition, rural youth were highly involved in agriculture than their counterpart in the urban setting. Interestingly, the urban youth were also involved in agriculture, although the educated youth were less engaged in agriculture as shown in table 8.2 below. Table 8.2 Years 2005/06 Characteristics Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services Location Region Sex 2009/10 Rural 82.4 5.6 12.0 74.3 7.0 18.2 Urban 19.5 62.7 62.5 12.9 16.1 70.9 Central 49.6 13.1 37.3 42.1 10.4 47.4 Eastern 83.2 3.1 13.6 69.7 6.2 24.1 Northern 80.9 8.5 10.6 73.9 9.7 16.3 Western 86.0 3.6 10.3 77.0 7.5 15.5 Male 63.9 11.7 24.3 52.7 13.4 33.9 Female 80.7 3.8 15.5 73.7 4.4 21.7 Education No primary 89.4 5.4 5.2 82.4 6.9 10.6 Primary 79.1 5.3 15.5 73.7 5.7 20.6 Secondary and above 73.1 7.4 19.5 39.7 13.8 46.5 Table 8.2 Disaggregated analysis of by background characteristics. Source: Ahaibwe, Mbowa & Lwanga (2013) The declining youth involvement in agriculture, leads to the increase in unemployment. The Ugandan population has grown from an estimated 5 million in 1948 to 34.1 million in 2012. It is projected to reach 55 million 2030, 64 million in 2040 and 80 million in 2050. Chapter 8 – The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in northern Uganda | 151 Table 8.3 Years 1969 1980 1991 2002 2012 Population (million) 9.5 12.6 16.7 24.2 34.1 2014* 34.9 24 Table 8.3 Growth trend in Uganda, 1969–2012. Source: UBOS (2012); UBOS (2014). As shown in figure 8.1 below, the population keeps on reducing as one moves higher up in the age categories. This has a lot of implications on the productivity of the labour force, especially in the agriculture. Young men and women need to be supported so as to become future farmers. 80+ 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–10 10–14 5–9 0–4 Male Female About half the population is under the age of 15 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 Percent of the population 15 20 25 Figure 8.1 Population Age Distribution. Source: Government of Uganda, 2012. The urban population has continued to increase and about 14.7 percent of Uganda’s population live in urban areas today as shown in table 8.4 below. 24 The Central region registered the highest population, with 9.6 million people; Eastern Uganda followed with 9.1 million; while Western region had 8.9 million; and the Northern region remained the least populated, with 7.2 million people. 152 | David Ross Olanya Table 8.4 Year Population in millions Percentage (%) 1980 0.8 6.7 1991 1.7 9.9 2002 2.9 12.3 2012 5.0 14.5 Table 8.4 Urban population trends in Uganda, 1980–2012. Source: UBOS (2012). Uganda’s population is about 34.1 million people, with an annual growth rate of 3.2 percent, and about 65 percent are youths (UBOS, 2012). About 83 percent of the youth have no formal employment. Unemployment in Uganda remains a serious challenge, and high youth unemployment is attributed to slow economic growth and small formal labour markets, a high population growth rate, lack of sufficient skills and experience, lack of decent work, a rigid education system, rural-urban migration, limited social networks, and limited youth access to support systems (Government of Uganda, 2012). In addition, the youth have poor attitudes towards certain types of work. During 2011/12, after seeing high unemployment among the youth, a total sum of UGX 44.5 billion was allocated towards investment opportunities for the youth. However, the youth fund has not been translated into practice to reduce high unemployment. This negatively affects youth aspirations and perceptions of being future farmers, and instead reinforces the idea that labour should transition from agriculture to industrial and service industries. Yet such sectoral growth does not match the increasing number of youth searching for employment in urban-based sectors. In in the context of Northern Uganda, during a brutal wave of violence by the Lord’s Resistance Army in 1996, the government of Uganda responded by instituting a policy of forcing civilians in Northern Uganda out of their homes and into what it termed “protected villages.” It was believed that it would be easier to defend civilians in these villages (Patrick, 2015). Engagement in agriculture became difficult because of the policy and the nature of the protected villages that had distance limits upon which it was possible to do any economic activity, including agriculture. In addition, the region was experiencing low investment from the government, especially in infrastructure such as roads to link farmers to markets. A study conducted by International Youth Foundation (2011) identified barriers to effective youth engagement in agriculture including: the educational system’s emphasis on theory over practice; lack of modern farming skills and equipment; limited access to land, finance, and markets; erratic weather patterns; inflation’s impact on commodity prices; negative attitudes towards manual labour; and the inaccessibility or limitations of government programmes. This chapter is only concerned with youth engagement in agriculture, considering young people’s aspirations and how they would like to see their future. However, all these sectors need greater access to high-quality, relevant, practical skills training. Hence, common barriers for youth entrepreneurship may include lack of access to land and markets, lack of financial Chapter 8 – The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in northern Uganda | 153 resources, lack of an enabling environment and youth-friendly policies, high taxation and excessive bureaucratic procedures (International Youth Foundation, 2011). Interviews show that the youth in Northern Uganda view agriculture as the employment option of last resort as well as degrading work. They believe in formal education as a means to realise their aspirations. Those who have attained higher-level education consider agriculture as a disgrace to their educational careers pursued since childhood. They strive to avoid being farmers. In fact, education for young men and women in Northern Uganda is a way of avoiding being farmers.25 For the young men and women who have low educational status, their perception of agriculture as a field for future engagement is promising. Some consider agriculture as they are in agriculture, but they cite constraints to agricultural engagement as the main problems. Respondents acknowledged a lack of farming equipment inputs. Hoes are the most common piece of equipment, which are shared with other family members. In terms of access to land, elders in the region control use rights. The popular belief in the region is that land is owned communally. However, the experience of young men and women shows that access to customary land might not be a guarantee for the youth, especially where land value is increasing. Elders always tends to control how much can be used.26 Acquiring funding for the youth is the necessary responsibility the state could offer in order to improve their productivity in agriculture.27 8.5 Policy implications Young men and women play a critical role in the future of food security. However, engaging in agriculture is limited by inputs and generational problems in the sector itself. This has affected their aspirations as future farmers. In the case of Northern Uganda, where access to land is easier, the problem has to do with aspiration because the young rarely value being farmers. What should be taken into consideration are issues of access to credit, extension services and social capital (social groups), which determine the youth’s aspirations and perceptions of agriculture. As suggested by Timmer (1984 [1990], p. 64), achieving agricultural development in rural settings requires: massive investment in human capital, as seen in Japan and Taiwan; and investment in rapid technical change appropriate to these small famers in order to raise agricultural outputs and rural incomes simultaneously. The same analysis could be borrowed from Bates’s (1981) analytical framework. The argument is that government policy in developing countries tends to weaken production incentives for farmers. Policy tends to be antithetical to the interests of most farmers, including setting lower prices for community farmers’ produce; efforts often subsidise inputs, but these subsidies are often captured by larger farmers. When the government talks about production, it often attempts to secure high output rather than 25 26 27 Interviews with practitioners Interviews with youth group (boda-boda ) in Laroo division, Gulu municipality, Gulu district. Youth day celebration speeches in 2012, Gulu district. 154 | David Ross Olanya raising prices. The increasing demand for food and other raw materials for industrial processing is a way in for the youth in the reconstruction period. This leads on to how to improve productivity, profitability and sustainability of youth engagement in agriculture as one of the pathways to move out of poverty using agriculture for development. This calls for support through: 1. improving incentives, increasing the quality and quantity of public investments and reducing agricultural taxes; 2. improving access to financial services; 3. improving the performance of youth producer organisations; 4. innovating through science and technology; and 5. making agriculture sustainable by providing environmental services (World Bank, 2008). All these, however, depend on strong political support in providing infrastructure, services and social safety nets in the presence of administrative capacity and fiscal resources. There is now a general consensus that the state must invest in core public goods such as agricultural research and development, rural roads, property rights and enforcement of rules of contract. There is an urgent need to address the market failures of land access, credit and input insurance. Engaging and empowering the youth in agriculture would solve their aspirations and expectations through social mobility. In fact, rural employment needs to be decent. The World Bank (2011) has defined the ‘demographic dividend’ as the benefit arising from population growth and increase in the working age population positively affecting economic growth and income per capita. The demographic dividend can be realised in three ways: 1. translation effect; 2. saving effect (increase in working population results into higher savings), and 3. human capital effect that arises from increase life expectancy, health and educational demand. In order to benefit from the demographic dividend, transformation of the youth is necessary through training in skills and the use of tools. The government therefore is advised to: 1. recognise the importance of the youth in smallholder agriculture and family farming; and 2. increase and uphold public investments in youth smallholder agriculture, in particular the gender and youth dimensions of agriculture, and provide secure access to land, long-term finance, and market and vocational entrepreneurial training; and Chapter 8 – The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in northern Uganda | 155 3. recognise farmers’ organisations as legitimate stakeholders and economic actors, strengthening their participation in development and evaluation policies to ensure accountability (IFAD, 2007). 8.6 Conclusion By identifying the youth’s specific aspirations and perceptions of agriculture, this chapter analyses perspectives of the youth on agriculture as a generational problem. The negative perception of agriculture is driven by policy that neglects agriculture as the primary employer in the country. The little attention paid by the government has rendered agriculture less attractive to the youth because of low productivity and incomes, and little capital formation, especially in skills education. It is the social capital formation that the state shall focus, an example of skills education. Access to finance is another hurdle for the youth in agriculture. The agricultural finance sector is under-developed and market driven, with collateral security as a condition for lending. The youth do not meet financial eligibility. Even agricultural cooperatives are self-driven by groups, with little or no support from the government. To revive youth aspiration and improve perceptions of agriculture, and to solve this generational problem, the state’s policy must be relevant. In the context of Northern Uganda, where land access is not a big problem, skills training and capital investments in the youth are inevitable. Social groups (social capital) are the chief alternative for youth engagement in agriculture. Social institutions for the youth would mobilise them to access land, financial services and inputs. And marketing challenges could be solved through cooperation in the value chain network that would provide openings in the regional market. 156 | David Ross Olanya References Action Aid Uganda, Development Research and Training, and Uganda National NGO Forum (2012). Lost Opportunity? Gaps in Youth Policy and Programming in Uganda, Kampala. Adekunle, O. A., Oladipo, L. L., Adisa, F.O., & Fatoye, A. D. (2009). Constraints to Youth’s Involvement in Agricultural Production in Kwara State, Nigeria. Journal Agricultural Extension, Vol. 13(1), 102–108. Ahaibwe, G., Mbowa, S., & Lwanga, M. M. (2013). Youth Engagement in Agriculture: Challenges and Prospects (EPRC Research Series No. 106), Kampala, EPRC. Amstrong, P. I., & Crombie, G. (2000). 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D., & Jabara, C. L. (1988).Agricultural Development Principles: Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 158 | David Ross Olanya Tafere, Y. & Woldehanna, T. (2012, March 19–20). Rural Youth Aspirations beyond Agriculture: Evidence from Young Lives Study in Ethiopia. A paper presented at Young People, Farming and Food Conference, Accra, Ghana. Thirlwall, A. P. (2006). Growth and Development with special reference to Developing Economies (8th ed.). Palgrave. Timmer, C. P. (1984 [1990]). The Agricultural Transformation in Agriculture and Development in the Third World. C. K. Eicher, & J. M Staatz (Eds.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Government of Uganda (2001). National Youth Policy: A Vision for Youth in the 21st Century. Kampala, Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. Government of Uganda (2012). Uganda at 50 Years: Population and Service Delivery; Challenges, Opportunities and Prospects. The State of Population Report. Kampala. UBOS (2010). Uganda National Household Survey 2009/10. Kampala UBOS (2012). Statistical Abstract. Kampala: Uganda Bureau of Statistics. UBOS (2014). Statistical Abstract. Kampala, Uganda Bureau of Statistics UNCTAD (2009). World Investment Report 2009. Transactional Corporations, Agricultural Pro- duction and Development. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). UNDP (2012). Human Development Report 2012. Towards a Food Secure Future. New York. UNECA, & AUC (2010). Economic Report on Africa 2010: Promoting High-Level Sustainable Growth to Reduce Unemployment in Africa. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA): Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Vargas-Lundius, R. 2007. Migration and Rural Employment. Rome, IFAD. White, B. (2012, March 19–21). Agriculture and the Generation Problem: Rural Youth, Employment and the Future of Farming. FAC-ISSER Conference ‘Young People, Farming and Food,’ Accra. Whitehead, A., Hashim, I., & Iversen, V. (2007). Child Migration, Child Agency and InterGenerational Relations in Africa and Asia (Working Paper T24). Sussex: Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty. World Bank (2006). Development and the Next Generation: World Development Report 2007. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2008). World Development Report 2008. Agriculture for Development. Washington, DC. World Bank (2011). Uganda; Democracy and Economic Development in Uganda. Washington, DC. Chapter 8 – The dynamics of youth engagement in agriculture in northern Uganda | 159 Kisumu, Kenya, January 2018. Ecobank Towers and Town Clock. Photo: Mark Souther, Flickr Urbanisation entrenches statutory rights and diminishes customary rights that provide access to land resources for more people. Chapter 9, page 177 Kisumu is Kenya's third largest city with a population of more than 1,5 million in the metropolitan area (2017 estimate). Figure 9.1. Map of Kenya (with location of Kisumu indicated), derived from a United Nations map. 9. Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya Leah Onyango 9.1 Background Africa is the least urbanised continent yet it is experiencing high levels of urbanisation across the continent. The region’s cities exhibit high levels of poverty and inequality and fast growth of slums and informal settlements (UN-Habitat, 2014, p. 11), which are problems associated with rapid urbanisation. The influx of people into urban areas creates demand for housing and other social amenities, which local authorities are not able to adequately address (Okonyo, 2008, p. 6). They adopt a ‘firefighting’ approach, where they deal with issues that are getting out of hand. As a result, planning follows development instead of the ideal where development should follow planning. As towns expand, peri-urban communities are invaded by urban sprawl and with time they adapt or are pushed out. The process and level of adaptation are determined by the resources and assets controlled by the local community. Land is a critical resource, since community members are predominantly subsistence farmers, whose livelihoods revolve around land-based livelihoods. Access to land in Kenya is through customary systems (informal) or statutory systems (formal). Colonial regimes imported systems of common and statute law for their own purposes, operating them alongside existing systems of customary law (Adams & Turner, 2006, p. 4). This has created a plural legal system. Customary property rights are dominant in rural areas and statutory property rights are dominant in urban areas. Customary systems allow more people access to land and its resources. Statutory rights, however, promote individual ownership, which restricts access to land (Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan, 2002). Only registered proprietors have access to land and its resources. Customary systems provide user rights such as residency, cultivation, pasture, extraction of natural resources, etc. to families and/or the community, and rural livelihoods are based on these. As regions develop from rural to urban, customary rights are reduced and eventually become obsolete, since land moves from being a family asset to being an individual asset. There are two common scenarios that link this transition to increasing urban poverty. In one case, families divide up their land between family members (usually 164 | Leah Onyango only the male family members) who then become sole proprietors, giving them absolute statutory rights. There is no family or community control over this land. When the registered owner decides to sell it, which is often the case, he is left landless, making him more vulnerable and susceptible to falling into poverty. It is not easy for the family or community to restrain him because he is the sole proprietor and statutory rights are stronger than customary ones in urban settings. The other case is where the family land is sold by the family patriarch and the returns are shared to all. The family members are often ill prepared to invest in non-land-based livelihoods and this makes them vulnerable. Other household members who had user rights over the land no longer have them and they do not get any portion of the proceeds from the sale of the land either. In both scenarios, vulnerability is caused by loss of control of land. The primary argument of this chapter is that urbanisation promotes loss of customary rights over land as it entrenches statutory rights, and this leads to increased poverty in peri-urban areas when local communities are dispossessed and must seek non-land-based employment for which they are often ill prepared. Land is the primary asset of peri-urban dwellers, therefore rights to land resources should be safeguarded as a measure to reduce urban poverty for local communities in the face of accelerated urbanisation. The chapter discusses options for managing the process of urbanisation so that people living on the fringes of urban areas are not made vulnerable and left to fall into poverty. It draws its examples from Kisumu city and focuses on the socio-economic dynamics of the city’s peri-urban areas. 9.2 Methodology Characterisation of Kisumu city and its environs The first step in the methodology of this chapter is characterisation of the city and its environs. This is done to distinguish how urbanisation has impacted different parts of the city and resulting land use patterns. The assumption here is that areas closer to the city have more intense interactions and with corresponding consequences. These are expected to reduce as distance increases away from the central business district. The city was characterised using different land tenure systems, major land use and different stages of urban development. The output of this characterisation is a map showing five different land use zones, which the chapter uses as a basis for analysis. The chapter describes the social dynamics in each of the resulting zones and associated property rights, indicating the difference in effectiveness of both statutory and non-statutory property rights in each zone. Analysing applications to the Kisumu Municipality Land Control Board for subdivisions and transfer of land Land Control Boards are mandated to give development permission to landowners who want to subdivide, transfer or lease their land. One sub-location was sampled per zone to analyse applications to the land control board. An analysis of these tran- Chapter 9– Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya | 165 sactions provides insight on patterns of land transfers from the local community to the incoming population. The transfers take away customary user rights of other household members. The analysis also yields information on diminishing plot sizes as one moves towards the central business district. This has implications on livelihood options. Group discussions with inhabitants of the peri-urban areas One group discussion was held in each of the land use zones to elicit community perspectives on urban poverty and its dynamics using the stages of progress methodology.28 The group was composed of young, middle-aged and elderly participants to reflect past, present and future perspectives. All participants of the group discussion had to be indigenous to the village, because the objective of the discussion was to establish the role of changing land rights and people’s movement into and out of poverty. This required participation from indigenous people and owners. The focus groups was also used to elicit information on customary land rights in the past and today, changes in customary land rights in the past 50 years, the causes of this change and the consequences. Discussions with chiefs from the sampled sub-locations One local chief or sub-chief was interviewed as a key informant in each of the land use zones. The chief or sub-chief is the representative of the central government at community level. It is mandatory that chiefs are selected from among local people because they are expected to have detailed knowledge of the people and the social dynamics in their community. The study in this chapter interviewed them to elicit information on the social dynamics of the community, with specific reference to changing rights to land in the face of urbanisation. 9.3 Characterisation of Kisumu city and its environs Kisumu city is located on the shores of Lake Victoria in the west of Kenya. It lies 1,500 meters above sea level and is 25 kilometres south of the equator. It covers an area of 417 square kilometres, of which 157 is water and 260 land. There have been several extensions of the city boundary as indicated in figure 9.1, which shows the original town boundary, the second boundary and the current city boundary. Figure 9.1. Location of Kisumu city. Source: Olang’o. 2015 28 The stages of progress methodology is a participatory and community-based methodology developed by Prof. Anirudh Krishna of Duke University, USA, which relies on the community’s definition of poverty and attempts to identify and explain households’ movement into and out of poverty in diverse local conditions (Krishna, Kristjanson, & Nindo, 2004). The method is modular and has been used by various scholars (Swallow & Onyango, 2005; Onyango, 2008) in various forms and with various additions. 166 | Leah Onyango Kakamega Road Busia Road Mamboleo Road 1 Bondo Road 3 2 Kibos/Chiga Road Legend Road Kisumu Boundaries First boundary Existing boundary Second boundary 4 5 Lake Victoria Nairobi Road Scale 1:100‚000 Figure 9.2. Kisumu City boundary change and classification of land use zones. Source: Adapted from UN-Habitat 2007 The 2009 population census indicated that Kisumu had a population of about 500,000. It is the third-largest city in Kenya. Poverty levels are high at 48 percent, compared to 29 percent at the national level. It has a high incidence of food poverty, with 53.4 percent of the population below the food poverty line (compared to 8.4 percent in the capital Nairobi). The unemployment rate is 30 percent, with 52 percent engaged in informal sector activities (e.g. transport, petty sales and repairs), and an average monthly wage of around USD 40–50. Over half the population (60 percent) live in slums. Only 40 percent of the Kisumu population has access to piped water and just 10 percent of the city area is served by sewerage. Waste collection is poor and only 20 percent of waste generated is collected. Kisumu has a high HIV/AIDS rate, with 14 percent of the total population infected, compared to 7 percent nationally. Kisumu city is made up of the old city, which is planned, and peri-urban areas, which were formerly agricultural land that has since been swallowed by the city. The city is growing in four directions, along transport routes (see figure 9.2): Nairobi Road to the southeast, Busia Road to the west, Kakamega Road to the north and Kibos Road to the northeast. There is a general pattern that can be observed in the nature of growth. High-income earners are settling along Kakamega Road, which is on higher ground. Middle-income earners are settling along Busia Road, while those on low incomes are settling along Nairobi Road, which is low-lying and flood prone. Institutions such as the Great Lakes University are moving towards Miwani and Kibos Road where there are large tracts of land available on large-scale leasehold commercial farms. Land use, Zones 1–5 The chapter study characterised Kisumu city and its environs to distinguish how urbanisation has impacted differently on the different parts of the city. The study uses the Burges concentric zone concept to explain the dynamics of land use. Maleche (1992, p. 45) indicates that Burges established five zones: Zone 1: Central business district; Zone Chapter 9– Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya | 167 2: zone of transition; Zone 3: zone of working men’s homes; Zone 4: zone of better residences; and Zone 5: commuter zone. This study also generated five distinct zones from the characterisation based on the different land tenure systems’ land use and stages of urban development, as shown in figure 9.2. Zone 1 – Planned (old town) leasehold, non-agricultural land uses Zone 1 is determined by the old town boundary. All land is titled and all land use is non-agricultural (commercial, industrial, residential, social amenities and public utility) and held as leasehold land. Some of the leases are from the central government, while others are from the local authority. The leases are for 33, 45 and 99 years. Leasehold land is governed by statutory rights, with terms and conditions on how to use the land. Land use is planned and controlled. There are residential areas for high, middle and low incomes. During the pre-independence era, the high-income residential areas were set aside for Europeans, middle-income areas for Asians and low-income areas for Africans. This has since changed and income is the determining factor on where one resides. Only those who can meet the terms and conditions of the leases own land in this zone. Customary rights therefore do not apply. Row 3 of table 9.7 indicates that all (100 percent) access to land resources in Zone 1 is through statutory rights. Zone 2 – Unplanned, high-density freehold (Nyalenda/Manyatta/Nyamasaria/Obunga/Bandani) Zone 2 (figure 9.2) is the freehold land that lies immediately beyond the boundaries of the old town. All land is titled and all land use is non-agricultural (residential), but with freehold titles that are assumed to be agricultural. As more people moved into town the need for housing increased, but was not addressed by the local authority. Entrepreneurs bought land in this zone and developed housing units. Some landowners also did the same. Developments are unplanned and uncontrolled since there are no development conditions on freehold titles and the local authority lacks the capacity to enforce development control on freehold land. The unplanned nature of developments has compromised environmental health and security in the neighbourhood, in effect keeping away high-income tenants. Population density in this zone is very high. During the pre-independence era, this zone was part of the native reservation, therefore customary rights to land are recognised and applied. Zone 3: Unplanned, middle density (Otonglo/Mamboleo/Nyalunya/Kibos) Zone 3 (figure 9.2) is located across the second city boundary and the current city boundary. All land is titled as freehold, apart from small markets found in the zone. Land use in the zone is agricultural, residential and industrial. The population density can be described as moderate. Land use is unplanned and uncontrolled, since there are no development conditions on freehold titles and the local authority lacks the capacity to enforce development control on freehold land. Residential land use is dominated by owner occupiers. These are people who have moved in from other areas and purchased 168 | Leah Onyango land on which they have built houses that they themselves occupy. During the preindependence era, this zone was part of the native reservation, therefore customary rights to land are recognised and applied. Zone 4: Unplanned, low density (Ojola/Nyahera/Chiga/Rabour) Zone 4 (figure 9.2) falls along the outer edge of the current boundary. All land is titled as freehold, apart from small markets found in the zone. Land use in the zone includes agricultural, residential and industrial. The population density can be described as low. The predominant land use is agricultural. Many people who live in this zone work in the city Zone 5: Rural areas Zone 5 (figure 9.2) falls beyond the current city boundary and the main land use is agriculture. All land is titled as freehold, apart from small markets found in the zone. The population is lower than in the other zones. 9.4 Urban growth and changes in property rights An analysis of subdivision and transfer applications to the Land Control Board provides insights on patterns of land transfers that are synonymous with transfer of land rights. All land within the city boundary is titled and land rights can be transferred for a complete parcel, in which case the proprietor will apply to the Land Control Board for consent to transfer. The transfer can also be done on a portion of a parcel. In such cases the proprietor must first apply to the Land Control Board for consent to subdivide land before applying for consent to transfer. Initial results from the analysis (table 9.5) indicate that the applications for subdivision of land increase as one moves away from the central business district, while applications for transfer of land increase as one move towards the central business district (Zone 1). Further analysis (table 9.6) indicates that land parcel sizes become smaller as one move towards the central business district. On average, parcels of land in Zone 2 measure 0.045 hectares. Land parcels in Zone 3 measure an average of 0.17 hectares and those in Zone 4 measure an average of 0.75 hectares (table 9.6). Discussions with groups of local people from each land use zone on the changing property rights yielded results summarised in table 9.7. This graphic illustrates how customary rights reduce and statutory rights increase as urbanisation increases. The results of the discussion indicate that in the old town land tenure does not allow the use of customary land rights. In Zone 5 there is extensive use of customary rights and little use of statutory rights. The size of a parcel of land will to a large extent determine the type of land use that is viable and the resultant land use change in the neighbourhood. The diminishing size of parcels of land as one moves towards the central business district is an indicator that the land is no longer used for agriculture, as evidenced in Zone 2 where the average Chapter 9– Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya | 169 land holding is 0.045 hectares. The land use in this zone has changed to residential in response to the great demand for urban housing. Since the average land parcel is too small to subdivide, the dominant applications to the Land Control Board are applications for consent to transfer. The implication of the many transfers is the loss of customary rights many times over. The scenario in Zones 3 and 4 is different because the parcel sizes are relatively larger (0.17 hectares and 0.75 hectares), therefore there is still room for subdivision. There are a number of applications for transfer of land, which implies a significant loss of customary rights. Land use change here includes both residential and industrial. In Zone 5 the land units are large (1.8 hectares) and applications for subdivision are many times more than those for transfer. Only 20 percent of the sampled applications were for the transfer of land. This implies that not many people have lost their customary rights to land and the resources found thereon such as trees water and soil. Table 9.5 Sub location Subdivision (%) Transfers (%) Zone 2 Kasule 20 80 Zone 3 Kogony 57 43 Zone 4 Konya 58 42 Zone 5 K’ochieng 77 22 Table 9.5 Comparing applications to the Kisumu Municipality Land Control Board across five land use zones in Kisumu city Source: This study Table 9.6 Average land holding in hectares (before subdivision) Average land holding in hectares (after subdivision) Zone 2 0.09 0.045 Zone 3 0.34 0.17 Zone 4 1.70 0.75 Zone 5 1.80 – Table 9.6 Average land holding in each land use zone before and after subdivision Source: This study In traditional settings, all household members have access to family land, even when the title is in the name of the family patriarch only. They have user rights and can cultivate, pasture, harvest natural resources and build their homes on family land even without a title. There has been extensive subdivision and transfer of land to people who are not local to neighbourhoods. The new owners have no traditional obligation to the locals, therefore they do not extend to them any customary rights to access the land once it has been sold. This means that once land has been transferred out of the family, 170 | Leah Onyango all rights to that land are surrendered. Some of the landowners live within the zone and some live outside the zone. Most of the land in Zone 2 has been subdivided and transferred to non-family members, but there are still small pockets owned by local people. To a large extent they apply statutory rights, but to a small extent they apply customary law. For example, their sons still have the right to build on the family homestead. Row 4 of table 9.7 indicates that the dominant (80 percent) source of authority for accessing land resources in Zone 2 is statutory, but still there exists limited (20 percent) access through customary rights. In Zone 3, the local community still outnumbers the new landowners. However, statutory rights are stronger than customary rights because of the exposure that the local community has experienced from interactions with the new landowners. In most homes, the land is no longer registered in the name of the patriarch but has been subdivided and titles issued to individual sons. However, since this is land that has been inherited it is subject to customary rights, which give all household members user rights to the land. Row 5 of table 9.7 indicates that the dominant (60 percent) source of authority for accessing land resources in Zone 3 is statutory. However, the use of customary rights to access land resources is still significant (40 percent). The evidence of this is the level of user rights extended to other members of the household who still cultivate fields, pasture livestock, collect firewood, build houses, etc. In Zone 4, there are significant numbers of non-local landowners who have moved into the area. Row 6 of table 9.7 indicates that the dominant (60 percent) source of authority for accessing land resources in Zone 4 is customary, but still there also exists limited (40 percent) access through statutory rights. Row 7 of table 9.7 indicates that the dominant (80 percent) source of authority for accessing land resources in Zone 5 is customary, but still there also exists limited (20 percent) access through statutory rights. This is because the land is titled and major transactions are done based on statutory provisions. Chapter 9– Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya | 171 Table 9.7 10% Zone 1 Zone 2 20% 30% 40 % 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Restricted access to land resources and increased vulnerability to poverty Statutory RIGHTS Zone 3 Tragedy of the commons Zone 4 Zone 5 Table 9.7: Comparing the prevalence of statutory land rights to customary land rights across five land use zones in Kisumu city Source: This study The percentages refer to prevlance of either statutory rights or customary rights. The colour code represent the two types of rights and how they play out in each Zone. Enough customary rights to guard against dispossession of land resources Enough statutory rights to protect individual investments 9.5 Changing property rights and social strife As the urban population increases, there is a corresponding increase in demand for housing. This creates demand for land to develop urban housing. Many households are attracted to sell some of their land because of high prices. This continues until most of the family land is gone. In some cases, all the family land is sold. There are no legal provisions to regulate the amount of land a household can sell. Most of the households engage in farming and once they have sold their land they have no land on which to farm. This calls for a change in livelihoods. They must also seek alternative ways of occupying themselves. The educated get involved in professional work, while those without an education often join the masses of urban poor. Group discussions with local people and local chiefs indicated that the transfer of land is a source of conflict in many households. Those members of the household with rights to the land may not always agree with the decision to sell land for a range of reasons. The main one is fear of dispossession. Another reason is the fear that the proceeds of the sale will not be shared equitably. More often than not, the proceeds are shared among the male members of the household with no consideration for the female members who have user rights to the land. The other source of conflict is the fear that once a household starts selling land it will continue doing so until almost all the family land has gone, thus impoverishing the next generation. This is often the main concern of female household members and a major source of domestic strife. Incremental sale of land is a practice that has developed in the peri-urban region. 172 | Leah Onyango This is where a head of household who has sold land will keep offering small pieces of additional land to the vendor any time there is a financial need. Many times these transactions are informal and the amount of money exchanged is small. It is viewed as a form of irresponsibility by the rest of the household, who never get to benefit from the monies paid. However, at the end of the day the household must surrender large portions of its land. Customary rights offer the household some form of redress. The Land Control Boards recognise the customary rights of the other members of the household. The Board will therefore listen to complaints by other members of the household who are not happy with the sale of land. However, they can only restrain registered owners from selling land if the sale will render the household homeless. As a result of this, it is common to find that all land is sold, but the main homestead remains standing. The buyers will often build modern housing around this traditional homestead. In some cases, the family will agree to sell the homestead and use the proceeds to set up another family homestead far away, where land is cheaper and they can buy a larger parcel. This is a form of relocation caused by urbanisation for those who do not want to be swallowed up by the growing town. The Board can also restrain the sale if it includes selling land that has been allocated to others using customary rights, but has not gone through the technical process of subdivision and transfer to the allottees. The older generations allocate land to their sons verbally, but fear completing the process to the point of subdivision and transfer. Their fear is that once young people have received their title deeds, they will sell the land. The young people are allowed to build structures in the family compounds for residential purposes and collect rent. Since the title is one for the whole family, the young people cannot use it as collateral. This limits the kind of development that they can carry out on the pieces of land. The title gives them absolute rights over the land, so they do not need the consent of their parents to sell. They often sell and invest poorly, after which they join the urban poor. There is a new form of conflict over tenure with those who have come from elsewhere and bought land from locals. They are referred to as jodak.29 They are primarily driven by the desire to optimise profits and value land from a strictly commercial point of view (UN-Habitat, 2005).They do not entertain non-entrepreneurial associations with the local community. 29 Jodak is a Luo word used to refer to foreigners living among them. It communicates a lack of equality and subsidiarity. Chapter 9– Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya | 173 9.6 Dynamics of poverty The stages of progress methodology was used to establish a community perspective on poverty, as well as to analyse its dynamics among peri-urban dwellers. It helps uncover underlying causes that are responsible for this movement. It comprises seven successive steps, indicated below: 1. Assembling a representative community group; 2. Presenting our objectives; 3. Describing and defining poverty collectively (developing a scale for measuring poverty using assets (see table 9.8); 4. Treating households of today as the unit of analysis and inquiring about households’ poverty status at the present time and in the past (25 years ago, but can be altered depending on the study’s needs); 5. Assigning households to particular categories – poverty status today and poverty status in the past: • remained poor; • escaped poverty; • became poor; • remained non poor; 6. Compiling event histories: inquiring about reasons for escape and descent for a random sample of households; and 7. Following up by interviewing household members. The group agreed on what it means to be a poor person in their community. They discussed the attributes of a poor person in their community and reached a consensus. The attributes of a poor man in this study are as follows: • • • • • He struggles to put food on the table. His children often get only a basic education. He lives in a small, lowly house. He does not have a professional job. He has a low income, which is often erratic. Each group develops its stages of progress, like the one in table 9.8 below, through consensus and guidance from the facilitator. The participants in the discussion group represent households in the community. Each household is discussed to determine the stage they were at 25 years ago, 10 years ago and today. Households are placed at specific stages based on what they have or what they can do. 174 | Leah Onyango Table 9.8 Stages of progress Food Clothing Temporary house Casual labour Primary education POOR Petty business – capital investments less than KES 50,000 (USD 500) Small livestock like chickens/goats/sheep Purchase of bicycle Provides secondary education for children Poverty line Keeps cattle Improves housing (semi-permanent building) Medium-size enterprise (e.g. kiosk, small shops, etc.) – capital investment less than KES 500,000 (USD 5,000) NOT POOR Purchase of motorcycle Construction of semi-permanent rental housing Prosperity line Purchase of motor vehicle Construction of permanent residential house Investment in serious business (e.g. wholesale, transport, etc.) – capital investment more than KES 500,000 (USD 5,000) PROSPEROUS Investment in real estate Table 9.8 Stages of progress30 Source: This study Once the poverty status of each individual household is determined, each household is assigned to one of four separate categories. Categories of movement A. Poor then and poor now (Remained poor). B. Poor then and non-poor now (Escaped poverty). C. Non-poor then but poor now (Became poor). D. Non-poor then and non-poor now (Remained non-poor). 30 There was debate on whether a poor man could afford to send his children to secondary school. Those proposing it won the argument, since they said that the government was subsidising education and that there were constituency development funds that supported the education of children from poor families. Chapter 9– Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya | 175 Table 9.9 Category Zone 2 (N=20) Zone 3 (N=15) Zone 4 (N=15) Zone 5 (N=15) Total (N=65) Remained poor 30 40 27 33 32 Escaped poverty 10 0 7 0 3 Become poor 45 47 20 13 32 Remained non-poor 15 13 47 53 31 Net change in poverty +35 +47 +13 +13 +29 Table 9.9 Patterns of movement into and out of poverty (%) Source: This study In Zone 2, a total of 30 percent remained poor and 45 percent become better off, totalling 75 percent, with only 10 percent escaping poverty. There is a net increase in poverty of 35 percent (45 percent become poor less 10 percent who escape poverty). The pattern is the same in Zone 3 where there is a net increase in poverty of 47 percent. In Zones 4 and 5, the net increase is 13 percent in both zones. On average there is a net increase in poverty of 29 percent. The emerging pattern indicates that as one moves away from the central business district the rate at which poverty grows is reduced. What, therefore, is the association between this pattern and changing property rights? Other studies (Swallow, Onyango & Meinzen-Dick, 2006, p. 8) have shown that households that were able to escape poverty engaged in a wider range of livelihood strategies. This study has established that as towns grow, local people in peri-urban areas lose their land to newcomers and cease to have access to livelihoods that are land based. For example, horticultural produce has a ready market in towns, but this is land based and without land it ceases to be a livelihood option. There are many basic needs such as subsistence food, water, wood fuel, pasture, building materials, etc. that a household will derive from land resources. Households that have land are able to access these resources from their land. When they lose access to land they lose free access to these resources and can only access them at a cost. Loss of access is total when land is transferred using statutory rights. Customary rights will, however, allow all family31 members access to land and its resources. The group discussion revealed that even when land is registered in the name of an individual family member, other family members can still cultivate it, extract wood fuel, and even construct temporary residential and business structures from which rent is collected on arrangement, until such a time as the registered owners want to use it. This corroborates findings by Meinzen-Dick (2009, p. 4) that people can have overlapping and conditional rights to use and manage resources, such as to graze animals or harvest certain products from land officially ‘owned’ by the state or by other people, and these play critical roles in their livelihoods. If urban poverty is to be 31 Family’ in the traditional context of the local community living in this area (Luo ethnic group) goes beyond father mother and children to include an extended range of kin. 176 | Leah Onyango arrested, one needs to closely examine livelihoods associated with rising out of poverty with a view to promoting them. One also needs to establish what caused households to fall into poverty and mitigate the causes. These preliminary analyses indicate that complete dispossession of land is associated with falling into poverty. How then can this be mitigated? What options are presented in the plurality of property rights? 9.6.1 Safeguarding access to land resources for peri-urban communities Land is the main resource of peri-urban populations, yet the unfolding urbanisation processes in Kenya are likely to compromise their continued access to land. Market forces favour those with ability to pay. The challenge is therefore how to safeguard the peri-urban populations’ interests for posterity. The UN-Habitat report The State of African Cities 2014 (UN-Habitat, 2014) recommends that the needs of the poor should be incorporated through equality and human rights-based urban interventions. The concepts of ‘land banks’ and ‘land banking’ first emerged in the 1960s as proposals for new urban planning tools in the United States (US) to address urban sprawl (unconstrained and unrestrained new developments) and the decline and abandonment of inner-city neighbourhoods (Alexander, 2011). Land banking is the practice of aggregating parcels of land for future sale or development. It is mostly based on the prospect of urban areas expanding at the expense of rural areas. Land banking is flexible and can be used to address questions of dispossession of land in peri-urban areas as urbanisation progresses. The difference here would be that land banks should be quasi-governmental entities in which the community has majority shares. This would allow both the community and the government to be decision makers and influence the investments of land banks towards sustaining households’ rights to land resources in the face of an urbanising society. The role of the local government would be to prepare urban development plans and use these to establish future land requirements based on population projections for all the urban centres. The next step would be to identify suitable locations for each anticipated land use. The role of the community would be to supply the land bank with the required land. The need for land is considered a public interest and is therefore placed above individual interest. Where necessary, compulsory acquisition can be applied (with some variation from the normal process). This land would be placed in the land bank, which would become the main source of land for development of infrastructure, social amenities and other investments. Another role of the government would be to develop a policy stipulating that any investor purchasing or leasing land from the land bank would be required to partner with the bank. A certain percentage of the cost of the land would be waived and this would be the community’s share contribution in the investment. The community would therefore reap benefits from all investments done on land that had previously belonged to them. The size of the land parcel, contributed Chapter 9– Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya | 177 by each household to the land bank, would determine the share(s) allocated to each household. These shares would then become an inheritance handed down from one generation to the next in perpetuity. This would ensure that even as the towns grew and swallowed up peri-urban areas, local communities could still retain a level of access to land resources and would continue to earn income even after land had been transferred and developed. The proposed model is a mix of the use of land banks in the United Kingdom, where they operate as real estate developers, and what goes on in the US, where they are quasi-government entities created by counties or municipalities to effectively manage and repurpose land. The policy environment in Kenya is favourable for the application of such a model. The new constitution (Republic of Kenya, 2010, p. 14), which created a devolved government system, gave the planning mandate to county governments. The Urban Areas and Cities Act of 2011 (Republic of Kenya, 2011, p. 17) provided for integrated development planning, which presented an opportunity for establishing projected land requirements for cities and urban areas. Part 6, Section 50 of the Act states, “Every city and municipality established under this Act shall operate within the framework of integrated development planning”, which shall be binding and shall be the principal strategic planning instrument and guide and inform all planning, development and decisions regarding planning, management and development in the city or municipality. In the preparation of the integrated urban or city development plan (Section 52), a city or municipality shall provide for: • • • • • • • • • an assessment of the current social, economic and environmental situation in its area of jurisdiction; a determination of community needs, aligning them to the requirements of the constitution; protection and promotion of the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised groups and communities; a shared vision for the city or municipality’s development and that of the county as a whole; an audit of available resources, skills and capacities; prioritisation of the identified needs in order of urgency and long-term importance; integrated frameworks and goals to meet the identified needs; strategies to achieve the goals within specific time frames; and specific implementation. 9.7 Conclusion There is general consensus that urban poverty in Africa is high and continues to increase. This chapter has tried to point out the link between increasing urban poverty and loss of customary property rights by local communities living in peri-urban areas. It concludes that urbanisation entrenches statutory rights and diminishes customary rights 178 | Leah Onyango that provide access to land resources for more people. The loss of the customary rights that allow land-based livelihoods creates the need for alternative non-land-based livelihoods, which are often not forthcoming, with the result that peri-urban people who have sold their land join the masses of the urban poor. The ongoing transition calls for innovative approaches to addressing urban poverty. Many constitutions recognise the inevitability of legal pluralism, therefore tenure dualism needs to be recognised as a resource that can be used in the changing livelihoods of the urban poor. Legislation can then be used to strengthen customary property rights, for example by recognising the resource rights of indigenous people, or even provide them with additional bases for claiming property rights, and thereby increase their bargaining power in negotiations for resources. One such constitution is that of Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2010, p. 44). It provides for the regulation of land use and property (Section 66) and enactment of legislation ensuring that investments in property benefit local communities and their economies. This is against a backdrop of land policy principles calling for (a) equitable access to land and (b) security of land rights. This chapter illustrates that Kenya has a favourable policy environment for using legal pluralism as a resource for promoting pro-poor urban development. The example of land banking as described in this chapter illustrates that understanding legal pluralism can lead to more effective policies and interventions to strengthen poor people’s control over assets and reduce their vulnerability. The challenge in implementing such approaches is the practice in Africa, where planning follows development as opposed to the ideal where planning precedes development. Chapter 9– Legal pluralism and urban poverty in peri-urban Kisumu, Kenya | 179 References Adams, S. & Turner, S. (2006). Legal Dualism and Land Policy in Eastern and Southern Africa. In E. Mwangi (Ed.) Land Rights for African Development: From Knowledge to Action (The System-Wide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights Policy Briefs). Washington, DC: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Alexander, F. S. (2011). Land Banks and Land Banking. Washington, DC: Center for Community Progress. Government of Kenya (2009). Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009. The National Land Policy. Nairobi: Government Press. Government of Kenya (2010). The Constitution of Kenya. Nairobi: Government Press. Krishna, A., Kristjanson, P., Radeny, M., & Nindo, W. (2004). Escaping poverty and becoming poor in 20 Kenyan villages. Journal of Human Development 5, 211–226. Krishna, A. (2010). One Illness Away: How People Become Poor and How they Escape Poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maleche, Z. (1992). Principles and Theory of Planning. A Manual Prepared for the Master of Physical Planning Degree Course. GTZ/Makerere University. Meinzen-Dick, R. (2009, December) Property Rights for Poverty Reduction? (DESA Working Paper No. 91. ST/ESA/2009/DWP/91). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers. Meinzen-Dick, R., & Pradhan, S. (2002). Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights (CAPRi Working Paper 22). Washington, DC, p. International Food Policy Research Institute. Olang’o. J. O. (2015) Spatial and Institutional inadequacies hindering integration of street vending in the Urban economy of Ksumu City, Kenya (Unpublished doctoral thesis). Kenya: Maseno University. Okonyo, E. W. (2008). Customary Tenure: ‘Opportunity’ or ‘Obstacle’ to Urban Development – The Case of Kisumu City (Unpublished MSc thesis). Netherlands: International Institute for Geo-Information Science and Earth Observations (ITC). Onyango, L. A. (2008). Poverty, livelihoods and property rights in the Nyando basin, Kenya; A case for integrated approaches to development planning (Unpublished doctoral thesis). Kenya: Maseno University. Onyango, L. A., & Home, R. (2011). Land law, governance and rapid urban growth: A case study of Kisumu. In Robert Home (Ed.) Local Case Studies in African Land Law. Cape Town: Pretoria University Law Press (PULP). Pimentel, D. (2011). Legal Pluralism in Post-Colonial Africa: Linking Statutory and Customary Adjudication in Mozambique. Yale Human Rights and Development Journal: Vol. 14: Issue 1, Article 2. Retrieved from http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol14/iss1/2. Republic of Kenya (2011). The Urban Areas and Cities Act. Nairobi: Government Press. 180 | Leah Onyango Swallow, B., Onyango, L., & Meinzen-Dick, R. (2006). Irrigation management and poverty dynamics: Case study of the Nyando basin in Western Kenya. In Koppen, B. C. P. van. Giodano, M. and Butterworth,J.. (Eds.) (2007). Community Based Water Law and Water Resource Management Reform in Developing Countries. [London CABI International. UN-Habitat (2004). Kisumu City Development Strategy 2004–2009. Nairobi. UN-Habitat (2005). Situation Analysis of Informal Settlements in Kisumu. Nairobi. UN‐Habitat (2007). Kisumu Integrated Sustainable Waste Management Project Document, Nairobi. UN-Habitat (2014). The State of African Cities 2014. Re-imagining sustainable urban transitions. Nairobi. Wily, L. A. (2006). Land rights reform and governance in Africa: How to make it work in the 21st century? New York: UNDP Dryland Development Centre. Lower land densities and the nature of development in many areas of suburban fringes provide city authorities with an opportunity to set up land banks. Chapter 10, page 193 Cykling at the coast of Malindi in southeastern Kenya. Photo: Marco Pascolin, Flickr Percent Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa World 60 27 % 40 % 55 % (2017) (2017) (2017) 50 40 30 20 10 0 Year1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Urban population (% of total), development from 1960 to 2017. Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. Source: United Nations Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects, 2018 Revision. Malindi Map source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 10. Crossroads at the RuralUrban Interface: The Dilemma of Tenure Types and Land Use Controls in Housing provision and Urban Development in Kenyan Cities Jack Abuya Abstract Against the backdrop of rapid urbanisation that Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing today and the selected negative externalities arising from such growth, this study sought to investigate the implications of land tenure types in the control and management of urban spatial growth and housing delivery in Kenyan Cities. Taking Kisumu and Malindi Towns in Kenya as case study areas, the study used social surveys and spatial analysis to determine that the different tenure systems in both cities influence different land use patterns especially in the provision of housing. The findings demonstrate that both insecure tenure and plurality of tenure present unique challenges in housing development especially at the rural urban interface. This is manifested in the development of slum settlements arising from unfeasible land sub-divisions, disincentives for improved self-help housing for fear of evictions and weak enforcement of urban planning standards. It is recommended that efforts be in place to regularize tenure security in slum settlements in order to provide incentives for increased household investments in durable and socially accepted housing. Proper and enforceable land use plans buttressed by clear land tenure regimes should also be designed for the development of the urban fringes as towns continue to grow spatially outwards. Key Words: Urbanisation, Rural-Urban Interface, Urban Planning, Tenure Types, Housing. 186 | Jack Abuya 10.1 Introduction Since the 1950s, mankind has endured its most rapid expansion, from 2.5 billion to 6 billion people. Sixty percent of this gain has however been in urban areas, particularly in the urban areas of the developing world, where the urban population has increased more than fivefold in only 50 years. According to UNDESA (2014), ‘The urban population of the world has grown since 1950, from 746 million to 3.6 billion in 2014. Continuing population growth and urbanization are projected to add 2.5 billion people to the worlds’ urban population by 2050, with nearly 90 percent of the increase concentrated in Asia and Africa’. The outstanding fact however, is that, whereas urbanisation in developing countries has proceeded faster than in the developed countries, the correlation of the rate of urbanisation with economic growth has been weaker than in developed countries (UN-Habitat, 2013). Africa’s high rate of urbanisation has not been accompanied by a similar rate of social and economic development. As a consequence, African cities have had to face typical negative externalities connected with the unprecedented rate of urbanisation such as high poverty rates, poor governance and weak institutions leading to; corruption; high costs of doing business; low levels of human capital; social and spatial inequalities and exclusion, inadequate infrastructure and transport facilities, unemployment, poor health, housing shortages and growth of informal settlements, urban sprawl, environmental problems, lack of social harmony and cohesion, crime and violence, and a general sense of malaise and hopelessness (UN-Habitat, 2013). Due to the Sub Saharan Africa’s cities inadequate capacities in managing the rapid growth; urban planning, development control, land allocation, physical and social infrastructures are all deplorably inadequate to cope with the burgeoning population. Indeed this demographic transition has also brought with it tremendous spatial transformations. This is because urban environments represent one of the most rapid and longest-lasting forms of land use and cover transformations (Douglas 1994; Sánchez-Rodriguez et al. 2005). Though urban land cover comprises a small percentage of the global land surface, urban interests increasingly drive rural land-cover and land use changes because urban populations and economic activities require resources that extend far beyond the boundaries of the urban environment (Lambin et al. 2003). The manifestations of this imbalance can evidently be seen in the inadequate shelter delivery that most of these cities face. As a result, an increasing part of the urban population live in the slum settlements located in the peri-urban areas which are unplanned, often illegal, shanty-towns with limited access to basic needs and with environmental conditions that threaten life and health. The urbanisation trends in Africa are reflected in Kenya too. According to the World Bank (2011b), “Kenya’s population is growing fast, increasingly so in urban areas where every year more than 250,000 Kenyans are moving to urban areas and formerly rural areas are becoming increasingly urban.” Twenty years ago Kenya’s urbanisation level was only 18 percent (World Bank, 2011a). Since then, Kenya’s urban population has been rising rapidly. The share of the urban population is set to rise to 37 percent by Chapter 10– Crossroads at the Rural–Urban Interface | 187 2020, and in 2033 Kenya will reach an important milestone, when most of its population will live in urban areas (World Bank, 2011a). This study sought to characterize the spatial development of Kisumu and Malindi Towns, Kenya to showcase the challenges of land use planning and development control within changing or multiple tenure regimes in housing delivery and urban development. Kisumu and Malindi were particularly chosen because they possess distinctive differences in tenure types. Whereas Kisumu’s dominant tenure system in residential and the peri-urban areas is that of freehold system (absolute ownership) Malindi’s is dominantly squatter and rentals, since Malindi has been governed by a colonial ordinance which precluded the indigenous people from owning land on the 20 kilometres stretch along the Kenyan Coastal strip. The paper sought to articulate the dilemma existing in the peri-urban interface in regard to enforcing urban planning principles in land use controls for housing delivery and urban growth in areas, which hitherto, were rural and which have different ownership rights. It aims at demonstrating that plurality and or insecurity of tenure has a direct consequence of excercabating the growth of low quality housing and poor delivery of social services manifested in the of informal/slum settlements. The study noted that plural land tenure systems in the Rural-Urban interface, particularly in terms of the inherited complex colonial laws, have a profound influence upon the urban form, especially the uncontrolled land use development. New processes for converting customary and communal land into individual freehold land holdings and leaseholds, and for diverting land acquired for public sector development into the hands of land speculators is making it difficult to control development towards sustainable land utilisation for urban development. The Malindi Scenario is more complex because land is rented from absentee landlords. The Landlords terms for occupation is that tenants must not build permanent houses and may be required to vacate such lands at short notice. This is a big impediment in the delivery of quality housing to the urban residents. The study has relied on rapid assessment of primary data sources and secondary data from remotely sensed maps, census reports, research findings and other publications to establish that the plurality of tenure or lack of tenure security at the peri-urban fringe is an impediment to proper urban planning, proper settlements planning, good shelter delivery for urban residents, reinforces poverty and is an obstacle to overall sustainable urban development. This study proffer innovative but practical solutions for harmonizing or regularizing tenure types which anticipates urban growth. This would enable urban development practitioners and policy makers to make the most out of the urbanisation process by managing the growth of towns to leverage the economic and social dividends while forestalling the negative and unsustainable land use patterns. 188 | Jack Abuya 10.2 Methodology 10.2.1 Study Area Kisumu Town Kisumu is the third largest city in Kenya, after Nairobi and Mombasa in that order. It is the principal town in the western Kenya region, being the seat of Kisumu County. The town presently has a population of about 500,000 people with an annual growth rate of about 3 percent. The average population density is 825 per square kilometres (UN-Habitat 2005 and GoK 2010). It is one of the fastest growing cities in the country today and is surrounded by an agriculturally rich hinterland mainly supporting large scale sugar industry and rice irrigation, Kisumu’s contribution to the country’s economy is significant. The city stands on the shores of Lake Victoria, the second largest fresh water lake in the world, at an altitude of 1,160 metres above the sea level. The city covers an area of approximately 417 square kilometres, 35.5 percent of which is under water. Despite being endowed with a massive potential in natural resources, Kisumu still registers one of the highest poverty levels in Kenya exacerbated by a rapidly growing informal sector against a backdrop of collapsing or retrogressing private sector growth. Infrastructure development and service expansion has not matched the rapid population growth registered in Kisumu, providing a great challenge to the city authority. Of great significance is the fact that despite having a rich natural resource base, 48 percent of Kisumu’s population lives within the absolute poverty bracket comparing unfavorably with the national average of 29 percent. The city also experiences one of the highest incidences of food poverty (53.4 percent) in the country, concentrated mainly amongst 60 percent of the city’s population residing within the peri-urban slum settlements. (UN-Habitat, 2005) Despite the legislative authority giving mandate to the City Council to provide basic services within its area of jurisdiction, such provision has fallen way short of demand with only about 10 percent sewerage coverage, 40 percent water supply outreach and 20 percent solid waste management efficiency if geographically considered. Housing provision remains one of the bigger challenges for the authorities, with approximately 75 percent of the peri-urban inhabitants residing in temporary and semi-permanent structures with inherent infrastructural deficiencies (UN-Habitat, 2004). The physical characterisation of slums in Kisumu shows a concentric pattern of seven slum settlements on the fringes of the city. Two other slum settlements; Kibos Nubian and Gebo Kanyakwar are located further in the immediate hinterland. The Slums are Manyatta A, Manyatta B, Nyalenda, Kibos Nubian, Bandani, Gebo Kanyakwar Kaloleni, Manyatta Arabs, Obunga. Malindi Town Malindi on the other hand is a town on the North Eastern coast of Kenya. The town currently has a population of 141,000 people (GoK 2010). The main economic activities Chapter 10– Crossroads at the Rural–Urban Interface | 189 of the town are tourism and agriculture. The town has high cost tourist hotels and villas as well as low class slum settlements mostly habited by indigenous communities. The slum settlements in Malindi are Seven in number; Muyeye, Kisumu Ndogo, Kwa Ndomu, Majengo, Majengo Mapya, Maweni and New Stage. 10.2.2 Data collection and Analyses For Kisumu, this study relied on a rapid assessment of primary sources by conducting unstructured interviews to 30 residents of Manyatta, Nyalenda and Kibos Nubian Slum Settlements. Data was also obtained from secondary sources; research publications, census reports, municipal authority documents and central government reports. In Malindi the study collected data through structured questionnaires administered to 30 residents from Kwa Ndomu, Kisumu Ndogo and Majengo Slum settlements. Focus group discussions in which a group of three people representing each slum settlement were held. 10.3 Results and Discussions 10.3.1 Land Ownership This study established the existence of four tenure types: Freehold, Lease hold, illegal occupation/squatting and Land renting. In Kisumu land tenure in the sub-urban fringe is mixed, a small proportion is of the leasehold type and the bulk of the land on freehold tenure consisting mainly native population homesteads. The Peri-Urban land where the Urban poor (Slums) are located is 80 percent freehold, 10 percent is under Leasehold while 10 Percent are squatters. For example in the entire Kibos Nubian Slum settlement, no single family has ownership documents for their plots, yet they have lived on the settlement since 1904. In Malindi, around 50 percent of those in slum settlements are squatters, the rest are on rental land. There is need to use sustainable land management practices to enhance tenure security. This could involve, among other approaches, the conversion of freehold lands in the urban fringe into leasehold properties thereby giving municipal authorities more power to exercise control in their development. There is need to provide appropriate ownership documents and to implement sustainable land use practices in sensitive areas and ecosystems like wetlands, riparian areas, and hillsides where some slums are located. For Malindi, the government may additionally, compulsorily acquire the lands from the absentee landlords and then allocate the same to the individuals currently residing therein. Tenure regularisation has proven to be a powerful tool in quality housing development as well as in sustainable urban development. 190 | Jack Abuya 10.3.2 Development Control The multiplicity of tenure types in the urban fringe has created a problem in development control. Whereas it’s possible to control development in leasehold properties, which are located in the urban core, the same is difficult in freehold properties normally located in the urban fringes and rural areas, because freehold property owners insist on using ancestral land according to cultural orientations. These include traditional architectural/building design standards, siting and orientation of buildings in the traditional homestead, burying of deceased family members in the homestead, keeping of livestock etc. which in many cases are against the town planning regulations and municipal by-laws. Although the towns have structure plans and other piecemeal land use plans which gives indications of projected spatial development, there is no clear-cut policy for housing development on freehold properties and quite evidently, the result is rather mixed land use patterns and housing standards that fall short of the town planning benchmarks. This has resulted in the haphazard slum development in the urban fringe characterized by low quality houses and insufficient infrastructure. These areas are also known to host low income earners/the urban poor who have limited ability to invest in the improvement of the quality their housing. 10.3.3 Tenure Systems and Urban Housing Delivery The nexus between tenure systems and urban housing delivery is quite explicit. Plot owners have the incentive to invest in housing or to improve the quality of their housing if they have security of tenure. Additionally, security of tenure enables land owners to sell, transfer their parcels to raise funds for other investment options. They can also use the same lands to obtain bank credit. The reverse is true for insecurity of tenure. Squatters are in constant fear of evictions hence may not attempt to improve their housing conditions. In Malindi, especially in the rental land, land owners insist on tenants not building permanent houses. This simply means that the resident’s quality of housing may never improve. This finding confirms other earlier research results on the same topic. For example, a previous study in Karachi, Pakistan documented the relationship between hope for secure tenure and house improvements and found that for any income group, households with higher hope for secure tenure invest more in their houses than with some or no hope (Van Der Harst J. 1974). 10.3.4 Land Sub divisions There has been rapid subdivisions and sale of land in the rural urban fringe in the last twenty years. Municipal council records indicate that in a large number of the land subdivisions in the area, the quality of topographic land surveys and mapping is wanting (UN-Habitat 2005). Some informal land subdivisions have led to plot shapes and sizes which are not feasible for development. The plots are too small, which then Chapter 10– Crossroads at the Rural–Urban Interface | 191 leads to densification of the areas as well as inadequacy of land for future development of infrastructure and other social amenities like play grounds, schools, health centers etc. In other cases the plot shapes are irregular hence resulting in organic development patterns devoid of well planned, patterned and regular spatial layouts. This makes it difficult and expensive when planning and or constructing buildings, streets, water reticulation, drainage, electricity and sewerage networks. The problems of subdivisions can be attributed to lack of clear policy and procedure in the administration of Land within the rural urban fringe. On one hand the Lands Officer representing the Central Government can go ahead to approve subdivision schemes notwithstanding the fact that such lands are within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Planner. This structure allows the Lands Office to approve plans that would not meet the standards of a typical urban planning scheme. The Lands Officer would approve these subdivisions as a rural scheme. Landowners are increasingly sub-dividing their parcels and selling them out for economic gain. The result is a planning nightmare, with a confused blend of modern houses dwarfing the mud-thatched structures interspersed within settlements. The ongoing trend in favour of informal land subdivisions is introducing new forms of conflicts over tenure between the “original” land owners and the “foreigners/purchasers” popularly referred to as “Jodak” in Kisumu (UN-Habitat, 2005). Foreigners have gradually changed the character of slum dwellings as they are primarily driven by the need to optimize profits and value the plots in the settlements from a strictly commercial point of view. There is therefore need to address the issue of land sub-divisions through the enforcement of urban planning by-laws which have set minimum plot sizes, shapes and provisions for onsite infrastructure and social amenities (GoK, 2005). In Malindi this problem is worse for those who live in rental land. Landlords keen to earn more money and against the backdrop of increased demand for housing, keep adding more tenants to their finite land holdings. The consequence is that the land is constantly being subdivided and densities increasing. The tenants’ right to plot sizes considered to be adequate and feasible for development is hence violated at will. 10.4 Land Tenure and Land conflicts According to Wehrmann (2008), “A land conflict can be defined as a social fact in which at least two parties are involved, the roots of which are different interests over the property rights to land: the right to use the land, to manage the land, to generate an income from the land, to exclude others from the land, to transfer it and the right to compensation for it”. A land conflict, therefore, can be understood as a misuse, restriction or dispute over property rights to land. In situations where there is plurality of tenure or lack of it thereof especially in urban areas where land is scarce, there exist the potential for aggravated land conflicts with negative consequences. Wehrmann (2008: Pg.: iii) notes, 192 | Jack Abuya “Land conflicts often have extensive negative effects on economic, social, spatial and ecological development. This is especially true in developing countries and countries in transition, where land market institutions are weak, opportunities for economic gain by illegal action are widespread and many poor people lack access to land. Land conflicts can have disastrous effects on individuals as well as on groups and even entire nations. Many conflicts that are perceived to be clashes between different cultures are actually conflicts over land and related natural resources.” Kisumu is not an exception on this, different land user groups have had serious and often violent conflicts. The informal traders for example have many times occupied public or idle private land to conduct their business. In many other cases private individuals have had long court battles over contested land ownership rights. Some of these conflicts are as a result of double allocations, boundary conflicts, inheritance conflicts, ownership conflicts due to legal pluralism, ownership conflicts due to lack of land registration, ownership conflicts between state and private/common/collective owners, multiple sales/allocations of land, limited access to land due to discrimination by law, custom or practice, peaceful, informal land acquisitions without evictions, violent land acquisitions, including clashes and wars over land, evictions by land owners, illegal evictions by state officials acting without mandate, market evictions and distortion of local land markets/ Land values and prices, disputes over the payment for using/buying land, disputes over the value of land, conflicts between human/cultural and natural use (flora and fauna), destruction of property. Enhancing tenure security and use of appropriate Land Information System can be useful in mediating these conflicts and aid in efficient Land Administration and Management. 10.4.1 Land administration and management Land administration and management in Kisumu has gone through a long process with inherent changes. According to UN-Habitat (2005), ‘The 1903 Township Ordinance made Kisumu a “Grade A” town and extended its boundaries to fit a town of this status. The few local residents caught up in the extension lost security of tenure on their land. After they transferred to areas outside the township, though, their secure tenure was lost again through the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance. In the Kisumu “slum belt”, land has gone through the process of adjudication and a large percentage has been registered as individual interests on freehold tenure. The main reason is that neither the County Government nor the Central government has been able to acquire interest on this land due to the costs involved. The cost of compensation would be quite high. The peri-urban area features a number of quality structures that are unaffordable for the cash-strapped County to acquire with a view to gaining full control over their development. The net effect has been the inability of the County to set up land banks in these areas for public facility development. Chapter 10– Crossroads at the Rural–Urban Interface | 193 10.5 Recommendations and Conclusions It is evident that insecure tenure and or plurality of tenure present a big challenge to the implementation of appropriate urban planning standards and development controls for the attainment of sustainable urban development. It is also evident that insecure tenure impedes the delivery of quality housing to urban residents or even to slum upgrading/improvement efforts. In order to address this, measures and policies should be put in place to enhance tenure security. This could be in the form of regularisation of ownership of land for slum residents as well as the provision of incentives for self-help housing improvements. The lower land densities and the nature of development in many areas of suburban fringes provide city authorities with an opportunity to set up land banks for their own development projects as well as plan for anticipated urban growth. County Government Authorities hence need to acquire and bank land. This would go a long way not just towards provision of community facilities to support slum upgrading, but also towards handling future population increases and urban development needs. The County Governments need updated integrated development plans that would provide a basis for the preparation of local development plans for all slum areas while using participatory approaches as provided in the Physical Planning Act (1986). This would work best if such an approach were to include arrangements for an effective communication system that would allow for integration of government policies and local community ideas and aspirations in shelter delivery. 194 | Jack Abuya References Douglas, I. (1994). Human Settlements. In Changes in Land Use and Land Cover: A Global Perspective, B. L. Turner, II and W. B. Meyer (eds.), pp. 149–169. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Government of Kenya, (1986), The Physical Planning Act, Government Printers, Nairobi Government of Kenya, (2005), The Physical Planning Handbook, Government Printers, Nairobi Government of Kenya, (2010), National Population Census Report, Vol. 2 Government Printers, Nairobi Lambin E.F., Geist, H. J., and Lepers, E., (2003), Dynamics of Land-Use and Land-Cover Change in Tropical Regions, in Annual Review of Environment Resource, July 2003, Louvain Sánchez-Rodriguez, R., Seto, K. C., Simon, D., Solecki, W. D., Kraas, F., and Laumann, G. (2005). Science Plan: Urbanization and Global Environmental Change. Bonn, Germany: International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014). World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Highlights, New York UN-Habitat, (2004), Kisumu City Development Strategies (2004–2009), UN-Habitat, Nairobi UN-Habitat, (2005), Situation Analysis of Informal Settlements in Kisumu, UN Habitat, Nairobi UN-Habitat, (2013), State of the World’s Cities 2013, UN Habitat, Nairobi Van der Harst, J., (1974 ), Low Income Housing, Joint Research Project IV for Urban Development and Slum Improvement, Karachi Wehrmann B., (2008), Land Conflicts: A Practical Guide for Dealing with Land Conflicts, GTZ, Eschborn World Bank, (2011a), Making the Most of Kenya’s Demographic Change and Rapid Urbanization, Edition no. 4, World Bank, Nairobi World Bank (2011b), Turning the Tide in Turbulent Time; Making the most of Kenya’s Demographic Change and Rapid Urbanization, in Kenya Economic Update, 4th Edition, World Bank, Nairobi Geita, Tanzania, November 2017. Small-scale artisanal miners in Geita, one of Tanzania's main gold-producing regions. Photo: IIED. After they find minerals in any piece of land, the Mineral Act takes the upper hand over land policy, land laws and any legal decision. Chapter 11, page 203 Geita is a town in northwestern Tanzania of approximately 40,000 people. It is home to the country’s biggest open-pit mine and largest gold producer. Tanzania political map. Derived from a United Nations map. 11 Our Inheritance: Impacts of Land Distribution on Geita Communities in Tanzania Godfrey T. Walalaze 11.1 Introduction Land is the main resource that gives a sense of identity, belonging and connection to a family or a community in agrarian communities such as Tanzania and other African countries. Land is a God-given gift; one cannot claim to have moulded it, but rather found it. It is given to and inherited by the people of a given country, not by choice but by God’s providence (Klay & Lynn 2003). This free gift defines the economy, culture and livelihood of communities or countries, depending on how they can make use of the inherited resources; likewise, land can be the cause of conflicts, unrest and even deaths of many people if not well shared. The issue of land displacement and even land acquisition is getting more attention in Tanzania as in many other developing countries, due to high demand for arable land, food and even fuel in developing world (Woertz & Harrigan, 2014: 72).Displacement affects the identity of the people affected and their means of economic support. Displacement cuts away resources to make a living for many poor and marginalised people as they lose the small piece of arable land they own along with sacred places, hence they also lose their cultural and spiritual connectivity. Some of the loss of cultural and spiritual assets has involved demolishing places of worship and venerated places such as burial sites. Cumulatively, injustice over land acquisition may lead to economic, social and spiritual loss, which can fuel unexpected violence in the country and loss of peace based on injustice over land acquisition (Lentz, 2013: 82). It should be noted that peace prevails where misconceptions and misunderstandings in the community are absent. It is not a matter of differences that may cause conflicts, but rather it is the existence of actors, actions and conditions that promote a process in which divergence, disparity or diversity are converted into conflict (Mukandala, 2006: 3). The imbalances in land distribution and the turning of a blind eye to the laws and regulations existing in the country deny some people a life with dignity. In the words of the first president of Tanzania, the late Mwalimu Nyerere: “everything which prevents a man from living in dignity and decency must [therefore] be under attack from the Church and its workers. For there is, in fact, 200 | Godfrey T. Walalaze nothing saintly in imposed poverty… A man who has been demoralized by the conditions under which he is forced to live is no use to himself, to his family, or to his nation. Whether he can be of much use to God is not for me to judge.” (Nyerere 1973:220). 11.2 Summary of land issues in Tanzania The law recognises three types of land in Tanzania, namely general land, village land and reserved land. General land is surveyed land usually located in urban and peri-urban centres. Village land is usually land in villages and in villages and rural areas. Some village land has been surveyed but the majority of the land is un-surveyed. Village land cannot be used for investment until it is transferred to general land. Reserved land includes that reserved for forestry, national parks, public recreation grounds, etc. (URT, 1999 no. 5) During the pre-colonial era, Tanzania (then Tanganyika),32 used customary law and tenure as acceptable means of acquiring landholdings. The land title was thus under tribal jurisdiction, regulated by the traditions and customs of each of approximately 123 tribes. The chief was the head and final power in land administration matters (Richards, 1960:87). From customary practice, Tanganyika came under colonial rule, firstly by Germany. In the process of formalising land ownership, Germany issued an Imperial Decree in 1885, which declared that all land, whether occupied or not, was treated as un-owned imperial land and vested in the empire. Exceptions on this rule were granted to some private persons, settlers, chiefs or native communities who could prove that they owned the identified land. In 1923, after the First World War Great Britain took power. The British colonial legislative assembly enacted Land Ordinance Cap 113 for the Tanganyika Protectorate, to guide and regulate land use and ownership in Tanganyika. This law introduced a new ‘right of occupancy’. It was either deemed ‘right of occupancy’, mostly understood as customary right, or ‘granted right of occupancy’, understood to be the right to land acquired through documentation, which was often provided to settlers. Under this law, pre-independence Tanganyika witnessed land equivalent to about 3.5 million acres being alienated from natives in favour of settlers (Rwegasira, 2012: 37). After the independence of Tanganyika and the subsequent union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form Tanzania, the system governing land acquisition and management as created under the Land Ordinance did not change much. The law gave the power of custodianship to the president on behalf of the citizens. Although customary tenure existed, the ultimate power rested on the state’s power to give or take land for reasons deemed to be in the public interest (Rwegasira 2012). After Tanganyika attained its political independence in 1961, a need to develop a coherent and comprehensive land policy that would define land tenure and enable proper 32 Tanzania is the outcome of the Union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Chapter 11– Impacts of Land Distribution on Geita Communities in Tanzania | 201 management and allocation of land was realised. The realisation was even more intensified by the Land Policy of 1995 that classifies all land as general land, village land or reserve land. The policy was followed by the enacting of the Land Act of 1999 no. 4 and 1999 no.5 legislations that intended to resolve and bring harmony to land-related matters in the country. The policy aimed among other things to: • • • Accommodate changes in land use and increase in human population; Reduce conflicts in land use between agriculturalists, livestock keepers, forest areas, wildlife areas, water sources and miners; and Facilitate prospective investors who require land as a result of liberalisation of the economy and investment promotion. 11.3 Land as an inheritance Land is the only thing that gives a sense of identity, belonging and connection to family or community for people living in agrarian production systems. There is a close interface with our understanding of Holy Scripture. The inheritance is viewed from the perspective of what God told his chosen nation and how they were provided with land as their main identity and sole inheritance. A number of scriptural passages such as in the biblical books of Genesis, Deuteronomy and many others explain the matter. Specifically, (Joshua 13–19, RSV) how God commanded Joshua to divide the land as an inheritance for Israel. The land given to the tribes was called an inheritance. Land was thus never a mere geographical feature, shape or characteristic, such as soil, mountains, hills and valleys. It was never a piece of land for cultivation and means of survival; it was rather the sole inheritance to a given nation, tribe, ethnic group, clan, family and/ or individual. Land carried social and spiritual meaning that went beyond agricultural potential or a source of fodder for pastoralists. It was the bond that not only identified a person but, even more, clarified a specific bond to family and God. This bonding imposed limitations and obligations regarding the use and distribution of land. The idea that God owned the land had not only theological significance, but also real socio-cultural meaning. It was not conceived of as private property, but was the inheritance of the tribe and was apportioned by family. The plot or portion each family received, was their part of the tribal inheritance. Each family enjoyed lasting rights to use the land, but never as a commodity that could be bought and sold for private gain. Their portion was family property. They managed it on behalf of the entire tribe. 11.3.1 Moral obligations and inheritance The inheritance that is received requires obedience and respect in the utilisation, sharing and supervision of the sharing of the fruits of the land. Humanity has been given a duty as stewards of the inherited land. It is not left to them to plunder and destroy for their own pleasure; it is an obligation to take care of the land, for it is borrowed from 202 | Godfrey T. Walalaze future generations (Berry, 1971: 26) The respect, duty and responsibility that are found in relation to the inheritance can be summed up to reflect on the moral obligations towards the inheritance. From the God-centred perspective objective moral values are rooted in God. God’s own holy and perfectly good nature supplies the absolute standard against which all actions and decisions are measured. God’s moral nature is what Plato called the ‘Good’. Following Klay & Lynn (2003: 5), God is the locus and source of moral values as manifested through love: generous, just, faithful, kind and a provider. Moral obligation is thus preferred, since it provides a reflection on God as the source of duties, values and responsibilities to others. The moral obligation has to be assumed to make sure that there is a connection between what happens, why and how it happens. It is a chance to reflect on the motives of the actor, the action and the recipient of the action. It provides a platform to review and inform the proper connectivity to be pursued between inheritors and those who want to share in the inheritance. Tanzanians are thus morally bound to the inherited vast and abundant amount of natural resources. Wherever these resources are found, it is never a terra nullius or a no man’s land (Monbiot, 2003); the land is, rather, an important inheritance for communities, villages and all Tanzanians in general. 11.4 Land laws (Mining Act versus Land Act) Two pieces of legislation, the Mining Act of 2010 and the Land Act of 1999 (No.4 & 5) have caused high controversy in relation to the land administration and use plan. They address one important resource from different angles that in many ways contribute to a number of conflicts that arose out of the operations of mining resource extraction and land ownership in communities. Both the land and mining frameworks are built on same principles: • • • • emphasising exclusive rights of occupancy (one rights holder, one land parcel); secured tenure throughout the tenure period; development conditions applicable to leasehold systems; and transferability of rights, including compensation for loss (Hernandez, 2003). While both laws reflect the Tanzanian customary land system as part of the legal and respected security of tenure, these principles give rise to conflicts. The conflicts stem from the observed fact that mining seeks to extract whatever lies under the soil; in so doing it takes away ancestral customary land rights by arguing that there is no documentation of ownership. This ancestral land not only has economic and livelihood options, it also has deep spiritual connections. The public’s interest in the matter is on the fundamental right to worship and the right to one’s private life, and their spiritual beings and world. According to the Land Act of 1999, Article 113, Section 22(2), minerals are by definition not part of the land in Tanzania. The act does not define a difference between Chapter 11– Impacts of Land Distribution on Geita Communities in Tanzania | 203 lands where minerals are found and to have any extra value than other piece with no mineral. This is probably because ‘mineral land’ is not known until minerals are discovered. Despite that fact, as soon as minerals are found on any piece of land, that land falls under the Minerals Act and policies. After they find minerals in any piece of land, the Mineral Act takes the upper hand over land policy, land laws and any legal decision or discussion related to that land. Although the two systems have operated side by side, the disharmony between the land and mineral laws and their enforcement by authorities are the root cause of most conflicts between mining investors and communities in Tanzania (Lugoe, 2003: 6). That is because they override the distribution based on the need and categorisation of land use. 11.5 Large investments in Tanzania Visiting the website of the Tanzania Investment Centre one comes across advertisements on the potential of the country. The advertisements explain that Tanzania, being one of the developing countries, has an immense amount of untapped natural resources that provide opportunities for international investment. Resources include arable land, minerals and natural tourist attractions, all awaiting potential investors. Two sectors (mining and tourism) are the leading recipients of foreign investment flows and are tipped to become “growth sectors” of the economy (Ndulu, 2013) in Tanzania. As another important factor, the country has enjoyed peace and stability since its independence, as well as a good democratic system, which provides an additional factor to attract more investments. In addition to those qualities, the country is rated as having skilled labour, which is key to attracting foreign investors to African countries. Besides its resource abundance, Tanzania is on one hand competing for investors against other developing countries, and on the other investors are competing to win favour in natural resource-rich countries. The economic crisis of 2007–2008 in the world fell on the open and ready developing countries belief that investors are the means to achieve development. The leaders of many developing countries believe that by having international (external) investors, their countries get a chance to register fast development in infrastructure, education, technology, food security, machinery, taxes and related life skills. Such a notion contributes to excessive support for investors, which sometimes comes at the cost of natives. Support for investors has connections to many rich companies and countries looking for potential land for food production, fuel and related big investments. The initiatives for production outside of one’s own country and territory are accounted for by global short ages in food and biofuels, which occurred around 2007–2008. As stated by Cotula, et.al (2009:18), by 2009 not less than 640,000 hectares had been allocated to investors for biofuels in Tanzania. For similar reasons, there are a number of big investors in the country who have acquired land or are in the process of acquiring land in search of all sorts of natural resources. (Locher &Sulle, 2013: 14). There are those who invest in agriculture, such as under the Southern Agricultural 204 | Godfrey T. Walalaze Corridor Growth of Tanzania (URT 2009) and those who are deep in exploration for oil, extraction of gas, gold, diamonds, exploration for nickel and uranium, as well as forestry products. These and many more similar experiences reflect the rich natural resources given as an inheritance to Tanzanians. However, most of the resources may not benefit the intended heirs under the prevailing system of governance for these resources. Based on a big and rising need, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been rising in the country. Investments enabled the country to rise up to third-highest gold producer in Africa by 2007. However, the country has not benefited proportionally in terms of corporate tax and related revenues. The Guardian newspaper reported on 24 August 2013 that major foreign gold mining companies earned USD 6.97 billion between 2009 and 2012, but paid the Tanzanian government corporation tax amounting to only USD 280 million (Curtis & Lissu, 2008, p. 18). Gold is now the main mineral under extraction in Tanzania. Proven gold reserves are in excess of 36 million ounces. Each of the country’s six gold mines have a production capacity of between 200,000 ounces and one million ounces per year (Magai and Velazquez, 2011) As production levels continue to rise year after year, so too does the price of gold, which in September 2011 stood at approximately USD 1,770 per ounce on the world market, up from USD 271 per ounce in September 2001. The rising prices reflect a market where demand is more than 50 percent higher than supply and a promising industry for the economy. Gold production now accounts for over 41.3 percent of Tanzania’s export earnings, 75 percent of FDI and an increasing share of taxes, representing 3.6 percent of gross domestic product and, contributing 4 percent of its growth (ibid.). The trend shows that, for Tanzania, gold stands high, but as stated earlier, it contributes disproportionately little to the national economy in terms of taxes and corporate social responsibility. Gold, which is among the inherited land resources of Tanzania, has become the main attraction to investors (foreign and local). What is the impact of these resources (gold and others) in terms of contribution to the country’s economy? Do natives feel the impact of the contribution from large investors in mining and other sectors? Is there any sign of wealth trickling down to support the livelihoods of the peasants who live near mining areas? 11.5.1 The experience of Geita During the establishment of Geita Gold Mining (GGM), which is a subsidiary of AngloGold Ashanti, Geita existed as a district council that was established under the Local Governments Act, No.7 of 1982 and Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Ammendments Act, 1999. The council had jurisdiction over 7,825 square kilometres, of which 6,775 was dry land, while 1,050 was water surfaces. Traditionally, local people from this district made their living from agriculture, fishing, hunting and livestock management, as well as artisanal mining in the mineral-rich areas of Geita. From around the mid-1980s most of the people in Geita focused on artisanal small-scale mining (ASM) as the main activity for their daily bread. It was at this time that banks took into account, the contribution of gold through small-scale mining (Curtis &Lissu, 2008, p. 8). Chapter 11– Impacts of Land Distribution on Geita Communities in Tanzania | 205 The people of Geita have been living in the area since the late 1800s. Before multinational extractive companies arrived, mining extraction was largely conducted by small-scale miners. As revealed by Buxton & Best (2013), small-scale and artisanal mines can be a force for economic growth just as small-scale forestry and agriculture are, but right now they operate in a hidden world. Unfortunately the sector is a paradox: productive but undervalued, conspicuous yet overlooked, and ‘small-scale’ but economically and socially significant. It produces about 85 percent of the world’s gemstones and 20–25 per cent of all gold. Its mines (small-scale mines) provide jobs and income for 20–30 million of the world’s poorest people and support the livelihoods of five times that number. Overall, ASM employs ten times more people than large-scale mining. But it takes place in very remote areas, usually involves poor and vulnerable people, including women and children, and is renowned for severe pollution and harsh working conditions (ibid.). Artisanal and small-scale mining activities in Africa engage about 8 million workers, who in turn support about 45 million dependents. Moreover, the number of ASM miners is growing as a result of rising commodity prices and limited economic opportunities in other sectors. In contrast, in Tanzania it is believed that large-scale mining may have made not less than 400,000 people unemployed (Curtis & Lissu, 2008: 40), through evictions and reallocation. That occurred as large-scale mines take over land that was previously used by local people for farming, livestock keeping, beekeeping, artisanal mining and other economic activities, thereby contributing towards further impoverishing of the rural poor. 11.5.2 Impact of large investors on local communities in Geita district In July 2007, GGM reported an increase in production of 6 percent of gross income as compared to 2006. From 2000 to 2013 the company gave USD 683 million to community projects. (Daynes & Nice, 2013) However, in 2007, 86 families, comprising 256 people – men, women, spouses, children and elderly – were displaced from the area of “Mine Mpya” and dumped in the old courthouse that was not in use as their new homes. They had been forcefully evicted in the early morning hours to make way for a mine expansion by GGM. Talking to a team of religious leaders, Faida Gerald, one of the internally displaced people (IDPs), lamented the unfair compensation and additional hardship caused by loss of property. He explained how, to survive, he had moved from farm produce to becoming a casual labourer.33 From the time of displacement in 2007 to 2012, a cluster of makeshift tents sat in the gold-rich town of Geita. As from that time it was not even worth to live in, as it has been torn and became waste. The inception of GGM has caused hardship in the lives 33 Interview between religious leaders and Majebele, who was evicted in 2007 with his family. The author has visited people such as Faida, Majebele from several months after their eviction until 2012. In all that time, the life of these people showed that they had run into extreme poverty. Majebele was, unfortunately, not able to find another place to continue with his life. The loss of property left unforgettable pains, with marks of hatred against the government and investors. 206 | Godfrey T. Walalaze of many of the already poor people. Land distribution that did not consider the plight of local people has taken away their cultural heritage and economic means of survival. They have lost their inherited land and other belongings that once were the source and centre of living for their families. They have suffered loss of property, death of family members, loss of personal identity and spiritual connection, and – much more – loss of their sense of living (Curtis & Lissu, 2008, p. 35). In Magema, Nyamalembo village, near Mtakuja area of Mine Mpya’ there is a piece of land that stretches for more than 196 square kilometres. That area is said to have been occupied by GGM and thuseviction of more local owners. (Moloo, 2013). The small-scale miners say they were given an eviction notice to vacate the area in early May 2011. In the words of Raban Masunga, one of the community members, who revealed his disappointment in an interview in 2012: When Geita Gold Mine arrived 13 years ago, they found us conducting mining activities in our small scale capacity. But now, the hills have been sold. The land has been sold. Everything has been sold to the company. Even this place that we now hang upon might have been sold and that anytime we might be evicted from the place (Moloo, 2013) The situation of those who lived on artisanal mining became tense. They seem to have opted for fighting instead of running away. In most cases they ended up losing, as they were the weaker among those fighting. Mhoja Leonard is a case in point. He was reportedly searching for waste material at AngloGold Ashanti’s GGM mine when he was shot and killed by a security guard. In the follow-up with the company, he ended up receiving only funeral support, amounting to 10 kilograms of rice, sugar and water, with a promise to work together for compensation.34 Shockingly, the company denied responsibility of any sort in relation to the death of Mhoja. It instead explained: AngloGold Ashanti expresses deepest sympathy to the family and friends of Mr Mhoja Leonard. The death of anyone on our concession is something we take very seriously.’ In cleaning the hands of the company, the management claimed to understand the death to have been caused by Group Four Security (G4S). (Richard Duffy, 2013 as cited to have been interviewed by Moloo (June 2013) While the company boasted of taking care of and contributing to the community, it is said and observed that the outsourced companies were causing misery to the surrounding community members (elaboration above by Aljazeera can be referred, but also the eviction of 256 people (86 families) to an old forsaken court house explains on the challenge faced by poor local communities in the customary owned land. The company gave assistance as it claimed (Willy &Nice, 2013); however, how did that translate in 34 Interview with Leonard Salala, the father of the deceased boy Mhoja (17 years) in a visit to the area, October 2012. Chapter 11– Impacts of Land Distribution on Geita Communities in Tanzania | 207 the conflict situation, lamentations and injustices around land conflicts against the locals in Geita? Should that not be considered as part and contribution of poor land distribution and division between locals and investors? Who real is to blame for the loss of property and life of the poor local citizens, the Government or the investor? The Laws or the implementers of laws? 11.5.3 Challenges to compensation practices The plight of others who lost their land to GGM is not different. While some like Mhoja (17 years old) are lost from this world, the process to compensate the evicted people in Geita is surrounded by a number of questions on the integrity of the process, its transparency and the information shared. The coordination of information given to the evicted and the implementation of the practice seem to have forgotten the rules of participatory approaches. In the Land Regulations of 2001 it explains the process and necessary steps in the eviction and compensation of people from land they have been using. The guidelines assert that assessment of the value of land and unexhausted improvement should be prepared by a qualified valuer. Every assessment of the value of land and unexhausted improvement for the purpose of payment for compensation by government or local government authority must be verified by the chief valuer of the government or his representative (URT, 2001) although the regulation does not challenge the fact that it is the government doing the assessment, and the government chief valuer or his representative bringing the valuation without demanding the participation of the owners at the time, it has nevertheless put down considerable steps to be taken in the process towards compensation after valuation. Disturbance allowance is equal to the value of the land multiplied by the average rate of interest offered by the Central Bank of Tanzania on 12 months fixed deposit at the time of loss of interest in land (ibid., Regulations 16–19). Accommodation allowance is the market rent per month of the affected building multiplied by 36 months; payment for profit loss as well as timely payments are among the basic prerequisites for compensation. Unfortunately, while the case on regulations rules in favour of the evictees, there is still a challenging gap as identified in cases of compulsory acquisition; the law does not contain a full range of safeguards for the displaced. There is no mandatory requirement to compensate people with an alternative piece of land or other types of support to help the displaced people. Where it happens, the government can claim to be fulfilling its duty without necessarily being compelled by any law (Rwegasira, 2012). Most importantly, with reference to the Land Act of 1999 (No. 4 & Village Land Forum 5), the laws expressly direct authorities who have any reason to acquire land to give notice to the people using that land, and provide that the people will be required to move only after an agreement for appropriate compensation is reached and the compensation is actually paid (Buchanan, Kijo-Bisimba, & Rittich, 2011, p. 99). The case of Geita at Mtakuja shows some worries that there was a violation of the process of acquiring land from the natives who were using the land prior to 2000. The 208 | Godfrey T. Walalaze compensation practice is questionable. AngloGold Ashanti is recorded as having admitted that 857 people did not receive the compensation promised to them. The company claimed to have given money for compensation to government officials in 1999 and blamed government officials to have squandered the money. The Tanzanians have been reported to complain on small or no compensation and never on displacement, maybe based on the fact that the land belongs to the public under seal of the president. However, even that little is thought to end up in the hands of corrupt hands. (Lange: 2011). The CEO of AngloGold Ashanti is reported to have said, “it is our understanding that fictitious names have been added to the claims and that some committee members were sharing TZS 100,000:00 (USD 120) to prepare bogus claims” (Mwamunyange 2001). The matter has since died a natural death, since many of those who were denied their rights have no power or chance to keep on standing up against big figures from the company as well as the government (Lange, 2008). If this scenario stands to be true, where then did the money go? If the company really paid all that money and confirmed that 857 people did not get what was theirs by right, why do they stand not to get their money? Is it that there is ‘guilt on both sides’, since a single person cannot corrupt him/herself? Are there not systems that can identify such an abuse of power on the part of government officials, either in Tanzania or in the company’s country of origin? Where is the moral obligation of the authorities involved? Poor compensation in this process is facilitated by poor land distribution and land ownership in the area of Mtakuja and many other places in the country. Experience and observation show that most property rights on land in Tanzania are not documented or mapped to facilitate land transactions. There are only 150,000 land parcels that are registered, representing about 10 percent of all land in the country. Consequently, 90 percent of Tanzanians cannot identify their properties in the formal system of documentation. Procedures for land registration are currently very slow, costly and bureaucratic for firms, private individuals and, especially, the poor (Lugoe, 2008: 2). With reference to Geita, the examples cited in this chapter provide evidence that has led to conflicts between investors and those who were evicted without compensation from the land currently used by GGM. Chapter 11– Impacts of Land Distribution on Geita Communities in Tanzania | 209    ͙͘͘ ͘͠ ͠͞ ͟͡ ͠͞ ͘͞ ͘͞ ͘͜ ͚͘ ͚͘ ͞ ͟ ͘ ͘ ͘ ƒ†‘™‡”• ‡• ͘ ‘’‡•ƒ–‡† ‘ ͘ ͘ ƒ˜‡–‹–Ž‡• ‹˜‡‹ ƒ’ Ȁ Figure 11.1 The Chart on movement and compensation of displaced families by GGM in Geita. Source: The interpretation of the Researcher following visitations between 2008 to 2013 Out of 86 families, all of them had customary land tenure for the land they had owned under the deemed right of occupancy. All of them were evicted when GGM came in. By June 2012, only 7 families out of 86 were living on rented land; none had been compensated. The company had the power to evict the native owners after securing the granted right of occupancy, which in this case translated as having an official mandate and recognition before legal authorities. In December 2013, 20 families among those who had been evicted, were still living at the camp, while 60 were out of the camp and information on the 6 others were not ascertained. According to the land laws, displaced communities have the right to be properly compensated. The Land Act No. 4 and Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 specifies that there should be full, fair and prompt compensation to any person whose right of occupancy revoked or otherwise interfered by the state (URT 2001). The country’s Land or Compensation Claims Regulation of 2001 provides further clarity on compensation, stating that it may take the form of monetary compensation or a combination of plots or buildings of “comparable quality, plants and seedlings, and/or regular supplies of grain and other basic foodstuffs.” (URT, 2001) The author, being one among the team for the fact-finding mission by religious leaders in Tanzania, which took place during 2008, found that the process was unclear and information was not available, even to those who were to be compensated. In one case, an evictee was paid only TZS 400,000 (USD 239) “for his half-acre land with a 210 | Godfrey T. Walalaze house, banana trees and cassava plants”.35 Injustice was practised from the beginning of the process of taking land from the locals and passing it to the government and later to the investor in 2007. Was that by plan or by chance? Experience in Tanzania has shown that money cannot compensate the deep attachment of communities to their ancestral lands. Meanwhile, without having freehold tenure, indigenous landowners are susceptible to displacement, unfair compensation and subsequent eviction. For the wellbeing of communities, the government ought to take this issue more seriously when negotiating with mining companies. Co-ownership of mines through shareholding is a better alternative to compensation (Lugoe, 2011:9). 11.5.4 Structural systems in land administration The fact that today we still have a series of cases on land-related rights, cries out for questioning the position of the state powers and the moral authority of the leaders who have failed to fulfil the law and are still on power. There is a big question for the executive branch: if the Anglo Gold Ashanti claimed to have paid about USD 5.03 million in compensation, and the communities had been living in tents since 2007, how could citizens trust a system that had not refuted the claims and had not implemented the provision of due rights to the evicted people? In April 2013, GGM decided to take matters into its own hands, and agreed to fund the construction of 18 houses for displaced residents at a cost of USD 450,000.The fact that it still claimed to have already paid the compensation money, raises more questions about the credibility of the state powers and transparency of the company in the matter (IRIN, 2013). It raises questions about equity, sharing and a participatory approach that would lead to respect for the rights of local people. The case from Geita sheds light on a possible un-coordinated weakness in government institutions including ministries, as well as in the court system. The institutional system has allowed the powerful to trample the rights of the poor. Meanwhile, although not part of the system, the evictions and the relationship between the mining company and the surrounding community call for strict observation of how the company intends to fulfil her obligation to balance between the local community, profit and human rights. It is not enough for the mining company to claim that it has a high level of integrity and follows the laws of Tanzania without contribution through tax to the government and providing deemed rights to the people who have been living on the land for many years before their acquisition. 35 The fact finding mission was formed by the religious leaders of high level from the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (a Roman Catholic conference of Bishops), the Christian Council of Tanzania and the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA). The team found out that people were paid not based on laws. Chapter 11– Impacts of Land Distribution on Geita Communities in Tanzania | 211 11.5.5 Land injustice as an avenue to civil conflicts in Tanzania The IDPs, their poor compensation, their life in the torn-up tents, as well as the finger pointing between the government and the investors, are not good signs for peaceful coexistence in the community. Symptoms of conflict can always be placed in three main categories. The first can be said to occur when there is a gap between the production system and the distribution of goods or resources in a community or nation. The second category occurs when there is outright discrimination based on the politics, religion or race of a group or person. The last one occurs when, in addition to discrimination, there is also intentional abuse of human rights. The abuse that took place in Geita has all the features of provoking conflict between the segregated members of the community and the rest of the community members, leaders and investors. In the words of Bishop Bagonza, reflecting those of Nyerere, peace observed in Tanzania is not the fruit of the implementation of basic rights, but rather the expectation that one day justice will be implemented by the authorities in the country (Mukandala, 2006). The danger lying behind such hope is continuous disappointment among the local citizens despite the promised and sung hopes of a better life. The more the delays in implementation of peace, the wearier the people become, which provides an environment where violence and conflicts could arise within society. Tanzania has recently been facing the challenges of conflicts related to land. In many places, conflicts based on grabbed customary land have created tensions between the government and local owners. Proper procedures on land distribution can reflect quite well what is to be implemented for the sake of peace, sustainability and the rights of each side involved in the transfer of land. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Tanzania, have progressive land laws that recognise the rights of the majority of their citizens who hold land under customary tenure. But the same laws have failed to protect both village and public lands from being leased out by governments against the wishes of local customary landholders. Against this background, some people have asked why then might anyone expect that further large-scale land acquisitions should help protect the land rights of the local people, and convert the current land grabs into responsible land-based investments? Clearly, Tanzania should draw lessons from large-scale land-based investments in the country, while considering the impact and possible long- and short-term consequences (cf Cotula et al., 2009). Land tenure conflicts contradict national aspirations embedded in 2001 Village Land Regulations and 1995 Land Policy document as well as 1999 (no. 4 and 5) and pose a real challenge to the good intentions of land administration and management in the country. 212 | Godfrey T. Walalaze 11.6 Conclusions and recommendations Equitable and fair land distribution has a chance to avert conflicts in the country. However, if land is not well administered land tenure has the potential to foment conflict. The presence of mining companies on Tanzanian land is considered a blessing that should not by any means be allowed to be the cause of conflicts and disharmony. Gold and other mineral resources in the country should be taken as having exceptional potential, which should be harnessed to contribute significantly to the development of the country. However, intentional initiatives towards land-related laws should be considered, namely issues of land distribution, access and compensation. The legal and policy frameworks for land administration and mining production should be harmonised to avoid unnecessary conflicts between small- and large-scale investors in the mining sector. To achieve harmonisation, the government should consider putting emphasis on land tenure security, since customary tenure does not seem to be working for the protection of poor rural communities’ rights to their ancestral land. Human rights should be given due priority in matters that relate to transfer of land, and eviction of natives from public land in order to make room for investors. Such takeover of land should be preceded by timely, just and transparent compensation to the affected communities. As for areas that have been identified for transfer or where licences have been issued for statutory right of occupancy, then the compensation frameworks prescribed by the Laws and regulations of Tanzania should be followed. Compensation should not be considered as an add-on, but as a basic prerequisite in cases of eviction. It should directly be paid to the community rather than involving the government as a third party to avoid added transaction costs. Local communities should be educated on their rights and be given right to discuss and agree on the terms with the investors who want to work in the localities. Land registration is the determining factor in legal and unchallenged ownership, therefore, the government should facilitate and support each land owner to get a recognised land tenure contract. Chapter 11– Impacts of Land Distribution on Geita Communities in Tanzania | 213 References Ruth Buchanan, Helen Kijo-Bisimba, and Kerry Rittich, The Evictions at Nyamuma, Tanzania: Structural Constraints and Alternative Pathways in the Struggles over Land, in White and Perelman, Stones of Hope, 91–121. 150. Gellhorn, Ombudsman and Others, 239–240. 151 Buxton, Abbi,& Best, Sarah (2013). Responding to the challenge of artisanal and small-scale mining: How can knowledge networks help? http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Feb%202013/ ASM%20Challenge%20Response,%20how%20can%20Knowledge%20Networks%20Help. pdf. Accessed 23/July/2013 Benkenstein, A. (2012). Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges. SAIIA. Retrieved from: http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/artisanal-and-small-scale-mining-in-africa-opportunities-and-challenges. Accessed 08/Sept/2013 Berry, W. (1971). The Unforseen Wilderness: An Essay on Kentucky’s Red River Gorge, KY. University Press of Kentucky. Campbell, B. (2004). Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose Benefit? Uppsala: Nordic African Institute. Cotula L, Vermeulen S et.al (2009). Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investments and international land deals in Africa. London and Rome: FAO, IIED and IFAD. Curtis, Mark,& Tundu, Lissu (2008). A Golden Opportunity: Justice and Respect in Mining. Dar es Salaam: CCT, TEC and BAKWATA. Daynes, Willy,&Nice, Candice (2013). Anglogold Geita Africa Mining Retrieved http://www. bus-ex.com/sites/AngloGold-Geita-Africa-Mining. Accessed on 13/May/2013 Hernandez, A. (2003, April 13–17). Mining cadastre in Tanzania. Paper Presented to the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG) Working Week 2003, Paris. Indexmundi (2010). Commodity. Retrieved from http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity. IRIN (2013). Tanzanian Farmers Displaced By Mining Live Like Refugees Retrieved http://www. minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=12335 Klay, R. & Lynn. J. (2003). The Relationship of God’s Providence to Market Economies and Economic Theory. Journal of Markets & Morality, 6 (2), 541. Lange, S (2008). Land Tenure and Mining in Tanzania. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Report R 2008: 2) 34 p. Retrieved from http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3008-land-tenure-and-mining-in-tanzania.pdf. Accessed 23/July/2013 Lange, S (2011). Gold and Governance: Legal Injustices and Lost Opportunities in Tanzania. African Affairs, 110/439, 233–252. Larmer, B. (2009). The Real Price of Gold. Washington, DC: National Geographic Society. Lake Victoria Mining Company (2010) Financial Objective. Retrieved https://web.archive.org/ web/20150912213334/http://www.lakevictoriaminingcompany.com:80/corporate/financi- 214 | Godfrey T. Walalaze al-objective/ Copyright/publication date is 2010. Lawyers Environmental Action Team (2011). Land Acquisition for Agribusiness in Tanzania: Prospects and Challenges. Dar es Salaam. Lentz, C. (2013). Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Lema, E., Omari, I. M., & Rajani, R. (2006). Nyerere on education: Selected essays and speeches = Nyerere kuhusu elimu. (Nyerere on education.) Dar es Salaam: HakiElimu. Locher, M., &Sulle, E. (2013). Foreign land deals in Tanzania: an update and a critical view on the challenges of data (re)production (LDPI Working Paper 31). The Hague: Land Deal Politics Initiative. Lugoe, F. (2003, April 13–17). Mining cadastre in Tanzania.Paper presented to the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG) Working Week,Paris. Lugoe, F. (2011). The Land Factor in Mining Gold Reserves in Tanzania’ Governance of Africa’s Reource Programme (SAIIA Policy Brief No. 34).Johanesburg. Lugoe, F. N. (2012). East African Initiatives in Natural Resource Governance (Discussion paper). Johannesburg. Lusajo Peter (2013). The Implications of Tanzania not Domesticating International Human Rights Instruments: The Case Study of Cedaw. A Master’s Thesis, Mzumbe University. Morogoro, Tanzania. Retrieved from http://ww2.unhabitat.org/publication/hs66702e/rr_chp4.pdf. Accessed 23/July/2013 Magai P and Velazquez A. (2011). Tanzania’s Mining Sector and Its Implications for the Country’s Development. Working Paper No. 4 2011. Retrieved from http://www.lai.fuberlin.de/ homepages/Alejandro_Marquez/Publikationen/wp_2011_04_Magai-Marquez_Tanzanias-Mining-Sector.pdf. Accessed 08/Sept/2013 Ministry of Energy and Minerals (1997). Mineral Policy of Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Government of Tanzania. Moloo, Z. (2013) Local Miners Left out by Tanzania Gold Rush. Retrieved from http://www. aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013. Monbiot, G. (2003). No Man’s Land: An Investigative Journey Through Kenya and Tanzania. Cambridge: UIT Cambridge Ltd. Mukandala, Rwekaza (2006). Justice, rights and worship: religion and politics in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: E.& D. Publisher. Mwamunyange J.(2001). Tanzania to Probe Gold Scam. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/ stories/200104290004.html. Accessed 26/May/2013 Ndulu B. (2013). Facing the Challenges of Growth in Tanzania. A Presentation to REPOA Workshop. Retrieved from http://www.repoa.or.tz/documents_storage/Training_ workshops/Ndulu%27s%20presentation%20REPOA%27s%2013th%20ARW.pdf. Accessed 08/Sept/2013 Chapter 11– Impacts of Land Distribution on Geita Communities in Tanzania | 215 Richards, A. I. (Ed.), 1960. East African Chiefs: A Study of Political Development in Some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes. London: Faber & Faber. Rolnik, R. (2013, September 14). Housing is a Human Right. The Tablet: the International Catholic Weekly. Rwegasira, A. (2012). Land as Human Right; A History of Land Law and Practice in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota. Sulle, E., Hall, R., 2014. International and Regional Guidelines on Land Governance and Land Governance and Land-based Investments: An Agenda for African States. (FAC Policy Brief No. 77). Future Agricultures Consortium & Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, Brighton, Sussex. Retrieved from http://www.plaas.org.za/sites/default/files/ publications-pdf/Policy_Brief_077.pdf Tenga, R.& Kironde, J.(2012). Study of Policy, Legal and Institutional Issues Related to Land in the SAGCOT Project Area. Dar es Salaam: SAGCOT. URT. (1999) Village Land Act (No. 4 & 5). Dar es Salaam: Government of Tanzania. URT (2001). Village Land Regulation. URT (2009). Ten Pillars of Kilimo Kwanza: Implementation Framework. http://www.tzonline. org/pdf/tenpillarsofkilimokwanza.pdf. Accessed 23/May/2013 White, L. E., & Perelman, J. (Eds.) (2011). Stones of Hope: How African Activists Reclaim Human Rights to Challenge Global Poverty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Woertz, E., & Harrigan, J. (2014). Communications. The Middle East Journal, 68 (3), 494. Early morning Cloudcaps on Gahinga and Muhabura Volcanoes as seen over fields of beans and bananas near Ruhengeri Rwanda looking east. Photo: Robert Ford, iStock. Ambitious plans to increase food production through LUC (Land Use Consolidation) are compromised by uneven distribution of rain. Chapter 12, page 234 MAP OF RWANDA                                                      ͘ ͛͘ ‹Ž‘‡–”‡• ͘͞ 12 Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda: Qualitative reflections on environmental sustainability and inclusion Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara 12.1 Introduction A study on land use and water is an inquiry into environmental sustainability. Land use consolidation (LUC) as part of the Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) in Rwanda is implemented along with Irrigation and Mechanisation, both as state-led agricultural transformation strategies (GoR, 2007). A number of issues need to be elaborated and addressed. The first issue is how land use consolidation is placed in the nexus of land and agriculture in Rwanda. The second issue is that of bringing in water use, which seems often to be neglected in LUC debates in Rwanda. While water seems to be abundant in Rwanda, the amount of water withdrawal is limited (Musahara, 2009; RNRA, 2014). The position means water use is still sub-optimal in relation to raising productivity in land-scarce communities in Rwanda. However, water use for multiple purposes, facing competition from multiple users, needs to be managed in a manner that sustains the environment. The wisdom of the inquiry is nested in the need to establish trade-offs between the state programmes and needs of communities with regard to water. The policy framework for water use on land and its implications for regional integration and stability are in the domain of governance. It is thus argued that large-scale land use programmes that are promoted by the government need to give adequate attention to water use and environmental sustainability for long-term economic, social, political and regional stability. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 2 puts into perspective LUC as a government approach to land management and agricultural transformation; section 3 looks at the water aspects of LUC; while section 4 uses the case of one priority crop – rice – to analyse the role of water in the LUC programme; section 5 revisits and summarises environmental sustainability and the role of the state; and section 6 is the conclusion. 220 | Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara 12.2 Land use consolidation and the role of government In simple terms, consolidation means putting together small plots with the aim of making them viable and more productive per units of investment through economies of scale. These need not change the amount of land controlled by individuals, and consolidation is therefore not necessarily an instrument for social justice (Zhou, 1999). In practice, there are variants of implementing land consolidation. Land consolidation can follow different models, differing in terms of the process involved and also the extent of voluntarism among or coercion of the affected community. ‘Comprehensive’ land consolidation includes the re-allocation of parcels together with a broad range of other measures to promote rural development (FAO, 2003). Examples of such activities include: village renewal; support to community-based agro-processing; construction of rural roads; construction and rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage systems; erosion control measures; environmental protection and improvements, including designation of nature reserves; and creation of social infrastructure, including sports grounds and other public facilities. Other forms of consolidation are voluntary or individual types (FAO, 2003). In voluntary consolidation schemes, unlike comprehensive schemes, all participants must agree fully with the proposed project. As a result, voluntary projects tend to be small, and voluntary consolidation tends to be best suited to address localised problems. Voluntary projects usually have fewer than 10 participants, but in some cases this number may be higher (Musahara, 2006). Individual consolidation involves spontaneous consolidation of holdings, without the direct involvement of the state. However, the state may provide an enabling environment for consolidation by promoting instruments such as joint land use agreements, leasing and retirement schemes. Experience in a variety of countries has shown that entirely voluntary consolidation tends to be a “slow and unsatisfactory” process (Zhou, 1999). This is due to difficulties of community collective action, which suggest that progress would be particularly slow in communities where social bonds are weak or strained. Two conceptual issues are noteworthy. First, in Rwanda it is clearly pointed out that consolidation is related to the use of land. In many parts of the world different forms of land consolidation from time immemorial have been a method of tapping economies of scale. This is operationally the principal rationale, although some scholars prefer to focus on specific government goals such as agricultural transformation (GoR, 2007), more ambitiously referred to as a ‘Green Revolution’ (Ansoms 2009), food security or more modestly food self-sufficiency and in quite radical discourses as ‘consolidation of power’ in the hands of the state (Huggins, 2010). Across all these, LUC in Rwanda is both a land and an agriculture issue. In principle, it originated from the Rwanda Land Law and Policy (GoR, 2004; GoR, 2005). In practice, it is part of agricultural transformation (GoR, 2007; GoR, 2008). As noted in the citations above, LUC is part of the CIP. In 2004 and 2005 respectively, the government of Rwanda released land policy and law. It had then become clear that land use, crop intensification matters and villagisation would be linked. In 2000, the draft of Vision 2020 had also been produced and was Chapter 12– Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda | 221 published in 2002 (GoR, 2002). The Poverty Reduction Strategy, which was to run for three years, was enacted in 2002 (GoR, 2002) and referred to land reform and consolidation as part of the medium-term strategy for poverty reduction. The Organic Land Law No. 08/2005 of 14 July 2005 put it forthrightly, saying that Land Consolidation was: “a procedure of putting together small plots of land in order to manage the land and use it in an efficient manner so that the land may give more productivity” (GoR, 2005). The CIP was initiated in September 2007 to increase the agricultural productivity of high-potential food crops and to provide Rwanda with greater food security and self-sufficiency (GoR, 2007). The government of Rwanda (GoR) though cognizant of the importance of mixed crops in smallholder farming, found LUC appropriate for a modernising agriculture aimed at food security and self-reliance. As noted earlier, Vision 2020 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper were first to mention the need to transform Rwanda’s economy and to encourage good use of land for agricultural development. In 2009, the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation Phase 2 was designed for 2009 to 2012, to coincide with the conclusion of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (MINAGRI, 2009). Like policy documents, the devil is in the detail. It is still important to see how the programme has influenced livelihoods of people socio-economically and in a sustainable manner in relation to environmental resources; and whether in the process it has shifted land relations that may cause conflict over resources including water. One of the terms of the study for this chapter was to establish whether LUC was a voluntary programme or whether it involved government compulsion. In a report concluded in March 2013 and based on qualitative data from 18 sites, it was noted that initial phases involved some degree of government compulsion and most of the farmers had shown resentment at being required to grow a single crop. Indeed, the matter was a focus of political activists who linked LUC to state control and power consolidation (Huggins, 2012, Ansoms, 2012). The question here can be more specifically interrogated with regard to a specific crop such as rice and use of specific resources such as water, which are the theme of the entire study. The study report mentioned above indicated that farmers had almost unanimously adopted LUC and acknowledged its advantages with regard to food security and cash income. The positive views expressed by farmers can be explained by the dramatic increase in yields of priority crops. What is noteworthy, however, is that the reduction of tension between farmers, local leaders and the government was the result of a carrot and stick strategy. The government, at subsidised rates, provided farmers with work in cooperatives or groups, fertilisers and improved seeds. A farmer not within the accepted groupings would not be given these services. The same services governed water use for irrigation. The study also noted that some crops, notably maize, may have been getting more support and promotion than other crops. Being variously distributed in different regions meant some communities differentially got more developmental support than others. Crops like soya, with a lot of nutritional significance to communities, were not favoured by the government as such, but thrived by getting support from government agencies through other channels. A typical example was that of arrangements with the     222 | Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara                                                                                     ͘                             ͘Ȃ͚͚͟ ͚͚͟Ȃ͜͜͝ ͜͜͝Ȃ͙͠͞ ͙͠͞Ȃ͙͘͞͠   ͙͠͞Ȃ͙͘͞͠                                                             ͘ ͘ ͛͘ ͛͘ ͘͞ ‹Ž‘‡–”‡•‹Ž‘‡–”‡• ͘͞                             ͘      ͘ ͛͘ ͘͞ ‹Ž‘‡–”‡•   ͘Ȃ͜͟͠͝ ͘͟͡͝Ȃ͙͛͜͝͞ ͙͙͙͜͡Ȃ͚͛͘͡͝ ͜͟͠͝Ȃ͘͟͡͝ ͙͛͜͝͞Ȃ͙͙͙͜͡ ‘†ƒ–ƒ ͘Ȃ͜͟͠͝ ͜͟͠͝Ȃ͘͟͡͝ ͘͟͡͝Ȃ͙͛͜͝͞ ͙͛͜͝͞Ȃ͙͙͙͜͡ ͙͙͙͜͡Ȃ͚͛͘͡͝ ‘†ƒ–ƒ   ͘Ȃ͚͙͘͟ ͙͚͜͜Ȃ͚͙͛͞ ͘Ȃ͚͙͘͟ ͚͙͛͞Ȃ͚͜͠͞ ͚͙͘͟Ȃ͙͚͜͜ ͚͙͘͟Ȃ͙͚͜͜ ͚͜͠͞Ȃ͙͛͘͝͝ ͙͚͜͜Ȃ͚͙͛͞ ͚͜͠͞Ȃ͙͛͘͝͝ ͚͙͛͞Ȃ͚͜͠͞ ‘†ƒ–ƒ ‘†ƒ–ƒ ͛͘ ‹Ž‘‡–”‡•            ‘†ƒ–ƒ          ͙͘͞͠Ȃ͙ ͛͘͞ ‘†ƒ–ƒ ͚͚͟Ȃ͜͜͝    ͙͘͞͠Ȃ͙͛͘͞          ͜͜͝Ȃ͙͠͞ ͛͘ ‹Ž‘‡–”‡• ͘͞ ‹Ž‘‡–”‡•        ͛͘ ͘   ͘Ȃ͚͚͟                                                            Figure 12.1 Geographical coverage of priority LUC crops Source: Kathiresan, 2011 Ministry of Defence in western parts of the country (Musahara, Niyonzima, Bizimana, & Birasa, 2013). The distribution of LUC crops (figure 12.1) shows areas where there was general government support. However, this should not, without evidence, be wrongly interpreted as areas where there were these crops and especially where maize and rice may have been receiving more government support. On the same side of the coin, these could have been reaping a relatively larger share of the benefits of LUC. On the flip side of the observation, the same areas may have been receiving a more vigorous intervention of the state in matters of small peasant agricultural production and relations. Although the latter argument can be easily picked up by human rights critics of LUC, our study indicated that there had not been an adequate explanation why LUC farmers, as indicated, had accepted and were satisfied with LUC, and why 20 percent or more were still dissatisfied. With regard to land relations, land consolidation focused on land use and not land ownership. In valleys, the growth of maize did not affect ownership of small parcels of land. The only issue documented was that some farmers had tiny plots that were not viable and to get support they had to present plots in groups, surrendering nominal ownership to one farmer so that they could get input subsidies. For rice, it was noted          Chapter 12– Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda | 223                                 ͘   ͘Ȃ͙͛͟͠ ͙͛͟͠Ȃ͛͟͜͝       ͘͟͜͝Ȃ͡ ͛͛͞   ͙͝͞͠Ȃ͟ ͘͜͝ ‘†ƒ–ƒ                                                                       ͘ ͘ ͛͘ ͛͘ ͘͞ ͘͞                   ‹Ž‘‡–”‡•‹Ž‘‡–”‡•                  ‘†ƒ–ƒ     ͛͘ ‹Ž‘‡–”‡ ͘͞ ͛͟͜͝Ȃ͙͝͞͠ ͙͝͞͠Ȃ͘͟͜͝ ͙͛͟͠Ȃ͛͟͜͝    ͛͘ ‹Ž‘‡–”‡•         ͘Ȃ͙͛͟͠  ͘͟͜͝Ȃ͛͛͡͞ ͛͟͜͝Ȃ͙͝͞͠                 ͘                                                                                                                       ͘      ͘ ͛͘ ͘͞ ‹Ž‘‡–”‡•    ͘Ȃ͚͟͞ ͘Ȃ͚͟͞ ͙͚͝͝Ȃ͚ ͞͝ ͚͞͝ ͙͚͚͝͝Ȃ͚ ͛͘͜͟Ȃ͛͛͘͘͠͡ ͜͟Ȃ͛͘͠͡ ͚͟͞Ȃ͙ ͚͝͝ ͚͝͝ ͚͟͞Ȃ͙ ͚͚͞͝Ȃ͛͘͜͟ ͚͚͞͝Ȃ͛͘͜͟ ‘†ƒ–ƒ‘†ƒ–ƒ   ͘Ȃ͚͙͝͝ ͚͙͝͝Ȃ͙͙͙͘͜ ͘Ȃ͚͙͝͝ ͙͙͙͘͜Ȃ͙͚͞͝͠ ͙͚͞͝͠Ȃ͚͚͛͘͠ ͚͙͝͝Ȃ͙͙͙͘͜ ͛͘ ‹Ž‘‡–”‡•   ͚͞͝͠Ȃ͚͘͟͜͞ ‘†ƒ–ƒ ͙͙͙͘͜Ȃ͙͞ ͚͝͠ ͚͞͝͠Ȃ͚͘͟͜͞ ͙͚͞͝͠Ȃ͚͚͛͘͠ ‘†ƒ–ƒ Figure 12.1 Geographical coverage of priority LUC crops Source: Kathiresan, 2011 that wetlands were owned by the state and no conflicts were noted on the use of marshlands. In the uplands, land in many areas had been given up to make way for LUC. Related to the theme of this chapter was how LUC impacted the environment. Very close to this argument is thus the question of how LUC in Rwanda was cognisant of environmental sustainability. But before examining that, what do we know of water in general, and in Rwanda in particular? 12.3 Water aspects and LUC in Rwanda Water and environment Water is among the basic natural resources whose management needs collaboration between users and various institutions for efficient use of the quantity available and limitation of negative environmental impacts. The recommendation for efficient management of water is stipulated in Agenda 21, as formulated in the Rio Summit report (UN, 1992). Regarding water, strong interest was focused on development and integrated water resources management, water resources protection, water and sustainable development 224 | Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara in towns and rural areas, as well as the impacts of climate change on water resources (Ministry of Natural Resources, 2004). While water is a transboundary resource and subject to regional and international cooperation, such as the Nile basin and Lake Victoria basin initiatives, it is important first and foremost to zoom in and focus at country level. Integrated water resources management at the country level is a prerequisite for successful distribution and efficient use of water at regional and continental levels. In this regard, this section (12.3 focuses on Rwanda. We analyse the availability and accessibility of water resources for agriculture where LUC has expanded in different parts of Rwanda. We also look into whether water management has been conducted in an environmentally friendly way in Rwanda. The section ends by highlighting the situation as expressed through perceptions of farmers from around the country. 12.3.1 Unequal water resources distribution and increasing demand The dense hydrological network in Rwanda incorporates numerous small rivers, streams and wetlands, draining into lakes and other reservoirs. It has an estimated 9.5 billion cubic metres per year of actual total renewable water and an estimated 1,000 cubic metres of water available per capita (UNEP, 2010). Table 12.1 Water availability parameter Unit Amount Average precipitation in depth mm/yr 1,212 Total renewable surface water mm/yr 9.5 Total renewable ground Water billion m3/yr 7 Total renewable water billion m3/yr 9.5 Per capita renewable water (actual) m3/yr 977.3 Per capita renewable water (Africa) m3/yr 4,008 Table 12.1 Water availability in Rwanda (2008) Source: UNEP (2010). Africa Water Atlas Precipitation remains, however, the main source of water for farming in Rwanda. This source is unequally distributed. Situated in the Great Lakes region, Rwanda is characterised by a topography gradually rising from the east at an average altitude of 1,250 metres to the north and west where it culminates in the Congo-Nile Ridge mountain range, varying from 2,200 metres to 3,000 metres, and a volcano formation, the highest being 4,507 metres high (Prioul & Sirven (1981). This topography of high numbers of hills, mountains and lowlands explains the characteristics of the hydrographic network. The country is split by water, the dividing line following the Congo-Nile Ridge. To the west of this line lies the Congo River basin, which covers 33 percent of the national territory and receives 10 percent of water nationally. To the east lies the Nile river basin, whose area covers 67 percent of the territory and delivers 90 percent Chapter 12– Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda | 225 of water nationally. Rwanda is marked by continental equatorial climate zones: (1) the high altitude region; (2) the central plateau region; and (3) the eastern plateau and western lowlands. Annual rainfall varies from 700 mm to 1,400 mm in the east and the lowlands of the west; from 1,200 mm to 1,400 mm in the central plateau; and from 1,300 mm to 2,000 mm in the high altitude region, with an average of 1,200 mm per year (MINIRENA, 2004). In addition to the unequal spatial distribution of water, there is also uneven distribution in time. It is estimated that about half of total rainfall occurs in one season (March–May). This natural flow of rain requires that half of the water-requiring activities be conducted during this period, or that water is stored for use in time of shortage (UNEP, 2011). Table 12.2 Period Season description Share of annual precipitation February–May Long rains (April is the wettest month) 48% June–Mid-September Long dry spell Very little rain (25–50 mm, especially in high altitude areas) Mid-September–December Short rains (November is the wettest month during this season) 30% December–January Short rains with short dry spell 22% Table 12.2 Temporal distribution of precipitation Source: UNEP (2011). With socio-economic transformation underway, there is pressure on water resources countrywide. The effects of water resource use are demonstrated in the changes in the quantity and quality of water. All aspects of human activities including farming in Rwanda have produced varying impacts on and degrees of modification to the available water resources (REMA, 2009). However, it is observed that water use efficiency is very low, with about 4.3 cubic kilometres of rainfall lost as runoff water every year, while between 30 percent and 40 percent of water is lost in inefficient supply systems. The overall observation is that rainfall management is very low in all regions. Most precipitation is lost through storm water runoff and evaporation. MINAGRI (2010) estimates that as much as 4.3 cubic kilometres is lost though evaporation annually. However, rainfall is increasingly erratic and unpredictable, indicating that farming can no longer rely on precipitation alone. It is becoming problematic, with most irrigation systems being inefficient, as less than 2 percent of available freshwater resources are used (Ministry of Natural Resources, 2011). Specifically in terms of agricultural transformation, given the rapid growth in crop intensification and expansion of land area for agricultural use, there is a growing pressure on water resources. Hence, water resource management is one of the most important economic and social issues of the CIP (Kathiresan, 2011). The spatiotemporal disparities and increasing unreliability of rainfall underscore the need for efficient and equitable water resource management. In particular, adaptation measures need to be adopted and im- 226 | Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara plemented, including: harvesting and conserving rainwater; storage and internal redistribution; reducing losses through good soil and water conservation practices; adopting efficient irrigation technology; and shifting to water-efficient crops (MINIRENA, 2011). 12.3.2 Water use in farming and environmental impacts of rain-fed agriculture and soil erosion Although there are recommended forms of soil protection, the reality is that cultivation is still carried out on steep slopes without any recommended soil control measures (ROR, 2007). The result is that uncontrolled water run-off causes soil erosion, compromising ecosystem integrity and eroding riverbanks, leading to nutrient loading of water bodies. Soil erosion has also led to reduced soil fertility in acidic-soil mountainous areas, resulting in lowered agricultural yields (REMA, 2009). It is commonly recognised that Rwanda has been losing top-quality soil through erosion ending up in the stream network and marshlands (Musahara, 2006; Musahara & Rama, 2009). Research carried out has already estimated the loss of soil through the Nyabarongo river system at 51 kg/second at Kigali level; 44 kg/second at Kanzenze level; and 26 kg/second at Rusumo level (GOR, 2008). Irrigation, use of fertilisers and water pollution Rice growing constitutes the crop using the most irrigation, at 25,500,000 cubic metres in 2000 (REMA, 2009). Water resources can be negatively affected by the application of agro-chemicals. While many of the proposed irrigation structures might include canals, some may include small dams. Other potential impacts include water quality and quantity degradation (both surface and groundwater), surface water sedimentation, and spread of water-borne diseases (World Bank, 2014). Use of fertilisers has increased with the government policy decision to subsidise their distribution among farmers who have consolidated their land for agriculture (REMA, 2009). In 2007, about 21,600 tonnes of mineral fertilisers were ordered and 13,260 tonnes were received and distributed. About 4,200 tonnes of mineral fertilisers were distributed under the CIP (MINAGRI, 2008). It remains to be known to what extent such intensive application of fertilisers impacted on water quality. 12.3.3 Climate change Water availability is also associated with climate change effects, including climate-related shocks like drought and flooding becoming more regular in Rwanda. As mentioned above, the eastern and south-eastern regions where rainfall is lower than elsewhere in the country have been most affected by prolonged drought. However, the northern and western regions experience abundant rainfall that usually causes erosion, flooding and landslides. These extreme climate events have adverse environmental impacts on agricultural productivity (MINAGRI, 2009). With the conversion of water catchments into agricultural lands over the past decades, the destruction and drying up of many Chapter 12– Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda | 227 streams has occurred, and groundwater reserves have declined. Agricultural intensification, pollution, invasive species, watershed destruction, inappropriate settlements, inappropriate agricultural practices and inadequate sanitation have resulted in a decline in water quantity and quality, increased siltation and sedimentation, increased pollution and increased risk of aquatic weeds (REMA, 2009; Kathiresan, 2011). 12.3.4 Perceptions about water use and environment Empirical studies of a quantitative nature on the environmental impacts of land use consolidation in Rwanda are still lacking. Laboratory analysis of water and soil quality can indicate whether LUC has been successful or not in terms of environmental sustainability. In the absence of such rigorous quantitative analyses, farmers’ perceptions have been assessed using qualitative information collected through focus group interviews.36 The perceptions pertain to water quality downstream, soil erosion and maintenance of erosion ditches. The perceptions were also about the main hazards related to climate variability, since they also highlighted the issue of water availability for farming throughout the country. In relation to water quality downstream, figure 12.2 indicates that the majority of farmers appreciated the quality of the water they used. While about 42 percent found that water quality was the same, more than 50 percent of respondents found the quality was better and much better. ‡•’‘†‡–•ȋάȌ   ͙͘͘ ͘͠ ͘͞ ͚͜ ͘͜ ͚͘ ͘ ͛͞ ͙͟ ͠ ͝ — Š™‘”•‡ ‘”•‡ „‘—––Š‡•ƒ‡ ƒ‡ — Š„‡––‡” Figure 12.2 Perceptions of water quality, soil fertility and erosion ditches Source: Musahara, Niyonzima, Birasa and Bizimana (2013) 36 Focus group interviews were conducted in the context of a study funded by USAID Land Project, conducted by the Department of Planning and Development of the former National University of Rwanda (now University of Rwanda). 228 | Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara Figure 12.3 highlights farmers’ perceptions of soil fertility. In this regard, the majority found that soil fertility had realised tremendous improvements, with about 33 percent finding the quality better and 38 percent finding it even much better. This is not surprising, with the subsidisation from the government of chemical fertilisers in the context of LUC. For most of the crops prioritised in LUC, farmers were paying only half price. ‡•’‘†‡–•ȋάȌ      ͙͘͘ ͘͠ ͘͞ ͛͛ ͘͜ ͛͠ ͙͡ ͚͘ ͚ ͠ ͘ — Š™‘”•‡ ‡•’‘†‡–•ȋάȌ ‘”•‡ „‘—––Š‡•ƒ‡ ƒ‡ — Š„‡––‡”       ͙͘͘ ͘͠ ͘͞ ͛͜ ͘͜ ͚͞ ͚͘ ͛ ͚͠ ͙͘ ͘ — Š™‘”•‡ ‘”•‡ „‘—––Š‡•ƒ‡ ƒ‡ Figure 12.3 Perceptions of water quality, soil fertility and erosion ditches Source: Musahara, Niyonzima, Birasa and Bizimana (2013) — Š„‡––‡” Chapter 12– Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda | 229 Finally, figure 12.3 illustrates farmers’ perceptions concerning erosion ditches. Similar to water quality downstream and soil fertility, farmers estimated that erosion ditches had been maintained under the LUC programme. About 62 percent of respondents found erosion ditches better and much better while 28 percent estimated that the erosion ditches looked the same. This could be attributed to the continued programme of tree management, where they used to be grown before the programme’s implementation, as well as new plantations of trees where they were not. In addition, with the programme of Girinka (one cow for each poor family) expanding in Rwanda, households planted grasses along erosion ditches to feed livestock, which contributed to watershed management, protecting water courses. The positive perceptions of water quality, soil fertility and quality of erosion ditches indicated that efforts had been made in the LUC programme and were paying off. But it might also have still been too early for farmers to feel adverse environmental impacts themselves, as the programme was only implemented in 2008. To get the real picture, in addition to perceptions, the status of environmental impacts needs quantitative analysis, especially in the context of soil and water quality after intensive application of chemical fertilisers. The main challenge with the implementation of LUC has related to climate variability dictating the availability of water. The success of rain-fed agriculture depends greatly on the seasonal situation. It came out in the farmers’ perceptions that the most-feared shock that could undermine productivity was drought, figure 12.4. Prolonged dry seasons cause crop failures. The other shock is flooding, which is the opposite of drought. ‡•’‘†‡–•ȋάȌ     ͙͘͘ ͘͠ ͛͟ ͘͞ ͘͜ ͙͛ ͚͘ ͜ ͜ ͞ ‹‘Ž‡ ‡‘” –Š‡ˆ– –Š‡”• ͘ ”ƒˆ–‘” „ƒ†”ƒ‹ Ž‘‘† ‡ƒ–Š‘” •‡”‹‘—•‹ŽŽ‡• Figure 12.4 Shocks as perceived by farmers Source: Musahara, Niyonzima, Bizimana and Birasa, (2013) 230 | Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara   ƒ‰‹–—„ƒȂ —˜—„ƒ           –‡†‡ ƒ›‘œƒ  ƒ›‘›‘„ƒ —Šƒœ‹ ›‹’‹ƒ ‹–‹‰ƒ ‹•Š›ƒ ‹‰ƒŽ‹ ƒŒ‡˜—„ƒ ƒ•Šƒ”ƒ Š›‘‰™‡ ——‰—”‹ ™ƒ„— ›ƒ”—„ƒ”‡ —•—”‹ „ƒœ‹ ‰ƒ•ƒ•ƒ ›‹Ž‹ ™ƒ•ƒ˜‡    Figure 12.5 Locations where rice is grown in Rwanda Source: Kathiresan, 2011 Rice and water – Linking LUC and the need for water use planning Rice is one of the priority crops under LUC. Rice is considered a crop that uses a lot of water. Rwanda has been growing rice since the 1960s. The abundance of water and rainfall is ideal for the cultivation of rice. The dry season is conducive to harvesting and drying rice. Rice grows anywhere where there is wetland, and all rice-cultivating marshland has been consolidated. About 65,000 tonnes were produced annually and the rise observed in 2013 was due to deliberate promotion by LUC. The current trend in rice production is presented in figure 12.5. In table 12.3 it is noticeable that, rice production has grown by more than 32 times from the 1960s to 2000s. Since the 1980s, domestic demand for rice has grown rapidly; but the nation’s rice production met only 28, 50 and 60 percent of national needs in 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. More is expected to be grown as rice has become one of the key agricultural commodities that the country must grow intensively to feed its increased population and make the best use of available land. Rice performs well in flood-prone valleys, which thus eases pressure on hillside land for food production. Additionally, rice is easy to handle and store, thereby reducing post-harvest losses, and its by-products can be used as animal feed, a source of Chapter 12– Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda | 231 energy supply and substrate for mushroom growing. Moreover, rice has huge potential to be exported in the region. In more recent years, the government’s investment efforts have been directed towards the reclamation of vast areas of inland valley swamps (marshlands), construction of several small dams in the valleys, organisation of farmers’ co-operatives, privatisation of rice mills, farm mechanisation, and facilitation of the supply of inputs such as seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. This chapter is not about rice. But the argument is that rice is the crop that, among LUC priorities, puts the greatest demands on water supply from irrigation. It was also noted that more than 90 percent of Rwandan water is within the trans boundary water system of the Nile. It was thus quite noticeable that while there was a visible policy to promote the crop, which is quite strategic and important to food security. The implications for water use should be another priority in the sustainable management of LUC. On one hand there is the argument that rice does not in actual fact use water, as water for irrigation is sent back into the water system. On the other hand, the water in the main stream will be depleted or polluted, affecting countries and communities downstream. In the qualitative survey, farmers indicated that as a result of LUC they now had plenty of water through government intervention and promotion of irrigation. Indeed, in some cases LUC has provided an opportunity to address scarcities of water for irrigation that are common during the dry season (Kathiresan, 2011). Thanks to the CIP, irrigation and mechanisation services have been geared to support LUC. However, the study noted that issues of water quality resulting from LUC and water use have not been adequately studied. It is not known, for example, how rice as one of the major water-using LUC priority crops, which is most popular in valleys and marshlands, affects water quality. The impact of LUC and rice cultivation would constitute a study on its own, with field data and lab tests. The following aspects were identified in the study as being important to water quality. Firstly, it is known that LUC can be a source of major agricultural pollution. LUC of crop intensification is done on a large scale and supported by provision of fertilisers and pesticides. Therefore, three major sources that contribute to agricultural pollution of water streams are agricultural residues, fertiliser use and pesticides. The application rate of fertilisers and pesticides has a direct impact on river water quality through water pollution. Table 12.3 Decade Rwanda Burundi Kenya Tanzania EAC 1970s 1.85 4.44 24.56 12.40 184.05 1980s 4.64 15.41 30.19 17.29 329.54 1990s 6.53 29.75 31.58 54.47 446.29 2000s 213.03 199 475 1394 7646 Table 12.3 Comparative growth of rice production in East Africa (‘000 tons) Source: Karugia, Massawe, Guthiga, Macharini (2013) 232 | Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara LUC of crop intensification has, as noted, a high demand on water. This has required construction of reservoirs. Reservoir construction is a new source of pollution, especially due to the earth-moving equipment used. But are even more subtle aspects of water quality linked to LUC, whose importance may elude the ordinary practitioner. For instance, it was argued that LUC had a likely impact on water surface temperature, which has not been studied. Agricultural expansion and land management practices alter water surface temperature by modifying energy (Kueppers, Snyder, Sloan, Cayan, Jin, Kanamaru, Kanamitsu, Miller, Tyree, Du, Weare, 2008). These changes negatively affect freshwater quality and quantity, biodiversity, carbon cycling and climate. Indeed, temperature affects the speed of chemical reactions, the rate at which algae and aquatic plants photosynthesise, and the metabolic rate of other organisms, as well as how pollutants, parasites and other pathogens interact with aquatic residents. Another argument in the study was that LUC affects water turbidity and increases its suspended solids content, especially during rainy seasons. Turbidity refers to water clarity. The greater the amount of suspended solids in the water, the murkier it appears, and the higher the measured turbidity. Water bodies that have high transparency values (low turbidity) typically have good water quality. A third aspect of the effect of LUC on water quality needing scientific quantification is salinity and electrical conductivity. Salinity is an indication of the concentration of dissolved salts in a body of water. The level of salinity in aquatic systems is important to aquatic plants and animals as species can survive only within certain salinity ranges (Friedl, Teoderu, and Wehrli, 2004). Although some species are well adapted to surviving in saline environments, growth and reproduction of many species can be hindered by increases in salinity. The fourth aspect of water quality that needs to be quantified under LUC, and especially where rice is grown, is amounts of nitrogen, phosphorus and sulphates. These actually are linked to production of greenhouses gases that are under the probe of climate change scientists. Related to these aspects of LUC and rice cultivation is the question of heavy metals in water. Heavy metals are natural components of the earth’s crust and can enter the water and food cycles through a variety of chemical and geochemical processes (Tinsley, 1979). Pollution of streams and rivers could occur due to run-off flowing through agricultural areas where pesticides and fungicides are used, atmospheric deposition, mining areas, etc. The concentrations of heavy metals in water may vary considerably depending on annual and seasonal fluctuations (SCEP, 1971). Trace metals such as mercury, copper, selenium and zinc are essential metabolic components in low concentrations. However, metals tend to bio-accumulate in tissues and prolonged exposure, or exposure at higher concentrations, can lead to illness. Elevated concentrations of trace metals can have negative consequences for both wildlife and humans. Heavy metals of concern are lead and cadmium, which are highly toxic. Others are chromium and arsenic. LUC, and schemes involving large-scale use of water, soil displacement and machinery, need to be quantified as they are very likely to intensify concentrations of trace metals. LUC has to provide what is called minimum ecological flow. This is the mini- Chapter 12– Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda | 233 mum amount of water set aside to meet demands for ecological and basic human needs (‘ecosystem downstream’). These reflections on water use and quality under LUC and rice cultivation could certainly be further elaborated to indicate gaps that need to be covered. Quantification studies would give further credibility to qualitative evidence and argumentation. 12.3.5 Implications for environmental sustainability and inclusiveness The LUC study referred to, thus has inadequate data to assess its minimum damage to the environment. In the previous section, it is common knowledge that LUC is a candidate to take the blame for poor water quality water quality. While the use of chemical fertilisers is subsidised to ensure maximum yields in the shortest possible time, deterioration in water quality is not only dangerous to nature – for example, through the release of nitrous oxide into the atmosphere – but also to human health, as is the case with heavy metals like lead, arsenic and cadmium. The release of nitrous oxide, methane and, especially, carbon dioxide, which is the main contributor to climate change. Lack of inclusiveness is an aspect that needs to be addressed in LUC. Firstly, it is based on a range of crops in a limited number of regions. It is estimated that LUC reaches less than 30 percent of the population and is projected to reach 70 percent of households by 2017. The high yields realised from priority crop production are thus limited to certain areas and to certain communities only. Secondly, it has been established from a qualitative survey that some crops, especially maize and rice, have tended to receive more than proportionate support from the government. Farmers who do not cultivate these crops are not equally favoured by government support. Of course, some of these crops are exported, but what is noteworthy is that support for maize is at the expense of more support to tea and coffee. Although qualitative outcomes indicated that there were no visible gender disparities in the impact of LUC, quantitative indicators at household level with regard to input required by gender, distribution of benefits by gender and possibly the effect on nutrition at household level, are required to defray the ever-present cultural stereotypes. 12.4 Conclusions and lessons learned As a conclusion, it is apparent that LUC has been a major landmark in land and agricultural transformation in Rwanda. Its impact on the yield of priority crops has been noted. But there are a lot of issues to be addressed and gaps to be filled for environmental sustainability. Using water and rice as a case study, it was noted that there is room for more water demand, but not adequate provision for sustaining; for example, water quality substantive to environmental sustainability. While water seems to be abundant in Rwanda, precipitation, which is the main source of water for farming, is unevenly distributed. Regions of high altitude receive high rainfall causing from time to time 234 | Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara landslides and flooding. On the other hand, lowlands experience recurrent drought due to long dry seasons. Ambitious national plans to increase food production through LUC are furthermore compromised by uneven distribution of rain in time, as half of the total rainfall occurs between March and May. Concerning the expansion of LUC, the programme has not included all households and some crops, especially maize and rice, have been relatively better supported than others. In the case of rice, the government has made substantial investment efforts, with drainage of swamps and distribution of irrigated plots to farmers grouped in cooperatives. Improved seeds and fertilisers were distributed at subsidised prices, resulting in productivity increases in the past decade. It is not clear how gender is catered for in the agricultural transformation. Current studies can provide the basis for what is lacking and in the environmental sphere water quality has been used to show a lack of quantitative indicators that could be used to draw out a more environmentally conscious programme. Chapter 12– Land use consolidation and water use in Rwanda | 235 236 | Theophile Niyonzima, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Herman Musahara References Ansoms, A. (2009). Green Revolution for Rwanda. Reconciling rural growth with small scale risk management. Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp. FAO (2003). The design of land consolidation pilot studies in Eastern and Central Europe. Rome. Friedl, G., Teoderu, C. and Wehrli, B. (2004): Is the Iron Gate I Reservoir on the Danube River a sink for dissolved silica?, Biogeochemistry 68: 21–32. GoR (2004). Land Policy. Kigali: Government of Rwanda (GoR). GoR (2005). Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of Land in Rwanda. Kigali: Government of Rwanda (GoR). Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2007). Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2008-2012. Kigali, Government of Rwanda (GoR). Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (2008). Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture in Rwanda – Phase II (PSTA II). Final Report. Kigali, Government of Rwanda (GoR). Karugia, J.; Massawe, J.; Guthiga, P; Macharini, E. (2013). 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Working Paper No. 99/1. 238 | Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa Index access to land 17-18, 106, 153, 163 Agenda 21, UN 223 agribusiness 38 agricultural cooperatives 155 agricultural pollution 231 Agricultural Sector Development Programme, Tanzania 37 Akie 93 Al Ain Wildlife Corporation 75 Amin, Idi 52 Amuru 126 ancestral land 202, 212 Anglo Gold Ashanti 204, 206, 208, 210 Anuak 76 Apach 59 Argentina 105 artisanal small-scale mining (ASM) 204-205 Arusha Declaration (1967) 34-35, 89 asiimye 60 Baganda 59 Bagonza, Bishop 211 Bahima 58-59 BAKWATA See National Muslim Council of Tanzania banana 210 Bandani 167, 188 Bari 76 Baruli 59 Bashir, Omar el 70 beans 23 bibanja 55 biodiversity 232 biofuels 87, 203 Bogotá 105 Boma 77 Boma National Park 75 bomas (villages) 77 bona fide peasants 54 Bor 77 Bosnia and Herzegovina 78 Bretton Woods 142 Buenos Aires 105 Buganda 20, 55, 58-61 building design standards 190 Bullisa 129 Burges concentric zone 166 Busiro 59 Busogo 111 Busulu 55 Byamugisha 124 Capital Development Authority (CDA) 34 carbon cycling 232 cassava 210 Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 91 Central Bank of Tanzania 207 Central Equatoria 73-74, 76-77, 79 Certificate of Customary Right of Occupancy (CCRO) 90, 94 chemical fertilisers 233 Chevron 71 Chiga 168 China 133 Christian Council of Tanzania 210 CIP See Crop Intensification Program (CIP), Rwanda class struggle 19 Climate change 226 climate variability 229 climate zones 225 Index | 239 CNF See National Women Council (CNF), Rwanda coffee 233 Colombia 105 commercial farming 21, 31, 61, 134 commercialisation of land 19 commodity prices 142, 152, 205 Compensation Claims Regulation 209 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Sudan (2005) 69, 71, 79 Congo-Nile Ridge 224 Congo River 224 Constitution of 1995, Uganda 21, 52 Constitution of 2010, Kenya 177-178 CPA See Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Sudan (2005) credit systems 21, 110 Crop Intensification Programme (CIP), Rwanda 219-221 customary land (rights, tenure, use and markets) 9-10, 29-31, 41, 127, 132, 202, 211 customary law and rights 167, 169, 172, 175, 200 customary rights of occupancy (CCRO) 37 Côte d’Ivoire 58 Dar es Salaam 13, 93 Decentralisation Policy, Ugand 149 Deininger, Klaus 105 demographic dividend 154 Deng, David 73, 74 Deninger & Ayalew study (2006) 54 Department for International Development (DFID), United Kingdom 103, 124 De Soto, Hernando 105 Deuteronomy 201 diamonds 204 Dinka 71, 77, 79 Diop, Makhtar 124 disabled people 133 displacement 19 District Development Council, Tanzania 36 Dodoma Municipal Council 34 do-it-yourself employment 146 domestic violence 104 Duk 77, 78 Eastern Equatoria 76-77, 79 Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, Rwanda 221 Egypt 104, 133 Engels, Friedrich 62 England 60 Enough Project, The 73 entrepreneurial training 22 entrepreneurship 146, 152 environmental sustainability 219, 233 Envujjo 55 Equatorian regionalism 78 erosion ditches 227, 228, 229 Ethiopia 76, 80, 147 ethnic cleansing 21, 78 ethnic exclusivism 78 ethnic federalism 78 ethnic inequality 19 ethnic terroir 75 extractive industries 18, 38, 133 FAO 105 female-headed households 129 fertilisers 23, 142, 228-231 financial institutions 115 Finscope 107 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 111, 115 food (in)security 30, 40, 94, 133, 153 foreign direct investment (FDI) 19, 21, 33, 37, 69, 73, 87, 95, 133, 204 forest degradation 19 forestry products 204 Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) 58 240 | Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa FOWODE 129 France 60 Freehold 189 fuel insecurity 30 G4S See Group Four Security G8 58 Garuga 59 gas 204 Gashaki 111 Gataraga 112 Gebo Kanyakwar 188 Geita 23, 199, 204-211 Geita Gold Mining (GGM), Tanzania 204210 gender discrimination, equality and inequality 19, 106, 116, 133-134, 149 Gender Monitoring Office (GMO) 107 gender rights and gender-sensitive laws 19, 103 Genesis 201 Gerald, Faida 205 German East Africa 88 Germany 200 GGM See Geita Gold Mining (GGM), Tanzania Girinka 229 God-centred perspective 202 gold 204 Government of Rwanda (GoR) 103, 106107, 116 Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) 69-72, 76, 80 Great Britain 200 Great Lakes region 224 Great Lakes University 166 Green growth 75 greenhouses gases 232 Green Revolution 142, 220 groundwater reserves 227 Group Four Security (G4S) 206 GRSS See Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) Guatemala 105 Gulu 153 gunsinze 60 heavy metals 232 Heglig oilfields 72 higher-level education 153 HIV/AIDS 106, 166 housing development 22, 185, 189 human rights 131 hunting 87 ibimina 107, 111 IDPs See internally displaced people IFAD See International Fund for Agricultural Development Iganga 132 Imperial Decree (1885), German East Africa 200 India 133 informal employment 143 informal markets 41 informal settlements 189 Inheritance Law of 1999, Rwanda 106 internally displaced people (IDPs) 205, 211 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 105 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 90, 142 International Youth Foundation 152 Irish potatoes 23, 112 irrigation 23, 142, 188, 219, 226 Islamism 70 Japan 153 jatropha 94 Jikany 76 Jodak 172, 191 joint titles (joint land ownership) 110 Jonglei 77 Index | 241 Joshua 201 Juba 71-77, 80 Kabaka 60 Kabeer, Naila 124, 128 Kaberamaido 59 Kakamega Road 166 Kampala 13, 133 Kanzenze 226 Kapoeta 77 Karachi 190 Kasengor 77 Kayiira, Pater Baleke 58 Kayunga 57, 58 Kenya 9-10, 17, 22-23, 38-41, 72, 104, 163-178, 185-193 Khartoum 70, 72, 79 kibanja 54 Kiboga 58, 59 Kibos 167 Kibos Nubian 188 Kibos Road, Kisumu 166 Kidabaga 39, 40 kiganda 59 Kiir Mayardit, Salva 69, 79 Kilimo Kwanza, Tanzania 37 Kilolo 39, 40 Kinigi 111 Kinyarwanda 107, 108 Kisumu 22-23, 163-164, 169, 185-188, 191-192 Kisumu Ndogo, Kibera 189 Kitambi 58 Kiteto 93 Kiwalamo 40 Kong Mountains 73 Kwa Ndomu 189 Kyaggwe 58 Lake Kyoga 59 Lakes state, South Sudan 77-78 Lake Victoria 165, 188, 224 Lamu 72 land accumulation 33 Land Acquisition Act, Tanzania 35 Land Acts, South Sudan 72, 77 Land Acts, Tanzania 31, 36, 90-91, 201202, 209 Land Acts, Uganda 20-22, 49, 52-55, 125129, 133 Land Administration and Management 19, 192 Land Amendment Act of 2004, Tanzania 90-91 Land Amendment Act of 2010, Uganda 54-55 land banks 176 Land Commission, The Presidential Commission on Land Matters, Tanzania 29, 32, 34-35, 40, 42 land commodification 21, 123, 129, 132134 Land conflicts 19 Land Control Boards, Kenya 164, 168, 172 Land Decree of 1975, Uganda 52 land dispossession 9 land distribution and redistribution 9, 51 landed gentry and landed rich 49, 55, 62 land expropriation 70 land governance 19, 130 land grabbing 21, 34, 38, 74, 77, 80, 132134 Land Information System 192 landless labourers 9, 55, 143 land markets 29, 30, 37, 41, 134 Land Ordinance of 1923, British Tanganyika Protectorate 31, 35-36, 89-90, 200 land policies 19 Land Policy of 1995, Tanzania 200, 211 land reforms 52-53, 90 242 | Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa Land Reform of 1975, Uganda 52 Land Reform of 2010, Uganda 52 Land Registration and Titling (LRT) 103108, 112-115, 127, 133 land rights 17, 19, 40, 52 Lands Office, Kenya 191 land tenure security and systems 18-22, 88, 106, 167, 185, 189-190, 212 Land Tribunal, Uganda 54 Land Use Consolidation (LUC) 23-24, 219-220-222, 231-234 Land Use Controls 185 land use systems 19 large scale commercial agriculture 18, 29 large-scale land acquisitions 21, 73, 91 Latuko 76 League of Nations 31, 89 legal pluralism 10, 23, 192 Leonard, Mhoja 206 Lira 59 livestock keeping and management 31, 190, 204 loans 116 Local Government Act of 1997, Uganda 149 Lokoya 77 Loliondo 40, 41 long-term land lease 73 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 152 Lou 76 LRT See Land Registration and Titling LUC See Land Use Consolidation Luganda 52 Lukiiko 58 Luo 172, 175 Luwero 58 Lwanga-Lunyiigo 59 Maasai 93 Machar, Riek 69 Madudu 58 Magema 206 Magufuli, John Pombe 34 Magulu Nyondo 60 mailo 52, 54, 132 maize 23, 112, 142, 234 Majebele 205 Majengo Mapya 189 Malawi 9, 30 Malindi 22, 185, 187-191 mali ya taifa 32, 35 Mamboleo 167 Manyara 36, 93 Manyatta 167, 188 Maridi 72 Marx, Karl 55, 60, 61, 62 Masindi 58, 59 Masunga, Raban 206 Matiep, Paulino 73 Maweni 189 Mbale 132 Mbiru 59 mgunda 34 Mhoja 207 micro-credit systems and microfinance 104, 107, 116 Migereko, Daudi 123 migration 19 Mikese ward 93 Mine Mpya 205, 206 Mineral Act, Tanzania 203 mining industry See extractive industries Mining Act of 2010, Tanzania 202 Mining Act, South Sudan 74 Minister of Lands, Uganda 54 minister of natural resources and tourism, Tanzania 41 Ministry of Defence, Rwanda 222 Index | 243 Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Uganda 131 Ministry of Lands, Tanzania 90 Ministry of Lands, Uganda 134 Misseriya 71 Miwani 166 Miyuji 34 Mombasa 188 Morogoro 93, 94 Mozambique 9 mradi wa taifa 35 Mtakuja 206, 207 Mubende 58, 59 Muchunguzi 59 Muko 111 Mulbadaw 36 Municipal Planner, Kenya 191 Musanze 107 Museveni, Yoweri 52-53, 58, 61, 126 Musoke, Sevume 58 Muyeye 189 Mwalimu 32, 95, 199 Nairobi 166, 188 Nakasongora 58 Nantaba, Aida 57 National Agricultural Advisory Services, Uganda 149 National Agricultural and Food Corporation (Nafco) 36 National Congress Party (NCP), Sudan 70-71 National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) 107 National Land Policy of 2013, Uganda 130, 131, 134 National Land Policy of 1997, Tanzania 37 National Land Policy of 2004, Rwanda 106 National Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA) 210 National University of Rwanda 10 National Women Council (CNF), Rwanda 112 National Youth Council, Uganda 148-149 National Youth Policy, Uganda 145, 149 natural resources conservation 18 Neumman Kaffee Gruppe 58 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN) 58, 234 New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) 37 New Stage 189 nickel 204 Nile and Nile basin 224, 231 Nnamunswa 60 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 103 Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) 10, 17 Northern Province, Rwanda 107 Northern Uganda Social Action Fund 149 Ntungamo 132 Nuer 76, 79 Nyabarongo 226 Nyagava 88 Nyahera 168 Nyalenda 167, 188 Nyalubanja 31, 89 Nyalunya 167 Nyamalembo 206 Nyamasaria 167 Nyamwange 40 Nyange 111 nyarubanja 33 Nyerere, Julius 31-33, 35, 95, 199, 211 Oakland Institute 73 Obunga 167, 188 oil 71-73, 133, 204 Ojola 168 Okuku 53 244 | Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa Olo’bu 77 Organic Land Law of 2005, Rwanda 221 Organic Land Law of 2013, Rwanda 106 Otonglo 167 Oxfam 78 Paboo 126 Pakistan 190 Paraguay 105 pastoralism 38, 41, 58, 70, 87 patriarchal societies and systems 104, 125, 128 patrimonialism 59 payams (sub-counties in South Sudan) 77 peasantrization 51 Pemba Island 88 peri-urban areas and interface 177, 187 permeable soils 142 Peru 105 pesticides 231 Petroleum Act of 2012, South Sudan 74 Physical Planning Act of 1986, Kenya 193 Polanyi 60 pollution 227 polygamous relationships 125 Population growth 151 Port Sudan 72 poverty eradication and reduction 131, 132, 221 poverty line 109, 166 Poverty Reduction Strategy, Rwanda 221 prebendalism 59, 61 Precipitation 224 Private Sector Competitive Project (PSCP) 132 privatisation 21 progress methodology 165, 173 property development 18 Protestants 111 Rabour 168 rain-fed agriculture 226, 229 Remera 111 REPOA, Policy Research for Development, Dar es Salaam 10, 17 rice 23, 58, 142, 188, 219, 226, 231, 234 Right of Occupancy 89 Rio Summit 223 Roman Catholics 111 Royal Land Commission (1953-1955), British Colonial rule in Tanzania 32 Rufiji 38-40, 94 Rufiji Basin Development Authority 38 Rural Land Act, Tanzania 35 rural poverty 17, 146, 205 Rural-Urban Interface 185 rural-urban migration 10, 143-146, 152 Rusumo 226 Rwanda 9-10, 17, 21, 23-24, 103-116, 219-234 Rwanda Land Law and Policy 220 Rwandan Constitution of 2003 106 Rwandan genocide (1994) 106 SAGCOT See Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) Salala, Leonard 206 scramble for land 30 SDGs See Sustainable Development Goals security of tenure 53, 56, 132, 190 Seventh-day Adventists 111 Shilluk 79 Sida, the Swedish International Development Agency 10 Singapore 133 slum settlements 22, 133, 185, 187, 188 smallholder agriculture and small-scale farmers 9, 19, 21-22, 38, 87, 91, 93-95, 105, 134, 154 Sobat Basin 76 social justice 131 Index | 245 soil erosion 226-227 soil fertility 227-229 Sokoine University of Agriculture 10, 17 Soroti 59 South Africa 42, 147 Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) 37-38, 203 Southern Regional Government (19721983), Sudan 70 South Sudan 10, 17, 20, 69-80 soya beans 23, 221 SPLA See Sudan People’s Liberation Army SPLM See Sudan People’s Liberation Movement squatters 189-190 Ssabasajja 60 Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 108 statutory rights 175 Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation, Rwanda 221 Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) 90 subsistence farmers 23, 134 Sudan 70, 72 Sudan civil wars 69 Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 72-73, 77, 79 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 70, 72 Sudan second civil war (1983-2005) 70, 79 sugar industry 188 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 141 Swynnerton Plan of 1954, Kenya 104 Taiwan 153 Tanganyika 20, 31-33, 88-89, 95, 200 Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) 32-33 Tanzania 10, 13, 20-23, 29-42, 71, 87-96, 147, 199-212 Tanzania Agricultural Food Security Investment Programme 37 Tanzania Episcopal Conference 210 Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) 37-38, 203 taxation 153 tea 233 tenure security and systems See land tenure security and systems terra nullius 202 TIC See Tanzania Investment Centre Tindilo 73 Todaro-Harris model 146 Torit 77 tourism 18, 30, 87 tribal jurisdiction 200 ubwisungane magirirane (mutual support) 21, 111 Uganda 10, 13, 17, 20-22, 49-62, 71, 79, 123-134, 141-155 Uganda Land Alliance 126, 128 Uganda Land Authority 54 Uganda Land Commission 54 Uganda National Panel Survey 148 Uganda Wildlife Authority 126 ujamaa 34, 35, 36, 89 Ujamaa Village Act 35 umunani 108 Umurenge Savings and Credit Cooperatives (Umurenge SACCOs) 111-112 unemployment 143, 146, 149, 150, 152, 166, 205 Unguja 88 UN-Habitat 166, 176, 192 United Arab Emirates 75 United Kingdom 177 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) 186 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 103, 105 246 | Land Tenure Dynamics in East Africa Unity State, South Sudan 77 University of Agder, Norway 10 unplanned urban settlements 132 Unregistered Land Act of 1970, Sudan 70 UN Women 107 uranium 204 Urban Areas and Cities Act of 2011, Kenya 177 urban development and planning 22, 164, 167, 185-186 urbanisation 18, 22, 163, 176, 185 urban poor 10, 23, 178, 189 Uror 78 USA 176, 177 USAID See United States Agency for International Development village land acquisitions 39 Village Land Acts, Tanzania 37, 90, 91, 209 Village Land Regulation of 2001, Tanzania 23, 211 Villagisation, Tanzania 9, 35-36 Vision 2020, Rwanda 220 Wabena 88 Wahehe 88 Wangoni 88 Warrap 77, 78 Washington Consensus 142 Waste collection 166 water-borne diseases 226 water quality 227-231 Weber, Max 59, 61 Western Equatoria 79 wetlands 133 wheat 23, 142 wildlife reserves 9 women’s access to land 103, 108 women’s land rights 104, 106, 128, 132 Women’s Land Rights Movement 128 women’s rights 116, 123, 129 World Bank 9, 90, 103, 105, 115, 124, 132-133, 142, 149, 154, 186 World War I 89, 200 Yei 76, 77 youth definitions 145 youth engagement 22 Youth Enterprise Scheme, Uganda 149 Youth Opportunity Program, Uganda 149 youth policy 146 youth unemployment 22, 149 Youth Venture Capital, Uganda 149 Zambia 9 Zande 79 Zanzibar 88, 200 Zimbabwe 42 Index | 247 248 Current African Issues (CAI) Current African Issues (CAI) is a book series published by the Nordic Africa Institute since 1981. As the title implies, it raises and analyses current and topical issues concerning Africa. All CAI books are academic works by researchers in the social and multidisciplinary sciences. Previous titles in the CAI series: 51 Favouring a demonised plant : Khat and Ethiopian smallholder enterprise; Gessesse Dessie; 2013 64 The Nuer pastoralists : between large scale agriculture and villagization : a case study of the Lare District in the Gambella Region of Ethiopia; Wondwosen Michago Seide; 2017. 50 From global land grabbing for biofuels to acquisitions of African water for commercial agriculture; David Ross Olanya; 2012 63 Agricultural water institutions in East Africa; Atakilte Beyene (ed); 2015 62 Dammed divinities : the water powers at Bujagali Falls, Uganda; Terje Oestigaard; 2015 61 African conflicts, development and regional organisations in the post-Cold War international system; Victor A. O. Adetula; 2015 60 The role of food banks in food security in Uganda : the case of the Hunger Project food bank, Mbale epicentre; Joseph Watuleke; 2015 59 Resettled for development : the case of New Halfa agricultural scheme, Sudan; Marianna Wallin; 2014 58 Youth and the labour market in Liberia : on history, state structures and spheres of informalities; Emy Lindberg; 2014 57 Current status of agriculture and future challenges in Sudan; Farida Mahgoub; 2014 56 Election-related violence : the case of Ghana; Clementina Amankwaah; 2013 55 Academics on the move : mobility and institutional change in the Swedish development support to research capacity building in Mozambique; Måns Fellesson and Paula Mählck; 2013 54 The oil industry in Uganda : a blessing in disguise or an all too familiar curse?; Pamela K. Mbabazi; 2013 53 Sweden-Norway at the Berlin conference 188485 : history, national identity-making and Sweden’s relations with Africa; David Nilsson; 2013 52 Musical violence : gangsta rap and politics in Sierra Leone; Boima Tucker; 2013 49 Water scarcity and food security along the Nile : politics, population increase and climate change; Terje Oestigaard; 2012 48 Transnational activism networks and gendered gatekeeping : negotiating gender in an African association of informal workers; Ilda Lindell; 2011 47 Natural resource governance and EITI implementation in Nigeria; Musa Abutudu and Dauda Garuba; 2011 46 African migration, global inequalities, and human rights : connecting the dots; William Minter; 2011 45 The agrarian question in Tanzania? : a state of the art paper; Razack B. Lokina, Sam Maghimbi and Mathew A. Senga; 2011 44 Understanding poverty in Africa? : a navigation through disputed concepts, data and terrains; Mats Hårsmar; 2010 43 China, India, Russia and the United States : the scramble for African oil and the militarization of the continent; Daniel Volman; 2009 42 Persuasive preventio : towards a principle for implementing Article 4(h) and R2P by the African Union; Dan Kuwali; 2009 41 Africa’s development in the 21st century : reshaping the research agenda; Fantu Cheru; 2008 All titles can be downloaded in full text for open access. Please visit NAI’s online research publication database DiVA at http://nai.diva-portal.org. Agriculture remains the main source of livelihood for most rural people in East Africa. Farming is dominated by smallholders, of whom the majority are women. Their tenure and access to land is important for reducing rural poverty, enhancing food security and stimulating agricultural development. Secure tenure represents one of the most critical challenges to the development of sustainable agriculture in the region. In an effort to understand the land question and its variation across the region, this book analyses the land reforms, their context and dynamics. The book presents recent studies on the dynamics of land tenure and land tenure reforms in East Africa with a focus on Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. By selecting these five countries, the book is able to show the changing practices and variations in the land tenure dynamics and explain how they relate to historical and more contemporary issues. The chapters are written by researchers, policy makers and activists with a diverse background and experience/expertise in relation to the land question. Their contributions offer a multiperspective basis for critical rethinking and reflection on the future of the land question in East Africa. ISBN 9789171068309 9 789171 068309