Buddhism and Power

21 BUDDHISM AND POWER Edoardo Siani Buddhist kings rule by the Dharma. Saffron-robed monks cheer massacre. Business tycoons preach asceticism. Spirit mediums distribute lottery numbers. Astrologers advise soldiers on staging a coup. With roughly 95 per cent of its population identifying as Buddhist, Thailand is sometimes thought to be the country with the highest percentage of Buddhists in the world.1 Observed on the ground, however, Buddhism as predominantly practiced in Thailand appears to be more preoccupied with securing political influence and material wealth than peace and detachment. As such, it is hardly reminiscent of the doctrine of self-restraint that many celebrate worldwide. This chapter frames Thai Buddhism so as to account for its intimacy with power. Drawing from current scholarly debates, it demonstrates the obvious, yet obscure(d):Thai Buddhism cannot be conceived of as disfranchised from the accumulation of political influence and material wealth, as power is a constitutive part of its history, makeup, continued appeal and relevance in the contemporary world. Thai Buddhism and the question of power Buddhism is extremely diverse worldwide. So varied are its beliefs and practices that some scholars warn against generalisations and advocate speaking about Buddhisms in the plural.2 “Thai Buddhism” is an umbrella category that designates the form or forms of Buddhism prevalently practiced in the kingdom. It belongs, officially if not unproblematically, to the Theravada tradition. It is also influenced by Hinduism, Brahmanism and Mahayana Buddhism, and includes spirit cults shared by other peoples in South and Southeast Asia. Since at least the 19th century, Thai Buddhism has additionally incorporated discourses of proper religiosity, rationality and modernity that draw from Christianity and modern epistemologies. Scholars have long attempted to make sense of how these various elements – call them creeds, worldviews or cosmologies – interrelate or how they do not in Thai religion.3 Power has played a significant role in shaping the discussion. Earlier scholars commonly differentiated between Buddhism on one side and Hinduism, Brahmanism and local spirit cults on the other. They made the distinction precisely on the basis of what they deemed to be conflicting attitudes to power. Melford Spiro proposed to differentiate between Buddhism and local spirit cults.4 Although he acknowledged that the existence of 268 Buddhism and power spirits is upheld by the canonical texts, he maintained that the scriptures show that Buddhism is interested in salvation in the form of Nirvana (nipphan in Thai). As such, it is about attaining detachment from this world and indeed from the cycle of rebirths (Samsara in Sanskrit, and watta songsan in Thai), rather than doing well in it. Spirit cults, to the contrary, offer strategies to prosper in this world by means of appeasing invisible beings in exchange for their favour. Other scholars argued for a similar power-based distinction between Buddhism and Brahmanism or Hinduism.5 Scholars began challenging the tendency to equate Buddhism in its entirety to the sacred scriptures in the early 1970s. Stanley Tambiah, who worked ethnographically in the Thai northeastern region of Isan and wrote extensively on Buddhist kingship, critiqued it as reductionism. Such an approach, he argued, took the scriptural tradition at face value, overlooking the infinite facets that Buddhism acquires in the lived experience of its practitioners.6 Tambiah thus advanced that a fixation with the scriptures is of limited usefulness for the study of Thai Buddhism as an ever-changing social phenomenon. This paved the way for an analysis of power. Social scientists today tend to embrace the dynamic character of Thai Buddhism.7 Among other things, they study how its practices transform to respond to the needs of a changing society.8 These needs, of course, intrinsically relate to power. Contemporary ethnographies portray Buddhist monks, spirit mediums and astrologers as coexisting as they engage in practices, ranging from the sale (chao) of amulets (phra khrueang) to the divination of lottery numbers and lucky dates, which address the most pressing concerns of laypeople in the era of neoliberalism.9 While prosperity-oriented practices may not seem orthodox, they are, after all, realistically more central to scores of Thai Buddhists than the reading of the sacred texts.10 In fact, power makes the scriptures themselves subject to change. Thai monarchs gain legitimacy by regarding themselves as the protectors of Buddhism. They have the duty to adapt the sacred texts so as to ensure that religious practice in the kingdom is always aligned with the ultimate cosmic Truth.11 Fearing a decline in the observance of the Tripitaka, the canon of the Theravada tradition, 14th-century King Lithai compiled the Traibhumi, a cosmological treatise.12 Under colonial pressures, King Mongkut (r. 1851–1868) overwrote the Traibhumi by commissioning textbooks that advanced a more modern cosmology. He and King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–1910) further undermined the authority of the Vessantara Jataka, a key text from the Tripitaka itself.13 The late King Bhumibol Adulyadej (r. 1946–2016) then resurrected the Vessantara Jataka and modified it to be in line with his contemporary model of kingship. But the assumption that Buddhism should be unrelated to power is problematic on yet another account. In Thailand, Buddhism – including those forms that dictate its orthodoxy – has never really made a secret of its intimacy with power. In fact, it has openly conflated the ability to amass political influence and wealth with notions of virtue. Cosmological notions of power Thai Buddhist cosmology conceives power as a force, which flows from the celestial realms into this world. Ambitious individuals must accumulate (sa som) this kind of power and preserve (raksa) it. In the Thai language, several terms designate cosmological notions of power. The most central one is barami. The term appears in the aforementioned text of the Vessantara Jataka, which tells the story of the last incarnation of the Buddha as a royal before being reborn as Gautama. In its original scriptural context, barami refers to the ten virtues that are mastered by the Buddha-to-be and, by extension, by any legitimate Buddhist king.14 In contemporary Thai society, however, the term has come to designate a kind of power that anyone may accumulate through moral behaviour. 269 Edoardo Siani Human beings in Thai Buddhist cosmology operate within a moral universe, in which any action (kan kratham) has a moral dimension and, as a result, karmic consequences. This universe is governed by the Dharma (thamma), an ultimate cosmic law that is simultaneously moral and natural. When humans behave virtuously – that is, in accordance with the Dharma (yang mi sin tham), and thus morality and nature – they automatically accumulate positive karma, or merit (bun). When they behave unvirtuously (tham bap), they are penalised with negative karma, or demerit (kam). Barami designates an individual’s total reservoir of merit, accumulated through past good deeds, also in previous lives (chat). Barami has the key faculty of attracting anything that is desirable. Primarily, it enables whoever accumulates it in extraordinary quantities to attract a proportionally extraordinary number of followers (phu tam).15 People are said to “flock” spontaneously to meritorious individuals.16 Because of this, barami is the quintessential quality of leaders (phu nam) – be it kings, politicians, corporate managers, vendors, teachers, or parents.17 Extraordinary quantities of barami also attract proportionally extraordinary quantities of wealth. A Thai religious specialist explains that the latter faculty of barami derives from the former.18 In his reasoning, when an individual behaves morally, he or she attracts followers, who in turn demonstrate their gratitude (khwam kathan yu) through material gifts. The exemplary leader is generous, as the upmost virtue of a Buddhist is selfless giving (dana).19 The more a Thai Buddhist acts for the sake of others, the more influence and wealth he or she accumulates, becoming a rich leader. In a society where desire (khwam yak) is frowned upon, following the basic doctrinal tenets of Buddhism, it is those who master the virtue of selflessness who receive all the goods. The ascetic becomes powerful because he or she is disinterested in power while the power-crazed remain empty-handed. As political influence and wealth flow naturally to those moral people who do not really want them, barami is then a very ambiguous form of power. It attracts anything that is desirable – and yet not desired. From this perspective, the attainment of Nirvana easily takes the back seat in favour of worldly power. The latter narrative gained popularity in recent times. Bhumibol’s model of kingship rested on the idea that a moral leader should renounce Nirvana for the sake of his or her followers rather than renounce worldly power for his personal salvation. The monarch’s revised version of the Vessantara Jataka echoed this precept. Following the modification, the Buddha-to-be chose to forgo Nirvana to remain on the throne and enlighten the masses.20 To be sure, Bhumibol’s revision of the text was not a substantial departure from the original scriptural tradition, according to which Gautama could have become either a Buddha or a king, his decision to pursue Nirvana being “essentially a career choice”.21 The relationship between barami and the accumulation of wealth also underwent some transformations during King Bhumibol’s 70-year reign. As Thailand allied with the United States in the war against communism in Southeast Asia, state forces promoted capitalism with reference to Buddhist cosmology. Christine Gray shows that they actively encouraged investments into the business ventures of the crown as virtuous – monetary returns being associated with returns in the realm of merit.22 The notion that cosmic power attracts wealth likely already existed in Thailand as it did elsewhere in the region.23 Regardless, the public relations campaign reinforced the idea that financial success is an expression of individuals’ moral stature. Because barami is acquired through meritorious conduct, all good people will necessarily become powerful at some stage, or at least in some future rebirth. By the same token, all the existing powerful must necessarily be good, or at least they must have been good in the past, even if in a past life. If moral behaviour brings about political influence and wealth, and if political influence and wealth are in turn signs of moral behaviour, however, we arrive at a chickenor-egg situation, in which individuals in a position of privilege are automatically legitimised. 270 Buddhism and power This turns notions of power like barami into formidable instruments of legitimacy, which can be invoked to seal social inequality on celestial grounds. Social stratification in the Buddhist polity A Buddhist king is regarded as the most meritorious individual in the kingdom, with unmatched quantities of barami, accumulated in previous lives. A king’s heightened cosmological status legitimises his political role of sovereign as divinely sanctioned. It also legitimises his economic stature. Like him, if on a comparatively smaller scale, any powerful person (phu yai) may support his or her right to prestige with claims of exceptional past moral conduct. The Thai Buddhist polity resembles a fractal, in which the king-led social pyramid is replicated ad infinitum, from big to small, with different individuals performing the role of the ultimate moral leader over their affiliates.24 The relationship between the meritorious monarch and his less meritorious subjects is mirrored, at village level, by the relationship between the village head and the villagers; at the level of a school, by the relationship between the teacher and the pupils; at the level of a corporation, by that between the president and the subordinates; at the level of a household, by that between parents and children; and so on. While the workings of the moral universe grant a leader – a king rather than a parent – exceptional political and economic power, their affiliates expect them to always act for the benefit of the community rather than their own.25 The role of a leader is to selflessly share assets, including wealth, in order to allow their followers to benefit from their virtue. The followers, in return, demonstrate their gratitude by giving a portion of their earnings or labour to their leader. Giving to a leader amounts to an act of merit-making for the affiliates, as it enables them to contribute to the leader’s inherently moral activities, partaking in his or her virtuous conduct.26 In theory, followers who behave morally will be able to climb the social pyramid themselves one day. Unlike the caste system of contemporary Hinduism, class (chon chan) in Thailand is not prescriptive.This means that while bad deeds performed in previous lives determine one’s social conditions at birth, mobility is still possible through moral action. The ability to improve one’s condition is in fact widely regarded as a sign of exceptional virtue.27 In practice, however, an unwelcoming political and business environment makes upward mobility extremely difficult for those who are not in a position of power to start with, resulting in social exclusion. The cosmology-based model also affects political participation. This is evident in the crisis that has characterised the Thai new millennium. Supporters of the military juntas that installed themselves in power with coups d’état in 2006 and 2014 cheered the suspension of the electoral system by invoking international notions of “good governance”. They nevertheless subsumed them to a Thai Buddhist framework. They therefore suggested that letting individuals with insufficient quantities of barami partake in political decision-making inevitably leads to “corruption” (korapchan).28 The military governments themselves advocated the idea of an administration of handpicked “good people” (khon di), as opposed to delegating political decisions to the masses. Their rhetoric built on existing discourses, which advance the necessity of replacing “Western” democracy with a “Thai democracy” or “dharmacracy”: a nebulous mode of rule by an enlightened few people. Ironically, even Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister whose repeated electoral victories prompted the coups, once juxtaposed his ideal of “Buddhist politics” to his “Western” counterpart. “Politics which has the thamma is politics of men or moral integrity”, he said. “We ourselves must understand that that politics in our country has been influenced by British politics where they argue against each other like lawyers.This may conflict with [. . .] the parliament as a gathering of men of moral integrity”.29 271 Edoardo Siani Discourses of exclusive sovereignty that draw from Buddhist cosmology have long existed in Thailand. In the Cold War, propaganda compared communist sympathisers to the beasts that inhabit the lower realms of the Buddhist cosmos. As such, the insurgents were deprived of the most basic rights and protections that should come with citizenship. A monk, Kittiwuttho Bhikkhu, even preached that killing Thai communists was a virtuous action, amounting to an act of merit-making.30 During the massacre of pro-election protesters in 2010, celebrity monk Wo Wachiramethi similarly commented that “killing time is more sinful than killing people”.31 The uncertainties of power Despite its multiple advantages, barami is finite. As an individual stays in a position of power, he or she consumes his or her existing reservoir (chai barami), incurring the risk of running out. Because one’s remaining levels of barami are unknown,32 the only way to avoid falling from grace is to continuously engage in moral behaviour, producing new barami (sang barami). The constant cultivation of morality is also crucial, as there is a delay between the performance of virtuous action and the accumulation of barami. While an individual may engage in virtuous behaviour today, the acquired merit (bun) may not be spendable in terms of barami for days, months, years, decades, or even several rebirths. The original intimacy between morality and power does not preclude the possibility of immoral uses of power either.While power is moral in the sense that it is accumulated by means of virtuous action, its exercise is a different matter. Anybody who has authority (amnat) necessarily owes their position to barami, or past merit. Even immoral leaders like gangsters (nak leng) or corrupt politicians must have behaved morally in the past in order to be in a position of power now.33 Having barami is nevertheless no guarantee of moral conduct in the present or the future, as the authority that stems from it may be exercised either way.34 When a leader exercises his or her authority (chai amnat) morally, he or she produces new merit (bun), resulting in an increase in barami and, as a result, popularity and political longevity. When he or she exercises it immorally, however, he or she spoils barami (sia barami). As a result, his or her followers will be estranged, and his or her period of power will be shortened. Leaders engage in conspicuous acts of virtue to reassure followers of their continued morality. This serves as a relatively good guarantee that they are trustworthy and cautious not to abuse their authority. It also suggests that their levels of barami are not likely to subside any time soon, enabling leaders to offer protection to existing or prospective followers well into the future. The publication of photographs and footage showing political leaders engaging in lavish rituals of merit-making (kan tham bun), like freeing fish or financing the construction of monasteries, serves this dual purpose. Depending on the circumstances, even the use of violence may be regarded as an expression of a leader’s virtue, and thus compared to an act of merit-making. In times when the nation or the religion is under threat, for instance, Buddhist kings must wage war against the enemies.35 The sacred scriptures themselves prescribed that legitimate kings turn into warriors for the protection of the common good.36 Applauded by some and abhorred by others, the belligerent words of the monks quoted above adhere to these notions of virtuous violence. In Thai Buddhism, power is therefore something that may be both gained and lost, in accordance with the moral and natural law of the Dharma. Power may also be used for either good (khwam di) or bad (khwam chua), and the difference between the two is as open to debate as it is in other societies. These elements complicate the picture with uncertainty and ambiguity. They create the ideal terrain for contestation and resistance. 272 Buddhism and power Contesting power This chapter opened with a word of caution regarding the tendency to understand Buddhism in the singular. It proposed that there are multiple Buddhisms, both worldwide and within Thailand itself, as individuals continuously innovate for its beliefs and practices to be relevant and in line with their most pressing concerns. Are there not then cosmologies “from below”? The cosmological model presented so far, after all, does not respond effectively to the necessities of the masses. On the contrary, it supports a hierarchy that penalises them. The model also appears somewhat static and rigid rather than dynamic and negotiable. Contemporary Thai Buddhists engage to a great degree in cosmological speculation. In an era when people from all walks of life have access to an unprecedented wealth of information – also from other societies and worldviews – individuals venture in very personal interpretations of the workings of the cosmos. Insights from books read at university, rather than from documentaries watched on TV or conversations with foreign friends, merge creatively with Buddhist notions of morality, producing new ideas of virtue.37 Given that cosmology has to do with power, speculation about cosmic matters is an inherently political practice with an enormous potential for resistance. People’s freedom to engage in cosmology-making, however, has certain limits. These coincide with the karma-shaped hierarchy, which is normally unquestioned, along with notions of power like barami.38 The hesitance to discuss critically these issues inhibits the emergence of solid counter-narratives.This does not mean that resistance is absent. Instead of challenging the cosmological model, some try to use it to their advantage. They therefore question the morality of leaders they are in conflict with, arguing that their authority rests merely on barami accumulated in previous lives. On top of this, they depict themselves as the ultimate moral people, attempting to eclipse those in power by advancing their own relatively greater right to leadership.39 Historically, such narratives of resistance have allowed individuals from the margins to rise to authority. Especially before centralisation, charismatic leaders able to attract followers by making credible claims of exceptional barami could set up competing kingdoms.40 Regarded as “men of merit” (phu mi bun), they were usually religious masters like monks, spirit mediums and diviners. Some of them became so powerful that they posed a threat to the Bangkok government.41 Their emergence was suppressed with the use of force. Acting in their capacity of the protectors of Buddhism, kings often inaugurate their reigns by curbing charismatic individuals who may compete for power (khaeng barami). In the past century, kings did so by drawing a line between religion and “superstition” (ngom ngai). In some instances, they outlawed religious leaders like spirit mediums and diviners. At times, they even punished them by death.42 The practices of mediums and diviners were not illegitimate per se; divination, for instance, was regularly practiced at the royal court.43 Rather, the issue was determining who could engage in them and who could not – who had true barami and who did not.44 In the 19th century, the monastic community was additionally brought to a greater degree under the control of the state,45 The move stressed the primacy of standardised liturgy over the authority of individual charismatic monks.46 Like elsewhere in the world, politics and economy in today’s Thailand take on a secular façade. As a result, popular religious masters are less likely competitors than before in the greater contest for power. Buddhist idioms of power nevertheless continue to form an underlying (if fundamental) leitmotif, as politicians and businesspeople seek legitimacy by suggesting exceptional quantities of barami. Among those who attempted to install themselves to power as modern “men of merit” was Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram, one of the rebels who overthrew absolutism in 1932.47 Some understand that business tycoon Thaksin was also a “man of merit”.48 273 Edoardo Siani In the contemporary era, state authorities have invoked discourses of good governance to wage their crusades against “meritorious individuals” like Phibun and Thaksin, both of whom ended up in exile. These discourses establish the old line between those who can legitimately make claims of exceptional barami and those who cannot, while appealing to idioms of power and statecraft that have an international resonance and modern appeal. Their usage conceals the role played by Buddhist notions of power in Thai politics, tucking it under a veneer of secularism. Conclusion The intimacy between Buddhism and power goes often unacknowledged, obscured by a celebration of the doctrine’s emphasis on self-restraint. In Thailand, the Buddhist notion of asceticism is actually interlocked with the pursuit of worldly power, as people hold that political influence and material wealth flow naturally to those who behave selflessly, transforming them into rich leaders. This understanding of the workings of the cosmos enables individuals who are in a position of privilege to legitimise their existing status. Historically, people from the margins, like the “men of merit”, have nevertheless also managed to rise to positions of authority by turning the rules that govern the Buddhist cosmos to their advantage. Today, Buddhism continues to be a key arena for the contestation of power in Thailand, the mastery of its practices and idioms remaining critical for those who are on a quest for influence and wealth. As talks of a “dharmacracy” still loom over domestic politics and exorbitant amounts of money are passed around among the kingdom’s most ascetic politicians, business tycoons and military men, Buddhism will persist in being a fundamental ally of power as well as an instrument for its maintenance and assertion. Notes 1 See Peter Friedlander, “Buddhism and Politics”, in Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, edited by Jeffrey Haynes (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 16. 2 Gustaaf Houtman, “How a Foreigner Invented Buddhendom in Burmese: From Tha-tha-na to Bok-da Ba-tha”, Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford,Vol. 21, No. 2 (1990), pp. 113–128. 3 Talal Asad (2002) problematised religion as a category that is produced by secular modernity. Daniel (2000) demonstrated that the concept of “religion” is of little use for the study of societies like India, whereby what we refer to as Hinduism actually encompasses all spheres of life. In the context of Theravada Southeast Asia, Houtman (1990, pp. 113–117) argued that a term for “Buddhism” did not exist until the colonial period. Previously, the Burmese phrase bokda thathana (sasana phut in Thai) designated the teachings of the Buddha, while bokda dama (thamma in Thai) designated the Dharma as the ultimate Truth. See Talal Asad, “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category”, in A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion, edited by M. Lambek (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 114–132; E.Valentin Daniel, “The Arrogation of Being: Revisiting the Anthropology of Religion”, in Macalester International, Vol. 8, No. 17 (2000), pp. 171–191; Houtman, “How a Foreigner Invented Buddhendom in Burmese: From Tha-tha-na to Bok-da Ba-tha”, pp. 113–128. 4 Melford Spiro, Burmese Supernaturalism (Philadelphia, PA: ISHI,1967), pp. 247–280. Spiro’s work on religion in Burma had a strong influence on the scholarship on Thai Buddhism. 5 See, for example, Phraya Hanuman Rachathon, Essays on Thai Folklore (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 1988). 6 Stanley Tambiah, Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-East Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 7 A fixation with scriptural Buddhism is additionally problematic as it may overlook different religions’ approaches to soteriology. In Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the Truth is “revealed” from God to the faithful through the sacred scriptures. As a result, the texts are the ultimate authoritative vehicle on this world for salvation. The Buddha, however, was a (very special, to be sure) human being who worked his way up towards Enlightenment through the practice of virtuous conduct. As a result, some 274 Buddhism and power 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 contemporary Buddhists place greater emphasis on virtuous practice (kan patibat tham) as opposed to the scriptures. In this context, the practice of correct behaviour – whether by means of upholding precepts, worship, meditation and so on – may trump the scriptures as the ultimate vehicle of salvation. Reading the scriptures, if anything, may be one kind of correct practice. Pattana Kitiarsa, “Beyond Syncretism: Hybridisation of Popular Religion in Contemporary Thailand”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2005), pp. 461–487. Ibid. See also Justin McDaniel, The Lovelorn Ghost and the Magical Monk: Practicing Buddhism in Modern Thailand (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). See Peter Jackson, “The Enchanting Spirit of Thai Capitalism: The Cult of Luang Phor Khoon and the Post-Modernisation of Thai Buddhism”, South East Asia Research,Vol. 7, No. 1 (1999), pp. 5–60. See Christine Gray, “Buddhism as a Language of Images, Transtextuality as a Language of Power”, Word & Image: A Journal of Verbal/Visual Enquiry,Vol. 11, No. 3 (1995), pp. 225–236. See Frank Reynolds and Mani Reynolds, Three Worlds According to King Ruang: A Thai Buddhist Cosmology (Berkeley: University of California, 1982). Patrick Jory, Thailand’s Theory of Monarchy: The Vessantara Jataka and the Idea of the Perfect Man (Albany: SUNY Press, 2016), pp. 107–126. Known in contemporary Thai as thotsabarami, the Ten Perfections are giving, moral conduct, renunciation, wisdom, energy, patience, truthfulness, resolution, loving-kindness and equanimity. See Jory, Thailand’s Theory of Monarchy:The Vessantara Jataka and the Idea of the Perfect Man, p. 18. The key feature of barami is likely imputable to the pre-modern period, when Southeast Asian kings used to rule over a borderless territory, their success being measured in their ability to exercise control over numerous people rather than a clearly delineated land. See Stanley Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). This recurrent use of the word “flocking” in Thai Buddhist narratives is highlighted in Christine Gray’s Thailand – The Soteriological State in the 1970s, PhD Dissertation at University of Chicago, 1986. In theory, both women and men can have barami in Thai Buddhism. The relationship between gender and power, however, is more problematic than this.While both males and females can accumulate barami, only men have access to the routes of monkhood and kingship, which grant the highest cosmological and social statuses a human being can aim for. Because monks and kings are in a unique position to maintain a virtuous conduct, women are also banned from the most effective ways of accumulating barami. The author’s own fieldwork data, collected with diviners, their clients and their detractors in Bangkok between 2014 and 2016. See Edoardo Siani, The Eclipse of the Diviners: Sovereign Power and the Buddhist Cosmos at the End of Thailand’s Ninth Reign, PhD Dissertation at SOAS, University of London, 2017, p. 117. In the Vessantara Jataka, dana, or selfless giving, is the utmost virtue to be perfectioned by a Buddhist king. See Jory, Thailand’s Theory of Monarchy:The Vessantara Jataka and the Idea of the Perfect Man, p. 18. Ibid., p. 3. Craig Reynolds, “Power”, in Critical Terms for the Study of Buddhism, edited by Donald Lopez Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 211–228. Gray, Thailand – The Soteriological State in the 1970s. See, for instance, Benedict Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture”, in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, edited by Claire Holt, Benedict Anderson and James Siegel (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 1–70. See Lucien Hanks, “The Thai Social Order as Entourage and Circle”, Change and Persistence in Thai Society, edited by G. William Skinner and A. Thomas Kirsch (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), pp. 197–218. See Siani, The Eclipse of the Diviners: Sovereign Power and the Buddhist Cosmos at the End of Thailand’s Ninth Reign, p. 123. See Gray, “Buddhism as a Language of Images, Transtextuality as a Language of Power”, pp. 225–236. Lucien Hanks, “Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order”, American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 64, No. 6 (1962), pp. 1247–1261; and Charles Keyes, “Millennialism, Theravada Buddhism, and Thai Society”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1977), p. 286. See Daena Funahashi, “Rule by Good People: health Governance and the Violence of Moral Authority in Thailand”, Cultural Anthropology,Vol. 31, No. 1 (2016), pp. 107–130. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin:The Business of Politics in Thailand (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2004), p. 137. 275 Edoardo Siani 30 Donald Swearer, The Buddhist World of Southeast Asia, second edition (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), pp. 137, 273. 31 Suluck Lamubol, “Understanding Thai-style Buddhism”, Prachathai, 28 February 2014 <https://prachatai.com/english/node/3883> (accessed 30 July 2018). 32 Keyes, “Millennialism, Theravada Buddhism, and Thai Society”, p. 286. 33 Charles Keyes, “Economic Action and Buddhist Morality in a Thai Village”, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4 (1983), pp. 851–868. 34 The author’s use of the term amnat, which is based on the author’s own fieldwork data, collected with diviners, their clients and detractors in Bangkok between 2014 and 2016, differs from Peter Jackson’s. Jackson writes that amnat “denotes raw, amoral power that may be used for either good or evil and which is accumulated and maintained by sheer force”, while “in contrast, barami denotes the charismatic power possessed by morally upright, righteous people”. See Peter Jackson, “Markets, Media and Magic: Thailand's Monarch as a ‘Virtual Deity’ ”, Inter-Asian Cultural Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2009), p. 363. 35 Edoardo Siani, “Purifying Violence: Buddhist Kingship, Legitimacy and Crisis in Thailand’s Ninth and Tenth Reigns”, in King, Coup, Crisis:Time of a Critical Interregnum in Thailand, edited by Pavin Chachavalpongpun (NUS Press, forthcoming 2019). 36 Suwanna Satha-Anand, “The Question of Violence in Thai Buddhism”, in Buddhism and Violence: Buddhism and Militarism in Modern Asia, edited by V. Tikhonov and T. Brekke (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 178–185. 37 Edoardo Siani, “Stranger Diviners and their Stanger Clients: Popular Cosmology-Making and its Kingly Power in Buddhist Thailand”, South East Asia Research,Vol. 26, No. 4 (2018), pp. 416–431. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background. 41 See Patrice Ladwig, “Millennialism, Charisma and Utopia: Revolutionary Potentialities in Pre-modern Lao and Theravada Buddhism”, Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2014), pp. 308–329. 42 Pattana Kitiarsa, You May Not Believe, But Never Offend the Spirits: Spirit Medium Discourses and the Postmodernisation of Thai Religion, PhD Dissertation at the University of Washington, 1999, pp. 67–68. 43 Peter Jackson, Buddhism, Legitimation, and Conflict:The Political Functions of Urban Thai Buddhism (Singapore: ISEAS, 1989), pp. 58–59. 44 See Christine Gray, “Hegemonic Images: Language and Silence in the Royal Thai Polity”, Man, New Series,Vol. 26, No. 1 (1991), p. 45. 45 The effectiveness of King Rama IV’s reforms in standardising Buddhist practice in the kingdom is questioned by scholars like Justin McDaniel in The Lovelorn Ghost and the Magical Monk: Practicing Buddhism in Modern Thailand. 46 See Tiyavanich Tiyavanich, Forest Recollections: Wandering Monks in Twentieth-Century Thailand (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997). 47 See Gray, Thailand – The Soteriological State in the 1970s, pp. 366–370. 48 See Serhat Unaldi, Working Towards the Monarchy: The Politics of Space in Downtown Bangkok (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2016), pp. 53–85. 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