The Case of Direct Subsidy Scheme Schools in Hong Kong

Journal of School Choice International Research and Reform ISSN: 1558-2159 (Print) 1558-2167 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjsc20 School Choice and Whose Choice: The Case of Direct Subsidy Scheme Schools in Hong Kong Yi-Lee Wong & Paula Kwan To cite this article: Yi-Lee Wong & Paula Kwan (2019): School Choice and Whose Choice: The Case of Direct Subsidy Scheme Schools in Hong Kong, Journal of School Choice, DOI: 10.1080/15582159.2019.1610687 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15582159.2019.1610687 Published online: 06 May 2019. Submit your article to this journal View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=wjsc20 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE https://doi.org/10.1080/15582159.2019.1610687 School Choice and Whose Choice: The Case of Direct Subsidy Scheme Schools in Hong Kong Yi-Lee Wong and Paula Kwan Department of Educational Administration and Policy, Faculty of Education, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong SAR ABSTRACT KEYWORDS This article refers to the case of the Direct Subsidy Scheme (DSS) in Hong Kong to engage empirically in a debate over school choice. Based on a survey of 910 parents of primary school-leavers on their considerations in making school choices for their children, our analysis shows that DSS schools as an educational option are essentially exclusive to high-income parents, and that DSS schools are opted for as an alternative for the instrumental reason of having higher chances of getting into university rather than such claimed educational reasons as providing students with innovative design of curricula, pedagogies, and assessments. Basic education; direct subsidy scheme; Hong Kong; parental choice; school choice Introduction What neoliberalism promises us with marketization is competition and choice, which will, in turn, bring us efficiency and effectiveness in operation and ultimately quality products. Given such promises, the very same principle has been applied to basic education in many industrial-capitalist societies (Beach, 2010; Merrifield, 2008). It is true that the idea of school choice has been not only hotly debated but also severely criticized, albeit on a number of different grounds; but, defenders of the idea assert that whether school choice can deliver what it promises very much depends on its actual operation. And therefore, the merit of school choice should not be discarded but should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. And yet, one major criticism against the idea of school choice is made on equality ground, in that school choices are in principle open to all but are in practice only available to the privileged. Put simply, school choices are essentially confined to parents and their children of a particular socioeconomic background. There is a great deal of discussion over the implications of school choice for educational inequality questioning that school choice is whose choice. Despite such discussion, Hong Kong, as with many industrial-capitalist societies in the West, is still keen on the marketization of education (Chan & Mok, 2001; Chan & Tan, 2008). The Direct Subsidy Scheme (DSS) is such an CONTACT Yi-Lee Wong [email protected] Department of Educational Administration and Policy, Faculty of Education, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong SAR © 2019 Taylor & Francis 2 Y.-L. WONG AND P. KWAN initiative in Hong Kong designed to energize the private school sector. It is believed that this initiative will promote competition initially between schools within the private sector, subsequently between schools of the private and public sectors, and eventually between all schools. Through promoting inter-school competition, it is hoped that parents and their children can enjoy more school choices, which will ultimately improve the educational efficiency and effectiveness and thus the quality of basic education (Legislative Council Panel on Education, 2000). Given its “user pays” principle, there is warning that the DSS could well be providing an option exclusively available to students of relatively advantaged social background, and would thus have disastrous implications for educational inequality (Tse, 2008). While sensible, this warning remains theoretically postulated rather than empirically grounded; and therefore, it may not sound persuasive or convincing enough to alert policymakers to have a second thought. This article seeks to take up this issue empirically. In what follows, we shall first review the debate over the idea of school choice in a variety of societies and underscore the major arguments for and against the promotion of this idea. With this international insight, we shall then provide a brief historical background against which the DSS is designed in Hong Kong. In order to engage in the discussion over school choice empirically, we shall refer to a school survey recently conducted on how parents of primary school-leavers make school choices in Hong Kong. An analysis of parental considerations for school choices shows that DSS schools as an option is essentially exclusive to high-income parents. The results of the survey somehow lend empirical support to those opposing school choice on the ground of educational inequality. Arguments for and against school choice A variety of approaches/perspectives have been adopted to analyze the pros and cons of educational reforms promoting school choice; and it is not our intention to exhaust all approaches/perspectives here. Rather, we seek to highlight the major arguments thus far advanced in supporting and opposing the advocacy of school choice. Most arguments supporting the advocacy of school choice come from a market approach (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Chune & Witte, 1990; Cookson, 1992; Tannenbaum, 1995), fostering competition and accountability, which makes empowerment possible and is consistent with the spirits of democracy. School choice is seen as a process of empowerment for parents and their children as well as educators (Orfield & Frankenberg, 2013). Without school choice, parents are restricted to choosing a school in their living district, which means parents of disadvantaged background could not choose a socially desirable school out of their district; at least this is true of many states in the USA. By contrast, with a policy of school choice, JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 3 parents, regardless of their class and/or racial background, are entitled to their own choice. Having the right to choose schools of their liking, parents could and would presumably make such a choice so that it will meet their children’s individual needs best (cf. Alder, 1997). As a result, parents will probably be more satisfied with the chosen schools and be more involved in and cooperative with school demands. Meanwhile, in order to compete for students, educators have to be more accountable to students and their parents; and therefore, educators have and are also prepared to make more effort to be more innovative and flexible in designing quality educational programs and boosting the quality of teaching in order to be more responsive to students’ needs. In short, leadership, staff motivation, and morale would improve with school choice. This thus creates room for improving, if not transforming, the quality of education that the education system provides. Consequently, with a greater level of parental involvement and more school effort, student achievement will increase under school choice. In other words, competition and accountability fostered by market forces will make the education system less bureaucratic but more (cost-)effective and more efficient (Bulkley, Heniq, & Levin, 2010; Ladd, 2003). In this way, school choice could well be taken as a strategy for educational reform making an education system effective and efficient, by driving out bad schools or at least by forcing such schools to transform themselves. However, such arguments do not seem to pay much attention to the implications of school choice for educational inequality (Ball, 2007; Bernal, 2005). Indeed, most critics of school choices mainly focus on this point leveling their criticisms at assumptions underlying any market approach. Under school choice, all parents as potential consumers are assumed to access to accurate and relevant information so as to make an informed school choice for their children (Orfield & Frankenberg, 2013). Nevertheless, this assumption about the perfect information of the market could be invalid. When compared with parents of disadvantaged class, parents of advantaged class background, presumably having greater command in resources of various kinds, would be better able to access relevant and accurate information and also access better performing schools (Gewirtz, Ball, & Bowe, 1995). Perhaps, the imperfect information of the market is not the major point for rebuttal, when a market could actually provide parents as consumers with more information than a monopolistic state education system (e.g. Mendez, Yoo, & Rury, 2017; cf. Wilson, 2017). Rather, under school choice, parents are expected to move to the neighborhood of their choice so as to buy a quality education for their children. What is of greater concern is that not all parents could afford to do the same for their children or to buy them education of the same quality; consequently, parents of advantaged class background would be better able to get their children into better performing schools than are their disadvantagedclass counterparts (Ball, 2003). Nevertheless, supporters of school choice might 4 Y.-L. WONG AND P. KWAN argue that it is also the case even within a state education system, and that school choice could at least offer parents more alternatives than the existing state education system (e.g. Corcoran & Cordes, 2017; McTighe, 2017; Pack, 2017; Pendergrass & Kern, 2017). Undeniably, the geographic distribution of students by class and race will produce inequitable choices and increase school segregation (Ball, 1994; Ni, 2012; Reay, 2004; Taylor, 2002). In this way, school choice arguably put the wellto-do and the knowledgeable at a further advantage and thus accentuates the existing class inequality in education (Burch, 2009; Cookson, 1992; Nelson, 2017; Powers & Potterton, 2017; Rossell, 2017; Walford, 2006). Instead of choosing a school that could meet their children’s needs, parents actually compete for highly-sought-after schools. Consequently, school choice which intends to give parents a choice will end up giving schools a choice for selecting students (Jennings, 2011). Selectivity of students will not merely increase inequality between schools, but will also leave the special needs of students with learning disabilities or handicaps unmet (Brain & Klein, 1994). These opposing views, however convincing they may sound, are just general arguments for and against school choice (for more comprehensive discussions with a variety of perspectives see the collection edited by Fox & Buchanan, 2017). Whether a particular school choice policy can achieve its desired policy goals in a particular social context very much depends on its actual implementation. And indeed, success has been reported for such countries as Belgium, Holland, and Denmark (Tannenbaum, 1995; cf. Rouse & Barrow, 2009). So, it is argued that one cannot support or oppose school choice in general and one can only respond to specific school choice policy or plan (Cookson, 1994). Given these insights, in this article, we shall refer to the case of the DSS in Hong Kong to engage in the debate over school choice empirically. The DSS in hong kong The Hong Kong government intended to refer to the DSS as a scheme – inviting existing schools to join rather than creating new schools – that would promote effectiveness, flexibility, innovation, and choice through the market approach for basic education (Legislative Council Panel on Education 2000). Specifically, the government sought to nurture a private sector of schools through the DSS so that a market for educational services would be created; and then, it was hoped that competition promoted among private schools would subsequently be extended to the public sector. The scheme was launched in 1991 and reintroduced in 1999 but did not gain sufficient momentum until the early 2000s, when the number of primary and secondary DSS schools was increased from 12 in the 1996/1997 school year to 72 in the 2017/2018 school year (the website of Hong Kong Education Bureau), JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 5 although the number dropped slightly over the last few years. But, the development of the DSS is more complicated than this. In addition to DSS schools, there are three types of schools in Hong Kong: government, aided, and private schools. Government schools are run and completely funded by the government but private schools are not; they are run and funded by their sponsoring bodies. Aided schools are managed by their respective sponsoring bodies, like churches and trade associations, but are fully subsidized by the government. Before the launch of the DSS, the majority of schools were aided schools, government schools were about 10%, and only a very few minority were private schools. Governmental monitoring is strictly imposed on government or aided schools. Besides, all schools are essentially preparing their students for a common standardized examination held at the end of the basic education; except for the medium of instruction, all schools follow the same curriculum guidelines and choose from the same set of officially approved textbooks for teaching. But it is not the case for private schools; unsurprisingly, their quality varies tremendously. It was particularly the case in the past; private schools, despite their variations, were mostly taken as students’ last resort because of their usually poor learning environment and appalling teaching quality in the 1970s and 1980s. The initial intention underlying the DSS was to replace such private schools where the “bought place scheme” was implemented (Bray, 1995): The government paid the private schools for the number of places allocated to students at their school for secondary education in order to insure sufficient school places for school-age children so as to live up to the act of nine-year free and compulsory education policy passed in 1978. While places were bought in many so-called second-rate private schools, there were two other types of private schools. The first was pro-leftist (or procommunist) schools. Under the then colonial British rule, they were marginalized and excluded from the government’s funding and allocation schemes because of their pro-leftist political affiliation. In view of the return of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (i.e. communists) in 1997, the government was politically obliged to include the pro-leftist schools in the aided school sector (Chan & Tan, 2008). The second was international schools. In view of the 1997 handover, the government was faced with a legitimation crisis; waves after waves of Hong Kong emigrated away from Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s in order to seek political security. Children of those who emigrated but subsequently returned to Hong Kong had usually been taught in English and a curriculum in their previously emigrated country similar to an international school rather than a local government/aided school and thus may have difficulty in adjusting to the latter. The government felt obliged to take care of the educational needs of these children (Chan & Tan, 2008). In brief, the DSS initially targeted at not only so-called second-rate private schools but also pro-leftist and international schools. 6 Y.-L. WONG AND P. KWAN And yet, the DSS was not well received: Only 12 schools (4 international schools, 6 pro-leftist private schools, and 2 unusual schools) had joined the DSS by the 1996/1997 school year (Finance Committee, Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2019). In order to increase its attractiveness, the government intends to re-package the DSS as a mechanism for boosting the quality of basic education for all (Hong Kong Education Bureau, 2011). The introduction of the DSS seeks to inject diversity into the existing education system, in that DSS schools, enjoying much greater autonomy, would be more innovative and flexible in their design of curricula, pedagogies, and assessments and thus could meet students’ diverse learning needs. In this way, the DSS energizes the private sector of schools providing parents and their children with more diversified educational options. The very fact that parents can have more school choices will foster inter-school competition with government and aided schools. This inter-school competition will then force all schools to become more innovative and flexible in the provision of education and also to be more responsive to students’ learning needs. Operating with a market principle, excellent schools will be rewarded and poor schools will be penalized by students’ votes by feet. As a result, the quality of the provision of education will be improved (Mok & Welch, 2002). Apart from the above-mentioned different school types by school sponsoring body, secondary schools (nearly all of which are grammar or academically tracked schools) in Hong Kong are divided into three academic bandings. At the end of primary education, all primary form-six pupils (around the age of 11) are ranked according to their academic performances, by averaging out their scores in most academic subjects of the last two years of primary education that are considered together with the ranking of their school measured approximately by the scores of their schoolmates in the same form (Hong Kong Education Bureau). Secondary schools previously assigned to take up most students ranked as the top third are named band-one schools, whereas their band-three counterparts are previously assigned to take up most students ranked as the bottom third. All primary form-six pupils are required to choose a certain number of secondary schools of their liking at the beginning of the last school year of primary education and will be allocated through a centralized scheme to a secondary school of their choice at the end of that school year. Secondary schools have been competing for the so-called more academically capable students so as to improve their banding. Indeed, in choosing a school, what parents and their children care more about is its banding than its school type (i.e. government or aided). In order to attract more schools to join the DSS, the government increases developmental grants to schools, and it also allows schools to have more flexibility and enjoy greater autonomy in teaching arrangements (including the medium of instruction), staffing, and student recruitment. At present, JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 7 each DSS school receives a recurrent government subsidy in the form a block grant from the government on a per-student basis (i.e. the DSS unit subsidy rate – which is equivalent to the average unit cost of an aided school place – and the number of student enrolments); and, from 2001/02 onwards, a DSS school would continue full subsidy until its fee level reaches two and onethird of the DSS unit subsidy rate (Hong Kong Education Bureau). Despite subject to governmental monitoring through their school governing board, DSS schools enjoy more autonomy than aided/government schools in designing curriculum and teaching methods, which would supposedly enable them to meet the individual students’ needs. DSS schools are exempted from the medium of instruction (MOI) policy introduced by the government in the wake of the 1997 handover. This new language policy shifted the medium instruction decision from school sponsoring bodies to the government. A vetting committee was established to stream publicly funded schools into either English as Medium Instruction (EMI) or Chinese as Medium Instruction (CMI) in accordance with their student ability, teacher capacity, and school support strategies. This policy literally led to schools’ resentment with subsequent appeals against the government’s decision and all the appeals were finally settled in 1998. Ever since, only 114 secondary schools (about one-quarter of all secondary schools in Hong Kong) are qualified for using English as the medium of instruction. Although this language policy was intended to facilitate students to effectively master the subject knowledge in their mother language, it had led to a kind of labeling effect amongst schools given the vetting nature of the language policy. Although there are no academic studies or systematic evidence on comparing the actual grades of students from CMI and EMI schools in public examinations, most parents consider EMI schools to be superior to CMI, perceiving that the former could produce higher quality students for a more promising future; more specifically, the chances for graduates from EMI schools of getting into university – thus subsequently receiving a higher qualification and eventually obtaining a well-paid occupation – are expected to be much higher than their CMI school graduates. Indeed, EMI schools have become highly sought after by parents. This policy, despite its intention, has literally accentuated the demand for English as the medium of instruction. In addition, DSS schools enjoy greater autonomy in staffing and student recruitment than government/aided schools. DSS schools are allowed to offer more attractive packages for recruitment of teaching staff and even to opt out of the centralized scheme of student allocation (i.e. DSS schools could opt for not taking students assigned by the centralized scheme but government/aided schools could not). Over the last decade, some government/aided secondary schools were closed down by the government because they failed to recruit the sufficient number of school-age children. In view of a steadily decline in birth rate and thus the number of school-age children, this competition amongst schools 8 Y.-L. WONG AND P. KWAN has become more and more severe. Consequently, the DSS is taken as an attractive option for many school leaders in terms of securing their survival and even boosting up their banding: On one hand, because DSS schools would receive a larger amount of funding at the discretion of the school for infrastructure of the school and could choose the medium of instruction, the schools could make themselves attractive to parents selling themselves as a quality service provider, so to speak, because of their larger school campus with better facilities and their use of English highly regarded in Hong Kong as a teaching language; and on the other hand, because of their autonomy in staffing (e.g. recruiting better qualified teachers with attractive packages) and student recruitment (e.g. selecting more academically capable students), the schools could boost the scores of their students in the common standardized examination held at the end of six-year secondary education, which in turn boosts the banding of the school and thus increases the attractiveness of the school to prospective students and their parents. Consequently, since the year of 2000, the number of DSS schools has been on the rise; indeed, many socalled traditional elite schools (aided schools) join the DSS because they want to opt out from the government’s centralized student allotment exercise for gaining a greater degree of autonomy in admitting students of their choice. However, the number dropped slightly over the last few years because of public criticisms: Whenever a so-called traditional elite school wanted to seek conversion to become a DSS school, the public and especially its alumni strongly opposed and campaigned against on the ground of educational inequality whereby they argued schools should not overlook the needs of the less well-off students (as will be discussed below). Somehow, DSS schools could be seen as an additional educational option for parents who are dissatisfied with schools in the public sector. However, the fact that the DSS is governed by the “user pays” principle arguably has implications for educational inequality. DSS schools, being allowed to set their tuition fees, usually charge very high tuition fees: the annual fees for DSS primary schools range from HK$10,500 (US$1 = HK$7.8) to HK$78,000 and for secondary schools range from HK$700 to HK$98,000; and, the tuition fees of DSS schools which are traditional elite schools are closer to the high end of this range. Such high tuition fees are not affordable to most, when the median household monthly income from main employment was HK$25,200 in 2016 (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department 2016). In addition, there are 60 and 21 DSS schools in the secondary and primary sectors, respectively, in the academic year 2018–2019 and the majority of the primary DSS schools are operated under the remit of their secondary section. Given their “throughtrain” arrangement, once a student is admitted to its primary school it is likely that he/she can stay in the school for the entire K12 education. And therefore, it is speculated that additional school choices are beyond reach for most parents and are readily available only to parents of relatively high socioeconomic status JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 9 (Tse, 2008; cf. Luk, 1990). While sensible, this speculation is not empirically grounded, although it receives some indirect empirical support derived from data of Program of International Student Assessment (Hong Kong) (Zhou, Wong, & Li, 2015). This leads us to the survey used for empirical discussion that we seek to undertake in this article. Research design and data Data for our discussion on whether the DSS accentuates educational inequality were gathered from a survey of Hong Kong parents of primary school-leavers obliged to make a school choice for their children under the prevailing policy. As we aimed to compare the DSS goers with the non-DSS goers instead of narrowing our focus to those at the truncated DSS sector, we targeted at aided school sector which accommodates about 94% of primary students in Hong Kong. Moreover, we selected primary school-leavers in our study, because secondary DSS school choice was considered a more realistic choice (in relation to children’s educational career) than primary DSS school choice for Hong Kong parents. It is evident in the above-mentioned fact that there are only 21 DSS primary schools but 60 DSS secondary schools. Parents were recruited through schools: First, invitations to participation were sent to the principals of the 30 randomly chosen schools (out of 587 primary schools) in 2 administrative districts out of 19 whereby 18 schools agreed to take part in our study; and then, the distribution and collection of the questionnaires were channeled through the school management. There were 1,003 parents who responded, resulting in a satisfactory response rate of 59.2%; having taken out the incomplete questionnaires, 910 responses were retained in the analysis. The distribution of respondents by their family income and educational attainment exhibited a fair resemblance to the distribution of population in Hong Kong in general, and therefore we assumed that the data provided, statistically speaking, fairly representative views of parents in Hong Kong. Table 1 is a summary of the demographic profiles of respondents. This survey was designed to examine considerations behind parents’ school choices rather than their motivations of opting for DSS schools. Respondents were asked to provide a “yes” answer to a list of nine items that they would consider in choosing a school for their children. These items, informed by a focus group discussion previously held with parents of different socioeconomic backgrounds, were “school ethos and climate,” “school management,” “pastoral care,” “proximity to home,” “innovative curriculum,” “extra-curricular activities,” “ campus and facilities,” “student achievement in public examinations,” and “ using English as the medium of instruction.” The respondents were also asked if they would (“yes”) or would not (“no”) consider sending their children to DSS schools. This simple dichotomy format was preferred to a Likert’s scale response as indicated by 10 Family income Father’s academic attainment Mother’s academic attainment Father’s length of residence in HK Mother’s length of residence in HK Father’s age Mother’s age HK$10,000Below HK$10,000 $14,999 236 (25.9%) 239 (26.3%) Primary 121 (13.3%) Primary 124 (13.6%) Since birth 546 (60.0%) Since birth 477 (52.4%) Below 35 36–40 19 (2.1%) 97 (10.7%) Below 30 31–35 16 (1.8%) 75 (8.2%) HK$15,000-$19,999 HK$20,000–29,999 204 (22.4%) 110 (12.1%) Junior secondary Senior Secondary 294 (32.3%) 439 (48.2%) Junior secondary Senior Secondary 389 (42.7%) 351 (38.6%) Immigrant (with permanent residence status) 339 (37.3%) Immigrant (with permanent residence status) 295 (32.4%) 41–45 46–50 51–55 226 (24.8%) 437 (48.0%) 85 (9.3%) 36–40 41–45 46–50 287 (31.5%) 397 (43.6%) 108 (1.9%) HK$30,000-$39,999 Above HK$40,000 58 (6.4%) 63 (6.9%) Post-secondary 46 (5.1%) Post-secondary 46 (5.1%) Immigrant (without permanent residence status) 25 (2.7%) Immigrant (without permanent residence status) 138 (15.2%) 56–60 Over 60 24 (2.6%) 22 (2.4%) Over 50 27 (3.0%) Y.-L. WONG AND P. KWAN Table 1. Summary of respondents’ demographic profiles. JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 11 the focus group participants for easier completion; the simple format was considered more user-friendly to those respondents with lower educational background. It is of interest to note that “using English as the medium of instruction” and “student achievement in public examinations” are considered two separate factors irrespective of their relativity. The differentiation could be partly attributed to the keen competition for university places due to an annual quota system that only takes care of 15,000 students (i.e. around the top 18–22% of the relevant age cohort) in Hong Kong. While admission to an academically stronger school was mostly preferred, the focus group participants considered that an EMI school could better equip their children with the language proficiency for overseas higher educational institutions in case their children failed to get into a local university. In addition, the respondents were asked to provide personal information: their household monthly income, their age, their educational attainment, and their resident status in Hong Kong, and such information about their spouse. The classification of household income in the survey followed that adopted by the Government Census (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department 2016) in which intervals of HK$5,000 and HK$10,000 were used for the lower and higher income groups, respectively. In light of the relatively small number of cases found in some of the income categories, regrouping was done in our analysis; the “below HK$5,000” group was merged with the next higher category forming the “below HK$10,000” group and the higher end categories were integrated into the “above HK$40,000” group. Given their sizes, the groups of “HK$10,000 – HK$14,999” and “HK$15,000 – HK$19,999”, however, were retained, resulting in six income groups in the analysis. Analysis and discussion A simple frequency count of the “yes” replies to the nine school choice factors, shown in Table 2, revealed that “school ethos and climate” (N = 696, 76.5%) was ranked top of the list, and was followed by “proximity to home” (N = 510, 56.0%) and “student achievement in public examinations” Table 2. Frequency table on parents’ school preference. Criteria School ethos and climate Proximity to home Student achievement in public examinations Campus and facilities Using English as the medium-of-instruction Pastoral care School administration Extra-curricular activities Innovative curriculum Considered sending DSS schools are preferred to aided schools Frequency 696 510 463 429 427 353 291 288 182 237 Percentage 76.5 56.0 50.9 47.1 46.9 38.8 32.0 31.7 20.0 26.0 12 Y.-L. WONG AND P. KWAN (N = 463, 50.9%). The factors of “campus and facilities” (N = 429, 47.1%) and “using English as the medium of instruction” (N = 427, 46.9%) were rated similarly. The factor “innovative curriculum” (N = 182, 20.0%) obtained the least vote, and “extra-curricular activities” (N = 288, 31.7%) was ranked last but one. The high ranking of “student achievement in public examinations” and “using English as the medium of instruction” (see below) suggests that many respondents are concerned with the instrumental value of education in taking their children to university and thus a higher qualification (which is believed to lead the children eventually to a well-paid prestigious job), and the low ranking of “innovative curriculum” or “extra-curricular activities” (or “pastoral care”) hints that their children’s learning (rather than scoring) or personal development is not the top priority of many respondents. Meanwhile, many respondents value “school ethos and climate.” “School ethos and climate” could be interpreted two equally valid ways: It could be seen as a manifestation of parents’ instrumental concern about education, in that parents may prefer a competitive schooling environment for their children in the hope that their children will do well at school of such kind; but it could also be seen as an expression of parents’ concern about the intrinsic values of education, in that parents may prefer a schooling environment that allows an all-rounded development for their children. Regardless, this school factor somehow indicates that parents may take into account their children’s affective development in choosing a school. Besides, the practical concern of “proximity to home” is of relevance to many respondents. All in all, these findings seem to suggest that parents in Hong Kong, in general, do not unanimously take education instrumentally (cf. Wong, 2007). Despite a general ranking of the above-mentioned nine factors in choosing a school for their children, the chi-square test results show that respondents with different household incomes differ in placing emphasis on the following five factors: “School ethos and climate” (χ2 (5, N = 910) = 18.43, p < .05), “school administration” (χ (5, N = 910) = 12.14, p < .05), “innovative curriculum” (χ2 (5, N = 910) = 12.13, p < .05), “student achievement in public examinations” (χ2 (5, N = 910) = 31.27, p < .05), and “using English as the medium of instruction” (χ2 (5, N = 910) = 23.34, p < .05). Shown in Table 3 are the crosstab results on the five school choice factors by six income groups; the deviations of the actual counts from the expected counts in these criteria reflect the skewness of the responses. The respondents with income higher than HK$20,000 (the so-called higher income groups for short) took into consideration “school ethos and climate,” “school administration,” “student achievement in public examinations,” and “using English as the medium of instruction” more than those with monthly income lower than HK$20,000; but, the three so-called lower-income groups are not homogeneous. In particular, like their higher-income counterparts, respondents earning HK$10,000-$14,999 a month would value “school ethos and climate” and “innovative curriculum” in providing a quality education for their Table 3. Frequency table of parents’ preference on five criteria by income groups. Decision criteria School ethos and climate Student achievement in public examinations Using English as the medium-ofinstruction School administration count count count count count Below $10,000 $10,000 – $14,999 $15,000 – $19,999 $20,000 – $29,999 $30,000 – $39,999 Above $40,000 160 191 153 89 51 52 180.5 182.8 156.0 84.1 44.4 48.2 94 109 113 68 37 42 120.1 121.6 103.8 56.0 29.5 32.1 93 102 103 51 36 42 110.7 112.1 95.7 51.6 27.2 29.6 62 77 62 38 22 30 75.5 76.4 65.2 35.2 18.5 20.1 42 60 48 17 8 7 47.2 47.8 40.8 22.0 11.6 12.6 Total 696 463 427 291 182 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE Innovative curriculum Count Expected Count Expected Count Expected Count Expected Count Expected 13 14 Y.-L. WONG AND P. KWAN children, and respondents earning HK$15,000–19,999 a month would place an emphasis on “student achievement in public examinations” and “using English as the medium of instruction” concerning the instrumental values of education for their children. Meanwhile, the higher-income respondents, however, did not consider “innovative curriculum” as much as did their lower-income counterparts. These findings seem to suggest that higher-income respondents take their children’s education more instrumentally than their lower-income counterparts, although it remains unclear whether this difference is observed because the higher-income respondents value less the intrinsic values of education than their lower-income counterparts or because they are more knowledgeable than their lower-income counterparts about how the education system works and thus deliberately choose to be instrumental (Ball, 2003; Wong, 2007, 2017). Table 2 further shows that among the 910 respondents, 237 (26.0%) of them were DSS goers who replied that they would consider DSS schools as an option for their children. A series of chi-square tests was performed to see if this 26.0% of respondents who preferred DSS schools to others for their children differed on each of these nine school choice factors from the remaining 74.0% of respondents. The chi-square test results suggested that significant differences were found in two factors, namely, “using English as the medium of instruction” (X2 (1, N = 910) = 4.358, p= .037) and “innovative curriculum” (X2 (1, N = 910) = 3.857, p= .050). Table 4 indicates that a significantly higher number of DSS goers value “using English as the medium of instruction” (29.3%) but have no preference for “innovative curriculum” (27.5%). Although our design did not mean to examine parents’ motivation of opting for DSS schools, which should be explored further empirically with a larger sample, this finding somehow revealed that contrary to the policy-maker’s aspiration behind the introduction of the DSS scheme, parents in Hong Kong were attracted to DSS schools not by their innovative and flexible curriculum. Rather, their preference for DSS schools was instrumentally linked to the use of English as the medium of instruction. And the attractiveness of schools using English as the medium of instruction to parents can be attributed, at least in part, to the medium instruction policy mentioned at the outset. Table 4. Parents’ choice for DSS schools by two school choice factors. Decision criterion “Using English as the medium-ofinstruction” “Innovative curriculum” Preference for the criterion Said “yes” Going for DSS 125 (29.3%) Not going for DSS 302 (70.7%) Did not say “yes” 112 (23.2%) 371 (76.8%) Said “yes” 37 (20.3%) 200 (27.5%) 237 (26.0%) 145 (79.7%) 528 (72.5%) 673 (74.0%) Did not say “yes” Total Total 427 (100.0%) 483 (100.0%) 182 (100.0%) 728 (100.0%) 910 (100.0%) JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 15 Having ascertained the correlations between DSS school choice and the two parents’ school choice factors, a hierarchical binary logistic regression was run with a view to examining the effect of these factors on DSS choice and the effect of parents’ socioeconomic status on their school choice with these two school choice factors being controlled for. Accordingly, the first block of independent variables consisted of these two factors whereas the second block consisted of seven categorical demographic background variables (the educational attainment, age, and resident status of father and mother respectively, as well as family income). In coding the dependent variable of school choice, “going for DSS” was arbitrarily assigned the value of “1” and “Not going for DSS” the value of “0.” The regression statistics resulted from the entry of the first block showed that the two school choice factors contributed to explaining school choice with a weak effect (χ2= 8.313, p = .016, df = 2; Nagelkerke’s R2 = .016). The results suggested that “innovative curriculum” (p = .038) and “using English as the medium of instruction” (p = .032) were both significant predictors for school choice, yet in an opposing direction. A negative B was found in “innovative curriculum” (B = −.456, Exp(B) = 1.578) whereas a positive B was recorded for “using English as the medium of instruction” (B = .352, Exp(B) = .704), indicating that the likelihood of parents “going for DSS” varied inversely to their preference for “innovative curriculum” but directly to “using English as the medium of instruction.” That was, parents who favored using English as the medium of instruction were .704 times higher than parents who did not favor using English to go for the DSS option. And, the likelihood of those who do not prefer an innovative curriculum to consider DSS as an option was 1.578 times higher than those who prefer. Apparently, parents in Hong Kong choose DSS schools as an alternative for their EMI curricula but not for their innovative design of curricula, pedagogies, and assessments, meaning that the policy objectives of DSS scheme in Hong Kong can at best be seen as partially accomplished. A hierarchical regression was run with the seven background variables (which were represented by 33 categorical variables, c.f. Table 1) added into the analysis. This was done with a view to understanding the effect of the background variables on DSS choice with the effect of “using English as the medium of instruction” and “innovative curriculum” being removed. The groups representing the youngest, the lowest academic attainment, the longest length of residence in Hong Kong, and the lowest income were assigned as the reference category for the respective background variables in the regression. The statistics of the entry of the second block showed that they contributed considerably to explaining parents’ DSS choice, χ2= 147.377, p = .000, df = 28; Nagelkerke’s R2 = .265, as evident in the change in Nagelkerke’s R.2 An examination of the coefficients for all the 33 categorical demographic background variables revealed that family income was the only significant predictor of DSS choice among the seven background factors. Table 5 displays the 16 Y.-L. WONG AND P. KWAN Table 5. Model summaries of hierarchical logistic regression on prediction of “Going for DSS”. Model 1 Model 2 Variable B S.E. Sig Exp(B) B S.E. Sig Exp(B) “Using English as the medium-of-instruction .352 .164 .032 .704 .065 .189 .731 1.067 Innovative curriculum −.456 .220 .038 1.578 .256 .248 .302 1.291 Father’s academic attainment Primary .243 Junior Secondary .389 .492 .428 1.476 Senior Secondary .756 .449 .092 2.129 Post-secondary .353 .405 .383 1.424 Father’s age Below 35 .511 36–40 −.213 1.040 .837 .808 41–45 .543 .901 .547 1.720 46−50 −.034 .856 .968 .966 51–55 −.149 .837 .858 .861 56–60 .204 .865 .814 1.226 Over 60 −.479 .961 .618 .619 Father’s length of residence in HK Since birth .314 Immigrant (with PR status) −.490 .355 .167 .612 Immigrant (without PR status) −.200 .327 .540 .818 Mother’s age Below 30 .200 31–35 −1.652 .980 .092 .192 36–40 −.173 .778 .824 .841 41–45 −.607 .709 .393 .545 46–50 −.195 .685 .776 .823 Over 50 −.401 .703 .568 .670 Mother’s academic background Primary .143 Junior secondary .963 .575 .094 2.618 Senior secondary .211 .496 .671 1.234 Post-secondary .450 .454 .321 1.569 Mother’s length of residence in HK Since birth .126 Immigrant (with PR status) −1.539 .760 .053 .215 Immigrant (without PR status) −1.442 .767 .060 .237 Family income Below $10,000 .000 .861 $10,000 – $14,999 −.150 .411 .715 $15,000 – $19,999 −.150 .411 .016 2.472 $20,000 – $29,999 .905 .375 .009 2.742 $30,000 – $39,999 1.009 .387 .000 5.973 Above HK$40,000 1.787 .399 .000 7.473 Model summary Model Model 2 8.313, df = 2, p = .016 147.377, df = 28, p = .000 χ2 −2 log likelihood 894.727 747.350 .011 .183 Cox & Snell R2 .016 .265 Nagelkerke’s R2 regression statistics for the two models. Respondents of the second lowest income group did not differ significantly from those of the lowest income group (B = −.150, p = .715) in their school choice; and, the odds ratios of the remaining four groups were found to be significantly different from the JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 17 reference group. Put simply, the likelihood of going for DSS schools varied considerably with the respondents’ family income: The higher the family income the more likely that DSS schools would be a choice. The odds ratio of 7.473 found in the highest income group (HK$40,000 or above) is particularly alarming; it means that the likelihood that the respondents from the highest income group (over HK$40,000) would consider sending their children to DSS schools is 7.473 times higher than their counterparts from the lowest income group. Our analysis also suggested that the family monthly income of HK$30,000 served as a threshold: parents earning more than this amount – which was roughly equivalent to 1.5 times of the median monthly household income at the time when the study was conducted (i.e. HK$25,200) (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2016) – would consider DSS schools more favourably. Consistent with findings reported by Zhou and his associates (2015), our findings implied that DSS schools could be considered to be a monopolized school for the higher income parents. Conclusion While the debate revolving around school choice is basically between educational effectiveness and/or efficiency and educational inequality, the success of each school choice scheme is tinged on its implementation. This article engaged empirically in this debate with reference to the DSS in Hong Kong by examining the consideration of 910 parents from a survey in Hong Kong behind their school choices. Whereas the majority of schools in Hong Kong are essentially the same grammar schools, the DSS could be seen as providing parents and their children with alternative choices in terms of (innovative) curriculum, pedagogies, and assessments. However, these choices usually charge very high tuition fees and therefore it is speculated that these choices are not affordable for every school child in Hong Kong. The findings from the survey proved that it was empirically the case: Parents with monthly household income higher than HK $40,000 were more than seven times more likely than parents earning less than HK$10,000 a month to consider DSS schools as an option for their children. Furthermore, our data somehow indicated that parents preferred DSS schools to other schools essentially for the EMI curricula of the former but not for their innovative design of curricula, pedagogies, and assessments. What motivated Hong Kong parents to opt for DSS schools should be examined further in a more systematic manner. And yet, this study somehow showed that from the perspectives of parents in Hong Kong, DSS schools were a better school choice, so to speak, more for its potential of promoting their children’s educational success (and thus subsequent career achievement) than for the possibility of giving their children a quality education, let alone meeting their individuals’ special educational needs. 18 Y.-L. WONG AND P. KWAN In sum, the DSS in Hong Kong as an empirical case study of a particular form of school choice scheme is not sufficient to refute entirely theoretical arguments for the advocacy of school choice. However, our study at least poses an empirical challenge to the DSS and thus urges the policymakers in Hong Kong to seriously consider the implications of the DSS for educational inequality. And, one last point should also be noted. Most school choice schemes in the West (e.g. vouchers and charter schools) essentially target at the low income, the disadvantaged more generally, through providing their children with a free or subsidized basic education; by contrast, the DSS in Hong Kong is not the case or at least this scheme does not have such intention. Consequently, our findings might have only limited implications for other school choice schemes elsewhere, although our study of such an unusual school choice scheme perhaps offers a rather different understanding of the idea of school choice. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. ORCID Yi-Lee Wong http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8934-2853 References Alder, M. (1997). Looking backwards to the future: Parental choice and education policy. British Educational Research Journal, 23(3), 297–313. doi:10.1080/0141192970230304 Ball, S. (1994). Education reform: A critical and post-structural approach. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Ball, S. (2003). Class strategies and the educational market: The middle classes and social advantage. London, UK: RoutledgeFalmer. Ball, S. (2007). Education plc: Understanding private sector participation in public sector education. London, UK: Routledge. Beach, D. (2010). Neoliberal restructuring in education and health professions in Europe. Current Sociology, 58(4), 551–569. doi:10.1177/0011392110367998 Bernal, J. L. (2005). Parental choice, social class and market forces: The consequences of privatization of public services in education. Journal of Education Policy, 20(6), 779–792. doi:10.1080/02680930500293825 Brain, J., & Klein, R. (1994). Parental choice: Myth or reality? Bath, UK: Centre for the Analysis of Social Policy. Bray, M. (1995). The quality of education in private schools: Historical patterns and the impact of recent policies. In P.-K. Siu & P. T.-K. Tam (Eds.), Quality in education: Insights from different perspectives (pp. 183–198). Hong Kong: Hong Kong Educational Research Association. Bulkley, K. E., Heniq, J. R., & Levin, H. (Eds.). (2010). Between public and private: Politics, governance, and the new portfolio models for Urban school reform. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Education Press. JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 19 Burch, P. (2009). Hidden markets: The new education privatization. New York, NY: Routledge. Chan, D., & Mok, K.-H. (2001). Educational reforms and coping strategies under the tidal wave of marketisation: A comparative study of Hong Kong and the mainland. Comparative Education, 37(1), 21–41. doi:10.1080/03050060020020417 Chan, D., & Tan, J. (2008). Privatization and the rise of direct subsidy scheme schools and independent schools in Hong Kong and Singapore. International Journal of Educational Management, 22(6), 464–487. doi:10.1108/09513540810895417 Chubb, J., & Moe, T. (1990). What price democracy? Politics, markets, and America’s schools. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Chune, W. H., & Witte, J. F. (Eds.). (1990). Choice and control in American education Vol.1: The theory of choice and control in education. London, UK: The Falmer Press. Cookson, P. W. (Ed.). (1992). The choice controversy. Newbury Park, Calif.: Corwin Press, Inc. Cookson, P. W. (1994). School choice: The struggle for the soul of American education. New Haven, US: Yale University Press. Corcoran, S. P., & Cordes, S. A. (2017). The economics of school choice. In R. A. Fox & N. K. Buchanan (Eds.), School choice: A Handbook for researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and journalists (pp.69-80). Hoboken, US: Wiley-Blackwell. Finance Committee, Hong Kong Legislative Council. (2019, April 11). https://www.legco.gov. hk/yr95-96/english/fc/fc/papers/fc240514.htm Fox, R. A., & Buchanan, N. K. (eds.). (2017). School choice: A Handbook for researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and journalists. Hoboken, US: Wiley-Blackwell. Gewirtz, S., Ball, S., & Bowe, R. (1995). Markets, choice and equity in education. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Hong Kong Census Statistics Department. (2016). Hong Kong 2016 population by-census summary results. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Press. Hong Kong Education Bureau. (2011). Report of the working group on direct subsidy scheme. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Hong Kong Education Bureau. http://www.edb.gov.hk/ Jennings, J. L. (2011). School choice or schools’ choice? Managing in an era of accountability. Sociology of Education, 83(3), 227–247. doi:10.1177/0038040710375688 Ladd, H. F. (2003). Introduction. In D. N. Plank & G. Sykes (Eds.), Choosing choice: School choice in international perspective (pp. 1–23). New York, NY: Teachers College Columbia University, Teachers College Press. Legislative Council Panel On Education, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. (2000). Modifications to direct subsidy scheme (Paper No. CB(2)264/00-01(02)). Hong Kong: Hong Kong Legislative Council Luk, B. H.-K. (1990). Privatization and meritocracy: The real issue of the direct subsidy scheme. In A. Sweeting (Ed.), Differences and identities: Educational argument in late twentieth century Hong Kong (pp. 47–55). Hong Kong: Faculty of Education, University of Hong Kong. McTighe, J. (2017). The case for private schools. In R. A. Fox & N. K. Buchanan (Eds.), School choice: A Handbook for researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and journalists (pp.117130). Hoboken, US: Wiley-Blackwell. Mendez, S. L., Yoo, M. S., & Rury, J. L. (2017). A brief history of public education in the United States. In R. A. Fox & N. K. Buchanan (Eds.), School choice: A Handbook for researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and journalists. Hoboken: WileyBlackwell. Merrifield, J. (2008). School choice evidence and its significance. Journal of School Choice, 2 (3), 223–259. doi:10.1080/15582150802371408 20 Y.-L. WONG AND P. KWAN Mok, K. H., & Welch, A. (2002). Globalization, managerialism and structural reform in education. In K. H. Mok & D. Chan (Eds.), Globalization and education: The question for quality education in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Nelson, F. H. (2017). The case against charter schools. In R. A. Fox & N. K. Buchanan (Eds.), School choice: A Handbook for researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and journalists (pp.23-40). Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. Ni, Y. (2012). The sorting effect of charter schools on student composition in traditional public schools. Educational Policy, 26(2), 215–242. doi:10.1177/0895904810386598 Orfield, G., & Frankenberg, E. (2013). Educational Delusions: Why choice can deepen inequality and how to make schools fair. Berkeley, US: University of California Press. Pack, G. (2017). The case for magnet schools. In R. A. Fox & N. K. Buchanan (Eds.), School choice: A Handbook for researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and journalists (pp.180193). Hoboken, US: Wiley-Blackwell. Pendergrass, S. A., & Kern, N. (2017). The case for charters. In R. A. Fox & N. K. Buchanan (Eds.), School choice: A Handbook for researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and journalists (pp.237-251). Hoboken, US: Wiley-Blackwell. Powers, J. M., & Potterton, A. U. (2017). The case against private schooling. In R. A. Fox & N. K. Buchanan (Eds.), School choice: A Handbook for researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and journalists (pp.131-148). Hoboken, US: Wiley-Blackwell. Reay, D. (2004). Exclusivity, exclusion, and social class in urban education markets in the United Kingdom. Urban Education, 39(5), 537–560. doi:10.1177/0042085904266925 Rossell, C. H. (2017). The case against magnet schools. In R. A. Fox & N. K. Buchanan (Eds.), School choice: A Handbook for researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and journalists (pp.194-214). Hoboken, US: Wiley-Blackwell. Rouse, C. E., & Barrow, L. (2009). School vouchers and student achievement: Recent evidence and remaining questions. Annual Review of Economics, 1(1), 17–42. doi:10.1146/annurev. economics.050708.143354 Tannenbaum, M. D. (Ed.). (1995). Concepts and issues in school choice. New York, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press. Taylor, C. (2002). Geography of the ‘New’ education market: Secondary school choice in England and Wales. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Tse, K.-C. T. (2008). Choices for whom?: The rhetoric and reality of the direct subsidy scheme in Hong Kong (1988–2006). Education and Urban Society, 40(5), 628–652. doi:10.1177/0013124508316309 Walford, G. (2006). Markets and Equity in Education. London, UK: Continuum. Wilson, T. S. (2017). Philosophical understandings of American school choice. In R. A. Fox & N. K. Buchanan (Eds.), School choice: A Handbook for researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and journalists (pp.81-95). Hoboken, US: Wiley-Blackwell. Wong, Y. L. (2007). How middle-class parents help their children obtain in advantaged qualification: A study of strategies of teachers and managers for their children’s education in Hong Kong before the 1997 handover. Sociological Research Online, 12(6). Retrieved from http://www/socresonline.org.uk/12/6/5.html Wong, Y. L. (2017). Class differentials in getting parental assistance for seeking a second chance of getting into university: An illustration of community-college students in Hong Kong. Higher Education, 74, 163–178. doi:10.1007/s10734-016-0041-9 Zhou, Y., Wong, Y. L., & Li, W. (2015). Educational choice and marketization in Hong Kong: The case of direct subsidy scheme schools. Asia Pacific Education Review, 16(4), 627–636. doi:10.1007/s12564-015-9402-9