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Beyond Qbism with the Knowledge Ontology - iss. 20211210 pdf

2021, Beyond Qbism with the Knowledge Ontology 2021110

[issue 20211210] Qbism (quantum bayesism) is a philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) that places the agent and its expectations at the heart of theory. The QBists advocate a "subjectivist" interpretation of probabilities that allows to understand the quantum laws of Born and to eliminate certain enigmas of interpretation of the QM going "beyond" the interpretation of Copenhagen. The Ontology of Knowledge (OK) is in agreement with the main ideas of the Qbism. For the OdC indeed: -The agent is the focal point of the representation -Representation is specific to the agent -There are no "states of the world" but only "states of knowledge" -There is no probability of evolution of the "state of the world" but only probabilities, for the subject, of evolution of his Knowledge. -These probabilities lead to the future actions and experiences of the agent. The aim of this article is to propose, according to the OK, ways for an extension of the explanatory power of the QBism.

Beyond Qbism with the Knowledge Ontology Jean-Louis Boucon [issue 20211210] Abstract objective As far as the philosophy of quantum mechanics QM is concerned in general, one can only advise the reading of Michel Bitbol's book"Mecanique Quantique, une introduction philosophique" (ref MQIP). What is needed to know about the subject is presented in a comprehensive, structured and easily understandable way. Let us quote-in these words (translated): "The new theory presents itself above all (...) as a contextual predictive formalism." It allows the agent to assign probabilities to future experiments based on an experimental context. Qbism (quantum bayesism) is an interpretation of the QM that places the agent and her expectations at the heart of the theory. The QBists advocate a "subjectivist" interpretation of probabilities that allows to understand the Quantum laws of Born and to eliminate certain enigmas of interpretation of the QM "beyond" the interpretation of Copenhagen. The Ontology of Knowledge (OK) is in agreement with the main ideas of the Qbism. For the OK indeed: The agent is the focal point of the representation The representation is specific to the agent There are no "states of the world" but only "states of representation" There is no probability of evolution of the "state of the world" but only probabilities, for the subject, of evolution of his representation by the means of new experiences. The possible experiences and their probabilities are the meaning of representation. The aim of this article is to propose, according to the OK, ways for an extension of the explanatory power of the QBism. The Qbism in (very) brief The easiest way is to read "An Introduction to QBism with an Application to the Locality of Quantum Mechanics" Ref QBI. We have reproduced (translated and summarized) the essential elements of this article below. According to QBism, quantum mechanics is a tool that anyone can use to evaluate, based on their past experience, their probabilistic expectations for their later experience. Unlike Copenhagen, the QBism explicitly adopts the "subjective" or "judgmental" or "personal" view of probability: the probabilities are attributed to an event by an agent and are specific to that agent. The agent's probability assignments express her own personal degrees of belief about the event. This personal nature of probability includes cases in which the agent* is certain of the event: even probabilities 0 and 1 are measures of an agent's belief. This subjective view refers the theory of probabilities to its historical origins in gambling: an agent's probability assignments must never place her in a position where she would necessarily suffer a loss. * "Agent" means "the one who acts." We follow the widespread practice in the quantum information community of calling the agent Alice, and a second agent with whom she might be dealing, Bob. One measure for QBism is any action an agent takes to get a set of possible experiences. So obtained the experience is special to this agent. Taking into account the result of this measurement, quantum formalism guides the agent in updating its probabilities for future measurements. A measure does not reveal a pre-existing situation, as the term unfortunately suggests. This is an action on the world by an agent, who results in the creation of a result - a new experience for this agent. Quantum states determine probabilities using the Born rule. Note: A quantum state is not a state of affairs but a "list" of the probabilities of outcome of all possible future experiments. All future experiments made possible by an experimental device are formalized by a "state space" and the probability of measurements are the coordinates of a vector (the state vector) in that space. Since probabilities are the personal judgments of an agent, a quantum state is also a personal judgment of the agent attributing that state. The famous "collapse of the wave function" is nothing more than updating an agent's status assignment based on his or her experience. In the QBism, the only phenomenon available to Alice (the agent) that she does not model with quantum mechanics is her own direct internal awareness of her own private experience. The awareness of her past experience forms the basis of the beliefs on which her assignments of probability for her future experience are based. The personal internal awareness of Bob's private experience is, by its very nature, inaccessible to Alice. But Bob's verbal or written reports are experiments for Alice adapted to the application of quantum mechanics. She can deduce of this a quantum state as with any other quantum measure. Bob's answer only comes to exist for Alice when it enters her experience. This means that the reality differs from one agent to another. It's not as strange as it sounds. What is real for an agent is based entirely on what that agent is experiencing, and different agents have different experiences. An agent-dependent reality is limited by the fact that different agents can communicate their experience to each other, limited only by the language's inability to represent the full flavor of personal experience. The Ontology of Knowledge The simplest would also be to read "Introduction to the Ontology of Knowledge" (ref OK). The basics for understanding this article are listed below: -There is a Reality of pure logic. -Reality has no form. It is non fouded, with no primary truth, without substance. -Reality is Interdependence. It is complex. -Reality not subjected to time. -A complex interdependant logic system shows infinity of infinities of Individuations. -An Individuation is a singular mode of order whose asymptote is monodimensionnal, with the form →A→ A →A→ -Individuation is becoming "oneself". Its Shannon's entropy tends toward zero. -The "transcendental subject" is a contingent instance of individuation amongst infinity of infinities of possibles. -The reality implied in an Individuation is a Knowledge -The vocabulary of the OK differentiates what is Real (informal, interdependent, not subjected to time, unspeakable), what is Existing (which makes sense for a knowing subject), what is Actual (all order modes of Reality made possible by the Existing). -The "I" is reality, so it is interdependent of reality. -The necessity of individuation is fulfilled through singular contingent modes of order that are also Individuations. These are Facts of Knowledge. -This metastable reduction of complexity separates a Knowledge in Facts of Knowledge who are separable by cuts (Acts) of finite dimension hence representable. -The Viewpoint is a state of representation of the Knowledge. It is the present moment of the knowing subject, its own "I am" -The Act is a "surface" crossed by a Transaction (judgements) by which the unspeakable reality of the Fact of Knowledge is replaced by a finite and numerable set of probabilities that could be assignated to possible experience of new Facts. -This set of probabilities is the Meaning of the Fact of Knowledge as it appears to the subject. -The transcendental subject is not a being in itself. He is a logical Individuation. -All these probability assignments converge towards the asymptotic certainty of the "I become myself". This convergence is the very essence of the subject. -It follows that all Facts are interdependent within Knowledge. -The meaning of each Fact emerges from Global Knowledge according to a Perspective imposed by its interdependence with other Facts of Knowledge. -Since meaning is revealed in the form of probabilities on new experiences, the meaning is in essence animated by its own time. The time of the expansion of meaning emerges according to a Perspective imposed by the interdependence of the Facts of Knowledge. It is not Knowledge that extends but meaning, representation. -The World is Knowledge by a subject. The Shape of the World is specific to each subject. -The meaning of a Knowledge does not refer to a reality vis-à-vis but to the laws of probabilities that rule its expansion towards its neighborhood. -The truth of the "I" is a certainty for the "I". -The "I" of the subject combines and subsumes all these probabilities in the certainty of his own persistence. -The meaning of the world, for a subject, cannot therefore exceed the meaning of his own Existence. -The Existence of the World is contained in the Existence of the Subject. Similarities between Qbism and OK Despite different objectives, research areas and paths, the agreement between Qbism and OK seemed remarkable wherever comparison was possible: There is a Reality, -the "substance of the world" precedes the separation between object and subject, -the representation is unique to the agent -the predicate does not qualify the thing 'out there' but the expectations of the agent, -of the thing 'out there' we cannot say anything, -there are no "states of affairs" but only "states of representation", -there is no probabilities of evolution of the "state of affairs" but only probabilities, for the subject, of evolution of his representation, -these probabilities lead the agent's future actions and experiences, -agents exchange and adjust their representations, -neither the Qbism nor the OK are solipsistic, -for both Qbism and OK science is necessarily anthropocentric. Differences between Qbism and OK We will quickly move on to the obvious difference in objectives and areas: The Qbism aims to solve the difficulties of interpreting quantum theory while the OK tries to understand the relationship of consciousness to the world it represents. The Qbism is concerned with science and uses metaphysics, while the OK is an ontology that tests its compatibility with science. The differences between OK and QBism are not contradictions: I would rather say that, despite the profuse literature that describes and justifies QBism, some proposals (metaphysical) do not seem sufficiently resolutely expressed and their implications have not been exploited at their end. To answer the quantum question: "How can we take into account, in a scientific approach, the interdependence between the mind of the subject and the object of his representation?", did the Qbists prefer to minimize the use of non-necessary metaphysical proposals, even if it means leaving certain questions open, rather than taking the risk of permanently guiding the QM towards false leads? As a result, the Qbism suffers from the same flaws as the theories of Kant and Schopenhauer, from the same lack of focus that leaves it somewhere between an Idealism of which it defends and which would in fact say nothing of the nature of the Spirit and a Realism that it claims but which would say nothing about Reality, so-called "unspeakable". There is even a sort of regression from the Position of Kant, who, at a minimum, tried to define transcendental rules, conditions of any experience, intervening before the object took existence for the subject; The draft of a "how" of the QBist assignment of probabilities. Abandonment is even more sensitive compared to Schopenhauer in that the Qbism expresses only with the lips the identity of the nature of the subject and the object: While Schopenhauer would have explicitly stated: "Alice does not have a representation of the world but she is her representation of the world and this world she knows is Alice." Fuchs will only write: "The Qbism would say that the substance of the world is in the character of what each of us encounters at every moment of our life, a substance that is neither outside nor inside, but the substance of the world is before the separation between object and subject. » From the OK's point of view this is all the more damaging because the identity of nature of the object and the subject, the fact that 'the world of Alice' and 'Alice' are the same representation, provides answers to so many questions. In this article we will detail this according to five main themes: -The nature of probabilities and the reality they point to. -The nature of the subject (the agent) and its relationship to the object. -The time of the subject - the Anima. -How the Fact and the assignment of probabilities emerge to the consciousness of the subject. -Reversion of Intelligibility These themes will be addressed from the OK's point of view and with its terminology. I apologise in advance to the QBists if this article betrays some of their proposals or if the terminology used does not have the scientific rigor of the QM. 1-The nature of probabilities and the reality they point to. Let's mention the ref QBI : “Unlike Copenhagen, QBism explicitly takes the “subjective” or “judgmental” or “personalist” view of probability ... probabilities are assigned to an event by an agent and are particular to that agent. The agent’s probability assignments express her own personal degrees of belief about the event. The personal character of probability includes cases in which the agent is certain about the event: even probabilities 0 and 1 are measures of an agent’s (very strongly held) belief. The subjective view returns probability theory to its historic origins in gambling...” The OK fully agrees with the QBiste proposition: "the probabilities are assigned to an event by an agent and are particular to that agent" in its literal, strongest sense. But from this proposal the OK points out that the following propositions can be inferred without further assumption: probabilities are assigned to an event by an agent and are particular to that agent ↓ The probability relationship is not between a "state of the world" and possible "events of the world" but between a "state of representation*" and possible "Facts of Knowledge*" ↓ Quantum contextual probability is not determined by the laws of the world but by the laws of Knowledge* * Knowledge as per OK definition To illustrate this let's take the example of a chess game between two human players. -Both players can decide to do without parts as entities and designate each by their attachment to a player and their "dematerialized" rules of movement. The position of such a part on a particular box can then be replaced by a law of possibility on its future position, i.e. by a state of representation. -Players can also do without the chessboard and keep in mind the positions of all the parts, each in turn announcing his movement. -The notion of the position of the boxes localized in the two-dimensional space of the chessboard (e.g. a3) is also not necessary, a system of relationships adjoining each box to 2, 3 or 4 others boxes, having a unique solution (notwithstanding some symmetries) is enough to order the game boxes. -The very identity of the boxes is in fact superfluous, the boxes as 'places' and their positions on the chessboard can be replaced each by their set of "dematerialized" relationships of adjoinment. The chessboard is no longer a thing but a representation. -It is also possible to replace the state of the game, i.e. the attachment of each part to a box, by the succession of movements that cause it, i.e. by a list of choices of dematerialized statements among those authorized. -Each of these "past" movements can itself be replaced by the context of knowledge that made it possible and a judgment of the player. Thus described, the part is no longer a fact of the world but a series of facts of knowledge (in the natural sense of the term). Players do not assign probabilities to possible material events from a state of affairs but assign probabilities to possible expansions of their representation from their state of representation. With each move players exchange information that extends and partially adjusts their states of consciousness. The player's representation of a game in such a form of pure logic is made very complex, but "in reality" nothing has changed compared to the hardware version of the game. We have only removed meaningful stopping points that must then be replaced by the bundle of interdependencies that are their reality. Because the bundle of interdependancies goes far beyond the horizon of Meaning for the subject, it can no more be spoken about knowledge in the usual sense of the world but of Knowledge according to the OK definition. The nuance between the fact of the world and the Fact of knowledge may seem incidental. On the contrary, it is essential: If from a (possible) fact of the world it can be said that it has or has not yet happened in the absolute; that it was, it is or is not yet real; from a (possible) fact of knowledge it must be said that it makes sense (that it Exists) or that it does not yet make sense for the subject, which does not detract from its reality or its interdependence to what already Exists. NB: A logical theorem not yet demonstrated, although it does not yet Exist is nevertheless real and interdependent of what is already demonstrated (of the Existing). Thus, in our dematerialized game, all possible movements of players have the same reality, all are Actual in the sense of the OK although some do not yet Exist to the consciousness of the players. Actuality is not subjected to non-contadicion,only Existence is. This "dematerialization" shows that the need for a final result, included in a space with countable possibilities (white win or black win or a draw), logically precedes the succession of the facts of the game as an event. This necessity transcends the extraordinary contingency of its modes of accomplishment. It emerges from a set of logical interdependencies which "do not belong" to the representation of the party event, the reality of which is diffuse and which are not subject to the time of the game. It is the same for the assignment of probabilities to the following moves, "knowing" a state of the game. The reality from which this judgment emerges is a set of diffuse interdependencies, not subject to time. To illustrate the difference between Actual and Existing, let us cite another example: that of a chest filled with Legos: as long as the chest is closed, I can, by thought, order the parts according to all possible orders, all these orders are Actual. As soon as I open the chest, my thought makes Exist a structure of order: it separates the red parts from the yellow and the blue; then in each class it separates the pieces to a stud, two studs, then three studs etc... Nothing has changed "in reality", yet an order comes to Exist for me among all the Actual Orders, to the exclusion of the others. If on one hand the assignment of probability to a fact of the world can be akin, by its nature, to a conscious judgment of the subject, or even to a gambling, on the other hand the probability relationship between a state of representation and a Fact of Knowledge not yet Existing (for the subject) is already Actual, its reality is in the Actual interdependence relationships between the Reality of the State of representation of the Subject and its logical neighbourhood. It is not "what will become real" that is affected by a probability but "what will make sense to the subject", following which paths the representation of the Subject will extend in a neighbourhood of already Actual interdependencies, which new forms will appear to the representation of the subject among all Actual forms, which New Facts will make sense to him. In the dematerialized chess game, just before player A announces his movement, what has already taken Existence for a minute for the consciousness of A, is still for B only an Actual possibility. As A announces his movement, this possibility takes on the meaning of an Existing Fact for B's consciousness. We see that time does not affect what is Actual but only what Exists. And since Existence is relative to the subject, time is relative to the subject. Returning to the QM, the experimental device prepared by Alice made possible a set of Facts of Knowledge according to a distribution of probabilities. A Fact of Knowledge is not "something that becomes real", a Fact of Knowledge is real as soon as it is possible. By the time one of these Facts appears to Alice's Knowledge, this Fact comes to Exist for her. It takes form for her and takes place among the other Existing Facts that constitute her representation of the world. The question of the "collapse of the wave-function" disappears when we speak of Facts of Knowledge and not facts of the world, as long as we differentiate Actuality and Existence. What Alice refers to as a wave-function is an Actual reality: a set of "possible" Facts given her state of representation. "Possible" then having the meaning of "Fact likely to Exist for the agent." All these possible Facts are Actual but only one (generally) will come to Exist for Alice's consciousness. Among these Actual Facts, the probabilities of Existing are not equal. The law of distribution of these probabilities depends on the global state of representation of the subject (the experimental device is part of her state of representation). Two conclusions to this: 1) It is not necessary to refer the meaning of the state of representation of the subject to the meaning of a "state of the world" vis-à-vis, present or past. The state of representation of the Subject has no other meaning, no other reference, than the law of distribution of probability of Facts that it makes possible, as we explain in article ref OK. 2) The distribution of probabilities of these non-Existent Facts corresponds to the Actual reality of the Knowledge of the subject, although for his consciousness the assignment of probabilities seems to be a bet on future realities. How in the 21st century could one imagine that the facts of a knowledge (language, memories, sensitive abilities, procedures etc.) exist (in the common sense) in the present state of the brain or body of the subject, as an isomorphic set of things or actions of which it would represent the meaning, as in the present state of a conventional computer? The idea that a memory that does not Exist, that is not present in the consciousness of the subject would not be a reality is absurd. The idea that the reality of this memory would be somehow isomorphic to its meaning, that its meaning would always be present, present in its form, is absurd. A state of representation should not be regarded as an Existing reality, present in its form, but as an Actual reality, interdependent, not subject to form, not subject to time. The reality of what is Actual is not subject to time. Only Existence is subject to time. A Knowledge presents Actual singularities in its interdependence relationships. These singularities are the possibility and only the possibility of Knowledge Facts. The probability relationships between a state of representation and the Facts of Knowledge it makes possible are Actual, not subject to time. The "subjective" view of probabilities claimed by the QBists is only the appearance of that at the conscious level. Note that the concept of multiple universes proposed by Everett is included in the OK as long as one differentiates the Actual from the Existing. These multiple universes are a set of possibilities, beyond the horizon of meaning, they do not Exist, they are only Actual. Only one universe Exists and will Exist for me in my universe, because the universe is me and, by necessity, I am One. In the language used by Qbism pros the assignment of probability appears to be at the level of the consciousness or thought/subject of the agent. This feeling is reinforced by frequent reminders of the origin of probability theory related to strategies to follow in gambling and by the identification of the assignment of probability to a "degree of belief" of the agent. The problem is not so much what thought/subject has of subjectivity, because after all Alice's feeling can be based on an objective assessment of objective criteria and objectively justify her decisions. The QBist position lacks clarity in various aspects: on how the object of these assignments is defined (how are defined the facts on which Alice can bet?), on what grounds the possibility of assigning probabilities and on the level of consciousness at which these probability assignments emerge, the level of consciousness at which the predicates that attach to the object appear to the agent. The first point regarding the QBist position is that it remains “in-between”, what weakens it: it essentially states "the probability of such an event occurring is a judgment of the agent" as if the event, uncertain in its probability, was defined in its nature or at least in the nature of its attributes; as if the event were a priori descriptible in a space of meaning of finite dimension. Facts of Knowledge, contrary to the facts of the world, have no nature by themselves. Their meaning is not a priori but emerges from their interdependence with the other Facts of the Knowledge of the subject. The meaning emerges from the way Facts of Knowledge make each other possible, make possible the appearance to the representation of the subject of new Facts while ensuring the Individuation of his Knowledge. The Fact of Knowledge has no other meaning than the possibilities it creates for the subject, in the global context of his Knowledge. In fact, when from a state O1 Alice assigns 50% probability for fact A and 50% for fact B, the individuations of A and B are not necessary facts of the world but are already made necessary by a necessity O2 implied by the meaning of O1 that splits into 2 equiprobable contingencies A and B, in the context of the global Knowledge of Alice. If the agent's assignment of probability was pure "willingness to place or accept any bets she believes to be favorable", if there were not "in reality" contextual constraints on her future experiences, on possible ways of expanding her representation, Alice would not even know on what facts to bet, she could not designate any Individuated fact as possible because her Knowledge would be formless. But, as De Saussure wrote: without words, thought would be nothing "but an amorphous and indistinct mass." Language is not a tool invented by Man to share his thoughts, nor is language the cause of thought. Language and thought co-determine eachother as meta-Facts of Knowledge derived from a more general principle of knowledge. We see with this example of language how the context of Knowledge essentially imposes the form of what consciousness could bet on. Conscious thinking expands by quanta of meaning. Words, concepts, signs are generally quantified Facts of Knowledge. What will appear to Alice's consciousness, her future experiences, are everalready being constrained by the laws of the formation of meaning. Alice will know only the new Facts of Knowledge that are already made possible by her present state of representation. The principle that aggregates the meaning in quanta is no more a "mystery of the Spirit" than a "machine". This is a principle of logic that the OK calls the Logos, described by the ref articles. OK and PLOC. All of the Facts of Knowledge that determine the possibilities of Alice's thought are Actual (in the sense of the OK) although they do not necessarily exist for the Conscious representation and in the present time of Alice. The same is true of all the meta-Facts of Knowledge that define the possible structures of her conscious thinking. Only the Act of thought brings these Facts to Existence, into Alice's present time and into the world described by her Consciousness. -Probability values can only be assigned to significant elements and according to significant structures made possible by the laws of formation of meaning. -The possibles described by these probabilities are however Actual in the thought/object before they take Meaning for the thought/subject. If all these words, classes of words and possible syntaxes are Actual, who can say in what spacetime they reside? Let's take for example how a subject becomes aware of a speech (verbal, written, filmed or even musical): what is com-prehended from the discourse already determines, at all times, a set of possibles, in the form of expectations and these expectations are updated as an expected word appears Existing in the meaning of the subject. Everyone understands that outside the linear space of discourse meaning there is an Actual context in which each word (each Fact of Knowledge) is interdependent with other words (other Facts), that these interdependencies cluster in meta-facts of Knowledge: syntagms, syntactic rules, language norms, social ... From the structure of this Actual context we can only say that it is complex, unrelated to the onedimensional space of discourse. But also that it is under the constraint of the primary necessity of the transcendental subject. What the OK calls the In-act of Knowledge: Interdependencies Actual but which do not Exist as Facts of Knowledge for Consciousness, does not belong to the space-time in which consciousness describes the world. The In-act reality of our Knowledge "does not belong" to the four-dimensional world of our representations. They are immeasurable to each other. Thought/object "does not belong" to the four-dimensional world of thought/subject. They are immeasurable to each other. -The thought/object in which meaningful facts and structures are made possible cannot be described in the world of the thought/subject. The In-Act reality of Knowledge is interdependent. It is the interdependence of the In-Act Knowledge that determines according to which laws of probability other Facts will appear to the consciousness of the subject. The possibility or probability of a Fact raising from my experience is grounded by the principle that all the interdependencies that are the In-act of my experience impose a constraint on its expansion. The Actual interdependence between the "already com-prehended" experience and its expansion toward its neighbourhood is so strong that the laws of probability on the possible appearances of New Facts are extremely restrictive. This, in principle, justifies the degree of confidence (not subjective but statistical) that one may have in a probability assignment based on an "infinite" set of causes, a greater proportion of which are common to each of the Facts of the Knowledge. Examples include the Gnedenko and Kolmogorov theorem (1954), which states that "a normal random variable (X) is the sum of a large number of small independent random variables (xi) none of which are predominant." These are mathematics, the truths stated by this law in its generality as in all its possible instanciations are not subject to time. These truths are Actual in the meaning of the OK. It should also be noted that the logical relationship between (xi) and (X) is not causal. In a very general way, this law tells us that a subject whose representation would com-prehend a set of experiences {Xj}can, de facto, assign probability values to his future experiences (future according to the time of the subject). The probability relationship between {Xj}and {Xe} does have a reality, even if the {Xj} are in no way the causes of the {Xe}, and if it cannot be said either that the (xi) are the common causes of the {Xj} and {Xe}. This example shows that if the {Xe} come to Exist only for the agent according to his own time, the situation of interdependence is In-act, all truths (X) are Actual in their interdependence to the (xi). It also shows that values (X) are only labels attached to a mode of Actual interdependence between (xi). Although this mode of interdependence is inexpressible by the subject because it is Complex (in the sense of the OK), the law of probability that can be inferred from the representation of the {Xj} gives it a "usable" means to predict the evolution of the representation of the subject. The probability of {Xe} “knowing”{Xj}, which is rated P({Xe}|{Xj}) is the operational meaning of the{Xj}, but this operational meaning is only a "form" of the in-act reality of interdependence links derived from the (xi). This form is the result of a double act: that of individuating under the label{Xj}of the singularities of interdependence paths and that of individuating under the label P({Xe}|{Xj}) the relationship of each Xj to all the others. -The probability relationship between Facts already com-prehended and Facts to be comprehended, far from being a "belief" of Alice, are justified by the reality of an In-act interdependence. -The probability relationship between Facts already com-prehended and Facts to be comprehended is the (operational) Meaning of the Fact already com-prehended. The Act, which replaces the unspeakable complexity of In-act interdependence between (xi) with the meaning P({Xe}|{Xj}) can be described as a "judgment". This term "judgment" will only then express that the In-Act and the Consciousness being immeasurable to each other, the relation from the In-act to the meaning is unprovable by the conscience of the agent. But we understand that beyond the meaning, ahead of the Act that gives Existence (for the agent) to the Facts of Knowledge, Interdependence is very real, Actual. Assigning probabilities to possible Facts from Facts already com-prehended is not an “act of faith”, even if it seems so to the agent's conscience. This is the validity of this example because on the one hand the subject is "overhanging" the situation and on the other hand he chooses "randomly" his experiences in an already ordained space (a space of numbers for example). It is not so in the reality we study: -on the one hand Alice is an integral part of the situation. The experience for Alice is inseparable from all the conditions of possibility, all the In-Act Interdependencies that already determine Alice as a knowing subject and which are no other than the In-act (the formless substance) of her global Knowledge. Not only what she consciously represents of the world and her in the world, but also all the unspoken reality that justifies her existing to herself, there and now, endowed with thought, sight, hearing, touch etc., language, instruments Etc... in the presence of the individuated object of her observation. Any possible experience of the {Xj} is inseparable from this reality. -on the other hand Alice does not choose her future experiences "randomly". Nor are her future experiences imposed on her by the laws of a world “out-there”. (Indeed, who can believe that the laws that make any representation possible are precisely limited to those designed by the representation?) To understand how events come to Exist in Alice's time we must put Alice at the starting point of our reflection. There's Alice. There is a future for Alice because Alice's Meaning for herself is none other than the certainty of her future existence. There is a future of Alice's world because the meaning of each thing in its representation contributes to the certainty of her future existence and the possible new experiences that her representation makes possible (this point will be detailed later). Alice's representation is driven by its own nature and not by time. In an In-act, unfounded (no primary substance) and formless (without a priori order), the attributes of the world do not present themselves individuated and meaningful to the representation of Alice. To identify a new experience, Alice's representation can only be based on singularities of pathes. The only sense, the only values that Alice can give to an experience to distinguish it lies precisely in the probabilities of future singularities. Kolmogorov must then be rethought as expressing not a (universal) relationship between mathematical facts existing by themselves in an orderly world, but as describing the mode of expansion of representation and the relationship between the dynamic expansion of representation and its meaning. -It is not the thing that makes sense, it is not even the In-Act Knowledge. The meaning is only in the Act of knowing. The meaning is revealed by the Act, it designates the possible and it is 'de jure' based on the perspective that the In-Act of Knowledge constitutes. The possibilities are like labels affixed to the infinity of the In-act. Alice's possible experiences are still-already Actual (already there) in the logical neighbourhood of her already Com-prehended Knowledge. What Alice com-prehends now is already Interdependent In-act of what Alice can com-prehend. The probability of her future experiences is Actual in the Inact of her Knowledge. Although unspeakable because complex this relationship is Actual before the meaning appears. These experiences will come to Exist for Alice as meaningful Facts only by the Act, the Transaction that replaces the unspeakable with a probability or a state vector of finite size. Note: In the ref OK we show that this Transaction crosses an N-dimensional Cut in the complexity of the In-act, that all of these Cuts constitute the horizon of the meaning or horizon of representation. -The meaning of a meaningful Fact is a law of probability on Facts that it makes possible, not by itself, but in its relationship to the whole Knowledge of the subject, i.e. in its Existence. Thus, just as meaningful Facts are representations, the "probabilistic or causal" relationship between Facts is representation. The same is true for the generalization of all these relationships in the form of laws of the world, and so is the general framework of the laws of the world called space-time. -It is not the In-Act Reality that is subject to Facts, probabilistic or causal laws and space-time representation. Facts, Laws and Space-Time representation emerge from the In-act Reality according to the laws of the Logos. This proposal should help us to dissolve the apparent paradoxes of our quantum experiments. The probability of experiment results on variables, considered in a theoretical probabilistic space, has no reason to be subject to time or space. It is a set of experiences that are not governed by time. One could browse the set in any order, in any way, one would get from experience results, represented in any space, always and again invariant laws. Michel Bitbol (ref MQIP P 28) quotes Heisenberg (1932) p. 38 "In modern physics, atoms lose these last properties; they do not possess geometric qualities to a higher degree than color, taste, etc. All the qualities of an atom of modern physics are derived, it has no immediate and direct physical property."... the algebraic operations of quantum mechanics substitute to the values of variables interpretable as intrinsic determinations, and their changes in value interpretable as absolute events, observable aimed to represent determinations and events relating to various classes of experimental devices.... Space and cinematic coordinates are no exception to this rule. » For Heisenberg, the 'place' is not an intrinsic determination, it is not as such a sensitive phenomenon, before the global ability to know gives it the sense of place. The same is true for all other Facts and Attributes. But then the "ability to know" must be given a broader meaning. Thus, when the global ability to know "focuses its attention" on the "place" attribute of a Fact, it creates the perspective that will make it likely, if not certain, that the "place" Fact-of-sensation will emerge at the conscious level. Of course this is simple "awareness" but also when the agent sets up an experimental device that will impose the class "place" among the classes of possible Facts, it is still her faculty of representation that is at work. Michel Bitbol (ref MQIP p230) quoting E.P. Wigner states that the (probabilistic) contextual predictive formalism of the QM must be supplemented by principles of invariance towards movements in space and time. However, we have seen that the laws of probabilities are the reality from which space and time forms are born. One cannot therefore speak of the invariance of probabilistic predictive laws in space and time as a "property" of these laws but as properties of the process by which time and space emerge from probabilistic laws, i.e. of the Logos. 2-The nature of the subject and its relationship to the object QBism says "Knowing is assigning probabilities" In accordance with QBism, the OK states that "The Meaning of a Meaningful Fact is a law of probability on the meaning Facts it makes possible." Note: Even in a Darwinian justification of meaning, the reference to a truth vis-à-vis is useless: If representation offers a selective advantage it is because of the relevance of the expectations it allows and not because it refers to a truth vis a vis. To introduce a new difference between OK and QBism, let's mention D. Mermin (ref MBSMQ) “There is indeed a common external world in addition to the many distinct individual personal external worlds. But that common world must be understood at the foundational level to be a mutual construction that all of us have put together from our distinct private experiences, using our most powerful human invention: language.” The OK shares this view. Nevertheless, the construction of the "common world" mentioned by D. Mermin is described too superficially. It seems once again as a conscious act of men. Language is presented as a human invention, a tool designed to share our private experiences at the conscious level. We'll show in the following lines: 1- the extraordinary consequences of the QBist proposition "Knowing is assigning probabilities" on the nature of the subject, 2- that language is much more than a tool of sharing, that knowledgeable subjects have in common much more than language. Pre-note 1)-The attitude of the OK (and of QBism) is in no way anti-realistic. As we have stated above, there is indeed a Reality. The meaning emerges from interdependent (but formless) Reality according to the strict laws of the Logos. -It is also not an idealistic attitude, because for the OK, Idealities are either directly akin to eigensolutions of the Logos which are possible "universal forms" or to generic Facts of Knowledge made possible by the state of a culture: language, tools, general concepts. 2) We must recall here the distinction between transcendent subject and knowing subject: The transcendental Subject is a Knowledge, an Individuation, a mode of order of the In-act reality whose asymptote is a monodimensional "becoming oneself". As a mode of order, of necessity, it precedes meaning. It is therefore not subject to time. The Knowing Subject is the meaning he gives himself, he is at the same time the "I am" "what I am" "the world where I am". He runs through his Knowledge like a wave of judgments of necessity, a wave of meaning. The Existing is the present, the front of the wave, the horizon of meaning. What Exists for the knowing subject, including himself, is what advances with the wave. If the meaning that Alice gives to the Facts of her Knowledge does not refer to a truth vis-à-vis but to a law of probability, what about the meaning that Alice gives herself? For the OK the answer is made evident by the above and can be summed up by an additive to the Descartes's Cogito: "I am" is also the affirmation of the necessity* that “I will be”. *The term "near certainty" would be more prudent than necessity, to give way to a possible existential hiatus: Does the possibility that I no longer exist for myself in the next moment make sense to me now? We propose to ignore this doubt in the rest of this article. According to Descartes, the truth of the "I am" is certain for the subject, but the truth of this proposal only makes sense to himself through the Act that states it, this Act which always projects the consciousness of the subject towards the future experience of himself and the world he knows. By saying "I will exist" Alice exists and her world exists with certainty at the (always) present moment of her representation. There are no other ways to exist. This certainty is not only a subjective opinion or belief because it is contained in the In-act reality of her Knowledge, in the necessity of her Individuation. Because the In-act reality of her Knowledge is complex and unfounded, Alice's certainty of still existing the next moment is unprovable. Existing is a judgment, a predicate which truth is necessary although contingent to infinity; An everlasting victorious fight of Individuation over complexity. The "certainty that I will be," that I will have the meaning of "myself" is a judgment, a meta-fact. This meta-Fact expresses that all the Facts of my Knowledge will help to make possible the "I" of the following moment, it is also the principle of Individuation of G.Simondon (ref ILFI) "I am by the act of always becoming myself", stripped by the OK of everything materialistic. Because it is a law of probability on future experiences the sense of representation contains the power of its expansion and the a priori subsumption of sense by Individuation is the necessity that directs this expansion. The necessary expansion of meaning and the law of probabilities on Facts that will appear during this expansion, this power and this necessity, are the meaning of her Knowledge and this meaning is not psychological but purely logical. We have therefore given Alice as a knowing subject the meaning of "law of probability on her future experience of herself," and to the world that she knows the meaning of "law of probability on future expansions of her representation." The law of expansion of each Fact therefore merges to that of all other Facts to form the law of expansion and Individuation of the subject. A Fact Exists for Alice if it makes Alice possible. The Importance of a Fact for Alice is P(Alice|Fact). A Fact Exists for Alice if its importance is not zero. The Existence of Alice is the union of the P(Alice|Fact) of all Facts of her Knowledge 3- The time of the subject - The anima Now let's try to dispel what seems to me to be an ambiguity of the QBism. This ambiguity can be illustrated by the following quotations C. Fuchs ref QBI: "Alice's awareness of her past experience forms the basis for the beliefs on which her state assignments rest. And her probability assignments express her expectations for her future experience." D Mermin ref:MBSMQ: “my Now advances along my trajectory at one second of my personal experience for each second that passes on my watch, which follows the same trajectory (NDLR: of space-time)as I do.” Lubos Motl (ref DMQB) " D. Mermin also claims that Qbism solves "the Now" problem in philosophy, a discussion between Einstein and Carnap on whether or not the special awareness of the present is accessible ... even though relativity wants us to look at things "eternalistically" because the whole spacetime is the only invariant thing, quantum mechanics really overrides it and does give the present a special status – because it assigns a special role to the observers' experiences and those are attached to some particular moments (or periods of time)... The Now problem ... is "reification" of something (fallacy of incorrect attribution of "real existence" to some auxiliary theoretical constructs such as the spacetime or the quantum state” D. Mermin quotes (ref MBQM) Einstein's remark "Space and time are modes in which we think and not conditions in which we live", and comments: "Th(is) feeling is pure CBism (Editor's note CBism - QBism), ... I would love to think that Einstein said and believed this." Although D. Mermin doubts that Einstein actually uttered this proposition, his comment clearly shows his agreement. If once again the OK approves these quotations on the merits, the question left unanswered would be: "Alice assigns probabilities to her future experiences, but why would Alice have future experiences? So what is the nature of this change? If there is no time that, imposing itself on Alice, would change her representation of "Now" and also turn her watch, is this future also only a conjecture, a creation of Alice's spirit?" When one takes Alice as an object, the Qbist (subjective) view of probabilities does not appear satisfactory, the explanation given is circular: Alice's conjecture of the change in her representation would be the very nature of this change. The "my 'Now'" that D. Mermin speaks of is not really defined. It cannot be the present physical state of my brain (was it extended), nor all the logical facts that would constitute my thought at a moment of my subjective time. We have already seen that the logical reality of thought does not belong to the time or space of the subject. At best it can be said that "my 'Now'" would be the meaning I give to the world with me at the centre, but that does not advance us much. It should be noted that this is not a question of criticizing the QBist position. Both Fuchs and D. Mermin have made it clear that they prefer to leave unresolved metaphysical questions whose solution is not essential to the completeness of quantum theory rather than to take the risk of directing it permanently towards false Tracks. On the contrary, the OK must propose an unambiguous answer to this question of change. The answer is given by the OK under the name anima (ref OK). Here's the gist: For OK existence is not a succession of states of existence. Existence is not the state of something. To exist is meaning, including the existence of the subject for himself. To exist for the subject is to have meaning for oneself. The meaning does not state "what is" externally or internally but what is made possible because of what Exists for the subject. This relationship between what exists and what it makes possible, that OK names judgement (and in some cases judgement ogf necessity) is transcendental. It owes nothing to the subject's understanding, it is a probabilistic expectation, In-act before beeing represented, before the Fact comes to Exist, and which becomes Actual as soon as the Existence of the fact is revealed. Certainly it appears to the subject's mind: my mind knows how to think of the relationship between <snow> (as existing) and <cold> (as possible), but this sayable relationship is only an emergence off the unspeakable according to a meta-judgment of necessity (which transcends, ie logically precedes the spirit, according to the definition of the OK). In a way, the Existing <snow> is the label of a set of vectors (the possibles) with a probability law. All these possibilities are the attractors of meaning which determine the multiplicity of the subject. The judgement of necessity on Existing is a vector " becoming itself " present, certain, necessary, non contradictory, that splits in " contributive becoming " vectors Actual, possible, contingent, possibly contradictory. By its nature of judgment, by the "existential" relation between present Existence and Actual meaning, meaning constantly escapes the present moment of the Existent. The essence of time is therefore in the very nature of meaning: the intensional reality from which the meaning of the present moment emerges contains the possibility, even the necessity, of other experiences which will come to increase the existing and so on, irreversibly. Meaning is nothing more than a promise of meaning. The "present" is (extensional) meaning, but the (intensional) reality of that which has present meaning does not belong to the present moment. The meaning of "I am" is not in a real present state of the I (which would be absurd since I is not One in reality) but in the fact that the experience of the I makes it almost certain (of a probability infinitely close to 1) the experience of the I. Existence is therefore change, without reference to an external intuition of time. The Meaning of Alice for herself therefore does not refer to Alice's "state of reality" because this reality is unspeakable, but to the Act by which Alice "becomes herself". This is the principle of Anima according to the OK. There is therefore no external time, no subjective assignment of probabilities, but the reality of an Interdependence In-act. Alice's In-act reality 'now' contains the possibility of Alice 'in the next moment' and this possibility is the Meaning of Alice. The Act, orthogonal to the Cut that "contains" the reality of Alice, carries the time of Alice. Alice's time is orthogonal to the meaning of Alice. We say orthogonal because the unspeakable reality of Alice's Knowledge projects itself as a point (Alice's "Now") on a line (the "time"). Of course Interdependence is in principle reversible, but the reality of the Facts of Knowledge being unfounded, the Meaning of a Fact is akin to an infinite predicate, more precisely to a set of predicates that form probabilities arising from a reality seemingly bottomless. The logical Transaction that represents this transition from the unspeakable to the dicible is in essence an irreversible reduction in complexity. Formal equality is inherently approximate. It is inferred that the time under which Alice represents the billions of facts that populate her world is irreversible. Note that this definition of orthogonality allows a definition of the continuity of the Meaning: the meaning attached to each point being the projection of an unfounded and complex reality, the interdependence between two points is also the projection of a reality unfounded and complex. The above lines could be repeated by replacing "Alice" each time with "Alice's “ I ” " or "Alice as an object for herself," or "Alice's World with Alice in the middle." With some adjustments, they would also be worth "such an object of Alice's world." This could be an interesting exercise for the reader. These explanations of the OK reinforce and extend the QBist position: There is neither the present 'state' of things nor the 'space-time' outside, invariant, possibly infinite, but N-dimensional Cuts in the Reality (Facts) crossed orthogonally by an Act. The crossing of these Cuts is a Transaction. The Transaction carries the Meaning of Fact and the orthogonal Act carries the Meaning of the Fact's Time. Note that this proposal is ontologically compatible with General Relativity while giving 'locally' a specific role to time. It should also be noted that the Transaction, which, through a Cut, replaces complexity with the Meaning of a Fact of Knowledge, which replaces the possible with the Existing, although it can be referred to as a "collapse" of complexity, does not change reality In-act. Only the Meaning that appears to the agent, the Meaning produced by its overall ability to know is affected. This also applies to the representation of the link X↔ Y which is a Fact of Knowledge. We have stated in a new form the identity of nature and the fusion of the object and the subject, as stated by Schopenhauer (ref MVR): "I am my Knowledge, the world is my Knowledge, my Knowledge is the world and it is me." In this fusion, the "I" is the Fact of Knowledge conceived as the asymptote of the aggregation of all Facts of My Knowledge. Although her nature is one of its kind, Alice can be designated for three levels: 1) Alice's In-Act Knowledge, which would be the bundle of Interdependencies stamming from Alice as a point of view 2) Alice's "Thinking Self" which would be Alice's Conscious representation of herself in the world she represents, which is in a way the projection of her In-act Knowledge on the horizon of Meaning. 3) Alice's "I," a virtual asymptote to which the aggregation of Alice's Meaning seems to converge. This "I" can also be referred to as the point of view. The Ultimate Quantum of representation. The fusion of the object and the subject into one representation, the identification of the Meaning of the Facts of this knowledge with a law of probability on its future expansions, the identification of the "I am" with the certainty of "I will be", allow us to state that: -The Meaning of "I am" is the fusion of the Meaning of everything I com-prehend -The meaning of "I am" is the union of all the probabilities I assign. -Since the "I am" is the certainty of "I will be," the union of probabilities that I assign to everything I com-prehend leads to the certainty of "I will be" -In the asymptote, the union of all probabilities I assign is therefore equal to 1 (certainty) by definition. These statements have two major consequences, already mentioned in article ref LAMG - The sciences, the representation of the world are not only centered on the knowing subject but the union of their semantic content is limited to the existence of the subject. We will not elaborate on this in this article. - Since the union of the Facts of my Knowledge is limited to my Existence, the Facts of my Knowledge are not independent. The Probability of my Existence "knowing" a Fact X: P({I}|{X}), the Importance of a Fact is not independent of the other Facts of my Knowledge. -The meaning of each Fact emerges from my Knowledge based on a perspective drawn by the context of interdependence of all Facts. This perspective defines the "Importance" to me of each Fact, according to which structures these Facts merge and merge their importance etc., (see ref LAMG, Appendix V) It is unfortunate that the Qbism preferred to leave this process hidden under the mystery of thought/consciousness rather than attempt its elucidation in the form of a logical process and give Schopenhauer's luminous intuition the scientific and contemporary form it deserves. The analogy is so obvious with the QM that one is tempted to describe the Perspective as a statespace of representation, the referencial of which would be built of Facts made possible by the general context of Knowledge. The Meaning of each State of Fact can be represented in this statespace by a state-of-Fact vector, i.e. a set of probabilities of the appearance of the possibles of the referencial. We will leave this exercise to more qualified. We can say, however, that the principles of representation of reality by "contextual probabilities", a term that Mr. Bitbol rightly prefers to "quantum mechanics" or "undulating mechanics" (see ref MQIP) are infinitely better suited to the description of a world as representation of the subject than that of a world as "external reality". 4- How attributes emerge Appendix III of the LAMG ref "From Maine de Biran to Poincaré's Geometry" deals in detail with this subject and we will specifically develop the excerpt below: The fact of the sensation is detached from the ability to know and not from a fact opposite. Common sense dictates that the sensation comes from a fact in vis-à-vis and enters the mind in the form of a sensitive phenomenon, transformed by understanding into an intelligible phenomenon recognized by reason as a fact-of-sensation. The fact-of-sensation, once revealed to reason is combined with others to, ultimately, synthesize a representation of the world. For Maine de Biran (Ref NoK and DAI), this view is wrong, it is applying to thought/object the modes of reasoning that describe material or logical systems developed by consciousness (thought/subject) and whose relevance is not established to describe thought/object. It is only after having globally affected the mind, in a diffuse form, that the sensitive phenomenon appears as a fact-of-sensation. The sensation is present (although formless), as an affection of thought/object and it is the overall ability to know that gives it shape. But the combination of sensation with other sensations and concepts, is not done at the level of the sensation revealed, it affects, still informal or at least diffuse, the thought /object. The reflex acts are proof of this. The sensations do not combine as facts-of-sensation revealed as such, but spread as an affection in thought/object, still informal, or at least diffuse from where they emerge and combine. Only then formal concepts can reveal themselves to the subject in the form of Facts of Consciousnes, ie of meaning attractors of which the probability to be revealed wouls not be zero. Sensations are not combined by reason as logical propositions would be, but sensations merge in their diffuse form as chaos and only then new formal concepts can emerge from this chaos. representation operates by detachment and not by synthesis. The (formal) facts of the world ... stand out as Knowledge Facts of the global ability to know. However, the Fact of Knowledge cannot be seen without the watermark presence of the knowing subject. The Fact can only appear to the "knowing self." Without a subject there can be no objects. At the moment when the Fact of sensation reveals itself to the subject, it is already part of the All of his Knowledge. To the idea that reason synthesizes the universe of representation by adding, at every moment, oneon-one, the facts-of-sensation, revealed for themselves, it must then be opposed that it is the global ability to know that lets emerge outside it, the Fact of Knowledge, as part of an All, designed and organized globally in the self/object.... We see then that the fact-of-sensation in its form and also its position in the universe of our representation, is just as and certainly much more determined by representation and its laws, than by the eventuality of the a priori form of a cause 'out-there' or its position relative to other objects. To support this, let's quote Mr. Bitbol (ref MQIP p112 113) who, referring to Goodman and Wittgenstein writes: ". . . a probabilistic estimate at first glance offers great resistance to its possible experimental rebuttal. It would even be fair to say that it is a law irrefutable by the only finished experience.... If the probabilistic assessment is based on solid reasons, if the renunciation to these reasons leads with it the fall of a pan too broad and too well validated of knowledge, the finding of a frequency that deviates from the projected value will not be enough to refute the latter. Many more experiments will have to be done, many more discrepancies will have to arise before the possibility of replacing the projection system from which probabilities derive is simply considered. » This remark is relevant in the context in which it was written, i.e. in the relation of the experimental fact to the conscious conditions that warranted the agent's assessment of its probability. It is infinitely more relevant if one relates the In-act of a Fact of Knowledge to the In-Act of Knowledge as a whole. In other words: Estimates of probabilities produced by representation, understood as a probabilistic structure are much more the result of the laws of probability that structure representation than of supposed experimental facts. Logos defines how such representation expands. Let's quote C. Tiercelin: ref PHP "The line between fact and value is tenuous" There is nothing in the extract of the ref. LAMG above, it seems to me, that the proponents of QBism could dispute. Nothing new, actually. Yet when QBists use phrases such as “... her own personal degrees of belief about the event...” or “... probabilities are the personal judgments of an agent...” (ref QBI), the least that can be said is that these expressions are ambiguous as to the relationship of the agent's consciousness to sensitive phenomena. To dispel these ambiguities one would like to read explicitly phrases such as: "What appears as a judgment to the consciousness of the agent is already "Actual" in her thought/object before having made sense" and above all that it is explicitly applied to the judgments about time and space. Let it be clear that the predicates of moment or place are no more realities vis-à-vis than any other predicate. Only then can the true nature of space that both separates and unites be understood. Mr. Bitbol wrote in the introduction to his book (ref MQAP): "Any critical investigation into the object of quantum physics is (so) stopped, watered down, diluted, because of the presuppositions of the language used and the familiar circumstances of its employment. » Let us say that the above lines add to Mr. Bitbol's quotation the logical implications of merging the object and the subject, namely that the language and the familiar circumstances of its employment stop, water down and dilute any critical investigation into the object of investigation that is the subject for itself, i.e. into the thought/object. -Meaning does not allow us to describe what thought is before meaning. It is not a question of language inadequacy, lack of information, misrepresentation (i.e. that could have been accurate), nor epistemology, but a fundamental question of Complexity (in the OK sense) that makes Interdependent Reality unordainable in the four-dimensional space-time of our representations, nor in any finite dimension space. The reality before the Meaning is immeasurable to the universe of representation, of any representation. The In-act of thought does not belong to the four-dimensional world of conscious thought. There is a "Cut" between the Meaning and its In-act reality. What seems to "happen" to us on our side of the horizon of Meaning (of the Cut) is In-act (not located in time) beyond that horizon. Not the signs and symbols, not the synaptic connections that remain descriptions, but the Complex and unfounded reality of logical interdependencies beyond the horizon of Meaning. Representation only gives meaning to a formless reality "located" in an 'beyond' where alwaysalready merge objects and subject, things and thought. The predicates of representation express a form of infinite contingency. However, the quote from the OK above tells us that "it is the global ability to know that lets emerge outside it, the Fact of Knowledge, as part of an All conceived and organized globally in the self/object. (Editor's note: in thought/object)" The relationship between such Fact of Knowledge and Knowledge as a whole cannot be properly described according to the patterns available in the world of representation because the reality of this relationship is in the In-Act of Knowledge, beyond the horizon of Meaning. this is detailed in ref: LST We believe that we are "taking notice" of a fact at the moment when it appears to our conscience, but this is only a (poor) picture of reality. In the In-Act Reality of Knowledge, the Fact we believe we are aware of must be replaced by all the In-act interdependencies that determine all possible Facts of Knowledge. The experimental device, the language, all the exchanges between agents, all the mental or physical acts that brought Alice to the place and time of the experiment, capable of her experience, merge to constitute the State of representation that determines the possible of her experience. It is from this reality that the meaning of the Fact of Knowledge emerges among the other Facts of Knowledge. The reality of this merger is in the In-act complexity. Its representation by language as a (present) state of representation is certainly necessary for our limited minds but it is necessarily deceiving. (see in particular the OK and PDL ref to detail what the "present moment" is). On this basis we can get rid of the concept of 'hidden variables' which for the OK is meaningless. The variables Exist below the horizon of representation. Beyond this horizon of Meaning, there are no "hidden" variables because there are no variables at all: The In-act reality is not representable by attributes because it is complex (in the sense of the OK). The above lines complement the explanations given by Mr. Bitbol (ref MQPI p 189 190) to the famous question of the non-separability of measurements made on either of the two systems of a pair: In preparing the experimental device Alice changes her state of representation and thus the perspective with which she apprehends the object of her experience (both systems). It creates Knowledge conditions that make certain specific Facts of Knowledge likely. However, Alice's perspective generally determines which Facts or Classes of Facts will appear and in what relationship to her global worldview. There is total non-separability between the preparation and the object of the experiment, just as there is non-separability between the representation of Alice and each Fact that composes it. Perspective is the global relationship of Facts to her representation of the world, this probabilistic perspective may well include correlations or exclusions between the possibility of Facts. The "container" representation, where images of existing Facts, Laws and Procedures would be stored for themselves, is a misleading representation. "Actually" Knowledge of the subject is an informal, interdependent whole, in which Facts, laws and procedures are Actual according to laws of probability. The experimental device is the dicible and present representation of the global conditions of Knowledge that make possible and correlate the appearance, for Alice of measurement results on the systems of the pair. Here are some examples to illustrate this: -In the example of the chess game we described earlier, what has the meaning of a present state of the game, a physical reality or at least a state of representation descriptible by common language is in fact the fusion of a considerable set of rules, choice, immaterial relationships that are almost impossible to link unequivocally to its description through language. -At the moment when Marcel Proust's consciousness remembers the madeleine of his childhood, the State of representation that makes this mental experience possible merges all the conditions of possibility of past 'gouters' which are in themselves a bottomless reality, but also all the emotional contexts that made it such a dear memory, but also all the conditions that make possible its reappearance in the present of his consciousness, starting with the fact that Proust is still alive at this instant. As Schopenhauer (ref MVR) explains so well, none of these conditions (which he refers to as a causal "activity") deserves more than another the title of "cause" of remembrance. As soon as one tries to go back to the In-Act reality of the State of representation, beyond the horizon of Meaning and ready-made images, where all these conditions really merge, one finds the inextricable complexity of this reality and the fact that it is unfounded, that any condition is itself conditioned by others. Who can reasonably believe that the reality of the relationship between the madeleine and the global capacity to feel belongs to a present (was it subjective) moment in M. Proust's threedimensional universe? -If now it is assumed that it is by writing "The Search" that Proust remembers the taste of the madeleine; Since writing creates the conditions for the possibility of remembrance, it must be integrated into the State of representation. How then can we bring the act of writing, the time of writing, the norms of writing and all the physical and mental conditions that underlie the possibility, in the present moment of M. Proust's three-dimensional universe? This Transaction is precisely what the QBists call a probability judgment, a bet, a will to believe, an Act that replaces the In-act complexity of the State of representation with a state vector, i.e. by combining a set of possible (observable) probabilities. Except that this Act does not have the subjectivity QBists implied by the terms of judgment, bet and will. Since the object and the subject are one and the same representation. The states of things that appear to me as the physical conditions of possibility of my experiences are in fact states of my representation. In an "ordinary" representation of a quantum experiment, the distinction between representation and experimental device is already particularly tenuous. Given the amount of knowledge involved in its preparation, an QM experience is a thought experiment long before it is a realization of the physical world. With the QBism, the probability relationship is not between a state of the physical device and possible physical events but between a state of representation and possible facts of Knowledge. Since the conditions of possibility of a quantum experiment merge into a state of representation, all the details made in the above lines apply to it. We must therefore go back beyond the horizon of meaning to consider all the In-act interdependencies that determine our State of Knowledge and from which emerges, for the agent and himself alone, the meaning of a physical device located in the world. One might be surprised that a representation can modify or create what we see as a state of physical affairs. The examples below show that there is nothing there but very ordinary. -At the moment when my mind turns its intention to such a memorized subject, my representation sets itself in a state, a perspective that makes possible the appearance at the conscious level of such a class of new Facts of Knowledge. My perspective directs the expansion of my representation. - As I turn my gaze to a particular subject of the world, my representation sets itself as a perspective (extended to the senses) that makes possible the appearance at the conscious level of such a class of new Facts of Knowledge. My perspective directs the expansion of my representation. -The moment I extend my hand to a particular subject of the world, etc. , because the gesture is a fact of Knowledge that represents itself as a physical fact (Ref : MOND). My perspective directs the expansion of my representation, including through gesture. -The moment I open a book, etc. -It is quite easy to admit that "language and thought co-determine as meta-Facts of Knowledge." What may seem less obvious but was perfectly demonstrated by G Simondon (Ref MEOT) is that the tool and thought co-determine according to the same principle. The acquired technical gestures, the primary tools are facts of knowledge that determine the possibilities of a new experience. This possibility is in turn the seed of a new Fact of Knowledge, whose Meaning is the probability of the experiences it makes possible. As with the language sign, the Meaning of the tool is shareable, it forms culture. The tools, mechanisms, physical devices that surround us and their operation modes must therefore be considered as Facts of Knowledge, the Meaning of which is the expectation of what they make possible. Heisenberg had already written that the experimental device is an extension of the agent's knowledge which, because it helps define the possible results of her experiment, is part of the global perspective that drives the expansion of her knowledge. There is no difference in nature between Alice's representation and the experimental device she implements. As I implement an experimental device, my representation (including the device which is a fact of Knowledge) is arranged as a perspective (a state space) that defines which classes of new Facts can appear at the conscious level. The set of classes of phenomena (new Facts) that are made possible, is the basis of my perspective, of my state-space. The probability of new Facts appearing is both the Meaning of my Knowledge and the expectation of new Facts. Meaning is a law of probability that can be expressed as a statevector. Using the terms of the QM, a state of representation defines a perspective that is formalized (in the space of representations) by a state-space composed of all possible Transactions vectors, vectors of the expansion of representation quantified in the form of new Facts. To each of the Transaction vectors is attached a probability of the appearance of the new Fact, the sum of the Transaction vectors, weighted by their probability defines the state-vector of the Fact, which is also its meaning, which is also the expectations it raises Every actual appearance of a new Fact of Knowledge updates my representation and eventually my perspective. 5- Necessity and coherence of morphogenesis [new from iss. 20200418] The article "OK and the form of the World" (Ref: MOND) states: - representation is not isomorphism but morphogenesis, and the law that governs this morphogenesis is the Logos, a transcendent logical principle. The article "Is the OK a solipsism?" (Ref: SOLI) states: - the "I/subject" is only a category, a meta-Fact of my representation. - the other "subjects" exist for me, qualitatively in the same terms as the "I/subject". - my (intensional) reality is just as unknowable to me as the (intensional) reality of the other subjects. The question then is: If the representation is not constrained by its isomorphy to an "object of representation", a universal reference vis-à-vis, why are the representation by the subject and the representations compared by various subjects consistent? In other words, isn't the morphogenesis hypothesis invalidated by the seemingly transcendent properties of representation and by the compatibility of the countless shared experiences that knowing subjects make of the world ? One could return the question in the form of a: "Why is the physical world coherent?" The questioner could also be referred to Kant (Ref: CRP) and his successors. But we will rather propose here an analysis according to the OK whose conclusions shed new light on certain quantum apories. Preliminary note: Excerpt from the article (ref: MOND) Outside of a consciousness there is no object. Physical phenomena have no intention, no object and therefore no objects. The existence of the object is, exclusively, a "psychic" phenomenon. This statement, inferred from Brentano's courses on intentionality (Ref: Bisart RCI), reminds us that the hypothesis of a physical world, of an "object of representations" cannot ignore that this object is nothing without a subject. This is also what Schopenhauer basically stated: "The world is my representation. The subject is the substrate of the world, the invariable condition, always implied by every phenomenon, of every object; for all that exists exists only for the subject." [Ref MRV] From contingency to necessity The article (Ref: MOND § Idoneity, Individuation and Existence are the essence of the subject.) already provides a detailed answer to the question: "Why is the representation by a subject consistent?" Reading this § is highly recommended. The conclusion is: ... idoneity, the Kantians"in mundo non datur ..., are part of the essence of the subject: the perspective of a subject is for himself and in essence, coherent, consistent, complete, idoneous. The coherence of our representations is not an accident, nor an opportunity, it is the very essence of our Existence. That is the point that we will go deeper into. For this the first question could be: what does Certainty of a Fact mean? - The fact that a present state of the physical world will have such a certain and universal consequence, which can be perceived by both Alice and Bob as by any subject? - The fact that, for Alice and Bob separately, their present representation of the world will make appear with certainty, each in her (his) future representation, a new Fact of representation? In the case of a fact Certain, the two hypothesis cannot be distinguished from each other: whether according to the path of necessity of the physical world or the path of certainty of the representations, Alice and Bob will find and share in the end the same fact that has occurred. So much so that one wonders what Alice is talking about when she says, for example, "the planet Venus will rise at 05:43 tomorrow", is it a necessary fact of the world or a fact Certain of her representation? It should be noted that, fact of the world or fact of knowledge, the very possibility of this statement (what makes sense of its formal content) presupposes as a prerequisite an extraordinary amount of Facts of Knowledge. Similarly, when we say,'"Next spring nature will be reborn," we do not know whether the stated necessity belongs to the physical world or to the world of our representations. This new example, however, allows us to make progress in our analysis: The relationship (in the physical world) of the state of nature at Christmas to its rebirth in the spring, although necessary, is actually made up of an extraordinarily complex bundle of contingent relationships. These contingencies not only affect some partial final results: a tree will be reborn or not, a seed will germinate here or elsewhere, but the causal path itself is contingent: such bee will fertilize one flower or another, it will rain here and not there, etc. ... Similarly, when I state "I will die" as a necessary truth in the physical world, the paths of my life as well as the circumstances of my death are contingent. It must be understood that the one-dimensional arrow → which describes the necessary consequential relationship from A to B, A and B being designated as states of fact, in what we call the physical world, certainly describes a reality but not the reality. The succession of winter and spring, my death, are already and inevitably a "factual judgment" which presents as 'one and necessary' what is actually 'complex and contingent'. So here is a new key: Even in the hypothesis of the physical world, contingency, far from being an obstacle to necessity, is in a way its substance. To be more precise, it is in the complexity of the contingent routes that the necessity "necessarily" appears in the form of Individuation. In a contingent and complex path, the probability of Individuated solutions is infinitely close to one. Individuation is necessary. The same applies to the necessary relationship between the state of some-thing P at the moment t and its state at the moment t+dt. Although in the extensionnal multiplicity of our representation the linear trajectory in the space of phases from the Pt state to the Pt+dt state may appear to us certain and Individuated, the intensionnal reality of which it is the meaning is complex and contingent (but necessarily individuating). Let us note that contrary to a first intuition, the “necessary” paths are not simple and monodirectional, quite the contrary: the more the paths are complex, the more the attractor to which they lead is powerful and complex, the more they appear as One and necessary. Determinism is not simplicity. The necessity that appears to the meaning is a predicate, a meta-Fact of representation, its intensional reality, beyond the horizon of meaning, is a factual judgment on a complex net of contingencies. It should be noted that according to this formulation, it is the existence of solutions in its principle that is necessary but not their particular instances. We now need to understand why such a specific instance would be necessary. Time, contingency and necessity: On this question, the difference between the hypothesis of the physical world and that of the world of representation lies in the idea of time: (Ref: CNT) In the hypothesis of the physical world, time and space are preconditions for the future of the world. For the OK the sense of representation is animated by the very nature of the representation. The subject discovers the meaning of his representation over a time of his own. Moreover, this time applies only to what is represented and does not apply beyond a horizon of meaning, to the intensional reality of facts which is unspeakable, formless, not subject to time. These different conceptions of time lead to different conceptions of necessity, contingency and their interweaving. Science is still struggling to provide these concepts with a satisfactory framework in the event of a physical world governed by time. This is the case, for example, with quantum mechanics. This is also the case of Darwinian theory, which, situating the necessity of evolution within a temporal framework, presents this epistemological weakness that it describes the principle that allows us to describe it (Ref: OK). In the OK hypothesis, it is in the unspeakable reality, not subject to time, that one must think of the necessity of the principle of Individuation despite the contingency of its instances, the detail is given by the article "Introduction to the OK" (Ref: OdC). Let us say here that the necessity (probability 1) that appears to the subject as a relationship in time, is the form given to an intensional reality, unspeakable, formless, not subject to time. All possible instances, all specific solutions of the necessary principle of Individuation are Actual (as would all possible propositions of a language, resp. all possible solutions of a system of equations) but not Existent (not expressed, resp. not calculated) The knowing subject and its representation (which are one!) is one of those eigen-solutions. The time of the subject is representation, discovery of a meaning that emerges from what was In-act (always there) but unspeakable. Note that In-act does not mean "of all times" but "not subject to time" The meaning of the "I" is the certainty that the subject has to still be that same "I" the next moment. This need for the "I," the Individuation of meaning, is a eigen-solution to the principle of Individuation. The Individuation of the subject seems to him as an ever-future promise, but beyond the horizon of meaning, it is In-act. The conditions of my future coherence are "out of time" The fact that the world evolves for me without hiatus and perpetuates my Individuation, what the OK refers to as the idoneity of my perspective, is an Actual certitude, an Actual meta-fact that leads to an Actual solution. If I remain one, if my representation of the world remains idoneous, it is not by chance, by accident, nor by a series of trials and errors, nor by the design of a supreme being but because the "thread of Interdependence" that follows this "I" represents an Actual instance of a necessary principle, giving meaning to an Actual reality, i.e. out of time. The same analysis can be made about the whole of humanity: If humanity remains one, if the common perspective of humanity is coherent, idoneous and perpetuates its Individuation, it is not by chance, by accident, nor by a series of trials and errors but because the "thread of Interdependence" that follows this "we" is an Actual instance of a necessary principle, giving meaning to an Actual reality, i.e. out of time. Meaning is in collective thought as much as in the individual thought. To the questions: "So everything would be written already?" "Are we reduced to discovering what is already In-act?" "The necessary, the contingent, the free choice, the impossible even, would they be an illusion?" The answer would be "We are representation, we are meaning. It is in the world of meaning that we exist and this world is subject to time, necessity, contingency, free choice and impossibility." On either side of the horizon of meaning. We represent the past (including the very moment it made sense) as an always necessary truth. What happened, both the facts and the paths taken, necessarily happened, and not otherwise. As soon as the coin stops spinning, we have won or lost, necessarily. Regarding the past we talk about uncertainties but never contingencies... In the bundle of relationships leading to this result which, a thousandth of a second before was for me a contingent future and which, now that I know it, seems to me a necessary truth, when does disappear the contingency and appear the necessity? I recommend that the reader design for himself, as an exercise, a series of increasingly complex, increasingly detailed devices that will show him that in principle, chance disappears only when the result is acknowledged by the subject. We still need to define the word "acknowledge": Our findings are based on our sensations and the OK shows (see § 4) that sensation is not an intelligible phenomenon that presents itself as "Individuated and necessary" to the understanding. Sensations co-emerge, in relation to each other and because of these relationships, from our global capacity to give meaning, our perspective. This phenomenon of co-emergence out of the perspective is a probabilistic process. As a result, the boundary between contingency and necessity cannot be properly located, except in the Act of Creation of Meaning. We now know that the "necessary truth of the past" is only true at the so-called macroscopic scale, for the speakable, because beyond the horizon of meaning, contingency also affects the past: In the experience of Young's slots "everything happens as if" (as usually said) the photon had passed through both the slots of the screen. What appears as necessary truth below the horizon of meaning, in the macroscopic world of my representation, is contingent beyond, in the unspeakable microscopic reality. The contingency (of the past) does not cross the horizon of meaning. The intensional reality of the photon's (past) journey is complex and contingent but it becomes a necessary truth when an experience gives it a (macroscopic) meaning to the subject. Let us not misunderstand the term 'macroscopic': it is not related to the experimental device as such, but to that a Fact (a singularity) only exists, only makes sense, if its importance is not zero in the perspective of the subject. Similarly Alice can see nothing impossible (for example the same Fact here and there at the same time) on the scale of the dicible. Similarly, the irreversibility of time relates only to the dicible, it is a meta-fact of representation. It is the representation that is, in essence, a step forward (ref: CNT). For the subject, the propositions: “What is revealed is necessary” and “My time is irreversible” are equivalent. Nothing can be said beyond. Similarly for continuity, it is the statistical principle of constitution of meaning that imposes the continuity of meaning. The continuity of reality means nothing beyond the horizon of meaning. The Transaction that brings out the meaning replaces a dicible and necessary path in time for complex, contingent, out-of-time journeys. No surprise in this proposition since we have already shown that the Existence of the world represented is also that of the "I" whose Meaning expresses the certainty of still being "I" at the instant of after. It is only at the dicible, macroscopic scale that necessity and time prevail. Our perspectives, based on billions of billions of relationships, are idoneous in that they do not call into question our Individuation. This allows us a more rigorous definition of the term "macroscopic" in the quantum sense: We will say : a macroscopic truth is necessary to my Individuation. Why is every speakable truth consistent? Necessity, coherence, continuity, idoneity must be rethought as predicates, de facto judgments on an In-act, "out of time", reality. We are a solution to a principle that transcends us: the Logos that applies to the In-act reality. Although unspeakable, the conditions that impose coherence and necessity, idoneity in our representations are "In-act" , "always already present" Consistency and necessity of meaning owe nothing to a miracle: they are essential to representation: The Facts make sense, i.e. Exist, have importance in the perspective of the subject, in that they contribute to his perenity, to his Individuation. But the "I", my Individuation is an In-act solution of the Logos applied to the reality In-act, i.e. out of time. Just as in the resolution of a system of equations, I only discover one by one the results whose coherence is already In-act in the original system. This is not a chance if every piece of meaning fits so well in our individual and collective representations: Meaning is idoneity, consistency, necessity. Because we are reality, we are Actual idoneous eigen-solutions to the Logos. Shared experience: Let's see now the contingent Fact: Alice and Bob have prepared an experiment leading to two possible facts F1 and F2, exclusive to each other. Alice could acknowledge either F1 or F2, without questioning the consistency of her representation. But the find by Alice of F1 and Bob of F2, if they share it, cannot call into question the coherence of the perspective of their humanity, because their humanity is an idoneous path and this idioneity is of extraordinary persistence. The conditions of this idoneity, the coherence of Alice and Bob observations are In-act (out of time). If the finding is macroscopic, as soon as the evidence of it is shared, this evidence will be the same for Alice and Bob. Existing is non contradictory because it is necessity for the subject's individuation, whether it is Alice's, Bob's or {Alice and Bob}'s The relative position of their experiences in time and space of the representations does not change anything to this. Since our existence is a condition to all questions, the correct question is not "How do we exist in the world?" but "How does the world exist for us" 6-Reversion of lntelligibility. Let's quote again D. Mermin (ref MBSQM): "I have used myself as one example of a perceiving subject. I could equally well have written “you” or “Alice” or “Bob”. I focus on one particular subject, both to underline the unbreakable privacy of the directly perceived experience of each and every one of us, and also to emphasize that each of us has their own personal model of the world, based on their own private body of experience. » The OK shows that if our representations of the world evolve individually, this Individuation is infinitely less "solipsistic" than the individuation of our physical becomings. To eliminate redundancies between the former and the latter why not make our physical becoming a mere representation of that of our Knowledge? Why not reverse the direction of intelligibility? Again, the OK shares the QBiste point of view, except that the word "experience", if not defined, casts doubt on the meaning of the proposition. A thought experiment is an "experience" according to the QBism Is there anything other than thought experiments? Does representation of the subject change by its own power or is it forced to change because of an outside world? As we have seen before, the OK clearly responds ,"representation of the subject changes by its own Power* and its own Necessity* according to the Principle of Logos" *Power and Necessity are not psychological but refer to meta-facts of pure logic. The consequences of this proposition alone would deserve a book. Let's settle for general ideas hereunder: -It is not the world that is intelligible to us, it is our representation that gives form to an otherwise formless reality. -Each subject gives form to the world according to an universal principle that transcends him and within a framework that overhelms him and which could be referred to as his cultural framework in the broadest sense. -Man's representation of the world is necessarily anthropocentric -The separation is not between object and subject but between the In-Act, formless reality and the Meaning, between the below and the beyond a horizon of the Meaning. -This Separation is a Cut, the beyond the horizon is not descriptible by the forms that describe the below. -This horizon closes our representation, not only towards the infinitely large but also towards the infinitely small, the passed, the future, the too complex... -Science, pure sciences and physical sciences must integrate the knowing subject and his horizon of representation. -Pure sciences (see ref LAMG) as well as the physical sciences (cosmology, RG, QM) can only demonstrate the certainty of our Existence. -Darwinian evolution can also be rethought in terms of representation. -Representation is not a container of semantic Beings ordained according to an N-dimensional logic (otherwise impossible to describe) but a system of possible interdependent Facts. -The Meaning of Knowledge extends (for itself) through the appearance of Facts among the possible, according to a law of probabilities that represents its Power and its Necessity. -The Meaning of our Knowledge and Facts that it com-prehends is represented in the world we know. -The Reality of our Knowledge and its possible Facts cannot be represented in the world we know. -Our Reality cannot be represented in the world we know. This final statement may sound as a revival of the Cretan paradox, and it is actually. OK cannot pretend to describe with words what it demonstrates as not descriptible with words. Let's consider that as a good new: there is still some truth beyond OK. Appendix The OK and the tractatus (TMP) by L. Wittgenstein It seems interesting to me for the reader to reinterpret in the light of the OK the few stanzas below from L.Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1 - The world is all that takes place. 1.1 - The world is the totality of facts, not things. 1.11 -The world is determined by the facts, and by that they are all facts. 1.12 - For the totality of the facts determines what takes place, and also everything that does not take place. 1.13 - Facts in logical space are the world. 1.2 - The world breaks down into facts. 1.21 - Something in isolation may or may not happen, and everything else will remain unchanged. 2 - What takes place, the fact, is the subsistance (1) of states-of-thing . 2.0141 - The possibility of its occurrence in states of things is the shape of the object. 2.0121 - .... (Something logical can only be possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.) (1). Subsistance translates here the word 'das Bestehen'. the translator of the TMP notes: The translation "existence" seems to me to refer too directly to the encroachment, when it is essentially existence in logical space. "Existence" will translate: Existenz, a term that seems to be used most often in an even more abstract sense, for example the existence of a concept. Author's Note: While I understand the translator's intent, the term Existence as defined by the OK seems to me to be quite appropriate to convey LW's idea that "all (logical) possibilities are facts" (are actual according to the Definition OK) while only some come to Exist (according to the OK definition) as "state-of-thing", thus moving from the logical world to the physical world. The author: Jean-Louis Boucon E-mail : [email protected] Blog : http://jlboucon-philo.over-blog.com/ Références : Ref QBI An Introduction to QBism with an Application to the Locality of Quantum Mechanics Christopher Fuchs, David Mermin, Rüdiger Schack https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.5253 Ref MQIP Mécanique Quantique, une introduction philosophique Michel Bitbol Ed. Champs Flammarion 1999 Ref MBSQM Making Better Sense of Quantum Mechanics David Mermin https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.01639 Ref DMQB David Mermin on Quantum Bayesianism Lubos Motl https://motls.blogspot.com/2014/04/david-mermin-on-quantum-bayesianism.html Ref CIQM Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics Jan Faye https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/#NewPer Ref ILFI : L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information Gilbert Simondon Réédition. Millon 2005 Ref MEOT : Du mode d’existence des objets techniques Gilbert Simondon Aubier, Paris, 1989 Ref CRP : Critique de la raison pure Emmanuel Kant Ed G Flammarion 2001 Ref QRPR : De la quadruple racine du principe de raison suffisante Arthur Schopenhauer Ed. Vrin 1991 Ref MVR : Le monde comme Volonté et comme Représentation Arthur Schopenhauer www.schopenhauer.fr Ref NoK : Œuvres choisies – notes sur Kant Maine de Biran 1942 Aubier Ed. Montaigne II - Détermination du fait primitif du sens intime. P77-89 Ref DAI : De l’aperception immédiate Mémoire de Berlin 1807 Maine de Biran Ed. Classiques de poche Ref PHP : Hilary Putmann l'héritage pragmatiste C. Tiercelin Ed Collège de France coll Métaphysique et connaissance Publications of the author : available in pdf on www.academia.edu Ref OdC Introduction to Ontology of Knowledge Ref TRANS The Ontology of Knowledge and the transcendantal Ref PLOC The philosophy of language and the Ontology of Knowledge Ref LOGEX From Logical to Existing Ref LAMG The Ontology of Knowledge, logic, arithmetic, sets theory and geometry Ref BQOC Beyond Qbism with the Ontology of Knowledge Ref SOLI Is Ontology of Knowledge a solipsism ? Ref MOND The Ontology of Knowledge and the form of the world Ref CNT A natural concept of time Ref COG The concept of grounding and the Ontology of Knowledge Published Book: Ref UPF : L’Univers n’a pas la forme Jean-Louis Boucon Ed. Mon petit éditeur 2013