Will Ukraine’s Far-Right Parties Fail Again in 2019?

Utrikespolitiska Institutet Brief, 2020

Ukraine’s system of political parties has since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 featured a small number of far-right political parties. How strong is the Ukrainian far right movement today? How has the movement performed in the recent Ukrainian elections and which role does the movement play in the Ukrainian civil society?

In the context of the rise of radical right-wing parties in most European countries, the enduring absence of a far-right group in the Ukrainian parliament seems paradoxical. However, recent developments, namely the victory of the far-right ‘Freedom’ Party (All-Ukrainian Union ‘Freedom’, Vseukrayins’ke ob’’ednannya ‘Svoboda’) in the 2009 Ternopil regional elections seems to attest to the gradual revival of the radical right in Ukraine. The article considers the far-right legacy in Ukraine and the reasons why it failed in the post-Soviet period, and then focuses on the history of the Freedom Party and discusses its prospects at the national level.

International Policy Analysis ISBN 978-3-86498-325-2, 2012

The major political forces in Ukraine do not have a well-articulated ideology. An analysis of the gradual emergence of the Svoboda (Freedom) party into the political mainstream since 2001 and as a contender in the October 2012 parliamentary elections reveals that this party is the flagship of core extreme right ideology.

On Sunday, Ukraine is to hold its parliamentary elections -the eighth time in its history as an independent state. And this time, the things are way different as compared to any other round of elections that was ever held in the country. This article would aim to describe:

The year 2019 will be an election year in Ukraine, with a presidential election in the spring and a parliamentary election in the autumn. The short timeframe and the order in which these two elections will be held increase the chances of the winner of the presidential election forming the largest faction in parliament. The first phase of election campaigning has already begun, with Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko as the main contenders, but opinion polls are inconclusive. The atmosphere surrounding the campaign is one of mistrust on the part of voters in the authorities and the political class. Ukraine's Euromaidan Revolution created expectations politicians could not fulfil. The incumbent president is trying to consolidate those closest to him and eliminate any rivals so as to become the only choice for governmental rule before active campaigning begins. Poroshenko is also bringing financial, media, and administrative resources to bear to reduce his rivals' potential and increase his impact on voters. In addition to stressing foreign policy successes and achievements in reforming the country, campaigning will also feature anti-Russian rhetoric and an emphasis on the sense of subjectivity that Ukraine and its people, (re)gained as a result of the Revolution. More assertive rhetoric towards international financial institutions, the EU, and certain Member States can also be expected. Though the electoral mechanism is set to go into full swing in September, whether the campaign will ultimately be successful remains in doubt. Support for Poroshenko is declining and is at its lowest since 2014. Cracks within the ruling camp are increasingly evident, with no apparent vision as to how to compete effectively with Yulia Tymoshenko, tipped by polls as the favourite. Tymoshenko has profited from both errors and inaction, and from reform carried out by the post-Maidan authorities which has had painful consequences for society. The president's chances of re-election will be slight without some new and irrefutable success to show the electorate. Partners and other key political players cannot fail to notice the signs of Poroshenko's vulnerability. Their current support for Poroshenko is not absolute, and they could shift their support to a more promising candidate. This means that in Ukraine the old alliances are going out of fashion, and at the same time no new alliances have yet been established. An intense battle has begun behind the scenes between the oligarchs and politicians, from which the main contenders for power in 2019 will emerge.

Jacobin, 2019

The astonishing results for Zelenskiy and his party are indisputable signs of a profound crisis of Ukraine’s political, economic, as well as intellectual, elites. The presidential and political elections of 2019 showed a huge demand for alternative ones. The demand for a deeper change — and an alternative project for national development — can only grow as disappointment with these “new faces” mounts. Indeed, for a poor country torn by many internal and geopolitical contradictions, achieving such change is a question of survival.

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW, 2023

Diana Șoșoacă is a member of the Romanian Parliament who entered politics amid the spread of anti-vaccination views in society during the Covid-19 pandemic. She advocates conservative rather than nationalist ideas. Diana Șoșoacă’s scandalous pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian statements, such as regarding the annexation of the territories of Ukraine, are a logical extension of her political narrative, which contradicts the official course of the Romanian government on this issue. Such ideas are supported by a small part of Romanians society, mainly extreme right and conservatives.

Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, 2013

2013