A New Basis for Moral Philosophy.pdf

ALISTAIR MORRISON AND STAFF 152 m y th : th e jo u rn e y o f th e Id e a a s a " s h ip w re c k in to N a tu re ," a c a s tin g its e lf o u t in to c o n tin g e n t e x is te n c e , w h ic h is S p irit's firs t, p a in fu l s te p to w a rd s b u ild in g its e lf a s p le n d id m o n u m e n t o u t o f n a tu re ; th e n th e Id e a 's u ltim a te re tu rn h o m e fro m th e v o y a g e o f its e x te rio r e x is te n c e -a re c o n c ilia tio n o f th e u n iv e rs a l a n d in d iv id u a l in th e fu lly c o n c re - tized Idea, Spirit's new creation. ~ \&\~ L a n g a n s u c c e e d s in d e m o n s tra tin g th e w a y in w h ic h th e H e g e lia n s y s te m h e lp e d to g iv e M a lla rrn e 's p o e try its tig h t u n ity , re fle c tin g H e g e l's p ro je c t, m e th o d , e v e n v o c a b u la ry a n d rh y th m . A t th e s a m e tim e , th e a u th o r's a n a ly s is o ffe rs a ric h u n d e rs ta n d in g of H egel th ro u g h s u c h n o tio n s a s : th e c u lm in a tio n o f n a tu re a n d h is to ry , th e n o tio n o f s c ie n c e a s s e rtin g its e lf a s a b s o lu te s c ie n c e , a n d th e tru th o f S p irit a s k n o w in g its e lf to b e in fin ite w ith in fin itu d e . T h is c o m p a ra tiv e s tu d y b ro u g h t to g e th e r tw o d is p a ra te fig u re s w ith s e n s itiv ity a n d v is io n . It o ffe rs a p h ilo s o p h ic a l a c c o u n t th a t is b o th c o m p e llin g a n d c o n v in c in g .-Irm g a rd B. S c h e re r, Washingtan, D.G. 1· \.~\ if -r L E E ,K ., A New Basis for Moral Philosophy. B o s to n : R o u tle d g e a n d K e g a n P a u l, 1 9 8 5 . x v + 2 5 2 p p . $ 3 6 .9 5 .-A s its title im p lie s , th is b o o k is m e a n t to g iv e a n e w fo u n d a tio n to m o ra l p h ilo s o p h y . In th e s e n s e m e a n t, a fo u n d a tio n is a c o g n itiv e g ro u n d in g . L e e is o p p o s in g th e various non-naturalist 'volitionalisms' that have proved so influentia l in re c e n t m o ra l p h ilo s o p h y . T h e b u rd e n o f h e r b o o k is to s h o w th a t th e n o n -n a tu ra lis t c la im th a t th e re is n o g ro u n d in g fo r v a lu e s in facts is unwarranted. This claim is due, she says, to positivism and e m p iric is m a n d th e a s s o c ia te d c o n te n tio n th a t k n o w le d g e is o n ly p o s s ib le o n th e b a s is o f s tric t d e d u c tio n s o r s tric t im p lic a tio n s fro m e v id e n c e . If e v id e n c e E d o e s n o t s tric tly im p ly a s s e rtio n A, th e n A is irra tio n a l a n d u n ju s tifie d . B u t to m a in ta in th is , s a y s L e e , is to c o n d e m n o n e s e lf to a b s u rd ity . S tric t im p lic a tio n d o e s n o t in fa c t o b ta in in a n y s p h e re o f c o g n itiv e d is c o u rs e (e x c e p t m a th e m a tic s a n d lo g ic ), s o if m o ra l c la im s a re irra tio n a l b e c a u s e th e y la c k s tric t im p lic a tio n from evidence, then claims in many other spheres are irrational, and th is c o n s e q u e n c e is a b s u rd . T h e re fo re , s h e s a y s , p e o p le s h o u ld c e a s e fin d in g fa u lt w ith m o ra l c la im s a s if th e y w e re s o m e h o w u n iq u e ly d e fic ie n t in th is re s p e c t. L e e a tte m p ts to s h o w th a t s tric t im p lic a tio n is n o t n e c e s s a ry fo r v a lid ity a n d ra tio n a lity in a rg u m e n t, a n d th a t th e re is a v ia b le a lte r- native, what she calls "epistemic implication." She accepts the claim of prescriptivists like Hare that "is" does not strictly imply "ought." But "ought" does epistemically imply "is." Assertions, including m o ra l a s s e rtio n s , o rd in a rily re q u ire e v id e n c e to b a c k th e m u p , b u t n o t a n y th in g w ill d o a s e v id e n c e . If e v id e n c e E is re a lly to c o u n t a s e v id e n c e fo r a s s e rtio n A th e n E m u s t s a tis fy : (a) re fe re n tia l re le v a n c e (A a n d E m u s t re fe r to th e s a m e o b je c t), (b) c a u s a l re le v a n c e , a n d (c ) its c a u s a l re le v a n c e m u s t b e in d e p e n d e n t o f p rio r c o m m itm e n ts to A. To cite one's personal commitment to torturing enemies as evi- d e n c e th a t e n e m ie s s h o u ld b e to rtu re d fa ils (a). T o c ite in te rfe re n c e SUMMARIES AND 153 COMMENTS w ith flu te -p la y in g a s e v id e n c e th a t to rtu re o u g h t to b e a v o id e d fa ils (b). T o s a y o n e s h o u ld d is c rim in a te a g a in s t b la c k s in s e llin g h o u s e s b e c a u s e b la c k s lo w e r th e v a lu e o f h o u s e s fa ils (0 ). T h e lo w e rin g o f h o u s e -v a lu e s o n ly o c c u rs b e c a u s e p e o p le a re a lre a d y p re ju d ic e d a g a in s t b la c k s . If E d o e s s a tis fy th e s e re q u ire m e n ts a n d is tru e th e n A is c o rro b o ra te d o r s u p p o rte d . S u c h is th e th e o ry . I d o u b t, h o w e v e r, if it w ill d o th e jo b in re fu tin g n o n -n a tu ra lis m th a t L e e h o p e s it w ill. H e r p o s itio n is ra th e r lik e th a t a d v o c a te d b y F o o t a n d A n s c o m b e s o m e th irty y e a rs a g o . S h e , lik e th e m , s a y s th a t o n e c a n n o t a d o p t a rb itra ry m o ra l c o m m itm e n ts ; one must give reasons for them, and these reasons must be serious a n d n o t triv ia l. T h a t is th e p o in t o f e p is te m ic im p lic a tio n , w h ic h o n e m ig h t s e e a s a n a tte m p t to fo rm a liz e th e c ritic is m s o f F o o t a n d A n s c o m b e . B u t H a re , w h o m a ll th e s e th re e a re a tta c k in g , h a s n e v e r d e n ie d th a t s o m e c o m m itm e n ts m ig h t b e a rb itra ry . W hat he has in s is te d is th a t th e y a re a t le a s t p o s s ib le b e c a u s e th e y d o n o t o ffe n d a g a in s t th e u s e , o r lo g ic , o f v a lu e te rm s . L e e n e v e r re a lly fa c e s . u p to th is . S h e is c o n te n t to re p e a t th e o rig in a l c h a rg e o f a rb itra rin e s s . B u t th is is n o t e n o u g h to re m o v e n o n -n a tu ra lis m . W h a t n e e d s to b e d o n e is to s h o w th a t s o m e c o m m itm e n ts , o r w a y s o f m a k in g c o m m itm e n ts , a re n o t ju s t a rb itra ry b u t s tric tly im p o s s ib le . T h is c ritic is m c a n b e re in fo rc e d in a n o th e r w a y . L e e s a y s th a t th e fa c t to rtu re c a u s e s p a in is le g itim a te e v id e n c e fo r s h o w in g it o u g h t to b e a v o id e d , fo r p a in is s o m e th in g w e a v o id . B u t h o w is th e fa c t th a t w e a v o id p a in s u p p o s e d to e s ta b lis h th a t p a in o u g h t to b e a v o id e d ? T h is is ju s t th e p o in t H a re in s is ts o n ; th e s h ift o f m o o d fro m " is " to " o u g h t" n e e d s to b e e x p la in e d a n d it is n o t e x p la in e d b y m e re ly re p e a tin g th e s h ift. It is , in fa c t, th is c h a n g e in m o o d th a t h a s in d u c e d non-naturalists to deny any strict entailment between "is" and "ought." An Haught" could never be entailed by an "is," not because n o fa c tu a l e v id e n c e w o u ld e v e r b e s u ffic ie n t (w h ic h m ig h t a ls o b e tru e of entailments between an "is" and an "is"), but because no factual e v id e n c e w o u ld e v e r b e in th e rig h t m o o d . In c o n fin in g h e rs e lf to ta lk a b o u t s tric t e n ta ilm e n t w ith o u t m e n tio n in g a n y th in g a b o u t th e q u e s tio n o f c h a n g e s in m o o d , L e e o b s c u re s th is p o in t. Lee, in fact, gives a false impression of what Hare's type of view is . S h e s a y s th a t, a c c o rd in g to th a t v ie w , w h a t m a k e s s o m e th in g rig h t is th e fa c t th a t th e a g e n t h a s a fa v o u ra b le a ttitu d e to w a rd s it (p p . 3 4 , 1 1 6 -7 , 1 2 2 ). B u t, a t le a s t fo r H a re , th is is fa ls e . S o m e th in g 's b e in g rig h t is n o t a fa c t, n o t e v e n th e fa c t th a t o n e h a s c e rta in a ttiT o s a y s o m e th in g is rig h t is n o t to state a n y th in g ; it is to prescribe, and prescriptions are not statements. All non-naturalists, Hare especially, maintain that "ought" propositions, insofar as they are evaluative, are not, and cannot be, statements. Lee seems to tu d e s . ig n o re th is p o in t. A s a re s u lt h e r c a s e a g a in s t n o n -n a tu ra lis m re a lly g e ts o ff th e g ro u n d . T h e b o o k n e v e rth e le s s h a s m e rits . never T h e re a re s o m e e x c e lle n t c riti- cisms of contemporary conceptual relativists, culminating in an exte n d e d c ritiq u e o f P o p p e r th a t is w e ll d o n e a n d m u c h n e e d e d . T h e th e o ry o f e p is te m ic im p lic a tio n its e lf, w h ile n o t s u c c e s s fu l a g a in s t 154 ALISTAIR MORRISON AND STAFF n o n -n a tu ra lism , is still a n in te re stin g id e a a n d d e se rv e s to b e e x a m in e d fro m th a t p o in t o f v ie w . T h e d isc u ssio n o f th e d iffe re n c e s b e tw e e n n e w a n d o ld (o r M illia n ) lib e ra lism , a n d th e e x te n d e d c ritiq u e o f n e w lib e ra lism a re a lso w o rth re a d in g -th o u g h I a m n o t c o n v in c e d th a t o ld lib e ra lism is re a lly a s v ia b le a n o p tio n a s L e e th in k s. S till, p ro v id e d o n e se p a ra te s th e m e rits fro m th e fa u lts in th is b o o k , a n d le a rn s fro m th e la tte r, it re p a y s th e tim e sp e n t in re a d in g it.-P e te r S im p so n , T h e C a t h o l i c U n i v e r s i t y o f A m e r i c a . L L A N OA , . M e ta f{ s ic a y L e n g u a je . P a m p lo n a : E d ic io n e s U n iv e rsid a d d e N a v a rra , S . A . (E U N S A ), 1 9 8 4 . 3 6 2 p p . 2 5 0 0 p e se ta s.-T h e te x t is d iv id e d in to fo u r c h a p te rs: 1 .0 M e ta p h y sic s, tra n sc e n d e n ta l p h ilo so p h y a n d a n a ly tic p h ilo so p h y ; 2 .0 T h e se n se s o f b e in g ( e l s e r ) ; 3 .0 B e in g a n d e x iste n c e ( s e r y e x i s t e n c i a ) ; a n d 4 .0 M o d a litie s. A fte r a d e fe n se o f c o n te m p o ra ry a n a ly tic p h ilo so p h y a g a in st th e u su a l c h a rg e (" la a c c u s a c i6 n m tis fr e c u e n te " ) o f its su p p o se d ly su p e rfic ia l c h a ra c te r a n d its la c k o f p h ilo so p h ic a l sig n ific a n c e ( " s u s u p u e s t o c a r d c t e r s u p e r fic ia l y . . . s u fa lta d e r e l i e v e j i l o s 6 j i c o , " p . 1 5 ), L la n o o ffe rs a th o u g h tfu l re a d in g o f W ittg e n ste in (se c tio n 1 .2 ) a g a in st h is a n c ie n t, m e d ie v a l a n d K a n tia n sc h o la stic b a c k g ro u n d (se c tio n 1 .1 ). F o llo w in g G ilso n 's h isto ric a l a n a ly sis, L la n o d ia g n o se s a "te n d e n c y to re fle c t u p o n c o n c e p ts w ith th e risk o f fo rg e ttin g th e re a l th in g s w h o se n a tu re s th e se c o n c e p ts re p re se n t.. .. W h ile th e sc h o la stic ism m o st d ire c tly b o u n d to A risto tle k e p t th e c o n sid e ra tio n o f re a l, c o n c re te b e in g firm ly in v ie w , D u n s S c o tu s-in a d ire c tio n a lre a d y p o in te d o u t b y A v ic e n n a -w a s c o m p le te ly o c c u p ie d w ith th e c o n c e p t o f p u re b e in g (1 0 p u r a m e n te e n t e ) ; a c o n c e p t w h ic h , b y b e in g a b stra c t, w a s u n d e rsto o d a s u n iv o c a l. T h is p e rsp e c tiv e le d h im to 'p re sc in d ' fro m th e actual reality of things, i.e., from their real existence; because, alth o u g h e x iste n c e itse lf is a n o tio n o r r a t i o k n o w a b le in th e o b je c t, it is n e v e rth e le ss re q u ire d a s a c tu a lly b e lo n g in g to th e o b je c t i n s o f u r a s i t is k n o w a b l e : 'e x i s t e n t i a n o n e s t p e r s e r a tio o b i e c t i , u t s c i b i l e e s t ' " (p . 2 5 ). A g a in st th is b a c k g ro u n d , b e in g is ta k e n a s in te llig ib ility , in v o lv in g a re la tio n sh ip to th e u n d e rsta n d in g th a t lo g ic iz e s th e m e a n in g o f b e in g itse lf so th a t "th e fo rm a l-e sse n tia l d im e n sio n ta k e s u n to itse lf th e w h o le w e ig h t o f re a lity " a n d " e s s e is re d u c e d to a q u a si-a c c id e n ta l m o d e o f th e e sse n c e " (p . 2 5 ), w h ic h c o m e s to b e th e m a tiz e d in its o w n rig h t a s "th e r e a l m o d a l i t y , u n til a lin g u istic a n a ly sis, w h ic h c a n a c c e p t o n ly th e l o g i c a l m o d a l i t y , p a ssin g th ro u g h th e lo g ic o -tra n se e n d e n ta l m e d ia tio n o f th e g n o s e o l o g i c a l m o d a l i t y " (p . 2 6 ). B e in g is a c c o rd in g ly p ro g re ssiv e ly "re a b so rb e d in to h u m a n th o u g h t a n d la te r in to v a rio u s a n th ro p o lo g ic a l d im e n sio n s (la n g u a g e , a c tio n , so c ia l stru c tu re , c o rp o ra lity ... )" (p . 2 6 ). S e c tio n 1 .3 , "T o w a rd a re a list semantics," starts from Frege's attack on psychologism in the Fauna n d le a d s to a re in sta te m e n t o f A risto te lia n o f A r ith m e tic se m a n tic s in se c tio n l A , "W o rd a n d c o n c e p t." C h a p te r 2 d e a ls w ith th e sta n d a rd to p ic s: 2 .1 , P re d ic a tio n , id e n tity , e x iste n c e ; 2 .2 , b e in g in d a tio n s