Papers by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Oxford University Press eBooks, Sep 19, 2019
Scrupulosity is a form of OCD that raises philosophical puzzles because of its superficial simila... more Scrupulosity is a form of OCD that raises philosophical puzzles because of its superficial similarities to morally extreme, non-pathological motivation. Cases of Scrupulosity are first presented, then Scrupulosity is characterized as a form of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) because of its moral or religious obsessions and/or compulsions and its underlying anxiety. Scrupulosity is specifically characterized by perfectionism, chronic doubt and intolerance of uncertainty, and moral thought-action fusion. It is a mental illness and not simply religious devotion, moral virtue, or strength of character. Scrupulous moral judgments differ from genuine moral judgments because their underlying anxiety leads to systematic distortions and leads those with Scrupulosity to act in a way that primarily soothes their anxiety instead of responding to the morally relevant features of the situation. People with Scrupulosity are likely less accountable for harms they cause, which can be explained by reasons-responsiveness theories of responsibility. There is justification for treating Scrupulosity over moral objection without imposing the therapist’s own moral standards.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Sep 19, 2019
Scrupulosity is a form of OCD that raises philosophical puzzles because of its superficial simila... more Scrupulosity is a form of OCD that raises philosophical puzzles because of its superficial similarities to morally extreme, non-pathological motivation. Cases of Scrupulosity are first presented, then Scrupulosity is characterized as a form of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) because of its moral or religious obsessions and/or compulsions and its underlying anxiety. Scrupulosity is specifically characterized by perfectionism, chronic doubt and intolerance of uncertainty, and moral thought-action fusion. It is a mental illness and not simply religious devotion, moral virtue, or strength of character. Scrupulous moral judgments differ from genuine moral judgments because their underlying anxiety leads to systematic distortions and leads those with Scrupulosity to act in a way that primarily soothes their anxiety instead of responding to the morally relevant features of the situation. People with Scrupulosity are likely less accountable for harms they cause, which can be explained by reasons-responsiveness theories of responsibility. There is justification for treating Scrupulosity over moral objection without imposing the therapist’s own moral standards.
Current Psychology
This cross-cultural study compared judgments of moral wrongness for physical and emotional harm w... more This cross-cultural study compared judgments of moral wrongness for physical and emotional harm with varying combinations of in-group vs. out-group agents and victims across six countries: the United States of America (N = 937), the United Kingdom (N = 995), Romania (N = 782), Brazil (N = 856), South Korea (N = 1776), and China (N = 1008). Consistent with our hypothesis we found evidence of an insider agent effect, where moral violations committed by outsider agents are generally considered more morally wrong than the same violations done by insider agents. We also found support for an insider victim effect where moral violations that were committed against an insider victim generally were seen as more morally wrong than when the same violations were committed against an outsider, and this effect held across all countries. These findings provide evidence that the insider versus outsider status of agents and victims does affect moral judgments. However, the interactions of these iden...
Current Psychology
This cross-cultural study compared judgments of moral wrongness for physical and emotional harm w... more This cross-cultural study compared judgments of moral wrongness for physical and emotional harm with varying combinations of in-group vs. out-group agents and victims across six countries: the United States of America (N = 937), the United Kingdom (N = 995), Romania (N = 782), Brazil (N = 856), South Korea (N = 1776), and China (N = 1008). Consistent with our hypothesis we found evidence of an insider agent effect, where moral violations committed by outsider agents are generally considered more morally wrong than the same violations done by insider agents. We also found support for an insider victim effect where moral violations that were committed against an insider victim generally were seen as more morally wrong than when the same violations were committed against an outsider, and this effect held across all countries. These findings provide evidence that the insider versus outsider status of agents and victims does affect moral judgments. However, the interactions of these iden...
Judgment and Decision Making
As the study of moral judgments grows, it becomes imperative to compare results across studies in... more As the study of moral judgments grows, it becomes imperative to compare results across studies in order to create unified theories within the field. These efforts are potentially undermined, however, by variations in wording used by different researchers. The current study sought to determine whether, when, and how variations in wording influence moral judgments. Online participants responded to 15 different moral vignettes (e.g., the trolley problem) using 1 of 4 adjectives: “wrong”, “inappropriate”, “forbidden”, or “blameworthy”. For half of the sample, these adjectives were preceded by the adverb “morally”. Results indicated that people were more apt to judge an act as wrong or inappropriate than forbidden or blameworthy, and that disgusting acts were rated as more acceptable when “morally” was included. Although some wording differences emerged, effects sizes were small and suggest that studies of moral judgment with different wordings can legitimately be compared.
Judgment and Decision Making
As the study of moral judgments grows, it becomes imperative to compare results across studies in... more As the study of moral judgments grows, it becomes imperative to compare results across studies in order to create unified theories within the field. These efforts are potentially undermined, however, by variations in wording used by different researchers. The current study sought to determine whether, when, and how variations in wording influence moral judgments. Online participants responded to 15 different moral vignettes (e.g., the trolley problem) using 1 of 4 adjectives: “wrong”, “inappropriate”, “forbidden”, or “blameworthy”. For half of the sample, these adjectives were preceded by the adverb “morally”. Results indicated that people were more apt to judge an act as wrong or inappropriate than forbidden or blameworthy, and that disgusting acts were rated as more acceptable when “morally” was included. Although some wording differences emerged, effects sizes were small and suggest that studies of moral judgment with different wordings can legitimately be compared.
Judgment and Decision Making
The Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFVs) – a recently developed set of brief scenarios depicting vi... more The Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFVs) – a recently developed set of brief scenarios depicting violations of various moral foundations – enables investigators to directly examine differences in moral judgments about different topics. In the present study, we adapt the MFV instrument for use in the Portuguese language. To this end, the following steps were performed: 1) Translation of the MFV instrument from English to Portuguese language in Brazil; 2) Synthesis of translated versions; 3) Evaluation of the synthesis by expert judges; 4) Evaluation of the MFV instrument by university students from Sao Paulo City; 5) Back translation; and lastly, 6) Validation study, which used a sample of 494 (385f) university students from Sao Paulo city and a set of 68 vignettes, subdivided into seven factors. Exploratory analyses show that the relationships between the moral foundations and political ideology are similar to those found in previous studies, but the severity of moral judgment on indi...
Judgment and Decision Making
The Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFVs) – a recently developed set of brief scenarios depicting vi... more The Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFVs) – a recently developed set of brief scenarios depicting violations of various moral foundations – enables investigators to directly examine differences in moral judgments about different topics. In the present study, we adapt the MFV instrument for use in the Portuguese language. To this end, the following steps were performed: 1) Translation of the MFV instrument from English to Portuguese language in Brazil; 2) Synthesis of translated versions; 3) Evaluation of the synthesis by expert judges; 4) Evaluation of the MFV instrument by university students from Sao Paulo City; 5) Back translation; and lastly, 6) Validation study, which used a sample of 494 (385f) university students from Sao Paulo city and a set of 68 vignettes, subdivided into seven factors. Exploratory analyses show that the relationships between the moral foundations and political ideology are similar to those found in previous studies, but the severity of moral judgment on indi...
Judgment and Decision Making
The moral dumbfounding phenomenon for harmless taboo violations is often cited as a critical piec... more The moral dumbfounding phenomenon for harmless taboo violations is often cited as a critical piece of empirical evidence motivating anti-rationalist models of moral judgment and decision-making. Moral dumbfounding purportedly occurs when an individual remains obstinately and steadfastly committed to a moral judgment or decision even after admitting inability to provide reasons and arguments to support it (Haidt, 2001). Early empirical support for the moral dumbfounding phenomenon led some philosophers and psychologists to suggest that affective reactions and intuitions, in contrast with reasons or reasoning, are the predominant drivers of moral judgments and decisions. We investigate an alternative reason-based explanation for moral dumbfounding: that putatively harmless taboo violations are judged to be morally wrong because of the high perceived likelihood that the agents could have caused harm, even though they did not cause harm in actuality. Our results indicate that judgments ...
Judgment and Decision Making
The moral dumbfounding phenomenon for harmless taboo violations is often cited as a critical piec... more The moral dumbfounding phenomenon for harmless taboo violations is often cited as a critical piece of empirical evidence motivating anti-rationalist models of moral judgment and decision-making. Moral dumbfounding purportedly occurs when an individual remains obstinately and steadfastly committed to a moral judgment or decision even after admitting inability to provide reasons and arguments to support it (Haidt, 2001). Early empirical support for the moral dumbfounding phenomenon led some philosophers and psychologists to suggest that affective reactions and intuitions, in contrast with reasons or reasoning, are the predominant drivers of moral judgments and decisions. We investigate an alternative reason-based explanation for moral dumbfounding: that putatively harmless taboo violations are judged to be morally wrong because of the high perceived likelihood that the agents could have caused harm, even though they did not cause harm in actuality. Our results indicate that judgments ...
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) holds that moral judgments are driven by modular and ideologically... more Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) holds that moral judgments are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral foundations, but where and how they are represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs remains an open question. Using a moral judgment task of moral foundation vignettes, we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral judgment of moral foundations, versus conventional norms, reliably recruits core areas implied in emotional processing and theory of mind. Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each moral foundation has dissociable neural representations distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT, political ideology modulated neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm that each moral foundation recruits domain-general mechanisms of social cognition, but has a dissociable neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We discuss these findings in view of unified versus d...
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) holds that moral judgments are driven by modular and ideologically... more Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) holds that moral judgments are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral foundations, but where and how they are represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs remains an open question. Using a moral judgment task of moral foundation vignettes, we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral judgment of moral foundations, versus conventional norms, reliably recruits core areas implied in emotional processing and theory of mind. Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each moral foundation has dissociable neural representations distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT, political ideology modulated neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm that each moral foundation recruits domain-general mechanisms of social cognition, but has a dissociable neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We discuss these findings in view of unified versus d...
A common form of moral hypocrisy occurs when people blame others for moral violations that they t... more A common form of moral hypocrisy occurs when people blame others for moral violations that they themselves commit. It is assumed that hypocritical blamers so act to falsely signal that they hold moral standards that they do not really accept. We test this assumption by investigating the neurocognitive processes of hypocritical blamers during moral decision-making. Participants (62 adult U.K. residents; 27 males) underwent fMRI while deciding whether to profit by inflicting pain on others and then judged the blameworthiness of others’ identical decisions. Observers (188 adult U.S. residents; 125 males) judged those who blamed others for making the same harmful choice to be hypocritical, immoral, and untrustworthy. However, analyzing hypocritical blamers’ behaviors and neural responses shows that hypocritical blame was positively correlated with conflicted feelings, neural responses to moral standards, and guilt-related neural responses. These findings demonstrate that hypocritical bl...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cogni... more Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper, we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists should consider stability and then surveying previous research, we will present the results of an original three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial dilemmas three times, 6–8 days apart. In addition to investigating the stability of our participants’ ratings over time, we also explored some potential explanations for instability. To end, we will discuss these and other potential psychological sources of moral stability (or instability) and highlight possible philosophical implications of our findings.
Clean Hands
Scrupulosity is not religious devotion or moral virtue. Those with Scrupulosity are concerned wit... more Scrupulosity is not religious devotion or moral virtue. Those with Scrupulosity are concerned with moral behavior primarily as a way to reduce their underlying doubts and anxiety. Moral character requires attention to, concern for, and responsiveness to the morally relevant features of situations, acts, and people. Moral character also requires a stable set of underlying traits and beliefs that noncoincidentally lead to the appropriate motivations and endorsements. Some with Scrupulosity are ego-dystonic, rejecting their scrupulous symptoms, but one might also reject one’s own character. Those whose Scrupulosity is ego-syntonic—who endorse their scrupulous symptoms—also differ from those with moral character because those with Scrupulosity display fixation on certain issues to the exclusion of others, are inflexible with respect to circumstances, are overly concerned with merely possible—not probable—events, have an inflated sense of personal responsibility, and care about moral iss...
Agency in Mental Disorder
Scrupulosity is a form of OCD where patients obsess about morality and sometimes compulsively con... more Scrupulosity is a form of OCD where patients obsess about morality and sometimes compulsively confess or atone. It involves chronic doubt and anxiety as well as deviant moral judgments. This chapter argues that Scrupulosity is a mental illness and that its distortion of moral judgments undermines, or at least reduces, patients’ moral responsibility. The authors go on to argue that this condition challenges popular deep-self theories of responsibility, which assert that one is only blameworthy or praiseworthy for actions that arise from one’s deep self, from what one truly values. Patients with ego-syntonic Scrupulosity, however, identify with their condition and seem to have cares that reflect their deep selves, yet do not seem fully responsible for their actions or their consequences, such as neglecting the needs of their loved ones. Other theories, particularly reasons-responsiveness theories, better capture the ways in which responsibility in Scrupulosity is reduced.
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
The generality of decision and game theory has enabled domain-independent progress in AI research... more The generality of decision and game theory has enabled domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this conclusion.
Many theorists claim that social media contribute to political polarization, but it is not clear ... more Many theorists claim that social media contribute to political polarization, but it is not clear how these effects occur. We propose and explain a theoretical model of this process that focuses on moral outrage. This combination of anger and disgust can emerge from a mismatch between evolved human nature and certain features of political discussions on the internet. We identify three specific types of socially negative behavior that moral outrage facilitates: aggression (behavior intended to harm others), sophistry (poor argumentation), and withdrawal (avoiding discussions of politics). We describe psychological mechanisms through which moral outrage can lead to these outcomes, specifically focusing on dehumanization and group antagonism. We discuss research justifying our proposed model and suggest new ways to empirically test its links. Our model should be useful for researchers exploring the question of when and how political discussions on social media go wrong as well as what to do about these problems. BACKGROUND .
Journal of Practical Ethics, 2021
This paper explores some ways in which artificial intelligence (AI) could be used to improve huma... more This paper explores some ways in which artificial intelligence (AI) could be used to improve human moral judgments in bioethics by avoiding some of the most common sources of error in moral judgment, including ignorance, confusion, and bias. It surveys three existing proposals for building human morality into AI: Top-down, bottom-up, and hybrid approaches. Then it proposes a multi-step, hybrid method, using the example of kidney allocations for transplants as a test case. The paper concludes with brief remarks about how to handle several complications, respond to some objections, and extend this novel method to other important moral issues in bioethics and beyond.
Uploads
Papers by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong