Dialetheism. An Outlook .pdf

Dialetheism: The Power of Contradictions An Outlook Luca M. Possati To cite this version: Luca M. Possati. Dialetheism: The Power of Contradictions An Outlook. 2019. <hal-01997376> HAL Id: hal-01997376 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01997376 Submitted on 28 Jan 2019 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. 1 Dialetheism: The Power of Contradictions An Outlook Can we treat contradiction? Is it possible to justify a contradiction from a logical point of view? Does contradiction force us to abandon logic? From a logical point of view, a formal system S implanted in language L is said to be consistent or non-contradictory if it never allows the demonstration and refutation of a formula at the same time, in other words, a contradiction.1 If instead such is said to be the case, then S is said to be inconsistent or contradictory. It is said to be trivial if and only if it allows the demonstration of all the formulas of L. The trivialist claims that all the contradictions are true and, thus, that everything is true. In the case that the system used entails negation, it is said to be banal, because it demonstrates everything and the contrary of everything: a ∧ ¬ a → b. The connection between inconsistency and triviality is explained by the law of PseudoScotus: ex contradicione quodlibet, from contradiction anything follows. Technically, in the natural deduction calculus, the Pseudo-Scotus is obtained by means of the rule of the elimination of negation (E ¬) with the further step of the introduction of the conditional (I →). It is the negative version of the paradox of material implication [¬ p → (p → q)]: the false, the absurd, implies anything. Paraconsistent logics both deepen and put this conviction to the test. The Pseudo-Scotus is called “the principle of explosion” to convey the idea of the destructive power of a contradiction within a formal system. If a formal system allows even one contradiction, the consequences are disastrous, and the system becomes deductively useless.2 A paraconsistent logic avoids explosion.3 We can admit contradictions, without trivializing the 1Defining what a contradiction is, is an enormous problem. Contradiction is a dichotomous situation: a statement and its negative counterpart. In technical terms, a contradiction is the conjunction of two statements, and one is the negation of the other. We could also say, in a formulation that is distributive rather than collective, that a contradiction is a pair of statements of which one negates the other, eliminating the reference to the conjugation. From a semantic perspective, contradiction is the conjugation (or pair) of statements that cannot be neither both true (subcontrary) nor both false (contrary). In metaphysics, a contradiction is rather a situation in which an object at the same time possesses and does not possess a certain property. From here arises the hypothesis of contradicting worlds. The principle of non-contradiction negates the possibility of contradictions at the syntactic, semantic, ontological, and psychological level. As Aristotle says: “It is impossible to be and not to be at the same time” (Met. 1006a 1–5). 2Berto (2006, 99–100). 3Paraconsistency is not a new argument in philosophy. Aristotle’s syllogisms were already an example of paraconsistent logic. Even the stoics did not seem to recognize the necessity of the explosiveness of contradiction. Such necessity rather become crucial in classical logic. The rediscovery of paraconsistency occurred in the second half of the 20th century, through the discussive logic of Jaśkowski (a nonadditive approach), as well as from the strategy to the fragmentation of David Lewis, the theses of Rescher and Brandon, da Costa's work, adaptive logics, Routley's relevant logics, and the approach of Priest. From a semantic point of view, in paraconsistent logics, the validity of an argument is defined in terms of the truth-according-to certain interpretations. Semantic models are adopted, therefore, in which it is possible to give an interpretation of the terms used (constants, variables, connectives, quantifiers), on the basis of which a and ¬ a can both be true. One way is to use the logic of three values: ‘true’, ‘false’, and ‘true and false’, an approach taken by Priest. According 2 whole of our thought. Nietzsche had already recognized this: illogicality is essential to life and many good things come from it, and “only naive men believe that everything leads back to coherence”.4 However, this type of logic must defend itself against a radical criticism from Quine: change of logic, change of subject, in the sense that the non-classical logics are suspected of modifying not only the interpretation, but also the meaning itself of symbolic logics. ‘Deviant’ logic does not change anything, or better, just changes the argument. For example, the symbol of negation for traditional logic means one thing, while for ‘deviant’ logic it means another; the referent changes. It is difficult to reply to these criticisms. We are in the presence of a clash between intuitions and logical vocabularies for which it seems hard to provide definitive solutions. Regardless of this, paraconsistent logics identify themselves not so much with a certain use of logical symbols but with an underlying philosophy: significant motivations exist, which compel us to accept contradictions in our formal systems, and thus to modify classical logic. What are the methodological requisites that must be satisfied such that a logic can admit contradictions and do so in a productive and useful way? In a paraconsistent logic, the law of noncontradiction and the Pseudo-Scotus are invalid. A paraconsistent logic contests the necessity of the link between contradiction and Pseudo-Scotus. There are contradictions, but they are not explosive. We can modify the classical logic to support them. The admission of contradictions does not have to trivialize the system on the basis of some versions of the Pseudo-Scotus, which is equivalent to saying that we must be able to use contradictions to formulate valid inferences. However, what does this mean at the formal level? The majority of paraconsistent logics seek to neutralize the PseudoScotus by renouncing one or more classical derivation rules. In the natural deduction calculus, the Pseudo-Scotus is demonstrated by using four rules: ‘conjunction elimination’, ‘disjunction introduction’, ‘disjunctive syllogism’, and ‘conditional introduction’. The third of these rules, otherwise known as modus tollendo ponens (α ∨ β, ¬ α / β), plays a crucial role in the demonstration of the Pseudo-Scotus because its behavior becomes problematic when faced with inconsistent situations. This rule, despite being valid in consistent systems and theories, is not capable of adequately preserving the truth in contradictory situations. Let us see why. If we suppose that α and ¬ α are both true, then (α ∨ β) will always be true, even if β to this logic, it is possible that a and ¬ a are both true, supposing that a is ‘true and false’. The paradox of the liar is an example of a proposition that is at the same time both true and false. Priest (1979) gives a justification of this point of view, starting with an analysis of Gödel’s first theorem of incompleteness. If we consider S to be a formal system in which we formalize all of our demonstrative procedures in mathematics, then S will not contain Gödel's statement. Nevertheless, through a simple semantic reasoning based on Tarski's T-schema, we can prove that the indemonstrable statement of Gödel is true, so it is demonstrable. We can even formalize this simple semantic reasoning and reinsert it into S. What happens then? System S becomes paraconsistent. This is the core of Priest's argument: we cannot demonstrate Gödel's statement, but we recognize its truth. Therefore, if we want to ‘save’ this truth, we have to modify our formal system and make it paraconsistent. In S, Gödel's statement is both true and false at the same time. Our formal system cannot catch the truth of Gödel's statement if they remain consistent. However, such a manner of proceeding is not immune to criticism, particularly from the technical point of view: see Chihara (1984, 117–124). See also Priest (2006, 39–50) and Priest (1998, 410–426), where the central thesis is the following: If the objective of any cognitive process is the truth, it does not mean that contradiction must always be an obstacle to it, which is why coherence and rationality do not always coincide. 4See Nietzsche (1965, 38). Note that in Melandri there is also a very clear intuition of this logical possibility, so much so, that we can consider his analogical logic as a logic of paraconsistency. Cfr. Melandri (2004, 231–232). At the origin of this approach, there is a precise interpretation of the relations between logic and language, culminating in an evaluation of classical logic as “the result of the absolutization of a contingent equilibrium” (628), the one between linguistic synthesis and calculus. The linguistic theory of Melandri heavily depends on that of Snell (1952) and on the distinction between the three originating forms: substantive (informative and extensional), adjectival (expressive and intentional), and verbal (pragmatic, dynamic), which are in every possible proposition. Melandri links the three forms of Snell to three categories of tropes: synecdoche, metonymy, and catachresis. This is connected to two central points of La linea e il circolo: a) the critique of logicism conceived in a reductionist sense and b) the thesis that mathematics is an autonomous rationality, independent from logic, at least from the logic of elementary identity. 3 is false, according to the truth tables. Hence, if we apply the modus tollendo ponens, a false conclusion (β) may be derived from premises that are both true, α ∨ β and ¬ α. This goes against the fundamental criterion of logical correctness: it can never be the case that the premises are all true and the conclusion false. Even paraconsistent logic must respect this criterion. The collapse of disjunctive syllogism has further serious consequences. Given the classical definition of the material conditional, the modus tollendo ponens is logically equivalent to another even more basic rule: the modus ponendo ponens (α → β, α / β; the separation rule or conditional elimination). The material condition, as truth-functional connectives, can be defined in terms of the disjunction between the negation of the antecedent and the consequent (¬ α ∨ β); the equivalence is evident. Paraconsistent logic has to give up the modus tollendo ponens to neutralize the Pseudo-Scotus, but it cannot renounce the modus ponendo ponens, which expresses an essential, inferential characteristic of the conditional itself; a connective that does not conform to this rule is not really a conditional. Consequently, ‘deviant’ logic must develop a new semantic of the conditional, rethinking negation and disjunction in such a way that it avoids equivalence with the modus tollendo ponens, which would bring about a return to the Pseudo-Scotus, and saves the essential rule of the modus ponens.5 This is what, in the literature, is called the ‘condition of the modus ponens’. Paraconsistent logic moves precariously, each time reorienting its interpretation and its use of connectives and inferential rules. The only criterion is distancing itself as little as possible from classical logic. A paraconsistent logic, being a subset of classical logic, has to seek to save what works in standard logic, by putting it to its best use. In the literature, this is called the ‘condition of minimum damage’, even if such a parameter remains rather ambiguous6 and Quine’s objection is always lurking. Paraconsistent logic does not throw away the whole of classical logic; it cannot do it. It must seek to modify its structures attentively to a) render the syntactic and semantic contradictions innocuous (eliminating the Pseudo Scotus), and b) manage to save the problemsolving ability of the classical approach (it is what, in the literature, is called classical recapture). The paraconsistent logic has to keep the 'virtues' of the classical system by recovering some fundamental theorem. In da Costa’s logic, the so-called positive-plus, the positive part (without negations) of classical logic is conserved almost intact, but when contradictions are encountered, the treatment of the negations is modified. Therefore, a minimal basis of eleven axioms is fixed, and two operators are introduced, one for consistency and one for inconsistency. If we assume a consistent operator, then the law of non-contradiction would be valid, as well as the Pseudo-Scotus, and it would never be able to yield a and not a, or the systems would risk exploding. If we assume an inconsistent operator, both a and not a are valid. Da Costa and others developed a series of different logical levels, which are more and more powerful, demonstrating how consistency and inconsistency are diffused from components to composites. Here, an extremely fluid logic emerges, capable of explaining situations that classical logic cannot. Negation is the crucial point. Da Costa formulates some semantic clauses that govern the functioning of negation, on the basis of which he avoids the explosion of the PseudoScotus and obtains the classical recapture.7 The power of negation is nevertheless greatly weakened. Let us give another example. In 1911-12, inspired by Lobachewsky’s works on non-Euclidian geometry, Vasil’ev envisaged an ‘imaginary logic’, which was a non-Aristotelian logic where the principle of contradiction was not valid in general. Vasil’ev did not believe that there exist contradictions in the real world, but only in a possible world created by the human mind. Thus he hypothesized imaginary worlds where the Aristotelian principles could not be valid – although 5See 6See 7 Berto, Bottai (2015, 54–55); Berto (2006, 107–108). Bremer (2005). See da Costa (1974). 4 Vasil’ev did not develop his ideas in full.8 The problem of the meaning of negation is also of central importance for dialetheism. What is dialetheism? Paraconsistency is a property of a consequence relation whereas dialetheism is a view about truth. We must distinguish between two degrees of paraconsistency: weak and strong. The two are differentiated by the fact that strong paraconsistency affirms the reality of true contradictions, whereas weak paraconsistency does not. There are inconsistent theories (the naive theory of sets, intuitive semantics, the infinitesimal calculus of Leibniz, the atomic theory of Bohr, many of our systems of common beliefs, etc.), which are useful because they work. The underlying logic is a paraconsistent logic. Weak paraconsistency affirms it, but without admitting that this logic refers to contradictory states of affairs. Strong paraconsistency, rather, overcomes this limit by admitting the reality of ‘true’ contradictions: there are states of affairs that violate the law of non-contradiction in its logical–semantic–ontological formulation. Some contradictions exist, which are necessary and inevitable because they are real. This form of paraconsistency is dialetheism. It is a metaphysical thesis. A logic L is dialetheic if it permits contradictions, formally conceived as formulae of the form (α ∧ ¬ α), to be assigned at least the truth-value true in an interpretation. In Priest, the most important theorist of dialetheism, two opposite tendencies emerge: a) the need to preserve the classical sense of negation as an operator of contradiction – negation introduction implies contradiction, namely, the rule that the contradiction is always false; and b) the need to weaken the law of non-contradiction and the Pseudo Scotus, which, however, as we have just said, play a constitutive role in the definition of negation. Therefore, the negation sign employed by the dialetheist should generate contradictions, but it should not prohibit contradictions from being true. Priest argues that this is possible. I will briefly consider Priest's views about contradiction, without mentioning critiques and replies. An essential premise must be made. Priest's dialectical approach fits into a broader conception of logic and the relationship between logic and reality. According to Priest, in fact, we must distinguish between logical reality and logical theories. If there is a theory (a set of propositions connected to each other to form an inference, and therefore a system of inferences), there must be a reality that this theory claims to describe and explain, and that makes this theory valid or invalid. Thus, for Priest, logical reality exists, which is the set of norms that make our reasoning valid. Logical theories reflect this reality. This distinction is clearly stated in a passage from In Contradiction: […] with logic, one needs to distinguish between reasoning or, better, the structure of norms that govern valid/good reasoning, which is the object of study, and our logical theory, which tries to give a theoretical account of this phenomenon. The theoretical principles we do actually accept are not God-given or fixed for all time. Indeed, reasoning is a complex and delicate human activity, and it is unlikely that any theory we produce, at least for the present, and maybe forever, cannot be improved. The norms themselves may also change. There may well occur a dialectical interaction, characteristic of the social sciences, between the object of the theory and the theory itself. Nonetheless, the distinction between a science and its object remains; and once this gap is opened, it suffices for the fallibility of the theory.9 Logical theories are the set of mathematical tools we use to describe logical reality. This set is neither finished nor fixed. Like in any other science, even in logic there exists – as Priest affirms in the last part of the passage we have just read – a dialectical relationship between theory and reality. 8 Raspa, Di Raimo (2012). (2006a, 207). 9Priest 5 There is an exchange: logica ens determines logica docens, but logica docens in turn can influence logica ens.10 This is an important point: the realist conception of Priest is not a Platonic conception. Logical reality is not an immutable and unattainable hyperuranium, but human reasoning itself, something that depends on our ordinary linguistic and inferential practices, on our social existence. More precisely, we could say that, for Priest, logical reality can be identified with the notion of validity. In Doubt Truth to Be a Liar, he writes: The study of reasoning, in the sense in which logic is interested, concerns the issue of what follows from what. Less cryptically, some things – call them premises – provide reasons for others – call them conclusions. […] Logic is the investigation of that relationship. A good inference may be called a valid one. Hence, logic is, in a nutshell, the study of validity. But what is validity? Beyond a few platitudes, it is not at all clear how one should go about answering this question. It is not even clear what notions may be invoked in an answer: truth, meaning, possibility, something else? […] In a nutshell, I will argue that validity is the relationship of truth-preservation-in-all-situations. […] each pure logic, when given its canonical interpretation, can be thought of as a theory concerning the behaviour of certain notions; specifically, those notions that are standardly deployed in logic. Validity is undoubtedly the most important of these – to which all the others must relate in the end.11 Inference is a relation between some premises and conclusions in which the former express reasons for affirming the latter. A valid inference is an inference in which necessarily, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. In all the possible worlds where the premises are true, the conclusion is true. Therefore, validity is the phenomenon of the preservation of truth in all possible worlds. The aim of deduction is to preserve the truth by moving from the premises to the conclusion – to prevent the case that a true conclusion follows from false premises. Validity is the primary element of logical reality. In another passage of Doubt Truth to Be a Liar, Priest states: What makes a theory the right theory is that it correctly describes an objective, theoryindependent, reality. In the case of logic, these are logical relationships, notably the relationship of validity, that hold between propositions (sentences, statements, or whatever one takes truthbearers to be). But what are these logical relationships? Several answers are possible here. Perhaps the simplest is one according to which logical truths are analytic, that is, true solely in virtue of the meanings of the connectives, where these meanings are Fregean and objective. Logical relationships are therefore platonic relationships of a certain kind.12 This suggests that logic depends on semantics, or at least on the semantics of ordinary language. Validity is a relationship between possible worlds that are non-existent objects. But should we be realist about logic? The answer […] is 'yes'. Validity is determined by the class of situations involved in truth-preservation, quite independently of our theory of the matter. This answer has a certain ontological sting, of course. […] the situations about which we reason are not all actual: many are purely hypothetical. And one must be a realist about these too. These are numerous different sorts of realism that one might endorse here, many of which are familiar from debates about the nature of possible worlds. One may take hypothetical situations to be concrete non-actual situations; abstract objects, like sets of propositions or combinations of actual 10See Priest (2014). 11Priest 12Priest (2006b, 176). (2006b, 173). 6 components; real but non-existent objects.13 Now, this theoretical approach is applied by Priest also to the treatment of negation. He distinguishes between negation as a theoretical object, which corresponds to the operator treated by logica docens, and negation as a real object, which Priest calls vernacular negation. Negation is above all an entity, a unique well-defined entity, which the multiple logical theories (intuitionist negation, classical negation, and negation as cancellation) try to describe and explain. The central point for Priest is the following. The understanding we have of negation as an entity cannot be reduced to the use we make of the particle ‘not’, neither linguistically nor logically. This is made evident by the fact that we can use this particle in ways that have nothing to do with negation. Our understanding of negation overcomes the ways the particle ‘not’ is used. But what is the vernacular negation? Priest replies that negation understood as a real object must not be identified with the particle ‘not’; rather, it must be identified with a set of linguistic expressions and inferential practices that express a particular relation: the relation of contradiction. Contradiction is the core of negation. Negation is a contradiction-forming operator. Priest explains this point as follows: […] the obvious question is what, exactly, an account of negation is a theory of. It is natural to suggest that negation is a theory of the way that the English particle 'not', and similar particles in other natural languages, behaves. This, however, is incorrect. For a start, 'not' has functions in English which do not concern negation. For example, it may be used to reject connotations of what is said, though not its truth, as in, for example, 'I am not his wife: he is my husband'. (Some linguistics call this 'metalinguistic negation', though this is obviously not a happy appellation in the context of logic). More importantly, negation may not be expressed by simply inserting 'not'. For example the negation of 'Socrates was mortal' may be 'Socrates was not mortal'; but, as Aristotle pointed out (De interpretatione, ch. 7), the negation of 'Some man is mortal' is not 'Some man is not mortal, but 'No man is mortal'. These examples show that we have a grasp of negation that is independent of the way that 'not' functions, and can use this to determine when 'notting' negates. But what is it, then, of which we have a grasp? We see that there appears to be a relationship of a certain kind between pairs such as 'Socrates is mortal' and 'Socrates is not mortal'; and 'Some man is mortal' and 'No man is mortal'. The traditional way of expressing the relationship is that the pairs are contradictories, and so we may say that the relationship is that of contradiction. Theories of negation are theories about this relation.14 What kind of relationship is a contradiction? Priest states that “traditional logic and common sense are both very clear about the most important point: we must have at least one of the pair, but not both. It is precisely this which distinguish contradictories from their near cousins, contraries, and sub-contraries”.15 Therefore, “a genuine contradiction-forming operator will be one that when applied to a sentence, α, covers all the cases in which α is not true”; thus, “it is an operator, ¬, such that ¬ α is true if α is not true, i.e. is either false or neither true or false”.16 The contradiction is a dichotomic situation: the world is cut into two parts that are exactly the symmetrical inverses of each other; therefore, they cannot exist together. There is an inverse complementarity: the absence of one contradictory is the condition of the presence of the other one, there is no third way. The relationship 13Priest 14Priest 15Priest 16Priest (2006b, 207). (2006b, 77). (2006b, 78). (2006b, 79). 7 of contradiction is therefore symmetrical and unique: for each body there is only one contradictory, its contradictory. Formal negation, as a theoretical object, expresses exactly this basic structure, this inverse complementarity. As Priest points out, the law of the excluded middle and the law of noncontradiction both represent the nucleus of contradiction. Priest states that, in a formal system, negation has sense thanks to these two laws. However, others can also be added, such as the principle of double negation (α = ¬ ¬ α) and the two laws of de Morgan. All these laws can be validated by the conception of negation as a contradiction-forming operator. Now, to admit that, in some cases, α ∧ ¬ α does not mean to betray the reality of negation, nor does it mean that ¬ is not a contradiction-forming operator. It means instead that […] there is more to negation than one might have thought. Let us call this more, for want of a better phrase, its surplus content. The classical view is to the effect that negation does not have surplus content: any such content would turn into the total content of everything since α ∧ ¬ α ˫ β. But the classical view has been called into question by dialetheists.17 Negation presents a ‘surplus content’: this justifies the choice of the dialetheist. Admitting contradictions does not mean abandoning the definition of negation as a contradiction-forming operator. It is precisely the ‘surplus content’ that allows us to separate, in negation, its essential core, which is represented by the law of non-contradiction and the law of the excluded middle, from what is not essential, as the Pseudo-Scotus. It is evident: speakers in ordinary language and in the sciences finding a contradiction do not infer from it any other utterance. Finding a contradiction does not stop a dialogue; rather, it often nourishes it. Priest, moreover, has provided some arguments intended to show the non-intelligibility of a form of negation which presents among its own principles characterizing the Pseudo-Scotus. Starting from the thesis of 'surplus content' Priest modifies the sense of negation by showing that it is a contradiction-forming operator and that this does not imply the explosiveness of contradiction. The dialetheist does not deny the law of non-contradiction, but the link between the latter and the Pseudo Scotus. This allows him or her to talk about dialetheias. A dialetheia is a proposition in which both an affirmation and its negation18 – assumed as inverse operations – are true. Dialetheism claims that there exist dialetheia, or propositions that are true but paradoxical, of the contradictory form; “a dialetheia is any true statement of the form and it is not the case that […] our concepts, or some of them anyway, are inconsistent and produce dialetheias”.19 There exist states of affairs and objects that are both contradictory and necessary. “Dialetheism is a metaphysical perspective: the view that some contradictions are true: there are sentences (statements, propositions, or whatever one takes truthbearers to be), such that both α and ¬ α are true, that is, such that α is both true and false”.20 As Priest writes, “dialetheism is a metaphysical view: that some contradictions are true”, whilst “paraconsistency is a property of a relation of logical consequence”.21 The latter can subsist very well without the former, but not vice-versa. Dialetheism imposes a radical transformation of our way of conceiving reality and rationality: “rationality is also intimately connected with dialetheism”.22 For the dialetheist, paradoxes are the terrain where he or she seeks to justify his or her 17Priest (2006b, 83). the technical particulars, see Priest (2006, 88–102). The general question of negation is beyond the limits of this paper. 19Priest (2006b, 4). See also Priest, Berto (2013); Priest (2008). 20Priest (2006b, 1). 18For 21Priest 22Priest (2014, XVIII). (2006a, 1). 8 perspective. In In Contradiction, Priest affirms that paradoxes are not simple errors, accidental or isolated, but are generated by a common theoretical condition, distinguished by two aspects: autoreference and circularity. Therefore, there exists one essential structure of paradoxes. We can divide the totality of statements into two subsets: the set of true statements and its complement, which does not necessarily coincide only with the set of false statements. The paradox is a statement that is found in both subsets. A bivalent situation is thus produced, in the sense that the paradoxical statement, in the very moment of its expression, opens itself to two perspectives: one under which it is true, the other under which it is false. Such duplicity is not resolved simply by increasing the truth values and postulating ‘true and false’ statements because we can always reinterpret the complement by inserting statements in it with a fourth value of truth, and this makes the repetition of the paradox possible.23 In In Contradiction, Priest distinguishes paradoxes into logics, semantics, and set theoretics, and then dedicates a chapter (the third chapter of the first part) to Gödel’s theorems. The most immediate example is: ‘I am lying’. If it is true, then I am lying, but whoever lies, says what is false; therefore I am not lying. If instead the affirmation is false, I am not lying: then I am telling the truth, and thus I am lying. Whatever strategy we deploy to unravel this situation, we will always have the same result: a reinforcement of the paradox, the contradiction appears again as reinforced. I can use the concepts of the presumed solution to construct a revenge liar, and if I seek to respond, again I will arrive at such a point that my reply will destroy itself. The dialetheist does not seek to repeat the paradox, but completely changes the paradigm: he or she has as its starting point paradoxes, unsurpassable contradictions, the dialetheias, which he or she accepts as facts, and constructs a new point of view on logic around them. The dialetheist claims that paradoxes can be logically accepted by supplying a new, more fluid logic. Luca M. Possati Berto, Francesco. 2006. Teorie dell'assurdo. I rivali del principio di non-contraddizione. Roma: Carocci. – 2010. L'esistenza non è logica. Roma-Bari: Laterza. Berto, Francesco, Bottai, Lorenzo. 2015. Che cos'è una contraddizione. Roma: Carocci. Bremer, Manuel. 2005. An Introduction to Paraconsistent Logic. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang. Chihara, Charles 1984. “Priest, the Liar, and Gödel”. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 13, p. 117-124. Da Costa, Newton. 1974. “On the theory of inconsistent formal systems”. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 15, p. 497–510. Melandri, Enzo. 2004. La linea e il circolo. Studio logico-filosofico sull'analogia. Macerata: Quodlibet (I ed. 1968). Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1965. Umano, troppo umano. Milano: Adelphi. tr. it. by G. Colli, M. Montinari. 23See Berto (2006, 62). 9 Priest, Graham. 1979. “Logic of Paradox”. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, p. 219-241. – 1998. “What Is so Bad about Contradictions?”. Journal of Philosophy, 8, p. 410-426 – 1999. “Perceiving Contradictions”. Australian Journal of Philosophy, 77, p. 439-446. – 2002. Beyond the Limits of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 2005. Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. – 2006a. In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent. Oxford: Clarendon Press (second edition). – 2006b. Doubt truth to be a liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. – 2008. An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 2014. One. Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. – 2014b. “Revising Logic”, in Rush P. (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 211-223. Priest Graham, Berto, Francesco. 2013. “Dialetheism”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Raspa, Venanzio, Di Raimo, Gabriella. 2012. N. A. Vasil’ev, Logica immaginaria. Roma: Carocci.