Linking Preparedness, Response & Resilience in Emergency Context

Linking Preparedness, Response & Resilience in Emergency Context Authored by : Chalwyn Caulker, Chrysiis Katsea, and Isabella Shraiman March 14th, 2018 acknowledgements The research team would like to thank its LSE mentors, Dr. Tayyab Safdar and Dr. Georgina Pearson, for their support and guidance. We would also like to thank Simone Di Vicenz from Christian Aid UK for trusting us to work with him on the LPRR project. Special thanks to our fellow student, Miko Alazas, for his help and network during our research. We would also like to thank Dora Bakatselou from Action Aid Greece for putting us in touch with her colleague, Sotiria Kyriakopoulou. Finally, we would like to thank all of our interviewees for taking the time to share their insights with us. context The present Humanitarian Consultancy Project took place in the course of our MSc degree in International Development and Humanitarian Emergencies at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). The present report is the outcome of a five-month research project prepared for Christian Aid UK on the «Linking Preparedness, Response and Resilience (LPRR) in Emergency Context» project. disclaimer The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the London School of Economics and Political Science or Christian Aid UK. IMAGES Cover images courtesy of Christian Aid and Reuters. All further images courtesy of Christian Aid. Full image referencing included in bibliography. ABBREVIATIONS AA: Action Aid ADTF: Aging and Disability Task Force (Philippines) AFM: Tax Registration Number (Greece) A_INGO_GR: The anonymous INGO operating in Greece which was interviewed for this project is hence forth referred to by this abbreviation ALRMP: Arid Lands Resource Management Project AMKA: Social Security Registration Number (Greece) ARMM: Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao ASAL: Arid and Semi-Arid Lands BDKN: Bangladesh Disaster Knowledge Network C4D: Communication for Development CA: Christian Aid CARE: Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere CB: Caritas Bangladesh CBM: Christian Blind Mission CBO: Community Based Organisation CCCM: Camp Coordination and Camp Management CDMP: Comprehensive Disaster Management Plan (Bangladesh) CEDMHA: Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance CHE: Complex Humanitarian Emergency CIDP: County Integrated Development Plan CIJP: Inter-church Commission on Justice and Peace CMAM: Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition COSE: Coalition of Services of the Elderly LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 2 CSO: Civil Society Organisation CW: Concern Worldwide DEC: Disasters Emergency Committee DfID: Department for International Development of the United Kingdom DMC: Disaster Management Committee (Bangladesh) DRR: Disaster Risk Reduction DRRM: Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (Philippines) DSWD: Department of Social Welfare and Development (Philippines) ECHO: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations EDP: Externally Displaced Person EIU: Economist Intelligence Unit EU: European Union EUROSTAT: Statistical Office of the European Communities FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FCAS: Fragile or Conflicted Affected State FBO: Faith-based Organisation GBV: Gender-based Violence GoK: Government of Kenya HCT: Humanitarian Country Team HPG: Humanitarian Policy Group IACHR: Inter-American Court of Human Rights ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross IDP: Internally Displaced Person IFRC: International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement (I)NGO: International Non-Governmental Organisation LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 3 IO: International Agency IOM: International Organisation of Migration IRK: Islamic Relief Kenya IRC: International Rescue Committee KEP: Citizens’ Service Centre (Greece) KFSSG: Kenya Food Security Steering Group LP: Livelihood Programme LPRR: Linking Preparedness, Response and Resilience LSE: London School of Economics & Political Science MSF: Doctors Without Borders ND: Not Dated (references) NDDCF: National Drought and Disaster Contingency Fund NDMA: National Drought Management Authority NDRRMC: National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (Philippines) NFI: Non-Food Item NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation OAS: Organisation for American States ODI: Overseas Development Institute PAGASA: Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (Philippines) PAR: Philippine Area of Responsibility PBI: Peace Brigades International PM: Prime Minister PSWS: Public Storm Warning Signals (Philippines) SGBV: Sexual- and Gender-based Violence SYRIZA: Coalition of the Radical Left (Greece) LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 4 UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNOCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene WHO: World Health Organisation LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………………………………………………………7 INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………….10 CHAPTER ONE ……………………………………………………………………………12 Methodology………………………………………………………………………13 Literature Review …………………………………………………………….……16 CHAPTER TWO……………………………………………………………………….…...20 Comparative Analysis……………………………………………………….…….21 CHAPTER THREE …………………………………………………………………………32 Assessment………………………………………………………………………...33 CHAPTER FOUR…………………………………………………………………………..41 Key Findings………………………………………………………………………..42 CHAPTER FIVE…………………………………………………………………………….45 Conclusions and Recommendations……………………………………………46 APPENDICES I. Terms of Reference………………………………………………………..49 II. Colombia Country Case Study…………………………………………...51 III. Kenya Country Case Study……………………………………………….68 IV. Philippines Country Case Study………………………………………….86 V. Bangladesh Country Case Study………………………………………...96 VI. Greece Country Case Study…………………………………………….106 VII. Haiti Country Case Study………………………………………………..116 VIII. Sample Interview Questionnaire……………………………………….128 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………….130 LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report evaluates the status of (I)NGO-government collaboration in emergency contexts. Using qualitative data sourced through six country case studies and a combination of semi-structured interviews and literature review, this report outlines on a policy and practical level those practices that have hindered or facilitated effective (I)NGO-government coordination. Specifically, it assesses relationships between government and humanitarian actors during responses to the Kenyan Food Crisis (2010/2011); IDP programming in Colombia; Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013); Cyclone Mora in Bangladesh (2017); the Haitian earthquake (2010); and the refugee crisis in Greece. The case studies were selected according to relevant macro-categories including: • Type of disaster: socio-natural disaster, conflict; • Timeline of emergency: rapid onset, slow onset, protracted crisis; and • Regime Type: flawed democracy, hybrid regime, FCAS. This report is situated within the broader Linking Preparedness, Response and Resilience (LPRR) project, a DFID-funded nine-member Consortium led by Christian Aid that aims to integrate resilience into humanitarian programming. In 2017, the LPRR project identified six principles for building better humanitarian responses which facilitate long-term community resilience: 1. Allow and enable the community to co-run the response; 2. COORDINATE INTERVENTIONS AND WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT; 3. Support community cohesion and establish effective two-way communication; 4. Address underlying causes of vulnerability: protect and prepare; 5. Include psychosocial support; and 6. Livelihoods and savings This report analyzes relationships between (I)NGOs and government during past and ongoing emergencies and identifies best practices for humanitarian actors to work with or through government in crisis contexts. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 7 While most (I)NGOs have adopted resilience programming, there is continuing debate over how this is best targeted within humanitarian interventions, and how these interventions affect government capacity and local community resilience. Governments are instrumental to the community resilience building agenda. As such, it is naïve for humanitarian actors to use the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence to avoid meaningful engagement with affected states’ governments. This report finds that within the limited discourse on (I)NGO-government cooperation in humanitarian contexts, there is a gap between academia and practice. The report will demonstrate that the hesitance to discuss (I)NGOgovernment cooperation exists mainly at the theoretical level whereas practitioners on the ground can and do engage with government in emergency responses. The type of emergency (socio-natural disasters vs fragile/conflict settings) affects the way (I)NGO-government relationships manifest themselves. However, even within conflict settings, there are opportunities for engagement between humanitarian actors and government. The type of regime, timeline of crisis, and other factors including international linkages, socio-economic divisions, bureaucratic structures, and operational setting, shape the policies and practical approaches best suited for humanitarian actors to engage with or work through governments in crisis-affected areas. The report concludes that if the aim is to facilitate long-term community resilience, best practices for (I)NGO-government collaboration should be at the forefront of the localisation agenda. As such, key findings from this report include: • Sustainable community resilience is linked to government capacity, and as such, whenever possible, (I)NGOs must seek to coordinate interventions with government; • The nature of (I)NGO-government collaboration is contextual, and the form of any relationship is dependent on the relevant macro-categories referenced above; • Collaboration is a dynamic, non-linear process. It requires negotiations, compromise, active communication, long-term presence and trust-building with the affected community, local partners and government; LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 8 • Government is not monolithic, and therefore humanitarian actors must adopt multi-pronged, multi-level approaches to government; • (I)NGO-government relationships evolve over time according to shifts in government policy and disaster response phases; and The recommendations identified by this report include: • • • • • • • Create clear and open communication channels between key stakeholders including government, CSOs and the private sector; Facilitate frequent strategic and operational dialogue between key stakeholders to prioritize community development challenges and the respective intervention; Support local initiatives to work with the government; Avoid setting up parallel systems that further undermine community and government coping strategies; Manage (I)NGO-government relationships through a consortium, whenever possible; Adopt a multilevel strategy by partnering with different departments and levels of government, CSOs, local communities and the private sector; and Reflect on internal challenges (including fraud and corruption) and be open to criticisms. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 9 INTRODUCTION This project fits into CA’s LPRR project, which is an initiative on behalf of a consortium led by CA, including Action Aid, Concern Worldwide, HelpAge International, Kings College London, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Saferworld and World Vision. The initial LPRR research resulted in a list of six key recommendations on how community resilience could be achieved, compiled through interviews with community members and aid workers. One of the recommendations identified was the need for humanitarian actors to “coordinate interventions and work with government” (Murphy et al., 2017). This report seeks to address a gap in the literature and provide a practical and policy guide for humanitarian agencies. This guide is built on existing literature and the experiences of (I)NGO staff members involved in the following six cases: • the IDP crisis in the Chocó region in Colombia (1997 onwards); • the drought (2010/2011) and food insecurity crisis (2010 onwards) in Kenya; • Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013); • Cyclone Mora in Bangladesh (2017); • the earthquake in Haiti (2010); and • the refugee crisis in Greece (2015 onwards). CHAPTER ONE explains the methodology and provides a brief literature review to situate the research, with specific focus on the tensions between humanitarian principles and practice, and the transferability of the (I)NGO-government relationship typology theorized by development scholars. CHAPTER TWO is a comparative analysis of the case studies, based on the macro categories presented in Figure 1.1, and argues that both socio-natural and conflict emergencies offer opportunities for (I)NGO-government coordination, but that regime type, crisis timeline, and other variables like bureaucratic structures, international linkages, and operational setting shape what form that coordination takes. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 10 CHAPTER THREE is an assessment of (I)NGO-government collaborative practices, based on the following indicators: • the relationships of the (I)NGOs studied with government authorities before, during and after the emergency; • their partnerships with local NGOs and other CSOs; and • whether the interventions targeted and positively impacted resilience in the affected communities. The assessment finds that (I)NGO-government coordination is most successful in promoting community resilience when all stakeholders make active efforts to communicate at all phases of the response; draw upon previous sector-specific experiences to coordinate with the government; and utilize relationships built by local partners to strengthen (I)NGO-government coordination. In CHAPTER FOUR, we discuss the key findings. These highlight the importance of centring government capacity in (I)NGO interventions and the dynamic, contextspecific nature of collaboration. CHAPTER FIVE provides the research conclusions and a comprehensive list of recommendations for best practices for humanitarian actors to work with or through government in emergency contexts. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 11 Chapter One Methodology Literature Review METHODOLOGY This report relies mainly on qualitative data drawn from six case studies chosen by the consultancy team and Christian Aid UK. The research consisted mainly of a deskbased literature review of primary ((I)NGO reports and documents) and secondary (academic papers) sources, supplemented by semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in (I)NGOs operating within each case study context. Emphasis was placed on qualitative data collection because its descriptive, detailed nature is well suited for a nuanced understanding of the complex interactions between humanitarian actors and governments in emergency situations. DATA SOURCES Data for this research was primarily sourced from the (I)NGOs under study, from publicly available information on their websites, internally circulated documents provided by stakeholders within (I)NGOs and their local partners, and through interviews conducted with key stakeholders. In addition, a thorough literature review was conducted to provide a strong theoretical basis and a deep understanding of operational contexts. DATA ANALYSIS Context analyses were conducted for each of the six case studies (see Appendices II-VII). These served multiple purposes: 1) analyzing the diversity of the cases under study and creating a nuanced understanding of the complex operational setting humanitarian actors work in; 2) providing the basis for a cross-case study comparative analysis of practices employed by (I)NGOs to coordinate humanitarian responses with relevant government authorities; and 3) cataloguing and evaluating the types of practices in use for (I)NGOgovernment cooperation. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 13 These context analyses were structured according to indicators drawn from previous LPRR reports. This was done to ensure continuity and comparability across LPRR research. These indicators include: • Community risk profile; • Crisis profile; • Political infrastructure analysis; • Socio-economic profile analysis; • Stakeholder Analysis; • Long-term development context; • Organizations present (international, national, and local); • Programming and implementation; and • Recommendations, gaps and challenges identified by the project THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK This research draws from the six recommendations laid out in the LPRR report published in 2017 by furthering investigation into the recommendation to work with the government. There is a gap in the humanitarian sector on this point, as working with government is still viewed as a challenge to the classical humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality. However, as the humanitarian field has come to conceptualize resilience in its programming, there has been increasing space within the sector for collaborating with and supporting government action in emergency contexts. LIMITATIONS This research is limited in scope to focus on (I)NGO-government relationships. While local partners and affected communities are not excluded in this narrative, our data is sourced primarily from (I)NGO and government sources, meaning that local level voices are not sufficiently incorporated at this stage. Additionally, our (I)NGO-sourced documents are potentially subject to donor-driven biases. Further research would benefit from the inclusion of more local practitioner and beneficiary voices. Furthermore, future research should expand the study of conflict cases to include interstate conflict and CHEs. One final limitation encountered in this research was the limited number of interviews conducted, due to the time and LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 14 resource constraints of the consultancy team. However, because stakeholder interviews represent only a supplementary form of research to the desk-based literature review, the consultancy team does not feel that the limited interview data presents an unacceptable flaw in our findings. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 15 LITERATURE REVIEW There has been a decades-long trend at all levels of humanitarian discourse towards addressing the gap between short-term emergency relief and long-term development work. The debate surrounding the ‘humanitarian-development grey zone’ can be understood as part of the humanitarian learning process, as aid agencies reflected on the failures to effectively address crises such as the African famines of the 1970s and 1980s (Mosel and Levine, 2014). Humanitarianism has evolved from a conception of a relief-development continuum to a contiguum approach (Mosel and Levine, 2014) with the theory that emphasizing community resilience can bridge the gap between short-term aid and longer view development (Macrae, 2012). This has resulted in shifts towards more participatory and inclusive humanitarian responses to emergencies. RESILIENCE DISCOURSE The concept of resilience has infiltrated disciplines ranging from engineering to psychology (De Bruijne et al., 2010). Humanitarian literature has also applied resilience thinking to its programming and embedded it within the localisation agenda. Humanitarian resilience is understood as the opposite to vulnerability (De Bruijne et al., 2010); as having absorptive, adaptive, and transformative qualities (Béné et al., 2012); and as a dynamic process linking adaptive resources or capacities to recovery and adaptation following disaster (Norris et al., 2008). LPRR defines resilience regarding a community's capacity to adapt and 'bounce back better,' emphasizing the local level implications of a resilience approach (Murphy et al., 2017). Current trends in resilience discourse seek to apply resilience frameworks to the prevention and mitigation phases of the disaster cycle, making resilience a proactive feature of humanitarian preparedness programming (Murphy et al., 2017). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RESILIENCE IN EMERGENCY CONTEXT The Consortium’s contribution is to re-open the resilience debate by emphasizing local knowledge – both survivor and first responder - in resilience recommendations LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 16 (Murphy et al., 2017). The LPRR report published in 2017 lays out six core recommendations for improved resilience-focused humanitarian programming: 1. Allow and enable the community to co-run the response 2. Where feasible, coordinate interventions and work with the government 3. Support community cohesion and establish effective two-way communication between crises survivors and implementing organizations 4. Address underlying causes of vulnerability: protect and prepare 5. Recognize psychosocial support and 6. Livelihoods and savings The combination of these six principles presents an innovative approach to humanitarian programming. However, there exists a gap in humanitarian literature in regards to the recommendation to “coordinate interventions and work with the government”. This has led to the generation of the research topic undertaken by this report: WHAT ARE THE BEST PRACTICES AT POLICY AND PRACTICAL LEVEL FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTORS TO WORK WITH OR THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT IN CRISIS-AFFECTED AREAS? HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT Humanitarian-government cooperation in emergency contexts is still a largely taboo subject due to the persisting importance of the classical principles of independence and neutrality (Harvey, 2009). However, Dunantist-style humanitarianism is also built off recognizing the sovereignty of the state and therefore as the primary actor in emergency contexts (Gordon and Donini, 2016). With (I)NGOs, the recognition of government sovereignty and the need to seek government approval to operate in an emergency does not always translate into a practice of incorporating government policies in (I)NGO program design. The LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 17 combination of these factors creates a tension. As such, there is an increasing level of internal reflection into the application of Dunantist principles, especially in the context of resilience discourse and shifting the power towards local actors. In 2009, ODI’s Humanitarian Policy Group argued that (I)NGOs should not use neutrality and independence to avoid meaningful, principled engagement with affected states’ governments in a way which builds local government capacity to protect its citizens (Harvey, 2009). Not only is there a historically limited practice of these types of partnerships, but there is also a lack of academic literature exploring the potential for and best practices of (I)NGO-government cooperation in emergency contexts. The limited literature which does explore these types of relationships focuses exclusively on socio-natural disaster contexts (Bannerman et al., 2011), leaving out rich potential research into how (I)NGOs can work with and through government in conflict and protracted crisis settings. This is because the principles of independence and neutrality throw a suspicious light on government actors in conflict settings (Harvey, 2009). However, this casts government as a monolithic oppositional entity, ignoring the potential to find allies within various branches, leverage existing legal instruments or institutions, or play off of other government interests (Bannerman et al., 2011). LEARNING FROM THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT: WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT Cooperation between (I)NGOs and governments is much more frequent in development contexts, and there is a corresponding body of literature exploring such relationships. The relationships between (I)NGOs and government in development contexts have multiple dimensions – governmental resistance or acceptance of institutional pluralism; relationship’s balance of power; and the level of formality and institutional linkage. This creates eight different types of possible (I)NGO-government relationships: repression, rivalry, competition, contracting, third-party government, cooperation, complementarity, and collaboration (Coston, 1998). In the partnership-type relationships, a further two dimensions of mutuality and organizational identity can be identified as creating the relative scale between cooperation, complementarity, and collaboration (Brinkerhoff, 2002). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 18 We can observe many similarities when comparing this typology of (I)NGOgovernment relationships to those in emergency contexts. Parallel dimensions – regime type, balances of power, institutional linkages, mutuality, and organizational identity – apply to understanding the different manifestations of (I)NGOgovernment relationships in humanitarian contexts, as will be demonstrated in this report. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 19 Chapter Two Comparative Analysis COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS This chapter performs a comparative analysis across the six case studies to identify trends in (I)NGO-government relationships, provide a basis for the further assessment of collaborative strategies, and identify best practices in (I)NGOgovernment relationships. Figure 4.1: Introduction to the Case Studies The table below provides a breakdown of the cases. For a more in-depth overview, please see the full analyses (Appendix II-VII). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 21 LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 22 The following sections analyse the case studies with respect to (I)NGO-government relationships, by comparing across the macro categories above. TYPE OF EMERGENCY: SOCIO-NATURAL DISASTER Disaster management in the Philippines is primarily the local government's responsibility, while the national government's role is to support its local counterparts. (I)NGOs have collaborated with government to begin addressing gaps in government interventions, often by training local authorities (Beridico, 2018; Libot, 2018). In Bangladesh in 2004, the national government released the CDMP to institutionalize risk reduction approaches by creating partnerships between government and CSOs (Bannerman et al., 2011). CDMP and its 2010 expansion, CDMP II, have created an effective coordination platform, the (I)NGO Coordination Committee on Disaster Management (NGOCC), to promote information sharing and create centralized documentation of response projects, thus helping with ongoing needs assessments and project evaluation (BDKN, 2013). Prior to the 2011 food crisis, Kenya did not have an effective drought risk management plan. Since then, Kenya’s government introduced the Ending Drought Emergencies Common Programme Framework (GoK, 2012). Within this framework, LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 23 KFSSG meets monthly and includes representatives from over 50 different organizations including GoK departments, UN agencies, donors and (I)NGOs. So far, KFSSG has facilitated effective (I)NGO-government joint initiatives, and to some extent, multi-agency food security assessments and coordinated field assessments have become increasingly frequent (Wheeler, n.d.). In Haiti, in 2010, there was no national framework that facilitated (I)NGO-government collaboration, specifically in response to earthquake interventions, and government capacities were severely damaged in the earthquake. Without government direction, UN and (I)NGO efforts to coordinate responses were too little too late and strained relationships between various agencies further deteriorating coordination (Anonymous CA staff, 2018). Besides Haiti, the socio-natural emergency cases all feature varying forms of existing government framework for disaster response, which creates space for (I)NGO-government collaboration. The failure of the Haitian government to create a standing disaster risk management framework can be attributed to regime type, which is further explored in a later section. CONFLICT Colombia and Greece represent the conflict category in this report. In the case of Greece, the conflict(s) are external to the country but have caused 1,062,624 refugees to pass through Greece from 2014 to present (UNHCR, 2018). This created very different dynamics between Colombia and Greece. CA and partners’ programming in Colombia has focused on holding the government accountable for its failure to protect its citizens and engaging national and local government to protect communities at risk of violence and displacement from various armed actors (Mortensen, 2018). This has created a unique dynamic in (I)NGO-government relationships. In this case, (I)NGOs are in constant engagement with the Colombian government at all levels, actively seeking out and working with potential allies within government (like the Constitutional Court and the Victims’ Office), and simultaneously applying normative and diplomatic pressure on the state by supporting high-profile lawsuits against human rights offenders and the Colombian state itself (Mortensen, 2018; IACHR, 2013). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 24 In Greece, the government does not bear responsibility for the conflicts which have produced refugees, but under international law is legally obliged to respect the principle of non-refoulement (European Commission, 2017). In 2016, the government created an independent Ministry of Migration Policy to better manage the flow of migrant arrivals. Camp management is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Migration Policy or the army/navy, but coordination meetings are taking place regularly among the various humanitarian actors operating on site (Kyriakopoulou, 2018). However, coordination has been very passive and limited on a national level: beyond communication of independent activities, there have been no collaborative efforts at the national level. Partly in reaction to this lack of collaborative relationships at the national level, (I)NGO-government collaboration has begun to take shape at the municipal level, through the REACT programmes (URBACT, 2017), as well as other projects (A_INGO_GR, 2018; Kyriakopoulou, 2018). The trend which emerges in our study of conflict emergencies is that regardless of the government’s role in the conflict, (I)NGOs can find opportunities to engage with government by appealing to government’s responsibilities under national and international law. TIMELINE OF CRISIS: RAPID ONSET The disasters in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Haiti represent rapid onset crises, which pose a unique set of challenges to responders who must act quickly to protect populations and provide emergency relief. In Bangladesh, CDMP created DMCs (trained in coordination by government and (I)NGOs) to aid in communication of early warnings and evacuation instructions, and to assist in distribution and coordination of relief (CEDMHA, 2017). The Start Network had a four-day window after Cyclone Mora to implement relief projects (Start Fund, 2017). However, once on the ground, Caritas Bangladesh had to adjust their programme because the information it had received from the government did not accurately report all affected communities (Gomes, 2018). Since 2011, the disaster management in the Philippines is under the NDRRMC, while provincial and local LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 25 authorities have a respective DRRMO. A cluster system has been set up in the Philippines to divide labour and ensure the response is direct and the coordination is efficient, led by the relevant national agency or ministry, along with (I)NGOs and UN agencies. IOM in specific co-leads the CCCM cluster. Prior to the 2010 earthquake, organizations including the World Bank were working with the Haitian government to incorporate disaster risk management into Haiti’s overall development strategy (FAO, 2012). However, the project was still in its early stages, and the lack of an effective early warning system contributed to the scale of the damages incurred (FAO, 2012; CRS, 2010, p. 4). The rapid onset and the severity of the earthquake severely crippled government capacity, leading to an uncoordinated inflow of (I)NGOs and resources which government structures were not able to accommodate (Anonymous CA staff, 2018). The cases studies demonstrate how advance planning and existing disaster management frameworks are key to effective response and (I)NGO-government coordination in rapid onset crises. Bangladesh and the Philippines had these frameworks, and so responses were much more coordinated than in Haiti. SLOW ONSET The drought-related food insecurity in Kenya1 as a slow onset crisis should have provided a unique opportunity for preventative (I)NGO-government interventions to mitigate impact and plan response. However, this was not the case in 2010/2011, as both the government and (I)NGOs were slow to respond to early warning indicators (Hillier, 2012, p. 9). In 2010/2011, (I)NGOs assumed more responsibility than GoK during the peak of the crisis because prior to the adoption of a devolved governance system, (I)NGOs operated as de facto local governments and therefore most of the relief funds were channeled directly to (I)NGOs, bypassing the government (Maingi, 2018). The lack of effective local governance structures and of an existing response coordination plan prior to the onset of the crisis hindered (I)NGO-government collaboration. However, since the solidification of devolved 1 Kenya was analyzed both as a slow onset and protracted crisis, as since 2011, there have been recurring food insecurity crises. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 26 governance after 2010, regional and local government has become much more effective and has overseen setting priorities, allocating funds, and directing (I)NGO projects, creating consultation systems between (I)NGOs, donors, and GoK (Maingi, 2018). PROTRACTED In the cases of protracted crises like in Colombia, Kenya, Haiti, and Greece, (I)NGOgovernment relationships tended to evolve over time according to political changes. For example, in Colombia CA and partners have found or expect to find increasing allies in government as different administrations have pursued different policies in conflict and post-conflict reconstruction and as some of the institutions created in the 2016 Peace Accords develop (Mortensen, 2018). There is also the hope that since (I)NGO programming seeks to support the development of CBOs, that community leaders will run for local office in the future (Lazaro, 2018). In Kenya[1] (I)NGO-government relationships have evolved over time based on changes in the country's political and economic structure, most notably the devolution of power and Kenya's reclassification as a middle-income country. Prior to 2010, the bulk of (I)NGO-government collaboration was concentrated at the national level, which tended to be detached from local priorities. However, since 2014, with the GoK’s devolution of power, there has been a shift towards (I)NGO collaboration at the county government level. As such, (I)NGO-government collaboration has arguably become more effective, specifically within a framework of community-based interventions (Kopplow, 2018). Similarly, in Greece, (I)NGOgovernment relationships are shifting as the government changes its policies, including creating the Ministry of Migration Policy and holding coordination meetings between government and the ECHO-funded (I)NGOs operating in the country (A_INGO_GR, 2018). In Haiti, there was no system that aimed to coordinate (I)NGO-government joint interventions. Additionally, the fact that donor-funding was mostly channeled through (I)NGOs created tensions between (I)NGOs and government (Njoka et al., 2016). While some (I)NGOs like Christian Aid advocated for reconstruction funds to primarily be channeled through the government, this change came in much later in LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 27 the reconstruction efforts and (I)NGO-government relationships remain strained (Anonymous CA source, 2018). REGIME TYPE: FLAWED DEMOCRACY Colombia, the Philippines, and Greece are all ranked as flawed democracies by the EIU. In the case of Colombia, one of the major issues is corruption at local levels of government: this leads to a failure to protect citizens from armed actors and displacement, high levels of government abandonment, and difficulty implementing of reforms made at the national level, like laws for land restitution and victims’ rights (Lazaro, 2018). To effectively advocate for communities within this context, CA and partners have engaged in a multi-level strategy to draw attention to local abuses and leverage national and international pressure and legal instruments to punish perpetrators of abuse and win land restitution cases for displaced communities (Mortensen, 2018). In the Philippines, governance issues include the wide trickle down of power resulting in poor coordination among the different levels of government, which creates issues for (I)NGOs trying to collaborate across the different levels (Libot, 2018). Greece is labeled as a flawed democracy because of the corruption levels and the lack of transparency in the country, which is also evident in the refugee crisis case, as it is not clear how the EU funding is utilized, resulting to the lack of trust between (I)NGOs and authorities, with the latter blaming the (I)NGOs for having a ‘colonial mentality’ (Howden and Fotiadis, 2017). HYBRID REGIME Bangladesh and Kenya represent Hybrid Regimes in our study, meaning they feature electoral irregularities, an unfree political opposition, and high levels of corruption, among other indicators (EIU, 2017). In the case of Bangladesh, there are LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 28 significant limits on opposition politics, but disasters provide a window for opposition and media criticism of the ruling party: this criticism acts as a motivating factor for the Bangladeshi government to make serious efforts in disaster response coordination, including actively working with (I)NGOs (Gomes, 2018). In Kenya, increased media reporting exposed the GoK's ineffective and slow response and propelled a call to action. The combination of media criticism and CSOs’ demands for government action led to the establishment of the NDMA and NDDCF in November 2011 to lead and coordinate drought management in Kenya, bringing together multiple stakeholders including (I)NGOs and GoK. Additionally, corruption allegations tend to influence (I)NGO-government collaboration in Kenya (Bailey, 2015, p. 26). The trend emerging from our study of hybrid regimes is that even within hybrid systems suffering from corruption, humanitarian actors can find opportunities to work with government, especially at local levels. FRAGILE OR CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATE (FCAS) Although the EIU currently ranks Haiti as a Hybrid Regime, for the purposes of this report, we determined that analyzing (I)NGO-government relationships within FCAS framework would be more insightful for understanding the failure of coordination during the earthquake response. Haiti is marked by volatility and political tension between different parties which combined with the blow to government capacity as an impact of the earthquake meant that in 2010, the government was unable to effectively carry out its governance functions and was labeled by the World Bank as a fragile state (n.d.). (I)NGOs in the immediate relief phase largely did not work with the Haitian government: less than 1% of relief funds were channeled through the government (Anonymous CA source, 2018; Ramachandran, 2012). OTHER RELEVANT VARIABLES: This report identified other relevant variables, which while not present in all cases studied, did impact (I)NGO-government relationships in those cases where they were observed. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 29 POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC INFRASTRUCTURE Colombia’s political landscape is characterized by decentralization of power: the national government has limited power to enforce or implement policies at the local level, where government institutions may be aligned with certain paramilitary or criminal actors (Mortensen, 2018). In this context, (I)NGOs work to pressure the national government to assert authority and ensure implementation and to build stronger linkages between affected communities and local governments to counter the power of armed actors (Lazaro, 2018). During the Cyclone Mora response in Bangladesh, although national-level (I)NGOgovernment coordination platforms were utilized, most of the day-to-day coordination was played out at the sub-district administrative level, especially during the recovery phase (Gomes, 2018). Benefits of working with more local government included easier communication and better government production and management of information, therefore opening space for greater impact on the ground (Bannerman et al., 2018). During the 2010 /2011 drought cycle, resources were directed towards (I)NGOs like Islamic Relief that designed and implemented interventions with limited community and government involvement (Maingi, 2018). Since 2014 however, the devolution systems drafted in the 2010 Kenyan constitution have been implemented. The devolution of power has had a positive impact on accountability and public service delivery at local levels (World Bank). Since the devolution, there has been a decline in (I)NGO collaboration with the national government and increased collaboration with county government, where most of disaster funding is now channeled. INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES International linkages played significant roles in shaping (I)NGO-government relationships in certain cases. For example, Colombia’s current administration is eager to overcome its negative international image of civil conflict and narcotrafficking, and so the (I)NGOs are able to leverage the national government’s desire to ‘rebrand’ by using the international community, including diplomats and (I)NGO representatives in Bogotá and international bodies like the IACHR, to pressure the government to force implementation of protection laws at the local LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 30 level (Mortensen, 2018). In Greece, its EU membership structures government responsibility to refugees. OPERATIONAL SETTING Whether the intervention was implemented in a rural or an urban community affected how (I)NGOs engaged with government. In cases like Colombia and Kenya where the rural affected communities suffer from significant government abandonment, (I)NGOs engaged in advocacy activities to pressure national and local-level governments to address community needs (Mortensen, 2018; Turnbull, 2012, p. 7-20). In Bangladesh, (I)NGOs were able to work with municipal authorities to draw on urban infrastructures and human resources to address community needs. However, in Haiti, the lack of formal infrastructure or functioning municipal government in densely populated urban areas was an obstacle for effective relief (Gomes, 2018; GFDRR, 2015, p. 1). CHAPTER CONCLUSION The type of emergency does impact the practice and success of (I)NGOgovernment relationships, but both socio-natural and conflict emergencies present opportunities for (I)NGOs to engage with or work through government in crisisaffected areas. The type of regime, crisis timeline, and other factors like bureaucratic structures, international linkages, and operational settings shape the best practices at the policy and practical level for humanitarian actors to build and evolve relationships to government. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 31 Chapter Three Assessment ASSESSMENT OF (I)NGOGOVERNMENT COLLABORATION PRACTICES Following the comparative analysis of the case studies, the present chapter seeks to assess the existing practices of collaboration between (I)NGOs and country authorities in emergency contexts. The assessment will look at the relations between (I)NGOs and authorities before, during and after the emergency, the formation of partnerships with local NGOs, and how successful the (I)NGOs’ interventions were targeting and achieving community resilience - the overall goal of the LPRR project. The assessment also takes into consideration the macro categories identified in the comparative analysis chapter. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 33 (I)NGOS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO / DURING / IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE EMERGENCY: COLOMBIA: CA has worked on anti-violence and community empowerment in Colombia since the 1980s, and has been involved in IDP programming in the Chocó region since the early 2000s (CA, 2013). Because of CA’s long-term commitment to the anti-violence sector, they have managed to build strong links with the communities, local NGOs and CBOs, sympathetic government actors, like the Constitutional Court and the Victims' Unit, and with the international diplomatic community in Bogotá. Since the passing of the 2004 Victims' Law, national government has increasingly featured space for engagement on citizen protection, and CA and local partners have effectively sought out allies in various government institutions with whom to work. The fact that CA has had a long-term presence and a history of engagement with government on anti-violence work meant that they have been well positioned to capitalize on shifts in government policy and further their advocacy work in support of displaced communities. KENYA: Kenya has become increasingly susceptible to droughts, and every year, the effects are becoming more severe. As a result, the GoK has established working groups, consisted of GoK departments, UN agencies, donors and (I)NGOs, in charge of handling drought-related food insecurity. IR has operated in Kenya since 1993, but since 2006 it focuses its intervention on emergency relief, recovery and livelihood support especially to communities at risk of drought-related crises. CW has worked in Kenya since 2002 running a multi-sectoral programme both in urban and rural settings and working with various government partners, including the County Government of Marsabit, specifically the county-level Ministry of Health. IR includes the annual CIDP in their interventions and funds CIDP, giving them some level of bargaining power, with which they advocate for community participation in the outlining of the CIDP. IR has various government partners including the Kenyan Meteorological Department and the county-level Ministry of Agriculture. Both INGOs’ existing sector-specific partnerships with government agencies meant that they could effectively translate those relationships into the emergency response interventions needed during the food crisis. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 34 PHILIPPINES: Both the IOM and HelpAge International/COSE were operating in the country prior to the hazard and had pre-existing capacity-building relationships with the authorities, which helped in the establishment of active partnerships with government in the aftermath of the typhoon (Beridico, 2018; Libot, 2018). At the time of Typhoon Haiyan, IOM was a major INGO which implemented its projects without local partners and therefore worked more with the national authorities, but encountered challenges in collaborating with local government (Libot, 2018). On the contrary, HelpAge International, which implements its projects in partnership with local NGO COSE, found collaboration with local authorities to be more feasible (Beridico, 2018). However, both (I)NGOs had previously coordinated with the Philippines government in typhoon response and so could draw upon those preexisting sector-specific relationships during Typhoon Haiyan programming. BANGLADESH: Start Network’s established its Bangladeshi fund one month prior to the landfall of Cyclone Mora, but members of the Network including CB have been active in the country for decades. Start Network, while working in the immediate response phase, countered the challenges posed by the time-sensitive nature of the projects by working through local partners and the national branches of its member organizations to coordinate with national and local government for information sharing and to get the necessary approval to implement their projects in a timely manner (Ahmad, 2018). In the recovery phase, CB coordinated more with the district and sub-district governments to assess needs, avoid duplication, and monitor beneficiaries (Gomes, 2018). Bangladesh’s national government disaster management plan specifically calls for (I)NGO-government coordination, and so the humanitarian actors had pre-existing sector-specific relationships with relevant government agencies on which to build coordination during the Cyclone Mora response. HAITI: CA has supported partners in Haiti since the 1980s, and it was present in the 2010 earthquake response. The influx of INGOs post-earthquake, and the unwillingness of these INGOs to collaborate with the government due to political instability, further undermined government capacity. However, a couple (I)NGOs like CA have sought to collaborate with national and local government officials at multiple stages of the post-earthquake response. At a macro level, CA tends to liaise with key national government ministries, but within communities they work with LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 35 local government. Additionally, CA encouraged local partners to collaborate with the government, highlighting that while CA funding and support is bounded within time, the Haitian government’s is not (Anonymous CA source, 2018). Another success was that they advocated that donor funds should be channelled through the government (Anonymous CA source, 2018). However, because CA and other (I)NGOs did not have pre-existing relationships with the Haitian government in earthquake response, the lack of past sector-specific collaborative history further impeded effective (I)NGO-government coordination in the 2010 earthquake response. GREECE: AA has been active in Greece since 1998 and in 2015 it initiated an emergency appeal to address the refugee crisis. AA had been registered in Greece prior to the refugee crisis, so, it was easier for them from a bureaucratic perspective to get the permission needed to operate in the refugee camps (Kyriakopoulou, 2018). A_INGO_GR started operations only in 2016 so did not have existing relationships to draw on for coordination on refugee interventions (Anonymous A_INGO_GR staff, 2018; URBACT, 2017). Coordination meetings are held and are structured around sectoral clusters, but they are attended mainly by (I)NGO representatives, with officials from different levels of government only occasionally taking part: due to this lack of communication and absenteeism, outcomes from coordination meetings vary greatly and opportunities for some (I)NGOs to collaborate with and lobby national government are limited (Kyriakopouloy, 2018). PARTNERING WITH LOCAL NGOS: COLOMBIA: CA partners with local NGOs, affected community CBOs, and with local human rights defenders. This network creation helped amplify community voices at the national level and reinforce links between community and local and national government. KENYA: CW did not partner with other (I)NGOs, as in Kenya the state is the sole provider of healthcare services, and CW did not want to risk forming parallel service structures. IRK worked with local partners to implement projects. The Kenyan case demonstrates how local partnerships must still be carefully managed: while still an LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 36 overwhelmingly positive element, partnerships with local NGOs cannot replace the need to collaborate with the state. PHILIPPINES: IOM partners with local organisations in their capacity of co-leading the CCCM cluster. HelpAge International implements its project through COSE, making it easier for them to respond in emergency cases, because of the permanent presence of their local counterpart in the country. BANGLADESH: Start Network and its members work with national branches of member organizations and local NGOs. This provides them with high quality data of realities on the ground to supplement information provided by government and helped build relationships with district and sub-district government agencies. HAITI: CA partners with various CSOs and post-earthquake interventions are mostly implemented through local partners. CA encourages implementing partners to seek local government input on projects to ensure that the objectives align with the government’s reconstruction agenda. GREECE: A_INGO_GR’s global policy includes the partnership with local organisations to ensure sustainability. AA has been working closely with local NGOs and grassroots groups to develop local capacities. However, neither organization utilized local NGO relationships with government as a way build a stronger platform for (I)NGO-government coordination. BUILT RESILIENCE: COLOMBIA: One of the most important aspects of resilience building in this case is the creation of links of accountability between displaced communities and all levels of government. CA’s relationship with the Colombian government and its ability to advocate effectively for the communities have been instrumental in fostering a sense of accountability and responsibility. Challenges in working with government and enforcing accountability still continue in the Colombian case, but CA and partners’ work have demonstrated how even in conflict contexts, (I)NGOs can engage with governments to protect and promote community resilience. KENYA: Resilience was targeted through CW’s CMAM Surge, an approach that strived to improve health and nutrition services available at Marsabit County health LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 37 facilities: CW partnered with the government to train and support community health facilities and workers (Kopplow, 2018). IRK targeted resilience through various projects including the DRR/LP initiative that aims to link communities along the disaster chain and introduce alternative sources of livelihood including commercialized forage production and small-scale enterprise through microfinancing (Maingi, 2018; IRK, n.d.). Both CW and IRK worked within local agendas, targeted specific sectors, and partnered with the respective government ministry in their interventions. The combination of these factors led to the success of the interventions and positively impacted community resilience. PHILIPPINES: In order to make sure that they build resilience, IOM's interventions always have a clear start and end point, and work towards building community capacity. HelpAge International/COSE supported community self-organization, capacity building, and advocacy initiatives; trained volunteer health workers; and advocated for affected communities to participate in local DRRM councils (Beredico, 2018). Because (I)NGOs had working relationships with the state, they were able to effectively build up community relationship to government in a way which positively impacted community resilience. BANGLADESH: Start Network's use of cash programming allowed beneficiaries to exercise agency in the relief phase: post-intervention assessments showed that many chose to use cash aid for livelihood restoration, which helps to build resilience (Ahmad, 2018). CB’s recovery phase project focused on building back better shelters (Gomes, 2018). The INGOs’ relationships with the government allowed them to pool information and effectively target beneficiaries. HAITI: CA targeted resilience in two ways. First, Haitians were trained to build earthquake-resistant homes. This allowed local members of the community to have a source of income and build a portfolio so that they can be competitive candidates for future building contracts. Second, the homes have become an asset for these families, and this served to empower them. In addition to community resilience, CA also worked on improving government resilience, specifically economic stability. By advocating for the inclusion of government in (I)NGO programming, CA is helping to rebuild links between Haitian communities and their government. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 38 GREECE: A_INGO-GR works towards the integration of the EDPs currently residing in Greece. It assisted people in getting their social insurance number covering their health care, their tax number and also transition from the cash assistance programme towards national welfare and, in specific, the social solidarity income. AA targets resilience through a protection and empowerment programme for refugee women (Kyriakopoulou, 2018). However, the (I)NGOs’ difficulties in finding a responsive ally in national government has meant that project implementation has been delayed (A_INGO_GR, 2018). LEARNING POINTS – WHAT TO AVOID TO FOR EFFECTIVE (I)NGOGOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS: COLOMBIA: (I)NGOs should not exclude meaningful engagement with government because of the government's history of involvement in the conflict. Government is not monolithic, and allies can be found in different branches or institutions. KENYA: Frequent staff turnover should be avoided and communication channels institutionalized because it takes time for the members of staff to establish relations with the authorities. Additionally, corruption within the country should not be seen as a justification for avoiding collaborating with the authorities. Rather, they should try to create transparent, trust-based relations. PHILIPPINES: (I)NGOs should ensure that they do not undermine the credibility of the state by emphasizing that they intervene at the request of the government. BANGLADESH: (I)NGOs should not ignore existing relationships between local/national partners and government. HAITI: The local government should not require (I)NGOs to function as financial support providers, but as partners. GREECE: The government should not treat (I)NGOs as service providers or see them as competing parties fighting for the biggest share of the ECHO funding. CHAPTER CONCLUSION: LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 39 When humanitarian actors take active steps to engage with multiple levels of government, they are more successful in promoting community resilience. The existence of prior (I)NGO-government relationships, especially in the specific sector of the emergency intervention, is key to collaboration, thus indicating the importance of long-term (I)NGO presence in affected communities. Collaboration with local partners further helps build impactful (I)NGO-government relationships, ranging from collaborative or complementary interventions to coordination meetings to advocacy. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 40 Chapter Four Key Findings KEY FINDINGS BANGLADESH COLOMBIA GREECE • National coordination platforms are useful for coordinating the broad strokes of disaster preparedness and response plans, but coordination at the district and sub-district level was more impactful regarding preventing duplication and beneficiary tracking. • In rapid onset emergencies like a cyclone, information sharing is critical to effective interventions and coordination. However poor quality data continues to pose a challenge. As a result, in designing and implementing interventions, (I)NGOs must supplement government-provided data with their on-the-ground knowledge. • (I)NGOs can leverage government’s desire to control its international image to pressure the government to enforce protection laws at the local level. • (I)NGO-government relationships evolve over time according to shifts in government policy and disaster response phases. • Even in the case of a highly decentralized power system like Colombia, (I)NGOs can effectively engage government to fulfill its responsibility to protect by adopting a multi-level, multi-pronged approach. This includes utilizing national and international legal instruments, leveraging international linkages to apply downwards pressure for accountability, finding allies in different government institutions, and supporting CBOs and community leaders to lobby – or even join – local government. • There is intense competition for EU funding between (I)NGOs and the government which negatively impacts meaningful collaborative interventions. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 42 HAITI KENYA • It is counterproductive for (I)NGOs to exclusively function as service providers without actively participating in the coordinated designing and implementation of interventions. • Refugee interventions were poorly coordinated at multiple levels due to the lack of designated communication channels and government absenteeism from coordination meetings (Anonymous A_INGO_GR staff, 2018). • Ineffective post-earthquake rehabilitation and the lack of collaboration further magnified the effects and rendered all interventions somewhat useless and hindered reconstruction efforts. • It is key to concurrently coordinate with both local and national government. At a macro-level, responses should be coordinated within the national agenda, but for communityspecific interventions, (I)NGOs should work with local authorities to identify local priorities. • Collaboration in both the design and implementation of interventions was critical to the effectiveness of the response in addressing drought-related food insecurity. Additionally, the nature of (I)NGO-GoK collaboration depended on several factors including the level of government (county or national), the specific GoK ministry and the target sector (health, education, housing, agriculture). • (I)NGOs should pay attention to the capacities of the government. In a country like Kenya where the GoK is relatively functional, (I)NGOs should aim to work within the national and local response agendas to avoid setting up parallel systems that further undermine coping structures. Within this framework, the GoK should lead coordinated LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 43 interventions, and (I)NGOs should be complementary, intervening only when government resources are stressed. PHILIPPINES • Decentralized governance allows for flexible and localized decision-making and provides a new opportunity for effective (I)NGO-GoK collaboration. • Local partners play an important role in brokering relations between (I)NGOs and (local) government. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 44 Chapter Five Conclusion Recommendations CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS The changing dynamics and increasing frequency of crises, due to demographic shifts, geopolitical factors, and climate change, present challenges for (I)NGOs, but also new opportunities for a rethinking of the relationship between humanitarian actors and government. This report aims to provide a best-practices guide for humanitarian practitioners who seek to promote (I)NGO-goverment collaboration as a way to promote community resilience. As such, our recommendations are as follows: COMMUNITY I. Where possible, ensure that local community is involved in the design and implementation of interventions to build local ownership and improve community capacity and skillset. II. Support local initiatives, including local partners’ initiatives, to work with government. III. Advocate for the government to consult with communities and include community priorities in national and local development plans. IV. Where possible, encourage local leaders to run for office and facilitate community-level organizations which can lobby government. TRUST, ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY I. Trust and respect local structures, communities, and authorities, and recognize their right to dictate the direction of interventions. II. Corruption should not deter meaningful collaborative interventions. (I)NGOs must acknowledge that corruption is both cause and effect of weak institutional capacities, and that corruption is not exclusive to governments. III. (I)NGOs should reflect on internal challenges, including abuse and corruption, and be open to criticism. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 46 DIALOGUE AND PARTNERSHIP I. Where possible, provide a platform for effective and sustainable coordination. This includes organizing regular workshops between all stakeholders including the government, local communities and CSOs. II. When possible, all stakeholders, including affected community, should be involved in the design and implementation phases of interventions. III. (I)NGOs should clearly define and advocate for achievable goals so that they increase the chances of securing the government’s support. IV. Governments should not rely on (I)NGOs as sole service providers. COMMUNICATION I. Create clear and open communication channels between all stakeholders to promote longevity and institutionalization of relationships. II. Promote information pooling and sharing of expertise between all stakeholders. III. Adopt stakeholder feedback into project design and implementation. IV. Emphasize long-term presence on the ground as sector-specific preestablished relationships are crucial to collaborative interventions, especially within an emergency context. MULTI-LEVEL STRATEGY I. (I)NGOs default to working with the national government, which tends to overshadow equally meaningful collaboration with local government. (I)NGOs should adopt a multi-level strategy and collaborate with various levels of government including national, regional, provincial and county. II. (I)NGOs must recognize that government is not monolithic. They should seek out and collaborate with specific government ministries and departments where institutional interests align with humanitarian actors' objectives. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 47 III. Local partners play an important role in brokering relations between (I)NGOs and government. As such, (I)NGOs should utilize local partners to connect with local authorities. IV. Working with local authorities to address development challenges will improve long-term institutional capacity. V. Leverage international linkages where applicable. International pressure can act as a powerful incentive for governments to work with (I)NGOs. MULTI-AGENCY PLATFORMS I. Wherever possible, manage (I)NGO-government relationships through a consortium, especially at national level. AVOID SETTING UP PARALLEL SYSTEMS I. Ensure that the government is leading coordinated interventions at national, county and district level. II. (I)NGOs should avoid early interventions and strive to work within the national and local government agendas. III. (I)NGOs should see their role as complementary to that of the government and community. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 48 APPENDIX I – TERMS OF REFERENCE Organization and Department Christian Aid – Humanitarian Division Project Working Title Linking Preparedness, Response and Resilience in emergency context (LPRR) Background: Two short paragraphs. In the first, please provide a brief description of your organisation and its objectives. In the second, please provide a brief introduction to the topic to be addressed by the project. Why is the organisation interested? Why is the subject itself interesting? Christian Aid is leading a consortium of 8 humanitarian agencies in a DFID funded project, which seeks to promote resilient humanitarian responses. LPRR project, together with KCL conducted a research which asked community members and first responders of 8 past humanitarian crisis how a humanitarian response could build and not undermine community resilience. The recommendations from the research are: 1. Allow and enable the community to co-run the response 2. Coordinate interventions and work with the government 3. Support community cohesion and establish effective two-way communication 4. Address underlying causes of vulnerability: protect and prepare 5. Include psycho social support and 6. Livelihoods and savings These are not new findings, but the combination of them, makes them an innovative approach. These are now rolled out within the LPRR consortium members and country programmes in Myanmar and Kenya. However, there is a gap within the humanitarian sector on point 2. Working with the government still is considered a challenge within the sector. Therefore it is proposed that this LSE consultancy will explore how to transform this recommendation of WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT INTO PRACTICAL APPROACHES. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 9 Question: (One or two sentences. What is the motivating question? What is it, specifically, that your organisation would like to know?) Objective: (Short paragraph that explains what you hope to get out of the answer and how you may use the students’ ork to ad ance organizational objectives.)  What are the best practices at policy and practical level for humanitarian actors to work with and/or thought the government in crisis affected areas? The project team together with Kings College London (KCL) has conducted a research investigating 8 cases of study proposed by the project consortium to answer the question: how to promote resilience-focused humanitarian response. One of the recommendation is to work with and/or thought the government. This consultancy will explore existing literature and possible conduct some interviews to produce a paper highlighting what are the best practices of working with governments in humanitarian responses and inform practitioners of Start Network and LPRR consortium. Methodology: How the students are expected to answer the question. E.g. desk research, interviews, survey, review of internal documents, etc. If you wish the students to define the methodology please say so. Contact: (The name and contact information of the person within your organisation who will be responsible for liaising with the students.) Under the supervision of Christian Aid’s ‘project manager, the students will:  Initial literature review to scan the available resources and identify key macro categories specifically on working with/through the government (protracted crisis, fast and slow onsets, urban and rural to mention a few)  A short meeting with CA presenting the initial literature review to narrow down the review  Desk-based literature review  Potentially interview with few key actors to deepen the review  Writing a review paper with case studies  Presenting reoccurring themes to the LPRR team Simone Di Vicenz LPRR Project manager Humanitarian Division skype: sdivicenz Tel: +44 (0)20 7523 2143 e-mail: [email protected] LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 50 APPENDIX II – COLOMBIAN CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY RISK PROFILE Situation in the country The case studied was ongoing programming with IDP communities in the Chocó region of Colombia. The (I)NGO studied was Christian Aid Colombia, which works in partnership with Peace Brigades International (PBI), and several local NGOs and human rights activists including the Inter-church Commission on Justice and Peace (CIJP). Analysis of Disaster 1. The disaster a. There are currently 7.3 million IDPs in Colombia, 50% of which have been displace to urban slums. (UNHCR Factsheet 2017) i. Displacement continues today despite the 2016 Peace Accords due to: 1. Increasing violence in some areas as local armed groups struggle for dominance in the power vacuum left by FARC (Lazaro, 2018) 2. Armed group involvement in criminal activities (UNHCR Factsheet 2017) 3. Organized violence by local power holders against human rights activists, community leaders, and land claimants (UNHCR Factsheet 2017; Pedro Lazaro, 2018) b. The case under study is specifically focused on the Cacarica River Basin in the Chocó region and the 1997 Operación Genesis which displaced 3,500 people, primarily Afro-Colombians (Murphy et al., 2015). i. From February 24th to 27th, 1997, a military operation led by the 17th Brigade of the Army under the command of General Rito LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 51 Alejo del Rio took place in Cacarica with the official purpose to capture FARC fighters in the area. However, community members alleged that the operation was run in coordination with the paramilitary group United Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU) (Murphy et al., 2015). During Operación Genesis, military and paramilitary fighters killed, tortured, disappeared, and forcibly displaced members of the Afro-Colombian population in the region. 1. Brutal murder of Marino Lopez Mena (WOLA, 2014) 2. 83 civilians killed or disappeared (Murphy et al., 2015) ii. Around 3,500 people were displaced, of which around 2,300 resettled in other areas of the Antioquia department (IACHR, 2013). 1. The displacement of local communities benefited palm cultivators in the Chocó region a. The July 2013 conviction of businessmen Luis Fernando Zea Medina and Héctor Duque Echevery for conspiracy, invasion of ecologically important land, and forced displacement, due in large part to the organizing efforts of CIJP, community leaders, and other (I)NGOs (Mortensen, 2018) iii. The returns process occurred from January 2000 – March 2001 1. The displaced communities formed an inter-community organisation called CAVIDA (Communities for SelfDetermination, Life, and Dignity in Cacarica) as a platform for protection from armed groups, coordination of return process, and community development (Lazaro, 2018). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 52 2. The communities created two ‘Humanitarian Zones’ as conflict-free communities: Nueva Vida and Esperanza en Dios (Murphy et al., 2015). These ‘humanitarian zones’ have come to be recognized by the national state, the international community and local and international NGOs (Lazaro, 2018). 2. Colombia’s Historical Context a. The civil conflict has origins in La Violencia (1948-58) when an estimated 200,000 were killed during conflict between Conservative and Liberal political factions (Shiraz, 2014). b. Following Cuban Revolution, 1964 saw the creation of the ELN and FARC guerilla groups and the resurgence of politically-motivated civil conflict. These guerilla groups grew out of rural defense groups which were formed during La Violencia (Ferris, 2014). In response, the Colombian military and new right-wing paramilitary groups fought against guerilla groups, resulting in four decades of conflict with massive human rights abuses committed on all sides. During this conflict, the Colombian state effectively lost control of large parts of its territory. c. The 1970s and ‘80s featured the growth of criminal gangs and the narcotrafficking economy, which in turn interacted with the civil violence, forming links with the Colombian state and local authorities, with paramilitaries, and with the guerillas, especially in the 2000s onwards following a renewal of an aggressive militarized policy from President Alvaro Uribe (Ferris, 2014). d. Displacement has been a feature throughout the conflict, due to the violence on all sides i. Government has been reluctant to admit any fault or responsibility in causing displacement (Ferris 2014) 3. Conflict Profile LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 53 a. One of the reasons the Colombian civil conflict has lasted so long is because of the multitude of actors involved in prolonging the violence, including: i. Illegal Armed groups 1. Insurgent groups/guerillas 2. Paramilitary groups ii. Military iii. Criminal Gangs iv. Government v. Business interests b. The roots of conflict lie in then history of civil violence in Colombia, where high levels of inequality further exacerbated by export-oriented economic development have created patterns of violence (Flores, 2014). c. Conflict drivers include government abandonment and lack of legitimacy, in part due to the entrenched corruption at local levels, as well as the geopolitical and strategic importance of the Chocó region as a corridor for armed actors and criminal gangs and because its fertile soil makes the land desirable to agribusiness interests (Murphy et al., 2015). Community Risk Profile 1. The displaced communities in Cacarica exist in a context of marginalization, segregation, and isolation from wider Colombian society (Murphy et al., 2015; Lazaro, 2018). d. Lack of access to basic services – roads, electricity, health infrastructure, education, etc LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 54 e. Ongoing violence from insurgent groups, paramilitaries, and narcotrafficking elements f. Corruption of local authorities g. SGBV h. Concentration of wealth and power i. Unemployment and lack of economic opportunities Political Infrastructure 1. Governance Structures a. Electoral democracy: Colombia is ranked as a ‘Flawed Democracy’ by the 2017 EIU Democracy index. It is a federal system with strong executive branch. b. Colombia’s judiciary includes an independent constitutional court, which has proved an ally to displaced communities in the past decade (Mortensen, 2018). Colombia is also party to the IACHR, which in 2013 found the Colombian state responsible in the case of displacement during Operación Genesis (IACHR, 2013). 2. Power Relations a. The decentralized power structures in Colombian local government has led to implementation gaps between national-level protection policies and the on-the-ground realities faced by the communities in Cacarica. The case of Colombia is particular in that the government is not equally strong in all parts of its territory: the state has the funds and resources which may be absent in other emergency contexts, but not the political will to enforce authority in all parts of local government or parts of the country (Mortensen, 2018). i. There exist good intentional policies from the state, but strong interests at local level prevent enforcement. Local business interests, local authorities and police, and local paramilitaries LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 55 are all linked and these legal/formal power structures complement and supplement the illegal/informal ones. This pattern is very difficult to break: the 2016 Peace Accords have not changed these power dynamics. These elements are pushing back against peace agreement out of fear of losing illegally acquired land and power and/or going to jail (Mortensen, 2018). b. The Colombian case is that of a complex internal conflict with a multiplicity of actors. At different phases of the war, the government has had responsibility in some aspects of the conflict, either by collaborating with some of the actors or by looking the other way while actors committed atrocities against civilians (Mortensen, 2018). c. A power vacuum was created when the FARC demobilized after the 2016 Accords. This vacuum has not been filled by the state: instead, it has been filled by other insurgent groups or paramilitaries. Power struggles between armed actors continue within and around local authority structures (Mortensen, 2018). As a result, the affected communities largely see federal government as absent and local government as corrupt. 3. Relevant Legislation a. At the national level, various legal instruments exist to protect communities like the ones in the Cacarica river basin from forced displacement and violence. i. The Colombian Constitution enshrines the principle of collective titles to land, which was used to successfully pursue land restitution suits on behalf of the displaced communities (Lazaro, 2018). ii. The 2011 Victims' Law includes rights of reparation, truth, and justice for victims of the conflict, including right to land restitutions for IDPs (Nicole Summers, 2012). It also creates accountability mechanisms for perpetrators. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 56 iii. The 2016 Peace Accords resulted in the demobilization of the largest guerilla group, FARC. They have changed dynamics in the sense that they have created big expectations, along with skepticism, which have given energy to the displaced communities (Mortensen, 2018). However, the Peace Accords have created power vacuums in some areas, including the Chocó region, leading to renewed violence and increasing targeting of human rights activists as other armed actors vie for power in the space vacated by FARC. iv. The 2005 Law 975, known as the Justice and Peace Law which created a limited transitional justice regime with a limited truthand-reconciliation process aimed at bringing paramilitaries to justice (Summers, 2014). v. 1997 Decree 976 vi. 1997 Agreement Number 59 vii. 1997 Law 387 on Internal Displacement viii. 2005 Decree Number 250 b. At the international level, Colombia is also subject to inter-American human rights instruments, including the American declaration of human rights and to the legally binding decisions of the IACHR. Socio-economic Profile 1. Economy a. Economy dependent on extractive industries exports (coal, oil, mining), leaving it vulnerable to drops in commodity prices (Dube and Vargas, 2013) b. Informal economy and production of coca, opium poppy, and cannabis LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 57 c. Chocó department economy and the affected community is mainly characterized by subsistence farming, fishing, hunting, and logging. 2. Demographic makeup (World Population Review, 2018) a. Total 2018 Population: 49,341,513 b. Population Density: 43.32 c. Ethnic makeup: i. 49% mestizo ii. 37% White iii. 11% Black iv. 3.4% indigenous 3. Social norms a. Centrality of family b. Role of Catholic faith Stakeholder Analysis 1. Stakeholders a. Indigenous and afro-Colombian communities b. National government c. Local authorities (mayor, police, ombudsman) d. Local and International NGOs e. International bodies (UN, IACHR) f. MNCs g. Insurgency groups h. Paramilitary groups LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 58 i. Narcotraffickers 2. Power dynamics a. Decentralization of state power means that in practice local authorities allied with various paramilitary and/or criminal networks do not implement national level policies to protect IDPs, victims of violence, or HHRR activists b. Power vacuum left by FARC’s demobilization has actually increased violence in areas where other armed actors (ELN, paramilitary, criminal gangs) struggle to assert dominance. Long term Development Context 1. Human Rights programming focuses education and mobilization by CA, PBI and local actors like CAVIDA and CIJP. However, threats continue to be made against local and international human rights activists. PBI is also active in the protection and accompaniment of human rights activists. ABOUT THE PROJECT Christian Aid, in partnership with Peace Brigades International and local partner CIJP, have been advocating for human and land rights issues with displaced communities in the Chocó region of Colombia. Specifically, their work seeks to build vertical accountability between communities and local and federal level authorities and to support communities in claiming access to their traditional lands. Strategies have included rights-based education in communities, protective accompaniment of local human rights organizers, lobbying of the central Colombian government and diplomatic community in Bogota, and taking the government to court for failure to protect communities and human rights organizers from displacement and violence. Christian Aid and Partners in Colombia 1. History LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 59 a. CA has been present in Colombia since the 1980s, with programmes targeting victims of human rights violations in Colombia’s ongoing civil war, and opened a permanent field office in Bogota in 1997. Current work with communities displaced by Operación Genesis has been ongoing since the early 2000s. b. PBI has been active in Colombia since 1994, when it began accompanying local human rights organizers as a way to protect them and raise awareness about attacks on organizers (PBI, n.d.). 2. Local Partners a. CIJP, an NGO aiming to promote human rights and hold perpetrators accountable. b. CAVIDA, a local CBO formed by the displaced communities to advocate for their own interests. 3. Programming a. Project Aims i. Land restitution to displaced communities, including helping displaced persons reclaim appropriated land and form new ‘humanitarian zone’ communities ii. Human rights advocacy iii. Enforcement and implementation of federal level legislation in regards to the rights of victims iv. Creation of accountability between communities and local and national politicians v. Seek truth, justice, and reparation (PBI, n.d.) b. Targeted communities i. Victims of displacement in the Cacarica river basin from Operación Genesis LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 60 ii. New returnee communities who have formed ‘Humanitarian zones’, communities named Nueva Vida and Nueva Esperanza en Díos in the Chocó region iii. Humanitarian Zones in urban areas iv. Most of the displaced population in the Chocó region are AfroColombian and indigenous communities. c. Project Strategies i. Accompaniment ii. Human rights education iii. Use of national and international legal instruments iv. Prosecution of military officers and businessmen complicit in or responsible for forced displacement of communities during Operación Genesis and murders of human rights organizers v. Took Colombian national government to IACHR for failure to prevent forced displacement thousands of Afro-Colombian citizens in the Chocó region during 1997 Operación Genesis vi. It is important to understand that the work of CA and its partners has been an ongoing processes for 10-15 years, and therefore has evolved as the communities’ needs shifted and evolved. vii. Documentation of displacement, including supporting community voices in claiming land in technical and political ways, including by helping them establish documentary proof of land ownership (Lazaro, 2018). viii. Creation political alliances to protect communities from violence and protection of communities from threats against them when they organize for restitution (Mortensen, 2018). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 61 ix. Partners sit with communities and help them find strength and faith, patience and optimism, within themselves, and assist with technical side of process (Lazaro, 2018). d. Project Outcomes i. 500k hectares of land restituted to displaced communities (Mortensen, 2018). ii. 2013 IACHR ruling holding Colombian state responsible for failure to prevent forced displacement thousands of AfroColombian citizens in the Chocó region during 1997 Operación Genesis (IACHR, 2013). iii. Imprisonment of General Rito Alejo del Río for failure to prevent or intervene in the murder of human rights organizer Marino Lopez (Murphy et al., 2015). iv. Imprisonment of businessmen Luis Fernando Zea Medina and Héctor Duque Echeverry for forced displacement and conspiracy (Murphy et al., 2015). Relationships with the Colombian government 1. Because the (I)NGOs under study’s work has focused on holding the state accountable to its citizens, including opening investigations targeting military and government actors who have looked the other way when crimes were committed, CA and its partners have had to use an evolving strategy vis-à-vis the state. The challenges aren’t technical ones in coordinating a response across sectors, as in other humanitarian contexts, but lie in the question of how to make the state fulfill its responsibility to protect its citizens and prevent crimes being committed against them. To that end, the relationship between the (I)NGOs in operation and the Colombian government has been characterized by: a. A focus with communities on building resilience i. Organize within communities LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 62 ii. Speak with one voice iii. Creating internal community structures iv. Building consensus v. Rights-based education vi. Learning how to response to certain threatening situations b. Connecting communities with outside world and working to build networks to put pressure on government i. Creating contacts between communities and the local ombudsman to build upwards networks. ii. Creating contacts with INGOs and the diplomatic community in Bogota to build downwards networks. c. The protection element, including analyzing and dealing with risks to community organizers. d. Creation of downwards accountability from government to citizens. 2. Certain patterns have emerged from the (I)NGOs relationships with government. The relatively new institutions, such as the ones created by the 2011 Victims Law and the 2016 Peace Accords are progressive institutions who represent allies in the protection of the displaced communities of Cacarica (Mortensen, 2018). The Prosecutors Office is generally an oppositional force, because they aren’t interested in looking at crimes committed by the government or the military, just those committed by the insurgent groups like the FARC; however, even within the Prosecutor’s Office there are individuals who are more personally inclined to allyship with displaced communities (Mortensen, 2018). The military is almost like a state in itself with negative dynamics around conceptions of the internal enemy of the state which includes insurgents, but also human rights defenders: CA partners have been threatened/targeted by military and police intelligence (Mortensen, 2018). However, even within military there are elements which are realizing it is time to change, begging the question of whether policy LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 63 shifts in the military are sincere or mere protective tactics (Mortensen, 2018). The Constitutional Court has been ally in its mission to oversee compliance with constitution. There has been a lot of backdoor diplomacy with local and international NGOs in that cases where the Court has sought to pressure national government to close implementation gaps (Mortensen, 2018). 3. One of the major challenges in the Cacarica response is addressing interfering local power structures which block the implementation of national policy and threaten the lives and livelihoods of the communities. CA and its partners have adopted a strategy which brings these issues from the local to the national issues. The (I)NGOs document local issues and embed them in both the local and national public opinion and agenda: CA and other INGOs can help draw international and national actors’ attention to local-level issues, and because the Colombian government is actively trying to rebrand their international image, INGOs can leverage this to pressure the government to respond to national issues (Mortensen, 2018). Recommendations, gaps and challenges identified by the project 1. Opportunities and successes a. 500k hectares of land restituted to displaced communities. The restitution of land is a sustainable result because it is important to their livelihoods and those livelihoods help fill the gaps at the local level between state policy and implementation (Mortensen, 2018). However, the issues of lack of access to economic opportunities beyond subsistence farming remain (Lazaro, 2018). b. The 2013 IACHR ruling holding Colombian state responsible for failure to prevent forced displacement thousands of Afro-Colombian citizens in the Chocó region during 1997 Operación Genesis was a major symbolic and political win for the displaced communities (Murphy et al., 2015). c. Imprisonment of General Rito Alejo del Río for failure to prevent or intervene in the murder of human rights organizer Marino Lopez (Murphy et al., 2015). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 64 d. Imprisonment of businessmen Luis Fernando Zea Medina and Héctor Duque Echeverry for forced displacement and conspiracy (Murphy et al., 2015). e. The strengthening of local community capacities to self-organize, leading to increasing numbers of community organizers getting involved in local politics (Lazaro, 2018). Local CBOs like CAVIDA have been recognized for their use of participatory methods and the inclusion of women in the organisations (Murphy et al., 2015). f. CA staff feel that they are making progress in the fight against immunity: they hope the fact that if one person is put in jail, it will act as deterrence to others (Mortensen, 2018). g. The work of CA and partners has helped the communities better understand their rights and build connections so that they can fight for them. The communities have always been resilient as they have chosen to return to their land despite the threats from armed actors, but the work of the (I)NGOs has given them more tools with which to protect themselves and address some of their vulnerabilities. The relationship with state is shifting from a patron-client model based on the exchange of favors, towards a human rights based approach where communities learn to claim their rights and hold goverment accountable to communities (Lazaro, 2018). 2. Gaps and challenges a. Continuing lack of economic opportunities and infrastructure in returnee communities (Lazaro, 2018). b. The implementation gap between national and local levels of government continues to pose a challenge to the protection of the communities, especially in the context of the escalating violence in power vacuum left by FARC demobilization. The unequal LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE power relations between 65 communities and the state and its representatives means that representatives don’t feel accountable to isolated, marginalized communities like the ones in Cacarica, and communities don’t feel like they can keep their representatives accountable to them (Mortensen, 2018). Despite the existence of good policies at the national level, they do not translate to the local level because field-level public servants respond to power not to the formal mandate of their position (Mortensen, 2018). Therefore, the biggest challenge in the ongoing work in Colombia is holding the whold of the state accountable, with all of its levels and institutions. 3. Recommendations and Best Practices: a. Long term presence i. Consistency of message and commitment ii. Patience and Optimism iii. Longer time frames for development of relationships with communities and allies b. Multi-level strategy i. Work at both local and national levels: (I)NGOs will encounter different challenges and partners at each level, but they can complement each other. Working both levels simultaneously can help relationships be more effective by applying pressure between levels as needed. ii. Understand government’s goals on international stage (ie branding) and use those goals as leverage to accomplish local goals c. Division of Labor LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 66 i. Local partners are key implementers of projects. ii. INGOs are the coordinators: they should leverage their international character and legitimacy to focus attention on local and national issues, and build networks to bring legitimacy and international support to local partners d. Support local initiatives to work with government i. Encourage local leaders to run for office ii. Facilitate community-level organizations which can lobby government LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 67 APPENDIX III – KENYAN CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY RISK PROFILE Situation in the country Overview • A key regional player and a communications hub, Kenya is considered one of the fastest growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2015). However, growth rate is consistently interrupted by increasingly frequent and severe droughts, specifically in arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) • In the last decade, the country has experienced droughts in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2011, and the ongoing drought that arguable started in 2014 o Due to the cyclical nature of drought disasters, communities are unable to completely recover from impacts. Households are becoming increasingly vulnerable, thus losing their ability to bounce back (Njoka et al, 2016, p. 31) • Due to its scale and severity, the drought-related food insecurity crisis that hit Kenya in late 2010 and peaked mid-2011 was characterized as the worst drought in 60 years (BBC, 2011). It affected an estimated 4.3 million people (Hillier, 2012, p. 3; Guha-Sapir, 2012, p. 9) o The magnitude of the crisis was a combination of prolonged droughts, dismissal of early warning signals, changing migration patterns, an increase in food and fuel prices, inability of organizations like the WFP to meet food delivery commitments, and political distractions including the drafting of a new constitution, and corruption allegations for major government officials and donor-funded projects in ASAL regions (Turnbull, 2012, p. 9) o The GoK only declared a drought and food insecurity crisis on 30th May 2011, and the government-led interagency response started in August (Turnbull, 2012, p. 9) • About 75% of Kenya’s population work at least part-time in the agricultural sector, including livestock and pastoral activities (CIA, n.d.) LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 68 • Food production (specifically, maize, the national staple) is dependent on erratic and declining rainfall, and over 75% of agricultural output is from small-scale, rain-fed farming or livestock production (Bailey, 2015) o Short rains that usually start within the months of October to December accounts for 15% of total maize production (Bailey, 2015; Njoka et al, 2016, p. 27; LSE-LPRR, 2012, p. 82) o In 2010, short rains began about two to three weeks than expected and lasted about 6 weeks (GoK, 2012, p. 8). This resulted in a maize shortfall and a dramatic increase in prices (GoK, 2012, p. 9) • Agriculture accounts for 26% of national GDP, and the overall effects of the 2008-2011 drought in Kenya were estimated at Ksh 968.6 billion ($12.1 billion) (Njoka et al, 2016, p. 12) • Increased presence of al-Shabaab in addition to long-term ethnic rivalries (often about land) continue to pose security challenges and has become a priority for the development agenda (LSE-LPRR, 2012, p. 82) • Kenya is host to the Daadab refugee camp and hosts an estimated 502 739 refugees and asylum-seekers (RoK, 2014) • Kenya is ranked 146/188 on the HDI (UNDP, n.d.) • Currently, since 2014, Kenya has been suffering from prolonged drought, and in February 2017, the GoK declared a national food insecurity, with 23 of 47 counties affected. As of February 2017, an estimated 2.7 million people were at risk of food insecurity (CDKN, 2017, p. 5) ASAL Risk Profile • Kenya has 23 ASAL counties (including Marsabit) – 9 are considered arid and 14 as semi-arid - which makes up 88% of the country's landmass and hosts an estimated 15 million people, 36% of the total population (Njoka et al, 2016, p. 11-21; GoK, 2012, p. 3) o ASALs borders Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania o ASALs are naturally endowed with wildlife biodiversity, forests, wetlands, and various mineral and diverse cultures. o Arid counties are predominantly pastoral (high mobility of pastoralists and livestock) with limited crop farming, and the semi-arid counties LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 69 are agro-pastoral with integrated crop/livestock production (Njoka et al, 2016, p. 11) o Over 70% of livestock that accounts for 24% of agricultural output situated in ASAL (FAO, 2012, p. 48) • In 2010/2011, ASAL received less than 290mm of rain a year, way below the sufficient level for agriculture (Bailey, 2015, p. 26) • ASALs have low levels of human development, high levels of poverty, a low population density and poor infrastructure. A combination of these factors makes the population more susceptible to drought-related food insecurity, and increased conflict arising from the competition of scarce resources (Njoka et al, 2016, p. 12) Challenges to Livelihood and Coping Strategies • Degradation of the ecosystem (deforestation and encroachment) has depleted the natural endowment and has led to a loss of grazing and resource lands (PRISE, 11/12) • The subdivision and privatization of communal land has caused changes that are inconsistent with sustainable land use (Njoka et al, 2016, p. 11). • Mobility is a key coping strategy, however due to increased food insecurity there has been a rise of sedentarisation (Njoka et al, 2016, p.12) • Additional coping strategies (that have also further challenged livelihood) include the sharing of food assistance, increased household debts, separation of herds, slaughtering calves to protect mothers, out migration in search of labor, skipping meals and sale of firewood (RoK, 2014, p. 6/35) Analysis of Kenya's Political Infrastructure Governance Structure • Currently, Kenya is made up of a central government and a single subnational tier of 47 counties (Barkan, 2011, p. 17). The central government is headed by the president and county government is headed by a directly elected governor • The fault line of Kenyan political structure is ethnic politics, specifically political manipulation of ethnicity (Barkan, 2011, p. 3) LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 70 o Politics is driven by shifting coalitions amongst the largest ethnic groups, and electoral support is mobilized based on ethnicity (Barkan, 2011, p. 3). The combination of the two has stressed an uneven geographical pattern of economic growth which further marginalizes ASAL regions (Barkan, 2011, p. 3) • Political ethnic tensions are still high after the disputed December 2007 presidential election. The post-election violence (specifically land disputes) that lasted 6 weeks left an estimated 1500 Kenyan dead and more than 300,000 displaced (Barkan, 2011, p. 3) o The new constitution ratified in 2010 – which was negotiated by the two rival parties in the 2007 election - aimed to address political fault lines that propel ethnic tensions (Barkan, 2011, p. 3) o In March 2011, the ICC formally indicted suspected financiers of the post-election violence and this included prominent political figures in March 2011 - William Ruto (deputy president), Uhuru Kenyatta (president) and Francis Muthaura (former Head of Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet) (Barkan, 2011, p. 11) o The ICC's indictment was a key issue in 2013 elections and 2017 elections (to the extent that the results were contested at the supreme court (LSE-LPRR, 2012, p. 83) • Political structure is engulfed in corruption, and this poses a threat to the country's humanitarian and development agendas. While we should question the biases embedded within this ranking, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Kenya 154/178 (Zutt, 2010). o In 2010, the World Bank closed the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) – a drought risk management initiative – following a bribery scandal involving senior officers in Kenya's Ministry of Defense (World Bank, n.d.) Analysis of Kenya's Socio-Economic Profile • Throughout the decade, Kenya's GDP has rose between 5% to 8%, and is subjected to severe fluctuations in annual percentage of GDP growth due to a combination of factors (including rise in oil and food prices) each drought cycle (World Bank, n.d.) LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 71 o For example, in 2007, GDP growth was at 6.8% but decreased to 0.2% in 2008; in 2010 GDP growth was at 8.4% but decreased to 4.5% in 2012; and during the 2017 fiscal year economic growth decreased from 5.8% (2016) to 5.5% (World Bank) (World Bank, n.d.) • Kenya is a relatively young country regarding the median age of the population with half the population under 19 years (Barkan, 2011, p. 4). • Between 2011 and 2016, Kenya's population grew from an estimated 42.49 million to 48.46 million, a 33 percent increase from the 2001 estimates of 32.32 million (World Bank, n.d.) • Kenya is also one of the most urbanized countries in Africa with an estimated 22 percent of the population living in urban areas (Barkan, 2011, p. 4). Urbanization has led to the emergence of a dynamic middle class, which in turn has led to the rise of a well-organized civil society, the most extensive in Africa but rural communities like Marsabit has not benefitted from this (Barkan, 2011, p. 4). • The combination of a young population, urbanization, and economic growth has intensified income inequality, and further deepened provincial divide (urban-rural) which is often organized along ethnicity (Barkan, 2011, p. 4). • While the official languages are Kiswahili and English, Kenya has over 40 ethnic languages; and is Christian (80%), Muslim (10%), Other (10%) (LSELPRR, 2012, p. 86) GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS DROUGHT-RELATED FOOD INSECURITY IN ASALS Overview • In 2012, the government introduced the Ending Drought Emergencies Common Programme Framework, a 10-year program (2012 – 2022) that aims to develop and strengthen institutions, mechanisms and capacities that build resilience to drought and climate change specifically in ASAL (RoK, 2014, p. 3). • Following the delay of the long rains in April/May 2011, major INGO's including Oxfam intensified their lobbying of international donors and the GoK to start responding to early warnings (Oxfam, 2013, p. 7) LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 72 • Following CSO's demands for proactive government action, in November 2011, the NDMA and NDDCF were established to lead and coordinate drought management in Kenya (Hillier, 2012, p. 7) • In January 2012, OXFAM launched an OI Policy Paper that demanded political leadership in drought response and that all countries should sign charter to End Extreme Hunger (Oxfam, 2013, p. 20) • Kenya Food Security Coordination System (KFSCS), Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) were among the bodies in Kenya who were mandated in assessing the food security status in the country and they were composed of GoK departments, UN agencies, donors and NGOs) and is open to all organizations with an interest in food security. The coordinated intervention targeted several sectors including the agricultural, livestock, water, market, education, health and nutrition and food sectors (RoK, 2014; GoK, 2012, p. 36) Criticism of general drought response • The biggest criticism of the response was that it was reactive rather than preventative. In late 2010, the Gok and INGOs failed to respond to preventative warnings and to adequately response in the critical and early stages of the crises in 2011 (Oxfam, 2013, p. 10). While the GoK has taken steps to rectify this, it is important to highlight that the response to the current crisis, to some extent, is mostly reactive. • Another criticism is that in Kenya, aid is disproportionately directed towards the food aid system leaving little resources for strengthening early warning systems (CDKN, 2017) • While mortality rate was not as catastrophic amongst refugees, there were higher levels of malnutrition and damaged livelihoods within refugee communities and as such (I)NGOs needed to focus on the implications of food insecurity on refugee communities (Oxfam, 2013, p. 10) • Finally, while the District Steering Groups (DSGs) has the potential for action, it is subject to intense political pressures and tends to be ceremonial rather than performing (Oxfam, 2013, p. 28) Recommendations LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 73 • Greater flexibility between development and humanitarian actions. That is, adjust the scale/priorities of existing projects to prepare for future crisis including providing technical and surge capacity so that future crises are manageable. Easier to switch from development interventions to humanitarian interventions (Oxfam, 2013, p. 10). However, this is a challenge since development programs are long terms and less flexible and are required to predict expenditure from the start – this boosts accountability but hinders flexibility (Oxfam, 2013, p. 22) • Donor response was slow in 2008 and 2011 • The challenge facing the ASAL ecosystem is how to enhance the resilience of communities whose livelihoods depend entirely on climate-sensitive resources (Njoka et al, 2016, p. 30) • Ensure that government departments enforce policies especially environmental policies • weak government presence in pastoral areas, particularly in northern Kenya; understaffing and limited resources affect service provision, for instance in animal health. This further constrains the role of the government as a facilitator and coordinator of development and humanitarian work (Njoka et al, 2016, p. 34) Past and Ongoing INGO Projects (short-term and long-term) Oxfam Concern Islamic Relief World Vision Christian Aid Action Aid ISLAMIC RELIEF IN KENYA (IRK) • Overview LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 74 o Islamic Relief has been operating in Kenya since 1993 on an orphan sponsorships program. However, since 2006, IRK programs focus on emergency relief, recovery and livelihood support to vulnerable communities specifically those at risk of recurrent drought-related crises • Program, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Livelihood Programme/Health and Nutrition Programme in Mandera County o Project Profile: aims, theory of change, targeted communities and partners § the aim is to address short-term emergency needs and support medium-term rehabilitation efforts and long-term strategic needs of drought affected households by rebuilding assets. This is done through various programs including IRK's DRR/Livelihood and Health and Nutrition programmes § Their projects are primarily targets poor households in Mandera County (in addition to Wijr and Garissa Counties) o Project Outcomes § Their cash for work project has created short-term employment to over 6000 households § IRK's Sharia compliant micro credit project covers 1038 households § IRK has supported about 2500 agropastoralists § IRK has been supporting farmers along the riverine with irrigation along River Daua. Also supporting the pastoralists in protecting the main herds of livestock against drought shocks and support widow, poor and vulnerable mothers through micro-finance. o Government-INGO collaboration § IRK partnered with several county level government ministries including the Ministry of Agriculture Resilience Stanley Maingi defined resilience as the ability of communities to seek help and manage immediate drought-related effects (including food supplies and water LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 75 collection plans) and long-term development needs (including livelihood diversification for example, from livestock to farming). This is targeted though various projects including the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Livelihood Program that aims to link communities along the disaster chain and introduce alternative sources of livelihood including commercialized forage production and small-scale enterprise through microfinancing. Partners For the DRR/Livelihood Program, Islamic Relief had various partners including the Kenyan Meteorological Department, local communities, financial institutions, and county government including the Ministry of Agriculture. The DRR program adopts a multifaceted model of resilience in that it integrates the public and private spheres (and sectors) with the aim of directly impacting economic development. For example, the DRR framework stresses the need for community participation. As such, Islamic Relief has introduced the Community Disaster Risk Committee initiative which allows local communities to prioritize development concerns and challenges. Islamic Relief also worked on linking the meteorological department with local communities so that communities know when to raise alert. Additionally, Islamic Relief partnered with the county level Ministry of Agriculture to provide the technical know-how on farming. Regarding the private sphere, Islamic Relief worked with First Community Bank to open the first branch in Mandera County. Together, they also organized financial literacy workshops on available financial resources including savings and loans. Advantages and Challenges to (I)NGO-government Collaboration Maingi identified two factors that contributed to the success of the DRR Program: i. Islamic Relief includes the annual County Integrated Development Plan in their interventions and has further supported CIDP through funding which has given them some form of bargaining power, which they have used to demand community participation in the outlining of the annual plan ii. Consequently, through the Community Disaster Risk Committee initiative, Islamic Relief has been able to empower communities to prioritize development concerns. Within this initiative it has encouraged the government to actively consult with communities on development and LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 76 humanitarian agendas specifically on budgeting. As a result, community priorities have actively been adopted in the annual county government plan. While Maingi focused on the advantages of Islamic Relief's collaboration with the government, he identified challenges: iii. County governments are new, as such operating within their systems is a tedious process; iv. There are very few government technical staff working in rural areas and the limited staff are overwhelmed; v. Dismal communication networks between county government and local communities. The limited rapport between local communities and county government further increases the vulnerability of these remote communities; vi. Islamic Relief facilitates county government staff travel to remote areas. While funding did not necessarily pose a challenge, government staff travelling to local communities with the aim of creating a common agenda is difficult without the presence of Islamic Relief especially when the government does not have pre-established strong links with these communities. CONCERN WORLDWIDE IN KENYA • Overview o Concern has been present in Kenya since 2002. While their projects initially targeted urban areas, their work has been expanded to include rural communities o Their projects aim to facilitate community empowerment, advocacy and governance initiatives; and this is done by promoting primary education, water and sanitation, health and nutrition and tackling HIV and AIDS. In addition to long-term development projects, Concern also works with local organizations to respond to drought-related emergencies • Program, CMAM Surge Project, Marsabit County o Project Profile: aims, targeted communities and partners LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 77 § the aim of CMAM Surge (new approach) is to strengthen the capacity of government health systems to effectively manage increased cases of malnutrition (both SAM MAM) especially during emergencies without undermining ongoing health and nutrition systems § This new approach replaced the emergency model of nutrition response which had been in place since 2006, and proved to be ineffective during the 2010/2011 drought-related food insecurity § it was initially piloted in Moyale and North Horr (two-sub counties of Marsabit) in 14 health facilities between May 2012 and October 2014 § the approach was piloted in collaboration with the Sub-County Health Management Team (SCHMT) and was funded by ECHO o Project Strategies: theory of change § Surge model does not prevent malnutrition but triggers early action and community mobilization through capacity-based response thresholds § In Marsabit, factors such as rainfall, conflict, population movement, workload of households and festivals are positively correlated to malnutrition. As such, health workers are trained to interpret contextual factors that increase prevalence of acute malnutrition including the influence of overlapping factors § established a community-based surveillance system in order to ensure that trends at health facility level are reflective of the situation in the community § community engagement was crucial to the success of the pilot because they helped improve the accuracy of spike trend analysis and service utilization o Project Outcomes § The approach improved ownership and use of data at the health facilities. It also improved and dynamic communication between the Health Facility and SCHMT LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 78 § Since 2011, the model has been "triggered" 11 times by health workers at pilot health facilities. § The model was evaluated in 2014 for the "proof of concept," and Concern is in the process of exploring how the CMAM Surge can be applied in other contexts o Government-(I)NGO collaboration § Concern partnered with several levels of government and the project interacted with the Community Health System, health facilities, SCHMT, CHMT, national ministry of health Resilience Regine Kopplow defined resilience as the ability to anticipate to and recover from any forms of shocks and adapt to stresses in a timely and effective manner. Resilience was targeted through the CMAM Surge, an approach that strived to improve health and nutrition services available at Marsabit County health facilities. Concern partnered with the government to train and support community health facilities and workers. Concern's targeting of government and community resilience is different from mainstream community resilience initiatives that primarily targets individuals, households and groups. Partners Concern's primary partner was County Government of Marsabit, specifically countylevel Ministry of Health. There was no partnership between (I)NGOs and no direct involvement of local communities. According to Kopplow, in Kenya, the government (county, district and national) is the sole implementer of health services, and the introduction of a middleman (collaboration with other (I)NGOs or CSOs) would have been counterproductive to the aims of the pilot. Additionally, households were positioned as recipients or clients of the service, and thus, were not involved in design and implementation. It is important to highlight that in Marsabit, the link between local communities and county government is more nuanced. While county government can be considered a part of the broader local community, doing so fails to capture the power dynamics between county government and households. Within the CMAM Surge, it would be remiss to LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 79 consider the government as part of the local community. As will be highlighted below, the county government of assumed the role of coordinators and supporters of health facilities. And, the lowest level of community engagement however was training for local health workers and community health volunteers. Nevertheless, the absence of local partners did not negatively impact the pilot. Advantages and Challenges to INGO-government Collaboration Kopplow argued that there were two major factors that contributed to the success of the pilot: i) First, the importance of pre-existing relationships and consistent communication between Concern and the Ministry of Health. For example, Concern had been working with the government on other health and nutrition initiatives in Marsabit. There was already open communication, and trust that as partners they would both be able to deliver. However, she highlighted the need for ongoing communication to build on this preexisting relationship. As such, Concern frequently organized workshops that aimed to strengthen relationships between all stakeholders. ii) Second, the partnership between county government, Concern and health workers in both the design and implementation phases of the approach. Kopplow explained that health workers and county government staff felt that they were listened to, and saw their inputs incorporated into the approach. Thus, CMAM Surge was a solution that worked not just for Concern but for local health workers. An example of this partnership was the joint supervision of the implementation. Both Concern and county government staff frequently visited health facilities together. The partnership greatly impacted Marsabit health services and county government resilience in three ways: a. The partnership helped built local ownership of the program; b. There has been a shift on how county government perceive their capacity and skillset. There has been a decrease in the need for external support, and county government for the most part can rely on internal resources; c. Marsabit county is now able to provide forecast and slowly scale up responses so that health services are not overwhelmed with malnutrition spikes. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 80 While the advantages of Concern's collaboration with the government outweighed the challenges, it would be remiss to ignore these challenges: iii) The biggest challenge was staff turnover. However, this is commonly noted as a challenge for most health and nutrition services projects; iv) Though not directly related to the CMAM Surge, Kopplow highlighted that it is important to acknowledge that GoK corruption is major barrier to development in Kenya and (better) (I)NGO-government collaboration. Corruption, she argues, is not an isolated Kenyan problem, and is propelled by individuals within the system and not the system itself. As such, corruption should not be used to deter meaningful (I)NGO-government cooperation which leads to (I)NGOs setting up parallel systems. Instead, (I)NGOs should continue to play a role in making sure that funds are reaching the right groups and levels within the hierarchy. Kopplow further stressed that (I)NGOs should acknowledge internal challenges including issues with fraud and accountability. On the part of the government she states that the GoK needs to be more involved in (I)NGO activities. She concludes that for (I)NGO-government collaboration to be effective, INGOs and the GoK should demand transparency and accountability of each other. (LESSONS LEARNT) CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS The CMAM Surge and the DRR/LP does well in realigning the role of government and INGOs in humanitarianism and development. To make health systems "disaster proof" and to improve localized capacity, the GoK's pro-active and effective leadership remains crucial both during and after emergencies. A major critique of 2010/2011 drought intervention was the unpreparedness of INGOs and the GoK, and the lack of coordination, systems and priorities. Kopplow and Maingi argued that the role of the GoK and (I)NGOs can change depending on whether it is a humanitarian or development context. Their roles, Kopplow argues, also depend on the nature of the crisis and whether it is "lifesaving or less of a priority." While the GoK should always lead response efforts, within an emergency context their resources are frequently overwhelmed. Drought-related food insecurity requires high intensity service and labor and special standby resources (funding) that often LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 81 is not available within the government. Thus, emergencies generally require the assistance of external actors like INGOs. However, the GoK has become more apt to handle the effects of drought-related food insecurity. The government has outlined a national strategy that responds to drought-related crises and development challenges. Currently, the GoK is leading coordinated interventions at national, county and district levels. The 2010 devolvement has helped strengthened the capacity of local level governments. As such, INGOs should see their role as complementary to that of the government. More importantly, it is important to remember that (I)NGO-government collaboration is not a linear process. Finding a solution that works requires negotiations and willingness to compromise. As such, recommendations from the stakeholder analysis include: To the GoK: I. Provide an effective platform for coordination and discussion to map out areas for development; II. The GoK should adopt an open-door policy with INGOs including opening drought-related working body meetings to INGOs especially at national level; III. Concurrently, the GoK should make it their responsibility to ensure that INGOs are operating within national development agenda. For this to happen, county and district governments should show more interest (and be demanding) on INGOs operating within their districts and counties; IV. County governments are quite new and the human resources does not understand humanitarian programs and disaster risk reduction To (I)NGOs: V. For the GoK to assume responsibility, INGOs should avoid early interventions and strive to work within the national agenda to avoid setting up parallel systems that further undermine coping strategies; VI. INGOs should be conscious of the fact that county government departments have their own work plans and mandates from the national government which they must deliver; VII. Acknowledge that county governments are new, and this affects their response mechanisms. As such, INGOs should support government LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 82 resilience and initiatives including working to improve the skills of government staff. However, INGOs must also ensure that government initiatives align with community priorities; VIII. Support the government to consult with local communities especially when developing the Annual County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP); IX. Ensure that interventions can incorporate county government feedback; X. Collaborate with specific government ministries and departments; To the GoK and (I)NGOs: XI. There is a need for trust and transparency. Furthermore, (I)NGOs and GoK should reflect on internal corruption and be open to criticisms; XII. INGOs and the GoK need to maintain a daily (open) communication. Additionally, acknowledge that pre-established relationship is crucial to meaning INGO-government collaboration and important for successful project design and implementation; XIII. Promote market led interventions and work with the private sector. For example, work with tech companies. Bigger Picture The redrafted 2010 constitution transformed the political and economic structure of Kenya (World Bank). It aimed to strengthen human rights, dilute political elitism, and devolve power to local counties (Barkan, 2011, p. 4). Arguably, regarding the current drought-related food insecurity, the devolution of power has had a positive impact on accountability and public service delivery at local levels (World Bank). However, responses to the 2011 drought and food insecurity crisis exposed the need for a strong county government and (better) (I)NGO-government collaboration. During the 2010 /2011 drought cycle, resources were directed towards (I)NGOs like Islamic Relief that designed and implemented interventions with limited community and government involvement. Since 2014, however, Kenya has been reclassified as a middle-income country. Consequently, there has been a decrease in donor-available emergency funds, and a focus on development and disaster risk reduction interventions. Development and DRR funds are increasingly redirected towards the GoK, specifically, county government. This not only allows governments to take charge of interventions but also provides a renewed LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 83 opportunity for (I)NGOs to work with the government. County government leadership has also been propelled by devolution. Since the devolution, there has been a decline in (I)NGO collaboration with the national government and increased collaboration with county government. As such, (I)NGO-government collaboration has arguably become more effective, specifically within a framework of communitybased interventions. At the same time however, there has been a tightening of the role of (I)NGOs by the GoK including highly regulating the number (I)NGO expats and requiring (I)NGOs to account for their resources and showing returns. Maingi cites that while this might not be inherently negative, these regulations often tend to disproportionately affect CSOs, and limits their ability to critic Kenya's political situation. In Kenya, (I)NGO-government collaboration should not be dictated by the principles of independence and neutrality if the collaboration is focused on a national development agenda regardless of a community's political alignment. Next Steps There is a need for a comparative analysis on the relationship between humanitarian and development interventions in rural versus urban contexts and INGO-government dynamics within these contexts. Maingi and Kopplow alluded that INGO-government dynamics (and project logistics) can change depending on whether it is an urban or rural context including levels of bureaucracy. Regarding project logistics, Maingi highlighted that aspects of the DRR Program, specifically business-related interventions have been expanded to urban contexts. In rural areas, Islamic Relief provides interest-free loans to microenterprises however, in urban areas loans are given with competitive interest rates. Kopplow also argued that the CMAM Surge is not exclusive to rural health facilities. While adopting the approach to an urban setting will require a revision of approach specifics, the general framework would remain the same. The support package (resources) offered to health facilities will be different because urban communities respond to spikes in malnutrition slightly different. For example, opening hours will need to be extended in an urban setting to treat more patients because in rural areas it makes no difference LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 84 whether you open from 8 to 4 or up to 10 because people will not travel when it is dark. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 85 APPENDIX IV – PHILIPPINE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY RISK PROFILE Situation in the country Overview • • • • • • The Philippines is consisted of more than 7,000 islands, but the majority of its fast-growing population lives on just 11 of them (BBC, 2018). It is a disaster-prone country, often suffering from earthquakes, eruptions, typhoons and other storms (BBC, 2018). The Philippines was a Spanish colony for more than three hundred years, but has also been under US rule. (BBC, 2018). « Spanish and US influences remain strong, especially regarding language, religion and government. » The country gained its full independence in 1946 (BBC, 2018). The Philippines is a NATO-ally and has been provided military aid by the US (BBC, 2018). Among the seventeen regions that consist the Philippines, one of them is autonomous (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) with an ongoing conflict within its territories since 1969. Community risk profile Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world (UN OCHA, 2017). Because of its location on the Pacific Ring of Fire (DEC, N.D.) and close to the equator, it is prone to earthquakes (around 20 happening every day – most of them too weak to be felt), typhoons and volcanic eruptions. Sitting astride the typhoon belt, around 20 tropical cyclones enter the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR) every year, out of which 8-10 make landfall and 5 of them being destructive. With more than a quarter of the total population living under the poverty line, a big part of the population is vulnerable to socio-natural disasters, which in turn broaden the inequality gap, as they destroy livelihoods. Crisis profile Typhoon Haiyan (local name: Yolanda) entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR) on November 6, 2013. It hit eastern Samar Island on November 7, 2013 November. It exited PAR on November 9, 2013. It is the strongest land falling LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 86 tropical cyclone ever recorded. The death rate reached the 6,300 people (second deadliest in the country), while another 28,689 were injured and 1,061 went lost. It is also supposed to be the most destructive one regarding funding required for the recovery. The wind speeds reached the 300 km per hour. It caused a storm surge – a wall of water – that was more than five metres high in some areas, including in the town of Tacloban (DEC, N.D.). Because of the storm, there were also a lot of floods caused. More than 14 million people were affected in 46 provinces. • Preparations: o PSWSs raised by PAGASA in the Visayas and Mindanao shortly before Haiyan entered the PAR on November 6, 2013. o Eventually warnings expanded into Luzon. o Eventually warnings increased in severity for eastern areas. o Officials placed police officers in the Bicol Region ahead of the storm. o In the provinces of Samar and Leyte, classes were canceled o Residents in flood- and landslide-prone areas were required to evacuate. o Some of the storm-threatened areas were affected by an earlier earthquake in Bohol and Cebu (2 weeks before). o Then-Philippine President Noynoy Aquino requested the military to deploy planes and helicopters to the region expected to be affected. o As Haiyan was moving very fast, PAGASA issued warnings at different levels to about 60 of the 80 provinces o On November 8, the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters was activated, providing widespread charitable satellite coverage to relief organizations. • Impact: o Death rate: 6,300; 5,877 of which in the Eastern Visayas o According to the Philippine Red Cross, 22,000 people were missing as of November 13, 2015 LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 87 o Nearly all structures in the township of Guiuan in Eastern Samar suffered at least partial damage, many of which were completely flattened. o For several days, the damage situation in the fishing town remained unclear due to lack of communication in and out of the area. o The damage could finally be assessed after Philippine Air Force staff arrived in Guiuan on November 10. o There was widespread devastation from the storm surge in Tacloban City especially in San Jose, with many buildings being destroyed, trees knocked over or broken, and cars piled up. o Some areas on the eastern side of Tacloban city completely washed away. o Tacloban city's administrator, Tecson John Lim, stated that roughly 90 percent of the city had been destroyed. o Tacloban: little communication in the city, and no mobile phone coverage. o Up the east coast of the Leyte there are numerous towns and villages that are completely cut off without any assistance. o Large parts of Leyte and Samar without power. o Although wind speeds were extreme, the major cause of damage and loss of life appears to have been storm surge. o The storm crossed the Visayas region for almost a day, causing widespread flooding. o Power interruptions and floods were part of the disaster. Flights and boat trips were also affected. o Relief and rescue efforts were initiated straight after the typhoon exited the PAR, but some places remained out of reach, because of severe damage. • Aftermath: o By November 11, a state of calamity was declared, allowing the government to activate funds used for in cases of emergencies. The LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 88 declaration of the state of calamity facilitated the (I)NGOs to start their operations. o Approximately $700,000 had been allocated in relief assistance by the NDRRMC. o Local and national agencies deployed a collective 18,177 personnel, 844 vehicles, 44 seagoing vessels, and 31 aircraft for various operations. o WHO coordinated the massive international response to help the Philippine government meet the acute need for healthcare services in the affected areas. They organised sub-clusters at a local level. o The infrastructure of the region suffered severe damage, which caused great delays at the distribution of relief aid. o Though aid was flown into local airports, most of it remained there as roads remained closed. Political infrastructure analysis Philippines is governed as a unitary state along with the regional authorities of its 17 regions, the local authorities of its 1,489 municipalities and the chiefs of its 42,026 barangays. Exclusion to that is the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which is largely independent from the national government and where there is an ongoing armed conflict between government forces and Islamist rebels. On March 2014, the MILF rebel group signs a peace deal with the government that brings an end to one of Asia's longest and deadliest conflicts. The Marawi battle started in May 2017 and lasted for five months (ended in October 2017) between the national army and a jihadist group. The current president, Rodrigo Duterte, -a rather controversial figure- is the first one to be coming from the ARMM and he came to power with promises of a no-holds-barred campaign to take on crime, drugs and corruption. He snagged a “big trust” rating of 91 percent in the week following his assumption into office, the latest Pulse Asia survey revealed. Socio-economic profile analysis Philippines is the 34th biggest economy of the world with many parts of the country remaining poor. It is newly industrialised and an emerging market. Stakeholder Analysis LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 89 Disaster management in the Philippines is coordinated primarily by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is a government agency promoting social development, in the course of which it also runs disaster response operations. A number of UN agencies, INGOs, NGOs and CSOs operate in the country permanently, but the presence of those become more intense in the case of disasters. Long term development context (National Economic and Development Authority, 2017) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Ensuring people-centred, clean and efficient governance Pursuing swift and fair administration of justice Promoting Philippine culture and values Expanding economic opportunities in agriculture, forestry and fisheries Expanding economic opportunities in industry and services Accelerating human capital development Reducing vulnerabilities of individuals and families Building safe and secure communities Reaching for the demographic dividend Advancing science, technology and innovation Ensuring sound microeconomic policy Leveling the playing field through a national competition policy Attaining just and lasting peace Ensuring security, public order and safety Accelerating infrastructure development Ensuring ecological integrity, clean and healthy environment Organizations present (international, national, and local) • • • • • • • • • • British Red Cross Philippine Red Cross ICRC Christian Aid COSE HelpAge IOM UN IFRC World Vision LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 90 • • Christian Aid MSF Programming and implementation • • • • • • • • • • Shelter C4D Livelihoods CCCM Infrastructure Capacity building for government counterparts aiming to sustainability Community capacity building Advocacy Protection Health RECOMMENDATIONS, GAPS AND CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED BY THE PROJECT • • • • • • • Easy entry systems (like the One-Stop-Shop in Cebu and Manila airports) Building institution capacity aiming to sustainability: training of regional and local authorities to address gaps Build relation with different levels of governance (not only with the national/regional/local authorities, but with all) Sharing of knowledge and expertise Make sure to at least work closely with the national government (depending on the context, of course à might be dangerous in conflict settings) o Make sure to intervene after the government’s appeal for help o Make sure to not undermine the credibility of the authorities – make clear to the aid recipients that the xyz organisation is there, because of the government’s call o Make sure that you respect state sovereignty and the role of the authorities to lead the response o Make sure that communications channels are in place for better coordination Make sure to include communities in the response to avoid undermining their resilience. Partner with local NGOs. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 91 IOM IN THE PHILIPPINES: • Overview: o IOM established its first office in the Philippines back in 1975. o The Philippines became an IOM member in 1996. o IOM’s Global Administrative Centre was established in Manila, the Philippines’ capital, in 2003. o IOM is a member of the HCT. o IOM co-leads the CCCM cluster for IDPs along with the DSWD in cases of emergency. o IOM became a Related Organisation to the UN in 2016, but in 2013, when Typhoon Haiyan made landfall, IOM was still an (I)NGO. o The majority of IOM staff in the Philippines is local. • Project: o IOM initiated its response to the Typhoon Haiyan straight after the central government of the Philippines declared a State of Calamity on November 11, 2013. o IOM’s response included both the relief and the recovery stages. o IOM’s intervention included: § The coordination of the CCCM cluster along with the DSWD. § Shelter (emergency, transitional, permanent) § Construction of schools and health clinics. § Communication, including C4D. § Capacity building of affected communities (equipping communities with the necessary skills needed to respond to crises; e.g. training on how to read the EWSs, how to build more resilient houses) § Institutional capacity building (training with local and regional authorities) § • Information dissemination Government-(I)NGO collaboration: IOM’s mandate includes the collaboration with the national authorities; therefore, IOM worked closely with government agencies during the Typhoon Haiyan response. They co- LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 92 led the CCCM cluster along with their government agency counterpart. They enhanced the capacity of the local government. • Stakeholder Analysis: Giano Libot, Communications, IOM • Partners: IOM was co-leading the CCCM cluster along with the DSWD. They worked with the local governments to help them build their capacity. They were partnering with local NGOs in their capacity as managers of the camps. • Successes and challenges of government-(I)NGO collaboration: o Challenges: Ability to work/build relations with the local government o Successes: Improves the communication protocol system of the local authorities • Resilience: Building resilience is central to IOM’s interventions and that’s why there is always a clear start and end point in their interventions. They provide training to people to help them prepare adequately for a future similar event. They enhanced the capacity of the authorities. • Conclusions and Recommendations: o It is important that INGOs make sure that they don’t undermine the credibility of the authorities, by making clear to the beneficiaries that they are there after their government’s appeal HELPAGE INTERNATIONAL/COSE IN THE PHILIPPINES: • Overview: o HelpAge International has been operating in the Philippines in partnership with COSE since 1989. • Project: o A few days after the typhoon made landfall, HelpAge International/COSE initiated their common response which lasted until December 2015. o They focused on shelter for elderly people (giving priority to those who were mostly affected, as well as to those older people living alone), livelihoods (capacity building & cash assistance), health, protection and inclusion (executing also DRRM activities) LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 93 o The first year of the project was led by HelpAge International itself, but in the second year COSE took over the lead, with the support of their (I)NGO counterparts, who helped them enhance their capacity. o They gave special emphasis on the health component creating partnerships in various levels (see ‘Partners’ for details). o In the response, there were 70 members of staff included, they worked along with 11 municipalities and 100 barangays. o They also did advocacy work and contributed in the development of local policies related to the inclusion of elderly people in the response. • Government-(I)NGO collaboration: They mainly worked along with local governments, capacitating them to reach out to older people living in remote areas in order to provide them with health care by providing 4 municipalities with 2 motorbikes each. That way, people not having access/not being able to afford state health care services, were provided health care in their houses for free. HelpAge International/COSE were also participating in cluster meetings on a national level. It is interesting to not here that HelpAge staff didn’t need to go through any kind of registration process to be able to operate in the country. • Stakeholder Analysis: Emily Beridico, Executive Director, COSE • Partners: On a government level, HelpAge International/COSE worked closely with the local government, as mentioned before. On a community level, they worked along Older People Organisations, providing them with training on how to be community health volunteers, enhancing that way they capacity of the community and building resilience. HelpAge International capacitated COSE to lead the response in the second year by providing them with funding and technical support. HelpAge International also partnered with COSE, Handicap International, CBM and Leonard Cheshire Disability Philippines Foundation to launch the Aging and Disability Task Force (ADTF) in the Philippines to advocate for older people and people with disabilities to be included in the humanitarian interventions. • Resilience: HelpAge International/COSE built resilience by working on the livelihoods component and by building capacity on a local and community level. They also made sure to assist communities in organising themselves and networking, advocating for them to participate at local DRRM councils. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 94 • Conclusions and Recommendations: It is a priority for HelpAge International/COSE to include communities in their response to avoid undermining their resilience. And it has been proved that (I)NGOs partnering with local organisations in their response are generally more successful in addressing efficiently the needs of the affected communities. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 95 APPENDIX V - BANGLADESHI CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY RISK PROFILE Situation in the country The case studied was the response to Cyclone Mora, which struck Bangladesh on May 30, 2017, incurring major damages to the coastal area of Cox’s Bazar. The (I)NGOs studied were members of the Start Network who were active in both the relief and recovery phases of the response. Community risk profile a. Bangladeshi communities experience annual exposure to floods, increasing salination, and storms, and other events associated with cyclones. The frequency and scale of these events are increasing. due to climate change. Cox’s Bazar and other coastal areas are the worst affected (McVeigh, 2017). i. Climate change-related trends are causing the destruction of arable lands, and thus contributing to food insecurity in Bangladesh (McVeigh, 2017). b. Environmentally-caused displacement creates communities of people without legal claim to land or tenure, creating protracted conflict with local government. i. Riverbank erosion displaces between 50,000 and 200,000 people per year. Many individuals are repeatedly displaced over the course of their lifetimes. (Glennon, 2017) ii. Immediately threatened islands, chars, have a population over 4 million (Glennon 2017) c. Population growth and land subdivision have resulted in a virtual saturation of already decreasing amounts of arable land, creating more conflicts over land (Streatfield and Karar, 2008). d. Lack of economic opportunities LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 96 e. Lack of access to basic services, including education, health services and water and hygiene facilities (Wan and Francisco, 2009) f. Overcrowded living situations, both in rural and urban slum contexts (Streatfield and Karar, 2008). g. High levels of SGBV (UNFPA, n.d.) h. An estimated 655,000 Rohingya refugees have settled in Cox's Bazar district due to the ongoing emergency in Myanmar (IOM, 2018). Additional vulnerabilities faced by this community include lack of legal status, dispossession, displacement, and psychosocial trauma. Crisis profile a. Cyclone Mora left 52,000 houses damaged or destroyed, leaving 200,000 displaced, and a total of 540,000 in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2017) i. Cox’s Bazar was the worst hit area, with 17,000 homes damaged (Rahman, 2017). The six Rohingya refugee settlements in Cox’s Bazar were badly damaged, with up to 70% of shelters and infrastructure damaged (OCHA, 2017) b. The needs identified immediately after the cyclone hit included: i. Shelter ii. Emergency health care iii. WASH iv. Food items v. vi. Child protection Livelihoods – protect crops from flooding vii. Repairs to health, education and economic infrastructures LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 97 Source: Durjoy, 2017 c. Government Response to Cyclone Mora: i. The Bangladeshi government initiated its early warning systems and evacuation plans. 300,000 people were evacuated prior to the cyclone making landfall. (“Cyclone Mora: UN agencies working closely with government”, 2017). 475,669 people were moved into 11,820 cyclone shelters (“More than a quarter million people affected by Cyclone Mora”, 2017) ii. The government also distributed cash relief of 25,000 Tk per family of six for those affected by Cyclone Mora (“More than a quarter million people affected by Cyclone Mora”, 2017) Political infrastructure analysis a. Bangladesh is labeled a “hybrid regime” by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU Democracy Index, 2017) i. Electoral politics are characterized by volatility and conflict between two main parties, BNP and Awami League which occasionally turns violent (EIU, 2017). 1. The most recent 2014 elections were boycotted by most major opposition parties. The elections featured widespread protests and political violence (EIU, 2017). ii. The ruling Awami League party has a pattern of harassment of political opposition, media, and civil society (Freedom House 2017). iii. Bangladesh media is labeled as a ‘Not Free’ Press (Freedom House 2017). iv. There have been documented human rights abuses by the security forces, with near impunity (Freedom House 2017). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 98 v. There has been a history of coups and political violence throughout Bangladeshi national history (BBC, n.d.). b. Power Relations i. Documented corruption of local officials (EIU, 2017). ii. Issues of inconsistency in national policies (EIU, 2017). iii. Bureaucratic inefficiency (EIU, 2017). iv. Political violence and human rights violations by political actors (Freedom House, 2017). c. Disaster Management Policies, Legislation, and Government Bodies i. 1972 Flood Forecasting and Warning Service of Bangladesh ii. Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) 2004 and the CDMP II expansion (Bannerman et al. 2011) 1. CDMP I and II aim to institutionalize risk reduction approaches across 13 relevant government ministries and agencies by creating partnerships between government and civil society groups, including (I)NGOs, which can support and implement government initiatives. As a part of this, local Disaster Management Committees (DMCs) were created to aid in preparedness, early warning, and evacuations Socio-economic profile analysis a. Economy i. Agriculture remains the largest economic sector in Bangladesh (Streatfield and Karar, 2008). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 99 ii. The town of Cox’s Bazar has an important tourism sector, and aquaculture industry (Cox’s Bazar Beach, n.d.). iii. The garment industry in urban centers represents the main manufactured export (Asian Development Bank, 2018). iv. There persists a lack of economic opportunities and unemployment, but Bangladesh has been making development progress: the poverty rate declined from 57% to 25% from 1990 to 2014 (Glennon, 2017). b. Demographic Profile (World Population Review, 2018). i. Total 2018 Population: 165,790,664 1. Relatively young population, where the median age is 26.3 c. ii. Male/Female: 50.41%/49.59% iii. Population Density: 1127.38 iv. Ethnic makeup: 1. 98% ethnic Bengali 2. 2% tribal minorities, including Biharis and hill tribes. Social norms i. Emphasis on social capital and cohesion --> development of community-led response ii. High levels of disaster awareness in communities (Glennon, 2017). Stakeholder Analysis a. The local community, which is primarily employed in agriculture, fisheries, or service sector related to tourism. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 100 b. The Rohingya refugee community. c. National government institutions, including agencies involved with CDMP implementation. d. District and sub-district government authorities. e. Local, National, and International NGOs, including the Start Network members. f. Technical organizations and microfinance groups active in development projects in Bangladesh. g. CBOs h. International Organizations, including various UN agencies involved in ongoing development projects and the Rohingya refugee crisis. Long term development context a. Adaptation to Climate Change i. Local community organizations including NGOs and microfinance organizations like COAST have been active in designing adaptations for local community livelihoods as population pressures and climate change related environmental factors limit traditional agricultural activities. Adaptations include: a. Livelihood shift from rice farming to salt farming or crab husbandry (McVeigh, 2017). b. Migration away from coastal areas. However, many internal migrants are displaced multiple times in their lives and many end up in slums in Dhaka or Chittagong (Glennon, 2017). ii. Government programs LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 101 1. National Plan on Adaptation 2005 2. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009: first national program which integrates socioeconomic development with disaster management. 3. Government funding of the construction of 4000 miles of embankments to protect against flooding. However, these have to be rebuilt by the government every year (McVeigh, 2017). 4. Government Disaster Management included the creation of early warning systems and a cyclone shelter network (Glennon 2017) 5. Government funding of the planting trees on char islands to make them more stable against erosion (Glennon, 2017). iii. 1. International community INGOs and UN support for government and local adaptation efforts, mainly through provision of funding (Glennon, 2017) b. Disaster risk reduction i. The Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Consortium was active in Bangladesh from 2004 to 2013 and worked specifically with CDMP to strengthen local DMC networks (Bannerman et al., 2011). ECB carried out evaluations of existing DMC capacities and shared it with CDMP and worked together to address gaps identified and to pilot a new training module with DMCs (Bannerman et al., 2011). CYCLONE MORA RESPONSE: LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 102 a. Organizations Studied i. b. Start Network 1. Caritas Bangladesh 2. Concern Worldwide 3. Action Against Hunger 4. Christian Aid 5. Save the Children ii. Local Partners iii. YPSA iv. Mukti Cox Programming and implementation i. Emergency Relief: 1. Cash Programming 2. WASH infrastructure 3. Health and hygiene kits 4. Nutrition 5. Temporary and permanent shelter construction 6. Reparation of schools; distribution of education materials ii. 1. Recovery Phase Build Back Better shelter construction (Caritas Bangladesh) 2. Reconstruction of WASH infrastructure LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 103 3. Reconstruction of schools Recommendations, gaps and challenges identified by the project a. Gaps and Challenges i. Information Quality: Caritas Bangladesh encountered issues with information quality in data shared by government agencies. The data did not include all affected communities, so Caritas Bangladesh had to adapt their emergency relief cash program once on the ground (Gomes, 2018). ii. Processing Times: Start Network representatives commented on challenges of getting government approval in a timely manner for relief interventions (Ahmad, 2018). b. Recommendations i. ECB and Start Network both show benefit of managing NGO-government relationships through a consortium, as opposed to multiple separate relationships. 1. Multi agency platforms allow for increasing structure of partnership 2. Leverage (I)NGO expertise and resources more effectively 3. a. Avoid duplication b. Better targeting of resources c. Information sharing Get government to give umbrella approval of networkwide interventions to minimize processing delays in reaching affected communities (Ahmad, 2018). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 104 ii. Leveraging of existing relationships between local partners or national offices of NGOs and district and sub-district government offices to improve response coordination (Ahmad, 2018). iii. Promote two-way information sharing between government bodies and (I)NGOs on the ground to improve data quality (Gomes, 2018). LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 105 APPENDIX VI – GREEK CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY RISK PROFILE Situation in the country Overview • • • • • • • • • • Greece is located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa. It has been an EU member-state since 1981 à its asylum process is integrated into the European one. It has been suffering a destructing financial crisis since 2009. Unemployment rates hit 20,5% as of September 2017, according to Eurostat, but Greece has been through the financial crisis since 2009. A lot of young, talented and educated people have migrated to other countries seeking to find a job and live a decent life. The extremist far-right-wing party Golden Dawn’s popularity has increased since 2012. Greece is hosting, or functions as a passage, for migrants (immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees) traveling towards northern and western Europe mainly. The majority of the migrants come from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2015, a shift took place, with Greece overtaking Italy as the primary point of arrival In 2016 the Western Balkan route (from Greece to the North; aiming to reach Germany usually through Macedonia) was closed, so, a lot of people got stuck in Greece and after some months of dwelling in informal hotspots at the northern borders of the country, people were provided accommodation in hosting centres (rural, temporary accommodation; aka refugee camps). At the same time, an EU-Turkey Statement was signed on March 20, 2016 aiming to limit the number of people entering the EU irregularly (undocumented) through Turkey. Community risk profile It is a non-directly affected country, meaning that it's not hit by some socio-natural disaster or with an ongoing conflict within its territories. Not a disaster- or conflictprone country either. Hosts temporarily/permanently externally displaced persons at the beginning in a rural context, while since summer 2017 there was a shift to the urban setting mainly funded by the EU. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 106 Crisis profile A migrant crisis started in Europe back in 2014 with people arriving mainly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The numbers of those arriving to Greece increased largely in 2015. Although Greece was not the destination for most of them, as they were heading to northern and western European countries -mainly Germany-, when the Western Balkan route was closed, and the EU-Turkey deal entered into force in March 2016, Greek authorities were forced to create temporary shelters in rural settings (refugee camps) to host the people stuck in the country. Winter 2016-2017 was a very heavy one which left people suffering in tents inside camps, without any heating. In summer 2017 camps started closing down eventually and the people started being moved to urban accommodation services along with the humanitarian groups which turned to an urban context creating community centres and other facilities inside the cities and towns. Political infrastructure analysis • • • Greece is a liberal democracy and has a functioning government. The current coalition government resulted from the elections of September 2017. The PM comes from the leftist SYRIZA party, while his government counterpart is the leader of the right-wing ‘Independent Greeks’ party and he also serves as the minister of national defence, having made national defence a priority for the country. An independent Ministry of Migration Policy was established in the country in November 2016 in the endeavours of the Greek authorities to respond to the ongoing migrant crisis. Since 2012 a far-right-wing party, namely ‘Golden Dawn’, has gained popularity, spreading hate speech against ‘foreigners’, while also organising massive pogroms against migrants, and attacks against antifascists and human rights activists. Socio-economic profile analysis • • Ongoing financial crisis since 2009 à high unemployment rates. Rise of the extremist right wing party of Golden Dawn since 2012. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 107 • o The two aforementioned points contribute to the creation of a hate rhetoric against migrants and spread the fear of the different other. Greece’s strong civil society has been of great help in various ways (independent volunteers, food initiatives etc.). Stakeholder Analysis • • • • • • • • • Local communities Refugee communities Ministry of Domestic Affairs (until November 2016) Ministry of Migration Policy (since November 2016): asylum office and first reception services EU (European Asylum Offices, ECHO etc.) UN INGOs NGOs CSOs Long term development context • • • Integration plan of refugees and other migrants Bailout programme Economic growth Organizations present (international, national, and local) • • • • • • • • • • • Help Refugees Action Aid MSF Save the Children IRC NRC CARE Solidarity Now Metadrasi Arsis Praksis LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 108 • InterVolve Programming and implementation • • • • • • • Temporary (rural) and permanent (urban) shelter Education Integration (social, bureaucratic etc.) Psycho-social support Cash programmes Relief aid Protection RECOMMENDATIONS, GAPS AND CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED BY THE PROJECT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • A steering committee should be founded with all stakeholders having a voice. INGOs and authorities shouldn't see each other as competing parties (e.g. who will take the biggest share of the ECHO funding); they should coordinate instead. Establishment of regular, predictable coordination meetings. Establishment of focal communication channels. Availability and responsiveness from both sides. Responsibility sharing. Allow space for each other, as well as other actors. Not wanting INGOs to act as service providers. Equal focus to urban and rural contexts (not enough attention given to urban settings at the beginning, as the focus was in camps) Establishment of partnerships on both a national and local level. Improve public strategy. Authorities and (I)NGOs should make sure to not exclude the local population and its needs from their intervention, to avoid creating conflicts among the different groups. (I)NGOs should define and advocate for achievable goals; that way they increase the chances of securing the government’s support (I)NGOs should not have to trade their silence in regards with human rights violations or other government’s failures to be able to keep with the LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 109 • authorities for the improvement of the conditions under which refugee in Greece liveà threat to their independence Foreign branches of (I)NGOs already operating in a country could operate under the registry of their local branch, to save time. ACTION AID IN GREECE: • Overview: o Action Aid has been funding projects overseas since 1998. o In Athens, it is also running a community-centre-type ‘Empowerment Centre’ called ‘Epikentro’. o They also run an educational centre teaching children about human rights and active citizenship. • Project: o Action Aid Greece initiated its emergency appeal in September 2015 in the Greek island of Lesvos following a needs assessment that took place during a field visit. o As their main target was refugee women, they started by creating women’s safe spaces in the refugee camps of Moria and Kara Tepe in Lesvos, and later in the Caritas shelter as well, providing dignity kits including necessary NFIs following consultation with the targeted community and psycho-social support. They also ran vulnerability assessments, did information dissemination and referrals where needed. o In 2016, they expanded their intervention in the Attica region, in mainland Greece; in specific in the refugee camps of Skaramanga and Schisto. o Activities in Lesvos stopped in November 2016; in summer 2017, they also withdrew from the camps in Attica, after handing over their activities to other (I) NGOs, because of lack of funding. o After summer 2017, they started working along with the Municipality of Athens in the municipality’s ‘Migrant and Refugee Coordination Centre’ taking part in the coordination of the design of strategy and response in urban contexts. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 110 o They also coordinate the Health and Wellness Working Committee in the ‘Athens Coordination Centre for Migrant and Refugee Issues’. o Since January 2018 they have been running a ‘protection and empowerment of refugee women’ programme in the course of the aforementioned centre placed in the municipality, providing psychosocial support to women. • Government-(I)NGO collaboration: Action Aid has been collaborating closely with the Municipality of Athens since the fall of 2017. The have also collaborated indirectly with the national authorities lobbying them through the various working groups they have been taking part in with regards to refugee women’s protection. In the working groups, there are sometimes government representatives, but even in the cases that state officials don’t participate, feedback is shared with them to help them decide the strategy ahead. Action Aid also collaborated with state officials on a camp level. • Stakeholder Analysis: Sotiria Kyriakopoulou, Refugee Appeal - Programme • Manager, Action Aid Greece Partners: Action Aid Greece was joined in the very beginning of its emergency appeal by Action Aid international staff, who helped them enhance their capacity to be able to respond effectively to the crisis. When they were working in Lesvos, they coordinated along with the UNHCR and the IRC the GBV working group. Their partnership with the national authorities has been limited to the lobbying they have been doing through the working group that they have been taking part in, but since fall 2017 AA works along with the municipal authorities. Although when they were intervening in the camps they were mainly implementing their projects themselves, at the ‘Athens Coordination Centre for Migrant and Refugee Issues’ in the Municipality of Athens where they are currently operating at, they are implementing their projects through local NGOs and grassroots groups co-run by refugees and migrants at cases, helping them to build their capacity. • Successes and Challenges to government-(I)NGO collaboration: o Challenges: § Bureaucracy is not always of help for achieving collaboration. § Some more technical factors, like government/(I)NGO protocols making the collaboration more challenging. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 111 § AA has chosen to advocate for the improvement of the conditions under which the refugees in Greece live mainly by addressing the government directly and not by confronting it publicly. The government on its side should give more space for accountability and honest feedback to be provided by the (I)NGOs. o Successes: In Lesvos Action Aid Greece was the first organisation with a focus on women. • Resilience: Sotiria Kyriakopoulou defined resilience as the ability of every individual to successfully cope with adversity. In periods of crises, organisations can assist people in realising their resilience. • Conclusions and Recommendations: (I)NGO-government collaboration should initially aim at the sharing of knowledge put forward by experts from both sides in their endeavour to be as effective as possible to their response. The collaboration should be open and based on honest dialogue among different stakeholders who are essentially willing to take action. While responding to a humanitarian crisis in a context like the Greek one, authorities and (I)NGOs should make sure to not exclude the local population and its needs from their intervention. Merely focusing on EDPs may cause conflict and competition between the two groups. (I)NGOs should advocate for achievable goals, because in that way they increase the chances of securing the government’s support. (I)NGOs should continue their advocacy work against human rights violations and with the joint efforts of the government they should work towards improving the conditions under which the refugees in Greece live; thus, the authorities should be open to receiving constructive feedback from their (I)NGO counterparts. Foreign branches of (I)NGOs already operating in a country could possibly operate under the registry of their local branch, to save time. ANONYMOUS (I)NGO IN GREECE (IN TEXT CITATION: A_INGO_GR): • Project: o A_INGO_GR started their operation in Greece in 2016, due to the influx of refugees entering Europe through Greece and it is going to withdraw its mission within 2018. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 112 o After having a very short presence in the camps, very quickly they decided to move to the urban setting. o Their activities include: § Accommodation (vulnerable women – pregnant and with newborn babies; young adult men who no longer have the right to stay in shelters for unaccompanied minors) § Protection (legal case management; SGBV teams – case management and referral; psycho-social support; health care – teams accompanying people to state health care services) § Bureaucracy and integration (help people get their AFM -tax number- and AMKA -social insurance number-) § Cash assistance (Greek Cash Alliance under UNHCR) until August 2017 à transitioning to social solidarity income through the national social welfare system § Prenatal / anti-natal support for pregnant women (reproductive health) • Government-(I)NGO collaboration: Collaboration with authorities in the urban setting where A_INGO_GR operates was delayed, as the focus was on camps and reception centres until summer 2017; registration: ad hoc meetings with the minister where different orgs were invited; they also collaborated at the cash working group level, which was under the strict supervision of the ministry; Monthly coordination meeting of ECHO partners take pace where the ministry is also usually represented; proposals of ECHO partners projects always shared with the ministry; the collaboration was better at a municipal level, especially regarding the integration process; generally the collaboration was smooth, due to the fact that they operate in the urban setting; they note a raise of interest among different actors for the urban response – municipalities are taking eventually the leadership – previously they had no financial capacity; the Municipality of Athens has created working groups to coordinate the response more effectively within Athens; A_INGO_GR has signed a written statement of collaboration with the Municipality of Athens and the KEPs • Stakeholder Analysis: Anonymous member of staff, Head of Mission, A_INGO_GR LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 113 • Partners: The majority of A_INGO_GR’s programmes are implemented through local orgs as part of A_INGO_GR’s global policy aiming sustainability; building the capacity of local orgs injecting A_INGO_GR’s experience; difficult to make sure it’s a joint collaboration and not a donorrecipient relation • Successes and Challenges to government-(I)NGO collaboration: o Successes: § Mapping this invisible population living in the urban setting and bringing the attention there § Initiated the discussion on the matter of transitioning beneficiaries from cash assistance to the national social welfare system o Challenges: § No designated communication channels. § Competing relation about who is going to take the biggest share of the ECHO funding § Lack of official public consulted strategy that would allow a more coordinated response and would include regular meetings involving representatives of different parts/steering committee/state officials who are decision makers • Resilience: Although community resilience is not very applicable in the Greek context, working towards the people’s integration make them more resilient • Conclusions and Recommendations: o A steering committee should be founded with all stakeholders having a voice. o INGOs and authorities shouldn't see each other as competing parties (e.g. who will take the biggest share of the ECHO funding); they should coordinate instead. o Establishment of regular, predictable coordination meetings. o Establishment of focal communication channels. o Availability and responsiveness from both sides. o Responsibility sharing. o Allow space for each other, as well as other actors. o Not wanting INGOs to act as service providers. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 114 o Equal focus to urban and rural contexts (not enough attention given to urban settings at the beginning, as the focus was in camps) o Establishment of partnerships on both a national and local level. o Improve public strategy. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 115 APPENDIX VII – HAITIAN CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY RISK PROFILE Situation in the country Overview • Haiti is extremely vulnerable to socio-natural disasters with more than 90 percent of the population at risk of being affected, and climate change only serves to increase Haiti's vulnerability (World Bank, n.d.) • On January 12th, 2010, Haiti suffered from a magnitude 7.0 earthquake with an epicenter in Léogâne (29km from Port-au-Prince). The earthquake left about 316,000 dead, 300,000 injured and 1.3 million displaced (DesRoches, 2011, p. 1; DEC, n.d.) • In the two years after the earthquake, Haiti received an estimated $9 billion. This amount was three times the Haitian government’s revenue during that period (Bracken, 2017). • Past and present political instability (in addition to environmental degradation and thus increased vulnerability to socio-natural disasters) is a significant barrier to long term development in Haiti. The earthquake further troubled the fragile political structure. • The 2010/2012 cholera epidemic further agitated the effects of the earthquake and distorted post-earthquake response o Between October 2010 to December 2012 there was a cholera epidemic. A national cholera response was initiated in February 2013 when the cumulative cases of cholera heightened due to Tropical Storm Issac and Hurricane Sandy. o The epidemic affected an estimated 625,899, 7,787 of which was fatal (Save the Children, n.d.) o CDC reports show that the outbreak was likely caused by peacekeeping forces that have been present in the country since 2004 (BBC, 2017) • In addition to Haiti's sovereignty being undermined by externally imposed austerity measures, and economic and political isolation, decades of military LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 116 dictatorship, human rights violations and impunity have left unresolved legacies (Christian Aid, 2011) • Hurricane Matthew battered the south of Haiti on October 4, 2016, which was the most devastating disaster since the 2010 earthquake. It caused damages equivalent to 32% of GDP. In the country’s Southern Peninsula, a third of hospitals were affected, more than 500 schools were destroyed and the losses in agriculture, fishing and livestock had a long-term impact on the livelihood of the affected communities (World Bank, n.d) • While we should always question the biases embedded within international ranking indexes, Haiti ranks low on development (human and economic) indexes. For example, the country is ranked 68th on the UNDP Human Poverty Index scale with an estimated 65% of the population living under the national poverty line (WHO, n.d.), and ranks 163 on HDI (UNDP, n.d.) Urban Risk Profile • Haiti is the third most urbanized country in Latin America and the Caribbean (World Bank). The country has a 2.93% annual urbanization rate and as of 2017, 60.9% of total population is urban population (CIA, n.d.) • Generally, urbanization tends to often have a positive effect on economic growth, however, in Haiti, the relationship has not been linear to the extent that urbanization has had an opposite effect (World Bank, 2017, p. 3). Urbanization is not supported by adequate urban infrastructure and basic services (including water, sanitation and solid waste collection). Inadequate infrastructure undermines productivity and livability and as such, urban cities are overcrowded, and poverty rates continue to increase (World Bank, 2017, p. 5) • The 2010 earthquake was an extreme example of increased urban vulnerability that (I)NGOs and the Haitian government were not equipped to handle (Clermont, 2011, p.3) • Due to the lack of investment, urban populations, specifically those in coastal areas, are particularly vulnerable to socio-natural disasters • Urbanization patterns accounted for part of the economic losses incurred during the 2010 earthquake because of the substantial damage to the LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 117 already limited infrastructure, the disruption in logistics and transportation chains, and loss of life (GFDRR, 2015, p. 1) o Rural areas bore a larger share of the costs regarding losses in agricultural production (food insecurity and threat to livelihoods). • Moving forward, resilient urban planning is central to Haiti’s social and economic development (World Bank, 2017, p. 6) and disaster risk reduction capacity Analysis of Haiti's Political Infrastructure Governance Structure • Haiti is a semi-presidential republic, with the President (elected directly by popular vote) as head of state and the Prime Minister (appointed by the President and chosen from the majority party in the National Assembly) as head of government • Political instability (specifically presidential election disputes and postelection violence) poses a threat to Haiti's sustainable development agenda o Since the 2004 coup d'état, the US has led a multinational force known as the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) (BBC, 2017) o Allegations of fraud during the November 2010 elections led to a runoff election in March 2011. The 2010 elections affected the earthquake response in two ways. First, it further detracted attention from the government leading the recovery. Second, donors withheld funding pending the outcome (Clermont, 2011, p. 5) o In December 2014, Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe was forced to resign after days of anti-government protests o In October 2015, presidential and run-off parliamentary elections were annulled over fraud allegations that led to widespread protests (BBC, 2017; HRW, 2017) And second-round elections were deferred multiple times and during the 2016 elections, 27 candidates competed (HRW, 2017) o The inauguration of Jovenel Moise in February 2017 ended the protracted political crisis LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 118 • The political structure is further weakened by deep levels of corruption o Currently, prosecutors have brought corruption charges against 12 people, including government officials, and in December 2017, a travel ban was issued against Former Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive (2009 – 2011) and former Justice Minister Camille Edouard Jr. (2016) (Delver, 2017) Analysis of Haiti's Socio-Economic Profile • Haiti is a free market economy with low labor costs and tariff-free access to the US for many of its exports, and in 2016, its primary trade partners were the US (19.3%), China (18.9%), Netherlands Antilles (18.1%), Indonesia (6.5%), Colombia (4.8%) (CIA, n.d.) • Regarding GDP composition by sector, agriculture accounts for 21.9%, industry for 20.8% and services for 57.3% (2017 est.) (CIA). However, twofifths of all Haitians depend on the agricultural sector for livelihood, mainly small-scale subsistence farming, which remains vulnerable to frequent socionatural disasters (CIA, n.d.) • Due to political uncertainty, socio-natural disasters, decreasing foreign aid, and the depreciation of the national currency, GDP is increasingly unstable. For example, in 2009 GDP growth rate was 3.1 %, –5.5 in 2010, 5.5 in 2011 and plummeted to 1.4 in 2016 (World Bank, n.d.; CIA, n.d.) • Remittances are the primary source of foreign exchange, and is equivalent to more than a quarter of GDP, and nearly doubles the combined value of Haitian exports and FDI (CIA, n.d.) • While Haiti's outstanding external debt was cancelled by donor countries following the 2010 earthquake, as of December 2017, Haiti's debt has risen $2.6 billion. The majority of which is owed to Venezuela under the PetroCaribe program. (CIA, n.d.) • Although the government has increased its revenue collection, it continues to rely on formal international economic assistance for fiscal sustainability, with over 20% of its annual budget coming from foreign aid or direct budget support. (CIA, n.d.) • Haiti's population is 10.7 million people total (UNDP); 60.9 % of this is urban; median age of 23 years (CIA, n.d.) LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 119 • Regarding demographic characteristics, Haiti is 95% black, 5% mulatto and white with Catholicism and voodoo as official religions (CIA, n.d.) Social, Economic and Political Damages of the Earthquake Overview • Currently (2016/2017), an estimated 37,667 people were considered IDPs (this number only represents IDPs from the 2010 earthquake living in camps or camp-like situations), about 2,302 are considered stateless persons (stateless persons are individuals without a nationality who were born in the Dominican Republic prior to January 2010) (CIA, n.d.) • The earthquake killed several key government officials and destroyed 60% of government buildings including the National Palace, High Court of Justice and the ministries of Health, Interior, Finance, and Defense (Amadeo, 2017; Anonymous, 2018) • In Port-au-Prince alone, in addition to the 25% of civil servants that were killed, the earthquake damaged over 294,383 homes, 80% city schools, the main airport and almost all paved roads (Amadeo, 2017) • The earthquake created between $7.8 billion to $8.5 billion in damage and shrank GDP by 5.1% (Amadeo, 2017) Government-(I)NGO's post-earthquake response Overview • Immediate post-earthquake response could be divided into two phases. The first phase which was considered top priority was search and rescue, offshore vessel medical unit, electricity, communication for a better coordinated response (CRS, 2010, p. 3) Additionally, Haitian authorities and international relief agencies were tasked with delivering food and water to hundreds of makeshift camps in Port-au-Prince (CRS, 2010, p. 4) • The second phase was long-term development reconstruction of Haiti and this included restoring institutions and rebuilding infrastructures including housing Criticism of responses LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 120 • It is important to note that prior to the 2010 earthquake, organizations including the World Bank were working with the Haitian government to incorporate disaster risk management into Haiti’s overall development strategy. However, the project was still in its early stages, and the focus was geared towards hurricanes, which were the most common cause of natural disasters on the island (CRS, 2010, p. 4) • Alongside a weak Haitian state response, there was a plethora of (I)NGOs on the ground and while these (I)NGOs undoubtedly contributed to addressing emergency needs, they were poorly coordinated and unsupervised (Christian Aid, 2011, p. 10) • The centralization of the response further affected the quality of relief. For example, reports indicate that emergency aid delivery was concentrated in Port-au-Prince. As such, support for areas affected outside Port-au-Prince was dismal. (Christian Aid, 2011, p. 17) RECOMMENDATIONS • Moving forward, international organizations must ensure that funding for technical support, institutional strengthening and staff training to key Haitian government ministries is included in all reconstruction projects (Clermont, 2011, p. 5) • The government should work closely with the Haitian private sector and international donors to prioritize political and economic decentralization (Clermont, 2011, p. 5) • It should be noted that the government’s response (supported by agencies) to relocate families to makeshift camps that are situated in unpleasant and unpopular areas and far from services and jobs, run a real risk of becoming future slums (Clermont, 2011, p. 3) • INGOs should avoid the assumption that local skills and services are unavailable and a consequence of this was the erosion of pre-earthquake services. For example, during the immediate post-earthquake response, water vendors and medical providers could not compete with free water and healthcare, and private sector suppliers could not compete with large scale imports of goods made freely available from aid agencies (Clermont, 2011, p. 3) LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 121 PAST AND ONGOING (I)NGO RESPONSES (SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM) Action contre la faim World Vision CARE IFRC Oxfam Save the Children Concern Christian Aid Islamic Relief Noria LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 122 CHRISTIAN AID IN HAITI • Overview o Christian Aid has supported partners on Hispaniola since the 1980's and has had an active presence in Haiti since 1997 o The original aim of their projects was to support Haitians that had been excluded from state support in both Haiti and Dominican Republic. However, their projects now focus on facilitating community resilience. o Christian Aid projects are implemented through local partnerships with CSO's • Program, Post-2010 Earthquake Response o Project Profile: aims, targeted communities and partners § Since the earthquake (specifically 2010-2015), Christian Aid has worked to support the country’s reconstruction, using £14m of emergency appeal funds to reach 180,000 people affected by the disaster § The overall goal for the response was to provide emergency relief, support the reconstruction Haiti, and to make communities more resilient to future disasters. As such the response focused on food security, economic recovery, psychological and social support, emergency shelter and health (Christian Aid, 2011). § By partnering with several (I)NGOs and CSOs and local government, Christian Aid was able to reach the most vulnerable households affected by the earthquake o Project Strategies: theory of change § In addition to humanitarian relief, Christian Aid's long-term development project focuses on training construction workers (specifically masons) to build and repair earth-quake resistant homes in affected communities § Allow families to resettle in the country-side to escape the difficult conditions in Port-au-Prince § Stimulate local economies by providing seeds, tools and livestock for farmers to help local agriculture, livestock and LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 123 fishing economies, and giving loans and business training to traders o Project Outcomes § Their emergency response was able to reach about 185,484 people – distributed 237,000 hot meals, 10,000 hygiene kits, provided emergency shelter to nearly 2,500 families and donated cash to over 5,600 households § Regarding their longer-term reconstruction efforts, Christian Aid has built over 700 new homes, repaired about 1196 and is currently building 69 new houses § Helped over 32,000 people earning a living by supporting local economies § 35,00 people were trained on how to prepare for and respond to natural disasters to lessen the impact of future emergencies o Government-INGO collaboration § Christian Aid worked with local government in their emergency response Resilience Our anonymous source defined resilience as empowering communities to be better by giving them skills that they could use to make money. Resilience was targeted through the new houses, new lives initiatives which improved community resilience in two ways. First, Haitians were trained to build earthquake resistant homes. This allowed local members of the community to have a source of income and build a portfolio so that they can be competitive candidates for future building contracts. Second, the homes have become asset to these families, and this served to empower them. In addition to community resilience, Christian Aid also worked on improving government resilience. Resilience in this regard is focused on economic stability. Partners Anonymous argued that Christian Aid positions themselves as "brokering partnerships at different levels." As such, Christian Aid partners with various CSOs, and post-earthquake interventions are mostly implemented through local partners. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 124 Additionally, they have also collaborated closely with national and local government officials at multiple stages of the post-earthquake response. At central level, Christian Aid tends to liaise with key national government ministries. However, for community-based interventions, emphasis is placed on local communities and NGOs. Advantages and Challenges to (I)NGO-government Collaboration Anonymous identified factors that contributed to the success of their postearthquake interventions: i. Ensuring that all interventions including the new houses, new lives initiatives aligned with both the national and local governments reconstruction plans; ii. Encouraged local partners to collaborate with the government, specifically highlighting that while Christian Aid funding and support is bounded within time, the Haitian government is not. Thus, for sustainable development, CSO's and local communities should equally rely on government support. This allows CSOs to rely on the government while improving communication channels between the two. As such, Christian Aid facilitated dialogue through organizing training workshops for all stakeholders including government, CSOs and communities; iii. One of the biggest successes of (I)NGO-government collaboration is that Christian Aid supported the governments demand to receive a significant share of donor funding, even though this was achieved later in the response; Anonymous also identified challenges that affected project trajectory and INGOgovernment collaboration: iv. The biggest challenge was issues with land tenure. Considering the wider political instability, state capacity was strained, and the government was slow to issue building permits. The land tenure issue, for example, has proven to be a vital area where decisive state intervention could have rendered the rehabilitation efforts much more effective (World Bank); v. Another major problem was that local government officials expected Christian Aid to finance government initiatives. Furthermore, they expected project funds to be channeled through the government and not CSOs. To address this, Christian Aid as part of a larger network was able to contact the LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 125 central government to inform them of the situation. In other instances, when this continued to be a problem, Christian Aid tended to move to other areas where (I)NGO-government collaboration was better; (LESSONS LEARNT) CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS In conclusion, (I)NGO-government collaboration was imperative for effective postearthquake rehabilitation and the lack of collaboration further magnified the effects and rendered all interventions somewhat useless/hindered reconstruction efforts. As such, recommendations from the stakeholder analysis includes: To the Haitian Government I. The government should take the initiative to organize more regular meetings to understand (I)NGO project objectives; II. Must acknowledge that collaborating with (I)NGOs should not be contingent on whether these (I)NGOs can directly fund government initiatives. Thus, (I)NGO-government cooperation must focus on collaborative sensitization and constructive messaging; To INGOs: III. INGO's need to share more information about their work with the government. For example, in 2017 out of an estimated 500 organizations ((I)NGO's and CSO's) in Haiti, only 130 sent project reports to the government; IV. INGOs should demand that most donor funds should primarily be channeled through the national government. Recognize that (I)NGOs as the primary recipient of donor funds further undermines crises response sand government resilience; V. While collaborating with the government is good for sustainable development, not consulting and challenging government policies when necessary is dangerous. In the past, (I)NGOs tended to explicitly discount government policies without opening dialogue with all stakeholders. As a result, moving forward, (I)NGOs should note that the best way to challenge government policies is by making sure that communities understand LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 126 government policies and create the space to discuss community opinions and bring these opinions to the government; To the Haitian government and (I)NGOs: VI. There is a need for trust. On the part of (I)NGOs, corruption should not be used as an excuse to evade meaningful collaboration. The international community should trust Haitians and recognize their right to dictate the direction of interventions. There is also a need for Haitians to trust the international community. However, it is important to highlight that Haitian distrust is not misguided. Arguably, post-earthquake interventions served to propel international interests. For example, Anonymous highlighted that of all the construction contracts (from US aid) only 2% went to Haitian companies. Bigger Picture and Next Steps The general landscape of (I)NGO-government collaboration in post-earthquake Haiti in 2010 was primarily an example of bad practices that undermine effective interventions. Specifically, the lack of coordination between (I)NGOS and the Haitian government undermined the interventions. Nevertheless, organizations like Christian Aid have critiqued interventions, and aimed to improve the effectiveness of interventions by strengthening (I)NGO-government relations. Additionally, it is important to consider that (I)NGOs hesitation to collaborate with the government (regarding the independence and neutrality principle) would pose a bigger problem to collaboration if (I)NGOs were funding government projects for the postearthquake response. Moving forward, there is a need for (I)NGO-government communication to see how to best collaborate. Additionally, the 2010 earthquake arguable showed that (I)NGOs were unprepared to address socio-natural crises within an urban context. LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 127 APPENDIX VIII – SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE The following is an example of the types of questions asked during interviews with INGO representatives. • What do you define as resilience? How was this targeted in your project? • What was the biggest challenge in your project? The biggest success? • In the xyz case, who was in charge of leading the response (authorities, UN, INGOs, CSOs & other citizens)? o Are there laws in your country (or the country of operation) defining who should be coordinating the response? o To what extent would you say that your local partners are in charge of framing and executing the project? • Do the partners you work with have established relationship with the government? What is their relationship like? How important were preexisting relationships to the development and implementation of your project? • How necessary do you think was the presence your INGO/project for the success of the response? o In what ways was it necessary? What did you offer that the government or local institutions couldn’t (funding, aid, knowledge, build capacity/resilience)? • To what extent did the project seek to collaborate with government or local institutions? Was the collaboration smooth? Who was the driving force behind any collaboration? o What form did the collaboration (if any) take? What was communication like? o Did all stakeholders have a voice? Were there power imbalances in collaboration? If so, who had the most power? Were any efforts made to level the playing field? o What has been the biggest challenge (success) in your collaboration? o In your experience, did your organization coordinate better with the national, regional or the local government? o What is the governments biggest concern (priority) in regard to the response/project? LINKING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE 128 • Do you believe it’s important to for INGOs and governments to coordinate in emergency contexts? o What can the government do to improve the coordination with the INGOs? o What can the INGOs do to improve the coordination with the government? • What should be the role of INGOs in humanitarian contexts, and what is the role of national/local authorities? Which should be the role of the authorities? • How did your project impact community resilience and communitygovernment relationships? • How flexible is the independence principle? 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