Spain

1138 European Journal of Political Research 43: 1138–1143, 2004 Spain IRENE DELGADO & LOURDES LOPEZ NIETO Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, Spain Table 1. Cabinet composition of Aznar II For the composition of Aznar II on 1 January 2003, see Political Data Yearbook 2000: 517, Political Data Yearbook 2001: 1085 and Political Data Yearbook 2002: 1088. Changes on 2 March 2003: Minister of Environment/Ministro de Medio Ambiente: Jaume Matas (1957 male, PP) replaced by Elvira Rodríguez (1949 female, PP) Changes on 3 July 2003: Minister of the Presidency/Ministro de la Presidencia: Mariano Rajoy (1956 male, PP) replaced by Javier Arenas (1957 male, PP) Minister of Science and Technology/Ministro de Ciencia y Tecnología: Josep Piqué (1955 male, PP) replaced by Juan Costa (1965 male, PP) Minister for Public Administration/Ministro de Administraciones Públicas: Javier Arenas (1957 male, PP) replaced by Julia García-Valdecasas (1944 female, PP) Changes in the composition of the cabinet The second cabinet of President Aznar underwent four changes during the first six months of the year. These changes were related to internal movements in the Government party (Popular Party) in order to compete in the regional and general elections. Two ministers (Environment and Science and Technology) were nominated to lead their party’s regional candidates (in Baleares and Catalonia). The other two replacements in the cabinet were responses to Aznar’s decision to resign after two mandates as President of Government. In this scenario, President Aznar, also President of the Popular Party, proposed that his Minister of the Presidency and First Vice-President Mariano Rajoy be his successor and candidate for the presidency of the government in the 2004 general election. Rajoy resigned in July and was replaced as Minister of the Presidency by the former Minister for Public Administration and general secretary of the Popular Party, Javier Arenas. The First Vice-Presidency of the Government was given to the Minister of Economy and former Second © European Consortium for Political Research 2004 Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA spain 1139 Vice-President, Rodrigo Rato. The post of Second Vice-President was occupied by the Minister of the Presidency, Arenas, and the job of Spokesman for the Government was given to the Minister of Work and Social Affairs. To sum up, Aznar tried with these changes to distribute positions among relevant members of the party who were also candidates for the succession in the party and in the elections (see also the next section on Issues in national politics). Issues in national politics Developments in the Spanish economy continued to be favourable throughout 2003. Economic growth was around 2.4 per cent, over the European mean, which was directly affected by the German and French crisis. Inflation showed better behaviour and the increase in prices for consumer goods reached 2.6 per cent at the end of the year. The unemployment rate continued to decrease slightly, to an average just below 9 per cent. By and large, the economic policy of the Government was successful in an adverse European landscape. The overall economic and social situation of the country was enviably good as compared to its European partners. The big issue on the Government’s agenda was terrorism, against which they continued their political policies. Several policy actions were taken and ETA commanders were arrested in cooperation with the French police. The terrorist band’s ability for killing was reduced after the detention of more than 100 activists and the defeat of some of its leaders. In addition, the fight against terrorism was enlarged due to the presence in Spain of Moroccan citizens connected with Al Qaeda. The Government also continued to hold people who were arrested because they were suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, but often with no factual basis for that suspicion. The Government also took measures to normalise the situation of illegal immigrants, variously estimated as half a million or more, mostly from Latin America, East Europe and North Africa. Nevertheless, it will prove difficult to reverse the widespread insecurity and, in some cases, xenophobia already produced by their association with a novel wave of violent crime. In Spain, except for the Popular Party, the whole country protested against the American invasion of Iraq. In February and March, several demonstrations took place that involved millions of participants. Despite the protests, the Aznar Government maintained its decision to support the war. Aznar remained firm on the main point and strengthened the bilateral relation with the United States. The confrontation between the Government and opposition parties opened a big gap that was neutralised in the Lower House by the majority control of the Popular Party over the chamber. However, in many © European Consortium for Political Research 2004 1140 irene delgado & lourdes lopez nieto ways, this situation reflected the refusal of a large part of the population to accept as inevitable the invasion of Iraq. As far as political issues were concerned, after the local and regional elections of May, the political scene focused on the succession of Aznar. The second half of 2003 was dominated by the nomination of Mariano Rajoy as the new Popular Party candidate for the general elections to be held in March 2004. Aznar had announced his resignation and the succession was a subject that acquired prominence during the year. The selection was made by the President Aznar from among Mariano Rajoy, Minister of the Presidency; Rodrigo Rato, Minister of Economic Affairs; and Jaime Mayor Oreja, the president of the Popular Party in the Basque Country. As shown in surveys, citizens were confident in the ability of those ministers to handle the most important problems facing Spain. All three were considered competent and qualified to improve and implement the policies promoted by the Popular Party. Finally, the Popular Party ratified Aznar’s decision and the new candidate started to prepare the way to the Palacio de la Moncloa, the residence of the Prime Minister. Throughout the year, but especially at the end of it, there were various events to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the approval of the Constitution. Election report: Local and regional elections Very broadly speaking, Spain divides into several patterns of local government in terms of differences between the municipalities. This circumstance makes it difficult to provide meaningful commentary on the local election results, since gains and losses made by the parties can only be interpreted in aggregated terms. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the local elections were regarded as a test for the level of support for the party in government. Local elections were held simultaneously with regional elections on 25 May and undoubtedly inflated the turnout of the former beyond ‘normal’ levels if we compare the regions that did not hold simulatenous local and regional elections (i.e., Andalusía, Catalonia, Galicia and Basque Country) with those that did. The turnout for these local elections was 67.4 per cent, with an increase of 3.4 per cent with respect to the previous local elections held in 1999. Turnout for the regional elections reached 71.8 per cent, a little increased over the local elections. On the whole, the Popular Party remained the strongest party in the local elections in terms of percentage of councillors (36.0). Its percentage of votes remained smaller (34.9) than the Socialist Party (35.5). This result was a direct © European Consortium for Political Research 2004 spain 1141 consequence of the effects of the electoral law and it was interpreted as a success for the PSOE and a defeat for the government party. In any terms, it was true that the highest number of councillors was obtained by the Popular Party, and it retained its influence on the local level. One might add that the different demographic complexion of the local authorities involved is confirmed by the rather obvious distinction between levels of party support in the municipalities inside the regions; thus, the Popular Party remained the best supported party in the Autonomous Community of Murcia, Rioja, Valencia and Balearic Islands, whereas PSOE concentrated its best support in Castilla la Mancha, Extremadura and Andalusia. The PSOE had some additional victories in Aragón and Catalonia, the regions mainly dominated by small and medium-sized towns, where the number of Socialist councillors was higher than for the Popular Party. The latter concentrates its support in rural areas. The Popular Party also emerged as the leading party of the urban areas, although post-electoral agreements reached by the PSOE and regional parties manage to avoid governments of the Popular Party, as was the case in the city of León and Vigo. Quite an important victory for the PSOE was in the city of Zaragoza where Alberto Belloch – former Minister of Home Affairs and Justice in the cabinet of Felipe González – was able to defeat the Popular Party candidate, although he needs the support of minority forces to govern. On the whole, the local elections confirmed the trend towards the bipolarisation of the party system, which was reinforced by the formation of strategic alliances (PSOE/IU/leftist regionalist versus PP/rightist regionalist) in several larger towns. In general terms, the results of the local elections were not quite what everyone expected. The opposition ‘won’ the election, but did not secure an overall majority in number of representatives. The Popular Party retained control over the big cities and assured itself of a significant presence in local government. Regional elections took place in almost all of the 17 regions (Comunidades Autónomas) to elect the regional parliaments that elected their respective regional presidents. In 13 regions, the elections were called by the regional presidents to be held simultaneously with the local ones. The result was an electoral and political map that is quite similar to the outcome of the elections held in 1999. In those elections, the Popular Party won in five regions by absolute majority (Castilla León, Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja and C. Valenciana) and in two others by simple majority where coalition governments were formed with regional political forces, but with Popular presidents. The Popular Party also was part of the coalition government in Canarias, although in this case the regional president belonged to a regional political force because the Popular Party was the second party in terms of votes and seats. The Socialist Party won in four regions, in three of them with an absolute majority (Asturias, © European Consortium for Political Research 2004 1142 irene delgado & lourdes lopez nieto Castilla la Mancha and Extremadura) and in Aragón it was the first party in votes and seats and built up a coalition government around a Socialist president. To these must be added another Socialist president of a coalition government, in Baleares, although the Popular Party was the first party in votes and seats (47.5 per cent). In general, after the May 1999 regional elections, the political map was quite competitive between the two main political parties in terms of votes and seats in five of the 13 regions. In terms of colour of the regional governments, the Popular Party had seven presidents and was part of another coalition government while the PSOE had five presidents. To what extent had the political map changed after the regional elections of 2003? The answer is that the changes had been quite limited in terms of party government type and colour because, in nine of the 13 regions, the distribution of power was the same as in the previous elections. The most important changes happened in four regions, although they did not change the number of regions governed by the two main parties. Two regions, where the Popular Party won in votes and seats, although without an absolute majority, changed the government party. In Baleares, the Popular Party achieved government replacing a Socialist-led coalition; but in Cantabria, the Popular Party’s former allies signed a government agreement with the Socialist Party and a minority regional leader was elected as regional president by the parliament. Two other regions had changes in 2003 because the first party lost its absolute majority. In Asturias, the Socialists continued in government, but in this case had to form a coalition government with a Socialist president, while in Madrid the Popular Party lost its majority, although it was the first party in votes and seats. The two opposition parties tried to form a coalition government, but they failed because two Socialist deputies did not obey party discipline. Five months later, in October, the former regional president had to call new elections in the region because it was not possible to reach any government solution. The seventh elections in Madrid were won by the Popular Party with an absolute majority. In November, another regional election took place in Catalonia, with its own electoral timing. As with the other regions, the electoral results were quite similar to the previous ones (October 1999). The Socialist Party won a slight majority in terms of votes, but the winner in seats was a nationalist coalition (CiU) that had governed this region during six legislatures. After a month of hard political negotiations, the Socialist Party reached a coalition agreement with two other political forces and for the first time a Socialist president was elected in Catalonia. How is the party distribution of power in the 17 Spanish regions at the end of 2003? The Popular Party is in government in nine regions and, except in © European Consortium for Political Research 2004 1143 spain Canarias, the presidents belong to the Popular Party. The Socialist Party is in government in seven regions, although in one of them the president is not Socialist. Only in the Basque Country is the party in government not one of the two main national parties. Sources and further information Spanish Government website: www.la-moncloa.es. Spanish Lower House website: www.congreso.es. Spanish Upper House website: www.senado.es. Spanish Opinion Polls online: www.cis.es. On terrorism, the Ministry of Home Affairs website: www.mir.es. © European Consortium for Political Research 2004