Ch 7 - The Development of EDUCO as Government Policy

Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online Chapter Title Copyright Year Copyright Holder Corresponding Author The Development of EDUCO as Government Policy 2018 The Author(s) Family Name Edwards Jr. Particle Given Name D. Brent Sufix Abstract Division Department of Educational Foundations Organization/University University of Hawaii Address Honolulu, Hawaii, USA Email [email protected] Q1 In this chapter, I detail the dynamics of the process by which the Education with Community Participation (EDUCO) program entered government policy. I also explain the ways in which transnational inluence impacted this process. In so doing, I provide insights that correspond to the purpose of this study. As will be shown, the overall process can be subdivided into multiple stages which span 1988–1995. Various forms of World Bank inluence are addressed in detail. The process of policy formation can be said to culminate with the inclusion of EDUCO in the Ten Year Plan, which was inalized in November 1995. Per the deinition provided in Chap. 1 for international processes of education policy formation, I present indings in this chapter up to the point at Q2 which the Ten Year Plan was produced, since this is the point at which EDUCO entered the government’s oficial reform strategy. AUTHOR QUERIES Q1 Q2 Please conirm if the abstract given is ine. Please conirm if cross-references of chapter numbers are correct throughout the chapter. CHAPTER 7 1 The Development of EDUCO as Government Policy AU1 2 3 In this chapter, I detail the dynamics of the process by which the Education with Community Participation (EDUCO) program entered government policy. I also explain the ways in which transnational inluence impacted this process. In so doing, I provide insights that correspond to the purpose of this study. As will be shown, the overall process can be subdivided into multiple stages which span 1988–1995. The process of policy formation can be said to culminate with the inclusion of EDUCO in the Ten Year Plan, which was inalized in November 1995. Per the deinition provided in Chap. 1 for international processes of education policy formation, I present indings in this chapter up to the point at which the Ten Year Plan was produced, since this is the point at which EDUCO entered the government’s oficial reform strategy. In Chap. 9, the promotion of EDUCO beyond El Salvador is examined. As is often the case, the strategy pursued by a Ministry of Education (MINED) in practice does not necessarily align with or relect the reform policies contained in policy documents. El Salvador provides an instance where this is true, in that EDUCO began in practice long before it entered the Ten Year Plan, as will be shown. In all, three stages were identiied between 1988 and 1995 that characterize the development of the EDUCO program as an element of MINED policy. The irst stage occurred between 1988 and 1991 and relected competing ideas of decentralization. The second stage took place during 1991–1993 and shows how EDUCO took © The Author(s) 2018 D.B. Edwards Jr., The Trajectory of Global Education Policy, International and Development Education, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-50875-1_7 173 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 174 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY root and began to be scaled up. The third and inal stage covered 1993–1995 and led not only to EDUCO’s institutionalization in practice but also to its formalization in policy. In each section, in addition to explaining the dynamics of interaction of the involved actors and discussing the forms of transnational inluence which manifest, I also characterize changes in context, as appropriate. Stage One: 1988–1991—COmpeting ideaS Of deCentralizatiOn 42 The irst stage in the long process that eventually led to EDUCO being crystallized in the Ten Year Plan is two and a half years in length. This stage begins in the lead up to when Cristiani took ofice in June 1989 and concludes with the decision by the Minister of Education to base the reform of the education system on a model of community management. In the interim, between late 1988 and February 1991, what the education reform process relected was a period in which multiple institutions favored different conceptions of decentralization. I unpack this stage below by explaining three subperiods. 43 Prior to the Election of Alfredo Cristiani 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 In the second half of 1988, various organizations—such as the Business Fund for Educational Development (FEPADE), the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—worked together to explore options for educational reform that Alfredo Cristiani could pursue after the elections (MINED 1999). As part of these efforts, USAID funded a report for FUSADES which was produced by the Miguel Kast Foundation, a conservative neoliberal think tank based in Chile and named after Miguel Kast, one of the original Chicago Boys who held prominent positions as Labor Minister and as Governor of the Central Bank during the Pinochet Dictatorship (Gauri 1998). That USAID would hire consultants from this think tank is not surprising, as Chile during the 1970s and 1980s was promoted by the U.S. government as a model for economic and social reform (Klein 2007). Similarly, FUSADES and the new business elite in El Salvador looked to Chile for inspiration—and even took study trips in 1988 to learn about the economic reforms being implemented there.1 AU2 STAGE ONE: 1988–1991—COMPETING IDEAS OF DECENTRALIZATION 175 The report produced by the Kast Foundation included recommendations based on the Chilean experience with education reform (Kast Foundation 1988).2 For a summary of the key Chilean education reforms between 1979 and 1987, see Table 7.1. In short, in the Kast Foundation report, there were three propositions. The report suggested (a) that there should be general deconcentration of administrative functions to regional or departmental units; (b) that the government should incentivize the private provision of education (e.g., by stimulating the creation of private education, or by allowing nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), funded with public resources, to manage schools); and (c) that there should be a voucher system through which parents could choose among schools (Kast Foundation 1988). However, as will be shown, this proposal was not successful, as it did not align with the constraints faced by the relevant actors in El Salvador at the time. Cristiani’s Election and Three Proposals for Decentralization Upon election in 1989, the Cristiani administration immediately turned its attention to instituting economic reforms that would allow it to qualify for a structural adjustment loan from the World Bank (World Bank 1995a). This meant, for example, increasing interest rates, elimination of government subsidies and price controls, constraints on the public payroll, controls on government expenditures, tariff reductions, and currency market liberalization. Also in the postelection period, Cristiani appointed a new minister and vice minister of education, both of whom came from the “hard core” of the Republican National Alliance (ARENA, for its name in Spanish).3 By August of 1990, Cecilia Gallardo de Cano, who had previously worked as an education specialist with FEPADE, not to mention with FUSADES and Chilean consultants on Cristiani’s proposal for social sector reform, moved from being vice minister to being the Minister of Education. She was not only politically ambitious, but also politically savvy, and passionate about education. It was these traits that helped her replace her predecessor, who, while also an integral member of the ARENA party, was more of a diplomat than a reformer.4 Importantly, Cecilia Gallardo would provide stability and continuity by remaining as the Minister of Education for eight years. As explained in Chap. 6, once in ofice, Cristiani adopted the economic and social reform priorities that had been established by FUSADES. With regard to education, FUSADES had, in turn, relied on the proposal put 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 176 AU3t1.1 t1.2 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY Table 7.1 Summary of key reforms to “modernize” the Chilean education system during 1979–1987 t1.3 Date Key issues Reform description t1.4 t1.5 t1.6 t1.7 t1.8 t1.9 t1.10 t1.11 t1.12 t1.13 t1.14 t1.15 t1.16 t1.17 t1.18 t1.19 t1.20 t1.21 t1.22 t1.23 t1.24 t1.25 t1.26 t1.27 t1.28 t1.29 t1.30 t1.31 t1.32 t1.33 t1.34 t1.35 t1.36 t1.37 t1.38 t1.39 t1.40 t1.41 t1.42 t1.43 December 1979 Transfer of schools to municipalities June 1980 Legal and accountability framework for municipalization; teacher privatization August 1980 Subvention (voucher); privatization of school construction and ownership Law of Municipal Revenues of 1979 served as the legal foundation for the transfer of schools and primary health clinics to municipalities. In Article 38 it declared a new municipal prerogative: “[Municipalities] can also assume control of services that are being provided by public or private sector entities” (Gauri 1998, p. 23). Municipal mayors, most of whom were military oficers, were ordered to assume control of educational services A June 1980 decree (a) described the contracts required for the transfer of state properties to municipalities; (b) outlined the regular audits of municipal inances and subventions that the Comptroller General of the Republic, the government agency responsible for audits and issues of constitutionality, would perform; and, crucially, (c) stipulated that personnel working in transferred services would have the option of either surrendering their status as civil servants, transferring their pension beneits to a private pension manager, and receiving severance pay, or remaining under the government salary and pension beneit systems without receiving severance pay. The severance pay was set high enough to win over the support of teachers in the transferred schools, enticing almost all of them to enter the private sector in 1981 A legal decree of August 1980 established a uniform subvention for private and municipal schools. The subvention’s value was to be tied to an indexed unit of account, and would vary according to the costs associated with the level of education being taught and the geographic location of the school. This decree authorized the corporation for the construction of educational establishments, the legal entity that possessed the title to the school buildings, to enter into leasing contracts with the municipalities for periods of ninety-nine years (continued) STAGE ONE: 1988–1991—COMPETING IDEAS OF DECENTRALIZATION Table 7.1 AU4 177 (continued) Date Key issues Reform description September 1980 School management by private corporations and not-for-proit organizations 1987 Completion of municipalization A September 1980 legal decree authorized extraordinary payments to municipalities to cover the costs associated with the transfer of schools and health clinics. The same decree permitted municipalities to delegate the management of schools and clinics to subsidiary private corporations. The amendment held that municipal governments, “for the purposes of the administration and operation of [transferred services], will be able to form … together with organizations of the community interested in the said services, one or more not-for-proit, juridical persons of private standing” (Gauri 1998, p. 25) In 1987 the military government transferred those schools that remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education to municipalities Source: Adapted from Gauri (1998, pp. 22–25) forth by the Kast Foundation (Marques and Bannon 2003). The result was that Cristiani’s Socioeconomic Development Plan 1990–94, in addition to stating a focus on programs for the rural poor, also called for improvements in the delivery of basic social services and “institutional improvements in the overly centralized … [Ministry of Education (MINED)] to gradually decentralize management responsibilities to the regional and local levels” (World Bank 1991, p. 21). With these strategic lines in mind, various international actors began to collect data on the state of the education system. For a summary of the dire state of the education system in the late 1980s, see Table 7.2. Additionally, from mid-year 1990 onwards, these international actors began to offer more speciic recommendations regarding the form that decentralization would take. Between May and September three reports emerged—one each from the World Bank, the Kast Foundation, and the UNESCO. Noticeably, activity around education reform began to pick up steam during the time these reports were being produced. This was for two reasons. First, in April 1990, the government and the guerillas resumed peace t1.44 t1.45 t1.46 t1.47 t1.48 t1.49 t1.50 t1.51 t1.52 t1.53 t1.54 t1.55 t1.56 t1.57 t1.58 t1.59 t1.60 t1.61 t1.62 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 178 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY State of Salvadoran education system during 1988–1990 t2.1 Table 7.2 t2.2 Dimension Description t2.3 t2.4 t2.5 t2.6 t2.7 t2.8 t2.9 t2.10 t2.11 t2.12 t2.13 t2.14 t2.15 t2.16 t2.17 t2.18 t2.19 t2.20 t2.21 t2.22 t2.23 t2.24 t2.25 t2.26 t2.27 t2.28 t2.29 t2.30 t2.31 t2.32 t2.33 t2.34 t2.35 t2.36 t2.37 t2.38 t2.39 t2.40 t2.41 t2.42 t2.43 t2.44 Education completion averages Urban population completed 6 years of schooling, while the rural population completed only 3.1 years Population with no education = 30%, rural population with no education = 42% Primary (net enrollment): 70% in 1988, in rural areas primary enrollment estimated at 60% Preprimary: Only 14% of El Salvador’s approximately 600,000 children between the ages of 4 and 6 were enrolled in preschool, and almost 90 percent of these children were from middle and upper class families 265,000 children between ages of 7 and 12 lacked access to primary education, mostly in rural areas 37% of children aged 7–14 were out of school 66% of the schools offered less than six grades and 29% only offered between one and three grades. In rural areas, 82% of the schools offered less than six grades and 40% only had between one and three grades Due to the war, 877 out of 3,000 schools were closed in 1982, and 575 remained closed in 1989 National average = 52 students per teacher; urban areas = 46; rural areas = 62. In some rural areas, student/teacher ratio of over 80 Real wages fell by over 67 percent between 1968 and 1989; Moonlighting was widespread; teachers frequently held not just one but two other jobs to maintain their previous income level Teachers refused to teach in many rural areas due to ongoing conlict 6,000 qualiied unemployed teachers Real public expenditures in education fell by over 40% between 1980 and 1988, and remained below the 1979 expenditure level. As a percentage of the GDP, education expenditures fell from 3.9% in 1980 to 1.8% in 1989 96% of the MINED’s budget was dedicated to teacher salaries Represented 20% of spending on education sector in 1989, majority from USAID. The Inter-American Development Bank; United Nations Development Programme; United Nations Children’s Fund; the United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization; and the Organization of American States provided minor support and technical assistance t2.45 Enrollment rates Access Schools offer few grade levels Schools closed/destroyed Student/teacher ration Teacher salary Teacher abandonment Teacher surplus Funding to education Foreign aid Source: MINED (1999), UNESCO (1990), World Bank (1990, 1991) STAGE ONE: 1988–1991—COMPETING IDEAS OF DECENTRALIZATION 179 negotiations, led by the United Nations, with a seriousness which suggested that an end to the civil war could be a possibility. Second, the World Bank had made it clear since late 1989 that it intended to engage with the government of El Salvador to provide a loan for the education and health sectors. Both of these events, together with the publication of the government’s Socioeconomic Development Plan 1990–94, prompted involved actors to gather data and to explore concrete options around how education reform would proceed. The World Bank’s report appeared irst—in May 1990—and echoed the content of the report by the Kast Foundation from two years earlier. That is, it suggested “opening channels for the participation of local levels of government, the private sector and NGOs in the delivery of education” (World Bank 1990, p. 4). The idea was that “the decentralization of school administration and resources to local levels of government” could occur through the creation of “non-proit private corporations,” also termed “associations of municipalities” (p. 4). Individual municipalities were thought to be too small and did not have the capacity in 1990 to successfully or eficiently administer educational services (World Bank 1990). According to the World Bank, the aforementioned corporations “would be private non-proit organizations that would operate under the technical supervision of the [MINED] and under the inancial supervision of the Treasury,” in addition to being audited by independent auditors (p. 39). The board of directors of these corporations would be composed of the mayors of the associated municipalities, as well as representatives of teachers and parents. In the second report from 1990, the Kast Foundation built on and further detailed its original recommendations from 1988. They again proposed the following actions: Administrative deconcentration to the regional level, empowerment of the municipal level to manage education services, the promotion of private schools, and a system through which educational subsidies would follow the child—in effect a voucher system (Kast Foundation 1990). Both the World Bank and Kast Foundation proposals mirrored the education reforms of the 1980s in Chile (Gauri 1998). The primary difference between the World Bank and Kast Foundation recommendations related to the question of whether to devolve certain responsibilities either to individual municipalities or to groups of them. The report by the Kast Foundation was produced during June and July of 1990. Up to that point, the MINED was on board with the idea of creating a more central role for municipal mayors in the governance of 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 180 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY education. Indeed, as of late July, internal documents from the World Bank reveal that the MINED’s priorities were “largely consistent with … Bank … recommendations.”5 Moreover, the World Bank was, at this point, planning to provide technical assistance “for reorganization of administrative functions within decentralized departments.”6 While the World Bank, which did not have a permanent mission in El Salvador, was intent on supporting its version of decentralization, the third report was being created. This report was produced at the end of September by a consultant from UNESCO—the same consultant who had implemented large-scale literacy campaigns with UNICEF for indigenous communities in Bolivia a few years prior. As a consultant for UNESCO, she was on a six-month contract in order to produce a report that characterized the education system based on data collected in all fourteen departments in El Salvador. Signiicantly, when the team led by this UNESCO consultant went to the countryside to collect data on the state of education services, it was the irst time that outsiders linked with the government had visited many of the rural areas of the country in over a decade. Two aspects of this report stand out in contrast with the reports of the Kast Foundation and the World Bank—irst, its ethos, and, second, its recommendations. With regard to the former, the fact is that, rather than lamenting the centralization of the MINED, the ineficiency of government bureaucracy, and the dificulty of iring teachers, this report emphasized the importance of the variety of specialists found within the MINED. It also called for collaboration among all actors and stakeholders in education, in addition to stating that the role of teachers and other education personnel should be recognized and optimized (UNESCO 1990). In terms of recommendations, the UNESCO consultant based her ideas on what she observed in the ield. Not surprisingly, what the team had observed was the community provision of education, both within and beyond areas formally controlled by the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). In part, what they witnessed were popular education schools; however, the phenomenon of community-provided education was not restricted exclusively to popular education in FLMN territories—it had also emerged in other areas that lacked government-provided services during the war. That said, the strongest forms of community provision and participation were indeed witnessed in those areas associated with the FMLN, as discussed in Chap. 6 (UNESCO 1990). In all cases, what the team witnessed were volunteer teachers who were compensated by the community either STAGE ONE: 1988–1991—COMPETING IDEAS OF DECENTRALIZATION 181 with a nominal donation or with the provision of food. A later report estimated that communities provided for their own education in 1,000 communities (World Bank 1991). On the basis of such observations, the UNESCO consultant recommended that the government should build on the community strategies which had developed during the war. She also recommended support at the community level for adult education, in order “to create community consciousness about the rights and basic educational needs of children” (UNESCO 1990, p. 98). For her, the empowerment of the community level was an important aspect of development, one which the government should support. Moreover, she was opposed to the Chilean model. She thought it had been unsuccessful in Chile and that it had no place in El Salvador, where there was an organic model of community management that could serve as an example of the way forward. She had always combated the privatization of education, and she saw her role in El Salvador as one of resistance to the model that the World Bank and others were putting forward. She strove to “transform the strategy … that came from the Bank”.7 In that the UNESCO consultant delivered her report at the end of September 1990, it came at an opportune time. The MINED was then in preliminary discussions with education specialists from the World Bank; both sides knew that the plan was to approve an education sector loan during mid-year 1991. Additional pressure to decide the direction that education reform would take was generated by the fact that a structural adjustment loan with the World Bank was in its inal stages of preparation and would be presented to the World Bank’s board of directors on February 12, 1991. The immediate relevance for the education system of the structural adjustment loan was that it (i.e., the structural adjustment loan) would require guarantees of increased funding from the government for this sector. Education was drastically underfunded, and if the government did not increase funding it would not be able in subsequent years to absorb and institutionalize new social sector reforms. Countervailing Forces and the Need to Make a Decision By October of 1990, a complex context had emerged in which a number of (somewhat) countervailing forces were in play. Although the end result would be a decision to pursue a pilot program based on the community participation model observed by the UNESCO consultant during her ield 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 182 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY visits, there are a number of factors which must be unpacked to understand this outcome. These include the desire of the government to subjugate FMLN-controlled areas, the anti-union sentiment among key actors, the persistent pressure to imitate the example of Chile, the confounding actions of teachers’ unions, the political astuteness of the Minister of Education, and the need to put in place a project which the World Bank would be amenable to inancing. I explain the intersection and interaction of these factors in what follows. To begin, one must recall that the relationship between the government and the FMLN was at this point in time—when the conlict was still ongoing—still very antagonistic, and would be for many years. This antagonism had repercussions in practice. As one education specialist who worked with USAID in the early 1990s commented: They, at times, would sabotage … anything that would get moving forward with [the FMLN]. … They would just not be in agreement that part of this money [i.e., international assistance] would go to them … And that … negative response toward the rebels was, you know, sort of like a rich man, poor man kind of thing. … If they behave and stay in their place, they’re okay, but, if they don’t, then … we need to get rid of them. And she, the minister, had that attitude – not to deal with them. … And when it came to the [popular education] schools, they wanted them to disappear.8 More than wishing to avoid working with the FMLN, the government did not want development partners such as USAID implementing programs for them either. Likewise, the government had very low tolerance for those who sympathized with the rebels and, in the course of reform, sought to undo the popular education system that operated in certain regions of the country.9 The second issue at the time pertained to anti-union sentiment. The World Bank as well as the government itself sought to break the teachers’ unions, which represented 30 percent of all public workers (World Bank 1990). In the words of the UNESCO consultant working in El Salvador at that time, “Yes, the government in that moment, and the MINED, as a subsystem, aimed to decouple and dismantle the teachers’ unions. The teaching syndicate was a great force and it applied great pressure, pressure that made Cristiani’s government very uncomfortable.”10 Thus, in addition to overcoming the FMLN, the government sought to undermine the unions, which were closely aligned with the FMLN. According to this same UNESCO consultant, who worked closely with the World Bank STAGE ONE: 1988–1991—COMPETING IDEAS OF DECENTRALIZATION 183 prior to and during EDUCO’s initial years, the requirements of the EDUCO model—or, rather, the model that would come to be known as EDUCO—“it with what they [i.e., the World Bank] wanted, because they were trying to break the hegemony that the teachers and their unions had [on education reform].” The third factor is that, in this context, the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the consultants from the Kast Foundation all strongly supported the Chilean model, as mentioned earlier. In the words of a senior MINED oficial from that time, “the great pressure of the World Bank, of all the organizations, was to decentralization the schools to the municipalities.”11 In addition, even the Minister of Education herself initially intended to follow this path, because, ideologically, it was compatible with her worldview and with the goals of the Cristiani administration.12 To be sure, not only would the Chilean model lead to decentralization at the level of the municipalities, it would also engender privatization of public education and serve as a blow to teachers because they would be contracted directly by private schools and therefore without the job security that accompanied employment with the MINED. However, by October of 1990, the Minister realized that it would not be possible to pursue this option. In large part, this was because of the fourth factor—that is, the reaction of the teachers’ unions. These unions objected strongly to the possibility of the Chilean model: “[They] were still strong … they paralyzed everything, and they were aggressive,” said a high-ranking MINED oficial from the time.13 Many of the mayors were intimidated. Beyond that, mayors lacked the capacity to govern education in their jurisdiction due to inexperience and a shortage of human resources.14 While experiencing this convergence of factors, the Minister of Education needed to look for a suitable alternative. To that end, one member of the UNESCO consultant’s team from 1990 recounted the following: “[The Minister] said, suggest to me something so that we can get these kids in the system quickly [and] give employment to the teachers, but through other mechanisms, not the current mechanisms.”15 The Minister did ind an alternative to the traditional system—one based in the community models that had been documented in the report by the UNESCO consultant at the end of September 1990. In a move that would change the course of Salvadoran education reform, Minister Gallardo recruited this consultant shortly after the UNESCO report was inalized in order to elaborate the design of a strategy to provide education at the preschool and lower primary level (grades 1–3). 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 184 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY Between October and December the consultant worked with the Minister, showing her that a model based on community control could work. On this point, a member of the ofice within the MINED that coordinated international assistance during 1990 commented the following: “Once the Minister sought to create something different, … [the UNESCO consultant] was the irst person to start the design, the person charged with … bringing EDUCO into the world.”16 Notably, however, the World Bank was not initially on board with this model. The Bank had for at least six months been under the impression that the MINED would pursue the Chilean model. UNESCO’s consultant was able to overcome their initial apprehension by relying on her previous experiences and the credibility she had amassed as a result. As she says: I was coming from working with many communities in Bolivia for years, with the poor, with women, with community participation. And, well, we showed that it was something that wasn’t going to scare anyone, that they could have a high impact with this, and that evidently it was going to increase coverage in a proper and eficient way.17 Beyond the initial idea, however, moving forward required evidence that the program could work under the mantle of the MINED. Thus, with minimal funding from UNICEF through its Expansion of Educational Services project, the MINED began in December 1990 a three-month pilot program in six communities (MINED 1994a). The key for the MINED was to show that they could create and operationalize the systems and legal protocols necessary for communities to form parent councils known as ACEs (Community Education Associations) and to be responsible for the hiring, management, and payment of teachers—with the funds for payment being transferred from the MINED to the bank accounts of the ACEs (MINED 1995a). A separate task for the UNESCO consultant and the Minister of Education was to overcome the initial hesitation of the government. As this consultant recounted: “The Cristiani government was afraid that the program was too leftist for them, but, quickly, once they began to see the results of the pilot experience, the government began to engage with it.”18 The point here is that the government’s aversion to the program—the design for which had been based, in part, on the experience of the popular education schools afiliated with FMLN communities—started to dissolve once it realized that this program allowed the government to accomplish its goal of implementing an STAGE ONE: 1988–1991—COMPETING IDEAS OF DECENTRALIZATION 185 alternative, decentralized form of management that could weaken the teachers’ unions and co-opt through incorporation those areas controlled by the FMLN. For many of the same reasons, the aversion of the World Bank was further diminished over the course of the pilot program. Despite the roots of the program being based in the experience of the rebels, the World Bank, too, started to see such a model as a real possibility once representatives of this institution had the opportunity to observe it in action. Indeed, there were two supervisory missions between November 1990 and February 1991, the purpose of which was to investigate if the pilot operated in practice as UNESCO’s consultant had suggested it would.19 This consultant characterized her interaction with Bank staff during these supervisory missions in the following way: I defended the program a lot on all the missions, always with irmness, with technical proiciency. I have training in education and … political science, very solid training that allowed me to imagine all possible scenarios and to put my back into the questions, the questioning, in such a way that the World Bank would have more conidence [in the program].20 There were two results of these missions and the defense offered by UNESCO’s consultant. First, the World Bank observed, irsthand, that a new and extreme form of decentralization was possible in practice. Second, the World Bank saw an opportunity: This model of decentralization shifted accountability dynamics away from the central ministry and toward the community, while at the same time offering the possibility of instituting cost recovery mechanisms—meaning that parents would contribute either in cash or in kind to inance the school. Cost recovery schemes were, in addition to decentralization, one of the themes with which the World Bank was primarily preoccupied during these years (Psacharopoulos et al. 1986). Most crucially though, the World Bank realized that this would be bankable if it worked. Recalling the international attention that the ideas of decentralization, participation, and community engagement were receiving (see Chap. 5), the staff of the World Bank knew that this model would boost their own careers. In the scheme of things, then, important shifts in the intentions of key actors had occurred by the end of February 1991. To be sure, this month constituted a crucial moment in the trajectory of education reform in El Salvador. Although the consultant from UNESCO was able to redirect the 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 186 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY attention of both the World Bank and the Minister of Education, the structural constraints of the moment ensured that no program would be successful which departed from the country’s neoliberal trajectory under Cristiani. Put differently, the Minister of Education and the World Bank considered the pilot program to be a legitimate model which could be replicated and scaled up not because it empowered the community and not because it engendered increased participation, but rather because it fulilled the exigencies of the moment. Indeed, going forward, although the government and the Bank would emphasize the participation aspect and the ability of the program to increase coverage in areas where government-provided educational services were lacking, the fundamental issue at this point in time was that the pilot program represented an avenue through which the Cristiani administration, with the support of the World Bank, could attempt to shock what it perceived as the overly bureaucratic and lethargic nature of the central MINED, create quasiprivatization arrangements at the community level, weaken teachers’ unions (since teachers were not eligible to join the unions if they worked for the program, as discussed in Chap. 2), and bring the popular education schools under the supervision of the government. In addition, it was thought (erroneously, as also explained in Chap. 2) that the program offered a comparatively less-expensive way to increase access to preschool and primary education, given that funding was not initially provided for the creation of school structures in participating communities, but rather was used for teacher salaries. For political reasons, these issues overwhelmed ideas of community empowerment and the conscientization of adults about children’s right to education, though the rhetoric around what would become the EDUCO program would certainly still draw on such ideas. Concretely, then, by February 1991 the Minister of Education had decided that she would bet on community management of education. Given the larger context and the forces in play, she knew that community management represented the best option for success. Scaling up such a program provided her with an opportunity to make a name for herself. She could set the MINED down a new path, one which represented innovation and which resonated with the worldviews and prerogatives of key governmental staff and World Bank representatives. If this program succeeded, her proile would be raised within the ARENA party, and she would be eligible for more prominent governmental positions. Many interviewees attested that she sought a successful and high-proile career for herself. In terms of the overall process, however, the point here is that STAGE TWO: 1991–1993—EDUCO TAKES ROOT 187 both the Minister of Education and key representatives of the World Bank were on board with pursuing community management of education. As will be shown, after this point, and thanks to the overwhelming support of the World Bank, community management of education would be set on a completely different trajectory. Stage twO: 1991–1993—edUCO takeS rOOt A great bit of activity occurred around the program for community management of schools from March 1991 to June 1993. This activity can be divided into four groups, with each group of activity occurring more or less in chronological order. To be speciic, I will detail, irst, the negotiation of the irst World Bank education loan; second, the rapid implementation and expansion of the program for community management; third, the negotiations between the government and the popular education teachers; and, fourth, how the program increasingly drew attention. The World Bank Social Sector Rehabilitation Project During the beginning of March 1991 representatives of the World Bank were in El Salvador to appraise the MINED’s proposal for the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project. This is the loan for which the World Bank had been preparing for nearly a year. In appraising and discussing the community management strategy, the Bank suggested that the approach be called EDUCO, or Education with Community Participation. By this time, the World Bank was excited, if somewhat tentative, regarding this new, previously untested approach. As one member of the World Bank team working in El Salvador recalled, “We thought EDUCO was the ultimate way of decentralization.”21 The Minister of Education was equally enthused, and having committed to pursuing education reform through community management, she sought large quantities of funding to put this strategy into action. The World Bank, though, had its doubts about the MINED’s capacity at that time. As a result, the Bank insisted on a lower funding amount, in order to ensure that the program would be manageable. To that end, a key World Bank team member stated: The Minister wanted a lot of money … there were so many demands. They wanted a lot of money to solve all the problems that they had. … And she was not pleased with the things that I was cutting because … the capability 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 188 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY was very low. And I tried to convey to her this message: Much better for us to do something that is focused, that has impact, than to do all kind of things. I told her, I said, “listen, Cecelia, if we … really implement a very tight and well-done project, later we are going to get money from every place.” And this happened.22 457 458 459 460 461 479 In the end, rather than issuing a loan for $46 million, as the Minister had requested, the World Bank included $10.3 million for education in the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project. Table 7.3 summarizes the funding issued by the World Bank during 1991–2001 for the reform of the education system. To put these loan amounts in perspective, the total budget for education in 1992 was approximately $109 million (MINED 1994b). Moreover, 96 percent of this amount was dedicated to teacher salaries (MINED 1999), meaning that the MINED could not use its own funds for experimentation or expansion. Over the course of negotiations for the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, which culminated in May 1991, many other recommendations and requirements would emerge. Indeed, archival research for this study revealed that a series of agreements, assurances, and conditions were attached to this loan; they have been summarized in Table 7.4. We see that, in addition to obtaining agreements around formative evaluations and cost recovery, as well as assurances around staff selection and the implementation of a communication campaign to advertise and promote EDUCO t3.1 Table 7.3 t3.2 t3.3 Project title Total WB project fundinga WB funding for EDUCOb t3.4 t3.5 Social Sector Rehabilitation Project (1991–1996) Basic Education Modernization Project (1995–2001) $26 million $34 millionc $10.3 million $17.5 milliond 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 Summary of World Bank education loans to El Salvador, 1991–2001 t3.6 Source: Developed from World Bank (1991, 1995b, 2002) t3.7 t3.8 t3.9 t3.10 t3.11 t3.12 t3.13 t3.14 t3.15 a Figures in this column represent funding negotiated from World Bank. Total amounts for each loan surpassed these igures; contributions of other organizations and counterpart funding from the government not are included here b Note that these igures are conservative, as the EDUCO program beneited from other project components and the funding designated to them c An additional $37.3 million was contributed by the Inter-American Development Bank under the Basic Education Modernization Project d Represents actual funding; initial funding expected to be allocated to EDUCO under the Basic Education Modernization Project was $12.5 million STAGE TWO: 1991–1993—EDUCO TAKES ROOT AU5 189 Table 7.4 Agreements, assurances, and conditions related to the World Bank Social Sector Rehabilitation Project (1991–1996) t4.1 Agreements 1. Evaluations: The MOE would (i) submit terms of reference for the formative evaluations of the community-operated school programs, no later than six months after project effectiveness; (ii) submit, no later than March 31 of each year during project implementation, the results of the respective formative evaluations; and (iii) prepare action plans including a timetable for implementation and implement such action plan 2. Cost recovery: The criteria for selection of communities to beneit from the preprimary and primary education programs under the proposed project would include counterpart contributions (in cash, kind, or labor) equivalent to at least 10 percent of the resources provided by the MINED Assurances 1. Communication campaign: The government would present to the bank for review an action plan for purposes of promoting and disseminating information about the community-operated school program and timetable for implementation by December 31, 1991 2. Staff selection: At negotiations, assurances were obtained that project coordination unit staff, with qualiications, experience, functions, and terms of employment satisfactory to the bank, would be maintained Conditions 1. National education funding: Prior to effectiveness, the government will consult with the bank regarding the 1992 budget before its presentation to the National Assembly, to assure the bank that additional resources for preprimary and primary education will be available 2. Legal framework: The President and the Ministry of Education would approve norms and procedures (“reglamento”) to regulate implementation of community-operated schools including eligibility criteria for CCG, satisfactory to the Bank, and would furnish to the bank evidence of contracts (convenios) with 27 community groups 3. Legality: The government would present legal opinion assuring there are no legal impediments for community groups to hire teachers and administer schools 4. Auditors: The government would prepare, satisfactory to the bank, terms of reference to be used by the auditors for the auditing of community-operated schools 5. Community access: Loan proceeds would not be disbursed in municipalities which would be inaccessible for purposes of project implementation and supervision according to bank assessment 6. Loan disbursement: Loan proceeds would not be disbursed for any project activity carried out by a community group unless such community group has signed a contract (convenio) with the MOE t4.3 t4.4 t4.5 t4.6 t4.7 t4.8 t4.9 t4.10 t4.11 t4.12 t4.13 t4.14 t4.15 t4.16 t4.17 t4.18 t4.19 t4.20 t4.21 t4.22 t4.23 t4.24 t4.25 t4.26 t4.27 t4.28 t4.29 t4.30 t4.31 t4.32 t4.33 t4.34 t4.35 t4.36 t4.37 t4.38 t4.39 Source: Information drawn from World Bank (1991) and World Bank Group Archives (Memorandum, Kye Woo Lee to Mirna Lievano de Marques, March 15, 1991; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, World Bank Group Archives; Memorandum, Michelle Riboud to Shahid Hussain, May 2, 1991; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, World Bank Group Archives) t4.40 t4.41 t4.42 t4.43 t4.44 t4.2 190 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY 508 within the country, the World Bank also made the effectiveness of the loan conditional on the following: (a) World Bank approval of the national budget for education for 1992 (not to mention assurances regarding increased funding in subsequent years) and (b) the creation of a clear legal basis for teachers to be managed by ACEs. The World Bank also required that participating communities must be accessible by Bank staff on its supervision visits—visits which occurred between one and three times annually during the life of the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project. In all, there would be nine supervision visits between July 1991 and February 1996, the majority lasting from four to ten days (World Bank 1997a). The government took action in response to these conditions. First, according to internal Bank documents from mid-1990, the government provided the Bank assurances that it would increase public spending in education from 1.6 percent of gross domestic product in 1991 to 2.7 percent in 1994.23 Between 1991 and 1996, the government more than doubled the MINED’s budget, though in real terms spending held constant (World Bank 1997a). Separately, the President, Alfredo Cristiani, issued a decree which ensured that the EDUCO program operated on the basis of unambiguous legal terrain. This presidential decree was issued on June 17, 1991, just two days before the World Bank’s board of directors approved the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project (MINED 1994b). The above-mentioned agreements, assurances, and conditions pertain, primarily, to foundational elements of the EDUCO program, such as counterpart funding and legal framework. What these stipulations did not encompass were the speciic actions to which funding from the World Bank was to be dedicated. Nevertheless, given that 96 percent of the MINED’s budget was consumed by teacher salaries, the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project provided the government with the resources necessary to fund reform actions—actions which I discuss in the following section. 509 EDUCO’s Rapid Implementation and Expansion 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 510 511 512 513 514 515 As part of Social Sector Rehabilitation Project negotiations, the UNESCO consultant who inspired the community management pilot became the coordinator of the EDUCO Project Ofice within the MINED. Over time, this ofice, which was located directly under the Minister of Education, would serve as the mechanism through which MINED leadership would leverage reform—that is, “modernization”— of the entire STAGE TWO: 1991–1993—EDUCO TAKES ROOT 191 education system. Such leverage would be possible because of the success of this ofice in widely implementing a program that was seen as highly innovative. To that end, three elements were key to this program’s success in practice, in addition to the Minister’s political commitment and the World Bank’s funding. These elements were (a) the scale of EDUCO’s implementation, (b) technical assistance from the World Bank, and (c) the EDUCO communication campaign. With regard to the irst element, the staff of EDUCO’s ofice worked assiduously during 1991–1993 to implement the program. Initially, the program was targeted to about 80 communities, though it was quickly scaled up to 236, primarily in three departments. These departments were, not surprisingly, in the heart of FMLN territory (World Bank 1991).24 As Table 7.5 indicates, during 1991–1993 the EDUCO program more than quadrupled in terms of the number of participating ACEs, teachers, and students. Table 7.5 also shows that, by 1993, enrollment in EDUCO represented the equivalent of 10.2 percent of the student population in traditional public schools between preschool and grade four. As can be seen, these upward trends would continue, and by 1995 EDUCO would serve the equivalent of 26.7 percent of students in those levels (preschool–grade four) in public schools.25 In terms of timing, Table 7.5 also indicates that EDUCO had not only been created but was rapidly expanding before the Peace Accords were signed in January 1992. Put differently: Before much of the country had even experienced peace, let alone the opportunity to engage in education reform, the World Bank and the MINED had Table 7.5 Growth in EDUCO program, 1991–1995 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 t5.1 Year ACEs Teachers Students EDUCO enrollment as % of traditional public enrollment for preschool through grade 4 t5.2 t5.3 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 236 845 871 1,334 1,341 263 1,009 1,311 2,316 2,918 8,416 32,288 41,952 74,112 113,664 4.2%a 8.5% 10.2% 17.6% 26.7% t5.4 t5.5 t5.6 t5.7 t5.8 Source: MINED (1992, 1995a, d) t5.9 This igure represents the enrollment in EDUCO as a percentage of preschool through grade 6 enrollment in traditional public schools; data are not available by grade level for the public sector for 1991 t5.10 t5.11 a 192 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY already negotiated and begun to implement a new form of education governance. This new form of governance was the central prong of reform for the education system, and was, as will be shown, non-negotiable in the postwar period. In practical terms, the expansion of the EDUCO program was an intense task, given that its coordinating ofice during stage two only contained three staff, the coordinator and two other functionaries. They dedicated themselves to the operationalization of the program, which required the development, testing, and revision of a number of administrative processes, such as the creation of thousands of bank accounts and the approval of bank transfers from the MINED to ACEs. In addition, as can be seen in Table 7.6 the augmentation of the EDUCO program entailed not just the formation of ACEs at the community level, but also a range of other tasks, such as training for EDUCO supervisors and ACE members, not to mention an ongoing communications campaign. By 1993, the program reached all fourteen departments, and the MINED started the process of deconcentrating to its three regional ofices those tasks related to technical assistance for EDUCO communities. Respectively, the years 1991–1993 represent periods of experimentation, implementation, and expansion. An indication of Bank satisfaction with MINED’s efforts during this time is the fact that, on the basis of program accomplishments, the former (World Bank) referred, in internal communications, to the achievements of the latter (MINED) as “magniicent work.”26 While the staff of the EDUCO ofice performed the tasks listed in Table 7.6, it should be noted that the World Bank also contributed technical assistance, particularly during its supervision visits. According to staff from the EDUCO ofice during its early years, representatives of the World Bank came and wanted to see results. One staff person mentioned that “the World Bank doesn’t play”— that beyond review of statistics and reports, they also wanted to visit some of the communities where EDUCO was being implemented, to see if it was working as reports suggested.27 Apart from observation, however, World Bank staff were interested in eliminating any obstacles to the program’s success. For example, they were interested to resolve issues around the delayed payment of teachers, since this caused frustration. Moreover, and interestingly, upon noticing that teachers would transfer from EDUCO to traditional schools as soon as they had the opportunity, the World Bank also stipulated that EDUCO teachers should receive additional inancial incentives28 so that they would remain in the program.29 More generally, however, with regard to STAGE TWO: 1991–1993—EDUCO TAKES ROOT Table 7.6 193 Summary of EDUCO program actions by year, 1991–1995 t6.1 Year Characterization Actions t6.2 1991 Experimentation 1992 Implementation 1993 Expansion 1994 Appropriation 1995 Institutionalization Pilot project with six schools Creation and revision of bureaucratic processes Establishment of legal basis for ACEs Negotiation of loan with World Bank Implementation of program in three departments Training for EDUCO supervisors and for ACEs Deinition of roles for MINED staff Execution of communication campaign to sensitize communities, stimulate interest, and assuage fears of teachers’ unions Preparation of technicians to promote EDUCO Identiication of communities for program Creation of new EDUCO sections Training for EDUCO supervisors and ACEs Improvement of bureaucratic processes Reception of World Bank supervision visit Execution of communication campaign EDUCO begins to receive international study delegations Expansion of EDUCO in all 14 country departments Deconcentration of technical assistance to three administrative regions of the country Regional ofices assume responsibility for program expansion Increase in EDUCO program budget to expand its central coordination unit personnel EDUCO identiied by Minister as central mechanism through which to increase enrollment and modernize the entire MINED going forward Creation of libraries in EDUCO schools Reception of World Bank supervision visit Execution of communication campaign Salvadorans assume leadership of EDUCO ofice Delegation of inancial management to regional ofices Rapid incorporation of communities into EDUCO EDUCO program begins expansion through grade 6 Training for EDUCO supervisors and ACEs Execution of communication campaign Reception of World Bank supervision visit Integration of EDUCO ofice responsibilities into structure of MINED Negotiation of new loan with World Bank Rapid incorporation of communities into EDUCO Training for EDUCO supervisors and ACEs Execution of communication campaign t6.3 t6.4 t6.5 t6.6 t6.7 t6.8 t6.9 t6.10 t6.11 t6.12 t6.13 t6.14 t6.15 t6.16 t6.17 t6.18 t6.19 t6.20 t6.21 t6.22 t6.23 t6.24 t6.25 t6.26 t6.27 t6.28 t6.29 t6.30 t6.31 t6.32 t6.33 t6.34 t6.35 t6.36 t6.37 t6.38 t6.39 t6.40 t6.41 t6.42 t6.43 t6.44 t6.45 Source: Derived from interviews and from MINED (1994a) t6.46 194 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY World Bank technical assistance, a long-time education specialist with the MINED who worked with the EDUCO program early on declared the following: In the 1990s, this country advanced in education like few countries in the world have. … It’s because the World Bank guaranteed that the country was going to meet its commitments, and because they monitored us very closely. … We were here with constant visits from World Bank people … from the [Team Leader] and her army – at times there were up to twelve consultants and they came to see the inances, the accounting, the audits, the curriculum, the training, the evaluation system, the technology, etc.30 Representatives of the World Bank were, thus, clearly invested in the success of the EDUCO program. Similarly, the World Bank sought to develop interest on the part of education stakeholders in El Salvador—both at the community level and within the teachers’ unions. They did this by including inancing in the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project for a communications campaign. While exact igures for this campaign are not available, documents show that, in the second World Bank education loan (discussed in more detail in a below section), $1.3 million was included for the communication strategy (Basaninyenzi 2011). As the World Bank team leader for El Salvador would later recount, “At the beginning of the project, a big effort was made to persuade people of the beneits of the EDUCO education reform program and minimize the propaganda of the opposition groups,” particularly “teachers unions and members of the guerrilla movement” (Basaninyenzi 2011, pp. 2, 4). The communication strategy itself contained three prongs. First, staff of the MINED engaged in awareness raising campaigns (campaña de socialización) at the local level in which they held workshops and went to communities to explain what EDUCO was and to begin to create ACEs.31 Second, the MINED disseminated information through multiple mediums. They created radio programs, hosted televised discussions, made informational videos, and, in particular, utilized the newspapers, where interviews with the Minister of Education would be published.32 Newspapers were an especially valuable outlet for information on EDUCO because the MINED was able to publish weekly reports in the Sunday edition, which had a “short journal annex with information on the progress of projects and the results of enrollment by region” (Basaninyenzi 2011, p. 3). STAGE TWO: 1991–1993—EDUCO TAKES ROOT 195 The third and inal prong of the communication campaign involved direct interaction between World Bank staff and the opposition groups. The task team leader from the World Bank engaged in conversations with teachers unions and the FMLN members (Basaninyenzi 2011). As this task team leader has said: “I held very open and frank discussions about the development and plans of the Ministry,” and, though “the negotiations with these opposition groups took a long time, … they inally succeeded in persuading these groups that most parties shared the same goal – providing education to the poorest communities” (Basaninyenzi 2011, p. 2). However, it is also important to note that resistance by teacher’s unions likely decreased as well because they saw that EDUCO would not affect current members, that is, because only those teachers in the EDUCO program would be subject to one-year contracts, ex explained in Chap. 2. In the end, due to such public relations victories, the World Bank perceived that the communication campaign was a success. In their words: “The communication interventions made an impact on stakeholder relations, including those originally opposed to EDUCO” (Basaninyenzi 2011, p. 3). It should be noted, however, that not everyone was persuaded to join EDUCO; a few communities in FMLN strongholds opted to remain independent, thus seeking other sources of funding for their schools in order to preserve their autonomy (ADES 2005; Edwards and Ávalos 2015). Government Negotiations with Popular Education Teachers33 In relation to the above point, it should be mentioned that the MINED, without the World Bank, engaged in negotiations with the popular education teachers as the EDUCO program was being scaled up. At the end of 1991, in anticipation of negotiations in the postwar period, popular education teachers in departments such as Morazán and Chalatenango, among other areas, began to collect information about the extent of the popular education movement.34 During negotiations, which began sporadically in 1992, the popular educators communicated with the MINED through a few grassroots organizations,35 as well as through the national public school teacher’s union (the National Association of Salvadoran Educators), which supported the cause of the popular teachers (Hammond 1997). Through negotiations, popular educators wanted both to keep their autonomy and to be recognized by the MINED (Hammond 1997). 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 196 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY That is, the coalition of approximately 1,000 popular educators, which served approximately 13,500 students, did not wish to abandon the parallel system that they had developed in the preceding years (Alvear 2002). At the same time, however, they wanted their status as teachers and the educational attainment of their students to be accepted by the MINED. They also desired governmental funding. The response of the MINED was to offer funding only if the communities accepted the EDUCO program. The MINED also required that the popular education teachers attain their teaching certiicates (a process which would take years) in order to be eligible for a position either with EDUCO or within a traditional school. In practice, this meant that that if communities accepted government funding, they would be abandoning the approach of popular education, since it precluded them from hiring their community teachers. According to Hammond (1997), during 1992–1993, the MINED stalled when it came to offering, or even approving, equivalency courses so that popular educators could work toward their teaching certiicates (Hammond 1997). While Hammond’s (1997) research was in Chalatenango, other research done in neighboring Cabañas (ADES 2005) found that the MINED did in fact recognize the high school equivalency classes taken by the popular education teachers. Even in the latter case, however, it should be noted that the process of attaining the minimum teaching credentials required about ten years for the popular teachers (ADES 2005). Due to low initial levels of education, many of these teachers had to complete a high school equivalency and then attend university classes on the weekends while working fulltime (as teachers who were unrecognized by the MINED and who were compensated minimally through donations from community members and NGOs). It is only because of the scholarships and funding provided by local and international NGOs and USAID, as well as by universities from Spain, that these teachers were able to complete this process, as the MINED was not forthcoming with resources for this effort. Similarly, it is only because of contributions made by NGOs and the Catholic Church that a few communities were able to resist the EDUCO model long enough such that they could wait to hire their own popular education teachers, once this latter group attained the required credentials (ADES 2005; Edwards and Ávalos 2015). Indeed, most communities where the popular education approach had been implemented joined EDUCO before they could hire their own teachers due to dire inancial circumstances; they needed the STAGE TWO: 1991–1993—EDUCO TAKES ROOT 197 MINED’s resources in order to continue to fund their schools. On this point, it should be noted that, in the postwar context, communities in conlict-affected contexts were no longer eligible to receive funding from international organizations that target resources to such contexts. These organizations had been a key source of support during the civil war (Rosa and Foley 2000). Increasing Attention to EDUCO: International Delegations and Dissemination On an international scale, and unlike with the popular education communities, the EDUCO program experienced increasingly positive attention once word got out about it. Indeed, during stage two, as news of the EDUCO program and its success in implementation circulated within and beyond the Central American region, the MINED not only began to receive international delegations but it was also asked to send representatives to other countries to speak about the program. With regard to the former (i.e., international delegations), the irst occurred in September 1992. The Minister of Education of Guatemala, who was also in the process of negotiating a loan with the World Bank (and following the conclusion of a civil war there, no less), contacted the Salvadoran MINED to arrange a study tour.36 This would be the irst of many international study tours to examine the EDUCO experience. To be sure, the data collected reveal that other governmental study groups followed with representatives from Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius Islands, Mexico, Morocco, Nicragua, Panama, Paraguay, Senegal, and Thailand (Meza et al. 2004). Furthermore, interviews revealed that the World Bank played a key role in inancing these study trips, which was not an unusual practice at the time. An education specialist from the World Bank explained this with reference to El Salvador: They had an open door for delegations to come and learn about the EDUCO program. The bank was actually instrumental when we were able to inance or support countries from other continents to come and do study programs for different programs – Colombia to look at Escuela Nueva, El Salvador to look at EDUCO, Brazil to look at Bolsa Escola. So, for a long period, the Bank facilitated those exchanges. Of course, for delegations to 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 198 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY come into a country, the local authorities, the local MINED had to have an open-door policy, which was the case of El Salvador. Again the difference of El Salvador, and I want to stress that, is that they presented their model without packaging it, but just allowing those delegations that would come from Thailand, Bangladesh, African countries to be able to absorb the principles, some of the lessons learned, to be able to develop their own school based management with community participation programs. But, yes, I think for a while El Salvador became a common place for foreign delegations to come to learn about community participation in management of schools.37 A combination of factors thus raised EDUCO’s proile internationally— these being the MINED’s openness combined, irst, with World Bank inancing and, second, with an example of reform that was taking root on the ground in El Salvador. By the late 1990s, the MINED reported that it had received more than twenty such delegations (MINED 1999). The MINED’s own role in promoting EDUCO went beyond accepting delegations, though. Indeed, MINED representatives themselves went to numerous other countries. Interviewees mentioned that, over time, they were sent by the World Bank to such countries as Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Spain, and the United States. One key functionary, who worked with the EDUCO program early on, and for many years, mentioned that she would eventually “know all of Latin America … and a great part of the world because of EDUCO”— about 25–30 countries in all.38 According to her, “people wanted to know how it was possible that illiterate rural people could manage, could hire, could ire teachers, how it was that the poor could be interested in school. That is was people had a hard time understanding.”39 More recently, in 2011, this same interviewee was brought by the World Bank to Afghanistan to discuss and promote the EDUCO model. For the World Bank, such Salvadoran education specialists have played a key role in EDUCO’s promotion. In the words of the above-mentioned interviewee, “I helped a lot with the community theme. When people [i.e., governments] were scared to give money to the parents, I helped to make the school boards and transfer the funds to the schools … in many places.”40 This Salvadoran education specialist served as reinforcement when oficials in other countries were reluctant. To continue, informational trips disseminated the EDUCO model while also reinforcing the EDUCO model at home. From the perspective of MINED representatives, these trips were not only inherently desirable STAGE THREE: 1993–1995—EDUCO’S INSTITUTIONALIZATION… 199 for the ability to travel to other countries, but they also served as status symbols and created jealousy. This was because, in the words of the UNESCO consultant who coordinated the EDUCO program, staff within the MINED saw the World Bank as the “paradise” to which they wanted to arrive—a paradise that might be attainable by working with the EDUCO program.41 While very few MINED staff would be able to work for the World Bank as a result of the EDUCO, what the years after 1993 evinced was an even more central role for this program within the broader reform of the Salvadoran education system. Stage three: 1993–1995—edUCO’S inStitUtiOnalizatiOn and fOrmalizatiOn On the basis of the actions and accomplishments of stage two, both the MINED and the World Bank dedicated themselves to continuing with the expansion and institutionalization of EDUCO in stage three. This would be the period during which EDUCO would shift from being the preferred education governance mechanism of the MINED in practice to being the oficial mechanism of the MINED as relected in policy. The MINED strategy document that would oficially incorporate community level decentralization was the Ten Year Plan, which would be inalized in November 1995. Stage three thus extends from mid-year 1993 through the end of 1995. As will be shown, two separate processes manifested in stage three—one through which the World Bank and the MINED engaged in order to reinforce EDUCO and to institutionalize it as the foundation of the education system, and another, more public process through which USAID and other organizations would engage, also along with the MINED, in order to discuss areas of education reform unrelated to the governance of the system. At the last moment—and in ways that will be detailed—these two processes dovetailed. In order to explain stage three, I unpack a range of issues across four subsections. In the irst section, I address the larger context of public sector modernization. In the second, I briely detail ive separate developments from 1994. In the third, I discuss the second education loan from the World Bank. And in the fourth section, I review and problematize the relationship between EDUCO and the more formal and public process of policymaking which occurred during 1993–1995. 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 200 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY Public Sector Modernization and EDUCO In 1993, while EDUCO was sailing along and gaining attention, preparations were being made for another structural adjustment loan from the World Bank, this one for $75 million. Just like the irst one of these (which spanned February 1991–June 1993), the second one would also focus on neoliberal economic reform; the difference is that the second one would seek “a comprehensive public sector modernization effort” (World Bank 1996, p. i). According to World Bank documents, public sector modernization had been a policy priority for President Cristiani since his election in 1989, though he was not able to give priority to this issue until 1993, presumably due to the demands of the Peace Accords and the numerous actions that were being implemented in accordance with the irst structural adjustment loan (World Bank 1996). In practice, this second structural adjustment loan, together with the technical assistance that accompanied it, focused on the privatization, decentralization, debureaucratization, and restructuring of governmental ministries. It also meant the elimination of the Ministry of Planning (World Bank 1993). The other element of note to emerge from the technical assistance which accompanied the structural adjustment loan was the Public Sector Modernization Action Plan. Not only was this Action Plan created by World Bank technical assistance but, just as had happened with FUSADES and President Cristiani’s plan for economic and social reform, the Action Plan provided a “foundation for the incoming Government [of President Armando Calderón Sol] to develop and implement a Public Sector Modernization Program” (World Bank 1997b, p. 15). Thus, in late 1993 and early 1994, in the lead up to the election of Armando Calderón Sol (who took ofice in June 1994), the focus on government-wide modernization had implications for the education sector. This was particularly so because the Ministry of Planning (before its elimination) declared that “one of the strategic priorities in the modernization of the public sector should be to technicize, debureaucratize, and decentralize systems of inancial management, public investment, and governmental control” (MINED 1994a, p. 27). In the education sector, EDUCO it the bill—and, as such, efforts around its ampliication and institutionalization would only strengthen, both on the part of the MINED and the World Bank. The largest action to that end would come about in early 1995, when the MINED would negotiate its next education loan with the World Bank. However, in the interim, that is, during 1994, STAGE THREE: 1993–1995—EDUCO’S INSTITUTIONALIZATION... 201 there were a number of relevant developments that must be detailed. I discuss these briely in the next sub-section. Developments Around EDUCO During 1994 AU6 Five developments stand out during 1994. The irst was the decision by the Minister of Education that the expansion of education in rural areas would only be permitted through EDUCO. Not surprisingly, this decision occurred in the context of heightened attention to government-wide modernization, explained above. The point, to reiterate, is that, with regard to the education system, EDUCO aligned with the push by the government and the World Bank to “modernize” the public sectors. The second development was the departure of the UNESCO consultant as the coordinator of the EDUCO program. Her exit occurred not only because there was increasing jealousy around the program’s management, but also because it was undesirable for reasons of legitimacy and credibility to have an international consultant managing the MINED’s key program. For these reasons, the Minister of Education decided to place EDUCO under the leadership of one of the Salvadorans who had experience with the program. Third, the capacity of the EDUCO program ofice was expanded through the doubling of its’ staff from three to seven. Additional capacity was necessary to accommodate the growing size of the program. By 1994, there were 1,334 ACEs, 2,316 teachers, and 74,112 students in the program—and it would only continue to expand. In that respect, 1994 was the irst year that EDUCO schools began to educate students in grade four (as discussed further in Chap. 2). Fourth, the World Bank made clear its intentions of using the EDUCO program as a model for the nation. It did this in a mid-1994 study in which it stated that—pending the outcome of a irst quantitative evaluation—it would prepare “a strategy for expanding the program as the preferred delivery system for pre-primary and primary education in all rural areas in the next ive years” (World Bank 1994b, p. 43). That same study mentioned that EDUCO could possibly be adapted to urban areas, which it eventually was (World Bank 2009). Fifth, just before the end of the year, the World Bank produced a cursory evaluation. This evaluation was mentioned in the irst public World Bank report to overview the EDUCO program (World Bank 1994a). According to this report, the cursory evaluation of the EDUCO program 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 202 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY 884 showed better irst- and second-grade mathematics test scores for students from EDUCO schools, when no controls were used (World Bank 1994a). Though the positive effects of EDUCO disappeared when background controls were applied, the indings still garnered signiicant attention, especially within the World Bank and the MINED.42 With this report in hand, preparation for the next education loan proceeded in earnest. 885 The World Bank Basic Education Modernization Project 879 880 881 882 883 909 While the government had doubled the budget of the MINED between 1991 and 1994, it sought additional funds and technical assistance from the World Bank in order to continue to expand the EDUCO program (MINED 1994b). To that end, a second World Bank education loan was put together in early 1995. The project that it inanced was known as the Basic Education Modernization Project, and it would eventually provide an additional $17.5 million to support EDUCO (World Bank 2002). Among other things, the resources from this loan would be directed at scaling up the program through grade six and creating 3,000 new ACEs (World Bank 1995b). As with the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, the World Bank obtained agreements and assurances in relation to the Basic Education Modernization Project, as well as attaching conditions. Notably, however, the agreements, assurances, and conditions established for Basic Education Modernization Project did not relate to the EDUCO program. Whereas the irst education loan—the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project—focused on EDUCO, the second one was preoccupied with other reforms within the MINED, such as the consolidation of multiple departments in order to streamline administrative processes. The EDUCO program was already entrenched and doing well. As such, the role of the Basic Education Modernization Project with regard to EDUCO was to ensure that suficient funding and technical assistance were provided for its continued augmentation countrywide and its integration to the other administrative departments within the MINED. 910 A Separate, Public Process of Education Policy Formation 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 911 912 913 It should stand out by this point that the indings presented in this chapter, while they have detailed the emergence, expansion, and institutionalization of EDUCO, they have not discussed any formal policymaking processes. STAGE THREE: 1993–1995—EDUCO’S INSTITUTIONALIZATION... 203 To that end, through the research conducted for this study, though I found that there was a more public and formal policymaking process which took place during 1993–1995, it had more of a symbolic function— and, as such, had very little bearing on EDUCO’s trajectory. That said, it should be noted that the education strategy document produced during 1993–1995 did oficially make the governance strategy which EDUCO represented a key priority. I will explain this below, in addition to summarizing and commenting on this policy formation process. Overall, interviews and documents reveal that, between late 1993 and late 1995, there were four events and subprocesses that led to the inalization of the Ten Year Plan (Guzmán 2005; MINED 1999; Reimers and McGinn 1997). As the name indicates, this policy document was intended to guide education reform for the ensuing decade (1995–2005). This policy was the culmination of the oficial and public process of policy development in the postwar context. The steps in the oficial process can be summarized in the following way: 1. Education Sector Assessment (October–December 1993): A USAIDfunded education sector assessment was carried out by international and local consultants and was simultaneously discussed by a pluralistic advisory committee of key actors from across the Salvadoran political continuum (Reimers 1995). The advisory committee not only helped to inform the ongoing research but was also important because it helped to build the relationships and consensus that would later facilitate the inalization of the resulting education strategy. The process of conducting both the sector assessment and the dialogue of the advisory committee were led by the Harvard Institute for International Development in conjunction with the Central American University—a private, Jesuit institution—and FEPADE. 2. Promotional Workshops (January 1994): The Harvard Institute for International Development, the Central American University, and FEPADE conducted workshops on results of the sector assessment with key groups of governmental, educational, and private sector stakeholders in the country. For the rest of the year, an inter-institutional promotional committee (comité dinamizador) comprised of individuals from inluential political and technical organizations (including unions, private universities, NGOs, and the MINED) continued to share the study with stakeholders from the education sector who would be integral to implementing changes in policy that resulted from the study. 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 204 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY 3. National Commission on Education, Science, and Development (October 1994–June 1995): President Armando Calderón Sol (who took ofice in June 1994) appointed a diverse group of twelve highproile educational actors to the National Commission on Education, Science, and Development (hereafter, National Education Commission), which spent seven months developing a vision for the reform of the education system (Comisión Presidencial 1995). 4. Consultative Forum (January 1995): With inancing from USAID and administrative support from FEPADE, the aforementioned interinstitutional promotional committee organized a inal “consultative forum” attended by over 200 people from a wide range of institutions, including the National Legislative Assembly, teachers’ unions, donor organizations, women’s groups, community-based NGOs, universities, and the MINED, among others, in order to share and receive feedback on both the education sector assessment as well as directions for education reform in general (MINED 1995a). 5. Education Strategy Finalization (November 1995): The MINED inalized and published the Ten Year Plan, taking into account the sector assessment, the process of consultation, and the report of the National Education Commission. The ive objectives of the Ten Year Plan were to improve educational quality; to increase the eficiency, eficacy, and equity of the education system; to expand coverage; to create “new modalities of service provision”; and to strengthen “teaching of human, ethical, and civic values” (MINED 1995b, p. 11). The EDUCO Program was featured in this Plan as the primary means for increasing the coverage of the education system. During these two years, an enormous amount of time and energy was dedicating to conducting these events, performing research, and soliciting feedback. Upon review, however, it is striking that the EDUCO program was almost entirely overlooked. It was barely mentioned in the education sector assessment, and not at all in the report of the National Education Commission. Where it was mentioned, for example, in the consultative forum, discussion tended to pertain to how better to incorporate it into the MINED, not whether or not it should be a central strategy for the provision and governance of education. When I asked an education specialist familiar with the EDUCO program how it was that this program ended up in the Ten Year Plan, she simply informed me that, within the MINED, the people who were NOTES 205 responsible for creating the Ten Year Plan were the exact same people who favored EDUCO.43 Thus, from an insider’s perspective, it was not—and should not be—surprising that EDUCO (or, more speciically, the strategy that it represents) featured prominently in the Ten Year Plan. EDUCO had key supporters in the MINED, and these supporters inluenced those priorities which would be crystallized in the Ten Year Plan. Most relevant for our purposes, however, is the fact that that EDUCO did not enter this more formal and public process of determining priorities for education reform until the inalization of the Ten Year Plan, in November 1995. In the end, we see that the policy of EDUCO in practice emerged earlier and was the result of behind-the-scenes advocacy by the UNESCO consultant combined with political calculations on the part of the MINED and the representatives of the World Bank. The formal political process for including EDUCO in an oficial policy document came later and served to further legitimate the de facto policy of the MINED for pursuing reform of education governance. The point here is that, by including EDUCO in the MINED’s Ten Year Plan, it created an oficial policy document through which EDUCO had been incorporated. The principles and approach which EDUCO embodied had inally been crystallized in a policy document that communicated the priorities that would guide the MINED into the future. As such, though the implementation of EDUCO would continue for many more years, the international processes of education policy formation through which EDUCO was generated and included in oficial policy can be said to have concluded at this point. Having explained the process by which EDUCO evolved and entered MINED policy, I now turn in the next chapter to a further discussion of the mechanisms of transnational inluence in regards to that that process. nOteS 1. Interview with INTACT36. 2. See Gauri (1998) and Schiefelbein and Schiefelbein (2000) for more on Chile’s education reforms during the 1980s. 3. Interview with INTACT18. 4. Interview with MINEDNL21. 5. Memorandum, Ana-Maria Arriagada to Kye Woo Lee, July 27, 1990; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, World Bank Group Archives. 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 206 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 1045 1046 1047 24. 1048 1049 1050 25. 1051 1052 1053 1054 1055 26. 1056 1057 1058 1059 27. 28. 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 1068 29. 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY Ibid. Interview with INTACT18. Interview with INTACT4. See Chap. 6 for more on popular education in the context of the civil war. Interview with INTACT18. Interview with MINEDNL21. Interview with INTACT18. Interview with MINEDNL21. Interview with MINEDNL21. Interview with MINEDNL19. Interview with MINEDNL2. Interview with INTACT18. Interview with INTACT18. Interview with MINEDNL17. Interview with INTACT18. Interview with INTACT12. Interview with INTACT12. Memorandum, Jean-Jacques de Saint Antoine to Alfred Heron, March 7, 1991; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, World Bank Group Archives. To be speciic, the departments to which EDUCO was targeted under Social Sector Rehabilitation Project were Sonsonate, Chalatenango, La Paz, Cabañas, Morazán, and La Unión (World Bank 1991). See Chap. 2 for more on EDUCO’s ampliication. As noted there, by 2004, EDUCO would include 7,381 teachers and 378,208 students. Approximately 55 percent of rural public schools (which make up twothirds of all schools in El Salvador) would operate under the EDUCO program (Gillies et al. 2010). Memorandum, Ana-Maria Arriagada to Kye Woo Lee, August 3, 1992; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 2; 1121342, World Bank Group Archives. Interview with MINEDNL17. Memorandum, Ana-Maria Arriagada to Kye Woo Lee, August 3, 1992; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 2; 1121342, World Bank Group Archives. Although EDUCO teachers were paid less than traditional teachers, by 1995 the MINED began to offer a monthly bonus of $40 for rurality to EDUCO teachers. With this bonus, EDUCO teachers made, on average, 7 percent more than teachers in traditional schools (Gillies et al. 2010). Initially, according to World Bank documents, EDUCO teachers at the preschool level were to be paid $160 per month (World Bank 1991). See Chap. 2 for more on teacher compensation. REFERENCES 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. AU7 207 Interview with MINEDNL19. Interviews with MINEDNL13 and MINEDNL14. Interviews with INTACT18 and MINEDNL21. See Chap. 6 for more background on popular education teachers. Interview with LOCACTNM1. Examples of these grassroots organizations include the following: trustees for the Development of the Communities of San Miguel and Morazán (Patronato para el Desarrollo de las Comunidades de San Miguel y Morazán), the Association of Communities for the Development of Chalatenango, and the Educational Coalition of El Salvador (Concertación Educativa de El Salvador). See Poppema (2009) and Gershberg et al. (2009) for more on Guatemala’s version of community-managed education, which was adapted from the EDUCO model. Interview with INTACT34. Interview with MINEDNL8. Interview with MINEDNL8. Interview with MINEDNL8. Interview with INTACT18. Interview with INTACT35. Interview with NATACTNM1. referenCeS ADES (Asociación de Desarrollo Económico Social, Santa Marta). (2005). Una Sistematización de la Educación Popular en el Cantón Santa Marta, Cabañas, El Salvador, 1978–2001. San Salvador: ADES. Alvear Galindo, V. (2002). La educación en Morazaán, El Salvador, durante la guerra civil de 1981 a 1992: ¿parte de una estrategia de supervivencia? (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Berlin Free University, Berlin. Basaninyenzi, U. (2011). Case study: A communication approach to El Salvador’s EDUCO education reform efforts. Washington, DC: World Bank. Edwards, D. B., Jr., & Ávalos, E. (2015). Resistance to, and adaptation of, the program for Education with Community Participation in El Salvador: The experience of Santa Marta and its inversion of neoliberal reform logic. San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana. Gauri, V. (1998). School choice in Chile: Two decades of educational reform. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Gershberg, A. I., Meade, B., & Andersson, S. (2009). Providing better education services to the poor: Accountability and context in the case of Guatemalan decentralization. International Journal of Educational Development, 29, 187–200. 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 208 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 7 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCO AS GOVERNMENT POLICY Gillies, J., Crouch, L., & Flórez, A. (2010). Strategic review of the EDUCO program. USAID. Retrieved from: http://www.equip123.net/docs/e2EDUCO_Strategic_Review.pdf Guzmán, J. (2005). Educational reform in post-war El Salvador. In E. VargasBarón & H. Alarcón (Eds.), From bullets to blackboards: Education for peace in Latin America and Asia (pp. 43–62). New York: Inter-American Development Bank. Hammond, J. (1997). 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(1995). Propuesta: Transformar al educación para la paz y el desarrollo de El Salvador. San Salvador: National Commission on Education, Science, and Development. REFERENCES 209 Psacharopoulos, G., Tan, J., & Jimenez, E. (1986). Financing education in developing countries: An exploration of policy options. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Reimers, F. (1995). La educación en El Salvador de cara al siglo XXI: Desafíos y oportunidades. San Salvador: Universidad CentroAmericana/Talleres Gráicos. Reimers, F., & McGinn, N. (1997). Informed dialogue: Using research to shape education policy around the world. Westport: Praeger Publishers. Rosa, H., & Foley, M. (2000). El Salvador. In S. Forman & S. Patrick (Eds.), Good intentions: Pledges of aid for postconlict recovery (pp. 113–158). Boulder: Lynne Rienner. UNESCO. (1990). Servicios educativos a niños pobres Salvadoreños de 0 a 14 años. San Salvador: UNDP/UNESCO. World Bank. (1990). El Salvador: Population, health, nutrition and education: Issues and opportunities (Report no. 8715-ES). Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (1991). Staff appraisal report. El Salvador: Social sector rehabilitation project. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (1993). Loan agreement (technical assistance loan) between Republic of El Salvador and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (1995a). Project completion report: Republic of El Salvador: Structural adjustment loan (Loan 3293-ES). Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (1995b). Staff appraisal report: El Salvador: Basic education modernization project. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (1996). Implementation completion report: El Salvador: Second structural adjustment loan. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (1997a). Implementation completion report: El Salvador: Social sector rehabilitation project. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (1997b). Implementation completion report: El Salvador: Technical assistance loan. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (2002). Implementation completion report on a loan in the amount of US$34 million to the Republic of El Salvador for a basic education project. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (2009). Strengthening accountability in social service delivery in Central America: The EDUCO school-based management model. Washington, DC: World Bank. 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 Author Queries Chapter No.: 7 0003186997 Queries Details Required AU1 Please reword the irst paragraph ‘This chapter sets …’ as it is the same as the Abstract text. AU2 Please conirm if hierarchy of section headings is correctly identiied and given. AU3 Please check if inserted tables are ine. AU4 Please provide the month details for the entry 1987, if applicable. AU5 As per style notes are not allowed in Tables, hence it has been moved to corresponding table note. Please check if ine. AU6 References “World Bank (1994a, b), Schiefelbein and Schiefelbein (2000)” are cited in text but not provided in the reference list. Please provide reference details. AU7 Reference “MINED (1995c)” is not cited anywhere in the text. Please provide a citation. Author’s Response