Art Now Exists in the Condition of Philosophy

Minerva and the Muses. The Place of Reason in Aesthetic Judgements, 1999

ABSTRACT This work is an attempt to refute aesthetic scepticism and to vindicate an aesthetic rationalism. In the first section, the notion of aesthetic scepticism is introduced and three of its basic subclasses, i.e. non-descriptivism, relativism and general subjectivism are criticised. Sceptical non-descriptivist doctrines like the emotive theory of aesthetic meaning are sharply criticised and the writer tries to show that even if aesthetic or critical judgements were non-descriptive, it would not mean that they were necessarily beyond the realm of reason. Further, it is maintained that aesthetic emotions have a rational core, so even if our critical judgements were entirely emotional, the aesthetic sceptics would not necessarily carry the day. In the second section different non-sceptical positions are discussed. In the first part of the section, the theories of such mental philosophers as David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Monroe Beardsley are scrutinised. In the second part the non-mentalistic views of Wittgenstein and his followers are in the focus of attention. The writer concludes the section by stating that none of the non-sceptical views are entirely satisfactory. The aesthetic verificationism of the mental philosophers leads to a blind alley and mentalism itself is too close to scepticism for comfort. The pluralism of the Wittgensteinians, i.e. the idea of a plurality of language games, does not really deliver the goods. This brand of pluralism has to many relativistic implications for it to be an effective antidote against scepticism. Further, the Wittgensteinians tend to reduce critical judgements to rhetorical persuasions, which again smacks a bit too much of scepticism. But the writer concludes that there is a lot to be learned from both traditions, especially Kant and the Wittgensteinians who are closer to each other than most aestheticians tend to think. In the last and most important section, the notion of rationality is defined. Reason is regarded as argumentative, fallibilistic and intersubjective. The writer tries to show that critical judgements can count as rational. This is basically done with the aid of «the theory of constrains». Meta-aesthetic theories constrain critical judgements in various ways. These theories tend to have truth-values and their rational decidability has implications for the decidability of the judgements they constrain. Even aesthetic scepticism constrains critical judgements, gives some better argumentative supportability than others. This actually makes aesthetic scepticism self-defeating, because according to its catechism, there is no such thing as a better argumentative supportability for judgements. Thus, scepticism is not a tenable position; critical judgements are not beyond the realm of universal reason. Further, critical judgements have a concrete, rational side, a kind of rationality, which is more local than global. The upshot of all this is that aesthetic scepticism is not a viable position. Key Words: aesthetics, scepticism, relativism, emotions, critical judgements, Kant, Wittgenstein.

In the early 1990s, the Esprit and Télérama journals dedicated several issues to what was called a “crisis” in contemporary art , namely the supposed loss of normative criteria allowing one to judge and evaluate works of art. Following their publication, several French philosophers – among which Marc Jimenez, Jean-Pierre Cometti, Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Gérard Genette, Yves Michaud and Rainer Rochlitz – took part in a public debate which more or less explicitly centered around the Critique of Judgment, in terms similar to those employed by Kant himself in 1790. Indeed, the art world has appeared divided since then: one side (which includes, among others, Jean-Marie Schaeffer and Gérard Genette ) argues that judgment can only be subjective (left to each individual’s appreciation), while the other side (on which Rainer Rochlitz can notably be found) contends that judgment can be objective (by resting on impartial properties or criteria). Not only do these two antagonistic positions correspond respectively to the thesis and antithesis of the Kantian antinomy relative to the judgment of taste , they also exclude what allowed Kant to resolve this apparent aporia: the notion of common sense. A detailed analysis of the aforementioned positions nevertheless calls for a complexification of this somewhat schematic description of the current debate. Other philosophical legacies deserve to be recognized and examined; a semiotic study of the main expressions used (“contemporary art”, “aesthetic judgment”, “artistic criteria”) also sheds light on linguistic differences – which can contribute to the distortion of the debate and to the caricaturing of the positions at hand; contemporary art, finally, has redefined the debate’s fundamental terms, since it has questioned several notions and definitions which seemed to be given until recently – starting with the very idea of “work of art”. If, in its general outline, the current debate therefore can be apprehended through the Kantian treatment of the issue of the aesthetic judgment, it is not limited to his framework of analysis, and those convergences and divergences will be highlighted here. This presentation will therefore reexamine the issue of the judgment of works of art, by challenging Kantian aesthetics through contemporary artistic philosophical discourses and practices.

How to judge a work of art? This question, already present in the Critique of the Power of Judgment by Immanuel Kant, was updated in France in the early 1990s (thus more or less two centuries later), when the Esprit and Télérama journals dedicated some issues to what was called a " crisis " in contemporary art, namely the supposed loss of normative criteria allowing one to evaluate artworks. Following their publication, several French philosophers – among which Marc Jimenez, Yves Michaud, Gérard Genette, Jean-Marie Schaeffer, and Rainer Rochlitz – took part in a public debate on judgment, which more or less explicitly centered on the third Critique, in terms similar to those employed by Kant himself in 1790. Underlining the specificity of this debate, the present paper intends to (re)examine the issue of the judgment on works of art, by presenting and responding to two types of relativism and establishing a dialogue between Kantian aesthetics and contemporary philosophical discourses. Comment juger une oeuvre d'art ? Cette question, déjà présente dans la Critique de la faculté de juger d'Emmanuel Kant, fut réactualisée en France au début des années 1990 (soit près de deux siècles plus tard) quand les revues Esprit et Télérama consacrèrent plusieurs de leurs numéros à ce qui fut appelé une « crise » de l'art contemporain, soit la perte supposée de repères normatifs pour juger les oeuvres. Suite à ces publications, plusieurs philosophes français – parmi lesquels Marc Jimenez, Yves Michaud, Gérard Genette, Jean-Marie Schaeffer et Rainer Rochlitz – prirent part à un débat public sur le jugement, qui se concentra plus ou moins explicitement sur la troisième Critique, en des termes proches de ceux employés par Kant lui-même en 1790. En soulignant la spécificité de ce débat, cet article entend (ré)examiner la question du jugement sur les oeuvres d'art, en présentant et en répondant à deux types de relativisme et en établissant un dialogue entre l'esthétique kantienne et les discours philosophiques contemporains.

The Yearbook on History and Interpretation of Phenomenology, 2014

In the article I aim to answer the question whether and how can we err in aesthetic judgments. Starting with Hume’s thesis that sentiment is always right as a typical example of thesis of infallibility of aesthetic judgments, I ultimately seek to disprove such thesis and show that it is possible to err in aesthetic judgments on normative grounds. I begin with consideration of Husserl’s redefinition of the notion of transcendence and with his interpretation of the phenomenon of error. I then proceed to analyze two approaches to the question: Ingarden’s consideration of aesthetic values as objectively grounded, and Dufrenne’s consideration of aesthetic values as intersubjectively grounded, but because of that actually being capable of being subject to disclosure and analysis. After assessing these approaches I conclude that there are sufficient grounds for the thesis that aesthetic judgments are, in principle, intersubjectively correctible, and that such correction takes, or can take place, in art critical discourse.

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 2008

The notion of the ‘free harmony of the faculties’ has baffled many of Kant’s readers and also attracted much criticism. In this paper I attempt to shed light on this puzzling notion. By doing so, I aim to challenge some of the criticisms that this notion has attracted, and to point to its relevance to contemporary debates in aesthetics. While most of the literature on the free harmony is characterized by what I regard as an ‘extra-aesthetic approach’, I propose ‘an aesthetic approach’ to the harmony. Such an aesthetic interpretation explains why aesthetic judgement, but not cognitive judgement, is based on a free agreement of the faculties in distinctively aesthetic terms. By contrast, an extra-aesthetic approach to Kant’s aesthetic theory does not explain what it is in beautiful objects as beautiful that calls for a free agreement of the faculties. I argue that this approach is limited, and suggest an alternative to it by articulating the necessary reciprocity and explanatory interdependence between the form and value of beautiful objects and the form of the mental activity that underlies judgements of taste. My proposal is not only aesthetic, but also normative in its attempt to carve up a space for a distinct form of aesthetic normativity, the one that Kant describes as ‘free lawfulness’ or ‘lawfulness without a law’. I opt for a specifically normative variant of aesthetic interpretation because I believe that Kant is committed to the view of aesthetic judgement as normatively autonomous and irreducible.

Mind & Language

In his debut monograph Ayon Maharaj develops the core argument of his 2009 doctoral dissertation into an original and meticulously crafted account of aesthetic agency in its conceptual evolution from Kant to Adorno. The central argument --that art can offer uniquely valuable and revealing forms of experience --is, of course, nothing new: it is one of the central claims of German Idealism's challenge to the sovereignty of Enlightenment rationality. Similarly, the historical arc is a familiar one, proceeding from Kantian to Romantic to Hegelian aesthetics and culminating with Adorno's post-romantic synthesis of these competing traditions. Nor, for that matter, is the attempt to rescue the claims of Idealist aesthetics for the present without precedent; Maharaj joins a growing chorus of recent thinkers (e.g., Robert Pippin, J.M. Bernstein, William Desmond) attempting to revisit and rethink those claims from a contemporary standpoint.

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 2006