The loneliness of the borders: a case study

The loneliness of the borders: the case of the village Tsamantas Borders are the scars of history -Robert Schuman Borders? I have never seen one. But I have heard they exist on the minds of some people -Thor Heyerdahl Abstract Tsamantas is the name of a village in Thesprotia, a geographical department at the northwest tip of Epirus. It is located right in the foothills of the mountain Mourgana, just a few kilometers away from the Greek -Albanian border. Its long-term history was shaped by an absurd human construction, which created uncertainty, division, and changed the relations between the two countries forever. The consequences of this dichotomy are more than evident today, and reveal the catastrophic effects of nationalism. A former resident of the village recalls oral disseminated stories from the past, and draws us a picture of the local everyday life, before and after the appearance of the border. Through his narration we conceptualize the direct and dramatic influences of this separation, and we see how a friend or a neighbor became the Other or the enemy. Just an imaginary line managed to cause depopulation of the area and alienation between the people, leading to nothing but decay. (Balkan) Borders and nationalist utopias Borders are the officially recognized geographic boundaries between two states or, in other words, an imaginary line that separates two territorial areas. As Nitsiakos described it, “borders are the ultimate symbols of the state’s authority, a demonstration of the state’s sense of security against its neighbors or a confirmation of its hostility towards them” (Nitsiakos 2011: 157). It’s a concept related to the idea of the “nation-state”, which spread across Europe during the 19 th century, boosting the formation of national identities. By successfully doing so, “boundaries were seen as vital elements of the struggle among conflicting political ideologies” ( Hatzopoulos 2008: 185). People were fighting over territories in order to establish a stable environment to live in and, in this context, borders were perceived as the outcome, or even the reward for their efforts. This led to the development of nationalist feelings and to the creation of a hostile image against the Other 1. Despite the traumatic experiences of war and division, people in search of identity continued to express their need for a nation and a flag, thus establishing the term “nationalism”. As a result, a negative perception occurred on how they viewed their neighboring states, which got worse due to the mobility of the populations and the financial transitions. The economic difficulties created an unstable environment that could easily trigger tension among bordering states. Especially after the consolidation of the capitalistic model, the hostility became even more evident. Capitalism, among other things, also created the “bourgeois”, a social class that “cannot imagine the Other” (Barthes 1979: 255). So, ironically, the financial borders were successfully opened, but they became hermetically closed for human beings. Naturally, those who were challenged directly were the rural and the borderland populations who could no longer cover their basic needs, and were forced to gradually abandon their residencies. It is generally observed that with the “national integration and the economic development of the nation state”, begun the “decline and the ultimate demise” of any traditional formations left (Nitsiakos 1993: 155-6). A corresponding example will be analyzed later on, in order to showcase the results of such a transition. According to Anderson’s description, the nation is a “community that imagines itself as a political society, inherently bordered and simultaneously sovereign. It constitutes a community at an imaginary level because no member, even of the smallest nation, will never meet most of the other members, will never come across or even hear of them, but each of them has a sense of belonging” (Anderson 1997: 26). Although there are Others from everyone’s point of view in each nation, they are not considered as such The big “Other” has a symbolic sense and it is preferred here because it can better outline the perception of the “neighbor” on either side of the border. It is a conce pt related with Hegel’s and later Lacan’s theories. 1 because there’s something that officially unites them, a common ground. So, the Other, is usually related with the “tribe” (Konstantopoulou 1999: 17), which is seen as a type of identity and has inherent features and values that automatically characterize its people. For instance, someone is considered inferior or superior, even civilized or not, depending on his/her origins and history. What is usually not mentioned, is that these stories and qualities are mainly constructed by a local perspective, which is basically supporting the national narrative and promoting the values of the “nation-state”. Their effectiveness to this day has to do with the constant spread of these stereotypes and, as Barthes explains, “the supreme power of a myth is its repetition” (Barthes 1979: 235). In other words, by repeating a story someone can establish it as a fact, but that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s true. Even though an identity is often considered to be natural or irreversible, it is truly “a mental construction, which is shaped through long term and complex historical, social, political and cultural procedures” (Konstantopoulou 1999: 110). Specifically, in the Balkans, the identity shaping is an ever-changing and ever-evolving notion. The map of the peninsula has been reshaped so many times and in numerous different ways, while the final formation of the states came through only recently. Moreover, the populations were never clearly distinct, despite the diverse ethnological composition and the multifaceted ideological fields of the area. In many cases the similarities are more and more obvious than the differences. As a result, achieving national uniformity was rather challenging because it is usually “shaped depending on long term historical circumstances, but in the Balkan area it has a completely different sense because of the multinational model” (Vakalopoulos 1994: 43). However, the majority of approaches and studies, concerning this territory, take for granted that nationalism is its quintessential feature and the “principal explanatory framework through which the past and the present of the Balkans is to be narrated” (Hatzopoulos 2008: 1). Nationalism has indeed played (and is even still playing) a significant role in the special case of the Balkans, where interrelated populations were forcefully divided in order to form separate nations, a fact that explains the constant national imbalance and reification of the borders. What is still problematic is that “the meaning of the Balkans always emanates fro m the ways in which they are perceived in connection with other concepts, and depends on the meanings that these other concepts are attributed” ( Hatzopoulos 200: 186). Hence, each person (or nation) approaches the same concept from various viewpoints, resulting in even acknowledging different countries as “Balkans”. We are dealing with a particularly vague concept, which is susceptible to numerous discussions, and it is because of this vagueness that it is often easily interpreted with nationalistic criteria. Neither trying to separate ourselves from the Other, nor making his/her picture look normal and familiar (as if it wasn’t), makes sense, but unfortunately that’s how the Balkan subject is usually being approached. From the so-called “European point of view”, the Balkans are constructed and perceived as non-European territories (Nitsiakos 2011), which just happened to be in the same continent. Greece, being simultaneously a Balkan and a European state, renders its cohabitation with the other Balkan countries a highly complex issue. However, there is a tendency to forget this twofold identity, despite sharing common grounds and heritage. On the contrary, Greece is obsessed with its association with the West, and puts constant efforts to highlight that and remind to everyone its European side. Greece, as a Balkan and non-Balkan country, has established rather poor relationships with its direct neighbors, an attitude that shows even “pettiness and intense psychological complexes” (Vakalopoulos 1994: 20). The most characteristic example is probably the ambiguous relationship with Albania. There’s a really long, complicated and painful history behind the GreekAlbanian borders, for which neither side should be particularly proud. Until the end of the 19 th century there was great vagueness in the area, which was later interpreted as it pleased each side. On the one hand there was the “emerging Albanian nationalism”, and on the other hand “the unrestrained tendency, by the romantic or elite Athenian circles, to greekify even Albanian territories” (Vakalopoulos 1994: 246). Afterwards, there is a certain series of events that follow: the creation of the Albanian state in 1914, the sealing of the Greek-Albanian borders in 1945, the collapse of the Hoxha regime in 1989 and the re-opening of the borders in 1990. Apart from these dates, there is always also the issue of the so-called north Epirus, which was repeatedly attempted to be incorporated in the Greek state. The existence of a Greek minority that lives in the south of Albania, or in the north of Epirus, is a good example to showcase the arbitrary and unnecessary use of the borders. Especially in this case, we have the division of a rather coherent population, just to adopt a half-hearted solution. People on both sides of the border have much more in common than we are left to believe. Except for shaping identities and establishing national boundaries, a border is directly affecting the everyday life of the people who live near it. The predominantly rural populations that were working and residing on either side, long before the consolidation of the Greek-Albanian border, suddenly felt isolated and trapped in a region with no prospect. It’s no coincidence that there are numerous immigrants from these areas, who were forced to go abroad due to financial difficulties, and afterwards they became the benefactors of their own hometowns (if possible). It’s significant that most of the villages that are still standing today, it’s because of them. So, in combination with a general urbanization of the society, the borde rline villages were gradually abandoned, raising questions regarding the direct effects of the imposition of an imaginary line. The village Tsamantas Tsamantas is a small village in Thesprotia, a geographical department at the northwest tip of Epirus. It is located right in the foothills of the mountain Mourgana, just a few kilometers away from the Greek -Albanian border. Its long-term history goes back to the byzantine era, when the border sit uation was totally different. The village had always had close relationships with its neighbors, whether these were called Albanians or not. I happened to be in this area with a small group of people in order to reorganize and curate the local folklore museum, only to find out that the place is almost completely abandoned today. Out of pure luck, we came across Nick 2, a former resident of the village who lives and works abroad, but comes back to his home for a few days during summer vacation. Having the chance to do an intervi ew with him proved to be an enlightening experience that led to a better understanding the local region and its historical evolution. At the last census held in 2011, Tsamantas counted 71 residents, but according to Nick the current permanent population isn’t more than 20 to 30 people. Years ago, the place was “full of life”, but the “biggest disaster of the village were the wars” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013) 3. We know that till 1895 Tsamantas was a large and active village, which was later irreversibly affected by the Balkan wars that caused the first massive wave of migration. In 1913 the population was about 1200-1300 people, but in 1924 a second wave fled to Melbourne (Australia) in search for work opportunities. As the immigrants sent money back home during the interwar years, there were still 1400 people residing in the village in 1928. However, after the 2 nd World War, the village was fully exhausted, and in the 1950s the count dropped to about 500 people. As a result of this decay, during the 1960s there was another large migration wave, which was meant to be the final blow for the area. With so few permanent residents left today, “it’s hard for the village to survive” anymore (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). The economy of Tsamantas had always been based mostly on agriculture and farming, while also raising many talented tinkers (ganomatis or kalaitzis), who were employed all around the country. Until the 2 nd World War, the population managed to survive decently, but then “there were the borders…the uncertainty” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). Previously , the village 2 For reasons of proper research behavior, the interlocutor is not mentioned by his real name, but with a nickname. 3 All extracts in quotes are from the oral interview with Nick, held at the village Tsam antas, in 11/7/2013. had relationships with other nearby regions, which were not considered hostile or opposite at the time, in any way. “Here, the villagers of Tsamantas had pieces of land and farms in Albania, and till the 1940s they were allowed to go there during the morning and come back at night, with a special permission. However, after the war and the civil war the borders were hermetically sealed” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). Especially later, with the communist regime, Albania was considered “the great enemy, the communism” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013), and the shepherds were no longer allowed to go too high in the mountain s. It was at that time that several provocations took place as well. For instance, a Greek would shoot a goat in order to create an incident with the Albanians. “It was something obscene, an Orwellian situation…in order to come here from Kalamas (a nearby location) you had to have a special permission, and that lasted till the 1970s” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). Where there is a border there are also local myths and tales around it, and naturally there is a particular story that concerns Tsamantas and a few neighboring villages as well, on how they ended up at the Greek side of the border. During the German occupation there was a German commissioner called Von Thierry, who really appreciated archaeology and Greek history. So, one day he went to visit the monastery of the area and there he saw a big lantern, which was a gift from the patriarch. He real ly fancied that item, and being a collector himself, he asked the priest (his name was Dimitris Pesxos) to give it to him. According to the local legend the priest replied: “I can’t give this to you because it belongs to St. George, but I’m going to pray, and if you put us in the Greek side of the border you can have it” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). After the promise, the German commissioner took out his map, drew another line and incorporated five more villages (Povla, Vavouri, Lias, Lista and Tsamantas) in the Greek territory. “The paradox”, adds Nick, “is that the commission wouldn’t normally incorporate a region whose river goes to the other side of the border”, but in this case they made an exception (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). This story is supposed to be 9 9% true, and it has been told for many years now, gaining more and more credibility. Even Nick insisted: “you may not believe it but this is what happened” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). Truth or not, this area was subjected to many changes over the years concerning its bordering situation, and it was not unusual for a piece of land to belong to the Greek side for a while and the next moment to the Albanian one, or the other way round. Despite the constant changes, there are some special events that took place in the summer of 1944 that can only prove the superficiality of the borders. That year the Germans had demolished many villages close to Tsamantas, and had burned to the ground one of them (Lintista). The poverty of the area was terrible and what’s worst was the level of starvation. “That summer was the point zero for Tsamantas” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). The remaining population was so poor that they just grabbed anything valuable from their homes (from jewelry to carpets) and went to sell it in Albania for “a handful of corn” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). Moreover, in order to survive, women had to walk all the way to Sagiada (a little port at the west of Tsamantas), to pick up salt from the salt lakes. Finally they managed to endure the difficulties, but many people still say that “if it hadn’t been for Albania, we would have died here…there was nothing left for us”, and Nick confirms that “Albania saved them back then” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). In spite of this incident, the circumstances at the village got even worse, when the civil war began in 1946, and Tsamantas, being too close to the borders was politically divided. The neighboring villages (Lias and Lintista) were strongly supporting the leftists, while the “whole mountain up here was shelter for the communists [… as] of course the ammunition came through Albania too” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). During that time people started leaving once more, especially those with relatives in America, who decided to migrate for a better future. “People begun not to trust their own neighbors, they became very suspicious, and given the poverty [of the area] they started stealing from each other” (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). It was at that point that they stopped having faith in their community and to the person next door, so they decided to leave. Most of them said that they would come back eventually, and even left their homes exactly as they were, as if they were to be gone for just a little while. However, “the village gradually weakened” and after a while, neither the first generation of immigrants, nor neither their children visited the place (Nick, interview 11/7/2013). After all these years of struggle, a formerly flourishing village is now facing complete extinction, due to its position in the map. Being located so close to the Greek-Albanian border, it was exhausted by the wars, the long periods of starvation and the years of isolation. For the villagers, their relationship with Albania was direct, and not that of the touristic type. Their everyday life was interrelated: they would exchange products or farm their animals at the same place. The mountain of Mourgana was indeed standing in between them but both populations were its residents, and it was not considered a form of boundary, rather an area of cohabitation. Local populations had learned to work together, cooperate and live in peace at the same region. They considered themselves neighbors and not Others. Moreover, these ties were an important part of their economy as well, so when they were forcefully cut, the villagers experienced sudden impoverished, and in many cases, they were obligated to abandon their homes in order to survive. Apart from the abovementioned tragedies, the border also resulted in a tremendous reduction of the local populations, causing the inevitable decay of the whole area. The last effort for revival took place in 2005, when a conference was held in the folklore museum of Tsamantas entitled: “Common European Cultural Heritage - Museums, borders, cultural awareness and communication betwe en border regions”. It was organized by the Center of European Studies (University West of England), aiming to initiate transnational dialogue and mutual understanding among people of different cultural backgrounds. However, almost ten years later, the first step towards that direction is yet to be made. What local populations are still looking for, is the establishment of a cross-border cooperation, especially with south Albania, in order to achieve financial and cultural development. Conclusion Following this short narration concerning the village of Tsamantas, we come to realize a few things about the borders and the division of humanity in general. This case is just one amongst many others, where a border managed to cause more problems than it was supposed to solve, by instantly distorting the image of the people living on the other side, to Others. Similar results have probably occurred elsewhere, when imaginary lines called “borders” were used to separate neighboring territories. Two people from two different nations may have never met, but the feeling that there is suddenly something in between them, something that separates them, is only enhancing their distance and sharpening their differences. In this case, a wide-spread story around the creation of this particular border and its alleged undisputed originality, makes a good example that showcases both the importance and the randomness of a decision, which ended up deeply dividing a previously balanced region. Thus, there is one more reason for oral stories to be recorded and be taken into account when “official” history is written (Nitsiakos 2011), otherwise the centrality of nationalism in the perception of cases like the Balkans will never be rejected. Historical change is presented differently within a nation, in order to convince people of its necessity, while it is a whole other experience for local communities whose everyday lives are tremendously altered. The official history creates a certain image regarding the past, presenting it as the only possible scenario, while the truth is that most of the times that’s only one piece of the whole puzzle. In this case, the narration of a local story brought to light incidents of the past that cannot be found in any history book, nor are in line with the largely accepted nationalist storyline. Local knowledge seems to be our only weapon against the prejudices of the past and the tool to help us build the future. In other words, the solution is “the deliverance of mandatory orientations and complexing type priorities and outdated schemes, and the formation of full front Balkan window, recovered from any introversions” (Vakalopoulos 1994: 291). In a long-term perspective, an overall change of perception against our “genetically utopian thought”, according to Kristeva, would be to imagine “a world without strangers” (Kristeva 1997: 65). When such notion would not be considered a utopia, but a plausible idea, it would be clear that the world doesn’t belong to a person or state. We are all Others to someone else’s eyes anyway, but this doesn’t have to be considered an unfortunate fact. Being different from each other, doesn’t mean that people cannot acknowledge and accept their differences and cohabitate this planet harmoniously, without being separated by borders. What’s irrational is a planet full of borders and imaginary restrictions, not a borderless human society bound by mutual respect and solidarity. Bibliography Anderson, B., 1997, Φαντασιακές Κοινότητες [Imagined Communities], Athens: Nefeli. Barthes, R., 1979, Μυθολογίες [Mythologies], Athens: Rappa Publishing. Dermentzopoulos, Ch., Nitsiakos, V. (eds.), 2007, Όψεις του λαϊκού πολιτισμού: Μνήμη Στάθη Δαμιανάκου [Views of popular culture: In Memory of Stathis Damianakos], Athens: Plethron. Hatzopoulos, P., 2008, The Balkans beyond Nationalism and Identity: international relations and ideology, London and New York: I. B. Tauris. Kristeva, J., 1997, Έθνη Χωρίς Εθνικισμό [Nations without nationalism], Athens: Alternative Publications. Konstantopoulou, Ch., Maratou-Alipranti, L., Germanos, D., Oikonomou, Th., 1999, «εμείς» και οι «άλλοι»: αναφορά στις τάσεις και τα σύμβολα [“we” and the “others”: reference in tendencies and symbols], Athens: National Center for Social Research, tipothito, Giorgos Dardanos. Nitsiakos, V., 1993, Παραδοσιακές Κοινωνικές Δομές (β’ [Traditional Social Structures (second edition)], Athens: Odisseas. έκδοση) Nitsiakos V., Manos I., Agelopoulos G., Angelidou A., Dalkavoukis V. (eds.), 2008, Balkan Border Crossings: First Annual of the Konitsa Summer School , Berlin: LIT. Nitsiakos V., Manos I., Agelopoulos G., Angelidou A., Dalkavoukis V. (eds.), 2011, Balkan Border Crossings: Second Annual of the Konitsa Summer School, Berlin: LIT. Vakalopoulos, K., 1994, Θεωρητική Προσέγγιση και Ιστορική Ερμηνεία της Βαλκανικής Συνύπαρξης [Theoretical Approach and Historical Interpretation of the Balkan Coexistence], Thessaloniki: Publishing house of Kuriakidis brothers.