The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future

ORIENTAL ARCHIVE 78, 2010 • 127 The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future Ondrej Beranek “A kind word and forgiveness is better than charity followed by injury.” – Quran 2:263. “In Islam, then, as with other religions, the actual behaviour of adherents does not correspond to the ideal as expressed in doctrine. This is recognized as a problem in all the major religions. It is commonly expressed as a contrast or incompatibility between human feelings and frailities on the one hand and the purity of divinely inspired values on the other. [...] Believers compromise with the world and with their own desires, and betray their religion, precisely because their religion, like their desires and the false values of the world, is essentially a human creation.” 1 – Sir Raymond Firth (1901–2002). Introduction* In recent years, many articles and books dealing with the issue of both medieval and contemporary Islamic charity have appeared. However, the former ones, quite naturally, do not deal with current forms of Islamic charity, and the latter usually ignore the past. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to propose two arguments. First, since an insufficient historical perspective tends to be the characteristic feature of many studies about contemporary Islamic charitable organizations,2 it might be useful to provide a perspective – on the basis of some historical examples – on some key elements that have been linked to the granting of charity on many occasions in the past and which, in some cases, are still in place today. Only in this way will we be able to discover, not simply how the charitable institutions were supposed to work in theory, but how they actually functioned in reality and what were the objectives of many of them from the outset. Only in this way will we be able to fully grasp the contemporary (mis)use of Islamic charity. * This paper summarizes, revises, and updates the main points of a book that I co-authored with Pavel Tupek, which was published in Czech as Dvojí tvář islámské charity (The two faces of Islamic charity) (Brno: CDK, 2008). I wish to thank Pavel for his many comments and deep insights. I also want to acknowledge the feedback that I received on various drafts of this paper from attendees of the MIT Security Studies Seminar and also a roundtable discussion that was organized by the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University. ArOr – Issue 78.2 ISSN 0044-8699 © 2010 Oriental Institute (ASCR), Prague 128 • ONDREJ BERANEK Secondly, a number of negative aspects are particularly associated with those Islamic charitable organizations whose activities relate to the notions of jihad and da‘wa, or the mission to promote Islam. Da‘wa does not mean merely proselytism or the activity of preaching; it is the basic act of activization within Islam and its incorporation into all spheres of life. On the ideological level, one can focus mainly on two strands of fundamentalist thinking within Sunni Islam: the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism.3 I would suggest that it is their radical offshoots which are actually behind most cases of the misuse of charitable organizations for ideological and political goals. Both strands also branch out and have an ability to create sophisticated organizational networks, using diversified financial resources. In the 20th century, the vast mobilization of Islam both in the social and political spheres stemmed mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result of da‘wa and persecutions, the Brotherhood spread out from its Egyptian birthplace into the wider world, forming thus a very complex network of movements and organizations. Moreover, they have usually demonstrated a strong interest in entering the sphere of politics. Organizations inspired by the Brotherhood’s teaching, by and large, have usually diverted part of their resources to the support of their cause in the Middle East, with Palestine at the forefront. On the other hand, Salafism, which – in a simplified way – originated in modern times on the Arabian Peninsula, functions outwards from the core, making use of its financial resources to spread its interpretation of Islam to the periphery. The institutionalized form of Salafism virtually corresponds to the official interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia. It tends to be apolitical and, due to Saudi Arabia’s wealth, it spreads fast, not simply through the world of charitable organizations. Apart from this, there is also a form of Salafism which has a domestic political agenda, something which is not of interest for us in the context of this paper; and there is also a Jihadi Salafism, which does not acknowledge the legitimacy of current Arab regimes and, as far as the charitable organizations are concerned, constitutes the most dangerous trend.4 A Brief Theory of Charity in Islam The encouragement to make charitable donations forms an integral part of both the Quran and the texts containing the Prophet Muhammad’s words and deeds (hadith). Compulsory alms donations (zakat) belong to one of the five fundamental pillars of Islam and impose on the faithful the duty to donate a certain amount of their earnings to the needy at the end of a defined term. Everything that surpasses this duty is a sign of internal devotion and piety, and it is to this realm that the granting of voluntary charity (sadaqa) belongs.5 Before it became one of the five pillars in the formative phase of Islam, the concept of compulsory alms giving had gone through a period of development, which is also documented in the text of the Quran. In the Meccan suras, there was yet no differentiation between compulsory and non-compulsory alms giving, and the donations had a general character: “Take alms (sadaqa) out of their property, The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future • 129 you would cleanse them and purify them (tutahhiruhum wa tuzakkihim) thereby” (Quran 9:103). Both terms, which were later incorporated into jurisprudence, are included in this verse: sadaqa carries the possible meaning of both the compulsory and non-compulsory alms and zakat refers exclusively to the compulsory alms known to us from the Medinan period. The Quran (9:60) explicitly names groups of people for whom the zakat is intended: “The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allah (fi sabili’llah), and for the wayfarer.” The exact definitions and specifications of these eight groups fall into the interpretation of Quran exegetes and jurists. Nevertheless, the zakat gradually evolved from being a charitable institution into one of the taxes required by the state treasury. An American Orientalist, Morris Jastrow (1861–1921), described this fact as early as the beginning of the 20th century: “The zakat [...] came to serve an entirely different purpose, dictated by the conditions that arose with the two-fold aspect of Islam as a religion and a state. Instead of being a voluntary contribution for the support of the poor, the zakat was made a legal assessment to form part of revenue for the state. [...] This “pillar” of the faith thus furnishes an illustration of the combination of state functions with religious duties, so characteristic of the theocratic form of government which developed with the spread of political power through the conquests of the Arabs.”6 The waqfs (awqaf), or the specific inalienable charitable foundations similar to the European charitable trusts, have also traditionally helped to finance many institutions of the Islamic civilization. All over the Islamic world, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, both great works of architecture and a broad range of services vital for society have been, for centuries, financed and maintained through this system.7 In Islamic law, the waqf is defined as a pious act, in which a Muslim donates parts of his property for a charitable purpose. At the same time, the waqf designates the property that is donated in such a way. Currently, the idea of the waqf does not receive as much attention in Islam as it did during the medieval era. The most common of the current waqfs are mainly the remnants of charitable waqfs (waqf khayri) in the form of the large Islamic charitable organizations. They exist mostly in those countries where Shari‘a is applied, but can also be found in the West. These charitable foundations often substitute for the role of the state and, apart from their own return, their main income originates from alms and donations by rich Muslims and Islamic states. Charity in Medieval Islam Charity has been one of the central topics in Islam since the times of the prophet Muhammad and discussions concerning its form date back an equally long time. In the medieval Islamic era, charity had many faces and its richness and variety is attested by a great deal of material evidence.8 As far as the Islamic world is concerned, reports of charitable actions have been preserved in the form of a broad 130 • ONDREJ BERANEK range of legal and administrative manuals, chronicles, biographical dictionaries and publications dealing with urban topography. In addition, the reports from Muslim and European adventurers, who had already been visiting the Middle East from the early Middle Ages, constitute invaluable material concerning the broad spectrum of institutions and activities supported by acts of charity. As for the geographical distribution of Islamic charitable services, they were concentrated – as is the case of the Christian institutions in the West – in urban centers. Europe witnessed only a few rural institutions which were supposed to help the poor: village hospitals, parishes, and the like. In the Middle East, the poor in the countryside had to rely on the help of their neighbors rather than on charitable organizations. The early waqfs quickly became by far the most popular and most frequent type of institutionalized voluntary charitable donation. The waqfs had been founded by members of various strata of the population – sovereigns, high officials, rich people, or those from lower income groups – and the endowed property constituted a significant part of every Muslim city or piece of agricultural land. It was possible for the waqfs to consist of large or small immovables and also of cash. The extent of this voluntary charity can be seen from the fact that at the end of the Mamluk period, almost the whole of Egypt had become a waqf. Since the waqfs were such important institutions, the Muslim rulers who assumed power soon after the emergence of Islam tried to influence their activities in order to benefit from them both economically and politically. Although the independence of the waqfs should have been provided for by judges, they were in fact subject to the ruler and the agents of his will. The fact that the earnings from these institutions served to legitimize power formed an important aspect of the waqfs. If we say that the waqfs played an important role in the daily life of any Muslim city, then this counts double for Mecca and Medina. Both rulers of Muslim dynasties and ordinary people perceived the granting of charitable donations to these two spiritual centers of Islam as their religious duty. The gifts to the poor in these cities consisted mainly of cereals and food, but the charity of the surrounding Islamic world also comprised alms donations and the founding of religious and educational institutions. A whole range of charitable foundations involved in sending their help to Arabia bore the same name – waqf al-haramain (Foundation of the two holy places, Mecca and Medina).9 However, from the preserved documents we discover that these poor people were not only freed female slaves, but also Muslims who, for instance, kept servants in their households and can thus hardly be considered as being poor according to today’s standards. But, apart from aid for the poor, these charitable donations sent to Hijaz also served other purposes. On the ideological level, it expressed the bond between the Muslims from far away regions and the cradle of Islam and, at the same time, their interest in the welfare of the believers living there. Such waqfs, whose earnings served the holy places, were an integral part of every important Muslim dynasty, and Mecca and Medina received donations from every corner of the Islamic world. Even Timur (1336–1405), a Turkic conqueror of western and The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future • 131 central Asia, established charitable waqfs for the support of the holy places, and thus gained some level of legitimacy for his reign. Many of the charitable donations of the medieval al-Haramain institutions were a welcome source of revenue for the Meccan aristocracy, which, accustomed to this sort of charity, lived a relatively debauched lifestyle for these times. This phenomenon was also recorded by the famous Swiss traveler, Johann Ludwig Burckhardt (1784– 1817): “From trade, stipends, and the profits afforded by hadjys, the riches which annually flow into Mekka are very considerable, and might have rendered it one of the richest cities in the East, were it not for the dissolute habits of its inhabitants. […] The generality of Mekkawys, of all descriptions and professions, are loose and disorderly spendthrifts. […] Neither the sanctity of the holy city, nor the solemn injunctions of the Koran, are able to deter the inhabitants of Mekka from the using of spirituous liquors, and indulging in all the excesses which are the usual consequences of drunkenness. The Indian fleet imports large quantities of raky in barrels. This spirit, mixed with sugar, and an extract of cinnamon, is sold under the name of cinnamonwater. The Sherifs in Mekka and Djidda, great merchants, olemas, and all the chief people are in the habit of drinking this liquor, which they persuade themselves is neither wine nor brandy, and therefore not prohibited by the law.”10 The fact that Saudi Arabia began to “pay back” this help after the largest oil reserves in the world had been discovered on its soil, has become an ironic act of fate. Since the second half of the 20th century, it has been taking care of the welfare of Muslims from all over the world through its numerous charitable organizations (one of them, interestingly enough, bearing the same name as its predecessors, alHaramain). And, as in medieval times, this can be interpreted as a political symbol for Saudi Arabia and a concerted attempt to legitimize its power. Mujahids and Mystics The historical manifestations related to the aforementioned category of “the cause of Allah” (fí sabili’llah) form another important aspect of charitable activities. It included all of the sadaqa, waqfs and zakat institutions. Drinking fountains (sabil) serving the public had an expressly charitable nature. In addition, people who converted to Islam were financed from zakat incomes. The payments to these people were, nevertheless, not the only way of financially promoting Islam’s glory. Money gained from zakat incomes has also been historically used in Islam for leading jihad. This was the case, for instance, in relation to one of the most famous Muslim military leaders, Saladin (1138–93), and his financing of the battles with the crusaders.11 In his time, Saladin alienated vast parts of the Ministry of Finance’s lands and frequently instructed the zakat offices to transfer money to maintain his army. He also used the waqfs as a major instrument in his attempt to gain political and military control over Egypt and Syria. Such measures, most likely, were a continuation of policies carried out by those who had preceded him.12 Saladin also used the revenues to pay ransom money for Muslim captives. The establishment of 132 • ONDREJ BERANEK waqfs whose earnings were meant to be used for the conduct of holy wars was also characteristic of these times. In medieval Islamic history, jihad would quite often serve only as an excuse for introducing taxes above the legal scope of the Shari‘a. Thus, as in the case of alms, the concept of holy war has also been manipulated for the achievement of political goals. A typical example of a city drawing money from religious foundations established to support jihad, was Tarsus, which lay on the then Muslim-Byzantine border. Its main patrons were recruited from the members of the Abbasid dynasty who were financing several garrisons with troops in the town of Tarsus by means of charitable institutions. Tarsus at that time, like the whole Muslim-Byzantine border region for that matter, was attracting many volunteers from all parts of the Muslim world who wanted to participate in jihad. They were supported by charitable foundations from their home countries. Naturally, these activities were not only financed by charitable organizations. Nevertheless, the preserved documents attest that the system of the foundations often worked better than the system of allocations from central governments. On the other hand, this does not mean that the charitable organizations would have been any less prone to corruption and misuse.13 The Sufi zawiyas, to which another significant part of charitable resources was related, also played an important role in medieval Muslim society. Zawiya, especially in North Africa, often meant an Islamic sanctuary or a religious school. However, in relation to the Sufis it meant a house in which the mystics could gather and practice their rituals. Apart from this, zawiyas also provided the surrounding communities with other services. In times of political unrest, for instance, they served as granaries, where farmers from the neighborhood stored their grain to protect it from plundering nomads. Often, they also served as a refuge for outcasts and opponents of the regime. The state was thus frequently helping to transform the Sufi zawiyas into hotbeds of political agitation and opposition activities. This is due to the fact that the zawiyas were exempt from taxes and the state army was not permitted to enter some of their premises. Many of the founders of zawiyas also made use of their returns to buy up real estate in the surrounding area, which they later transformed into waqfs. These were used for financing the education of religious scholars and students.14 Nevertheless, over time, the North African zawiyas gradually underwent a paradoxical development. Under the pretext of incurring considerable expenses due to the donations of food they made to the poor, they started to collect “fees” from their clientele. Not only that, they even imposed taxes, zakat and ‘ushr, on the surrounding farmers, which could otherwise only be levied by governmental officials. Written records show that both the new taxpayers and the lawyers disliked this “profitable charity.” In doing so, zawiyas followed the general decline of the Sufi orders (tariqa) which had first emerged in the 15th century. The Sufi orders ceased to be loose groupings of people sharing the same values and interpretation of faith. Instead, they were transformed into coercive groups with a strong personality cult, which fought amongst themselves with all types of weapons, including real The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future • 133 ones, in order to gain influence and control over the revenues of the charitable foundations. Membership in a Sufi order no longer meant an ascetic and lonely life, but became an opportunity to gain a higher status in society and to improve one’s financial situation. Charity, consequently, enabled many opportunistic mystics to avoid work without the risk of falling into poverty.15 The original practice, according to which zawiyas provided pilgrims with food and lodging out of sheer altruism, changed beyond all recognition – the main motivation shifted to the presumed return in the form of political or financial support.16 Due to this, zawiyas also gradually started to serve their guests with food of different qualities, on the basis of “selective generosity,” or according to their guests’ social status. This profitable aspect gained a complete majority in the 17th century. Nevertheless, the help provided for the hungry enabled zawiyas to maintain their popularity and they remained a potential threat to successive governments since they were able to draw on mass support and turn against their benefactors. These concerns were more than substantiated and many Sufi orders in fact turned into reform movements, proclaiming the end of despotism and the introduction of egalitarianism. It is not surprising that, on the rhetorical level, zawiyas were able to prove their credentials for establishing such equality, namely through their “charitable” work and “care” for the poor. Financing of Education Charitable foundations played a crucial role in the formation of a dogmatic and legal Islam as well. As with the zawiyas, these educational waqfs were also linked to certain social groups. Islamic law does not allow the foundation of a waqf to benefit an unspecified person. This applies especially for family waqfs. But in spite of that, as far as the purely charitable foundations were concerned, it was possible not to specify the recipient; only a general designation such as, for example, “those who seek knowledge” (i.e. students) was necessary. Seeking of knowledge (‘ilm) has traditionally been perceived as a form of worship (‘ibada) and a “light” leading to the truth. While some people tried to recognize God through a mystical experience, others searched for logical reasons which served their dogmatic or legal position. This gave rise to specific foundations which were closely connected with certain groups and strata of society. Just as they are often currently regarded, educational institutions in the medieval Islamic world were seen as charitable organizations par excellence. Typical examples of this are madrasas, a kind of law college.17 Nevertheless, not even in this case had the support of education been motivated by a charitable will of the sovereign; it had much higher aims. It became a symbol of political power and dominance over religious scholars. This was further enhanced by the fact that the founders had a perfect right to restrict newly established madrasas to teachers and students of their liking. Madrasas were important institutions for transferring and maintaining legal, or rather religious, thinking over the centuries up to the present 134 • ONDREJ BERANEK day. Their primary political function quite often consisted in challenging and refuting Shiite propaganda and establishing an array of their own scholars, wellversed in the field pertaining to a certain school of law. In this manner, the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i, and finally Hanbali schools of law were established. These madrasas contributed to the fact that, later on, the once popular and more religious than legal “Sunni” schools of law virtually ceased to exist. They had no chance against the other four schools in transferring their ideological content from one generation to the other without receiving state support through the system of madrasas and state owned waqfs. The basic principle of theses waqfs was that nothing could take place in them which would contradict the tenets of Islam. Consequently, this principle guaranteed the traditionalist evolution of madrasas – mainly the Hanbali School of law – and the teaching of rationalist theology there could not be carried on openly.18 Tuition at madrasas was free of charge and the facilities were financed by one or several waqfs. Nevertheless, this civilizational achievement also brought about some pitfalls. Although originally – from the historic point of view – some madrasas succeeded in preserving a certain kind of independence from the state, later on they completely fell under its power. The expenses related to the foundation and maintenance of Quranic schools were not very high. Yet, due to their enormous impact, these represented, apparently, the most effectively spent finances. The establishment of Quranic schools survived even into the Mamluk era, although from the 11th century the patrons had started to show a preference for financing law colleges as their main educational facilities. But even so, Quranic schools aimed at supporting the education of orphans managed to prevail and became part of the larger complexes affiliated to madrasas. The care of orphans by medieval Muslim society helps us to clarify some aspects of its charitable thinking. Besides religion, it was largely influenced by cultural values, which particularly emphasized the education of unprovided-for children. Education itself had an immense significance and served as a means of preserving culture. This in turn helps us to understand why, in medieval times, Islamic charity shifted its focus from the poor to the mystics and scholars. Islamic charity was much more focused on society as a whole than on its individuals.19 The maintenance of hospitals (bimaristan) belonged to a special category of charity.20 Very quickly, these hospitals became common urban institutions in big centers such as Baghdad or Cairo and also spread to provincial towns. The foundation charters of hospitals (waqfiya) explicitly stipulated how much money should be spent on doctors and nurses, and how much on the sick and the maintenance of the building itself. Nevertheless, as applied to other institutions as well as Islamic hospitals, it is hardly possible to differentiate between the ideal stipulations stated in their foundation charters and everyday practice. Some charters have been preserved, but what has not been preserved are any detailed documents identifying how long, or to what extent, the original intentions were fulfilled. From the preserved records, however, we can assume that from as early as the 15th century hospitals were affected by fraud and general neglect. The original idea of the hospitals was to take care of The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future • 135 people who, for various reasons, had become unable to take care of themselves. Thus, hospitals fell into the group of institutions which also included soup kitchens (imaret in Turkish), which had a role in handing out soup to the poor or students of madrasas. The imarets, usually public kitchens that were part of a mosque and were founded through waqfs, belong to a typical class of institution found in the Ottoman Empire. Apart from the formal expression of devotion and charity, their secondary aim also lay in the consolidation of Ottoman rule and the Islamization of formerly non-Islamic regions through the development of new urban centers.21 Medieval Islamic Charity: quid pro quo Just as is the case with any charitable donations anywhere else, in medieval Islam the donors had varied reasons which guided their benevolence. By and large, it can be said that whether the charitable donations were provided by the Abbasid caliphs, Fatimid imams, Ottoman sultans or ordinary people, the motivation was primarily concerned with personal salvation. Apart from that, an act pleasing to God (qurba), the purification of property and the raising of one’s own or family prestige all constituted other significant sources of religious motivation. However, this does not mean that the medieval provision of alms, especially by the ruling class, was not misused and had no secondary aims. As Shelomo Dov Goitein (1900–85) has put it: “Members of the ruling class or otherwise wealthy people, after having drained the population, often returned to it a part of the spoils in the form of pious foundations, or other charitable works, made to save the donor on the Day of Judgment.”22 The very nature of charity was itself prone to all possible kinds of manipulation, which served a variety of political aims. Instances attesting to such misuse were documented in the works of many Islamic historians and biographers. The main goal of such charitable donations was usually to get the public on the side of the new regime. Sovereigns also frequently distributed charity when faced with the threat of riots or revolts and the palace granaries were also opened in times of famine. Very often, the administrators of waqfs were put under pressure to use their revenues for goals other than those stipulated in the founding charters. Moreover, in cases of disobedience, the foundations were frequently confiscated. Bearing the supposed divine nature of the waqfs in mind – in theory, they all belong to God – such a finding may sound surprising. Whatever the reason that lay behind the charity of Muslim leaders, it contributed to the creation of a picture of them as being fathers caring for the welfare of their subjects. With this in mind, new gifts and charitable donations in 19th century Egypt were always announced as deriving from the “beneficence of the khedive” (ihsanan min al-khidiw). At least until the end of the 18th century, it had also been the common practice of the Ottoman sultans to hand out alms to the poor and needy once a week. The rulers’ benefaction was aimed at contributing to the picture of a cherished “monarch” and at creating an intimate bond between him and the poor. Their charitable work thus fully demonstrated the signs of reciprocity of the gift, as 136 • ONDREJ BERANEK outlined in Marcel Mauss’s pioneering essay.23 In these situations, the sultans were expressing their care for the poor, who were expected to return the favor to the ruler in the form of loyalty and love. Nevertheless, the granting of charity for political purposes was in no way an invention of the Ottoman sultans. This type of charity, in the form of the granting of gifts, had been connected with the demonstration of power since the very beginnings of Islam.24 Given their ideological terminology and the aims for which they were intended to serve, the Islamic waqfs and the voluntary charities exceed the borders of the traditional definition of philanthropy. They originated in an environment that was strongly influenced by Islamic dogma and which, since its very beginnings, had not only aimed at regulating the sphere of worship but had also sought to control all fields of human activity and existence. In Islamic political discourse, the general welfare of the umma (community of believers) was accorded central significance. Due to this, contributions to virtually any aspect of the umma’s life should enable the benefactor to draw closer to God and were perceived by society as charitable donations. For this reason, M. G. S. Hodgson (1922–68), a prominent Middle Eastern historian, does not describe the waqfs as institutions concentrating on philanthropy, but as a means of financing Islam.25 At least on the rhetorical level, the poor (fuqara’, masakin) always ranged among the most deserving recipients of all kinds of charity.The support of these groups was also described as the ideal aim of the waqfs. That is why Ahmad ibn Umar al-Khassaf (d. 874/875), the author of one of the earliest treatises on the waqfs, wrote that if someone founded a waqf without mentioning its legitimate recipients, then the revenue should be directed into the hands of the poor.26 Nevertheless, this vaguely defined category of “the poor” spread rapidly and also included people fulfilling various religious functions: Quran reciters, religious scholars working for mosques and madrasas, members of the Sufi orders, and Shari‘a experts (fuqaha’) among others. This happened in spite of the fact that the waqfs, from which the mosques and other institutions were able to benefit, were originally meant to provide only for the maintenance of the buildings, and not for the salaries of their employees. This argument was based on al-Khassaf, who expressly forbade the use of waqfs for the profit of Islamic scholars and other people who could not be regarded as poor.27 Nevertheless, it was exactly these categories of people who gradually became the most frequent recipients of revenues from the waqfs. Based on a study of the foundation charters, it is quite evident that the term “the poor” gained a completely new meaning over the centuries. Apart from the original meaning, relating to the economic situation, the term began to also encompass modesty, humility, devoutness, and comprised especially religious clerics (‘ulama’) and members of the Sufi orders. Occasionally it even happened that rulers such as the Ayyubid sultan in Egypt, al-Malik al-Kamil (1180–1238), preferred to pay out zakat to jurists and mystics to such an extent that nothing was left for the poor themselves. Such behavior was apparently not only the result of the momentary caprice of the sovereign, but fully reflected the shifts in strategic The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future • 137 thinking. The recipients came mostly from the legal and religious circles that played a crucial role for the regime, and were carefully selected for political reasons.28 To sum up, the answer to the question as to what extent the medieval Islamic states cared for the welfare and social security of their subjects, is a very difficult one to answer. But, as I have attempted to demonstrate, among other things, Islamic regimes have always used charity as a means of providing help to the religious establishment, which they also supported with a number of administrative provisions. This support, although quite often directed by pure religious thinking, was motivated both politically and socially. To a large degree, it reflected the endeavor of the governments to legitimize their rule and to gain social recognition. The Problem with Contemporary Islamic Charitable Organizations After having provided an historical overview it might be useful to focus on the (mis)use of charity in modern times and some key events and actors that have helped to form its shape. After 9/11, Islam and especially some acts of violence committed by its followers, received unprecedented publicity. Within this context, the focus of the Western intelligence services was aimed at Islamic charitable organizations. The reason for this arose from the fact that some of the money that had been intended for “charitable” purposes eventually found its way into terrorist bank accounts. For many people, mainly those less informed or those influenced by the media, such incidents have nourished the worst stereotypical general views of Islam. Islamic charitable organizations gain large amounts of charity donations every year.29 The vast part of the money goes abroad to help those suffering in regions stricken by famine, natural catastrophes or war crimes. Since Islam is a missionary religion, part of the assets is spent on the propagation of Islam itself. Many of the mosques or Islamic educational centers that have been built all around the world are a direct result of these expenditures. Another part of alms money is spent on development projects in the countries of their origin. This activity is especially important in those areas where the state is unable to cater for the basic social and health services. In this sense, Islamic charitable organizations represent an integral part of Muslim states and their economies. It is not necessary to emphasize that most Islamic charitable organizations are founded with a genuine desire to help those in need. They try to promote socioeconomic development, especially in places where the state is unable to cater for basic social services on its own. In addition, Islamic charitable organizations are far from being a homogeneous group and, more importantly, they do not need to abide by religious rules. Very often they use Islamic symbols only as a means of meeting public expectations and in order to acquire the necessary legitimacy and cultural authenticity. Though most Islamic charitable organizations focus purely on humanitarian activities, some of them, unfortunately, have become one of the sources of funding for radical movements. 138 • ONDREJ BERANEK Undoubtedly, these organizations also have a great potential for social and political mobilization. This reinforces the concerns about their capability to raise funds for radical groups. Such a concern is often connected with the Hamas or Hizballah movements, which face the accusation of diverting charitable funds to finance their military activities and facilities. Other organizations have either granted funds to Islamic radicals or have not succeeded in preventing their misuse for terrorist operations. Due to the authoritarian nature of many Middle Eastern countries, such an organizational network forms part of the social structure and is quite often used as the driving force in reaching several political, social, and economic aims. Furthermore, contributions from charitable organizations have formed a significant part of the financial networks of various transnational terrorist movements. Activities of such movements, nowadays, have a global impact. Since the attacks of 9/11, whenever a culprit is being searched, the biggest Islamic charitable organizations become the most natural target for accusations of supporting terrorism. This has been due to the fact that these organizations mostly work in dozens of countries and have a broad network of donors and recipients, which results in a higher risk of misuse. In this respect, the organizations from the Gulf, guided by the strict Salafi interpretation of Islam, are undoubtedly the most problematic bodies, being – although this is not universally valid – much more prone to providing financial support to radical or militant movements. In spite of this, it would be wrong to conclude that Islamic charities are able to develop a terrorist infrastructure on their own. Most Middle Eastern countries have strong authoritarian traits and it is very doubtful that they would allow the foundation of organizations supporting jihadi ideology. This is only true in cases where such measures serve the state’s interests. In such situations, the state not only sanctions the activities of charitable organizations but, in many instances, also supports and finances them. One of the main impetuses for national states to get involved in these activities, as Ira M. Lapidus has aptly put it, is motivated by their efforts to “shift Islamic discourse and action toward non-political goals consistent with their own existence. Ethnic associations, educational, da‘wa (missionary), welfare and charity enterprises provide an outlet for Muslim activism and form a counterpoint to politicized national or transnational action.”30 That this effort has the potential to backfire has been demonstrated more than once. The Afghani Jihad Probably the most important event in modern history which helped to define – among other things – the aims and the shape of Islamic charitable organizations for several decades to come, was the Soviet war in Afghanistan in 1979–89. With the covert support of the U.S., Islamists took control over the distribution of “humanitarian” aid, always keeping in mind their own interests. At that time, the Americans had not yet anticipated that the mujahids would eventually turn against them. The war having ended and the geopolitical situation having changed, the “freedom fighters” The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future • 139 suddenly became unwanted political radicals and religious fanatics. Many of them found a safe haven in Sudan, whose revolutionary Islamist government welcomed them with open arms. From here, they headed for regions where Muslims were participating in armed conflicts (Bosnia, Chechnya), or for places where the spread of their version of Islam required stronger arguments (Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa).31 Their doctrine of jihad and da‘wa put down roots even in the West, where the activity soon resulted in bitter fruits tasted first by the U.S. on 9/11. Terrorist attacks in Europe – Madrid, London and Amsterdam – and many other places followed. The war in Afghanistan led to the establishment of a transnational network of more or less formal and virtually independent organizations, which are usually convinced of their duty to protect Muslims in danger. An important link for the generation of older Islamists became the mutual referential point embodied in Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam, whom many of them knew personally.32 Azzam himself had rich experience with charitable work, as he had been nominated by Saudi Arabia as the head of the Peshawar branch of the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-‘alam al-islami), which was responsible for coordinating the activities of Islamic humanitarian organizations. Azzam was later joined by the then twentytwo year old Osama bin Laden, whom Azzam already knew from his work in Saudi Arabia. In 1984, the two men founded together an organization called the Services Office for the Arab mujahids (Maktab al-khadamat li’l-mujahidin al‘arab) in Peshawar, which later on gave birth to the al-Qaeda movement. This Office received the majority of its funds from Saudi Arabia – part was coming directly from the Saudi government, part through the alms collections in mosques, and another part from rich businessmen and members of the ruling family in the form of sadaqa. Among the important subscribers and supporters, for instance, could be found Salman ibn Abdalaziz, the governor of Riyadh, and Sheikh Ibn Baz, the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia at the time. But a funding source that should not to be overlooked was provided by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Through their Office, Azzam and Bin Laden were able to spread Afghan jihad propaganda and participated in accumulating the money necessary for the indoctrination and training of thousands of Muslims. With its branches in 35 countries, including the U.S., the Office also recruited new mujahids and enabled them to access the country. Azzam also gave work to hundreds of radical preachers from the Gulf. When the anti-Soviet revolt successfully reached its end, Azzam helped to redirect the mujahids’ fervor to other targets. This was partly due to his concern that the mujahids “could turn into bandits that might threaten people’s security and would not let them live in peace.”33 The fragile political situation in the Middle East at the end of the Afghan jihad helped in the internationalization of alQaeda and gave it a global shape. Excited by the defeat of the “empire of evil,” the mujahids returned to their homes wanting to introduce radical social and political changes. The Americans also withdrew their support from Afghanistan, leaving 140 • ONDREJ BERANEK many of the mujahids with the feeling of having been misused by their Western “allies” and abandoned by them at a moment when help from abroad was most vital and the country’s stability critically depended on it. Even before the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989, alQaeda had begun to export its socioeconomic, political, and military structure from Afghanistan to regional conflicts in which Islamic fighters were participating – particularly to Kashmir, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Mindanao, Yemen, Algeria, and Egypt. Under the guise of various charitable organizations, al-Qaeda established a hold in these regions, financing many militias and helping with their training. It also concentrated its activities on developing a network in relatively unprotected areas – Europe and North America. The organization skillfully succeeded in misusing both tolerance and freedom in these countries and thanks to its cadres, it managed to take over many Islamic communities and centers. Al-Qaeda’s activities also included the recruitment of imams and other employees of mosques. It also achieved great success in the field of charitable organizations, taking control over a large number of them. When Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait, thus provoking the first Gulf War that would lead to the deployment of half a million foreign soldiers in Saudi Arabia, many Afghan mujahids began to view the U.S. as the new chief enemy. Saudi Arabia and its Charities For the Islamic charitable organizations, Saudi Arabia had been the largest donor of money for many decades. Apart from this, the country also began facing the suspicion that it had been the most generous provider of help to al-Qaeda. The U.S. government was convinced that money from various international charitable organizations which was officially provided for humanitarian aid in the Middle East, had been, in fact, often misused – with the knowledge of the donors – and had provided support for terrorism.34 Even by 1996, the CIA had issued a secret report for the Pentagon stating details about how prominent Islamic charitable organizations were supporting terrorism. The CIA mentioned in its report that approximately one third of 50 international Islamic charitable organizations were supporting terrorism or employing individuals suspected of being linked to terrorist networks.35 Most of these organizations came from Saudi Arabia. Also, after 9/11, the U.S. Treasury designated a number of charitable organizations with links to Saudi Arabia as financing terrorist activities. Two factors crucially contributed to the Saudi support for the Islamic cause. The first is linked with the ideological situation in the Middle East at the end of the 1960s. At this time, the Arab world was characterized by the Arab nationalism movements embodied in Egyptian Nasserism as well as the Syrian and Iraqi Baathism. Thus, the Saudi rulers affiliated themselves with Islam, seeking in it the defense of both their integrity and legitimacy as the government. They reacted to the threat of Nasser’s pan-Arabism by proclaiming a new doctrine of Islamic solidarity. For that The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future • 141 reason, they started spreading their pan-Islamic mission to all Muslim countries. This activity gained a new dimension during the Iranian revolution in 1979 since this event threatened to activate the Shiites in the Muslim world. In 1979, Saudi Arabia was also experiencing its own problems with the Islamic opposition and this culminated in the seizure of the Great Mosque in Mecca. The Saudi regime tried to divert the religious zeal of Islamists somewhere else in order to pre-empt their possible criticism of the way they were governing. Supporting the Afghan resistance movement seemed rather convenient at that time. Part of the aid was collected directly, but most of the money came from Islamic charitable organizations, thus enabling “holy warriors” to reach the border regions as had happened earlier in the case of the medieval Tarsus. The second factor which enabled Saudi Arabia to finance its vast propagation campaign is related to the rocketing oil prices after 1973. Thanks to this undreamt of wealth, the country was able to start financing the construction of religious centers. With the growing wealth, rich businessmen and members of the ruling family also felt an urge to “purify” their property in the eyes of their fellow citizens. They did so through the pious acts of zakat, sadaqa, and also through establishing waqfs. In many cases, they did not bother to take an interest in the fate of their money. Thanks to its vast oil resources, Saudi Arabia in the last four decades has succeeded in creating a whole range of charitable and other organizations, whose central agenda lies in the promotion of the Salafi interpretation of Islam all over the world. But in this case, we can hardly speak of non-governmental charitable organizations, since the largest ones, including the Muslim World League and al-Haramain, were founded, controlled, and financed by the Saudi government. From the mid-1970s, Saudi Arabia has spent several billion dollars on its “foreign development aid.” At the beginning, the recipients were recruited from the Muslim world, but from the 1980s onwards, Saudi Arabia also started to generously support Muslim communities in otherwise non-Islamic countries – especially in Europe and North America. Numerous countries in Asia and Africa also benefited from the Saudi commitment to spread Islam. King Fahd (1921–2005) alone spent several billion dollars on the construction of two hundreds Islamic centers and on the support of more than 1,500 mosques as well as almost two thousands schools in non-Islamic countries in Europe, South and North America, Australia, and Asia.36 On all occasions, the main aim has been to support the Saudi Salafi interpretation of Islam. King Fahd’s example was shortly followed by other significant members of the Saudi ruling family. Saudi organizations devoted to the promotion of Salafi Islam also started printing millions of copies of the Quran and other religious works and distributing them all over the world. In many places, these organizations established firm contacts with similarly thinking ultraconservative Islamic groups and financed their further education in the Salafi doctrine. Due to its vigorous character, Salafism set firm roots among Muslims in the U.S., Africa, and Southeast Asia. Although it does not represent the prevailing Muslim thought, this ideology serves as the driving force, both psychological and religious, for militant Islamist 142 • ONDREJ BERANEK activities. Islamic extremism is far from being the dominant force within Islam, but due to the oil-money and the activities of many doubtful charitable organizations and Muslim associations, it is gaining support in many impoverished Muslim communities. The fact that Saudi Arabia’s oil income fell sharply in the first half of the 1980s significantly contributed to the trajectory of the Saudi charitable organizations. The government was no longer able to finance the Afghan jihad as generously as it had done before, so it mobilized the public. This increased the influence of the private sector and strengthened the businessmen and bankers who, on many occasions, founded their own charitable organizations. The endeavor to maintain the influx of humanitarian aid into Afghanistan at any price resulted in the Saudi government losing control over the flow and the use of charitable donations. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the process of financing the expansion of Islam to various resistance movements through Islamic charitable organizations was firmly established.37 Although Saudi Arabia was aware of this, it chose not to interfere in this tradition, all the more so since this development brought about short term benefits. After 9/11, when many negative facts concerning its religious and financial practices had come to light, Saudi Arabia made a significant effort to embellish its image. On the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution 1267, for instance, the Saudi government froze the Taliban’s assets. Apart from that, Saudi Arabia reformed its security system and started to supervise many charitable organizations based in its territory. In spite of this, Saudi Arabia continued to regardterrorism as a purely U.S. problem. It was forced to change its view on this on May 12, 2003, when several bomb attacks were carried out on its territory and these were swiftly followed by other incidents. After this, it became apparent that many charitable organizations were still supporting al-Qaeda’s activities on the Arabian Peninsula. Apart from introducing many legal regulations and bringing stricter rules to apply to the work of charitable organizations, the government issued a provision that was aimed at abolishing the omnipresent boxes for charitable contributions placed at many shops or mosques. This provision was adopted after it came to light that many of these boxes were run by Islamists who coaxed the money for their activities out of people’s pockets with inscriptions such as “help the orphans.” Despite several positive steps towards the regulation of the sending of charitable contributions overseas, there still exists a concern that there is a capacity for Saudi individuals and charitable organizations to support terrorism outside Saudi Arabia.38 Over the last few decades, Saudi Arabia has been gaining significant influence, especially in Southeast Asia, in the field of education and with its “generous” financial gifts it has been able to promote the Salafi interpretation of Islam. A whole range of schools financed by Saudis are able to offer free education to everyone who adopts the Salafi indoctrination. Many promising students are also offered free study at Saudi Islamic universities. Thus, Saudi money plays an important role in the spread of extremism in areas where the practice of Islam had been relatively The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future • 143 moderate until the 1990s. Although in many cases in the past the Saudi government has promised to close down the doubtful foundations, in reality they were at most just renamed and have continued in their activities. The Muslim Brotherhood and Palestine Embezzlement of humanitarian aid constituted a serious problem of everyday life in Palestine.39 On many occasions, charitable money finally landed up in various private accounts. The greed and corruption within the Palestinian authority left room for the Palestinians as far as the provision of basic services was concerned. This was a chance the Islamists could just not let pass. Apart from the foundations controlled by the secular PLO – even though Arafat carefully maintained his media image as a devout Muslim and Islam has always played an important role in Palestinian charitable work – purely Islamic foundations were also established. These were connected with the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and those of its successor organization – the Hamas movement. The Muslim Brotherhood undoubtedly represents the most important 20th century Islamic movement. Its influence is evident both in radical and militant groups (Hamas, al-Gama‘a al-islamiyya, to name just a few) and in outwardly moderate movements – especially in the West. Beginning in 1967, the Muslim Brotherhood has also managed to firmly establish mechanisms for spreading its ideology. One of the most effective ways was to found Islamic charitable organizations which supervised religious schools. The Brothers also used zakat to help thousands of poor families and students.40 In Arab countries, people often speak about this or that branch (Syrian, Jordanian, Palestinian, among others) of the Muslim Brotherhood, but in a broader context, this regionalism loses its ideological grounding. In spite of differing streams of opinion and a significant ideological fragmentation, individual groups within the Brotherhood cooperate and act in solidarity with each other. The common objective of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as its successor movements, is the idea of establishing an Islamic state which will be governed by the Quran and follow the example of the prophet Muhammad and the first “correctly-guided” Muslims. More detailed ideas about the nature of such a state and the way to arrive at its establishment remain the issue of ideological and political disputes. In reality, we can find a compromise between sheer idealism and political pragmatism.41 With the movement’s expansion, it speedily blended with the local radical and militant groups, and the Brothers were able to apply their rich experience in the field of social organization, political mobility, and activism. Thanks to this elaborate organizational structure, they succeeded in creating a sophisticated network reaching from the Middle East, across North Africa, the Horn of Africa and, from the Islamic point of view, the peripheral region of the Indian Ocean. Since the 1960s, the Muslim Brothers have also been operating in Western Europe and the U.S. In addition, the growth of the mass media, which the Brothers used not only 144 • ONDREJ BERANEK for their da‘wa but also for the development of the Islamic economy, contributed to the global character of the movement. In Palestine, the Brotherhood founded kindergartens, religious schools, libraries, sport and social clubs, but also provided financial support for students at Islamic universities. It also helped Palestinian families in need with gifts from the money gained from alms collections. The movement had great influence due to the waqfs. Not only did it own religious institutions, but also real estate or agricultural land. Nevertheless, the mosques became the most important means of promoting the Brotherhood’s influence. Thanks to the Brotherhood, the number of mosques in Palestine rapidly increased. In 1987, the movement controlled an estimated 40% of the mosques in Gaza.42 Saudi Arabia, which had been becoming more active concerning the Palestinian cause and Islamic politics in general, abundantly contributed to the construction of the mosques. Consequently, Islamic social welfare activism can indeed be seen as the main reason for the growth and enduring popularity of the Islamist movement. Most of the income of Hamas, reaching a level of tens of millions of dollars annually, comes from outside Palestine. Among the donors there are several foreign charitable organizations, corporations as well as criminal organizations, rich individuals, and even naive philanthropists. They not only come from countries such as Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, but also from Europe and the U.S. The Israeli secret service divides Islamic charitable organizations into two groups, with the first one being those organizations linked exclusively to, and established by the Hamas leadership with the objective of accumulating money. According to a modest estimation from 2004, for instance, they provide for an annual income of 15–20 million dollars.43 The second group comprises those charitable organizations providing help for radical Islamist organizations in general. The majority comes from the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. Some donors know relatively clearly where their money is headed. Yet others, having become the victims of a sly medial strategy and an effective propaganda campaign, act in good faith and seek only to help needy Palestinians and their families. An indirect way in which the believers’ charity and devoutness is misused is in relation to the payment of the zakat. Many organizations entrusted with its collection transfer the zakat via a sophisticated network from one organization to another, with one of the final recipients being the Hamas movement. Conclusion The ideal of charity is deeply rooted in all monotheistic religions. Hence it would be wrong to exclude Islamic charity from this tradition. The problems connected with some of its forms are not to be seen as flaws in the teaching of Islam. They originate from (mis)interpretations by some countries, organizations or individuals who misuse the noble ideal in order to fulfill their own political and ideological objectives. Throughout the history of Islam, members of the leading classes and The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future • 145 social elites have always played a key role in charitable activities. Nevertheless, in contrast to the original unselfish concept of the zakat, not even their charitable deeds were always motivated purely by the intention to help those in need. Charitable services as such were planted within a larger ideological scheme of islamizing and reislamizing society. Revenues from the pious endowments have also always been part of the rulers’ effort to transform the newly-acquired areas into Muslim lands. Although the medieval Muslim communities remembered the poor, the sick, the orphans and the widows in general terms, the focus of Islamic charitable work shifted to the welfare of the Muslim community as a whole. Solving an individual’s material problems was not viewed as the key component of charitable work. The question as to who deserves to receive charitable gifts has been a complicated issue since the very beginnings of Islam. This problem stems from the fact that the category of “need” and “poverty” in Islam was already viewed in medieval times in different terms than the way in which we usually perceive it today, i.e. through the prism of socio-economic criteria. It became common practice that people who were somehow crucial to the regime also fell into this category – this was the case of Islamic scholars and lawyers in the first instance. Also, in the past few years, the category has changed its shape significantly. Of course, the emphasis is still put on the needy – orphans, widows, the handicapped, the old, and the sick. But three other categories have gained importance. Among the first group belong refugees, a kind of a contemporary equivalent of the traveler in trouble. This category is especially important because the majority of today’s refugees are Muslims. Prisoners and their family members fall into the second, rapidly growing category.44 The third and probably most widespread group is broadly defined as those who endeavor to promote and defend Islam. Another important political aspect of the provision of charity has almost always been connected with the issue of power legitimization. In the rather segmented society divided into tribes, clans, and various confessional and ethnic groups in which power has been applied mainly through clientelism during the history of Islam, social status has always had to be secured with the help of the pretentious distribution of gifts and the demonstration of goodwill. That is what the gift, in its manifold forms, was aimed at securing. In addition, charity has always been a very effective way of demonstrating one’s own generosity and ensuring the recipient’s favor as well. Only rarely did pure altruism play a role in relation to the generosity of the ruling power. The donors, as is also the case nowadays, expected political support and loyalty in return for their “benevolence.” After 9/11, when the Islamic charities came under heavy criticism from the West, Muslim communities expressed legitimate concerns regarding the overreaction against their charitable work as this had created an organic and vital part of their faith. On the other hand, they had to remember that the misuse of charitable donations carried with it serious risks and raised genuine policy dilemmas, and there was a need, therefore, to provide for a higher degree of transparency in the activities of the charitable organizations. Because of its prevailing anonymity – which, after 146 • ONDREJ BERANEK all, is also called for by other monotheistic religions – , unclearly set rules, and the non-existence of a central supervising body, the zakat system is an easy target for misuse. Even in the countries where such a system is considered a “religious tax,” it does not receive the same transparency and is not recorded in the same way as in Western tax systems. For a very long time, it has been the opinion of many that the mere act of donation itself is the most important aspect and this approach has dominated the world of Islamic charities. The need to verify how the recipient spent the charitable donations has not been regarded as being important by many, because “God will settle the accounts with them on the Day of Judgment.”45 The important question remains as to how to establish harmony between the charitable sector’s independent character and the need for sufficient controls that will ultimately lead to the prevention of financial fraud. It is evident that the ostracization of Islamic charitable organizations, promoted especially in the name of the “global war on terror” in a very contentious environment, is not the most appropriate response. This has only led to a loss of contacts with their Western counterparts, thus widening the gap between the two sides. It has also resulted in driving money underground.46 At the same time, a number of donors have ceased to support these organizations out of a fear that they might otherwise be accused of supporting terrorism and consequently criminalized and black-listed under U.S. law. In general, the field of studies in relation to Islamic charity is permeated with a whole range of erroneous and naive ideas and facts that are “too good” to warrant checking for accuracy. There is no doubt as to the importance of supporting and helping neighbors and people in need. Also, the role of individual charitable activities provided by Muslims with the noblest intentions, whose numerous manifestations have not been mentioned in the previous pages, cannot be underestimated or ignored. On the other hand, it is more than likely that in the years to come the universal ideal of charity, especially in its institutionalized form, will be dominated by political ambitions rather than by the desire to provide real care for people in need. Notes 1 2 3 4 Raymond Firth, Religion: A Humanist Interpretation, 211. This is the case with regard to J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms For Jihad; Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks; Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed – and How to Stop it, among others. The realm of Shia Islam, or in this case more specifically the Iranian bonyads and their contacts with Hizballah, is beyond the scope of this study. For this subject, see Suzanne Maloney, “Agents or Obstacles? Parastatal Foundations and Chalenge for Iranian Development;”Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History; David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power; or Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. The literature on Salafism has been significantly enriched in recent years. See, mainly, Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009; Quintan Wictorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.” Studies The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 • 147 in Conflict and Terrorism 29, 3 (April–May 2006), 207–39; or Stéphane Lacroix and Thomas Hegghammer, “Saudi Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?” International Crisis Group, Middle East Report, no. 31, 12 September 2004. The literature on zakat, or the basic ideal of Islamic charity and its place in the Islamic economy, is abundant. See, among others, Abd al-Rahman Hasan Habannaka al-Maydani, Taysir fiqh faridat al-zakat: tabyin wa taqnin wa tarjih; Muhammad Mundhir Qahf, Iqtisadiyat al-zakat, Economics of Zakat; Abd al-Karim Zaydan, Al-zakat wa ahkamuha fi ’l-islam; C. Snouck Hurgronje, “On the Institution of Zakat.” In Gerald Hawting (ed.), The Development of Islamic Ritual; Yusuf al-Qardawi, Fiqh az-Zakat. A Comparative Study: the Rules, Regulations and Philosophy of Zakat in the Light of the Qur‘an and Sunna; Rober D. McChesney, “Charity and Philanthropy in Islam: Institutionalizing the Call to Do Good;” Ahmed El-Ashker and Rodney Wilson, Islamic Economics: A Short History; Nicolas P. Aghnides, Mohammedan Theories of Finance; Timur Kuran, “The Economic system in Contemporary Islamic Thought;” idem, Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism; Charles Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism; Muhammad Abdul Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice. Morris Jastrow, “Mohammedanism,” 237. Murat Çizakça, A History of Philanthropic Organizations, xii. For one of the most vivid insights into the world of medieval Islamic charities, see Yaacov Lev, Charity, Endowments, and Charitable Institutions in Medieval Islam. Furthermore, see also Amy Singer, Charity in Islamic Societies; Michael Bonner, Mine Ener and Amy Singer (eds.), Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts; Norman A. Stillman, “Charity and Social Service in Medieval Islam,” 211–221; or Adam Sabra, Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam. See Miriam Hoexter, Endowments, Rulers, and Community; or Miriam Hoexter, “Charity, the Poor, and Distribution of Alms in Ottoman Algiers,” 145–162. John L. Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia, vol. 1, 360–362. Yaacov Lev, Charity, Endowments, and Charitable Institutions, 7. Yehoshu’a Frenkel, “Political and Social Aspects of Islamic Religious Endowments (“awqaf”),” 1–20. For more details, see Yaacov Lev, Charity, Endowments, and Charitable Institutions, 68–69. Francisco Rodriguez-Mañas, “Charity and Deceit,” 60. For the general picture of the decline of Sufism and its transformation or debasement in the course of medieval times, see A. J. Arberry, Sufism: an Account of the Mystics of Islam. London: Allen & Unwin, 1950; or J. S. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. For the specific case of Maghrib, see Francisco Rodriguez-Mañas, “Charity and Deceit.” Francisco Rodriguez-Mañas, “Charity and Deceit,” 79. For more details about madrasas, see, for example, George Makdisi, “Madrasa and University in the Middle Ages,” 255–264; Roy P. Mottahedeh, “The Transmission of Learning,” 63–72; or Robert W. Hefner, and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds.), Schooling Islam. George Makdisi, “The Significance of the Sunni Schools of Law in Islamic Religious History,” 8. For a deeper analysis of this phenomenon, see Peter Brown, “Remembering the Poor and the Aesthetic of Society.” For more deatils about medieval Islamic hospitals, see Miri Shefer, “Charity and Hospitality,” 121–143; Yasser Tabbaa, “The Functional Aspects of Medieval Islamic Hospitals,” 95–119; or Sami Hamarneh, “Development of Hospitals in Islam,” 366–384. For more details about imarets, see Nina Ergin, Christoph K. Neumann, Amy Singer (eds.), Feeding People, Feeding Power; or Amy Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence. 148 • ONDREJ BERANEK 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 Shelomo D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, vol. II, 91. Marcel Mauss, The Gift. Nadir Özbek, “Imperial Gifts and Sultanic Legitimation During the Late Ottoman Empire,” 203–220. M. G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. II, 124. Miriam Hoexter, “Charity, the Poor, and Distribution of Alms,” 148. Claude Cahen, “Réflexions sur le waqf ancien,” 48. Yaacov Lev, Charity, Endowments, and Charitable Institutions, 17. For a balanced overview of this topic, see Jonathan Benthall, and Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent. Ira M. Lapidus, “Between Universalism and Particularism: the Historical Bases of Muslim Communal, National, and Global Identities,” Global Networks, 1 (2001), 50. For further details about the activities of Islamic charitable organizations in some of the mentioned areas, see, for example, J. Millard Burr, and Robert O. Collins, Alms For Jihad; Jonathan Benthall, and Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent; Alex de Waal (ed.), Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa; Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network; or Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, “NGOs in a Country Without a Government: Islamic Movements and Aspirations to Replace the State in War-torn Somalia.” For useful insights about this part of history, see, for example, Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia; or Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 5. Robert O’Harrow Jr., David S. Hilzenrath, and Karen DeYoung, “Bin Laden’s Money Takes Hidden Paths to Agents of Terror.” Washington Post, September 21, 2001. “CIA Report on Terrorist Abuse of Islamic Charities.” January 1996, 1. Available at http:// intelfiles.egoplex.com/cia-ngos-1996.pdf. David Ottaway, “U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities.” Washington Post, 19 August 2004. J. Millard Burr, and Robert O. Collins, Alms For Jihad, 29. For a recent assessment of Saudi efforts to control its charitable sector, see “Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Needed.” Unites States Goverment Accountability Office, Report to Congerssional Requesters, September 2009, www.gao.gov/new.items/d09883.pdf. For further details, see for example Jon B. Alterman, and Karin von Hippel (eds.), Understanding Islamic Charities, chapter 5. For the Palestinian charities related issues, see, mainly, International Crisis Group, “Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.” This report takes a detailed look at the controversy surrounding Islamic social welfare organizations affiliated with Hamas and proposes some recommendations to all parties involved. Furthermore, see Jonathan Benthall, “The Palestinian Zakat Committees 1993–2007;” Lars Gunnar Lundblad, “Islamic Welfare, Discourse and Practice;” or Matthew Levitt, Hamas. Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, 14–15. For more details about the history and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, see R. P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers; Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: the Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998; or Brigitte Maréchal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse. Leiden: Brill, 2008. For the debates about the contemporary splits within the Muslim Brotherhood see for example Marc Lynch, “The Brotherhood’s Dilemma.” Middle East Brief 25 (Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, January 2008); or Mona El-Ghobashy, “The The (Mis)use of Islamic Charity: Past, Present, and Future 42 43 44 45 46 • 149 Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37 (2005). Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, 15–16. Matthew Levitt, Hamas, 144. For more details about the remarkable spread of Islam in prisons, see, for example, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Prison Jihad? How Radical Islamic Charities Exploit Their Access to the Prison System.” The Weekly Standard, October 12, 2006; or United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of Dr. Michael Waller, Annenberg Professor of International Communication, The Institute of World Politics, October 14, 2003, www.freerepublic.com/ focus/f-news/1039743/posts. For this opinion, see Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, Jihad humanitaire, 332. For the consequences of the attack on Islamic charitable organizations after 9/11, see Jonathan Benthall, “The Overreaction against Islamic Charities,” 6–7. References Abdul Mannan, Muhammad. Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice. Sevenoaks: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986. Abu-Amr, Ziad. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. Aghnides, Nicolas P. Mohammedan Theories of Finance. Lahore: The Premier Books House, 1961. Alterman, Jon B., and Hippel, Karin von (eds.). 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