Mill's Act-Utilitarianism

Mill’s Act-Utilitarianism In my view, the account of Utilitarianism that John Stuart Mill provides in his essay Utilitarianism ​ is a form of Act-Utilitarianism. I believe this because, while there are passages in Mill’s essay that appear to favor a Rule-Utilitarian interpretation, closer analysis reveals that they are not opposed to, and sometimes favor, Act-Utilitarianism. To demonstrate this claim, I will provide two supporting arguments and respond to two arguments favoring the Rule-Utilitarian interpretation. Rule-Utilitarianism is the view which holds that an action is right if and only if it is in keeping with a rule that has better results in relation to the general happiness than any competing rule. Act-Utilitarianism is the view which holds that an action is right if and only if its consequences have the best effect on the general happiness when compared to all available actions. In chapter 2, paragraph ​ 2 of ​Utilitarianism, Mill writes, “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ‘utility’ or ‘the greatest happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” It’s ambiguous whether this statement supports an Act or Rule-Utilitarian interpretation. The key term is the word “tends”. It’s unclear how an individual action, as is required on an Act-Utilitarian interpretation, can tend to produce happiness. It seems like particular actions cannot tend to do anything. They are either successful or unsuccessful at accomplishing a task. On ​the other hand, types of actions ​can have tendencies. For example, ​ while an individual “white lie” may be the best available action in terms of happiness-maximization, lying as a ​type of action causes great harm. Moral rules such as “Do not lie” appeal directly to action-types rather than particular actions, so it appears that Rule-Utilitarianism can account for Mill’s use of the word “tends” while Act-Utilitarianism cannot. The defender of an Act-Utilitarian interpretation can respond by noting that the word “tends” does not necessarily involve action-types. Instead, it could simply mean to “​go or move in a particular direction​”1, as in, “the sunflower currently tends to face the Sun” or “The wind tends towards the East.” This use is appropriate when dealing with particular actions rather than types of actions. Additionally, Mill himself used this meaning of the word when he wrote in his personal letters, “...​the consideration of what would happen if everyone did the same, is the only means we have of discovering the tendency of the act in the particular case.”2 When this alternative definition is taken into account, along with Mill’s support of the definition, Mill’s use of the word provides no evidence favoring a Rule-Utilitarian interpretation and his description of Utilitarianism is shown to be most plausibly viewed as a form of Act-Utilitarianism. The next piece of evidence is Mill’s discussion of moral rules and their relation to the principle of utility. In chapter 2, paragraph 24, Mill discusses how moral rules are developed and Oxford Dictionary - Tend - 2017 Mill, John. 14 Apr 1872 “To John Venn” - A similar use of the word “tendency” can be found in Chapter 7, part​ 2 of Jeremy Bentham’s ​An Introduction To The Principles And Morals Of Legislation: “​The general tendency of an act is more or less pernicious, according to the sum total of its consequences: that is, according to the difference between the sum of such as are good, and the sum of such as are evil.” 1 2 what function they serve. Given the objection that “there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness,” Mill responds that there has been “ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human species. During all that time mankind has been learning by experience the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence as well as all the morality of life are dependant.” It’s from this experience, argues Mill, that we “have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions” and these beliefs constitute “the rules of morality”. As Mill explains, he views moral rules as the product of beliefs regarding how particular actions will affect the general happiness. He notes, however, that these rules are nothing more than the “intermediate generalization” of the first principle. This isn’t to say that these rules are simply “helpful guides”. Mill makes clear, “Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by.” So, while these rules are essential for Mill, they should be understood as tools for determining which actions will produce happiness. They remain “corollaries” that assist agents in applying the basic Act-Utilitarian principle. These two arguments provide the basic framework for understanding Mill as an Act-Utilitarian. However, two important objections to this interpretation must now be discussed. In chapter 2, paragraph 19, Mill writes, “​In the case of abstinences indeed - of things people forbear to do from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial - it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practiced generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it.” While this passage does discuss classes (or types) of actions, which seems to be in line with Rule-Utilitarianism, it must be emphasized that it takes place within the context ​of a larger discussion regarding an individual’s responsibility to take the populace as a whole into account when acting. As he writes, “The amount of regard for the public interest implied in this recognition is no greater than is demanded by every system of morals”. It is plausible to assume that, in this passage, Mill is referring to the undermining influence an action can have upon the rule which prohibits it. If this influence leads to the action being performed more frequently in the future, it will turn out that the action was ultimately harmful when considered beyond the initial effects of the action. This interpretation is completely in line with Mill’s discussion of public interest and influence. Given this context, Mill’s statements should be understood as referring to the influence that the individual’s actions would have on the populace as a whole. In this way, the obligation to abstain from such “generally injurious” actions can be accounted for by Act-Utilitarianism. The second objection is found in chapter 2, paragraph 10, where it is written, “​... ​the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable...is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments...This, being according to the Utilitarian opinion the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality, which may accordingly be defined ‘the rules and precepts for human conduct by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind.’” Here it appears that Mill is explicitly siding with Rule-Utilitarianism. However, given that, in this passage, Mill has already identified the standard of morality with the end of human action (an existence with the greatest possible general happiness), his discussion of rules and precepts should not be viewed as any kind of competing definition or criterion. Rather, Mill should be seen as making the claim that any action that is right according to the Act-Utilitarian principle will be an action that is enjoined by one of the rules or precepts he describes. But actions enjoined by such rules and precepts are not right because they are enjoined, they are right because they have the best effect on the general happiness when compared to all available actions. Nevertheless, as Mill specified in his earlier discussion of the role of moral rules, we require subordinate principles in order to apply the fundamental principle. Mill repeats this claim at the end of chapter 2: “There is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle in not involved”. So the only way for us to determine whether or not an action is right according to Act-Utilitarianism is for us to judge it according to our secondary principles. In sum, while it may seem like Mill is explicitly declaring his allegiance to Rule-Utilitarianism in this passage, a more appropriate reading will view it as claiming that certain rules and precepts are the standard we must use to judge whether or not an action is right according to Act-Utilitarianism.