A comprehensive draft overview of John Stuart Mill's public life and philosophy, including discus... more A comprehensive draft overview of John Stuart Mill's public life and philosophy, including discussion of: 1. A System of Logic. – 2. The Greatest Happiness Principle. – 3. Progress, Liberty, and Democracy. – 4. Equality. – 5. India and Empire. – 6. Distribution, Socialism, and Sustainability.
My aim in this chapter is to place John Stuart Mill’s distinctive utilitarian political philosoph... more My aim in this chapter is to place John Stuart Mill’s distinctive utilitarian political philosophy in the context of the debate about luck, responsibility, and equality. I hope it will reveal the extent to which his utilitarianism provides a helpful framework for synthesizing the competing claims of luck and relational egalitarianism. I attempt to show that when Mill’s distributive justice commitments are not decided by direct appeal to overall happiness, they are guided by three main public principles: an impartiality principle, a sufficiency principle, and a merit principle. The question then becomes how luck and relational considerations figure into his articulation of these public principles. I argue that Anderson is correct that relational egalitarianism is more fundamental than luck and responsibility in Mill’s thought, but I also hope to show that any fleshed out picture of Mill’s reform proposals must recognize his condemnation of the role luck plays in determining the distribution of opportunities and outcomes.
My aim in this chapter is to push back against the tendency to emphasize Mill’s break from Bentha... more My aim in this chapter is to push back against the tendency to emphasize Mill’s break from Bentham rather than his debt to him. Mill made important advances on Bentham’s views, but I believe there remains a shared core to their thinking—over and above their commitment to the principle of utility itself—that has been underappreciated. Essentially, I believe that the structure of Mill’s utilitarian thought owes a great debt to Bentham even if he filled in that structure with a richer conception of human nature and developed it in more liberal directions. This commonality is revealed, in particular, in Mill’s own institutional designs and practical reform proposals in Considerations on Representative Government and related writings. If this is right, then the tendency of interpreters to highlight their differences rather than their similarities has been to the detriment of both Mill and Bentham scholarship, and so to our understanding of the rise of liberal utilitarianism.
This paper explores the surprising ways in which John Stuart Mill works to accommodate the proble... more This paper explores the surprising ways in which John Stuart Mill works to accommodate the problems and insights of the public reason tradition, and the extent to which he makes arguments that can help those working within that tradition. This is important not only for a richer understanding of Mill’s utilitarian ethics and how consequentialists might address themselves to the public reason project, but also for those interested in the ongoing significance of Mill’s liberal principles after the turn to public reason in the work of Rawls, Larmore, Gaus, and others. I try to show how Mill’s utilitarian theory incorporates the claim that the demands of social life require a publicly accepted set of normative expectations to govern judgments about when one has met one’s obligations and, relatedly, about the appropriateness of blame or punishment. For Mill, such a social morality properly regulates these judgments even if it is not ideal, that is, even if it is not the set of rules the adoption of which would collectively maximize utility. Importantly, however, social morality is not static. It shapes our collective existence by defining the proper bounds of our practices of accountability even as it evolves over time.
This draft calls for a return to public philosophy in the spirit of the founders of the journal E... more This draft calls for a return to public philosophy in the spirit of the founders of the journal Ethics. It shows that the journal's principal founder, Felix Adler, had a vision that anticipated in certain ways the political liberalism of John Rawls. A much abbreviated version appeared as "On Felix Adler's 'The Freedom of Ethical Fellowship,'" Ethics 125:1 (October 2014), 208-210.
Central European University Press eBooks, Dec 31, 2023
The idea of "open society" has experienced a small revival within academic political philosophy i... more The idea of "open society" has experienced a small revival within academic political philosophy in the United States since the publication of Gerald Gaus's The Tyranny of the Ideal (2016). 1 Of course, "open society" has been an influential theme in public discourse since Karl Popper published The Open Society and Its Enemies in 1945 (1966a, 1966b), and it has continued to engage thinkers across the political spectrum through the work of the Open Society Foundations, related academic organizations like the Open Society University Network, and think tanks like the Niskanen Center (Niskanen 2022). 2 But within American analytic philosophy departments, the idea of open society has largely ceased to frame debates about the nature of a sustainable liberal political order. This is unfortunate at a time when broad church liberalism needs a robust defense against authoritarian threats, dogmatic partisans, and the decline of liberal democratic norms in many countries. The attention Gaus and others have paid to the idea of open society is, therefore, a welcome development, but I worry that some leading ideas in that revival fail to meet our political moment. In The Tyranny of the Ideal, Gaus reminds us of important core elements of Popper's account of open society: that being committed to justice is not necessarily the same as being committed to one's own current conception of justice, that we should always remain open to critical discussion and social diversity, that this has implications for the way we organize ourselves socially and politically, and that such openness suggests a piecemeal approach to solving social and political problems. Gaus extends this line of thought to contemporary debates within political philosophy, arguing that it should limit the role that ideals of justice play in our current collective decision-making about how to organize ourselves.
Advanced analytics and artificial intelligence are powerful technologies that, along with their b... more Advanced analytics and artificial intelligence are powerful technologies that, along with their benefits, create new threats to privacy, equality, fairness and transparency. Existing law does not yet protect sufficiently against these threats. This has led some organizations to pursue what they call “data ethics” or “AI ethics” in an attempt to bring advanced analytics and AI more into line with societal values and so legitimate their growing use of these technologies.<br><br>To date, much of the scholarship on data ethics has sought either to define the ethical principles to which organization should aspire, or to map out the laws and regulations needed to push organizations towards these ethical goals. While these two lines of inquiry are important, the literature is missing a critical third dimension: empirical work on how organizations are actually governing the threats that their use of advanced analytics and AI can generate. Good regulatory design requires such knowledge. Yet, while there have been important studies of how organizations manage privacy “on the ground” (Bamberger and Mulligan 2015), there has been little such work on the governance of advanced analytics and AI.<br><br>This report begins to fill this gap. Focusing on private sector organizations, the authors interviewed corporate privacy managers deemed by their peers to be leaders in the governance of advanced analytics and AI, as well as the lawyers, consultants and thought leaders who advise them on this topic. They also surveyed a wider range of privacy mangers. The study sought to answer three, fundamental questions about business data ethics management: (1) How do leading companies conceptualize the threats that their use of advanced analytics and AI pose for individuals, groups and the broader society? (2) If it is true that the law does not yet require companies to reduce these risks, then why are they pursuing data ethics? and (3) How are companies pursuing data ethics? What substantive benchmarks, management processes and technological solutions do they use towards this end?<br><br>The authors previously shared on SSRN their preliminary findings. This final report provides a much fuller picture. The report should provide legislators and policymakers with an empirical foundation for their efforts to regulate advanced analytics and AI, at the same time as it gives interested organizations ideas on how to improve their data ethics management.
From its inception in 1890, the International Journal of Ethics ðnow EthicsÞ declared that it was... more From its inception in 1890, the International Journal of Ethics ðnow EthicsÞ declared that it was “devoted to the advancement of ethical knowledge and practice.” Although the latter concern may seem anachronistic, the practical work of the journal’s founders was inspired by an aim shared by today’s public reason liberals and deliberative democrats: establishing a public morality that respects well-intentioned individuals holding a diversity of philosophical and religious commitments. In an essay reflecting on the first volume, Josiah Royce wrote that the ongoing task facing Ethics was that of reconciling “the fullest regard for the ‘independent’ conscience of each man” with “the deepest respect for the authority of the social order.” Felix Adler, the guiding force behind the journal, addresses this problem in “The Freedom of Ethical Fellowship,” from the very first issue. His example also demonstrates that the practical aim of Ethics was notmere window dressing. In 1876, Adler founded the Society for Ethical Culture, the leading organization of the “ethical movement” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Society organized an impressive array of social programs for the poor and working classes, women, and racial minorities. It developed a variety of educational programs and an active publishing arm. Ethics itself grew out of and superseded the Ethical Record, the first official organ of the Society. S. Burns Weston, the Society’s leader in Philadelphia, was managing editor of both publications. Almost every member of its first editorial board was closely associated with the ethical movement: Adler, Stanton Coit ðLon-
Joseph Persky's excellent book, The Political Economy of Progress: John Stuart Mill and Moder... more Joseph Persky's excellent book, The Political Economy of Progress: John Stuart Mill and Modern Radicalism, shows that J. S. Mill's support for socialism is a carefully considered element of his political and economic reform agenda. The key thought underlying Persky's argument is that Mill has an ‘evolutionary theory of justice’, according to which the set of institutions and practices that are appropriate to one state of society should give way to a new set of institutions as circumstances change and the people themselves improve. However, Persky does not spend a great deal of time discussing Mill's theory of reform, in particular the principles he believes should guide our reform efforts. Reflecting on these principles – notably his principle of impartiality or equal treatment – shows the consistency of Mill's thought over time.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, Feb 11, 2019
When and why are inequalities unjust? Luck egalitarians have argued that, as a matter of distribu... more When and why are inequalities unjust? Luck egalitarians have argued that, as a matter of distributive justice, the focus should be on eliminating inequalities resulting from bad brute luck rather than those resulting from personal choice. G.A. Cohen, for instance, writes that his "animating conviction" with respect to distributive justice is that "an unequal distribution whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on the part of (some of) the relevant affected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro tanto, unjust" (Cohen 2008: 7). 1 Luck egalitarianism makes personal responsibility the key factor affecting the justice or injustice of an unequal distribution of goods. It recognizes that in the course of pursuing our life plans, we may voluntarily choose to work more or less to earn certain goods, and we may benefit more or less from taking calculated risks. But it also emphasizes that a great many inequalities are traceable to factors beyond even our partial control, such as the wealth of one's parents or one's natural endowments, and that the influence of these factors on our opportunities and outcomes should be eliminated. Luck egalitarianism has come under fire from relational egalitarians like Elizabeth Anderson (1999; 2010) and Samuel Scheffler (2003; 2005) who argue that, by focusing on responsibility and luck, it loses sight of the core egalitarian justice concern. This core concern, as Anderson puts it, is to resist oppression and to establish a community of social equals (Anderson 1999: 288-289). Because luck egalitarianism, as a matter of distributive justice, allows in principle both extreme poverty and invasive or stigmatizing judgments of personal responsibility for those who have made bad choices, it threatens those individuals' ability to function as free and equal members of the moral community. The point is not just that ne'er-do-wells and criminals retain their basic moral rights. It is that honest, hardworking people who find themselves unable to provide for themselves (e.g., simply because their reasonable calculated risks did not work out) may then be publicly scrutinized for their failures before being provided aid. Relational egalitarians argue that whatever inequalities we allow, they must not undermine people's social dignity. 2 1 There are now many varieties of luck egalitarianism. Other canonical sources include Arneson (2000; 2011), Dworkin (2000), and Roemer (1993; 1996). 2 Luck egalitarians have responded to these and other charges-for instance, by arguing that distributive justice is not the only relevant consideration in many of the challenging cases-and so the debate about egalitarian justice continues. For an effort at reconciliation by a luck egalitarian, 8 Perhaps still the best single exposition of Mill's theory of equality can be found in Berger (1984: 159-204), but see McCabe (manuscript), Persky (2016), Claeys (2013), and Morales (1996). 9 At the time Mill wrote, the great majority of citizens in industrialized nations (and everywhere else) lived in poverty, and it is estimated that perhaps a quarter of UK citizens lived on less than the equivalent of $1/day (Ravallion 2016: 15). 10 Like Bentham, he accepts the egalitarian implications of diminishing marginal utility (see PPE, CW II.225-6). But his egalitarianism does not primarily rest on that point.
John Stuart Mill's defense of freedom of discussion in On Liberty remains a major influence o... more John Stuart Mill's defense of freedom of discussion in On Liberty remains a major influence on philosophical and public debates about free speech. By highlighting underappreciated textual evidence and key distinctions, this introduction attempts to show how the contributions of the symposium authors – Melina Constantine Bell, Rafael Cejudo, Christopher Macleod, and Dale E. Miller – point toward a more complete account of Mill's views.
This paper addresses the question of whether all that unites the main parts of John Stuart Mill’s... more This paper addresses the question of whether all that unites the main parts of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty—the liberty principle, the defense of free discussion, the promotion of individuality, and the claims concerning individual competence about one’s own good—is a general concern with individual liberty, or whether we can say something more concrete about how they are related. I attempt to show that the arguments of On Liberty exemplify Mill’s institutional design approach set out in Considerations of Representative Government and related works. Mill’s approach reflects both his debt to Bentham and his own progressive development of the utilitarian tradition. The paper proceeds by setting out the elements of Mill’s institutional designs and then showing that On Liberty neatly applies them, thereby clarifying the structure of the arguments of On Liberty.
A comprehensive draft overview of John Stuart Mill's public life and philosophy, including discus... more A comprehensive draft overview of John Stuart Mill's public life and philosophy, including discussion of: 1. A System of Logic. – 2. The Greatest Happiness Principle. – 3. Progress, Liberty, and Democracy. – 4. Equality. – 5. India and Empire. – 6. Distribution, Socialism, and Sustainability.
My aim in this chapter is to place John Stuart Mill’s distinctive utilitarian political philosoph... more My aim in this chapter is to place John Stuart Mill’s distinctive utilitarian political philosophy in the context of the debate about luck, responsibility, and equality. I hope it will reveal the extent to which his utilitarianism provides a helpful framework for synthesizing the competing claims of luck and relational egalitarianism. I attempt to show that when Mill’s distributive justice commitments are not decided by direct appeal to overall happiness, they are guided by three main public principles: an impartiality principle, a sufficiency principle, and a merit principle. The question then becomes how luck and relational considerations figure into his articulation of these public principles. I argue that Anderson is correct that relational egalitarianism is more fundamental than luck and responsibility in Mill’s thought, but I also hope to show that any fleshed out picture of Mill’s reform proposals must recognize his condemnation of the role luck plays in determining the distribution of opportunities and outcomes.
My aim in this chapter is to push back against the tendency to emphasize Mill’s break from Bentha... more My aim in this chapter is to push back against the tendency to emphasize Mill’s break from Bentham rather than his debt to him. Mill made important advances on Bentham’s views, but I believe there remains a shared core to their thinking—over and above their commitment to the principle of utility itself—that has been underappreciated. Essentially, I believe that the structure of Mill’s utilitarian thought owes a great debt to Bentham even if he filled in that structure with a richer conception of human nature and developed it in more liberal directions. This commonality is revealed, in particular, in Mill’s own institutional designs and practical reform proposals in Considerations on Representative Government and related writings. If this is right, then the tendency of interpreters to highlight their differences rather than their similarities has been to the detriment of both Mill and Bentham scholarship, and so to our understanding of the rise of liberal utilitarianism.
This paper explores the surprising ways in which John Stuart Mill works to accommodate the proble... more This paper explores the surprising ways in which John Stuart Mill works to accommodate the problems and insights of the public reason tradition, and the extent to which he makes arguments that can help those working within that tradition. This is important not only for a richer understanding of Mill’s utilitarian ethics and how consequentialists might address themselves to the public reason project, but also for those interested in the ongoing significance of Mill’s liberal principles after the turn to public reason in the work of Rawls, Larmore, Gaus, and others. I try to show how Mill’s utilitarian theory incorporates the claim that the demands of social life require a publicly accepted set of normative expectations to govern judgments about when one has met one’s obligations and, relatedly, about the appropriateness of blame or punishment. For Mill, such a social morality properly regulates these judgments even if it is not ideal, that is, even if it is not the set of rules the adoption of which would collectively maximize utility. Importantly, however, social morality is not static. It shapes our collective existence by defining the proper bounds of our practices of accountability even as it evolves over time.
This draft calls for a return to public philosophy in the spirit of the founders of the journal E... more This draft calls for a return to public philosophy in the spirit of the founders of the journal Ethics. It shows that the journal's principal founder, Felix Adler, had a vision that anticipated in certain ways the political liberalism of John Rawls. A much abbreviated version appeared as "On Felix Adler's 'The Freedom of Ethical Fellowship,'" Ethics 125:1 (October 2014), 208-210.
Central European University Press eBooks, Dec 31, 2023
The idea of "open society" has experienced a small revival within academic political philosophy i... more The idea of "open society" has experienced a small revival within academic political philosophy in the United States since the publication of Gerald Gaus's The Tyranny of the Ideal (2016). 1 Of course, "open society" has been an influential theme in public discourse since Karl Popper published The Open Society and Its Enemies in 1945 (1966a, 1966b), and it has continued to engage thinkers across the political spectrum through the work of the Open Society Foundations, related academic organizations like the Open Society University Network, and think tanks like the Niskanen Center (Niskanen 2022). 2 But within American analytic philosophy departments, the idea of open society has largely ceased to frame debates about the nature of a sustainable liberal political order. This is unfortunate at a time when broad church liberalism needs a robust defense against authoritarian threats, dogmatic partisans, and the decline of liberal democratic norms in many countries. The attention Gaus and others have paid to the idea of open society is, therefore, a welcome development, but I worry that some leading ideas in that revival fail to meet our political moment. In The Tyranny of the Ideal, Gaus reminds us of important core elements of Popper's account of open society: that being committed to justice is not necessarily the same as being committed to one's own current conception of justice, that we should always remain open to critical discussion and social diversity, that this has implications for the way we organize ourselves socially and politically, and that such openness suggests a piecemeal approach to solving social and political problems. Gaus extends this line of thought to contemporary debates within political philosophy, arguing that it should limit the role that ideals of justice play in our current collective decision-making about how to organize ourselves.
Advanced analytics and artificial intelligence are powerful technologies that, along with their b... more Advanced analytics and artificial intelligence are powerful technologies that, along with their benefits, create new threats to privacy, equality, fairness and transparency. Existing law does not yet protect sufficiently against these threats. This has led some organizations to pursue what they call “data ethics” or “AI ethics” in an attempt to bring advanced analytics and AI more into line with societal values and so legitimate their growing use of these technologies.<br><br>To date, much of the scholarship on data ethics has sought either to define the ethical principles to which organization should aspire, or to map out the laws and regulations needed to push organizations towards these ethical goals. While these two lines of inquiry are important, the literature is missing a critical third dimension: empirical work on how organizations are actually governing the threats that their use of advanced analytics and AI can generate. Good regulatory design requires such knowledge. Yet, while there have been important studies of how organizations manage privacy “on the ground” (Bamberger and Mulligan 2015), there has been little such work on the governance of advanced analytics and AI.<br><br>This report begins to fill this gap. Focusing on private sector organizations, the authors interviewed corporate privacy managers deemed by their peers to be leaders in the governance of advanced analytics and AI, as well as the lawyers, consultants and thought leaders who advise them on this topic. They also surveyed a wider range of privacy mangers. The study sought to answer three, fundamental questions about business data ethics management: (1) How do leading companies conceptualize the threats that their use of advanced analytics and AI pose for individuals, groups and the broader society? (2) If it is true that the law does not yet require companies to reduce these risks, then why are they pursuing data ethics? and (3) How are companies pursuing data ethics? What substantive benchmarks, management processes and technological solutions do they use towards this end?<br><br>The authors previously shared on SSRN their preliminary findings. This final report provides a much fuller picture. The report should provide legislators and policymakers with an empirical foundation for their efforts to regulate advanced analytics and AI, at the same time as it gives interested organizations ideas on how to improve their data ethics management.
From its inception in 1890, the International Journal of Ethics ðnow EthicsÞ declared that it was... more From its inception in 1890, the International Journal of Ethics ðnow EthicsÞ declared that it was “devoted to the advancement of ethical knowledge and practice.” Although the latter concern may seem anachronistic, the practical work of the journal’s founders was inspired by an aim shared by today’s public reason liberals and deliberative democrats: establishing a public morality that respects well-intentioned individuals holding a diversity of philosophical and religious commitments. In an essay reflecting on the first volume, Josiah Royce wrote that the ongoing task facing Ethics was that of reconciling “the fullest regard for the ‘independent’ conscience of each man” with “the deepest respect for the authority of the social order.” Felix Adler, the guiding force behind the journal, addresses this problem in “The Freedom of Ethical Fellowship,” from the very first issue. His example also demonstrates that the practical aim of Ethics was notmere window dressing. In 1876, Adler founded the Society for Ethical Culture, the leading organization of the “ethical movement” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Society organized an impressive array of social programs for the poor and working classes, women, and racial minorities. It developed a variety of educational programs and an active publishing arm. Ethics itself grew out of and superseded the Ethical Record, the first official organ of the Society. S. Burns Weston, the Society’s leader in Philadelphia, was managing editor of both publications. Almost every member of its first editorial board was closely associated with the ethical movement: Adler, Stanton Coit ðLon-
Joseph Persky's excellent book, The Political Economy of Progress: John Stuart Mill and Moder... more Joseph Persky's excellent book, The Political Economy of Progress: John Stuart Mill and Modern Radicalism, shows that J. S. Mill's support for socialism is a carefully considered element of his political and economic reform agenda. The key thought underlying Persky's argument is that Mill has an ‘evolutionary theory of justice’, according to which the set of institutions and practices that are appropriate to one state of society should give way to a new set of institutions as circumstances change and the people themselves improve. However, Persky does not spend a great deal of time discussing Mill's theory of reform, in particular the principles he believes should guide our reform efforts. Reflecting on these principles – notably his principle of impartiality or equal treatment – shows the consistency of Mill's thought over time.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, Feb 11, 2019
When and why are inequalities unjust? Luck egalitarians have argued that, as a matter of distribu... more When and why are inequalities unjust? Luck egalitarians have argued that, as a matter of distributive justice, the focus should be on eliminating inequalities resulting from bad brute luck rather than those resulting from personal choice. G.A. Cohen, for instance, writes that his "animating conviction" with respect to distributive justice is that "an unequal distribution whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on the part of (some of) the relevant affected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro tanto, unjust" (Cohen 2008: 7). 1 Luck egalitarianism makes personal responsibility the key factor affecting the justice or injustice of an unequal distribution of goods. It recognizes that in the course of pursuing our life plans, we may voluntarily choose to work more or less to earn certain goods, and we may benefit more or less from taking calculated risks. But it also emphasizes that a great many inequalities are traceable to factors beyond even our partial control, such as the wealth of one's parents or one's natural endowments, and that the influence of these factors on our opportunities and outcomes should be eliminated. Luck egalitarianism has come under fire from relational egalitarians like Elizabeth Anderson (1999; 2010) and Samuel Scheffler (2003; 2005) who argue that, by focusing on responsibility and luck, it loses sight of the core egalitarian justice concern. This core concern, as Anderson puts it, is to resist oppression and to establish a community of social equals (Anderson 1999: 288-289). Because luck egalitarianism, as a matter of distributive justice, allows in principle both extreme poverty and invasive or stigmatizing judgments of personal responsibility for those who have made bad choices, it threatens those individuals' ability to function as free and equal members of the moral community. The point is not just that ne'er-do-wells and criminals retain their basic moral rights. It is that honest, hardworking people who find themselves unable to provide for themselves (e.g., simply because their reasonable calculated risks did not work out) may then be publicly scrutinized for their failures before being provided aid. Relational egalitarians argue that whatever inequalities we allow, they must not undermine people's social dignity. 2 1 There are now many varieties of luck egalitarianism. Other canonical sources include Arneson (2000; 2011), Dworkin (2000), and Roemer (1993; 1996). 2 Luck egalitarians have responded to these and other charges-for instance, by arguing that distributive justice is not the only relevant consideration in many of the challenging cases-and so the debate about egalitarian justice continues. For an effort at reconciliation by a luck egalitarian, 8 Perhaps still the best single exposition of Mill's theory of equality can be found in Berger (1984: 159-204), but see McCabe (manuscript), Persky (2016), Claeys (2013), and Morales (1996). 9 At the time Mill wrote, the great majority of citizens in industrialized nations (and everywhere else) lived in poverty, and it is estimated that perhaps a quarter of UK citizens lived on less than the equivalent of $1/day (Ravallion 2016: 15). 10 Like Bentham, he accepts the egalitarian implications of diminishing marginal utility (see PPE, CW II.225-6). But his egalitarianism does not primarily rest on that point.
John Stuart Mill's defense of freedom of discussion in On Liberty remains a major influence o... more John Stuart Mill's defense of freedom of discussion in On Liberty remains a major influence on philosophical and public debates about free speech. By highlighting underappreciated textual evidence and key distinctions, this introduction attempts to show how the contributions of the symposium authors – Melina Constantine Bell, Rafael Cejudo, Christopher Macleod, and Dale E. Miller – point toward a more complete account of Mill's views.
This paper addresses the question of whether all that unites the main parts of John Stuart Mill’s... more This paper addresses the question of whether all that unites the main parts of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty—the liberty principle, the defense of free discussion, the promotion of individuality, and the claims concerning individual competence about one’s own good—is a general concern with individual liberty, or whether we can say something more concrete about how they are related. I attempt to show that the arguments of On Liberty exemplify Mill’s institutional design approach set out in Considerations of Representative Government and related works. Mill’s approach reflects both his debt to Bentham and his own progressive development of the utilitarian tradition. The paper proceeds by setting out the elements of Mill’s institutional designs and then showing that On Liberty neatly applies them, thereby clarifying the structure of the arguments of On Liberty.
Recent scholarship on John Stuart Mill’s moral theory has settled on the view that he is committe... more Recent scholarship on John Stuart Mill’s moral theory has settled on the view that he is committed to a form of rule utilitarianism. I argue that this consensus is mistaken. Mill’s explicit account of practical rules is incompatible with rule utilitarianism but consistent with sophisticated act utilitarianism. I also examine the direct, textual evidence cited by rule utilitarian interpreters, arguing that it is consistent with the act utilitarian account of practical rules. Finally, I argue that two systematic considerations cited by rule utilitarian interpreters—Mill’s analysis of “wrong” in terms of the appropriateness of punishment, and his account of supererogation—also do not require a rule utilitarian reading.
This paper proposes an interpretation of Mill's famous "assumption of infallibility" argument in ... more This paper proposes an interpretation of Mill's famous "assumption of infallibility" argument in On Liberty concerning the freedom of discussion. The assumption of infallibility argument provides a crucial constraint on what any authority may legitimately decide. In particular, authorities may not indefinitely undermine the revisionary efforts of future decision-makers. To do so would be to take up a position of superiority with respect to future generations that only infallibility could justify. The paper argues that this argument also explains Mill's claim that a competent individual may not sell oneself into irrevocable slavery. The paper also works to connect these claims with Mill's larger progressive project and to clarify his aims in On Liberty.
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Papers by Piers N Turner