Tom Morris on the Meaning of Life

Tom Morris on the Meaning of Life Gregory Bassham Tom Morris, a former philosophy professor at Notre Dame and author of True Success and many other top-selling books, is one of America’s best-known public philosophers. In Philosophy for Dummies,1 Morris has a fascinating chapter on the meaning of life. His main point is that theists (believers in God) have an easier time than non-theists do in seeing meaning in life, and in affirming the possibility of deeper and more enduring sorts of meaning. Here I examine Morris’s argument, develop it in certain respects, offer a couple disagreements, and argue for its basic correctness. What Meaning? Whose Life? Morris helpfully begins by asking what we mean when we ask, “What is the meaning of life?” More particularly, what do we mean by “meaning” and what do we mean by “life”? He notes that we speak of “meaning” in a wide variety of contexts. Words, propositions, poems, smokesignals, and gestures can have linguistic or communicative meaning. But Morris notes that when we ask about the meaning of life we are usually asking whether life has any value, purpose, or importance (Morris 283). These are the three central dimensions of what we might call existential meaning. And in asking about the meaning of “life” we might be asking about the meaning of human life (or all life, or the universe, or reality) as a whole, or about the meaning of my life in particular. In other words, we might be inquiring whether the cosmos has any purpose, value, or importance, or whether my own life does. 1 Foster City, CA: IDG Books Worldwide, 1999. All references are to this edition. 1 I think Morris is right is identifying value, purpose, and importance as the three crucial dimensions of existential meaningfulness. But it is worth probing a bit more deeply than Morris does precisely how these factors relate to meaning. For example, is value sufficient for meaning? That is, if something has value (happiness, for example) does it also ipso facto have meaning? Or should we say that only values that are felt or grasped or appreciated by some sentient or intelligent being have meaning? Does a beautiful moonrise on some remote planet have value (and therefore meaning) even if there is no one around to appreciate that value? Can there be meanings without meaning-conferrers and meaning-cognizers? It is difficult to say. Even greater puzzles arise with the notions of purpose and importance. Is purpose sufficient for meaning? As Morris notes, purposes (i.e., aims, intentions, or goals) that are directed at the pursuit and attainment of important values seem to suffice for meaning (Morris 284). But what about purposes that are utterly trivial or seriously evil? If I aim to become the most successful arsonist in human history, is that sufficient for meaning? Or should we say that only positive purposes can ensure or contribute to meaning? The same question can be asked about importance. If I pursue and achieve important values, my life has importance and, it seems, significant meaning. But what if my life is important for the mayhem I cause? Did Lee Harvey Oswald enhance or diminish the meaningfulness of his own life by murdering President Kennedy? Might evil deeds, in fact, subtract from the net meaningfulness of one’s life, perhaps by reducing another key dimension of meaning: value? I don’t know the answers to these questions. It does seem clear, though, that existential meaning cannot simply be equated with value/purpose/importance. Something a bit more nuanced needs to be said. Two Secular Approaches to the Meaning of Life 2 Having clarified the question “What is the meaning of life?” Morris turns to an even more basic question: “Is there any meaning to life?” He considers three prominent answers: nihilism, The Do-It-Yourself-Approach, and theism. He argues that nihilism is false, that the Do-It-YourselfApproach has inherent limits, and that only theism (or some similar religious view) allows us to see life as a whole as meaningful. Nihilism is the view that life has no existential meaning. As Morris puts it, strict nihilists believe that “Life itself has no meaning. Your life has no meaning. My life has no meaning. Existence is without meaning of any kind. There is a void of significance to everything. There is no purpose to life. No plan. No reason. . . . And nothing is finally of any importance whatsoever” (Morris 286). In the words of Ecclesiastes, “all is vanity and a striving after wind.”2 Morris notes that nihilism is impossible to prove. Nihilists assert a “negative universal existence judgment” (“there is absolutely no meaning, anywhere, anytime”), which is the hardest kind of statement to demonstrate. Moreover, Morris claims, there are no “common human intuitions” that offer clear support for nihilism (Morris 286). Even if we live in a blind, Godless, and thoroughly materialistic universe, it seems obvious that some things (a cure for cancer, for example) have purpose, importance, and value, and therefore, as Morris sees it, meaning. Thus, Morris says, however fashionable nihilism might be with novelists, poets, rock musicians, disaffected youths, and anguished French existentialists, it should be dismissed as “bad philosophy” (Morris 286).3 2 Ecclesiastes 1:14 (RSV). Nihilism can also be challenged on other grounds. First, is it even possible to sincerely believe that nothing has value or importance? As R. M. Hare points out, it seems to be psychologically impossible to believe that literally nothing matters. To paraphrase the comedian Redd Foxx, if you say nothing matters, let me slam my car door on your hand, and e’ll see if you really belie e that nothing matters or are just indulging in a bit of existentialist posturing. Second, can nihilism even be asserted without a kind of self-defeating inconsistency? Any argument a nihilist could give to defend his position must be motivated by a purpose—namely, to provide a convincing defense 3 3 A far more popular and plausible view is what Morris calls the “The Do-It-Yourself Approach” to life’s meaning. This is the claim that life can have meaning, but only if we give it meaning through our own personal choices, values, and purposes. On this view, the universe as such has no objective meaning or purpose. Nor does human existence. Meanings can come into existence only if we create them, and these choices are entirely up to us. We alone endow our lives with meanings. Meanings, like tastes, vary from person to person. Anything a person believes or feels to be meaningful, is meaningful to that person, and no one can say that they are mistaken. The Do-It-Yourself Approach thus affirms that meaning is entirely personal and wholly up to us. Meaning exists if, and only if, we choose to endow something with meaning through our own personal commitments, values, likings, and so forth.4 As Morris notes, the Do-It-Yourself Approach is based on a general view of meaning that he dubs “The Endowment Thesis.” According to the Endowment Thesis, “nothing has meaning unless it is endowed with meaning (purpose, value, or importance) by an intelligent agent” (Morris 288). Is the Endowment Thesis true? Clearly, some kinds of meaning can exist only if some intelligent agent has created or conferred that meaning. This is certainly the case with linguistic meaning. The word “cat,” for instance, has meaning only because people have agreed to treat that particular configuration of shapes and sounds as a sign that signifies a certain kind of furry mammal. (Millions of year ago, if sticks washed up on a beach and formed “CAT,” the resulting stick-pattern would have no of nihilism. But if, as Morris claims, purpose is a form of meaning, nihilism is pragmatically self-defeating. It employs a purposive act to deny the existence of purposes. 4 A weaker or more moderate version of the do-it-yourself approach might claim only that such endowed meanings are necessary for meaning but not sufficient. On such a view, merely believing that X is meaningful isn’t sufficient to make it meaningful; some other conditions must also be met. 4 meaning at all.) So words have meaning only if they are endowed with meaning by some intelligent agent. There are other kinds of meaning that can exist only if they are created or perceived by intelligent beings. A lock of hair in an envelope might have meaning only because it reminds a particular person of a lost child. Here “meaning” means something like “personal significance or value.” The lock of hair, as we say, “has meaning” to the person who lovingly remembers the departed child. Such “felt” or “projected” personal meanings can exist only if there are conscious beings who can create or feel them. It is far from clear, however, that all meanings must be endowed by intelligent agents. As noted, meanings are connected with values, importance, and purposes. Purposes involve aims and intentions, and so presuppose the existence of relatively intelligent agents (though surely some nonhuman animals have purposes). But values and importance may not. Some things might have value (e.g., a redwood forest or a happy chipmunk) or importance (e.g., the first appearance of life on earth) even if there are no intelligent beings around to recognize that value or importance. If so, then some meanings are not endowed. Some are “intrinsic” or “mindindependent” in the sense of being objective features of reality. This creates a problem for the Do-It-Yourself approach to meaning, which assumes that the endowment thesis is true. A second problem is this. As Morris points out, you cannot endow anything with meaning unless you have at least some degree of control over it (Morris 289). I cannot, for instance, endow the French language with all new meanings at precisely 10:43 tomorrow morning, because I have no control over the meanings of French words. To some extent, this is also true of our own lives. I have no control over when I was born, who my parents were, where I grew up, what genes I was born with, and so forth. So if my life has only those 5 meanings that I endow it with, only isolated parts of my life will have meaning. The only way my entire life could have meaning, it seems, is if every aspect of my life fits into some overarching Cosmic Plan. But of course if meanings are conferred by a Cosmic Planner, rather than created by us through our own personal and infallible choices, the Do-It-Yourself approach is false. So, at best, the Do-It-Yourself approach shows that I can give portions of my life meaning.5 There is an additional problem with the Do-It-Yourself Approach. Just because someone “finds” something meaningful, does that mean that it really is? What if what they find meaningful is utterly trivial, like endlessly twiddling their thumbs, or grossly immoral, like torturing kittens just for the fun of it? As we seen, nothing has meaning if it is completely devoid of value or importance. Can’t someone believe that something has value or importance, and yet be wrong? Whether I “find” something to be meaningful may be at least partly a matter of personal choice. I can “find” an old tin can to be meaningful if it reminds me of some important moment in my life. This is what I have called “felt” or “projected” meaning. But here we’re talking about a kind of meaning that isn’t purely a matter of personal taste or opinion. In this more robust sense, I can’t confer meaning or value on something simply by believing that it has meaning or value. As the philosopher David Hume rightly pointed out, the fact that “x is valued” (a factual or descriptive statement) doesn’t imply that “x has value” (a value or normative statement). So, contrary to the Do-It-Yourself Approach, there may be limits on the extent to 5 Though it might be argued that we do have some degree of control over the whole of lives—perhaps sufficient control to blunt this criticism. As Morris notes (p. 283), one kind of endowed meaning is sentimental meaning. Why can’t I now find value and significance in the circumstances of my birth, my childhood struggles, and other parts of my life that I could not couldn’t control in more robust sense? Indeed, why can’t I find value and significance in the entire narrative arc of my life? Is this sufficient control to endow my whole life with meaning? 6 which meanings are up to us. There may be objective meanings that are fixed and wholly outside our control. This, in fact, is what theists like Morris assert. God and Meaning Morris claims that “the meaning of life as a whole is tied to the existence of God” (Morris 292). Here it is easy to misunderstand Morris (as many of my students do) and imagine he is saying something stronger than he really is. As I read him, Morris does not assert any of the following claims: a) “There could be no meaning in a Godless universe.” (He seems to admit that there could be purposes, values, and significance even if, per impossible, there is no God.) b) “Only theists can live meaningful lives.” (Morris freely admits that atheists and other non-theists have intrinsic value, and can do things that have purpose, value, and importance—and hence meaning.) c) “Theists always live more meaningful lives than non-theists.”(If, as Morris claims, meaning consists in purpose, value, and importance, it is plain that atheists can live more meaningful (earthly) lives than theists.) d) “All meanings are determined by God; humans have no freedom to choose their own values or meanings.” [Morris argues for a mixed approach to meaning. As he sees it, there is an objective over-arching framework of meaning provided by God (God’s plan for the universe and for your life in particular, as well as objective values rooted in God’s nature and His commands), but within this larger context individuals are left free to 7 endow their days with meaning in pursuit of the projects and values that best reflect their own natures and talents (Morris 291).] If Morris isn’t making any of these claims when he says that “the meaning of life as a whole is tied to the existence of God,” what is he saying? What he is asserting is that theists have an easier time than non-theists in viewing their lives as meaningful.6 He writes: Theists believe that God created the universe for certain purposes, and that the creator in turn brought about our existence within the cosmos for distinctive purposes as well. On the theistic vision of the world, there are objective values rooted in the nature of God, and there is a source of importance for our lives and activities that comes from far above or below the sweep of our natural surroundings, which vertical metaphor you prefer (Morris 291). I think Morris is completely right here. Non-theists can certainly live meaningful lives and they can justifiably view their lives as meaningful—indeed, as rich in meanings. However, theists hold certain beliefs about God, the cosmos, and human existence that make it easier for them to both (a) view life as a whole as meaningful and (b) recognize the possibility of deeper and more enduring cosmic and personal meanings. How exactly? Building on Morris’s brief discussion, here are a few suggestions:  Theism provides a satisfying and inspiring cosmic purpose. According to theism, the universe is more than an accidental collocation of particles in motion. It is a stupendous cosmic drama, planned and guided by an all-powerful and benevolent Being, which will 6 Does Morris, as a theist, believe something stronger, namely that belief in God can help us to live more meaningful lives? Very likely, but Morris does not defend that view in Philosophy for Dummies. 8 end with the ultimate triumph of good over evil and the achievement of an infinite and eternal good.  Theism provides satisfying and inspiring sense of individual purpose. Theism teaches that everyone has been put on this earth for a reason. Each of us has a shared calling to love, serve, and glorify God, to develop our God-given talents, to assist in God’s great cosmic drama of redemption, and to ultimately perfect our characters and enjoy life with God forever. In addition to this generic calling, we each also have a specific God-given assignment or vocation that is unique. As noted above, choosing one’s specific mission or goals in life may be at least partly up to us. But with theism it makes sense to ask the question: Was there something I was supposed to with my life?  Theism provides a strong basis for affirming the equal inherent value and transcendent worth of all persons. While many ethical and political traditions pay at least lip service to the “inherent dignity” or “equal moral value” of human beings, it is obvious that people differ greatly in intelligence, talents, abilities, native endowments, and usefulness to society. Indeed, it is difficult to think of any purely factual or observable trait that could provide a basis for claims of equal moral value or transcendent worth. Theism does provide such a basis. It grounds the sacredness and equal dignity of human persons in their equal status as beloved children of God. According to theism, all human beings are created in the image of God and are co-equal brothers and sisters in God’s family. 9  Theism allows for the possibility of eternal value and importance. As noted earlier, one common reason for affirming the absurdity or meaninglessness of human existence is the brevity of life and the impermanence of all human strivings and achievements. If “life's but a walking shadow, a poor player, that struts and frets his hour upon the stage, and then is heard no more,” then it may well seem to be “a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”7 Traditional theism speaks to such concerns by affirming the existence of an afterlife and recognizing that the things we do in this life may have consequences for all eternity. We are not like stones thrown into a pond that make a few brief ripples and then leave the pond just as it was before. The lives we touch, the good deeds we perform, and the good qualities of character we build will endure and have permanent importance.  Theism affirms that all human lives have meaning. If meaning, as I have argued, is connected to the concepts of value, importance, and purpose, then some human lives are more meaningful than others. Clearly, people do differ in the amount of value, importance, and purposeful action they are able or willing to achieve. More troubling, perhaps, if meaning is a function of value, importance, and purpose, then some human lives may appear to be meaningless. Think of a small orphaned child who dies uncared for and unloved. Or a severely mentally and physically handicapped adult who has been bedridden in an institution his entire life. Their lives seem to be wholly or substantially 7 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 5. 10 lacking in objective value, importance, or purpose. Shall we conclude then that their lives are devoid of meaning? Not according to theism. From that perspective, all human beings have equal and infinite value in the eyes of God. We may hope, moreover, that those who have suffered misfortunes in this life, such as the orphaned child and the handicapped adult, will be compensated in the next, and may have opportunities in the afterlife for purposeful achievements of value and importance. Finally, according to most theistic traditions, God doesn’t judge us by our accomplishments. Rather, he looks within and judges us by the desires of our heart. So those who have not been able to accomplish much in this life can still live lives of significant value, importance, and purpose. For all these reasons, I think Morris is right in claiming that theists find it easier than non-theists do to view life as a whole, and their own lives as an entirety, as meaningful (and as deeply and enduringly meaningful). Theists, so to speak, have more “meaning tools” in their toolkits. Atheists and other non-theists will counter, of course, that these tools are imaginary. But that is a quite different conversation. 11