Muslim revivalism in 19th century India

Muslim revivalism in 19th century India ‘If one thing links all Muslim reform in the 19th century it is a new awareness of the need to act on earth in order to be saved, i.e. a new emphasis on jihad broadly understood.’ Discuss. Hasan M Zulfiqar Qureshi St. Cross College, Oxford Essay No. 4: February, 2015 Four generally applicable assertions can be made in relation to Islam in India in the 19th century. First, that the 19th century witnessed the growth of numerous Islamic reformist and revivalist movements who saw the need for action in support of thought, in the absence of viable Muslim power; second, that many of these revivalist trends, with certain exceptions, can be traced to revivalist attempts of the 18th century, and earlier, i.e. Shah Waliullah; third, that these movements developed their activist nature primarily in reaction to the encroachment of Western civilization, practices, ideas and philosophy (e.g. rationality), imposed on India by British rule, coupled with the perception that Islam was under attack; and fourth, that these movements expressed their reformism in differing ways - ranging from new theological interpretations of Islamic law and philosophy to efforts at armed resistance under calls for jihad. The 19th century saw a raft of societal, political and economic changes in India brought about by British rule. From about the 1820’s the long established Muslim agrarian class began to be challenged by a rising class of Hindu merchants and landed elite, supported by East India Company (EIC) policies. Public Islamic law slowly came to be replaced with British Colonial laws, and even personal (Anglo-Mohammedan) law was increasingly under threat. Ahmed, Aziz. Islamic Movements in India and Pakistan 1857-1964 (London, 1967), 19 The British further abrogated the Mughal revenue-free grants (waqf) made to support religious institutions. Revenue re-organization under the Permanent Settlement Act 1793, under Cornwallis, turned peasants into indebted serfs. The change of language of public instruction from Persian to English; the introduction of the western education system; Muslim reluctance to use these western educational facilities; all led to a vicious cycle which left Muslims less qualified, and thus less able to compete with Hindus for administrative jobs. Ibid, 26 Further, the patronage given to Christian missionaries by the British irked the Muslims who perceived it as open Christianization of the land, although the British administration was generally secular in nature. The annexation of Awadh (1856) and the failed mutiny of 1857-58 were the death knoll for the last vestiges of viable Muslim political power in India. These shocks made Indian Muslims ask where they fit into the new Indian society. Increasingly the question focused around how an Islamic society could survive under colonial rule and the increasing encroachment of western civilization. Groups and movements of Indian Muslims came to different answers to this question. Before I examine these responses, a note on the term ‘revivalism’; I define the term in much the same way that Fuad Naeem does – ‘as an analogue to terms … such as ‘tajdid,’ renewal, and ‘islah,’ rectification, both signifying the reassertion and reformulation in a new situation, and sometimes new form, of ideas and practices essential to the traditions which are under threat.’ Naeem, Fuad S. ‘Sufism and Revivalism in South Asia: Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi of Deoband and Mawlana Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly and their paradigms of Islamic revivalism,’ The Muslim World (Vol. 99: 2009), 437 The words ‘revivalism’ and ‘reform’ are used interchangeably. The Modernists The origins of the Aligarh modernist school of thought lie in early 19th century Delhi, which was a hub of reformist thought, hosting the famous Waliullah seminary. In the early 1800’s there began a slow deterioration of relations between Indian Muslims and their British rulers. Though there were ideological attacks on Muslim society, such as the encroachment on Muslim law mentioned above, which angered many Muslims; this also allowed an interaction with western modernist interpretations of ‘concepts and institutions’, Aziz, 26 helping foster modernist trends in Muslim thinking. However, the anger was still present, as the very nature of India was changing under the British. This is evidenced by Shah Abdul Aziz Dehlavi (d. 1823), Waliullahs eldest son, declaring India dar-ul-Islam under the Marathas, but dar-ul-harb under the British. Ibid. The Ulama, including Shah Abdul Aziz, and his disciple Maulana ‘Abdul Hayy (d. 1886), led the ideological defence, condemning the imposition of British law over Hanafi law. Ibid, 20 Despite this, Aziz Ahmed contentiously argues that the fundamentalist-reformist Mujahideen movement under Syed Ahmed Barelwi (d. 1831), -heavily influenced by Shah Abdul Aziz, and supported by Waliullah house scions ‘Abdul Hayy and Shah Ismail Shaheed (d. 1831)-, which could be termed the first modern religious, political and military Indian Muslim movement, was directed primarily at the Sikhs and not the British. Ibid. He evidences this ‘ambivalent’ attitude towards the British by the fact that some of the Waliullah house members were employed by the EIC and called for loyalty to the British unless and until they interfered with the religious freedom of Muslims. Despite this debate, it is evident that there was an adoption of certain scientific, bureaucratic and philosophical concepts by Muslims, proving that there was not a total rejection of western institutions. Ibid, 21 Scholars such as Karamat Ali Jawnpuri (d. 1873), another Shah Abdul Aziz disciple, argued that modern scientific knowledge is sourced from the Greeks through the Arabs to the Europeans, and besides, all knowledge itself is from God, as evidenced from the scientific ayats in the Qur’an – therefore it is not wrong to study the western sciences. Thus, despite grievances of British domination, western institutions, specifically those which were of a scientific or educational nature were cheered as the success of progress; progress which the Muslims had forsaken for so long. It was this modernist strain of thought which led the reform agenda from the fore. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (d. 1898) thought that as long as Muslims had the space to practice their religious freedoms, there was no need to rise against the British. Further, if the British weren’t present, the Hindus would gain ascendancy, as the Muslims were too weak to take back power. He understood the failure of the Mutiny in this context, during which he remained loyal to the British. According to Sir Syed’s realpolitik loyalism, the British were here to stay, and the Muslims needed to find ways to survive and prosper under them. Ibid, 34 To continue in India, the Muslims needed to reinvent themselves using modern institutions to better their intellectual and practical capabilities. His notion of jihad was different to Ahmed Barelwi’s. To Sir Syed, jihad meant organized social action on behalf of the Ummah. Lelyveld, David. Aligarh’s first generation: Muslim solidarity in British India (Princeton, 1978), 146 Thus, his urgent priority was the modern education of young Muslims. Aligarh Classes began in 1875-78 was roughly modeled on the Oxbridge system; English-medium, non-denominational, and a fort of liberal ideas, the scientific study of subjects, humanism, a fresh look at history, and pragmatism in politics. Lelyveld, 118-128 Despite this however, Sir Syed wanted his students to stay in India, and not to lose their identity; showing that he wanted modernization, not necessarily Anglicization. Yet, he also saw a problem in that there was the danger of his students losing their inherent faith in the discourse of the modern sciences, because there was no framework for them to reconcile the two. Thereafter he attempted to resolve the two; his new interpretation of Islam, propagandized mainly through his Tahzib al-akhlaq journal, combined Waliullahs’ ‘fundamentalism’ with his own modernist version of theology. Aziz, 40 His interpretations were highly controversial, David Lelyveld describes Sir Syed as stuck between two civilizations, neither of whom accepted him fully; Lelyveld, 106 yet made significant progress in attempting to reconcile western ideas and sciences with Islamic tenets. He asserted that Qur’anic revelation and natural law are identical; Ibid, 43 therefore they cannot be contradictory. Whilst disregarding the medieval law schools, he explained erstwhile physical events in the Quran and Hadith, as metaphors; for example, the al-’Isrā’ wal-Mi‘rāj as a dream. He also criticized the practice of authenticating hadith by ‘isnad only, as this is based on the reliability of individuals, and advocated an emphasis on matn (rational criticism of the narration itself). Chiragh Ali, Sir Syed’s colleague, offered even more radical and speculative modernist theories. Later, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the successor to Sir Syed retained the modernist interpretative spirit, but retreated from the speculative theories. He spent energy on lengthy refutations, in the light of reason, of western claims about Islam, explaining practices such as jihad and slavery in the historical context of the Prophets time. Christian Troll points out that Sir Syed’s unswerving reliance on a ‘full-fledged theological rationalism and naturalism’ or aql’, makes the Qur'an ‘lose its central and decisive place as the only witness to the true God’, Troll, Christian. Sayyid Ahmed Khan: a reinterpretation of Muslim Theology (New Delhi, 1978), 221-222 while ‘the faith which the Qur'an demands is not rational in the sense of being built on the evidence of reason. Ibid, 220 This is a denunciation which Sir Syed’s orthodoxy-inclined Ulama critics also relayed. Later, Sir Syed became aware of possible Hindu domination in the British introduced representative institutions; coining the idea of political separatism, which later formed the basis of the two-nation theory. The school of modernist thought did enjoy success in its objective of removing the historical and cultural baggage which had built up around the core principles of Islam during the previous centuries, without resorting to fundamentalism. Sir Syed’s most important contribution to revivalism was that he allowed generations of young Muslims to give a new importance to these core principles in the light of the challenge of modernity. Deoband Education as the answer to the challenges of the day was not only the purview of the modernists. The Daru’l-‘Ulum Deoband had been established a decade prior to Aligarh by Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, who were students of pre-Mutiny Delhi, belonging to the tradition of the Waliullah seminary. The primary institution of the movement was the seminary itself. Metcalf, Barbara. ‘Traditionalist' Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,’ ISIM paper (ISIM, Leiden: 2002), 4 Contrary to pre-colonial times when the madrassa was not a capital ‘I’ teaching institution, Deoband, taking its cue from European educational establishments, constructed a curriculum focussed, bureaucratic, Sharia-centric, Urdu-medium seminary where the focus was to be upon the study of Hadith in the classical sense, with no ‘modern’ subjects. Ibid, 5 The Deobandis, being distrustful of the colonial authorities, only sourced funding from charitable donations. Metcalf, Barbara. Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton, 1982), 98 Though there is evidence that students respected the Sufi tradition and celebrated the Sheikhs, Deobandi thought was disapproving of ‘non-Islamic’ practices such as the celebration of maw’lid and ‘urs, and the undue attention on dargahs and intercession- innovations which they attributed to the Shi’a and Hindus. The primary purpose of Deoband was therefore to use education as a means of facilitating Muslims to be Muslims without political power, being wholly separate from the state. Ibid, 87-96 To this end, Deoband involved itself in the rigorous training of Ulama who would devote themselves to the propagation of Islam to the individual. This new, professionalized, consolidated class of Ulama, in a time when Muslim political power was largely non-existent, was different to the historical class of Ulama under political authority, who were trained to fulfill state functions. The new class of Ulama was not accountable to political authority; in their direct relationship with the masses as teachers, scholars and prayer leaders they espoused their own version of Islam, without instruction or control by a Muslim state. At Deoband itself, fatwas were issued on questions of Islamic directives in light of newly emerging contextual circumstances. Metcalf, Barbara. ‘Traditionalist' Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,’ ISIM paper (ISIM, Leiden: 2002), 5 The dissemination of thought in writing was given precedence, and books on how to organize the Muslims life, such as Bahishti Zewar by Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, became hugely popular. In this endeavor, new technologies such as printing presses and railroads were employed to the full to reach the masses. The Deobandis were competing in a market of religious ideas to prove themselves the best protectors of Islam. Metcalf calls this a new ‘corporate identity’ of competition for the loyalties of Muslims. Ibid, 6-7 Metcalf’s argument of the Deobandi Ulama taking an ‘inward turn’ towards individual Muslim revitalization in the face of the challenges of modernity has been criticized by Zaman, Zaman, Muhammad Q. The “Ulama” in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton, 2002) who cites the continuing involvement of Ulama in the public sphere. However, both are correct, as Metcalf primarily examined the Deobandis in the latter half of the 19th century, whilst Zaman focused his analysis on the early 20th century. Between these two periods the Deobandis began to take an increasing interest in politics to further their agenda of a revitalized and purified Islam. Up until their entry into politics in the 1920’s though, the Deobandis wanted very little to do with politics. Deobandi thought has not only replicated itself with thousands of seminaries across the Muslim world, but has also manifested itself in a number of splinter groups whose ideological reasoning’s can be traced back to Deoband, but whose brand of revivalism is very different. The Ahl-i Hadith adopted a more extreme, elitist, sectarian and intolerant version of Deobandi fundamentalism; rejecting the medieval law schools altogether, focusing on Qur’an and Hadith only. Their vehement anti-Sufism and literate interpretation of Islam distinguishes them from the traditional Deobandis and places them closer to Salafis. Deobandi thought has also been instrumental in the rise of groups such as the Tablighi-Jamaat, an apolitical organization focused on proselytization to the individual; and later, Abul A'la Maududis’ politicized Jamaat-i Islami. The Barelwis The origins of Barelwi (or the Ahl-i Sunnat wa Jamaat) thought also lie in early 19th century Delhi. However, in contrast to the modernists and Deobandis, the Barelwis were not a product of a move towards revival, but a force against it. Sanyal, Usha. Devotional Islam and politics in British India: Ahmed Riza Khan Barelwi and his movement 1870-1920 (New Delhi, 1999), 3-11 Barelwi thought formed around its Hanafi scholar-founder Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly (d. 1921) who argued that Islam is the product of its evolution over the centuries, inclusive of its cultural additions. This then was an argument for the preservation of Sufi tradition in the face of the return to fundamental Islam of the Deobandis. The Barelwis thus emphasised traditional and customary Islamic practices such as mawlid, ‘urs, taaviz – bringing them into constant conflict with Deobandis and the Ahl-i Hadith. This focus on customary practices endeared the Barelwis mainly to the largely illiterate rural population of colonial India, whose daily practice of Islam was far more religiously convoluted when compared to the ‘high’ and purified Islam espoused by the revivalist Sunni Ulama. In contrast with the Deobandis, the Barelwis did seek a reconnection of the Muslims with political power, later leading to them supporting the Pakistan movement. Their relationship with the colonial authorities was also largely non-confrontational. Ibid, 55 Thus far the discussion has been limited to broadly the Sunni sphere. However, there was a significant revivalist trend amongst the non-Sunnis as well. Shi’ism It is known that there were individual Shi’as in the wider reform movement, e.g. in Waliullah’s school; but there were also movements of reform amongst the communities of Twelver, Isma’ili and Bohra themselves. Shi’a power centers had always been present across India, Shi’as being prominent at the Mughal courts too. Robinson, Francis. ‘Introduction: The Shi’a in South Asia,’ Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Vol 24, No. 3: 2014), 354 They also felt the effects of the loss of power and the challenges of colonial rule in the 19th century. The British, in Lucknow, courted Shi’i mujtahids in an attempt to offset the influence of Sunni Ulama. The Khoja Isma’ilis especially had a close link with colonial power, as their leader the Aga Khan (d. 1881) had cemented his leadership position through their help. Ibid, 355 Aga Khan III (d. 1957) would later amend, remove and replace certain traditions of the Khojas to construct a narrative geared towards his own semi-divine status. Ibid, 357 Successive Aga Khan’s used the close royal connection with the British to consolidate their community in India, prospering in the process. Ibid, 355 If some Shi’i used access to power to safeguard their interests, others without this access began to reassert their own distinctiveness as a rallying cry. Syed Dildar Ali Nasirabadi (d. 1820), of Awadh, constructed a narrative which was anti-Sunni, anti-Sufi, and theologically pro-reason. Marisyas grew popular as a means of expression of Shi’i belief and heritage. This distinctiveness often led to antagonism with Sunnis, seen in the practice of tabarra (the cursing of the first three Khulafāʾur-Rāshidūn). Ibid, 355, 358 The opposed revivalism of Indian Sunnis and Shi’as widened the divide between the two during the 19th century. Ibid, 357 In their reform agendas, Indian Shi’as were supported by Iranian revivalist movements; Ibid, 358 and there is also emerging evidence of the influence of Indian Shi’i revivalism on the wider Shi’a world. Ibid, 359 Later 20th century reform would continue among the Twelver Shi’a of India, seeking to ‘protestantise’ Shi’ism, adapting Imam Hussain’s message in an activist and anti-colonial light. Ibid, 355-356, 358 The Ahmadiyya The emergence of the Ahmadiyya is somewhat of an anomaly, as the movement grew less out of a desire to reform Islam in the face of colonialism, and more out of the pressures of localized post-Mutiny era religious competition in north-western India, being moulded by the ideas of a single individual, into a mutated version of Islam. Friedmann, Yohanan. Prophecy continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi religious thought and its medieval background (Berkeley, 1989), 1-4 Though we may ascribe the emergence of the Ahmadiyya to the general atmosphere of revivalism, it would be difficult to call it ‘reform’ in the conventional sense, as the Ahmadiyya went far further and changed some of the most basic tenets of Islamic theology; with their finished product rejected by almost all the rest of Muslim world. Mirza Ghulam (d. 1908) began his career by debating powerful Christian and Hindu missionary polemics in Punjab. Ibid, 4-8 Soon though, he began to preach of himself being the prophesized Mahdi, a minor prophet, and an incarnation of Isa and Krishna. Thus, he became a denier of both the finality of Prophethood –an absolute core tenet of Islam-, and the ascension of Isa, which inevitably led to conflict with mainstream Islam. He also forbade any use of jihad against the British, Ibid, 2 leading to claims that he was a British concoction to divide Indian Muslims. After his death, the Ahmadiyya split into two groups, the Qadiyanis, and the Lahori group. Two aspects of this movement have kept it alive until the present day; disciplined organization and vigorous proselytization. Ibid, 11-17 Most of the reformist movements above were centered in northern India. Here, a short discussion of developments in Bengal and South India follows. Bengal On revivalism in Bengal, there is considerable debate as to the nature and success of the movements. Roy, Asim. ‘Impact of Islamic revival and reform in colonial Bengal and Bengal Muslim identity: a revisit,’ Journal of South Asian Studies (Vol. 22, Special Issue: 1999) 41-44 Rafiuddin Ahmed Ahmed, Rafiuddin. The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906: a quest for identity (Delhi, 1996), early on, largely played down the role of revivalists in Bengal, whilst Asim Roy offers an attempt at a revisionist analysis. Roy points to important figures such as Titu Mir, Haji Shariatullah and Dudu Miyan, but is also critical of their revivalist trends, terming this and their jihad, ‘futile responses in the struggle against the new order’. Roy, 56 Roy is also critical of the reduction by some scholars of Bengali revivalism into compartmentalized categories of social, economic and political. Ibid, 41 Yet the impact of non-religious factors in popularizing the Faraizi movement and their advocacy of jihad, cannot be ignored. Neither can socio-economic factors of colonial/zamindar oppression which led to Titu Mir’s activism. 19th century Bengal had its own peculiar social conditions and rich culture which helped it foster a unique strain of revivalism, but not wholly disconnected from wider trends; molded also by Bengal’s alternate (to North India) experience of Islamisation. The Mappilas Perhaps even more uniquely than in Bengal, Islam in South India developed on a different path to Islam in North India. Any mention of South Indian Muslim revivalism immediately brings to mind the Mappilas of Malabar. Conflict with the Portuguese shaped the historical experience of the Mappilas, turning them from coastal traders to an inland agrarian people, engendering in them a deeply militant strain of Islam. Dale, Stephen F. Islamic history on the South Asian Frontier: the Mappilas of Malabar, 1498-1922 (Oxford, 1980), 29-36 The Mappilas’ strain of Islamic thought development thus fused their unique and somewhat isolated social experience with Europeans and Hindus, with their understanding of the use of violence in Islamic law. Ibid, 107-119 Denied economic independence by high-caste Hindu landowners (through taking of janmam rights), they developed a ‘frontier mentality’. Ibid, 119-152 For the Mappilas, their understanding of jihad was central. Jihad became a central obligation, taking on a cultural significance. Martyrdom in battle, or becoming a shaheed was encouraged as an ideal by the tannals (religious functionaries). Ibid This ritualized conception of shahadat was less a by-product of jihad, as most Muslims understood it, but became not dissimilar to the kamikaze pilots of Imperial Japan. Revivalist trends amongst the Mappila can also be sourced to their experience with Muslim Mysore, under whom they denied janmam to Hindu overlords, by giving taxes directly to the state. Ibid Later, when the British attempted to reverse this, a series of ritual and suicidal attacks took place against them and upper caste Hindus, called the ‘Moplah Outrages’. In the early 20th century, Mappila activism would turn into a full scale uprising against colonial authorities, largely devoid of any relation to events elsewhere in North India. Thus, Mappila revivalism does not have its roots in 18th century ‘Dehlavian’ reformism, and must be understood through their cultural experiences over the centuries. Conclusion This essay has discussed the differing responses to colonialism, modernity and the loss of power of the main revivalist movements of the 19th century. Two aspects could not be discussed due to the essay’s limited scope. The first, being the interaction between the movements and their intellectual rivalries which has played a part in cementing ideologies. Metcalf Metcalf, Barbara. Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton, 1982) makes some progress in this regard. Second, the impact of Indian Sufism on the above movements has also not been discussed. Fuad Naeem provides an interesting argument about the influences of Sufism on the revivalist thought of both Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi of Deoband and Maulana Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly. Naeem, Fuad S. ‘Sufism and Revivalism in South Asia: Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi of Deoband and Mawlana Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly and their paradigms of Islamic revivalism,’ The Muslim World (Vol. 99: 2009), 435-451 Concluding, based on the analysis of the main revivalist movements, the four general assertions made at the beginning of this paper seem to hold true. What linked most of the 19th century revivalist movements was an understanding of the changing world of modernity, and a need to respond by reforming Islam to meet its challenges in the absence of political power. Their understanding of jihad however, was markedly different. _________________________________________________ Bibliography Ahmed, Aziz. Islamic Movements in India and Pakistan 1857-1964 (London, 1967) Ahmed, Rafiuddin. The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906: a quest for identity (Delhi, 1996) Dale, Stephen F. Islamic history on the South Asian Frontier: the Mapillas of Malabar, 1498-1922 (Oxford, 1980) Friedmann, Yohanan. Prophecy continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi religious thought and its medieval background (Berkeley, 1989) Hourani, Albert. (cited in) Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India, Deoband 1860- 1900 (Princeton, 1982) Lelyveld, David. Aligarh’s first generation: Muslim solidarity in British India (Princeton, 1978) Metcalf, Barbara. Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton, 1982) Metcalf, Barbara. ‘Traditionalist' Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,’ ISIM paper (ISIM, Leiden: 2002), 1-24 Naeem, Fuad S. ‘Sufism and Revivalism in South Asia: Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi of Deoband and Mawlana Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly and their paradigms of Islamic revivalism,’ The Muslim World (Vol. 99: 2009) Robinson, Francis. ‘Introduction: The Shi’a in South Asia,’ Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Vol 24, No. 3: 2014) Robinson, Francis. Islam and Muslim history in South Asia (Oxford, 2003) Roy, Asim. ‘Impact of Islamic revival and reform in colonial Bengal and Bengal Muslim identity: a revisit,’ Journal of South Asian Studies (Vol. 22, Special Issue: 1999) Sanyal, Usha. Devotional Islam and politics in British India: Ahmed Riza Khan Barelwi and his movement 1870-1920 (New Delhi, 1999) Troll, Christian. Sayyid Sir Syed: a reinterpretation of Muslim Theology (New Delhi, 1978) Zaman, Muhammad Q. The “Ulama” in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton, 2002) Hasan M Zulfiqar Qureshi Muslim revivalism in 19th century India The Islamic History of South Asia 13