The Personification of Whales

The Personification of Whales Angela Scheres Professor Lassiter Philosophy 301: Ethics 16 November 2013 1 The Personification of Whales 2 The Personification of Whales Whales are the most majestic creatures living in the ocean, as they have been for tens of millions of years. Their time on Earth has spanned a vastly greater period of time than that of human beings, and their evolutional changes have caused some to consider whales as something more than sea creatures, even bridging the gap between non-human animals and human beings to give consideration that whales ought to be thought of as persons. Throughout history, a person has been known to be an individual, a human being. No other species has ever been awarded inclusion into the specific term that has been reserved only for creatures with the classification of Homo sapiens. In light of new information and our evolving understanding of the complexity that resides within brains of whales, should these sea creatures have their status upgraded from animal to person? More than two millennia ago Aristotle argued that reason separates human beings from all other animals, leaving animals outside of the realm of human morality, sharing that "decision is either understanding combined with desire or desire combined with thought; and this is the sort of principle that a human being is" (Aristotle). Paola Cavalieri argues that whales possess the necessary qualities to be considered for personhood, and shares "many authors have argued that the mental trait which is central to personhood is not so much rationality, as rather the property of being aware of oneself as a distinct entity, existing in time and endowed with a past and a future--in other words, self-consciousness" (2006). Cavalieri's argument, though thought-provoking in its own right, would not inspire Aristotle to agree to the assimilation of whales into a category, personhood, that has been reserved for humans since its inception. Over the last several hundred years humans have hunted many species, including whales, to the brink of extinction. Cavalieri shares that "the notion of person, usually contrasted with the notion of thing, has always played an important role with reference to the protection from such The Personification of Whales 3 harms" (2006). Her belief that whales should be given the status of personhood further justifies her reasoning that such a status would guarantee that whales have a right to life, insofar as human beings have such a right. It is likely that Aristotle would consider animals as having a right to life, until and unless a human being found it necessary to take that life for their own needs. Aristotle believed in a natural hierarchy within the animal kingdom, where "different levels are determined by the abilities present in the beings due to their natures" and "only animals and human beings are capable of conscious experience" (Wilson). Cavalieri is firm in her opinion that whales should be free from any danger or threat of life due to human interference, but Aristotle would disagree with this opinion based on his belief that "human beings are superior to animals because human beings have the capacity for using reason to guide their conduct, while animals lack this ability and must instead rely on instinct" (Wilson). It has been shown that "whale brains are impressive pieces of biological hardware, supporting a sophisticated type of awareness...over million[s] of years, whale brains evolved through a similar process as those of humans--the need for complex societies and relationships" (Cavalieri, 2006). Multiple non-human animals enjoy societal hierarchies within their respective species, and many of those species have developed rather complex societies. Aristotle would understand the evolution of these species, but would not consider the introduction of social hierarchies within the species as a causation for personhood. Professor Lassiter shares that "Aristotle asks what makes us human: when we identify what makes us persons, we can then identify what makes us virtuous persons" (Lassiter, 2013). Is it feasible to think that non-human species, such as whales, are able to identify such a thing as virtue? Lori Gruen's essay relays that "some, in the neo-Aristotelian or 'virtue ethics' tradition, have argued that while our behavior towards animals is indeed subject to moral scrutiny, the The Personification of Whales 4 kinds of arguments that have been presented frame the issues in the wrong way " (2012). One could argue on the widely agreed upon ideal that taking the life of an animal simply for sport or pleasure is not a moral act, is not the act of someone trying to achieve virtue. While Cavalieri shares that "the highly expanded brain size of cetaceans is, in a sense, convergently shared with humans, and that, while evolving along quite different paths, the brains of primates and cetaceans arrived at the same cognitive space" (2006), Aristotle would point out that no direct evidence is provided that would cause whales to be given the consideration of a moral agent capable of differentiating between what is and what is not a moral action, what is and what is not a virtuous action, or what is and what is not an action of reason. Personhood has always been correlated with the distinct nature of human beings, and Cavalieri disagrees, asking "is the concept of person coextensive with the concept of 'member of the species Homo sapiens'? Arguably not" (2006). Similar views give consideration to the validity of the identification of moral properties, "rather than identifying intrinsic or innate properties that non-humans share with humans, properties that are thought to be morally valuable in themselves ... we ought to understand moral status in relational terms given that moral recognition is invariably a social practice" (Gruen). Whales are extremely social creatures, even outside their species, and have shown appreciation to humans when they are recipients of our assistance. The nature of such sociability causes humans to derive more pleasure in providing assistance to whales that are in need, but does not give any inclination that they have morals, virtues, and reasoning abilities that are even remotely similar to those contained within the moral sphere of human beings, where the knowledge of the notion of personhood resides. Aristotle shares "there are three [capacities] in the soul--sense perception, understanding, desire--that control action and truth. Of these three, sense perception is clearly not the principle of any The Personification of Whales 5 action, since beasts have perception, but no share in action" (Aristotle). Aristotle shows an understanding of the complexities that are present in the non-human animal kingdom, and stays firm in his belief that only human beings are capable of morality, virtue, and reason. Whales have shown they are aware, on some fundamental level, of time--"of the backward, present, and forward looking attitudes forming the foundation upon which awareness of oneself as a distinct entity existing in time is mounted" (Cavalieri). Aristotle would argue that many non-human animals are very intelligent, showing an innate understanding of what we perceive to be time—and that Cavalieri does not dispel that this may, in fact, be instinctive, insofar as many non-human animals need to align their behavior with others of their species, with behaviors that are played out time and again over hundreds or thousands of years. This concept does not denote that whales have the capability of utilizing time for their specific and differentiating needs, as do human beings, "for beasts have neither decision nor rational calculation, but are outside [rational] nature, as the madmen among human beings are" (Aristotle). Cavalieri does provide information that whales exhibit fairly complex behaviors, that they do have a society within their species. The knowledge shared does not sway the teachings and belief of Aristotle, that "a beast has neither virtue or vice," and that animals do not possess the capabilities of reasoning and the understanding of morality that human beings have. The notion of personhood remains as something that is naturally and logically understood to be a human trait, and it ought not be stretched to contain beings, non-human animals, that do not have the capability of comprehending that which is of the utmost importance to humans--the ability to reason, the understanding of morality, and the desire to attain virtue within the moral realm. Aristotle would enjoy such a discussion, however, he would remain steadfast in his belief that reason unequivocally separates human beings from all other animals, including whales. The Personification of Whales Works Cited Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999. Print. Cavalieri, Paola. "Whales as persons." Ethics and the Politics of Food: Preprints of the 6th Congress of the European Society for Agricultural and Food Ethics: EurSAFE 2006 Olso, Norway, June 22-24, 2006. Vol. 6. Wageningen Academic Pub, 2006. Gruen, Lori. "The moral status of animals." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2012 (2010): n. page. Web. 17 Nov. 2013. Lassiter, Charles. Lecture. Philosophy 301. Gonzaga University, Spokane, WA. 22 Oct. 2013. Lecture. Wilson, Scott. "Animals and ethics." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2001. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/>. 6