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2005
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3 pages
1 file
This is an unpublished essay that I circulated privately in September 2005, several weeks after Hurricane Katrina struck the City of New Orleans. Having lived in the Big Easy while in college and having made it and its culture and its people an important part of my life, I was aghast at calls by people unfamiliar with the city to allow for its demise. This was before it became known to the country that the reason that the city was devastated was the failure of its levees to hold and protect the city and not because of many other factors.
Disasters, 2007
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a rapid succession of plans put forward a host of recovery options for the Upper and Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans. Much of the debate focused on catastrophic damage to residential structures and discussions of the capacity of low-income residents to repair their neighbourhoods. This article examines impediments to the current recovery process of the Upper and Lower Ninth Ward, reporting results of an October 2006 survey of 3,211 plots for structural damage, flood damage and post-storm recovery. By examining recovery one year after Hurricane Katrina, and by doing so in the light of flood and structural damage, it is possible to identify impediments to recovery that may disproportionately affect these neighbourhoods. This paper concludes with a discussion of how pre- and post-disaster inequalities have slowed recovery in the Lower Ninth Ward and of the implications this has for post-disaster recovery planning there and elsewhere.
Public Administration Review, 2010
New Orleans’ recovery from the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 reflects a long, complex, contentious process that still is not complete. In this article, the authors explore the key factors that have supported and hindered recovery so far. Initial conditions within the city, the web of policy demands, as well as recent changes in law and procedures for the region are explored using a new model that may be applicable to other severe disasters. Any recovery, the authors conclude, must be anchored within a local context, but only with necessary administrative backing from the wider region and society. Recovery from disaster offers a rare opportunity to rebuild damaged communities into more resilient ones when energy and investment are immediately channeled into the stricken region and focused in a constructive redesign that acknowledges environmental risk. The recovery process then shifts to mitigation and reduction of risk. Hence, cities will be better prepared for the next...
Ecological Engineering, 2006
Public Administration Review, 2007
New Orleans' natural and human-shaped environments are described here, as well as ecosystem damage that has made people and property even more vulnerable. Th e interactions dominating the intersection of the two environments are found in the social-politicaleconomic system, culture and history, intergovernmental relations, and law (see fi gure 1) that form the basis for lessons learned. Katrina was the most predicted disaster in American history (Fischetti 2001; Handwerk 2005; McQuaid and Schleifstein 2002)-a natural event that combined with massive human failure before, during, and after the event. It exposed failed systems of engineering, government, economics, public safety, logistics, recovery, and race relations. A stronger hurricane had long been anticipated for New Orleans. Th e media highlighted hurricanes each season; research was ongoing, and the U.
An Unnatural Disaster: The Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 2005
In the weeks since Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, much attention has been paid to the manifest failure of government rescue efforts. But a broader view is in order, one focused less on the apparent incompetence and unpreparedness of the government officials charged with managing such emergencies, and more on the failures of policy-making and resource allocation leading up to the disaster. An examination of those failures leads to a simple conclusion: the hurricane could not have been prevented, and some flooding may have been inevitable, but at least some, and perhaps much, of the damage visited upon New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina could have been prevented by wiser public policy choices. The choices that failed New Orleans are the subject of this report. It examines the environmental decisions that robbed the area around New Orleans of the natural environmental features that might have absorbed floodwaters before they toppled levees. It looks at the policy choices not merely the incompetence that resulted in the governments feeble emergency response. It identifies the serious environmental challenges now facing the New Orleans area resulting from environmental policy-making that allowed toxic chemicals to be produced, handled, and stored in such a manner that flooding would loose them on residents. It discusses the effect of energy policy choices on Katrina, as well as the implications of Katrina for future choices. It explores the environmental justice lessons to be learned from the Katrina disaster how environmental policy disfavors poor and minority Americans. It concludes with a series of challenging questions to be examined by investigators and policymakers as they reshape government policy to prevent Katrina-style environmental and policy disasters from compounding natural disasters in the future.
Social Forces, 2009
This article examines the process of post-disaster recovery and rebuilding in New York City since 9/11 and in New Orleans since the Hurricane Katrina disaster (8/29). As destabilizing events, 9/11 and 8/29 forced a rethinking of the major categories, concepts and theories that long dominated disaster research. We analyze the form, trajectory and problems of reconstruction in the two cities with special emphasis on the implementation of the Community Development Block Grant program, the Liberty Zone and the Gulf Opportunity Zone, and tax-exempt private activity bonds to finance and promote reinvestment. Drawing on a variety of data sources, we show that New York and New Orleans have become important laboratories for entrepreneurial city and state governments seeking to use post-disaster rebuilding as an opportunity to push through far-reaching neoliberal policy reforms. The emphasis on using market-centered approaches for urban recovery and rebuilding in New York and New Orleans should be seen not as coherent or sustainable responses to urban disaster but rather as deeply contradictory restructuring strategies that are intensifying the problems they seek to remedy.
Communities and Banking, 2008
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