On Organizational Apologia: A Reconceptualization

On Organizational Apologia Communication Theory Robert C. Rowland Angela M. Jerome Fourteen: Three August 2004 On Organizational Apologia: A Reconceptualization Pages 191–211 There is much less agreement about the characteristics defining organizational apologia/crisis response than in the case of clearly defined categories such as the eulogy. This lack of agreement can be traced to two conflicting purposes served by the category (image repair and image maintenance) and also the fact that the organizational apologist faces much greater situational variation than in other well-defined categories. This article confronts these difficulties by proposing a reconceptualization of organizational apologia. Drawing on argument field theory, we argue that all organizational apologia must use one or more of four strategies to protect the image of the organization. Regarding image repair, the article proposes a research agenda for identifying the situational characteristics that characterize well-defined subgenres. Over the past 15 years, researchers have focused enormous attention on how organizations respond to crises involving allegations of wrongdoing. Using a variety of approaches, including apologia theory (Ware & Linkugel, 1973), kategoria-based apologia theory (see Dionisopoulos & Vibbert, 1988; Hearit, 1995a; Ryan, 1982), corporate social legitimacy crisis theory (see Hearit, 1995a, 1995b, 1996), account theory (Scott & Lyman, 1968), crisis communication research (see Coombs, 1995), attribution theory (see Coombs, 1995), and impression management (see Allen & Caillouet, 1994), among others, these scholars have developed various schemes for explaining organizational crisis response. There is, however, relatively little agreement among the various research traditions. Early researchers in the field (e.g., Benoit & Lindsay, 1987; Ice, 1991) heavily relied on the system developed by Ware and Linkugel (1973), which identified four primary strategies and four different postures in approaching organizational self-defense. More recent approaches to organizational crisis response have identified far more variation. For example, Benoit (1995) identified five main categories and 12 subcategories of image repair strategies, and Coombs (1995) identified five main Copyright © 2004 International Communication Association 191 Communication Theory categories and 17 subcategories of crisis response strategies. Hearit (1995a, p. 6) argued that organizational relegitimation efforts “typically require a dual strategy of positive and negative rhetoric” usually involving some form of denial combined with dissociation strategies to redefine the situation. He also noted that the relegitimization process requires organizations to undertake both corrective action and “a form of epideictic, value oriented discourse in which they praise the very values they are reputed to have transgressed” (Hearit, 1995a, p. 11). In other research, Hearit (1994, 1996, 1997, 1999) identified additional strategies in particular case studies of organizational relegitimation. A number of other scholars have developed alternative approaches as well. It could be argued that the variation in approach is appropriate because the goal of the crisis communication researcher should be to explore the universe of options to better serve the development of crisis communication practices. At this point, however, a problem emerges. Implicit in all approaches to crisis communication or organizational apologia in which allegations of wrongdoing1 (either direct action or the failure to act) are at issue, is a goal of developing a theory to guide researchers and practitioners. If the choice of particular strategies to be used is purely a matter of taste or dictated by the particulars of the situation, then theorizing in the area will be limited to the development of a laundry list of potential strategies. Such an approach would have limited value. In a different context, Rowland (1991) explained this point when he distinguished between ontological and heuristic genres. In a heuristic genre, the generic claim is really a metaphor stating that an individual or group of symbolic acts look like some other symbolic act. Thus, one could talk about West Coast rhetoric, or the rhetoric of rock, or neoliberal rhetoric. In these examples, the categorization is either arbitrary (there is no reason that all rock songs have to be liberal) or tautological (neoliberal rhetoric is produced by people who are neoliberals). In contrast, ontological genres are actual groups of discourse that possess similar sets of characteristics and can be compared. Unlike heuristic genres, ontological genres can be used both to predict and to evaluate within a category. Once one knows the quite limited set of characteristics defining a typical eulogy or inaugural (Campbell & Jamieson, 1985, 1986, 1990; Jamieson & Campbell, 1982; Rowland, 2002), for instance, that set of characteristics can be used as a template for describing future members of the category and evaluating their effectiveness. Clearly, theorists focusing on organizational apologia and/or crisis response, want to develop a theory that in Rowland’s terms is ontological, not heuristic. Theorists (e.g., Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Benoit, 1995; 192 On Organizational Apologia Coombs, 1995; Hearit, 1995a; Ware & Linkugel, 1973) attempt to identify the characteristics that define organizational apologia/crisis response in its various forms and then apply those characteristics to other instances in the category. Coombs (1995, 1999b), Coombs and Halladay (2002), and Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003) have developed models of crisis communication that attempt to link together strategies, situation, and crisis type. Theorists also have developed guidelines defining when particular strategies should be used. This conclusion applies not only to organizational apologia, but also to crisis response research. As Hearit and Courtright (2003, p. 83) noted, “Many conceptions of crisis communication proffer the primacy of a generic approach to the study of organizational crises.” Although not all of the researchers operating in this area embrace an approach drawing on genre theory, as soon as they make claims that go beyond mere description of available strategies they implicitly are attempting to develop an ontological, rather than heuristic, approach to organizational apologia/crisis response. Benoit (1995) implicitly was getting at this point when he noted (p. 160): “The critic who tries to assess the apparent effectiveness of rhetorical choices has an obligation to identify factors that seem to contribute to the success or failure of the discourse.” Put differently, any principled theory of how organizational actors respond to crisis situations must in some sense be an ontological generic theory if it is to do more than describe available strategic options. The problem, however, is that, although researchers consistently embrace an ontological approach, there is almost no agreement on what characteristics define the category. Continued development of a theory of organizational apologia/crisis response requires finding a solution to this problem. Absent a theory-based explanation for why organizational advocates choose (or should choose) particular strategies in particular situations, organizational apologia/crisis response research will be limited to heuristic description.2 Of course, it could be argued that the lack of agreement about what makes up organizational apologia3 is not important. The difficulty here is that ontological genre studies generally are defended precisely because they can reveal what Campbell and Jamieson (1977, p. 21) called the “constellation” of characteristics needed to produce an effective work in the category. The approach is useful both as a descriptive tool and as a means for evaluating whether a given work effectively fulfills the genre or is even a member of the genre at all (Campbell & Jamieson, 1977; Miller, 1984; Rowland, 1991). Thus, one could argue that the failure to find a predictable set of characteristics across the range of organizational apologia studies has the effect of undercutting any claim of generic status or generalizability across a range of cases. 193 Communication Theory In this article, we take a different approach. We argue that the lack of consistency across organizational apologia reflects two factors: the existence of two different and sometimes conflicting purposes in organizational apologia and the fact that there is much greater variation in the societal constraints facing the organizational apologist than there is in the constraints facing a eulogist or inaugural drafter. We then argue that an overarching explanation of organizational apologia best can be developed by conceptualizing the category as similar to a purpose-centered argument field in which a few characteristics are universal because they are tied to the essential purposes of the field and other characteristics are tied to discrete subfields, which differ based on the constraints they face. We conclude by proposing an agenda for organizational apologia studies. Purpose, Constraint, and Variation in Apologia The first step in reconceptualizing organizational apologia is to consider how the category is different from other well-known ontological genres. We already have noted the lack of agreement about defining characteristics in organizational apologia, in contrast to the widespread agreement in the case of the eulogy, inaugural, and other ontological genres. It is important to recognize that the differences among organizational apologia are tied to variation in purpose and constraint across the category, variation that is largely missing in other ontological genres. In the cases of the eulogy and inaugural, for instance, there is great similarity in purpose served by and constraint faced by the rhetoric. Eulogies as a rule reunify the community after the death of someone has pulled it apart, help the living cope with the loss of a friend or loved one and also confront their own mortality, and finally help the bereaved come to grips with the meaning of the life of the person who has died. There is very little variation among eulogies in serving these purposes (Jamieson & Campbell, 1982). In those rare cases when the eulogy does not serve these purposes, it may look quite different from traditional eulogies. Rowland (1991, 2002) illustrated this point when he noted that Reagan’s Challenger eulogy included characteristics that are uncommon in normal eulogies because Reagan was trying to calm the fears of schoolchildren who had watched the accident and also protect NASA, purposes that are different from the norm in a eulogistic situation. A similar point could be made about the inaugural address. Inaugural addresses from administration to administration tend to serve the same purposes or functions because any new administration needs to reunify the country, create support for its program, and prove its legitimacy (Campbell & Jamieson, 1985, 1986). 194 On Organizational Apologia It might seem at first that there would be similar agreement on purpose in relation to organizational apologia, but that in fact is not the case. Apologia originally was defined as a speech of self-defense (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). Such a definition implies that apologia needs to be undertaken only when an actor is perceived as being responsible for some level of wrongdoing (Hearit, 1994; Ware & Linkugel, 1973). Others have developed a similar analysis of purpose (see Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1995, 1999b; Hearit, 1995a; Seeger, 1986; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002). What has not been noted is that two somewhat conflicting purposes are common in the category (especially in the organizational variant): presenting justification of action or denial of guilt in the particular case (image repair) and maintenance of an overall positive image. By image, we mean the way the organization is perceived by others. The image repair purpose relates to how the organization is perceived in relation to apparent wrongdoing. The image maintenance purpose relates to the general perception or reputation of the organization. The ultimate purpose of apologia is, of course, to get the individual or organization out of crisis, to return public attitudes to the place they were prior to the crisis. Thus, in a situation in which accusations of serious wrongdoing are present, the image repair purpose takes primacy. The image repair purpose, however, will not produce in every instance the same strategic responses because, as we already have hinted, the details of the situation heavily influence what can be said. For example, denial can be used only if there is strong credible evidence denying the charge, and the denial does not attack a fundamental stakeholder crucial to the organization, such as the customer. A number of other situational factors influencing organizational apologia also have been identified (see Crable, 1990; Dionisopoulos & Vibbert, 1988; Hearit, 1995a; Sproule, 1988). Regarding the second purpose, organizations in an apologetic situation always have the goal of showing that the organization is generally caring, decent, and so forth, apart from the specifics of the situation necessitating the apologia. All organizational actors must fulfill the purpose of supporting the credibility and maintaining the image of the organization. Thus, the organization will speak and write in order to protect and enhance that credibility and image. This purpose is universal because organizations want to maintain important and ongoing relationships with stakeholders, including employees, shareholders, key partners, the public, and government. In the most serious instances, these two purposes collapse into each other because there is no method of maintaining a positive image without denying guilt or presenting justification for the action, such as differentiation or transcendence. Thus, an organization accused of serious 195 Communication Theory wrongdoing will be unable to rely on bolstering or corrective action by themselves because those strategies will be seen as inadequate. On the other hand, in less serious situations, the two purposes may even conflict. Take the case of a company that has released a small amount of pollution because of an unpredictable mechanical accident. At one level, a strategy based on denial would seem to be appropriate because the company should not be held responsible for an accident that could not be predicted. At the level of image maintenance, however, the denial strategy may be counterproductive, producing in the audience a sense that the organization is not a good corporate citizen. The company may find it advisable to accept responsibility in such a case, despite the fact that it is not really responsible, and show its contrition via a heartfelt apology, corrective action, and compensation for the victims. Audi faced a variant of this situation when the organization was falsely accused of producing cars that sometimes suddenly accelerated without action of the driver (Hearit & Courtright, 2003). Audi attempted to deny the charge, but had difficulty explaining instances in which cars accelerated suddenly, and as a consequence the company suffered major financial losses (Hearit & Courtright, 2003). It seems clear that Audi felt the need to deny the charge without attacking a key stakeholder group (car owners) by arguing that they were causing the accidents by hitting the accelerator instead of the brake pedal. That is why Audi coupled denial with remedial actions such as anchoring floor mats and installing a shift lock on the vehicle. These actions, however, had the effect of undercutting Audi’s denial of the charge by seeming to indicate that something other than operator error was causing the accidents (Hearit & Courtright, 2003). Audi was caught between denying the charge and blaming its own customers. Our argument to this point is that strategy choice in organizational apologia will be influenced by the relative importance of the two purposes we have identified. Although both purposes are always present, their comparative weight will vary between situations, with the image repair purpose assuming greater importance the more serious the perceived wrongdoing. It is important to note that contrary to most theorizing, the image maintenance purpose is in a sense more universal than the image repair purpose. Organizations always seek to maintain their image when they are accused of wrongdoing. They do not, however, always seek to repair the image in a particular case, either because specifics of the situation make such repair very difficult (they really did it) or because using repair strategies such as denial could be counterproductive to the image of the organization. It also should be noted that the image maintenance function tends to be more important in dictating strategic response in the case of organi- 196 On Organizational Apologia zational, rather than in individual, apologia. Any organization accused of wrongdoing will be concerned about protecting its image with key stakeholders. The organization cannot continue without those stakeholders. It is much easier for an individual to break off such relations or simply not care if certain groups reject him or her. After winning a second term, U.S. President Bill Clinton could afford to write off Christian conservatives; Exxon, for example, cannot afford to write off customers or shareholders. For that reason, it should be easier to develop a principled theoretical approach to organizational, as opposed to individual, apologia. The foregoing suggests that variation in the importance of the image maintenance and image repair purposes found in organizational apologia in part explains the lack of consistency across the category as a whole. Thus, any overarching theory needs to account for the fact that the image maintenance purpose is always important in organizational apology, whereas in certain cases the image repair purpose may be of much less import. We already have hinted at the second difference between organizational apologia and other limited ontological genres, such as the eulogy and inaugural. In these cases, situational constraints facing the individual are quite consistent. The primary situation in the case of the eulogy is the death of someone important to us. In the case of the inaugural, the situational constraints relate to the election of a leader following a contested campaign. Although almost all research on the inaugural has focused on the presidency, in principle the same approach could be used for similar leadership transitions. It should be obvious that such situational constraint is not present in the case of the apologia. A number of factors vary widely across apologia, including perceived guilt and the credibility of the organization (see Coombs, 1995, 1999b; Coombs & Halladay, 2002), magnitude of the harm and the nature of those harmed (see Burns & Bruner, 2000; Coombs, 1995; Ice, 1991), degree of actual responsibility for the wrongdoing and the veracity of the evidence (see Coombs, 1995), the fluidity of public opinion (see Moffitt, 1994), perceived moral dimensions to the alleged wrongdoing (see Coombs, 1995, 1999b; Lerbinger, 1997), and involvement of third parties. For example, Exxon was limited by the massive amount of oil spilled in the Exxon-Valdez disaster. Simple denial was not an available option. In contrast, Audi could have used denial, but the organization faced the problem of blaming its own customers and the public perception that it was guilty. Many similar examples could be cited to demonstrate that the constraints facing organizational actors in crisis situations vary enormously. It is, therefore, unsurprising that there is much more strategic variation in organizational apologia fulfilling the image repair function than in other ontological genres. 197 Communication Theory Reconceptualizing Apologia as Similar to an Argument Field In a number of essays, Rowland (1981, 1982) argued that the fundamental organizing principles of argument fields are tied to purposes served by the field and those of any subfields within it in relation to a specific subject matter. Thus, the purposes of the law shape the evolution of legal practice, the rules of evidence in particular contexts, the means through which legal disputes are resolved, and so forth. At the same time, particular purposes in specific subfields of the law produce characteristics that are similar in some ways to the entire field because all subfields share the general purpose of producing a just result, but also create differences among the legal subfields. The differences among the subfields exist because of purposive and subject matter differences between them. Thus, patent law and international law will bear some similarities, but also may be quite different. In this way, Rowland explained how certain characteristics might be invariant across an entire argument field, whereas other characteristics would vary with the particular subfield.4 We would suggest that a similar principle is at work in organizational apologia. Here, we are not arguing that apologia is a kind of argument field. Rather, we are drawing a heuristic comparison between argument fields and apologia. In this view, similarities across all apologia can be tied to the purpose of maintaining a strong organizational image. As long as this purpose is perceived to be significant to the individual or organization, a number of image maintenance strategies must be utilized in effective apologia. Thus, organizations that want to maintain their image should demonstrate concern for the victim(s), bolster individual or organizational values, make it clear that no harm was intended, and/or actively take steps to prevent the harmful action from occurring again. We will develop this argument in more detail in a later section. Although a concise and consistent list of strategies tied to the image maintenance function of apologia can be generated, no such list can be tied to the image repair function. The problem here is that available image repair strategies are limited by the specifics of the situation in a way similar to how argumentative subfields are shaped by specific purposes and specialized subject matter. A comparison from individual apologia may make this point clearer. President Clinton faced very different situations regarding charges concerning his relationship with Monica Lewinsky and those regarding his involvement in the Whitewater development. In the case of Lewinsky, after an initial attempt at denial, that option became unavailable as a credible strategy because strong evidence surfaced that the affair had occurred, thus he relied on atonement (Koesten & Rowland, in press). In the Whitewater case, however, he 198 On Organizational Apologia consistently relied upon denial and eventually was vindicated when even his harshest critic, Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr, was unable to find evidence of wrongdoing (Ray, 2000, Text: Final report, 2002). The explanation for the strategy variation is simple: Clinton denied when he could and atoned when he had no other option. The larger point is that strategic choice-making to serve the image repair purpose is heavily influenced by the specifics of the situation in relation to key variables, such as perceived guilt, magnitude of harm, degree of actual responsibility for the harm, the presence or absence of involved third parties, and so forth. The differences among situations relating to these variables require choices among the apologia strategies identified by Ware and Linkugel (1973), Benoit (1995), Coombs (1995, 1999b), and others. Given these factors, it is unsurprising that critics and theorists have identified any number of combinations of the nearly 20 different strategy categories or subcategories identified in the literature. It is not merely that a much larger number of strategies have been identified in relation to organizational apologia than in other ontological genres, but that no consistent pattern has been identified in terms of how those strategies are combined. Instead of seeking a single coherent approach to organizational apologia to deal with this situation, we suggest it would be more sensible to attempt to identify the invariant characteristics found in all organizational apologia serving an image maintenance function and then seek the equivalent of argumentative subfields to explain variation of image repair strategies across apologia. Thus, the critic might attempt to identify the strategies that define apologia when responsibility for the bad act is certain (and consequently denial is unavailable) and the harm to others is large. The strategies present in a variety of other subgenres could be sketched in turn. The focus of this article is on the first of the two stages of reformulating organizational apologia theory and on sketching a research agenda for the second stage. In the following section, we argue that organizational apologia concerned with image maintenance must contain one or more of a small set of message strategies focused on supporting the image of the organization, but not necessarily responding to the particular charge being made. Further, we will demonstrate that this set of strategies (invariant characteristics in the context of field theory) is required to achieve the image maintenance purpose. Image Maintenance and the Subgenres of Organizational Apologia In the previous section, we argued that strategy choice in relation to the primary purpose of organizational apologia—image repair responding 199 Communication Theory to perceived wrongdoing—is heavily influenced by the specifics of the situation facing the organization. Consequently, it is impossible to identify an overarching strategy typology that applies to all subgenres of organizational apologia. In contrast, a strategy typology can be developed in relation to the secondary purpose of apologia, image maintenance outside the particulars of the apologetic situation. Regardless of crisis type, this secondary purpose requires a particular response involving a limited set of message strategies that reinforce a positive image for the organization if an organization has any hope of maintaining credibility and retaining a positive image following a crisis. In order to achieve this secondary generic purpose, the organization must do one or more of the following: demonstrate concern for those who have been wronged, bolster organizational values, deny intent to do harm (often by saying that one is sorry and did not intend to produce any bad result), and/or indicate that the organization has taken steps to prevent a recurrence of the situation.5 We also suggest that the more serious the situation, the more likely multiple strategies will be needed. In making this argument, we essentially claim that these characteristics are field invariant characteristics of organizational apologia. Demonstrating Concern for Victims The first strategy of image maintenance is for the organization to show concern for those who have been harmed, the victims of the wrongdoing. The term victim encompasses not only those who were physically injured in a crisis event, but also those who suffered psychologically or emotionally from the event. In the case of organizational wrongdoing, even if the organization can prove that it was not responsible for the crisis, it still must demonstrate concern for those affected by the event. A great deal of research supports this assertion (e.g., Coombs, 1999a, 1999b; Hearit, 1999; Marcus & Goodman, 1991). For example, Coombs (1999a, 1999b) asserted that compassion and expression of sympathy for victims always should be a primary concern for organizations regardless of crisis type. Hearit’s (1999) analysis of the cyclical nature of the apologetic process in the Intel Pentium chip crisis offered further support for the necessity of this strategic response. In this example, Intel may have been correct when it denied that flaws in the chip had any negative impact on customers, but in taking that approach Intel seemed to be “insensitive to customer concerns” (Hearit, 1999, p. 299). Hearit (1999) noted that when Intel switched from a rhetoric of denial to one of apology, the case virtually disappeared from the news and Intel’s stock price began to recover. Thus, regardless of the level of organizational responsibility or locus of control, scholars have found that organizations that want to portray a positive organizational image have little choice but to demonstrate concern for victims. To neglect to do so would 200 On Organizational Apologia paint a picture of the organization as coldhearted and driven by the bottom line. Bolstering Organizational Values A second image maintenance strategy available to organizations is bolstering the overall values, goals, and mission of the organization. Coombs (1995, p. 461) claimed that “a positive performance history is essential for ingratiation strategies [in his typology this includes bolstering]” to succeed. This conclusion applies more broadly than just to ingratiation strategies. It seems clear that promoting the organization’s commitment to whatever societal value is at stake (consumer safety, for example) is essential to an effective apologetic campaign. For stakeholders to let an organization “off the hook,” they have to believe the organization shares their value norms. Before stakeholders can do this, they need to be made aware of the values, goals, and mission of the organization even if the organization has committed bad acts in a particular case. Hearit (1995a, p.11) was getting at this point when he stated that in reestablishing legitimacy, organizations may use “a form of epideictic, value-oriented discourse in which they praise the very values they are reputed to have transgressed.” The bolstering does not deny or justify the bad action, but it may be used to maintain the image of the organization. Two important implications come out of this discussion. First, the foregoing analysis clarifies the role of bolstering in apologia studies. Since Ware and Linkugel included bolstering as part of their original typology of four strategies, the way the strategy functions has been questioned. At one level, it was hard to understand how bolstering was an apologia strategy at all. Bolstering values or good acts unrelated to the specific wrongdoing would not seem to be an effective means of persuasive selfdefense. Exxon hardly could have told the nation, “Well, yes, we spilled a lot of oil, but look at those cheap gas prices.” However, the view that bolstering functions to fulfill the secondary image maintenance purpose of apologia explains this situation. Bolstering will not get an organization out of the wrongdoing, but it is a crucial strategy for maintaining or strengthening the image once a solution to the crisis has been found. Second, the previous analysis again demonstrates why the secondary image maintenance purpose is so central to organizational apologia, but much less so for individual apologia. Overall image and the particular wrongdoing are much more separable in the organizational context than the individual one. An organization may admit wrongdoing, even serious wrongdoing, but successfully bolster its image by pointing to other good acts. In the case of an individual, that aim is more difficult to achieve. Few spouses, for example, would be likely to forgive a partner for an affair based on unrelated good acts. The point is that in individual apologia, the specific act and overall image tend to be linked 201 Communication Theory more tightly than in the case of organizational apologia. This, in part, may explain the failure of a substantial portion of the United States population to forgive former President Clinton for his affair with Monica Lewinsky, despite enormously powerful bolstering involving foreign and domestic policy successes. Denying Intent To Do Harm A third image maintenance strategy available to organizations is to deny the intent to harm anyone. If an event threatens the image of an organization, perception of responsibility generally lies, at least in part, with the organization. To restore a positive organizational image, organizations need to assure the public that the organization in no way intended for its products, actions, or decisions to negatively affect the public in any way and that it had taken every possible step to avoid negative outcomes prior to the event. Therefore, the generic response that an organization should utilize in order to fulfill the image maintenance function is denial of intent. In this way, the organization shows its concern for the victims. Note that this strategy may be used regardless of whether the organization denies responsibility for or justifies the action taken in relation to the alleged wrongful action. An organization may deny or accept responsibility, but still use denial of intent as a method of image maintenance. In fact, there is a strong argument that organizations should deny intent even if they also deny that they in any way caused the crisis. Denial of intent to do harm is essential to protecting the image of the organization. In some instances, however, the circumstances of the crisis may make it difficult for organizations to use this strategy. Had Valujet, for example, issued a statement that it “did not intend to kill anyone” in the airline’s terrible 1996 crash in the Everglades, it would have resulted in ridicule and possibly audience backlash. In cases in which the nature of those harmed or the magnitude of the wrongdoing prevents the organization from directly denying intent to do harm, the organization can only label the event as an accident and rely on the other general strategies of image maintenance, especially bolstering of organizational values. In such an instance, bolstering may be used to indirectly demonstrate that the organization intended no harm. Preventing Recurrence by Pursuing the “Root Cause” A fourth image maintenance strategy available to organizations facing crises is to relay the message to stakeholders that they are actively taking steps to prevent a recurrence of the problem, regardless of responsibility. Organizational actors often utilize this strategy by pledging to pursue the “root cause” of the event, even while denying responsibility for it (see Jerome, 2002, for an analysis of this strategy in the Ford- 202 On Organizational Apologia Firestone tire/SUV rollover crisis). A number of theorists have recognized that corrective action is an apologia strategy. For example, Benoit (1995) addressed the value of corrective action efforts, Hearit (1995a) asserted that corrective action is a necessary part of any relegitimization campaign, and Coombs (1999b, p. 120) argued that in confronting a crisis, organizational “stakeholders should be told what is being done to correct the problem.” What had not been recognized previously is that this strategy is tied to the purpose of maintaining an overall positive image and not the purpose of image repair to produce forgiveness for the organization or individual. Following both the Challenger and Columbia accidents, NASA and outside investigators conducted rigorous “root cause” analyses focusing both on the mechanical and human failures leading directly to the accident and also on problems with the organizational culture in NASA (Rowland, 1986; Wald & Schwartz, 2003), but these actions in no way reduced the responsibility of NASA managers who made decision-making errors in relation to the two failed missions. The strategy of preventing recurrence by seeking the original cause is designed to protect the image of the organization, not repair it. It protects the image by indicating that the particular wrongdoing is unlikely to occur again and also by bolstering the basic values of the organization. The Importance of Field Invariant Strategies for Image Maintenance The field invariant strategies we have identified are tied directly to the secondary image maintenance purpose of organizational apologia. Failure to include these strategies in a campaign makes it less likely that an organization will be able to maintain a positive image, even if it successfully deals with particular allegations. We suspect that a similar argument could be made about individual apologia. However, it is important to recognize that the image maintenance purpose is more central to organizational than individual apologia because (a) organizations maintain ongoing relationships with stakeholders in situations in which individuals might choose to sever those relationships, and (b) organizations find it much easier than individuals to displace blame on an individual or group. Exxon could to some extent displace blame on a drunk ship captain. President Clinton, in contrast, could hardly seek exoneration in the Lewinsky scandal by blaming his bad side. In order to meet the image maintenance purpose, organizations should use one or more of the invariant strategies defined above. The four strategies are in most cases perfectly compatible together, and a skillful organizational advocate is likely to use all of them. At minimum, the image maintenance purpose requires use of at least one of the strategies in any situation involving perceived wrongdoing. It should be recognized that, 203 Communication Theory although these invariant strategies will help an organization meet the secondary image maintenance purpose found in apologia, they cannot, by themselves, achieve the primary purpose of image repair. We made that point clear earlier when we noted that bolstering is not an image repair strategy in any sense, nor does seeking the root cause or denying intent to do harm in any way dispute that people may have been harmed by the bad acts of an organization. Here, we build on the insight of Hearit (1995a, pp. 6–12) that organizations typically respond to a crisis with negative rhetoric involving dissociation and positive rhetoric involving corrective action and bolstering. We suggest that what Hearit calls a positive rhetoric is primarily aimed at achieving the image maintenance purpose of organizational apologia. In addition, although corrective action and bolstering are common positive strategies achieving the image maintenance purpose, there are other strategies that are not necessarily positive but may serve that purpose. Organizations often deny any intent to do harm and express concern for victims as ways of maintaining their image. These strategies are not focused on positive attributes of the organization, but on denying negative attributes. They can, however, be used to fulfill the image maintenance purpose. Unlike image maintenance, effectiveness in achieving image repair depends upon the specifics of the exigency facing the individual or organization, and it is not possible to develop a single, coherent typology of invariant strategies to achieve that aim. The best solution to this difficulty is to focus on identifying subgenres of apologia and to lay out the required characteristics to resolve the situation in each of those subgenres. Toward the Identification of Subgenres of Apologia The next step in reconceptualizing organizational apologia is to begin the process of identifying discrete subgenres within apologia and then to develop an appropriate typology of strategies, within each subgenre, for achieving the primary image-repair purpose served by all apologia. Hearit and Courtright (2003, p. 91) observed that “crisis research has not progressed greatly in differentiating types of crises, treating them across a broad range of events as more similar than dissimilar.” A focus on subgenres has the potential to identify how the various strategies of organizational apologia are combined in identifiable patterns. The identification of such patterns would provide important guidance to both the critic and practitioner in understanding how the many available apologia strategies are appropriately combined in different situations. Whereas describing a complete typology of subgenres is beyond the scope of this 204 On Organizational Apologia essay, we can sketch the process that should be followed to fill the theoretical gap identified by Hearit and Courtright (2003). The key to identifying subgenres is to focus on the key variables that constrain the options of the individual or organization presenting the apologia. We suggest that there are five main variables: perceived guilt, magnitude of harm (including the nature of the victim), data indicating the actual responsibility for the harm, the presence or absence of involved third parties, and whether the actions fit traditional moral standards in the culture. The first variable is perceived guilt. When an individual or organization is perceived to be guilty, it is much harder to rely on denial that wrongdoing occurred or blame shifting to another party than if the individual or organization is not perceived to be guilty. One aspect of perceived guilt is the prior reputation of the organization, which is heavily influenced by the organization’s history. If the public perceives the organization to be guilty, either because of apparently damning facts or because of prior bad acts, this perceptual constraint should play a major role in shaping apologetic response. A number of authors, notably Coombs (1995), have argued that the magnitude of the harm and the nature of the victim also influence apologetic response. Coombs (1995, p. 459) asserted, “The more severe the damage the more willing publics are to ascribe responsibility for the crisis to the organization.” Thus, a manufacturing accident that kills 25 workers will require different kinds of strategic responses than an accident that causes three workers to break their legs. It is not simply that bigger tragedies are harder to cope with than smaller ones, although that is certainly the case. Another variable is the nature of the victim. As a general principle, the more that the victims are perceived to be similar to the audience, as well as innocent, the greater the perceived crisis will be. So, for instance, Americans are much more likely to perceive a situation as a crisis if American children are threatened than if those harmed were adults in Asia or Africa. A third factor is the existence of data indicating responsibility for the situation demanding an apologetic response. An organization may be perceived to be responsible for a crisis, when in fact it has no such responsibility. On the other hand, in some cases an organization may not face an initial negative perception, but must deal with the long-term difficulty that a collection of documents or other material indicates actual responsibility for the event. Clearly, organizations are constrained if they lack a credible argument that they were not responsible for the wrongful action. In some cases, the mere existence of the harmful situation may make it all but impossible to use denial. Absent a major storm, piracy, or catastrophic equipment failure, supertankers are not supposed to become grounded and spill large quantities of oil, for example. It is 205 Communication Theory important to recognize that there is a significant distinction between perceived and actual responsibility. In situations in which an organization is perceived to be but is not actually responsible, denial is available as a strategy, although it is difficult to use. Of course, perceived guilt is always a rhetorical construction, but the existence of documents, witnesses, or other tangible evidence linking the organization to the crisis will significantly limit the strategic options open to the organization. If this material is clear and convincing, denial will be all but ruled out. A fourth important factor is the presence or absence of involved additional parties. In some cases, an organization may be constrained by the presence of a crucial associate or business partner who would have to be sacrificed if certain strategies of self-defense were chosen.6 At that point, the organization may have to choose between the ongoing relationship and effective apologetic response. Ford-Firestone faced precisely this situation when charges were brought against Firestone for producing inadequate tires used on the Ford Explorer. Either Ford or Firestone could have blamed the other, but at the cost of a business relationship of close to 100 years. In this context, it is perfectly understandable that Ford shifted blame first. It is much easier to replace a company supplying tires with another such company than it is to replace a major buyer for those tires. The final factor is the relationship of the event requiring apologia to traditional moral standards in the culture. Thus, if a scandal involves allegations of sexual misconduct of some kind by the boss with employees, stakeholders in a more permissive culture may be easier to persuade that no serious wrongdoing occurred than stakeholders in a restrictive moral culture. An Ivy League college president might admit having an affair and retain his or her job, whereas the president of a fundamentalist university would not survive the scandal. The five factors that we have identified, individually and in interaction, shape the strategic responses available to organizational apologists. The next step in identifying subgenres of apologia should be to focus on how those factors interact to create discrete subgenres. For example, it is easy to predict that in a situation in which the magnitude of harm is low, there is neither a perception of responsibility nor actual responsibility for the incident, and the behavior falls within cultural moral norms, a wide variety of potential strategies will be available. On the other hand, the situation will be much different if the magnitude of harm is high, perceived responsibility is strong, there is hard data proving that responsibility, and the incident violated central moral principles in the culture. In that situation, the organization would have little choice but to accept responsibility and ask forgiveness. Another possible subgenre may involve a product recall situation in which actual responsibility and 206 On Organizational Apologia perceived responsibility are both high (the organization did release the product), and the public has been moderately harmed. In the context of individual apologia, one attempt in the direction of sketching subgenres of apologia has been taken recently. Koesten and Rowland (in press) describe a subgenre of “atonement” rhetoric in which the accused is responsible for the wrongdoing and can neither deny its existence nor attempt to justify it via transcendence. Drawing on Jewish theology, they argue that the characteristics defining a rhetoric of atonement are these: (a) Acknowledge wrongdoing and ask for forgiveness; (b) based upon reflection, offer a thorough change of attitude and relationship; (c) take steps to develop a different kind of present and future; (d) use public action or private mortification to demonstrate the authenticity of the apology; and (e) seek atonement in a public forum. Atonement is a subgenre that must be used when both actual responsibility and perceived responsibility for the action are high, there is a moral violation involved in the incident, and the magnitude of the harm is not so high that forgiveness is impossible. In the case of atonement, the limitations on the subgenre seem so specific that the differences that often exist between individual and organizational apologia may not be present. Based on the factors identified in this essay, it should be possible to identify subgenres of organizational apologia. Researchers should consider how the factors we have identified limit strategic responses and then use a series of case studies to develop and test typologies for the specific subgenres. At that point, organizational apologia may reach something like the specificity found in other ontological genres. Conclusion As noted earlier, many scholars have attempted to create typologies for describing and evaluating organizational and individual apologia. To this point, there has been little agreement among the various typologies, and the most developed systems (see Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1995) contain so many strategy options that they are of limited value to the critic or crisis consultant. In this article, we have tried to explain why previous categorization has not been successful and also suggested a means of solving the problem. Drawing an analogy to argument field theory, we argued that apologia serves two related, but still different, functions: image restoration and image maintenance. Part of the difficulty with existing typologies can be traced to a failure to separate strategies serving these different purposes. In relation to the secondary image-maintenance purpose, we identified a set of “field invariant” strategies: demonstrating concern for those harmed, bolstering organizational values, denying intent to create harm, 207 Communication Theory and preventing recurrence by seeking the cause of the problem. These strategies can be used in any a pologetic context to support the image of the organization, but they cannot be used by themselves to serve the image repair purpose. The typology of image maintenance strategies should aid both the critic in explaining or evaluating apologia and the practitioner in confronting an apologetic exigence. We have also built a case for developing typologies of image repair strategies tied to subgenres of apologia. Here, we have argued that no simple typology of image repair strategies can be created because of variation in exigence. However, it should be possible to identify subgenres of apologia, based on factors such as magnitude of harm, perceived responsibility, degree of actual responsibility for the incident, presence of other individuals or organizations in the situation, and so forth. Such an approach should make it easier for scholars to create useful descriptive and prescriptive typologies to explain and evaluate organizational apologia. These frameworks also should be useful for the practitioner. In this article, we proposed a reconceptualization of organizational apologia. Clearly, significant research is needed to test the value of that reconceptualization. For the approach to be tested fully, scholars should focus research in three areas. First, a meta-analysis of existing research and additional case studies are needed to validate the universality and effectiveness of the invariant strategies for image maintenance. In doing this, scholars should focus on a wide variety of organizational crises in order to test the utility of the proposed typology. Second, scholars should work to outline subfields of organizational apologia. The key to the generic categorization of organizational apologetic responses for particular types of crises lies in understanding the characteristics of the subfields of organizational apologia. It is only when scholars begin to thoroughly outline how strategies function in subfields that they will be able to provide specific typologies fulfilling descriptive and evaluative functions. Third, scholars should test whether it is possible to extend the argument developed in this essay to individual apologia. As we have noted at several points, there are significant differences among the constraints faced and strategic options open to individuals and organizations accused of wrongdoing. At the same time, both individuals and organizations must respond to accusations of bad acts. It is possible that the approach developed here could be extended to individual apologia. Further research should explore this possibility. One significant theoretical implication can be drawn from the reconceptualization of apologia proposed in this article. An underlying theoretical presupposition of this argument is that purpose plays a crucial role in generic categorization. In the case of organizational apologia, theorists and critics had not recognized the two somewhat different 208 On Organizational Apologia purposes at issue in the category. Instead, they have focused on the nature of the situation in which apologia occurs, a perceived crisis in which there has been alleged wrongdoing. We agree with Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003, p. 64) that “the value of understanding crisis type is that it reduces the uncertainty associated with crisis and helps managers respond more effectively.” At the same time, a focus on situation alone has not been sufficient to provide adequate descriptive and prescriptive typologies for organizational apologia. The addition of purpose to the equation, however, makes it possible to identify invariant image-maintenance strategies and to sketch an approach for identifying subgenres relating to the primary purpose of image recovery. Carrying out the research agenda sketched here should, in the language of Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer, further reduce the “uncertainty” facing both managers and critics concerned with organizational apologia and crisis response. In theoretical terms, the foregoing indicates the crucial importance of considering purpose7 in any form of generic analysis. Robert C. Rowland (PhD, University of Kansas) is professor and chair of the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Kansas. Angela M. Jerome (PhD, University of Kansas) is an assistant professor of communication at Illinois State University. Portions of this article, particularly the discussion of invariant strategies, are adapted from the dissertation of the second author, which was directed by the first author. Address correspondence to Robert C. Rowland, Department of Communication Studies, University of Kansas, 1440 Jayhawk Blvd., Lawrence, KS 66045; email: [email protected]. 1 If the crisis is a natural disaster or some other act of God in which there is no allegation of wrongdoing, a much wider set of strategies may be available than when there are allegations of misconduct of some kind. Our focus is on instances in which misconduct is an issue. 2 Although our argument focuses on organizational apologia/crisis response, a similar argument could be made about the lack of agreement concerning the characteristics defining individual apologia. Our focus in this article is on organizational apologia because the forces limiting organizational response are more constraining than those governing individual apologia, a point we will develop at several points. We will note instances when our argument also may apply to individual apologia, but considerable further research is needed to verify those claims. 3 As we noted earlier, we believe that theorists focusing on organizational apologia and those focusing on organizational crisis response in situations where wrongdoing is alleged have very similar goals. To avoid redundancy, in the remainder of this article we will refer to this topic as organizational apologia. 4 Here, we slightly extend Toulmin’s (1958) usage. 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