The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled Promise

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled Promise AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Policy Note # 04 by Kurt Bassuener Berlin - Sarajevo October 2015 by Bodo Weber http://democratizationpolicy.org A report from Atlantic Initiative & Democratization Policy Council Author: Kurt Bassuener Editing: Toby Vogel & DPC executive editorial board Berlin - Sarajevo October 2015 This paper was supported by: http://democratizationpolicy.org TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................... I INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY............................................................................................................ 1 FORCE STRUCTURE........................................................................................................................................ 2 AFBIH MISSIONS AND THE ONGOING DEFENSE REVIEW.............................................................................. 3 THE AFBIH IN THE POLARIZED POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................... 5 Politicization in the Ranks ................................................................................................................ 7 The Regimental System .................................................................................................................... 8 Military Capability and Performance ............................................................................................... 9 4’s Challenges .......................................................................................................................... 10 Defense Property............................................................................................................................ 13 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................... 14 http://democratizationpolicy.org PREFACE This DPC-Atlantic Initiative Policy Note is part of a series of occasional thematic pape s hi h olle ti el o pose the se o d editio of DPC a d the AI s “e u it Risk Analysis Study. The first edition, published in October 2011, assessed a full spectrum of risk factors: the functionality of government institutions at all levels, political use of conflict rhetoric in the media, police, army, privately-held weapons, private security companies, religious and ethnic radicalism, socio-economic strain, juvenile delinquency and sports violence, and the posture of the international community in BiH. This second edition assesses these same factors from the vantage point of the present day, including new information previously unavailable to the authors. These papers are not mere updates of the first edition; each Policy Note is a stand-alone assessment of the theme in question. However, where information from the 2011 edition remains relevant, it is included. This Policy Note Series was produced with the generous support of the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Friedrich-EbertFoundation (FES) office in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSF BiH). This paper was supported by DCAF. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The A ed Fo es of Bos ia a d He zego i a AFBiH o the fo e will mark its tenth anniversary in 2016 and stands as a useful reminder of the considerable progress achieved in the first decade following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. However, the force was assembled just when all other state-building consolidation and reforms began to stop, stall or reverse.. The AFBiH is not immune to the effects of the polarized political environment and its attendant afflictions – patronage and clientelism, short-termism, and a lack of accountability. Furthermore, the Republika Srpska (RS) Government has perennially ta geted the AFBiH s udget fo uts as pa t of its poli to de ilita ize BiH, a d the e fu the eake the state. In addition, in much the same way that Dayton included compromises which have been proven to obstruct the creation of a functional and accountable governance system for BiH, the tradeoffs required to create the AFBiH impedes its integration. In particular, the maintenance of ethnic majority infantry battalions poses a risk in the event of the emergence of further interethnic polarization, as does the (ceremonial) regimental system – originally intended as a containment mechanism for Armija BiH, Vojske RS, and HVO traditions for veterans of these forces, but now being perpetuated by the encouragement of new recruits to join them. Full integration of the force down to the operational level remains unrealized. Furthermore, sources indicate that currying favor with political and religious authorities in pursuit of advancement has become ever more visible in the ranks. Progress toward the goal of NATO membership, questioned by both the RS Government and more recently by Serb e e of the BiH P eside Mlade I a ić, has ee ho led the fa t that the ownership of defense property remains in dispute. Resolution of this issue, which would free troops from defending these sites for other duties, is an explicit requirement for the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to be activated. Registration of this property, ruled State property by the BiH Constitutional Court and more recently the Court of BiH, was part of the coalition agreement for the BiH Government, but remains vehemently opposed by the RS. Despite these considerable impediments, the AFBiH has performed admirably, both abroad in peace support operations (with regular contingents supporting ISAF in Afghanistan) and at home. In the latter case, during and following the May 2014 flood emergency, the AFBiH saved lives and property of BiH citizens throughout the flood affected areas. This boosted morale considerably and connected the force to the citizenry as never before. The AFBiH was the only state, entity, or cantonal official body to emerge with its reputation enhanced through its flood response; all others performed miserably. This disaster response experience also identified deficiencies in equipment, training and preparation which can be remediated to ensure better performance in the future. Fi all , the AFBiH is i du ti g e lood i to the offi e o ps th ough a B itish-sponsored program to e uit u i e sit g aduates. The effo t as u i e sall lauded i the autho s i te ie s as a a e ue to further professionalize the force. In short, the problems identified with the AFBiH are essentially the same as they were four years ago, when the first edition of the DPC/Atlantic Initiative (AI) Security Risk Analysis was published. There is no AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | I expectation that the AFBiH will generate destabilization or initiate inter-ethnic violence. But there is almost universal belief that in the event of such violence, it would collapse along its ethnic fault lines. The AFBiH cannot but reflect the politically-driven polarization which dominates the political arena in BiH. With these findings in mind, DPC and AI recommend the following to Western governments: 1) End the ambiguity on BiH security guarantees: The reduction of EUFOR to a paltry approximately 600 troops has conveyed the signal to politicians and citizens alike that there is no longer a credible deterrent to destabilizing actors, nor a capability to react to unforeseen crises or undeterrable threats. The EU and NATO need to finally state without ambiguity that any attempts to split BiH or initiate interethnic violence will be confronted forcefully. 2) Demonstrate steadfast Western solidarity and firmness regarding compliance with legal decisions relevant to defense property: The 2012 BiH Constitutional Court decision on State property has never been the rallying cry it should have been, given the resolution of the RS Government to defy it. There must be concrete consequences for RS Government decisionake s, hi h a i lude EU est i ti e easu es. 3) Continue long-term support to e lood i the AFBiH. The B itish-sponsored new officer induction program is universally praised. Other donors should consider similar or complimentary efforts to introduce new talent and skills into the AFBiH. 4) Provide support for force integration at the company level. Operational unit integration, particularly for units deployed abroad and for newly-inducted officers, is an important goal that needs to be an explicitly defined – and articulated – target for Western assistance. 5) Assign experts to assist in procurement, so the defense budget can be wisely spent in a timely fashion. Assistance in developing tenders and due diligence by Western militaries/MoDs would maximize the utility of the limited defense budget and external assistance. 6) Provide assistance in planning for natural disasters: An approach similar to the preliminary efforts that were undertaken to remediate serious deficiencies in police coordination should be undertaken for the AFBiH and the wider civil defense architecture in BiH, including the Ministry of Security and entity and cantonal bodies. 7) Provide or assist in procuring specialized equipment for civil emergencies, including through regional pooling/collaborative arrangements, focusing particularly on the deficiencies identified in the May 2014 flood emergency: helicopters capable of vertical extraction, firefighting equipment, boats, and specialized engineering equipment. AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | II Introduction and Brief History The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) is regularly referenced as a signal achievement of the state-strengthening process that reached its apogee in 2005. In psychological terms alone, it was probably the greatest accomplishment in state-building in BiH to date. In 1996, the concept of unifying the belligerent armies into a single command and control structure, radically shrinking the active-duty force to approximately 10,000 and ending conscription, was inconceivable. But a confluence of events and leadership undertaken by both international (OHR, OSCE and NATO in particular) and BiH actors within the scope of the Defense Reform Commission made the establishment of a BiH Ministry of Defense (MoD) a reality by early 2004, and of a unified AFBiH in 2006.1 Even prior to the unification of the entity armed forces into the AFBiH as an all-volunteer force in early 2006, a joint unexploded ordinance platoon was deployed to Iraq.2 Participation in international peacekeeping and peace-suppo t ope atio s has ee a fo al poi t of the AFBiH s de elop e t, ith a Peace Support Operations Training Command (PSOTC) co-located at Butmir with the AFBiH Operational Command (as well as EUFOR and NATO Headquarters).3 AFBiH troops have repeatedly deployed to serve i NATO s I te atio al “e u it Assista e Fo e I“AF i Afgha ista , he e they have learned valuable skills, operating in unfamiliar environments. The most recent deployment involved troops from the 6th Infantry Brigade, based in Banja Luka.4 Such deployments are expected to continue. BiH is considerably more secure as a result of defense reform and the establishment of the AFBiH. A number of interviewees compared the defense reform process in a favorable light as opposed to the failed p o ess to a hie e eal poli e est u tu i g. As o e ilita p ofessio al put it, Defe se efo m was NATO-led, with a goal, a strategy to reach it, one voice – dest o i g the old, uildi g the e . 5 Yet the political environment in which the Defense Reform Commission operated and the AFBiH was initiated was far more favorable than that in which the AFBiH has been forced to develop – and even then many compromises were necessary to allow it to move forward. Many involved in the process lament the fact that it has not developed further due to political factors within BiH.6 But it was far from a lea slate p o ess of dest o i g the old. O e i te ie ee opi ed istfull , it s ot a seed of future conflict) – it s a flo e of the fo e a ies e did t de apitate he e should ha e. 7 A othe as lu t: The A as a fudge… it just o tai ed [the p o le ]. 8 None of those consulted for the first or second editions of this study believed the AFBiH would be an i stigato of desta ilizatio i BiH, ut the fo e s elia ilit – or survivability – under acute stress was widely questioned. This Policy Note attempts to assess the factors affecting the AFBiH and its viability as 1 Brochure of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, p.5, Available at http://www.mod.gov.ba/foto2015/1809-Engleski%20jezik%20.pdf 2 Ibid, p.5. 3 Ibid, p.33. 4 http://mod.gov.ba/OS_BIH/Aktivnosti/mirovne_misije/Archive.aspx?pageIndex=1, accessed September 20, 2015. 5 Interview with international military professional, May 2011. 6 Discussions with international military professionals, April-August 2011. 7 Discussion with international organization and military professionals, diplomats, June 2011. 8 Discussion with international military professional, April 2011. AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 1 a professional force under its legal chain of command, especially in situations of ethnic polarization. It also presents how the current climate of political polarization influences the AFBiH and threatens its future. Force Structure The AFBiH is not a large military force, even by regional standards. 9 It is also well below its mandated strength of 10,000 active duty soldiers, 1,000 civilians, and 5,000 reservists.10 According to senior BiH MoD officials, the current total figure, MoD included, is just over 10,000.11 The law that prescribes the force strength also determines the force composition. These quotas of o stitue t peoples a e li ked to the e sus, ith so e o errepresentation for Croats vis-à-vis their proportion of the population at that time. The latest publicly available personnel breakdown dates from mid-2015, but the numbers remain exactly the same as in 2011:12 Bosniaks: 45.90% or 4,826 persons; Serbs: 33.60% or 3,533 persons; Croats: 19.80% or 2,084 persons; and Other nationalities: 0.70% or 74 persons. The force structure is divided into operational and support commands.13 All command structures are multiethnic – even the monoethnic infantry battalions are subsumed into brigades that include battalions from all three constituent peoples, and there is a requirement that at least ten percent of the units are drawn from other ethnicities.14 As of September 2015, the AFBiH is structured as follows15 – the locations of the commands and units are listed in parentheses: Joint Staff AFBiH (Sarajevo) Lt.Ge . A to Jeleč – Chief of Staff Bos ia s ilita is oughly equal in size or smaller than many NATO and EU members of similar demographic size – approximately 4 million (Denmark, Lithuania, Ireland). Regionally, not only do neighbors Serbia and Croatia (which is only about 20% larger in population than BiH) have significantly larger armed forces (roughly 200% and 100% larger, respectively). Ma edo ia, hi h has a out half BiH s populatio , has a o pa a l -sized force, with approximately 7,600 uniformed troops. See http://www.morm.gov.mk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/BELA-KNIGA-NA-ODBRANATA.pdf, p. 36. 10 Brochure of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 24, available at http://www.mod.gov.ba/foto2015/1809-Engleski%20jezik%20.pdf 11 Interview with senior MoD official, June 2015. The Brochure of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, p.24, at: http://www.mod.gov.ba/foto2015/1809-Engleski%20jezik%20.pdf lists the mandated strength as 10,000 professional soldiers (including officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted personnel), with a reserve of 5,000 troops and 1,000 civilian employees. 12 Interview with senior BiH MoD official, June 2015; Discussion with international military professional, November 2008. 13 An organigram is available on page 21 of the 2015 MoD/AFBiH Brochure, available at: http://www.mod.gov.ba/foto2015/1809-Engleski%20jezik%20.pdf 14 Ibid, 2015. 15 Brochure of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015, p.23-24, available at http://www.mod.gov.ba/foto2015/1809-Engleski%20jezik%20.pdf 9 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 2 Maj.Ge . Mi ko Tepšić – Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations Maj.Ge . “e ad Mašo ić – Deputy Chief of Staff, Resources AFBiH Operational Command (Sarajevo)    A tille th I fa t B igade Čaplji a 5th Infantry Brigade (Tuzla) 6th Infantry Brigade (Banja Luka) Battalio s Do oj, Mosta , a d Žepće Ai Fo es a d Ai Defe se B igade )aluža i, outside Ba ja Luka    Air Defense Battalion (Sarajevo) Ai “u eilla e a d Wa i g Battalio )aluža i, outside Ba ja Luka Air Forces Support Battalion (elements in both Banja Luka and Sarajevo) Tactical Support Brigade (Sarajevo)        Armored Battalion (Tuzla) Communications Battalion (Pale) Engineering Battalion (Derventa) Military Intelligence Battalion (Sarajevo) Mine Clearance Battalion (Travnik) Military Police Battalion (Sarajevo) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare Battalion (Tuzla) AFBiH Support Command (Banja Luka)    Personnel Management Command (Banja Luka) Training and Doctrine Command (Travnik) Logistics Command (Doboj) Logisti al “uppo t Battalio s Ba ja Luka, Čaplji a, Tuzla, Sarajevo) AFBiH Missions and the Ongoing Defense Review According to Article 4 of the BiH Law on Defense, the missions of the AFBiH16 are limited to the 16 Law on Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005, available at: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/laws-ofbih/pdf/014%20%20ARMY%20LEGISLATION/BH%20Law%20on%20Defence%20of%20Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%208805.pdf AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 3 following: a) Participation in collective security operations, peace support and self defence operations, including combating terrorism; b) Providing military defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its citizens in the event of an attack; c) Assisting civil authorities in responding to natural and other disasters and accidents; d) Countermine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and e) Fulfilling the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A ti le of the La e pli itl p e ludes usi g the AFBiH fo politi al pu poses o politi al pa tisa a ti ities. 17 According to one Western military professional, these strictures preclude any activities to a d p epa atio fo the o goi g efugee isis o BiH s o de s, a se t a e uest f o the Cou il of Ministers and a (unanimous) BiH Presidency decision.18 As this paper was being researched, the effort to finalize the draft Defense Review was ongoing in the MoD. The BiH Presidency requested that this process, initiated in 2011, be completed by the end of September.19 Seasoned observers believe an extension will be requested, as the ha d pa t of the p o ess, spe if i g hat the A should look like – size, lo atio , et . e ai s i o plete.20 This e e ise is i teg al to ode izi g a d ight-sizi g the fo e – and NATO will review the AFBiH in the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) in the spring.21 There remain disputes a o g the th ee t i es, as o e Weste ilita p ofessio al alled the , o e the size a d shape of 22 the force which remain unresolved to date. According to one senior MoD official, there was an effort to dismantle the (multiethnic) Tactical Support Brigade, based at Rajlovac.23 There were also discussions as to hethe the AFBiH should ai tai its a o fo e. The U“ a ts us to gi e it up24… We a discuss going to more (armored) cavalry – ut o l ith se ious a tita k apa it . 25 One Western o se e oted the a o s oke . No od is talki g a out u i g e ta ks. It osts a lot of manpower and money to keep what they have running. So this is constituency placation (for the Bos iaks … Bos iaks a t a ept a s alle a ithout a o … But ho to t ai a d e uip a th ee i fa t igade a o € / ea tops? 26 He added, Serbs of course have the fear of being outgu ed. But I al a s tell the ou thi k the A is ou ai p o le o that? 27 On the defense agai st a o , this p ofessio al s ie as that the “ edish Cold Wa odel of u e ous hu te -killer 17 Ibid. Interview with Western military professional, September 2015. 19 Interview with Western military professional, September 2015. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Interview with senior MoD official, June 2015. 24 Presumabl to o e t ate o o e e peditio a fo es. Ho e e , gi e abandoning armor would be a hard sell – particularly to Bosniaks. 25 Ibid. 26 Interview with Wester military professional, September 2015. 27 Ibid. 18 the AFBiH s te ito ial defe se AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | a date, 4 teams with antitank missiles would be far more cost-effective and flexible.28 From the Alliance perspective, BiH s o t i utio s of i fa t , ilita poli e, a d e plosi e o di a e disposal EOD a e valuable.29 He averred that preparation to be able to deploy a full battalion to NATO operations (as is the case with Macedonia), for example, is an attainable goal, if that were the focus of the Defense Review and resulting budget.30 But the primary configuration of the force remains unresolved. The AFBiH in the Polarized Political Environment In 2011, DPC and AI reported in A Security Risk Analysis that a u de u e t of di isio a th ough 31 the AFBiH, despite its design for structural integration. This finding remains valid, based on subsequent research and interviews. The compromises required to assemble the force from the Federation and Republika Srpska armies – the (ceremonial) regimental system (discussed further below) and nine ethnic majority infantry battalions – eated st u tu al i pedi e ts to the fo e s fu the i teg atio at the operational unit level. But the political climate in which the AFBiH has operated for the past decade has steadily worsened; this has had numerous direct effects on the AFBiH, as well as influencing the environment in which all serve. The constant scrabble for adequate resources has stunted the ability of the AFBiH to develop its apa ilities a d e uip itself ade uatel fo its desig ated tasks. We spe d less i pe e tage of pu li spe di g tha a o e i the egio , a o di g to o e BiH offi ial.32 The government of the Republika Srpska, led in 2015 (as in 2011) by RS President Milo ad Dodik s I depe de t “o ial De o ats “N“D , has fo ea s se t i ed sig als o e BiH s pote tial NATO e e ship – in the past noting that BiH will ot joi u less “e ia does a d egula l e alli g NATO s o i g of “e s i the ‘“ a d “e ia.33 In late December 2014, Dodik argued that the Serb public was against joining NATO, and that it was unclear whether they believed that entering the EU was a good idea.34 This year in May, contradicting p e ious state e ts, he stated he as t agai st NATO membership in principle; it is up to the people.35 I the ‘“ u soli ited epo t to the U ited Natio s “e u it Cou il i Ma , la guage i pa ag aph efe s to the AFBiH udget as the ost eg egious a o g u justified BiH-le el e pe ditu es, a d notes research showing the major shrinkage of European defense budgets.36 A previous report had 28 Ibid. Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Azi o ić, Bassue e a d We e , Assessi g the Pote tial fo ‘e e ed I te eth i Viole e i Bos ia a d He zego i a: A “e u it ‘isk A al sis, De o atizatio Poli Cou il/Atla ti I itiative, October 2011, p. 32, available at http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/pdf/DPC-AI_BiH%20Security_Study.pdf 32 Interview with senior MoD official, June 2015. 33 Dodik: NATO je “ e o a di ao osi o aše i u a iju o i to je eop osti o, Kliker, July 16, 2009, available at: http://kliker.info/dodik-nato-je-srbe-bombardovao-osiromasenim-uranijumom-i-to-je-neoprostivo/ 34 Dodik: “ i se p oti e ulasku u NATO pakt, a ejas a je koliko je do o da ide o I u EU!, Slobodna Bosna, December 25, 2014, Available at: http://www.slobodnabosna.ba/vijest/18134/dodik_srbi_se_protive_ulasku_u_nato_pakt_a_nejasno_je_koliko_je_dobro_da_idemo_i_u_eu.html 35 Dodik: NATO e e ship a epta le if people a t it, B92, available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.php?yyyy=2015&mm=05&dd=27&nav_id=94247 36 th ‘epo t to UN “e u it Cou il, Go e e t of Republika Srpska, May 8, 2014, p. 21, available at: http://www.bihdaytonproject.com/?p=2586 29 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 5 further called for the military to be reduced to a peacekeeping detachment and a protocol unit, devolving the rest of its roles to civilian structures under entity control.37 Dodik has openly and epeatedl alled fo BiH s de ilita izatio .38 “N“D legislato s, pa ti ula l MP Duša ka Majkić, ha e alled the MoD/AFBiH udget i to uestio . According to one senior MoD official, the practice of operating on continuations from the previous ea s udget did eal da age.39 Delays in passing budgets and authorizing expenditures also have a egati e effe t. Fo e a ple, o e i te ie ee oted a idl the e goi g to get eat up agai . The just got the autho izatio to o k ith thei udget allo atio . The a t possi l spe d it this ea . So the ill e atta ked fo i effi ie … O e half the positio s that deal ith o e a e e pt . “o the ll e i a ush, do ap te de s, e d up u i g ad e uip e t. 40 E e ea the lose o e because of this practice, noted another Western military professional.41 The net effect has been that the AFBiH has been on a starvation diet since soon after its birth. According to senior MoD officials, dis ussio s a e u de a as to hethe to ai tai the AFBiH at its u e t st e gth o edu e it. If e cut the fo e, the udget gets hopped too. 42 Interestingly, one voice from within the AFBiH ranks still felt that the a tual effo t to ipple the fo e s de elop e t e e ted the ‘“ as ot o e su ate ith its heto i . I o de h ‘“ offi ials do t a t agai st the MoD a d AFBiH, he asked. Whe the a o e t e ds e e e u e ated, he odded k o i gl , a d added ut the e is o eal p essu e f o Dodik, others. Did they really accept it, or are they keeping quiet until the right moment?... (the RS Governme t does t do so u h p a ti al agai st the MoD a d AFBiH. The e ot u de f o tal, isi le atta k. 43 Other interviewees noted that their Bosniak AFBiH contacts believed that the constant RS push for defense cuts amounts to demilitarization by stealth.44 Nor is the MoD immune from the usual intra-ministerial warfare that afflicts other BiH state bodies, in which party cadres fight to pursue ideological agendas and settle scores. In the previous government, a o di g to o e se io MoD offi ial, the “N“D s Deput Mi iste , Ži ko Ma ja a , sa it as his ole to prevent the AFBiH from procuring anything. This undermined the system and the force as much as possi le… O l o e-thi d of the e gi ee i g e uip e t is ope atio al pea eti e sta da ds. 45 At the ti e of iti g, Mi iste of Defe se Ma i a Pe deš HD) is u de i di t e t fo falsif i g atte da e e o ds of a ad iso , fo e C oat e e of the BiH P eside I o Mi o Jo ić, ho allegedl e e th ‘epo t to UN “e u it Cou il, Go e e t of ‘epu lika Srpska, May 8, 2013, pp. 11-12, available at: http://www.vladars.net/eng/Documents/IX%20Republic%20of%20Srpska%20Report%20to%20the%20UNSC.pdf 38 De ilita iza ija BiH? Dodik za ukida je o uža ih s aga, Telegraf, October 8, 2012, available at: http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/370882-demilitarizacija-bih-dodik-za-ukidanje-oruzanih-snaga 39 Interview with senior MoD official, June 2015. 40 Interview with Western official, Sarajevo, July 2015. 41 Interview with Western military professional, September 2015. 42 Interview with senior MoD official, Sarajevo, June 2015. 43 Interview with AFBiH officer, Sarajevo, July 2015. 44 Discussion with international military professionals, September 2011. 45 I id. The i te ie ee haste ed to add though that the pea eti e sta da d of ope atio al ou ts discounts much useable equipment: I a a situatio , it s a lot o e – a piece of equipme t is o side ed ot full ope atio al if a doo light does t o k. 37 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 6 came to work.46 She is also accused of falsifying fuel purchases. One seasoned observer commented that su h p a ti es a e o e too su p isi g i the i stitutio al ultu e. It s p o a l d edged up people she pissed off… I do t k o hat s e t… I su e she s ei g pillo ied. I o i ed she s guilt – so 47 is e e o e else of doi g si ila stuff. Politicization in the Ranks But respondents note that politicization is not exclusive to the politically appointed civilian positions in the Ministry of Defense. Generalships were viewed by the vast majority of interviewees as politicized. It s ostl to ke positio s i the st u tu e – st ategi pla e e t of lo alists … Ce tai positio s belong to each ethnic group. Senior staff changes. Everything is fixed. The fight is within ethnic g oups. 48 As an intervie ee i stated, offi e s a e li ited e ause of thei o stitue t peoples ide tit . “o , this slot is fo a Bos iak a d ou e a C oat. That so t of thi g. 49 That observer linked this p a ti e to the state s o stitutio al st u tu e. A othe fo eign military professional observed that he d hea d o siste tl that if ou e ot o e ted to a politi al pa t , ou do t get o . 50 A troubling phenomenon which seems to be active – and perhaps deepening – is politicization and polarization in the ranks. An AFBiH interlocutor noted with evident repulsion the phenomenon of officers making ostentatious displays of religiosity for personal advancement. For Bosniaks like the i te ie ee, this as a ifest i o e isits to the os ue; offi e s a t to e seen there. Exo u ists fasti g, aki g p a e s… It s careerism. The e doi g it fo pe so al ad a e e t. The have Iftar (post-su set eal eaki g the fast du i g ‘a ada i ope atio al u its. But he otes this was visible among all three main religious o u ities/eth i ities. The e is so e a o g all th ee (groups). Going to mass visibly – get a he k e t to ou a e. The e a e li ks to pa ties. 51 The most recent evidence of religious/party patronage in the AFBiH emerged recently when it became apparent that the Ministry of Defense is funding Hajj pilgrimages and Orthodox devotional trips to Greece for some AFBiH members.52 One Western observer also questioned the practice of sending ethnic Serbs to supplementary officer training in Serbia, eth i C oats to )ag e , a d Bos iaks to A ka a; o othe a has seg egatio like this o e. 53 Pot đe a optuž i a p oti i ist i a Ma i a Pe deš, N1, August 25, 2015, available at: http://ba.n1info.com/a57662/Vijesti/Vijesti/Potvrdjena-optuznica-protiv-ministrice-Marine-Pendes.html; “ee also “ka dal uHDZ-u BiH: Mi ist i a o a e Ma i a Pe deš optuže a za esa jesta ad, HINA, July 16, 2015, available at: http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/skandal-u-hdzu-bih-ministrica-obrane-marina-pendes-optuzena-za-nesavjestanrad/831067.aspx 47 Interview with Western official, Sarajevo, July 2015. 48 Interview with AFBiH officer, Sarajevo, July 2015. 49 Discussion with international military professional, June 2011. 50 Discussion with international military professionals, September 2011. 51 Interview with AFBiH officer, Sarajevo, July 2015. 52 One Western ilita p ofessio al e p essed his disgust thus: “o the ha e the o e to se d o the Hajj, ut the do t ha e the fu ds to epai o pute s a d op a hi es? I te ie , “epte e . P ethod o hadž, a sada i hodočašće a K f: G ađa i plaćaju odlazak na vjerska putovanja, bh-index.com, September 17, 2015, available at: http://www.bhindex.com/prethodno-hadz-a-sada-i-hodocasce-na-krf-gradani-placaju-odlazak-na-vjerska-putovanja/# 53 Interview with Western military professional, September 2015. 46 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 7 The Regimental System Competing imperatives of retaining elements of the entity armies and creating a new combined force led to compromises in the construction of the AFBiH. To get consensus in the defense reform process, hile the e tit a ies e e a olished, a egi e tal s ste as eated as a e ho of the th ee wartime armies – the Armija BiH, the HVO, and the VRS. Three regiments – the 1st Guards (Croat), 2nd Rangers (Bosniak) and 3rd Infantry (Serb) – e e eated, a o di g to o e ea lie i te ie ee, to th o the “e s a o e a d a ept o e all defe se efo .54 I , the deal as to allo attalio s to e formed on an ethnic basis – it was one of the o p o ises to get defe se efo . 55 Another i te lo uto elie ed the o l o se sus as to ha e eth i all -based infantry battalions. That was the o l possi le solutio at the ti e; e did t follo up a d keep pushi g fo deepe i teg atio . 56 Deeper integration of the force would have cost more political capital and leverage in 2005 to achieve; revising the arrangement after the fact will be even harder. Each regiment has a small headquarters staff; members of the regiments wear shoulder badges signifying their membership. Article 6 of the Law on Service stipulates that these three regiments are repositories of culture and heritage to which service members can belong. There were to be six noninfantry regiments for other branches of service without this culture and heritage link – but this has not happened. The regimental system does not have an operational character. But there remains an uncomfortable overlap with the operational AFBiH. Members of the regiments are concentrated in nine monoethnic infantry battalions, all of which are under the AFBiH Operational Command and included in the three (multiethnic) infantry brigades. The regimental mechanism is seen by many as an avenue for political and ethnic manipulation of the AFBiH. One potential way this can be manifested is through pressure on new recruits to join the regiments. Interviewees familiar with the AFBiH regimental structure note that despite hopes that recruits would see opportunities in developing their skills to rise in the ranks, whi h e ui es o e to se e i a ultieth i e i o e t e.g., outside the o oeth i i fa t attalio s , the e has ee a persistence of new trainees electing to be posted to these units.57 Some of this seems an understandable gravitational pull to stay lose to ho e. U like the Yugosla People s A , he e e listed e e e se t fa f o ho e desig , the AFBiH s ste does t e ui e the to get a a fo othe s kit he ; the a hoose to se e i the i fa t attalio ea est thei ho eto s. 58 Some interviewees stated that recruits are subjected to pressure to enlist in the units under the regimental system before leaving basic training. One interviewee stated that the recruits trained at ‘ajlo a , outside “a aje o, a e [W]ell-trained and choose thei u its. The the eth i p essu e sta ts. 59 A othe said, the p o le is that the a e u de p essu e to ea the eth i adges. I fa t o a de s a e s ueezed all the ti e to do eth i egi e tal fu tio s politi ia s a d ete a s 54 Discussion with international military professional, May 2011. Discussion with international military professional, November 2008. 56 Discussion with international organization officials, military professionals, and diplomats, June 2011. 57 Discussion with international military professional, August 2011. 58 Ibid. 59 Discussion with international military professional, June 2011. 55 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 8 organizatio s. 60 This is seen by some experts as an impediment to the development of the capabilities the force will need in the future. Furthermore, former Deputy Defense Minister Marjanac reportedly wanted all Serbs in the AFBiH to wear badges signifying this identity.61 More recently, a senior MoD offi ial opi ed gli l that Defe se Mi iste Pe deš as a fi elie e i apa theid, e.g., ai tai i g 62 functional ethnic division in the ranks. The consequences of this lasting, visible and heightened ethnification are evident. The lines between regimental events and commemorations undertaken by AFBiH personnel acting in their personal capacity can often be confusing, even to those attempting to unravel them and go beyond their (often mis-) representation in the media. Regimental functions – involving serving AFBiH personnel – can create ample opportunities for misperception, appearing to blur the lines between ethnically polarized commemorations of wartime experience and the needs of a unified state-level force. In the research for this study, numerous incidents were cited of political leaders, including politicians from neighboring states, addressing AFBiH officers and troops with nationalist statements at events with nationalist symbols. It may even be that some of those interviewed were unclear whether the events were egi e tal o o du ted ete a s o ga izatio s. A o e sa gui e ote as sou ded o the egi e ts a se io MoD offi ial ho eplied saltil to a ue o the atte : It s ullshit. It s th ee days a year. It is a politi al heada he, ut ot a ajo i pedi e t, i his ie .63 Military Capability and Performance Despite the institutional challenges, AFBiH officers are largely seen by Western military professionals to be making the effort to develop as best they can within the constraints wrought by BiH politics. The junior to mid-grade officers were most often cited as the drivers of change and modernization; many among them had opportunities to deploy on peace support missions abroad. But a frequent complaint was the lack of vision at the ministerial and command level, as well as a risk-averse culture throughout. O e ea lie i te ie ee des i ed the AFBiH i as a so ial elfa e o ga izatio . 64 Another e e tl stated The MoD a e i ilia s, the do t a e. The staff is lade ith fo e e tit MoD people ho had to e kept o the pa oll. The e aiti g fo thei pe sio s. The do t a e at all. The e is so e hope ith ou g offi e s, so e i il se a ts. 65 Many interviewees mentioned the problem of insufficient funding not only in regard to developing the force to NATO standards, but to even maintaining its current equipment and facilities. One stated that The AFBiH is ill-equipped...The battalions have no capability to fight or move. 66 None of those interviewed for this study believed that the AFBiH is capable of large-scale military operations. The BiH participates in a plethora of regional initiatives, and has been deploying contingents to peace 60 Discussion with international military professional, May 2011. Discussion with international military professional, September 2011. 62 Discussion with senior MoD official, June 2015. 63 Ibid. 64 Discussion with international military professional, June 2011. 65 Discussion with international military professional, July 2015. 66 Interview with international military professional, April 2011. 61 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 9 support operations since before the AFBiH was assembled. The AFBiH has sent several rotations of t oops to Afgha ista to pa ti ipate i NATO s I te atio al “e u it Assista e Fo e, the ost e e t deployment consisting of an infantry platoon providing perimeter security at Bagram Air Base outside Kabul.67 Bringing in New Blood In terms of staffing, one widely celebrated new element is a British-sponsored program, launched in early 2014, to recruit recent university graduates for officer training.68 One Western military professional stated that the p og a as i po ta t – to esist epotis a d o uptio i the a ks.69 The first class entered service in December 2014.70 A se io MoD offi ial alled it o e of the est thi gs e ha e. We a t to keep a d e pa d it. 71 He added that the e is st o g i te atio al suppo t fo merit- ased edu atio al p og a s. We ha e ig a d po e ful f ie ds i the effo t to p ofessio alize and modernize the AFBiH, in his view.72 The p og a s u e t lass o sists of spe ialists e.g., doctors, veterinarians, etc.); the upcoming target class size is 64, and the prior class numbered in the 20s.73 The process assesses applicants on the basis of their qualifications without regard to their ethnic affiliation; quotas come into play once a pool of finalists is asse led. “o it s al a s the est of ea h t pe, ut ot e essa il the top fi ishe s. 74 The eed fo e lood as fo e ost i the i ds of those ho desig ed the p og a . If e a sti k ith this fo te ea s, pe e t of the offi e s ill have o e th ough this a . That ould e t a sfo atio al, a o di g to a se io Weste diplomat.75 AFBiH offi e s i te ie ed ag ee. We eed a e ge e atio . We eed to lea out the a generation – people like me – to e a le to o e fo a d… It s a e good sta t…The do t e e e the a , do t a e a out eth i elo gi g. 76 Yet the BiH Minister of Defense has apparently already eighed i to e su e that so e of he NCOs – p esu a l C oats a e i luded i the e p og a .77 One AFBiH officer noted that ethnic- ajo it i fa t attalio s u de ut the ethos of the p og a . If ou a e i gi g i e offi e s i to that e i o e t…it u s ou te to the idea of i gi g i e lood. 78 4’s Challenges The AFBiH emerged from two significant tests of its disposition and capability in 2014 – large-scale public protests in February and major flooding in May, the latter improving the public image of the force 67 2015 MoD/AFBiH Brochure, p.45. Ibid, p.15. 69 Interview with Western military professional, September 2015. 70 Ibid, page 19. 71 Interview with senior MoD official, July 2015. 72 Ibid. 73 Interview with senior Western official, July 2014; interview with AFBiH officer, July 2015. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Interview with AFBiH officer, July 2015. 77 Interview with senior Western diplomat, July 2015. 78 Interview with AFBiH officer, July 2015. 68 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 10 and its morale. The social protests initiated in Tuzla in early February 2014, and which spread to Sarajevo and numerous other towns in BiH – primarily, but not exclusively in the Federation, and primarily but not solely in Bosniak-majority areas – included some highly visible acts of vandalism and violence. The protests put political elites on the defensive quite sharply, albeit briefly, and exposed the dysfunction of security planning and coordination, particularly in the capital.79 Political leaders sought to protect themselves from a wave of popular wrath, quite frequently by attempting to deflect it toward ethnic and/or political adversaries. But the AFBiH did not get involved in any way. One well-i fo ed offi e stated e sti k to our role, the law. We had no engagement.80 We were more alert on our premises. But we have no role – not even assisti g i i il distu a es. The e as o dou t, o politi al p essu e. 81 He added that his wife attended the demonstrations and he would have as well, were he not in uniform.82 In the unlikely event that the Presidency unanimously ordered the AFBiH to intervene in a politically or ethnically pola ized situatio , o e i te ie ee fo the fi st editio of this stud stated that the AFBiH s espo se would be that it could not act, for it has no doctrine or training for such actions, being tasked with territorial defense. 83 The May 2014 floods offered those serving in the AFBiH the opportunity to provide direct and life-saving assistance to BiH citizens throughout the affected areas. In the view of the author, it was the only governmental institution above the municipal level which acquitted itself with any credit or effectiveness at all; all other cantonal, entity and state governance units failed this clear test. The emergency provided the AFBiH with the most intensive and important opportunity to interact with the wider citizenry since its founding. The AFBiH assembled personnel and equipment to deal with situations as they emerged, at the request of the civil authorities, where their resources allowed – o he e e 84 ould, he e e e e i ited. People a epted our mixed teams without a problem – nobody cared ho as ho. I o de ho u h e e ploit that, i te s of i fo i g people. 85 As reflected in the “ee EU Poli ies Boo e a g: Bos ia a d He zego i a s “o ial U est, Bodo We e a d Ku t Bassue e , DPC Policy Brief, Democratization Policy Council, Sarajevo and Berlin, February 2014, available at: http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/DPC%20Policy%20Brief_Bosnia-Herzegovina's%20Social%20Unrest.pdf This phenomenon will be a subject of a future paper in this series, looking at the police forces in BiH. 80 The disposition of the AFBiH in the case of a civil emergency had been a hypothetical topic in the first edition of this study. At that time, the majority view of informed interviewees was that the Armed Forces could not and should not be called upon to suppo t go e e ts i a the ase of i il u est. I , a se io AFBiH offi e a ed U“ diplo ats that the AFBiH ould eak if alled upo to assist i ilia autho ities ith a i te al se u it halle ge. Gi e that the o de to a t ould ha e to come from the BiH Presidency, in unanimity, it is hard to imagine the AFBiH being ordered to deploy in a politically polarized situation. Even if it were, one interviewee for the first edition stated that the reply to the BiH Presidency would be that the Armed Forces could not act, for it has no doctrine or training for such actions, being tasked with territorial defense. Discussion with inter atio al ilita p ofessio al, “epte e . “ee Bosnia - Senior Military Commanders Concerned about Political C isis I pa t o A ed Fo es, Leaked U“ diplo ati a le, Ma h , , available at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08SARAJEVO414.html 81 Interview with AFBiH officer, July 2015. 82 Ibid. 83 Discussion with international military professional, September 2011. 84 Interview with senior BiH MoD official, Sarajevo, June 2015. 85 Interview with AFBiH officer, July 2015. The MoD website has a whole section dedicated to the flood relief effort, Poplave i odbrana (Floods and Defense), available at: http://www.mod.gov.ba/aktuelnosti/Poplave_i_odbrana/Archive.aspx?template_id=144&pageIndex=1 79 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 11 p ess, the ‘“ Go e e t see ed o e o e ed ith pu sui g tu f attles a d sta i g o essage about the fecklessness and alleged anti-Serbness of the state than ensuring timely provision of assistance to its residents in need.86 O e AFBiH offi e oted, i the ‘“, the e is a i fo atio a . There is nothing in the media about the AFBiH. Any reflectio is e li ited, o t olled. A o di g to senior MoD officials, the AFBiH accomplished the following during the flood emergency and recovery effo t: We e a uated , people f o da ge ous situatio s. 87 I additio , e fi ed , of lo al roads, re o ed , u i ete s of de is, lea ed , e of lo al i e s… uilt idges, repaired 2,800m of dikes, and drained 36,500 square meters of agricultural land, removed 2,800 animal a asses… We did all this ith pe so el, a pi k-up team, not a formed unit. Some 27 vehicles 88 were employed in these operations. The MoD received 38 requests for assistance, 33 of which were implemented, according to MoD officials.89 Engineering units, attached to the Tactical Support Brigade, are based throughout BiH. According to troops directly engaged in the effort in the Maglaj-Doboj region, e had good oope atio ith i il defe se, afti g lu s… I Maglaj a d Do oj, I thi k that cooperation with local authorities went very well. The problem was that the RS e tit le el did t a t to ask fo help, e e though it as e iti al. 90 The deplo e t th oughout the ou t oosted o ale i the AFBiH. It as e positi e fo o ale; it united people – in the units and at the top. It was the first time we had a common enemy! For a ighte futu e, e eed a o o e e . 91 All soldie s felt the e e useful a d a ted. The did the est the ould ith hat the had, o se ed o e Weste offi ial.92 But the experience also e posed eak esses i the fo e s e uipment and preparations, according to informed observers. P o le s i luded o a d a d o t ol, esou i g – that s he e the fell sho t. The e is t a good mechanism for dealing with civil emergencies. This has more to do with the (BiH) Ministry of Se u it s inability to manage a crisis – they have no crisis management staff. So these are long-standing systemic p o le s, ot the espo si ilit of the t oops. 93 The long-term funding shortages certainly reduced the AFBiH s pote tial to assist i this a d futu e ises. We do t ha e e ough apa it , ut e had the ill to help. We eed adapted hoppe s, disaste elief e uip e t. This is o e of the AFBiH s ai tasks, One illustrative episode was the punishment meted-out to Ma o O e Pet o ić “D“ fo tha ki g the eigh o i g (Federatio u i ipalities of Teša j Bos iak-majority) and Usora (Croat-majority) for sending humanitarian assistance to his flood-stricken city of Doboj, on the River Bosna. Petrovic was relieved by RS Prime Minister of his leadership of civil defense and replaced with General Momir Zec, a former RS commander. Throughout the election campaign which followed that su e , Pet o ić s p o-Bos ia o ie tatio as used the uli g “N“D as a s ea agai st the “D“ a d the Allia e fo Cha ge. “ee G ado ačel ik Do oja: K i sa što sa p o osa ski o ije ti a , ‘adioSarajevo.ba, May 21, 2014, available at: http://radiosarajevo.ba/novost/152413/gradonacelnik-doboja-kriv-sam-sto-sam-probosanski-orjentiran “ee also H. Čalić, O e Pet o ić: “tid e g afita s po uko koljite alije!, Dnevni Avaz, May 21, 2015, available at: http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/178997/obren-petrovic-stid-me-grafita-s-porukom-koljite-balije?url=clanak/178997/obrenpetrovic-stid-me-grafita-s-porukom-koljite-balije 87 Interview with senior BiH MoD official, June 2015. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Interview with AFBiH officer, July 2015. 91 Ibid. 92 Interview with Western official, Sarajevo, July 2015. 93 Ibid. 86 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 12 so it ought to e a fu di g p io it . 94 When asked specifically for the sort of equipment required, interviewees enumerated several items on their wish list: helicopters capable of vertical extraction; medevac; specialized vehicles; firefighting equipment; and boats. Interviewees in the MoD noted they were waiting for US help on vertical extraction equipment and training, and also the delivery of 18 Chinese engineering machines.95 The flood emergency, which also heavily affected neighboring Serbia, also offered opportunities for the greatest cross-border military cooperation to date. The coope atio f o eigh o s as e isi le, good. We got help f o C oatia, “lo e ia of diffe e t t pes. 96 The MoD has stated that it wants to develop an interchange of training in specialty capabilities within the region. BiH excels in demining, fielding an entire battalion for that purpose based at Rajlovac. Apparently, the US wants the AFBiH to train Montenegrin forces – and in exchange, AFBiH pilots could be trained at facilities in Croatia and Serbia.97 In terms of civil defense and natural disaster relief capabilities, DPC has advocated for some time that this should be a focal point of regional cooperation and international assistance.98 Defense Property The issue of immovable defense property and surplus arms and munitions, which is part of the 5+2 formula that the PIC Steering Board established in 2007 as the hurdles to clear before OHR can be closed, remains unresolved. The lack of political agreement on this issue between RS and FBiH politicians also i pedes the AFBiH s a ilit to eet the e ui e e ts of NATO s Me e ship A tio Pla , hi h was conditionally granted at the Tallinn summit in 2010, with resistance from Germany and the Netherlands, and – until then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton shifted the American position – the United States.99 The guarding of arms and munitions sites – some of which are empty, some of which remain loaded with (increasingly old and unstable) munitions dating to or before the war – costs the AFBiH manpower, resources, and the ability to train and professionalize further. One interviewee estimated the number of troops guarding these sites100 at any given time to be about 700.101 With the necessary rotations, this comes to about 2,000 – meaning about one-quarter of the force.102 So the impact on training is significant. The sites also house significant stores of surplus – and often dangerously unstable – weapons and ammunition slated for destruction. MoD sources state that there 94 Interview with AFBiH officer, July 2015. Interview with senior MoD official, June 2015. 96 Interview with AFBiH officer, July 2015. 97 Interview with senior MoD official, June 2015. 98 “ee Ku t Bassue e , The EU a d U.“. o “e u it i “EE: Di e ge e, Co e ge e, a d Mutual Co fusio , i A Futu e Security Archite tu e fo “outheast Eu ope, Aspe I stitute, Be li , Valeska Es h a d Julia e Ka us, eds. p. , available at: http://www.aspeninstitute.de/wp-content/uploads/A-Future-Security-Architecture-for-Southeast-Europe.pdf 99 Interviews with diplomats, Sarajevo, Berlin, and Washington, April 2010-July 2011. 100 Between the sites the BiH Ministry of Defense says it will require (numbering 69) and those o -p ospe ti e sites that it does not need – but whose ownership is still in dispute – these number 223. See the State Property Inventory at http://www.ohr.int/stateproperty/AnnexAENG.pdf 101 Discussion with international military professional, June 2011. 102 Discussion with international military professionals, September 2011. 95 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 13 remains 22,000 tons of surplus ammunition to destroy.103 The number of sites is currently 63; two will be added to facilitate destruction of surplus arms and ammunition.104 There has been some movement on this matter in the past year. First, the BiH Constitutional Court ruled in July 2012 that defense property is the exclusive purview of the state, directly confronting the RS Go e e t s li e o defe se a d state p ope t .105 The state-level coalition government assembled after the October 2014 elections, which includes the Alliance for Change (the Serb Democratic Party – SDS; the Party for Democratic Progress – PDP; a d the People s De o ati Pa t – NDP), has aligned around resolving the issue of defense property in order to allow activation of NATO MAP and further development of the AFBiH. As a result, at least twelve properties were registered in the first three months of the government.106 Yet i Ap il , “e e e of the BiH P eside Mlade I a ić, apparently reacting to constant attacks on his patriotism from Banja Luka, stated that NATO membership for BiH was out of the question unless and until Serbia joined the Alliance.107 The RS Go e e t o ti ues to esist egiste i g sites i the ‘“. I the ase of a site i Veliki Žep, the ‘“ positio as eje ted i a u a iguous, e lea uli g fo the MoD the Cou t of BiH that this 108 belongs to the state, ot “ pska Šu e a d MTel. Banja Luka is appealing the ruling. Two seasoned observers believe that whatever the appellate ruling, the RS Government will refuse to implement it – especially if the threatened referendum on the legitimacy of the state judicial institutions is held.109 Conclusions & Recommendations The AFBiH is not insulated from the society at large or the wider political environment. But given the inherent handicaps stemming from the unaccountability of the governing system and the leaders who inhabit it, the AFBiH has performed admirably under the circumstances, both on the home front and in deployments abroad. None of those interviewed either for the 2011 study or this second edition believes that the AFBiH poses a first-instance security threat. But the overwhelming majority – domestic and foreign – asserted that the AFBiH ould ollapse u de sig ifi a t i te eth i p essu e. Mo oeth i i fa t attalio s a e ot a problem now. But ith a es alatio of eth i iole e… I the case of real ethnic violence, (the whole AFBiH ould split, said o e offi e i su e .110 The events of the past few months – the Zvornik poli e statio shooti g i Ap il a d the ‘“ poli e Ope atio ‘u e hi h follo ed; the ‘“ autho ities playing-up fears of Islamist terrorism based on the foreign fighter phenomenon and instrumentalizing the Kumanovo operation in Macedonia the following month; and the attack at the Srebrenica 103 Interview with senior MoD official, June 2015. Discussion with senior MoD official, June 2015. See also page 12 of 2015 MoD/AFBiH Brochure, available at: http://www.mod.gov.ba/foto2015/1809-Engleski%20jezik%20.pdf 105 The decision in Case No. U 1/11 is available in PDF at: http://www.ccbh.ba/eng../odluke/index.php?src=2# 106 Discussion with senior MoD official, June 2015. 107 Koali ija se uši z og “ ija I NATO sa eza?, Dnevni List, April 16, 2015, available at: http://dnevni-list.ba/web1/koalicija-se-rusi-zbog-srbije-i-nato-saveza/ 108 Discussion with senior Western official, July 2015. 109 Discussions with Western officials, July 2015. 110 Interview with AFBiH officer, July 2015. 104 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 14 o e o atio o “e ia P i e Mi iste Aleksa da Vučić all sig if the trend toward further polarization.111 This security threat is not one that can be countered internally. As discussed earlier in this Policy Note, the AFBiH has no role in internal security. If pressed to act in such a fashion, it would most likely collapse. The best that can be hoped for in the event of the emergence of organized violence would be for the AFBiH – and the arms and munitions it possesses and secures – to remain out of it. The following policy recommendations are to Western governments – particularly those represented in NATO and the EU, both of which have extensive engagement with, and investment in, the AFBiH – and BiH more broadly. Individual member states of NATO and the EU, such as the United States and Great Britain, have cultivated close contacts with the AFBiH, and can play a particularly important role in supporting the AFBiH and drumming up further support from allies. 1) End the ambiguity on BiH security guarantees: The reduction of EUFOR over the past eight years to a paltry approximately 600 troops has conveyed the signal to politicians and citizens alike that there is no longer a credible deterrent to destabilizing actors, nor a capability to react to unforeseen crises or undeterrable threats. This affects the environment in BiH generally, by allowing greater leeway for political adventurism and irresponsible polarization. But it has a particularly severe impact on the AFBiH. Preventing destabilizing further polarization would be far less expensive in terms of resources and credibility than reacting to it. Unfortunately, the few attempts in recent years to send messages that the country will not be allowed to split or collapse have never been followed up, in word or in deed.112 The EU and NATO need to finally state without ambiguity that any attempts to split BiH or initiate interethnic violence will be confronted forcefully. 2) Demonstrate steadfast Western solidarity and firmness regarding compliance with legal decisions relevant to defense property: The 2012 Constitutional Court decision on State property has never been the rallying cry it should have been, given the resolution of the RS Government to defy it. This judge e t, as ith the Cou t of BiH s judge e t o a defe se p ope t site i the eastern RS, needs to be a focal point of Western – including EU – policy attention, as it is integral to the rule of law that all Western actors advocate. Should the RS fail to comply with these rulings (and others), there must be concrete consequences for RS Government decision-makers. These can i lude EU est i ti e easu es, su h as isa a s a d asset f eezes, as ell as o ato iu s on contact with officials in breach of legal judgements. O the Ku a o o i st u e talizatio i the ‘“, see Ku t Bassue e , No “ta ilit ithout A ou ta ilit : The West s ‘espo si ilit i Ma edo ia, DPC Poli B ief, Sarajevo, May 2015, pp 11-12, available at: http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/DPC%20Policy%20Paper%20%20The%20West's%20Responsibility%20in%20Macedonia-1.pdf 112 UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond did so in a commentary piece published in major BiH dailies. The original English e sio , The Case fo Cha ge i Bos ia, pu lished o O to e , , is a aila le he e: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-the-case-for-change-in-bosnia In the article, Hammond explicitly stated the follo i g: Do t aste p e ious ti e a gui g a out efe e du s a d separation. That is not going to happen. We have a legal responsibility to protect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we remain as committed to that responsibility as we were when the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed 19 years ago. The redrawing of borders in the Balkans is fi ished. U fo tu atel , su h lea la guage has ot ee si e epeated i Lo do , Be li , Washi gto , o B ussels, let alone undergirded with policies to support them. 111 AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 15 3) Continue long-te suppo t to e lood i the AFBiH: The B itish-sponsored new officer induction program is universally praised. Such efforts are long-term investments in BiH and regional security. Other donors should consider similar or complimentary efforts to introduce new talent and skills into the AFBiH. 4) Provide support for force integration at the co pa le el: As o e i te ie ee oted, e lood a get o upted o disillusio ed if i t odu ed to a s ste desig ed to pe petuate eth i di isio . Ma se io MoD offi ials ould like to see the fo e s i teg atio do to the o pa level. This is unlikely to be a rapid process, and will surely engender resistance. But a dedicated effort to ensure operational unit integration, particularly for units deployed abroad and for newlyinducted officers, is an important goal that should be an explicit – and articulated – target for Western assistance. 5) Assign experts to assist in procurement, so the defense budget can be wisely spent in a timely fashion. The staffing and capabilities shortfall in the MoD has numerous negative effects, but the impact on the procurement process is especially baneful, given the meagerness of resources at hand. Assistance in developing tenders and due diligence by Western militaries/MoDs would maximize the utility of the limited defense budget and external assistance. 6) Provide assistance in planning for natural disasters: Interviews for this report pointed to deficiencies in the preparations and capacities for civil emergencies like the May 2014 floods, particularly on the coordination side. In the case of serious deficiencies in police coordination exposed by the fumbling response to the violent element of the February 2014 protests, external supporters of public security and rule of law have devoted ongoing efforts to remediate them. A similar approach should be undertaken for the AFBiH and the wider civil defense architecture in BiH: Ministry of Security and entity and cantonal bodies. Even with the best planning and liaison, however, these ties can only function properly in a crisis with the requisite political will. 7) Provide or assist in procuring specialized equipment for civil emergencies, including through regional pooling/collaborative arrangements: Numerous interviewees enumerated the lack of proper equipment and training as a problem exposed in the May 2014 floods. These included helicopters capable of vertical extraction; firefighting equipment; boats; and specialized engineering equipment. Coordination of donations and support is essential – including with nonAlliance/EU donors like China. BiH, like many regional countries, also suffers regular/seasonal weather-driven emergencies, such as flooding and forest fires. The recent regional flood response effort should point the way toward further functional cooperation. External supporters of EuroAtlantic integration for the region should explicitly call for regional pooling of resources (such as the legendary Canadair firefighting planes, the lack of which is a regular seasonal talking point) and coordination of effort as criteria for such support. AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | 16