Machiavellian Weber

Machiavellian Weber: The Case for Realist-)dealism! Arta Moeini Georgetown University December 2013 0|Page Introduction Maximillian Weber has been dubbed the ultimate political realist and correctly so. Yet, his ealis is u h o e ua ed a d o pli ated than it first appears. Not surprisingly, different pundits i te p et We e a d his ealis diffe e tl . In particula , o e di e sio of We e s ealist a ou ts of sociopolitical phenomena has been even more troubling and controversial than others: mainly, his worry—postulated i his fa ous “ ie e as Vo atio —that the net result of Disenchantment (a process of unveiling and demystification of the world started by Rationalization in modernity and furthered by science) is meaninglessness o i g to the su je ti izatio of alues a d g adual fadi g of su sta ti e Value-rationality (Wertrationalität). In coming to terms with this problematic, conservatives, such as Leo Strauss (Natural Right and History, 1953), identify (and justifiably so) a Nietzschean character in Weber, ut Nietzs he is all the see i his thought. The thus dee hi esig ed to the ihilism of the modern era and even promoting it, and it is from this standpoint that they criticize him. They abhor what they perceive as Weber overlooking the ideal. Othe s, a el “heldo Woli Ma We e , 1 1 , t ied to e tif this i gi g to light We e s value-consciousness and drawing attention to his understanding of science’s (particularly social science) moral contribution as a venue for explanation and clarification of alues and the means to their achievement. In this view, (social) science itself in its many disciplines could become a source of Right (and as far as Wolin was concerned theoretically back his understanding of de o ati p i iples ). In what seems to be an overt contradiction of the spirit of Weberian thesis in Science as Vocation , Woli s We e pe ei es that o alit a d ea i gful ess ould e defe ded and even retrieved through science and theory (science could be utilized as a tool for the legitimation of values). Science could complement politics; it could couple power (the real) with Right (the ideal). Thus, only if we fail in our vocation as academics and intellectuals to critically evaluate values (in process of which the hope is some values can be legitimated), is our society and humanity as a whole threatened with the existential crisis of meaninglessness and nihilism. In stark contrast, the Liberal reading of Weber celebrates him as creating space for individuated value and value-pluralism in line with subjective reason. In this view, the value-agnosticism Weber is pointing to is not a crisis of meaninglessness and nihilism, but rather the hallmark of liberalism and culmination of an individualist ethos, promoting a healthy respect for different points of views, diversity, and tolerance of distinct individual agents. Values do not disappear into meaninglessness for each person ill still possess o e s own alues as a atio al su je t: he ill hoose his own pe so alized worldview, create his o meaning. For them, democracy flourishes on precisely such heterogeneity and subjectivism. That is all well except Weber himself never looks even remotely comfortable with the implications of his discovery. The main disconnect is that Weber, throughout his writings, indicated the social horizon of values, their social nature: values are only meaningful if they are objective that is shared among a group of people as common absolute commitments. Anything normative is only sensical in a communal setting. Weber was not such an advocate of individualism that liberals make him out to be. In fact, he intuitively recognized the inherent significance of culture and of community to human flourishing and even founded an entire discipline on such a spirit—sociology. Liberals might be comfortable with a 1|Page meaningless world of subjectivized value, the ight e e el o e We e s dis o e of the ad e t of a nihilistic world as salutary, but they must have the courage to say just that and go about making their case as a defense of nihilism in all its emancipatory and egalitarian potential for the individual. Alternatively, there is a third reading of Weber—informing the views of this article—in which Weber is neither a prophet of doom and nihilism nor is he a champion of value-pluralism and subjectivism. While the Nietzs hea p oje t espoused a ki d of i di idualis that seeks to e p ess itself i posi g a e o de a d la for oneself and at the level of an individual (which ironically echoes in the views of contemporary liberals), Weber developed such Nietzschean concerns applying them at a social level, extending their scope and their power as potentially creating a new order and norms within a community.1 Accordingly, while Nietzsche reveled in philosophy opi g ith ode it s dis o te ts only theoretically, Weber actually embraces the Nietzschean ill to action immersing himself in the realm of the p a ti al deali g ith the sociological and political implications of modernity. Thus, it is in Weber that Nietzs he s philosophi al a gu e ts e o e actualized in a socio-political framework. it is in Weber and his practical inquiries that Nietzschean thoughts find their ultimate development and completion. Nietzs he s p e ise orbits the self and self alone. Weber raises the stakes by broadening the scope (of the Nietzschean problematics) to the social. But how could this reanimation of values at the o u al setting actually take place. I believe Weber had observed a way he considered (empirically) plausible, a possible countermeasure to the modern trend of nihilism. He believed that if there was to be any chance at all for a normative regeneration/reordering, that path had to be sought in the political (domain). While I deeply sha e “heldo Woli s o fide e that “ ie e as Vo atio a d Politi s as Vo atio a e o pa io -pieces, united by common themes, all of the p ofou dl politi al , I eje t his reading of Weber which espouses science as the arena for (rational) examination and affirmation of values by means of elucidating their internal contradictions.2 Rather, in my reading, Weber does the exact opposite of what Wolin suggests; he powerfully severs the realm of science from the realm of values and thus frees the normative to stand on its own. After Weber, I am inclined to a ept s ie e s positio as a tool of clarification for the questions of ultimate ends, but that is certainly a far cry from science becoming a i st u e t of alue-legiti atio . “ ie e is i herently incapable of providing any such justification for values, never mind ordering or creating them. Rather, Weber advances the realm of politics (even in spite of its rationalization and bureaucratization) as the sole possi le e ue fo alue- eatio and alue-legiti atio i actuality as irrational as it a e fo o l i the o ete politi al do ai does power find real manifestation, whether as physical force or as charisma). Harnessing and channeling the power of the political domain in its full fo e, We e i st u ts, e ui es the o i tio politi ia of genuine charisma. In his anti-Marxian and anti-determinism, Weber delineates in this despairing, pessimistic, Nietzschean picture a political route to normative redemption, a way to subdue or at least mitigate some of the effe ts of totalisti Rationalization and Disenchantment. Arguably, Weber finds in the right kind of charismatic leader (o e ho i teg ates the ethi of Co i tio —Gesinnungsethik ith the ethi of Responsibility —Verantwortungsethik in his person) a certain redeeming quality able to transcend—at 1 2 Robert Eden, Bad Conscience for a Nietzschean Age: Weber’s Calling for Science , Review of Politics, p. 375 Sheldon Wolin, Max Weber, Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory , p. 2|Page least at the national level—the ha d age-like st u tu e a d li itatio s of ode politi s 3 and salvage/re-objectivize the values and ethics that have dissipated under ode alue-subjectivism (reanimating a sense of unity, meaningfulness, and community in his otherwise atomized, disillusioned, alienated and discontented people). In such a manner, We e e do s the [ ha is ati ] leader with the charisma of a this-wo ldl p ophet ho could mobilize the irrational faith of his disciples and even the whole machinery of the state for the sake of his sublime altruistic ends and in process resubstantiate the world with meaning. 4 The genuine charismatic leader is a seminal figure to Weber for he is the sole individual capable (courtesy of his charismata a d gifts of g a e of enchanting the modern dise ha ted o ld e ali ati g it o the asis of his own Weltanschauung—he thus re-injects a measure of magic and belief into the world. Given that his solution and the path he envisions for this normative recovery are totally and overwhelmingly political, Weber, in many ways, resembles and is inspired by Niccolo Machiavelli.5 His prospective practical solution to the problem of modern meaninglessness depends on an appeal to agency which corresponds with Machiavellian idea of Virtù. It also espouses a special kind of political realism, one that always has in mind the ultimate ends and ideals the realization of which serves as the light at the end of the tunnel (of the harsh realities). I call this particular breed of realism which consecrates agency (as its foremost value) and resonates in the thoughts of both Machiavelli and Weber, Realist-Idealism--which implies using and manipulating the actual facts on the ground as part of an adaptive strategy to achieve higher ends and having the courage and agency to proclaim i spite of it all / despite e e thi g . This is precisely what Weber imagines a t ue o atio al politi ia ould do and it is this quality that Weber finds salvaging of values in a nihilistic world). Fittingly, this is also what Machiavelli prescribes to the Prince if he hopes to attain the public and private glory that lie in that ultimate Machiavellian ideal which is the unification of Italy. But first, we must take a step back to investigate the Weberian line of thought and its e olutio f o its egi i gs. I ill o e e e ie i g We e s u de sta di g of ode it i its distinctive development in the West. This process would also entail recovering some degree of human agency. The leader emerges as the head of the Leviathan that is the society and recover a sense of unity and community and belonging for his value-free nihilistic people in his person; He thus acquires the standing of a secular prophet by becoming a law-giver . 3 Ernest Kilker, Max Weber and the Possibilities for Democracy in Max Weber’s Political Sociology, ed. Glassman and Murvar, p.63 4 The Machiavellian project is a call to reunification of )taly, which is predicated on a recovery of agency . Fortuna is twofold. One part suggests determinism of events whose effects we inherit—we have no control over this side as it has happened in the past. The second part is knowing that since we have a mind and can be self-causing we can influence and change our fates, our destiny. Thus, Machiavelli contends that we must not be fatalistic and passive. We have to use the disorienting condition of our time and adapt to it, use it as an opportunity for fundamental transformation: this for Machiavelli is the mark of the true leader, which he attempts to instil in the De Medici prince. To do this one needs to use Virtù which can be best understood as agency to dare and to take risks, take lady fortune and to rape her . By means of inspirational rhetoric, Machiavelli advises the prince that this is a time for action. Machiavelli is indeed calling on a charismatic leader to understand the harsh realities of politics and recognize that as a man of politics his (professional) ethics must be differ from the common man. The ethics of politics is first and foremost to bring glory to one’s country and people in this case )taly and that is an absolute end justifying the means knowing when to use force and violence when absolutely necessary for well-being of one’s people/and the state . So the prince has to reconcile his professional ethics (cf. ethics of Responsibility) with his ethics of Conviction and absolute ends (which are not personal but communal) in order to achieve the noble goals for his community and bring his country to new heights. In The Prince, Machiavelli beseechs an inspirational leader to innovate and recast the world instead of accepting it as is given the miserable condition of 15th cent. Italian Peninsula characterized by constant violence, treachery, and in-fighting. While The Prince describes and advocates the politics of founding, Discourses on Levy aims to protect the fruits of this innovative founding by means of routinization and institutionalization through establishing the rational-legal constitutional authority characteristic of a republic. 5 3|Page I. Weber and Modernity The first-order question for Weber driving his thought is ho histo i al p o esses ad a ed sociologically within a give i ilizatio . 6 Now given his particular Zeitgeist, it should come as no surprise that the historical process most captivating him was modernity—its genesis and its (sociological) phenomenology. Weber sets out to provide an empiricist and culturalist account of the genealogy of modernity in the West. In his renowned The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), Weber places the origin of modernity and its capitalistic economic order in the substantive Rationality that was enshrined in the comprehensive worldview and value-s ste of ascetic Protestant sects (Calvinist/Puritan). Ascetic Protestant ethics amounted to a substantive Worldview (Weltanschauung) based on a value-rational (Wertrational) code of conduct that demanded from the believer—the agent of God— ultimate devotion to his work as a Vo atio Beruf) culminating in a methodical, patterned way of life. The ascetic Protestant ethic converted mundane economic activity into a substantive moral praxis on the basis of the substantive form of rationality it possesses (which the ascetic finds rational and objective as a matter of faith). This belief in ethical ordering of life led to capitalism and kick-sta ted ode it . In actualizing (its unique) substantive Rationalism in its overarching quest for other-worldly spiritual salvatio , the Pu ita zeal ould e ought to ea o hu a a ti it a d to o de it so s ste ati all that it ould ge e ate st u tu es of po e that ould t a sfo the o ld alo g ith the humans in it.7 In process, modernity gave rise to the ascendency of a particular form of rationality, which Weber calls the spe ial a d pe ulia ‘atio alis of Weste ultu e —or instrumental rationality. This means-end instrumental rationality (from whence on rationalization) defines all aspects of modern life, manifesting in modern bureaucratization, institutionalization, legalism, formalism, economic system of capitalism, specification, technicalization, and finally modern science, effectuating the disenchantment of the world. As Wolin asserts, this (instrumental/technical) Rationalization is e p essed i the aste of ode s ie e o e atu e a d of u eau ati o ga izatio o e so iet , sig ali g the status of hu a action in a world whose structures encased action in routines and required it to be calculating, i st u e talist, a d p edi ta le .8 This process culminates in the gradual hardening of what Weber aptly names stahlhartes Gehäuse, a steel Casi g o “hell hi h Pa so s fa ousl t a slates as I o Cage i the modern world to which everyone is subject and from the systemic and mechanistic pulls of which there is no escape.9 Ironically, the socio-cultural revolution (initially in the realm of ideas as a consequence of the Reformation) that brought about the immense cosmos (modern capitalist order) in which we live leads to the development of a mechanistic system that works according to its own momentum; it determines life and people must conform to it akin to a factory-worker on an assembly-line. Without those Kalberg, Max Weber’s Types of Rationality , American Journal of Sociology, p.1177 Sheldon Wolin, Max Weber , p. 8 Ibid. 9 Gehäuse’s best translation would be any shielded inhabited space like a shell of a turtle: the most accurate translation of the phrase stahlhartes Gehäuse is hence an enclosed inhabited space encased in steel 6 7 4|Page original ideas to give it a sense of meaning and orientation, modern life takes place in a cold Shell made of steel in a state of chronic delirium. As such, in modernity and under capitalism, according to Weber, a fundamental shift has taken root: the care for external material goods is no longer secondary to our being, it has become part of that being, part of our existence, our one true cause. 10 As such, "the steel Shell of the capitalist order" conditions the priorities of modern society, and impresses these priorities on each of us as individuals. Our own shell, in which we live and breathe, is our shelter and constraint, yet it allows choices of various ki ds, o e e ts a d di e tio s that a e ou o ut still i keepi g ith the eta-structure and the meta-s ste i e ui e e ts of the ode o ld o de — the i age of a shell s olizes so ethi g that has not just been externally imposed (as in the iron cage metaphor), but that has become "part and pa el of [ou ] e iste e : e ha e e o e li i g ogs i the ode Ma hi e .11 In this, we did not have a choice (although it was not imposed on us either). Weber underlines this very point, The Pu ita a ted to o k i a alli g; e a e fo ed to do so. Fo he as eti is as a ied out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with i esisti le fo e. 12 It follows that the fulfillment of the Calling for the mundane economic activity has been forever severed from the highest spiritual, normative, and cultural values that produced it (the substantive rationality of Protestant ethic).13 This is pa ti ula l t ou li g, fo the habitation of a steel Shell implies not only a new dwelling for modern human beings, but a transformed nature; homo sapiens has become a different ei g, a deg aded ei g , disti ti el e ol ed to i ha it this io i e os ste . 14 This image is best captu ed i the o ks of Ha ah A e dt. A e dt appea s uite apti ated We e s ha a te izatio of the ode age, fo she asse ts i he o ight that ode oto izatio ould appea like a p o ess of biological mutation in which human bodies gradually begin to be covered by shells of steel".15 In the Weberian view, (instrumental) Rationalization infiltrates all aspects of modern life— externally it is embodied in bureaucratization, while internally it a ifests as su je ti izatio . With a Nietzscheanesque tone, Weber insinuates that (instrumental) Rationalism left unchecked leaves man in a condition of pointless empty servility. In a rather alarming and morbid statement, Weber contends: A lifeless machine is congealed Mind/Geist. It is only this fact that gives the machine the power to force men to serve it and thus to rule and determine their daily working lives, as in fact happens in factories. The same congealed Mind is, however, also embodied in that living machine which is represented by bureaucratic organization with its specialization of trained, technical work, its delimitation of areas of responsibility, its regulations and its graduated hierarchy of relations of obedience. Combined with the dead machine, it is in the process of manufacturing the Gehäuse of Materialism is no longer a cloak we can put away, but a hard shell which we must carry on our backs and in which we live. Baehr, The )ron Cage and the Shell as (ard as Steel , p. 12 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p.181 (from here on out referred to as PESC) 13 Wolin, p.415 14 Baehr, The )ron Cage and the Shell as (ard as Steel , p. 15 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (1958), p.322 10 11 5|Page that future serfdom to which, perhaps, men may have to submit powerlessly, just like the slaves in the a ie t state of Eg pt .16 For Weber, substantive Rationality is closely tied to the notion of agency: something must call us to action, bring us out of ourselves and our lonely slumbers. To act, we have got to believe. Having turned away from substantive Rationality (the source of our norms and values) into our subjective selves, we are left only with instrumental reason and utilitarianism, with nothing to move us, nothing to guide our actions— no (objective) moral compass with conventionally agreed upon directions. I othe o ds, the steel “hell is the symbol of passivity to We e , the transformation of the Puritan hero into a figure of mass edio it .17 To the testa e t of A e dt, It is uite o ei a le that the ode age—which began with such an unprecedented and promising outburst of human activity [in the Renaissance]—may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity histo has e e k o .18 Losing its source of substantive Rationality (the Protestant ethic), the (modern) Shell has been hollowed out without norms and values to cushion it; and so, we are left with an empty Shell which e o passes ou li es edu ed to othi g ess —senseless, directionless, and lost. The following passage from PESC est aptu es We e s se se of the state of modernity, No o e k o s ho ill li e i this “hell of steel i the futu e, o hethe at the e d of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of ideas and ideals like old times, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive selfimportance [this is an obvious rhetorical allusion to Marx and Nietzsche]. For the last Men [inhabiting] this cultural development [that is modernity], it might well be trul said: “pe ialists ithout Mi d, sensualists without Heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before a hie ed. 19 Thus, the ‘atio alizatio displa e e t f o su sta ti e to i st u e tal that o u s i the u foldi g of modernity emerges as the culprit of most evils of modern life, most importantly its likelihood of unravelling into meaninglessness and emptiness. To this problem, we shall now turn more carefully. II. Modernity Problematized—Rationalization Displacement Now many of the by-products of Rationalization mentioned above such as bureaucratization and legalism might have been novel concepts to the feudal Europe but they are not completely unique to the West o pa ti ula to the ode )eitgeist. Chi a, “assa id Pe sia, a d e e ‘o a E pi e to so e extent had developed their entire civilizations on these premises. But something about the Western experience a d its ode it , We e ealized, as d asti all a d idios ati all diffe e t—the distinguishing factor being the evenhanded and blind ge e al up ooti g i ode it of all asso t e ts (renditions) of Substantive rationalities (Wertrationalitäten). Weber correctly observed that in the advent of the ode epo h i the West instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität) had come to completely supplant and banish (at least in the public domain) all forms of substantive rationality, one particular Weber, Parliament and Government in Germany Under a New Political Order , p. Baehr, p.164 18 Arendt, p.322 19 Weber, PESC, p.182 (transl. slightly altered) 16 17 6|Page subset of which as in (rationalized ethic of) ascetic Protestantism had both caused and cultivated it (modernity) in the first place. Weber comments, Toda the spi it of eligious as eti is —of substantive Rationalism— has disappeared from this Shell/Casing, but victorious capitalism, since it rests on e ha i al fou datio s —on instrumental rationalism— eeds its suppo t o lo ge , lea i g the pu suit of ealth st ipped of its eligious a d ethi al ea i g .20In all other examples Weber encountered in history, the forces of instrumental Rationality had come to exist in-tandem with substantive rationality, always coextensive with Value-rationality and never doing away with it altogether. Fatefully, Weber realized that not only could formal instrumental atio alit ot ha e pla ted the seeds fo its o ge i atio , ut these egula ities of atio al a tio alo e ould e e e apa le of gi i g i th to ethical substantive rationalities, value-rationalization processes, worldviews, or a unified way of life: no ethi al a tio o ito ed a i te alized sta da d… a esult solel f o ea s-e d atio al a tio .21 Hence, the no ati e alue-o je ti izi g substantive rationality (Wertrationalität) of ascetic Protestant belief-system that put the process i otio that ul i ated i the ise of ode it o es to fade systemically as ode it (in its new type of rationalization) unfolds displaced by the alue- eut al (Wertfreiheit) Instrumental rationality without a way to restore the former from the latter, leaving mankind in a steel Casing that appears to be permanently stripped of all significance. Nietzsche was the first thinker to predict and detect this modern development. Furthermore, he pointed to scientific formalism as the quintessential enemy of values. He recognized that modern science —i its o sessio ith fa ts , ethods , and testa ilit of t uth-claims—was inevitably going to repudiate alues a d o s as i alid . Nietzs he also instinctively understood that ha i g shaken the ground of moral conduct and of commitment to moral ideals, [modern] science proves unable to supply a theoretical foundation for practical ethics and must admit it cannot [even] ground itself .22 As Kalberg puts it, the Judeo-Christian worldview, which provided the point of reference for major groupings of substantive and ethical rationalities as well as for the theoretical rationalization of their values i the West becomes largely replaced by the scientific worldview; with this axial shift and ith [We e s] definition of science as a mode of knowledge analytically distinct from values, values could no longer be defined as the legitimate subject matter of the 20th century's major theoretical rationalization pro esses .23 Nietzsche asse ts, As the will to truth thus gains self- o s ious ess…morality [which is at the heart of the Weberian notion of Substantive Rationality] will gradually perish now: this is the great spectacle in a hundred acts reserved for the next two centuries in Europe—the most terrible, most questionable, and perhaps also the ost hopeful of all spe ta les . 24 As su h, fo al atio alizatio processes in the scientific arena as well as in the economic and the legal spheres and in the bureaucratic form of domination coalesced to give birth to a network of patterns of action, all of which pointed in the same direction: suppression of value-o ie ted a tio ; a d so, ethi al atio alities lost the constellation of interests that enabled them to stand effectively in direct opposition to the impersonal character of all formal rationalities and to circumscribe the influence of the latter by subsuming them under an ethical Weber, PESC, p.181-182 (translation slightly altered) Kalberg, Max Weber’s Types of Rationality , p.1170-1171 22 Robert Eden, Bad Conscience for a Nietzschean Age: Weber’s Calling for Science , Review of Politics, p. 372 23 Kalberg, p.1173 : This holds true in spite of the fact that arguably Scientific knowledge itself could be viewed as a form of Substantive Rationality—also see Thomas Kuhn’s Structures of Scientific Revolutions (1962) 24 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay, no. 27 20 21 7|Page postulate . 25 Yet, upo lose i spe tio , it appea s that s ie e is ot the ulti ate ulp it in the breakdown of values, but is symptomatic (and indeed the agent) of the larger trend of Disenchantment shaping the modern cast of mind. Let us then consider in more depth the factors (particularly Disenchantment) i gi g a out this shift i (types of) Rationalization? III. Source of the Problem Identified—Disenchantment and Meaninglessness I posit that We e s remarks in Science as Vocation 1 1 —which togethe ith his Politi s as Vo atio (1919) could be dubbed his last words before his untimely passing—elucidate that he had finally ide tified the sou e of this suppla tatio a d pu gi g of the substantive in the modern world (Rationalization Displacement i the phe o e o he alls Dise ha t e t 26. It is the Disenchantment of the world and its values at the hands of modern science that so troubles Weber. He so de la es, The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 'Disenchantment of the world'. Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life, e o i g su je ti ized.27 This Dise ha t e t o i ed ith the p i iple of “u je ti it the development of the notion of individual autonomous reason) produces a powerful concoction that is absolutely antithetical to all Value-rationality and (objectivized) ethical systems. Modern science functions really as the means of applying this destructive potion (as far as values are concerned). To Weber, the ultimate and inevitable consequence of Disenchantment was the meaninglessness of the world and the human experience in it. Wolin best captures this critical Weberian sentiment, A tio ithout the passio s that We e asso iated ith spi itual a d o al ideals as " ea i gless," a category that became a major one in Weber's thinking henceforth. Meaninglessness was of special concern in the methodological essays because of the central part which modern science had played in destroying the sources of meaning. Capitalism and bureaucratization may have produced the social and political structures of rationalization but the equation of rationalization with meaninglessness was the special responsibility of modern science. Science had attacked religious, moral, and metaphysical beliefs and had insisted that everything could, in principle, be reduced to rational explanation. Such explanations had no need of gods, spirits, revelations, and metaphysical principles. The result was a bare world, denuded and drained of meaning, which science makes no pretense to replenishing. Science deals with fact, material reality, and rational demonstration. It is so helpless to restore what it has destroyed that, qua science, it cannot even justify its own value. Its own activity comes perilously close to being the definition of meaninglessness: [as Weber puts it,] "Chained to the course of p og ess," its "fate" is that "it asks to e 'su passed' a d outdated". 28 Given the deterministic forces that operate i the E losu e ade of “teel hi h is ou ode so ioe o o i o de , We e des i es the i pli atio s of this Dise ha t e t that is fostered courtesy of ou ode o sessio ith s ie tifi uest fo fact-based certainty and objectivity: in effect, divesting Kalberg, Max Weber’s Types of Rationality , p.1174 Disenchantment for Weber is not just the demystification of the world and a turn toward secular scientific understanding of it. I submit that there is a secondary far more important consequence which comes out of modernity’s obsession with certainty, facts and predictability which is loss of all (normative) values (not just religious but cultural) 27 Weber, Science as Vocation, p.20 28 Wolin, p.415-416 25 26 8|Page our world of values and hence meaning and producing alienation, discontent, disillusionment, and lack of human self-fulfill e t. E uall to la e is the p i iple of su je ti it . The subjectivist turn might have produced value-pluralism , but it has only done so by trivializing values (by rejecting their social authority) and hence contributed to the purging the world of all meaning and significance (that could be an objective source of action) getting dangerously close to nihilism. In Science as Vocation , I believe, Weber finally comes to terms with the fundamental crisis of his Zeitgeist (that of subjectivization of value and meaninglessness owing to Disenchantment) and begins to work it out it conceptually. The essential problem is that as a result of (instrumental) rationalization i the ode age, the e is no longer any authoritative normative standard outside and above the individual by means of which he can orient and ground himself and relate to his fellow men. Counterintuitively, modernity is revealed to have lost its o s ie e , its alue-consciousness, at its own hands. We e s Science as Vocation lecture is a rhetorical irony that serves as a powerful rejoinder to Kant and the Enlightenment line of thought. We e i gs to ea the full p a ti al i pli atio s of the fa t that s ie e has ee a ihilisti fo e putti g i to pe spe ti e the o al p edi a e t of o te po a s ie e , a d thus poses to science the choice of responsibility for the ultimate meaning of its own conduct . 29 While implicitly rejecting the prospect of rational universal morality and unconditional categorical imperatives (the Kantian solution), this lecture goes even a step further by pointing out the paradoxical and mindboggling realization that modern science itself categorically belongs in the realm of value-judgments, that accepting and operating within the scientific premises is above all a matter of faith and thus a vocation on the part of the scientist. Believing in the scie tifi p og a , observance of its modus operandi, is a choice, and an irrational faithful one at that, made within the kingdom of values. This warrants an analysis of the multi-fold ha a te of the o ept of atio alit i We e . As alluded to previously, Webe s o eptio of ‘atio alis is not limited to (instrumental) rationalization ta ta ou t o l to a i easi g pe asi e ess of the ea s-e d ) e k atio al t pe of so ial a tio ; it sig ifies u h o e as e ide t We e s e og itio of substantive kinds of rationality. 30 Ethical “u sta ti e atio alit is ost espo si le fo oth the diffuse ess a d the pe spe ti al atu e of Weber's rationalization theme, [specifically because] only ethical rationalities are capable of permanently suppressing [means-end/instrumental] practical rational regularities of action or, just as important, i te sif i g the t a sfo i g the i to p a ti al ethi al a tio . 31 Fu the o e, o l ethi al rationalities provide a value-content for theoretical rationalization processes, set them in motion in specific directions as value-rationalization processes, and give rise to comprehensive, internally unified value configurations .32 As Kalberg notes, I all ases, the su sta ti e atio alit is o side ed to e a "valid canon"; that is, a unique "standard" against which reality's flow of unending empirical events may be selected, measured, and judged. 33 Weber understood that since the standpoints represented by value postulates can be, in principle, infinite, action may be ordered into patterns and, indeed, into entire ways Eden, p.389 Kalberg, Max Weber’s Types of Rationality , p. 31 Ibid., p.1170 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., p.1155 29 30 9|Page of life in an endless number of ways: [accordingly,] small groups, organizations, institutions, political e tities, ultu es, a d i ilizatio s a e, i e e e a, o de ed i te s of spe ifia le alue postulate. 34 In this se se, ea h alue o stellatio i plies a ide tifia le o figu atio of alues [ho izo of significance] that determines the direction of a potentially ensuing rationalization process, [meaning] no absolute array of "rational" values exists as a set of perennial "standards" for "the rational" and for atio alizatio p o esses. 35 As su h, othi g is of itself "i atio al, ut athe e omes so when e a i ed f o a spe ifi " atio al" sta dpoi t. As Kal e g puts it, e e eligious pe so is "i atio al" fo e e i eligious pe so , a d e e hedo ist like ise ie s e e as eti a of life as i atio al . 36 I this light, su sta ti e atio alit a e defi ed as a i te all -consistent normative system which can be deemed objective owing to it being authoritative over the conduct of its adherents and so within its ethical parameters, believing i di iduals atio all o de their lives leading to a regular standardized pattern of conduct for the subscribing community (of the faithful). Of course, Weber realized that this p o ess o u s egula l ithi the ou ds of ultu es. I this ega d, We e s o eptio of su sta ti e ratio alit has a lot i o o ith Hegelia otio of atio al o je ti e “pi it Volkgeist he e the o je ti it lies i the fa t that alue postulates a e i di g a d autho itati e i the o te t of a particular (normative) community. Cultural arenas o Life- spheres, in a sense, defend their own value postulates as "rational" and label those of other life-sphe es "i atio al . 37 It thus appears that modern science does indeed promote instrumental rationality, a means-end mentality, but its ability to autho itati el p o ote a thi g at all depe ds o su sta ti e atio alit , on it being selected as an absolute end in itself. In this way, Weber anticipates the visionary Thomas Kuhn who understood even science as the abode of ever-changing paradigms. Modern science emerges as the e odi e t of o t adi tio upholdi g a illusio of atio alit irrationally—a totalistic religion with the scientific method as its ritual and not conscious of itself as religion and its power of enchantment, whose belief-system and worldview ironically ushers forth disenchantment denying religion in the first place. Science denies the nature of its own being: it is thus the ultimate manifestation of irrationality in the modern world (normative irrationality to be exact). In Weber, modern science begins to become conscious of itself, its normative ontological roots, and its normative irrationality. It may finally fathom that the basis of its authority is primarily and fundamentally normative. This realization, Weber believes, has an emancipatory potential. It validates the normative as indispensable to human existence while it also creates a separate autonomous space for its flourishing (as an end in itself) away from science. In his reestablishment of the normative as a valid and autonomous domain for the knowledge of right, the normative achieves its freedom from the shackles of an incapacitating and domineering science, and it becomes possible to resubstantiate the world, to reanimate it by once mere making it meaningful. In the pre-scientific age, public life was ordered according to competing value-systems (Wertrationalität) that were quite often socially, culturally, and religiously ordered across communities making them objective and authoritative over the subjects. They were the gods and demons, and the individual was habituated and instructed in them since birth so that they became part of his inner-being, Ibid. Ibid. 36 Ibid., p.1156 37 Ibid. 34 35 10 | P a g e his identity. I this a , the i di idual s o stellatio of alue i o ed, o e o less a d i the fundamentals, the constellation of values of his community which he shared with his neighbor, friend, and fellow-citizen. Weber refers to su h value-complexes and the ethical systems of substantive rationality as that p opheti pneuma, which in former times swept through the great communities like a firebrand, welding them together . 38 If the people in a community (the Volkgeist) discovered an internal contradiction within its particular Weltanschauung or the dominant Wertrationalität, they could lose faith in what unites them as a people and that community could collapse (this is the basis of the Hegelian theory of Geist). Weber realized that in the modern scientific age, we still have competing values but as science (disenchantment generally) has discredited their sources of authority be it religion or tradition (without offering a new source of authority for the normative ordering of life) they could no longer be binding rationally (and hence objectively) as a systematic code of life inculcated by the community on its members, for the new modern cast of mind is skeptical of all forms of belief. In Weberian perspective, the e t e e i st u e tal atio alit of ode it i p odu i g u eau a ies a d e hie a hies is linked to great substantive i atio alit .39 It is the modern emphasis on instrumental rationality and its effective Disenchantment and subjectivization of meaning and value (the kind of value-pluralism and relativism that culminates in Nietzschean nihilism) 40 that Weber rightly foresees as engendering the ode o ditio a s hola s aptl ha a te ize as atio al i atio alit . I so fa as all t pes of rationality introduced by Weber involve regularizing and patterning of life and action in a predictable objective fashion, it becomes increasingly clear that we in modernity live lives of substantive (normative) irrationality 41 , for through delegitimizing substantive rationalities and subjectivization of their valuepostulates we have abandoned all normative patterns of life that could be authoritative over us regulating our actions on an individual level (resulting in subjectivism/individualism). As such, one is left all alone having to choose among a pa theo of alue-gods ithout a so t of o pass to guide him: knowing he ca ot a ept all gods a d the ulti ate sta dpoi t a solute o it e ts the sig if ithout ei g disi ge uous to hi self, the individual has to decide which is God for him and which is the devil…th oughout all the orders of life. 42 The great paradox of the modern age is the seemingly e tai routines of the externalities of life, of our outward position in the world, juxtaposed against the crushing u e tai t of alue-decisions in our inner-life leading to a powerful sense of disorientation and despair (arising from the doubt that one could ever choose the right set of values)—after all, how can man be responsible for his choices if easo di tates that he ust also e agnostic as to their value? An agnostic choice is a contradiction in terms. Weber, Science as Vocation, p.20 William H. Swatos Jr. , Revolution and Charisma in a Rationalized World in Max Weber’s Political Sociology, ed. Glassman and Murvar, p.210 40 Weber’s understanding of nihilism and meaninglessness is about the lost legitimacy of systems of meaning/ constellations of values. Weber interprets this kind of value-anarchy as resulting in a deep sense of loss, despair, and alienation within the human experience. 41 The only semblance of normative order concerns those values that have one way or another been crystalized and institutionalized within the framework of our legal system which we abide by not because of their rationally-substantive hold over us but because of their formal rationality. All values resting outside the framework of law is subjective, perspectival and thus relative. 42 Weber, Science as Vocation, p.15 38 39 11 | P a g e Weber is adamant that science cannot adjudicate these kinds of normative dilemmas one way or another; it cannot take a stance. The normative cosmos is polytheistic inhabited by ultiple gods of the a ious o de s a d alues ; a d e a e e e -engaged with this pantheon of values-systems. Through s ie e, o e a only understand what the godhead is for the one order or for the other, or better, what godhead is in the one or in the other order . 43 Science can at best determine (and clarify) the i e consiste /i teg it of ulti ate Wo ld ie s Weltanschauungs) and resultant Weltanschauliche positions—in other words the internal structure of cultural values —and to point out the necessary ea s inevitable a d i teg al to the realization of a set end (along with the subsidiary consequences of such achievement); it a ot e e p ete d to a s e questions of the value [and the worth] of culture and its individual contents and the question of how one should act in the cultural community and in political associations .44 In this type of qualified explanatory understanding, s ie e s o t i utio to the eal of alues has ea hed its li it so fa as it a e dis ussed i a le tu e‐ oo a d a p ofesso and without a normative resolution .45 As such, ecause the various value spheres of the world stand in i e o ila le o fli t ith ea h othe which science cannot resolve, We e de la es “ ie tifi pleadi g in regards to normative questions futile and ea i gless i p i iple .46 For Weber, it is a matter of fact that so long as life remains immanent and is interpreted in its own terms, it knows only of an unceasing struggle of these [value] gods with one anothe .47 At least in theory, the ulti atel possi le attitudes [worldviews] toward life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion —a d et, to a tuall a d o etel li e a life, it is e essa to ake a de isi e hoi e i the domain of norms.48 But How? Now among the select s hola s that ha e e og ized this po e ful essage i We e s le tu e, most have interpreted this how individualistically, from the bottom-up if you will. They speculate that Weber is calling on the individual to make that decisive choice in regards to his Worldview and then to hold himself responsible for it. In doing so, they overlook three critical points. First, for Weber to have recommended to the individual to take a stance is itself a normative statement, a value-judgment which Weber has strictly forbidden the scientist, the intellectual, the lecturer from supplying as part of their o atio . Time and again, he claims unequivocally, that value-judg e ts ha e o pla e i the le tu eoo .49 Indeed, this is one of the fundamental leitmotifs of his Science as Vocation in the first place. Having gone to such lengths to showcase the problems that emerge when men of science/intellectuals attempt to influence the positions of their students by offering their personal value-judgments, it is unlikely and highly contradictory for Weber to then turn around and make such a profound normative claim to his student” audience. Secondly and more importantly perhaps, it is not as if an individual could just wake up one morning and consciously decides his absolute commitments, or his ultimate Weltanschauung. Considering the intrinsically communal nature of norms and ethos, this sounds like a nonsensical conclusion, especially in light of the fact that in his discussion of values Weber almost always uses language that imparts the collective and shared nature of norms and the social character of the ethics Weber, Science as Vocation, p.15 Ibid., pp.13, 17 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., p.18 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., p.15-18 43 44 12 | P a g e they generate. Weber understands that man is always socialized and habituated into his kingdom of values—that he does t hoose this ki gdo in vacuum or fi d his alue-god in the temple of his innerself. He is sensitized to it. In fact, when Weber employs his formative concept of Value-rationality (Wertrationalität), it is implicit that what makes these particular value-systems rational and hence objective is their authority over a group of persons in a social milieu—put differently, their rationality lies in the public and communal (generally cultural) belief in them in a particular context. Lastly, these commentators, in drawing their value-perso al o lusio s, fo us al ost e ti el o “ ie e as Vo atio a d ostl dis ega d We e s fi al o atio , Politi s as Vo atio . As su h, the fail to o i e We e s alua le fi di gs i Science as Vocation with his illustrative insights and projections i Politi s as Vo atio he e he la s out his ie as to ho we would (or rather could) cope in modernity with the i pli atio of his fi di gs i the “ ie e as Vocation pie e. I postulate that a lose eadi g of Politi s as Vo atio e eals We e s deep o i tio 50 that in the modern world the how–that is how one is to choose that ultimate normative basket—is informed communally a d i a a f o the top-do through a charismatic leader (particularly given the modern need for value-creation following the relative devastation of values in the wake of science). I ou a al sis of “ ie e as Vo atio , it is important to understand Weber as defending both the scientific and the normative in all of this. He is certainly not rejecting science or intellectualism as the devil as some claim; he is simply qualifying its jurisdiction against those (positivism comes to mind) who sought the answers to everything in science, asserting o e has to see the devil's (that is science's) ways to the end in order to realize his power and his limitations .51 Instead, Weber hopes to create a separate and autonomous abode for the creation and sustenance of rational values away from the suffocating grips of science, writing "These are two different things, as one a eadil see .52 The following passage is particularly illuminating, Science today is a 'vocation' organized in special disciplines in the service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of grace of seers and prophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does it partake of the contemplation of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the universe. This, to be sure, is the inescapable condition of our historical situation. We cannot evade it so long as we remain true to ourselves. And if Tolstoy's question recurs to you: as science does not, who is to answer the question: 'What shall we do, and, how shall we arrange our lives?' or, in the words used here tonight: 'Which of the warring gods should we serve? Or should we serve perhaps an entirely different god, a d ho is he?' the o e a sa that o l a p ophet o a sa io a gi e the a s e s. 53 And yet having seemingly offered some measure of hope to Tolstoy, Weber, immediately and perhaps harshly, brings to bear the deceptively o i ous poi t that the ode a is destined to live in a godless a d p ophetless ti e i hi h o authe ti di i el -ordained) prophets can walk this Earth by the sanction of God.54 This is where to many the Nietzschean spirit of Weber becomes evident, and they either This conviction is not argued explicitly and systematically given Weber’s untimely passing. At the same time, ) believe Weber subscribes to this view irrespective of his own normative commitments whatever they may be. As always, in his empirical study of modernity and its prospects as a social scientist, he remained normatively ambivalent. 51 Weber, Science as Vocation, p.18 52 Ibid., p.16 53 Ibid., p.19 50 54 Ibid. 13 | P a g e ele ate o atta k see “t auss We e s appa e t despai . I elie e the pi tu e is o e o ple . We e does indeed dispel the possibility of a prophet’s emergence in the religious sense in the modern disenchanted world, but he never goes so far as discounting the prospects for the emergence of a secular prophet-t pe figu e, o e ho possesses the gift of ha is a ut does ot lai autho it o ehalf of any supernatural divine beings. It seems that he intentionall ig o es it as pa t of “ ie e as Vo atio and this I posit is actually the topic of his se o d a d fi al le tu e, Politi s as Vo atio , he e the se ula prophet comes to implicitly be identified by the charismatic leader who unites in his person a (morallyinspired) ethics of Conviction and a (professional) ethics of Responsibility. In this struggle, Weber suggests that our only enemy is our own passivity, for the charismatic leade is o e of us. I the losi g e a ks of “ ie e as Vo atio le tu e, We e o e o e sho ases his highly anti-deterministic outlook with a clear appeal to agency and voluntarism. As William Swatos asserts, I st u e tal atio alit ad a es, to so e deg ee, as othe a tio -orientations shrink in importance; in so doing, it limits the range of human experience—a sense of loss and alienation results. The disenchanted world is thus often portrayed as a sad one in which unrelenting bureaucratization reduces creativity, spontaneity, and freedom to meaninglessness. We o sta tl seek e pe ie es ut a e left u fulfilled. I so e of We e s iti gs, this pessimistic Weltanschauung has no corrective; yet, such a position is clearly un-Weberian in its determinism. In such a context, voluntarism emerges as the only way forward against the suggestive determinism. Bea i g i i d We e s i e se dissatisfa tio ith Ma a d his o lusio s, If histo was totally o t olled atio alizatio , the the e is othi g to o e d We e s o k o e that of Ma o a 55 othe dete i isti fo e theo ist . In same vain as Machiavelli—who called on the prince to subdue the forces of Fortuna/determinism through his Virtù56 in order to unify Italy, create a new order, and serve as lawgiver (as such acting like a prophet), Weber suggests that it is only through a charismatic leader and his activism in reordering the normative dimension of modern life that this determinism can be broken if not socially at least politically (integrating his ethic of Responsibility as a true politician with his ethic of Conviction as a great man/charismatic individual). As su h, Volu ta is gi es a o e edit fo his destiny without being historically naïve: our future is conditioned by our past, but to speak of driving fo es is to lose tou h ith ou a ilit to e eate the atu e a d ea i g of hu a e iste e , losing touch with our agency and becoming passive. 57 As established before, the danger of passivity is the final implication of the Iron Cage that manifests itself as part of human psyche. In his final years, Weber understood that if we fail to actualize ou sel es eesta lishi g ou age , the uest fo e pe ie e and its lack of fulfillment [could] become in part definitive for human nature in our [modern] time and space—the p e o ditio s fo the pe a e t suspe sio of the atu al attitude that is our agency and freedom as human beings. 58 If we become resigned to our modern condition and stop resisting it consciously and actively, it will easily become existential to us and the source of our demise as species Swatos Jr., p.210 Virtù for Machiavelli has the connotation of agency and taking control one’s own destiny. (e thus calls on the prince to be daring and take risks for Lady Fortuna let’s herself be won more times by the impetuous than by the tame. see Machiavelli, The Prince, Chap. 25 &26) 57 Swatos Jr., p.210 58 Ibid., p.210-211 55 56 14 | P a g e perhaps even creating a new species unrecognizable to us—homo modernus. We cannot simply expect our modern condition to change no matter how much we might yearn for this change; and thus, e shall act differently—we shall set to work and eet the 'de a ds of the da ' fo this is the o l e ed to our sense of despair.59 It is in such a spirit of agency that Weber calls for political prophecy and so to Politics as Vocation , we can finally turn. IV. A Weberian Solution to Value-anarchy—The Charismatic Leader Having identified the core discontent at the hea t of ode it i the West as Disenchantment and the disenfranchisement of the normative in the hands of modern science, Weber (in his final years) begins to work out the outlines of a solution, one which he never gets to develop theoretically given his untimely death. He does so primarily in his last set of observations which he presents as part of Politi s as Vo atio . In this lecture, We e de la es, hat "at p ese t" o "fo the ti e ei g" zu d hst lies ahead "of us" (meaning Germans) is a polar night of icy darkness and hardness .60 Yet, far from acquiescing to the state of the modern world, Weber leaves room for change. Even in his relatively early The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, where he first describes the modern o ditio as a “hell of steel , his ie of the futu e, do i ated the Last Ma , is ot uite so despe ate, fo the possi ilit a ises that "e ti el e p ophets ill a ise, o the e ill e a g eat e i th of old ideas a d ideals , e de i g e ha ized pet ifi atio es apa le.61 Contrary to what Nietzschean scholars read in Weber, our miserable fate as the Last Men is not set in stone; things are not rosy in modernity, but there is no sense of an impending disaster in Weber from which we could never recover—just a somber warning. Quite the opposite, Weber has faith that the humankind will in time outlast and transcend modernity and its discontents, breaking free of its spell and its hard Gehäuse. Although Weber admits that toda the outi es of e e da life halle ge eligio and normative belief-systems, he is confident that the perpetual value-struggles are here to stay. To be sure, our values are what make us distinctly human—we are normative creatures. In this fact lies the promise of our salvation from the discontents of modernity. Even now in the modern era, Weber contends, a old gods as e d f o thei g a es; the a e dise ha ted a d he e take the fo of i pe so al fo es , ut still the st i e to gai po er over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with one a othe .62 In fact, Weber is hopeful that with the monistic force of Christianity shattered in the hands of s ie e, ou i ilizatio desti es us to ealize o e lea l these st uggles again, after our eyes have been li ded fo a thousa d ea s ‐‐ li ded the allegedl o p esu a l e lusi e o ie tatio to a ds the g a diose o al fe o of Ch istia ethi s —and create a new Wertrationalitäts giving new dimensions and meaning to human experience.63 Now since science (fostering Disenchantment) brings destruction to the normative while lacking in any regenerative powers in this realm, what becomes paramount to Weber is to salvage and reestablish Weber, Science as Vocation, p.21 Weber, Politics as Vocation, p. translation from Peter Baehr, The )ron Cage and the Shell as (ard as Steel 61 Peter Baehr, the )ron Cage and the Shell as (ard as Steel , p. Weber’s PESC, p.182) 62 Weber, Science as Vocation , p. -16 63 Ibid., p.16 59 60 15 | P a g e the (objective/supra-personal) authority of values and norms in the world. For Weber, this can only be done by means of charisma—the true anathema to science and its befitting nemesis. While Weber is informed by the valid critiques (of modernity) advanced by Nietzsche and Marx, he rejects Nietzs he s solution of radical individualism to his philosophical problematic (Fragestellung) in which individuals create their own norms and live in their own worlds of value as gods64 and Marxian solution of communism to his so io-e o o i problematic as both empirically and practically untrue. Inspired by Hegel, the only realistic—albeit by no means straightforward—solution for Weber involves reinstitution of (the authority of) values and norms at a communal level. The question then is how to in fact achieve this Sittlichkeit? Put si pl , if the e is to e a likelihood al eit sli of esol i g the ode isis—of illuminating and eki dli g the pola ight , Weber leaves the key in ha is ati leade s . In the same way that in the eligious age, the g a diose atio alis of a ethi al a d ethodi al o du t of life that flo s f o e e religious prophecy [dethrones the] polytheism [of values] in favor of the one thing that is needful , i the modern age the it is the charismatic leader, the secular prophet, that can order the value structure of a cultural complex and create the unified set of coherent values that are needful.65 Weber effectively calls on persons of charisma who possess true political Vocation (Beruf) to unite in their person their ethic of Responsibility (as a politician)66 with an ethic of Conviction and absolute ideals. True leaders are just the right blend of ambitious and realistic. Weber describes the charismatic leade ship as the autho it of the e t ao di a , personal gift of grace or charisma, that is, the wholly personal devotion to, and a personal trust in, the revelations, heroism, or other leadership qualities of an individual—this is "charismatic" rule of the kind practiced by prophets or-in the political sphere-the elected warlord or the ruler chosen by popular vote, the great demagogue, and the leaders of political pa ties. 67 I the ha is ati leade , We e u o e s the oot of the idea of [politi al] o atio i its highest fo , fo it is o l he ho t ul li es fo his ause a d st i es to eate his o k . 68One fu da e tal aspe t of ha is ati leade s is that people do not submit to them because of any customs or statutes, but because they believe i the a d thei essage e otio all a d pathologi all . The willingly and devotedly consent to their authority not because of any external factors/ pressures but internally and from within their hearts. It is important to mention that Weber does not argue that demagogues are desirable only that they are the rule rather than exception in the modern state (and the democratic process) and that while they could be a detriment to society (and they often are), they also hold the promise of having salutary effects (specifically those who possess genuine charisma). In many instances, they could emerge as another Cleon, but it is possible that one could become a Pericles, an outcome Weber sees as highly desirable in the modern setting and its value-anarchy. Since the formation of the modern state in Europe, We e states, the de agogue has ee the t pi al politi al leade i the West. The u pleasa t Here Weber would agree with Strauss that this would be the completion of Nihilism Weber, Science as Vocation , p. 66 Weber states, A political leader has a unique ethic of Responsibility that is completely different than the ethic of Responsibility (professional code of conduct) of the (bureaucratic) official who delegates his responsibility to his superior for his actions are always his own responsibility, which he cannot shuffle to someone else. Politics as Vocation , p.54). 67 Weber, Politics as Vocation, p.34 68 Ibid., p.34-35 64 65 16 | P a g e connotations of this word should not obscure the fact that it was not Cleon, but Pericles, who was the first to ea this ea i g. 69 We e is o fide t that as a p a ti al atte , a s e i g uestio s of the value of culture and its individual contents and the question of how one should act in the cultural community and in political asso iatio s a o l e esol ed by means of a demagogue or a secular prophet in the modern world— the t ue ha is ati leade , ho he alls the inwardly hose leade of hu a ki d .7071 They must be de oted to a Cause fo a tio (Sacheliche) themselves and be passionate about their system of values (which if successful they will propagate as a set of substantive rationality). After all, passions and devotions originate in response to values, which are then converted into a calling or a cause worth fighting for, giving meaning to human life. They must also be a true politician, tactful, and strategizing to achieve their noble cause. The leader needs to understand the realities of politics which always involve some use of force and to strategize on the means to his ends considering the consequences of his adopted stratagem; the ethics of Responsibility of the political leader (his professional ethics as a politi ia allo s hi to scrutinize the realities of life ruthlessly, to withstand them and to measure up to them inwardly given his trust in his ethic of Conviction.72 Finally, they ought to have the gift to inspire and move the masses to the tune of their message appealing to their pathos (emotional element) conquering their hearts. Politics in its true Weberian sense is a a ti ity of the head , ut it is just as u h the a ti it of the heart, of authentic passion for a cause.73 For Weber, those are the true conviction politicians, leaders and heroes, who a the sel es ith that staunchness of heart that refuses to be daunted by the ollapse of all thei hopes i the fa e of the hardships of the world.74 This ties i i el ith We e s ie of the asses a d thei p esu ed irrationality. To Weber (given his elevated status as a member of the elite gentlemanly Middle Class Bildungsbiirgertum—the self-appoi ted ustodia s of the Ge a ultu e , the o di a people e e little more than "masses" to be mobilized on behalf of the nation .75 Given the high stakes which had to do with the future of the German nation and its values, Weber could not preoccupy himself with the a e age fate of a o o pe so ; athe , his priorities were above all "aristocratic", concerned with the conditions of excellence [required of a leader], defi itio o l a hie a le the fe f o a o g whom the charismatic leader could emerge to guide the nation and make it whole. 76If these select leade s e e to su eed i thei issio , they would ha e the ha e at e eati g ea i g fo thei people, reendowing their community with a novel constellation of values, restoring a level of substantive rationality for their (cultural) community. Cha is ati autho it , We e tells us, e tails de otio to the specific sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns Ibid., p.54 Weber, Science as Vocation , p.13 71 Weber, Politics as Vocation , p.35 72 Ibid., p.91 73 Ibid., p.91-92 74 Ibid., p.93 75 Baehr, p.367 76 Ibid. 69 70 17 | P a g e o o de e ealed o o dai ed hi , a d so the ha is ati leade i his ordaining quality inherently possesses a generative normative capacity absent from all other sources of authority including science.77 Once the value-systems espoused by ha is ati leade s o e to e e t e hed as a epted o ld ie s o i g to the faith that is pla ed i the pe so of the leade , these su sta ti e atio alities and the "ideas" that legitimate them acquire an autonomous (Eigengesetzliche) power to focus the belief a d a tio o ie tatio s of e ti e populatio s, a d et thei pe petuatio is gua a teed, a o di g to Weber, only when they become institutionalized within legitimate orders and carried by established social st ata hi h a o l happe ia outinization of charisma.78 In order to make lasting the gains of the value-creation that the charismatic leader spawns, he must become a founder-lawgiver. By means of routinization of his charisma, he must internalize his distinctive substantive rationality into the mechanisms of the new state, into its very laws, creating a new substantive order for his community that could outlive him. These value constellations, even though for Weber they are themselves largely manifestations of "irrational" [given that none are universally objective/there is no one true one] …constitute rationally consistent worldviews to which individuals may orient their action in all spheres of life. Whenever these worldviews acquire the social and economic anchorage necessary for their diffusion throughout a civilization [by means of the charismatic leader reordering the collectivity], they lay down the "tracks" (Gleise)—or boundaries—within which the everyday altercations among economic, political, a d othe i te ests take pla e. 79 Of course, this process of reintroduction of meaning into the world must be done at a natiocultural level, for Weber understood that no charismatic leader and no message can be so unqualifiedly universal as to appeal to all (given the inherent language constraints that separate communities if not for other impediment). “o lo g as the leade s p oposed s ste of Value-rationality is believed as true as a matter of faith, it becomes overriding and dominant on his people and thereby objective and rational. Such a leader has therefore broken through the systemic chains of dete i is a d the ode steel Casing to reenchant his community by re-objectivizing value (reconstituting the basis of normative authority). In Hegelian language, by rousing the people through his character and message, the charismatic leader succeeds in founding a Sittlichkeit or an ethical totality (on the account of blind trust of his followers), hence reanimating the objective Spirit (Volkgeist)—his nation. O l a aluerationalizatio p o ess ooted i a ethi al atio alit a lead to the fo atio of at least a [ki d of] incipient worldview in reference to which, irrespective of its particular value content, everyday routines could be qualitatively [and objectively] assessed, fou d a ti g, a d eje ted ithi the f a e o k of a community.80 I te esti gl , this i plies that i We e s ie the a t of eha ilitation and recultivation of su sta ti e ationality i a o u it is al a s ealized if at all ea s of a i atio al p o ess guided by the right kind of charismatic leader: it is accomplished through captivating hearts not minds. It is in his solution to the problematic of modernity—in appealing to a charismatic leader who can inspire and reenchant a nation via his own strong belief/enchantment coupled with agency—that Weber takes a Weber, Economy and Society, p.215 Kalberg, p. 1173 79 Ibid., p.1170 80 Ibid., p.1171 77 78 18 | P a g e page out of the Machiavellian playbook. Here, the Machiavellian theory of agency finds its ultimate development and application. Confirming this outlook Weber asserts, I fi d it i easurably moving when a mature human being—whether young or old in actual years is immaterial—who feels the responsibility he bears for the consequences of his own actions with his entire soul and who acts in harmony with an ethics of Responsibility reaches the point where he says, "Here I stand, I can do no other. That is authentically human and cannot fail to move us…I this se se a ethi s of Co i tio a d a ethi s of ‘esponsibility are not absolute antitheses but are mutually complementary, and only when taken together do they constitute the authe ti hu a ei g ho is apa le of ha i g a " o atio fo politi s". 81 Viewed i this light, it e o es e ide t that to We e Cultu e se es as the a as o hi h hu a ei gs o fe ea i g a d sig ifi a e .82 Weber understood that it is up to us to be the artists and creators, and in the process of creation enrich and unify the human experience giving it context and a th. This of ou se e ui es o ou pa t a deli e ate “ta e “tellu g to a ds the o ld and its realities: we cannot be mere bystanders. 83And so finally, in a profound statement that truly echoes Machiavelli and his theory of agency, Weber writes, Politics means a slow, powerful drilling through hard boards, with a mixture of passion and a sense of proportion. It is absolutely true, and our entire historical experience confirms it, that what is possible could never have been achieved unless people had tried again and again to achieve the impossible in this world. But the man who can do this must be a leader, and not only that, he must also be a hero-i a e lite al se se… The o l a ho has a " o atio " fo politi s is one who is certain that his spirit will not be broken if the world, when looked at from his point of view, proves too stupid or base to accept what he wishes to offer it, and who, when faced with all that o du a , a still sa "Ne e theless!" despite e e thi g I will try.84 Conclusion I i t odu i g i o ati e o epts su h as the steel Enclosure / Shell hard as steel , Disenchantment, and Rationalization, We e s ai p oje t is to e-substantiate the world and its valuerationalities freeing it of the kind of incessant value-subjectivism, relativism, and value-neutrality (Wertfreiheit) characteristic of the modern period, which Weber correctly inferred will induce meaninglessness. We e s u ti el death ea t that he did ot s ste ati all o ohe e tl esol e the p o le s u foldi g f o his o o it e t to ode atio alis . 85 Yet, looking back at the two latest articulation of his standpoint before his passing in “ ie e as Vo atio a d Politi s as Vo atio (which qualify as his final commentaries) demonstrates that he was beginning to answer the many questions he lays out in his earlier works, particularly The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Having empirically de oded the p o ess of atio alizatio displa e e t i his ge ealogi al a ou t of ode it s ise i the West, I elie e We e s p oje t to a d the e d of his life as to forecast a practical Weber, Politics as Vocation , p. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, transl. E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch (1949), p.81 83 Ibid. 84 Weber, Politics as Vocation , p.93-94 85 William h. Swatos Jr., Revolution and Charisma in a Rationalized World in Max Weber’s Political Sociology, p.210 81 82 19 | P a g e means of recovering the lost authority of Value-rational substantive ethical life (the instigator of modernity) that had itself dissipated in the process of ode it s crystallization. He aimed to reclaim a conscience for modernity. This is the grounds for the modern vocation of a politi al leade —to relegitimize the normative sphere, to recalibrate and restandardize the world by means of propagating anew systems of substantive Value-rationality, and in process reintroduce meaning back into the way of life of individuals in a community. It is i de iphe i g the t ue i pli atio of We e s twin speeches that Machiavelli can be of particular assistance, fo I elie e We e s fi al o lusio s assu e a po e ful Ma hia ellia spi it, particula l i We e s ha pio i g of the ideas of agency and voluntarism in the face of the cold deterministic world shaped by the forces of instrumental rationalism. In many ways, Weber offers a Hegelian solution (to recover the normative via establishment of a Sittlichkeit) to the Nietzschean problem of emptiness and nihilism and Marxian problem of instrumentalism using an inventive twist on the Machiavellian approach—the charismatic vocational politician of conviction. At the same time, the entire project echoes a mindful critique of Kant and the Enlightenment. Max Weber and Niccolo Machiavelli are two great thinkers in the intellectual history of the West, writing in response to entirely different Zeitgeists. Their thought is informed by different crises and historical moments of great transition. They are alarmed by the condition of their particular times: Machiavelli is reacting to the Renaissance—the time of a new beginning and incredible change for Europe, while Max Weber is seeking a genealogy to the upheavals that defined his ode e iste e—as a social scientist, his project aspires to describe the phenomenology of modernity. And yet, despite these contextual differences, in many ways these two thinkers draw similar conclusions about the nature of politi s a d its o atio . Weber and Machiavelli are both identified with espousing doctrines of political realism. Yet, careful analysis of these two thinkers paints a more complicated picture showing this realism to be embedded in a powerful sense of idealism; put differently, it is idealism achieved by practical, pragmatic means. Both the prince and the charismatic leader must be motivated by an ethics of Conviction—a set of ultimate ends—(whether that is to unify Italy or reinstitute normative authority over a community) to become agreeable to the two thinkers. I this light, We e e e ges as a Ma hia ellia thinker in his understanding of political realism, one that appreciates that politi s ust e contextualized to acquire any meaning or substance (without this contextual dimension politics degenerates into a formal machine ). As such, I have alluded that both Machiavelli and Weber advance the notion of Realist-Idealism which could be subject to further study. Machiavelli and Weber are reacting to different social/historical conditions but their approach to solving the tensions inherent in their Zeitgeists and their solutions are the same—their hope lies in the rise of the charismatic leader with the correct blend of convictio a d politi al o atio . While Machiavellian narrative is much more historical and indeed political, Weberian account is much more sociological and even philosophical. After all, Machiavelli is mostly concerned with the fate of Italy (the Particular), while Weber dreads the future of ode West (the Universal). As a ulk of We e s ea lie iti gs a e de oted to e pli ati g a d describing the harsh realities of modernity and the causal chain of events (determinism) that propagated them, Weber presents a sociological account of the phenomenon of rationalization as a systemic condition endemic to modernity (as it has unfolded in the West). Machiavelli, however, never goes as far as offering a s ste atized so iologi al a ou t of Ital s ail e ts. No etheless, both Machiavelli and Weber 20 | P a g e depend on the transformative power of the Vocational politician as a savior-law-giver-founder, revolutionizing the status quo and bringing about a new order. Thus, as this paper hopes to have shown, there is a certain degree of optimism in Weber waiting to be released. Lastly, there is a secondary aspect to the Weberian prognosis that must be highlighted. Given the value-anarchy that characterizes the modern West in the Weberian paradigm and the fact that many demagogic leaders turn out to be a Cleon rather than a Pericles, Weber recognizes that in many cases the charismatic leader in his value-creation for the community can come to have a harmful rather than a salutary effect. In this respect, the substantive Value-rationalities end up unraveling into ideologies so characteristic of the 20th century. Weber never lived to see the 20th century in all its outrage, but his thought anticipates the mass appeal of ideology (especially as a tool for mass mobilization) and the various politi al is s satu ati g the world in modernity (Communism, Nazism, Maoism, and Islamism to name just a few). It is obvious that the more the old value-horizons were discredited, the human need for high ideals and absolute commitments became even more deprived and thus even more inclined to create new values (some even dreadful). Indeed, as traditional value systems recede under the weight of the totalizing condition of life in the West that is modernity (itself having become a kind of ideology) fostering meaninglessness, manufactured value-systems—in the form of comprehensive totalistic ideologies— arise to inherit the mantle of Significization (Sinnzusammenhang=coherent system of meaning). Yet, it is i po ta t to e e e that as a so ial s ie tist , We e heeded his o ad i e a d de oted hi self only to empirical description of events as they are (or he anticipated will come to be) without offering his own personal stance. Nonetheless, if we accept the Weberian framework, then it becomes awfully clear that given the entrenched determinism of the modern world, our only hope for reestablishing the authority of norms and values and so resubstantiate our cosmos remains the charismatic leader, precisely as Weber expected. Weber never discounted the negative side of the charismatic leader, yet it would bode well for us to remember that for every Hitler, there was a Gandhi and for every Stalin, a Mandela. 21 | P a g e