Maritime supply chain security: A critical review

Maritime Supply Chain Security: A Critical Review Michele Acciaro1,* and Patrizia Serra 1,2 1 Dept. of Logistics, The Kühne Logistics University, Hamburg, Germany 2 University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy Abstract The importance of container security for international trade is well established and has been the subject of recent research in the follow up of the implementation of global security initiatives and the imperative of avoiding supply chain disruptions and reduce vulnerability. This article provides a review of the emerging literature on container security specifically in its interface with global logistics systems. The paper highlights the topics that have emerged as well-established research areas and indicates in what areas scholarly attention is most needed. Keywords: Container Security; Supply Chain Security; Container Transportation. 1. Introduction Container transportation is the backbone of globalization and international trade and has allowed countries and firms to improve efficiency and reliability of their supply chains. The development of the container has been the critical innovation responding to the requirements of a globalized world, as shown by the average double-digit growth rates of container transportation in the last half century. The development of containerization has allowed for increases in loading and unloading efficiency unimaginable before. As container transportation increased and became more global, supply chains became more dependent on the box, with industrial processes deeply entwined with the global supply chain management strategies necessary to production and delivery of goods to markets worldwide. The benefits of such development are undeniable, but the dependence of modern industrial production to global supply chains has inadvertently exposed the world economy to a new source of risk: container supply chain vulnerability. While on the one side the development of container transport has substantially reduced the risks of cargo damage and pilferage, which had been the predicament of transportation providers and cargo owners for centuries, on the other side, the resulting international nature of global supply chains as well as the relative lack of visibility of chains worldwide, has exposed container transport, and consequently supply chains, to the most diverse threats. Contraband, smuggling of people and weapons, terrorist attacks and piracy are all too well-known criminal activities that can cause disruptions and costs increases in container-dependent transport chains. The very nature of globalized container transportation, with container boxes transiting the most remote corners of the world and the necessary reliance of logistics service providers on agents and operators often beyond the direct control of the cargo interest, have allowed criminal and terrorist organisations to interfere with container supply chains and make use of the world transport for malicious endeavours. Organisations and governments have responded with policies and practices aiming at reducing the exposure of supply chains to voluntary acts of breach and intentional chain disruptions. The application of policies, procedures and technologies aiming at reducing such exposure and at protecting, people, goods, facilities and * Corresponding author. Address: Brooktorkai 20, 20459, Hamburg, Germany; e-mail: [email protected]; telephone. +49 40 328707281; fax +49 40 328707209. 1 equipment in the chain, as well as preventing malicious interferences on the normal flow of goods and information with the objective of allowing contraband or theft, are referred to as supply chain security (SCS) (Closs & McGarrell, 2004). Ensuring security of maritime supply chains is critical to international trade (Closs & McGarrell, 2004). Although SCS is a rather developed area of research (Williams, Lueg, & LeMay, 2008), fewer studies have focused so far on maritime and container SCS (Barnes & Oloruntoba, 2005; Marlow, 2010; C. Yang & Wei, 2013). Container shipping and maritime security can be defined as “those measures employed by owners, operators, and administrators of vessels, port facilities, offshore installations, and other marine organizations or establishments to protect against seizure, sabotage, piracy, pilferage, annoyance, or surprise” (Hawkes, 1989: pg.9). Nation State and firm responses to the increasing threats associated with global chains have been diverse and multifaceted, and only after the events of 9/11 has the global approach to SCS, somewhat under the stimulus of the USA foreign policy, been characterised by a renewed and coordinated international efforts. The results of such efforts have been controversial, and it is beyond the scope of this manuscript to review the global order approaches that have influenced international relations in the last decade and a half, nor, for that matter, to express any judgement on the success of such approaches in defeating terrorism or reducing supply chain vulnerability and disruptions. What can though be assessed is that such policies have stimulated global and interdisciplinary discourses on the importance of supply chain vulnerability and disruptions, and contributed defining SCS as an autonomous area of academic investigation in the broader domain of supply chain risk management. The academic literature in the last fifteen years has highlighted the benefits of container security and a distinctive amount of analyses have been developed with the purpose of facilitating SCS initiatives, assess current practices and provide policy makers and the industry with scientific support on the elaboration of new security strategies. The area of container security is a dynamic and evolving discipline, shaped equally but governmental efforts to reduce security threats and industry practices to minimize security breaches costs and ultimately maintain or enhance the competitive position of the firm. The multifaceted nature of supply chain security entails that the literature is often fragmented and it is challenging to identify clear research developments and trends (Williams, Lueg, & LeMay, 2008). Hence, a continuous effort to update and refine the frameworks and structures developed is imperative, and even more so for those research areas that are emerging and interdisciplinary in nature as SCS. Furthermore, the SCS literature had only recently started to focus in container transportation. Considering the pivotal role that container transportation has on global production systems, it has been recommended more attention be dedicated to this area. This paper contribution to the existing discourses on SCS is two-folds. Firstly, it reviews supply chain security literature from the specific perspective of container security, highlighting the specificities of container transport with respect to SCS literature. This is important given the critical role that container transportation plays in the supply chain process (Closs & McGarrell, 2004; C. Yang & Wei, 2013). Secondly, by focusing on the literature of the last five years this review highlights how the conceptual structures and frameworks elaborated in the literature respond to the new developments in the discipline. Testing and reviewing conceptual and empirical frameworks is particularly important in container SCS, considering the dynamically evolving and often elusive nature of the discipline. This review is structured in the six sections. This introduction provides the background for the analysis and highlights why a literature review in container SCS is expedient. Section two outlines the process and the overall structure used for the review. Section three focuses on the analysis of the antecedents to container SCS. Section four analysis the policy, practice and technological developments that have characterised the enhancement of container SCS in the last half decade. Section five reviews the organisation and process frameworks that have been used for maritime SCS. Section six reviews those contributions that have addressed the major outcomes to SCS. And finally section six summarises the major findings of the paper and indicates the areas where scholarly attention is most recommended. 2 2. Literature review structure The SCS has increased substantially in the last decade and a half and has advanced the knowledge of SCS in multiple directions, but no specific attention has been dedicated to container SCS. In the search for a suitable container SCS security we have therefore looked at the recent SCS reviews and supply chain risk management. Previous literature reviews, such as Williams et al. (2008), Gould et al. (2010), and more recently Colicchia & Strozzi (2012) have employed different methods to summarise the existing literature. Williams et al. (2008) was one of the first papers to carry out a comprehensive and systematic literature review on SCS. They categorise SCS literature in four perspectives:     An intraorganisational perspective An interorganisational perspective A combination of both perspectives An approach, that deliberately ignores security as an issue. Intraorganisational approaches look at the supply chain from a single company perspective, presenting conceptual and practical approaches to prevention and response. Interorganisational approaches highlight the fact that supply chains are rarely managed within a single organisation and require the cooperation of multiple external parties, including governments. Some authors have highlighted the necessity to combine both approaches to reach SCS, and others pointed out the fact that some firm may reject taking any proactive attitude towards SCS, which are perceived to be ineffective and too expensive. Gould et al. (2010) approach the review systematically but from a thematic point of view, subdividing the existing literature around three main research areas:    SC efficiency despite security requirements Dealing with security risks in supply chains Improving response to a security event. They also provide a review of the definition of the concept of SCS and argue that operationalization in SCS is among the least developed areas in the literature. Colicchia & Strozzi (2012) approach the literature review combining a systematic review with a citation network analysis. Although the authors focus on the broader area of supply chain risk management, their findings are interesting in relation to the SCS literature, which is a subset of the supply chain risk management literature. They structure their systematic supply chain risk management literature using the approach illustrated by Denyer & Tranfield (2009) that consists of four categories: context (C), intervention (I), mechanism (M) and Outcome (O), from the acronym of which it takes its name (CIMO). The resulting structure of supply chain risk management literature is articulated according to Colicchia & Strozzi (2012) in four main research areas: complexity and uncertainty (context), practice and tools for supply chain risk management (intervention), organisation of supply chain risk management process (mechanisms), and increased supply chain resilience and robustness (outcomes). A similar approach has been used in this manuscript for the categorisation of container SCS. The structure used in this literature review is:     Vulnerability and potential for disruptions Policy, practices and technologies Organisation and processes Outcomes 3 In the case of container SCS the context is provided by the vulnerability and potential for disruptions of container supply chains because of increasing global container movement threats, mostly as a result of terrorism and piracy. The intervention category groups the literature that addresses practices, policies and technologies developed to enhance container SCS. The literature that focuses on how container SCS is likely to affect organisations and how organisations interact with each other, has been grouped under mechanisms. Under outcomes we collected the research contributions that investigate the possible outcomes of container SCS practices, such as decrease in vulnerability and disruptions but also cost increases. 3. Vulnerability and potential for disruptions 3.1. Increasing vulnerability In recent years, globalization and growth in seaborne trade have increased the vulnerability of supply chains to a series of international criminal activities that threaten the global movement of goods and may have significant impacts on economic activity and world trade. Piracy, people and drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, information security and, after the events of 11 September 2001, terrorism are all recognized as threats for supply chain security (see, among others, Closs & McGarrell, 2004; Lu, Chang, Hsu, & Metaparti, 2010; Thai, 2009; Van de Voort & O'Brien, 2003). A brief synthesis of literature related to threats in maritime supply chain is provided in this section, divided into two main areas dealing with piracy and terrorism. 3.1.1. Piracy and maritime robbery Maritime piracy is defined by the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea as “any criminal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship that is directed on the high seas against another ship, or against people or property on board a ship”. Although this definition is recognized in international law and accepted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), several authors argued that it is inadequate, limiting the offence to the high seas (Bendall, 2010; Dillon, 2005; Marlow, 2010). In order to overcome the distinctions between high seas and territorial waters, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has provided a wider definition of piracy which includes maritime crimes in territorial waters but which is not recognized in international law. Even if it is generally accepted that factors inspiring piracy have their origin in economic reasons (Talley, 2008), recently a nexus between piracy and terrorism, where pirates are also terrorist with ideological reasons, has been established (Bird, Blomberg & Hess, 2008; Fawcett, 2010; Garmon, 2002). Data on piracy events are usually available from reports provided by maritime organizations (e.g. IMO and IMB), however these statistics should be read with care because many events result unreported. In fact, many shipping companies prefer to cover any losses out of their own resources rather than report the event and suffer delays and additional insurance cost (Marlow, 2010) and often there is no discrimination between major and minor attacks (Bateman, 2010; Chalk, 2009; Fawcett, 2010). These reports, however, show that undoubtedly acts of piracy are increasing in the last years and the most pirate-ridden area at this time are the coast of East Africa, the Gulf of Aden and nearby waters of the Indian Ocean (Axe, 2009; Fawcett, 2010; Hanson, 2009; Middleton, 2009; Murphy, 2010; Schiemsky, 2009; Waldron &Kimball, 2008; Wilson, 2009). The hotspot for piracy and maritime robbery has shifted from Indonesia to Somalia, but there has also been a worrying increase in the number of pirate attacks in the southern part of the South China Sea (Chow, 2009). Literature dedicated to maritime piracy includes mainly legal review (see, among the most recent, Hong et al., 2010; Kraska & Wilson, 2009) and descriptive studies (see, among others, Bateman, 2009; Bateman, 2010; Fawcett, 2010; He, 2009; Ho, 2009; Murphy, 2010; Nakamura, 2009; Onuoha, 2009; Shih et al., 2010). These studies analyse the problem of maritime piracy and in many cases suggest measures for abating or containing it. Improved governance onshore, improvement of local security forces, cooperation between foreign navies engaged on counter-piracy operations and maritime law enforcement are among the most cited security measures proposed. 4 A limited number of studies deals with analysis aimed at investigating the economic effects of piracy. Mejia et al. (2009) perform an econometrical analysis identifying the types of vessels most likely being attacked by modern pirates. Whereas (Bendall, 2010; Fu et al., 2010; Van der Meijden, 2008) investigate the impact of maritime piracy on supply chains due to the re-routing of liner service in the attempt to avoid areas with high piracy-risk, their findings highlight that even from a pure economic point of view, more efforts should be dedicated by International authorities to contain the piracy problem. 3.1.2. Terrorism Maritime terrorism is defined as “…the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities” (CSCAP - Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific). Marlow (2010) expands this definition to include the use of the maritime sector to smuggle terrorist materials or personnel into a country. Several authors observe that attacks aimed at disturbing the container supply chain have the potential of creating global chaos in that supply chain (Anderson, 2002; Chang, Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008), but are less likely to inflict a high number of casualties (Van de Voort & O'Brien, 2003). On the basis of this consideration, Van de Voort & O'Brien (2003) propose a clear distinction in threat analysis between terrorists who want to target the maritime sector and terrorist who use the maritime sector to import/export terrorism, stating that threats are fundamentally different and require different solutions. Even if maritime history reports terrorist activities prior to 2001, it is only after the events of 11 September 2001 that the awareness of terrorist actions has undoubtedly risen (Sheffi, 2001). In fact, the first phase after the 9/11 was characterized by heightened security threat perception (Metaparti, 2010) during which several regulatory measures (Bichou et al., 2007; Hintsa et al., 2009; Yang, 2010; Yang, 2011;) have been quickly introduced with the aim of enhancing maritime security. However, in some cases, the quick adoption prevented a complete examination of threats and responses resulting in security gaps (Marlow, 2010; Metaparti, 2010). Several studies state that security measures required by regulations should be determined only after appropriate risk assessment evaluations and economic considerations: any measures which cost more than resulting benefits should be discarded (Gkonis & Psaraftis, 2010; Marlow, 2010; Prentice, 2008). 4. Policy, practices and technologies 4.1. Policy In the second half of the 20th century maritime security regulation has been moved to the top of the policy agenda. The need for increasing security measures in the maritime sector is founded on its high degree of vulnerability and in its crucial role for international trade: any disruption of the maritime supply chain could have drastic effects for the global economy. Since September 2001 governments, international organizations, customs and private firms have undertaken multiple types of responses and actions to enhance supply chain security (World Bank, 2009). Several studies provide a summary of existing initiatives, divided into voluntary programs and mandatory regulations (Hintsa et al., 2009) or distinguishing among international security measures (e.g. International Ship and Port facility Security - ISPS code, International Maritime Organization – IMO code, International Labour Organization – ILO code, World Customs Organization framework, etc.), National initiatives (e.g. Container Security Initiative - CSI, 24-hour Rule, Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism C-TPAT, etc.) and Industry programs (e.g. ISO initiatives) (see, among others, Bichou et al., 2007; Marlow, 2010; Metaparti, 2010; Yang 2010, 2011). A detailed review of security initiatives is provided by UNCTAD (2004) and OECD (2004). The urgency of reinforcing security regulations has lead to a confused regulatory framework characterized by many initiatives not always coordinated and not derived from a process of negotiation and coordination 5 among the multiple players involved (Helmick, 2008; Papa, 2013). This great variety of initiatives has been justified by the need to establish a multi-layer regulatory system in the attempt to fill potential security gaps (Flynn & Flynn, 2004; Willis & Ortiz, 2004), however, a closer analysis of the concrete security measures show that there are several areas in which they overlap or at least are interconnected (Bichou, 2008; Helmick, 2008; Hintsa et al., 2009; Metaparti, 2010; Papa, 2013). (Hintsa et al. 2009; Metaparti, 2010) in their studies state that a gap exists between theoretical supply chain security studies, emerging security standards and practical actions. Several solutions are proposed to overcome this gap. The academic community may overcome this gap via pragmatic case studies within real world supply chains (Hintsa et al., 2009). Whereas according to Metaparti (2010) this gap may be overcome reducing excessive bureaucratization, increasing International cooperation and making security integral to other activities of business. Currently, the features of the maritime security policies vary from country to country. For example, (Papa, 2013) analyses the United States and the European Union approaches on maritime security observing that while US have adopted a series of initiatives aimed at ensuring internal security, Europe Union is more oriented towards a strategy aiming at balancing security needs with the minimization of their negative impacts. An analysis of European policies in maritime security is given also in Pallis & Vaggelas (2007). The fragmented initiatives taken until now are not suitable with the internationalized nature of maritime sector and encourage the creation of an overregulated and bureaucratic scheme. The possibility in the future of identifying a competent international organization which could act as regulatory authority for maritime security at international level may allow to overcome the limits of the current fragmented regulatory framework (Allen, 2008; Papa, 2013). 4.2. Best practices and existing models Although many studies have focused on supply chain security (Banomyong, 2005; Yang, 2011), relatively few have empirically investigated the effect of supply chain security initiatives on supply chain performance and the relationship between security management and operating performance (Bennett & Chin, 2008; Yang & Wey, 2013; Voss et al., 2009). Among the most recent, Yang & Wey (2013) have focused on the effect of security management on security performance in the container shipping sector in Taiwan, empirically identifying crucial security management factors and examining their effect on security performance. In fact, although several security initiatives had been introduced during the past years, currently there is little empirical evidence about their impacts for the companies that have implemented them. Among the few works available in this regard we can cite (Gutierrez et al., 2007; Gutierrez et al., 2006; Martens et al., 2011; Talley & Lun, 2012; Yang, 2010, 2011). Gutierrez et al. (2007; 2006) analyse the impact generated by BASC (Business Alliance for Security Commerce), a private voluntary security programme created in Latin America, for the companies that have implemented it. Authors, through a questionnaire survey answered by BASC member companies, identify which supply chain security standards have been implemented by BASC companies, detect the most and the least efficient security measures implemented and provide a qualitative analysis of the cost and effectiveness of security measures implemented. Talley & Lun (2012) investigate the effect of security inspections on the quality of the port’s interchange services and, through an empirical analysis based on a e-questionnaire, find that an increase in security measures can also result in improvements in the quality of container port interchange service. Yang (2010, 2011) investigates through an empirical evaluation, based on data collected by questionnaire survey and a risk management matrix, the impact of risk factors from the Container Security Initiatives on Taiwan’s shipping industry and provide several risk management alternatives for shipping industry. Whereas Martens et al. (2011) use multiple regression analysis to investigate the antecedents to supply chain effectiveness. Another area of empirical studies in maritime security is represented by works that propose management framework with the aim of ensuring at the same time operating efficiency and compliance with regulations (Bichou et al., 2007a-b; Bichou & Evans, 2007; Bichou, 2004; Thai, 2009). Bichou et al., (2007a-b) propose a 6 conceptual framework for managing quality in the context of maritime security regulations and state that current regulatory requirements can be implemented in line with the principles of quality management, satisfying at the same time legal requirements and operational aims. Specifically, they discuss the application with a shipping company of a 10-step conceptual quality management framework to implement the 24-hour Advance Vessel Manifest Rule. Bichou (2004) proposes a conceptual framework to port security integrating and optimizing three initial models relating, respectively, to channel design and process mapping, risk assessment and management, and cost control and performance monitoring. Thai (2009) investigates how to enhance security while not putting at risk organizational efficiency and effectiveness and proposes a conceptual model of effective maritime security, including 13 dimensions and 24 associated critical success factors. The author suggests that managers can use the model to develop a checklist of essential components for their company’s security management policies. These empirical studies may represent a roadmap for the future of maritime sector to formulate quality standards so that the requirements of both regulators and customers can be equally satisfied. 4.3. Technologies Considering the costs and complexity associated with increasing maritime security, it is to be expected that efforts have been made to reduce such costs by means of new technologies. SCS technologies can be subdivided on the basis of the purposes that such technologies have and can be grouped in monitoring, prevention and forecasting. Monitoring technologies are those aiming at increasing the visibility of the chain or at the facilities and at reducing thereby the risk of malicious interference with the cargo or at certain facilities. Typical examples of monitoring technologies are cameras and RFID tags. A large amount of literature has emerged on the effectiveness of RFID tagging (Sarac, Absi, & Dauzère-Pérès, 2010) or have focused on the benefits of such technology (e.g. Chin & Wu, 2004; Huang, Lee, & Gong, 2012; Rizzo, Barboni, Faggion, Azzalin, & Sironi, 2011; Roberti, 2005) Prevention technologies can be used to prevent interference with the chain and ensure full visibility of the various parties involved. RFID has also such function, but in this are we can include fencing and data management technologies. Container scanning by means of x-rays, gamma ray, and pulsed neutron scanners is now available (Frankel, 2005). Seals have also become a valuable aid in preventing interference with the container. But, as noted by Frankel (2005), “The principal container security issue is: what has been loaded into the container? not what does someone say was loaded in the container, and not whether the seal on the container is intact.” Frankel recommends the use of technologies that allow, without opening the container, to inspect its contents, as the nature itself of the container, that is not used on closed or dedicated services does not allow any other form of reliable security technology to be particularly effective. Apart from the evident benefits of better insight on what the contents of containers are, a combination of various systems might in the end be the most appropriate solution, and indeed, container security technologies are moving towards a combination of various systems employed simultaneously. The literature seems to advise for intelligent container seals, or pre-scanning, that allow identifying suspicious containers, that can be then scanned, non intrusively with x-rays or gamma-rays, or opened if necessary (Bakshi, Flynn, & Gans, 2011; Frankel, 2005). One of the main issues related to inspections is the inefficiency deriving from the necessary limited capacity of scanners and inspectors (Bichou, 2004; Kumar & Vellenga, 2004; Yeo, Pak, & Yang, 2013). Acceptance of security measures is also important but only a handful of research contributions addressed such issue (Chao & Lin 2009). 7 Among the forecasting technologies this review considers the various methods that are used to assess the impacts of supply chain disruptions. This area of research overlaps with the models developed to maximise supply chain performance by means of simulation or other OR techniques. Without broadening the scope of the review too much it is worth mention the book by Bichou, Bell & Evans (2007) where various contributions investigate by means of forecasting and simulation the impacts of various approaches to assess resilience of networks. 5. Organisation and processes Several studies have focused on the organisational and managerial aspects relevant for maritime SCS. The focus of this section is to highlight the mechanisms that allow certain practices to be successful in terms of increasing maritime SCS. In order to structure such analysis we proceed by discussing the mechanisms that have focused on the individual components of the maritime chain and then on those that have focused on the complete supply chain. As far as the specific maritime supply chain components we will limit the review to the literature on ports, the shipping segment and the interfaces with hinterland transport and logistics systems, such as rail, road and inland waterways. When looking at the complete maritime supply chain we will follow the approach of Williams et al. (2008) and consider the intraorganisation, interoganization and combined perspective. 5.1. Security of single maritime supply chain components Yang & Wei (2013) distinguish between separate risk elements in container supply chains, namely: cargo, vessels, ports, people, information and financing. As discussed in the previous section, existing security initiatives, such as ISPS and the C-TPAT have different focus areas and aim at addressing security concerns arising from various risk elements. Some of these interventions focus on the cargo, while other on the port or the vessel. Most of the literature surveyed focused on chain mechanisms but does not discuss in detail how the initiatives will impact the individual risk elements. Frankel (2005) reviews the developments of maritime supply chain security highlighting the importance of technology and the impacts of various initiatives on tightening maritime supply chain security. Several contributions have addressed maritime security mechanisms that impact trade, although the focus has been mostly on US led initiatives, such as the container security initiative (CSI) discussed above. Other studies (Bichou & Evans, 2007) have focused on shipping and in particular vessel network resilience for supply chain security risks reduction. These studies though appear more applications of simulation or network analysis, where the security issues are only instrumental to show the value of the network simulation models. As far as ports are concerned Yang (2010) illustrates how the ISPS code impacts the Keelung Port in Taiwan. Lirn & Whang (2010) focus on the Kaoshung port also in Taiwan. Bakshi et al. (2011) analyse the impact of alternative scanning procedures in terms of congestion in two large container ports, highlighting that, while full 100% scanning will not be feasible, a combination of pre-scanning with more detailed inspections would reduce the costs and inefficiencies deriving from congestion. Bichou (2011) analyses a panel of 470 container terminals and observes that security impacts on operational efficiency, although the relevance of such effects depends substantially on the type of regulation and terminal. There is evidence though that targeted inspections focusing only on those containers that appear suspicious as a result of cargo pre-screening would greatly benefit the efficiency and effectiveness of security operations in port. A large part of the literature (Lewis, Erera, & White, 2003; Y. Yang, 2010; Yeo, Pak, & Yang, 2013) has focused on optimization of port and terminal links under security threats or with the objective of assessing the resilience of the system. Very few papers have focused on the links between port and maritime security and the hinterland transportation networks (Schilk, Blumel, Recagno, & Boevé, 2007). Schilk et al. (2007) highlight how security at a chain level for European transport requires further work both in terms of the policy and organisational concepts. They argue that while for the maritime segment, including ports, policy and practices are well underway, for hinterland transportation little directions exist with reference to hinterland 8 transportation (road, rail and inland waterways) and recommend the development of innovative security strategies and concepts combining maritime with hinterland transport to crate seamless security processes. Some studies have also assessed data information requirements for security such as Chao & Lin (2009), highlighting how security perception affects the adoption of new technologies. This area, though, still require further analysis. 5.2. Security mechanisms at a supply chain level As mentioned in the introduction, extensive literature has emerged in the area of SCS (Williams, Lueg, & LeMay, 2008), but not in particular on maritime supply chains (Yang & Wei, 2013; Frankel, 2005). Following Williams et al. (2008) in the case of maritime supply chains we can use three perspectives; the intraoriganisational perspective, focuses on the mechanisms that can be used by SCS within an organisation, with respect to those organisational functions such as marketing, purchasing and distribution. A supply chain security orientation is considered important for successful security practices (Autry & Bobbitt, 2008), and this includes information exchanges with external partners (Russell & Saldanha, 2003). These approaches tend to focus on prevention and response measures that can be adopted within an organisation. Considering that the maritime supply chain typically require the involvement of several parties, an intraorganisational perspective to maritime supply chain security appears insufficient. Sheffi (2001) suggest that leveraging relationships with suppliers and governmental agencies is necessary to improve SCS and supply chain continuity. Several authors suggest that these partnerships should include governmental agencies as well as private firms (Prokop, 2012; Russell & Saldanha, 2003; Sheffi, 2001). As supply chains have become more integrated they have shifted from exclusively intraorganizational coordination to coordination with other external organizations involved in the flow of product, information, and finances from raw material to end consumer. It would be valuable to investigate whether security initiatives are better handled by integrated ocean carriers, non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCC), or freight forwarders. An increasing role of SCS could at least in theory favour integrated carriers. In a recent review (Gould, Macharis, & Haasis, 2010), four main mechanisms are identified for dealing strategically and operationally with SCS issues, specifically terrorisms, and impacts and costs of compliance. Firstly, communications among suppliers appear to be critical (Autry & Bobbitt, 2008), which is also beneficial in improving information sharing among supply chain partners (Peleg-Gillai, Bhat, & Sept, 2006). A second strategy involves the development of a framework for security based on adherence to regulation (Gould, Macharis, & Haasis, 2010), and includes QM approaches (Bichou, Lai, Lun, & Cheng, 2007a; Bichou, Lai, Lun, & Cheng, 2007b; Lee & Whang, 2005). A third strategy entails a reorganization of logistics operations and warehousing to reduce dependence on overseas sourcing, but also securing alternative suppliers and increasing inventories (Sheffi, 2001). Ensuring that alternative transport modes are available is one of the suggestions made by Russell and Saldanha (2003). A fourth strategy refers to the development of mitigation measures to build up flexibility and resilience. Flexibility is often traded off for efficiency gains, e.g. by reducing inventories, but it can be maintained if alternative avenues are available to perform business and processes, transportation and access distribution facilities (Autry & Bobbitt, 2008; Russell & Saldanha, 2003). Resilience on the other hand is the ability of a system to recover after a disruption or a security incident, or in other words as the ability of the supply chain to return to normal standards of operations following a failure in one or more of its components (Willis & Ortiz, 2004). 9 6. Outcomes 6.1. Costs and benefits Is fairly well known that implementing security measures may lead to extra costs and delays and result in potential liabilities (Chang, Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008; Kumar & Vellenga, 2004). Several attempts have been made to calculate the cost impacts and financial implications of the introduction of new security regulations. For example, a summary of ISPS cost estimates as calculated by various regulatory risk assessment tools is reported in Bichou & Evans (2007). HPC (2010) provides an evaluation of the impact of additional terminal operations required for 100% scanning of containers in terms of investments and operation costs necessary to perform the additional terminal operations. Whereas the results of a global study based on a questionnairesurvey conducted by UNCTAD (2007) in the attempt to acquire a better understanding of economic implications of security measures are presented in Benamara & Asariotis (2007). Quantify the economic impact of maritime security measures is difficult and subjects involved are traditionally reluctant in sharing sensitive information. Brooks & Button (2006) in their work try, through interviews with cargo operators, to investigate the economic impacts of security regulations from a cargo interest perspective. Banomyong (2005) explores some of the financing implications of the security initiative, distinguishing two possible sources for financing container security initiatives: payment by users and public sources. 6.2. Security as a source of competitive advantage One of the most relevant outcomes of maritime security is that it can contribute to generate competitive advantage. Although so far most firms have seen security as a cost element, mostly as a result of the focus on direct expenses following security initiatives (Peleg-Gillai, Bhat, & Sept, 2006), there is increasing evidence that collateral benefits can be obtained through maritime SCS. Among these, Peleg-Gillai et al. (2006) indicate:  Higher supply chain visibility;  Improved supply chain efficiency;  Better customer satisfaction;  Improved inventory management;  Reduced cycle time and shipping time; and  Cost reduction following the above-mentioned collateral benefits. If looked in this sense, then supply chain investment contributes then positively to the competitive position of the firm and is not only a cost. In the specific case of maritime transport, voluntary logistics security programs, such as C-TPAT, by improving collaboration among logistics service providers, shippers and carriers can bring substantial improvements to the chain. Maritime supply chain security can be then interpreted as a parameter of quality of service, and take advantage of the concepts developed in the “total supply chain” approach (Sheu et al., 2006). This change in perspective is particularly important as a supply chain that is based on strong relationships will be the supply chain that is more likely to be effective, efficient, and relevant (Bowersox et al., 1999) 7. Conclusions and directions for further research This paper presented an updated literature review centred on the maritime and container supply chain security, mostly on articles appeared since 2007. The review is structured in four parts:  Contributions related to vulnerability and potential for disruptions;  Contributions on policy, practices and technologies;  Contributions on organisation and processes; and  Contributions on the outcomes of maritime supply chain security initiatives. 10 From this review the following observations can be made. Maritime supply chain security is an important research area, and considering the strategic role of maritime transport and container shipping on international trade, as well as the transnational nature of container shipping, would deserve more attentions from practitioners and researchers. There seem to be sufficient analysis on the antecedents of maritime supply chain security (e.g. terrorisms and piracy) although most of these contributions are theoretical and qualitative. Less attention has been dedicated to pilferage and smuggling activities among the main reasons for improving container security. Several contributions have focused on policy, technologies and best practices. Also in this case most of the analysis is of a theoretical and qualitative nature. Systematic reviews of security practices and cross sectional studies are by the nature of the subject difficult, but surveys can provide a wealth of information (e.g. Bichou et al., 2007). Furthermore as far as the initiatives are concerned, most literature made use of simulation and analytic methods that focus on liner shipping network reliability and container terminals, few on ports a whole, and only a handful on the interfaces between ports and other modes of transport (Schilk, Blumel, Recagno, & Boevé, 2007), or overall on the total maritime supply chain (Barnes & Oloruntoba, 2005). As far as processes and organisation studies, there is substantive literature on ports and to some extent on maritime networks. 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