Biased Intelligence Analysis and the Initial Invasion of Iraq

Biased Intelligence Analysis and the Initial Invasion of Iraq Faulty Intelligence and Human Error Laini Soszynski American Military University INTL506: Analytics II October 11, 2015 Introduction In 2003, the United States had already been committed to a war in Afghanistan since 2001 against the terrorist group believed responsible for the attacks of September 11, al Qaeda. During this time, the Taliban rule of the country was ousted and a new ruling party was put in its place in an attempt to establish a democratic governance. The Bush Administration, however, turned to Iraq as accusations of its support of terrorism and nuclear weapons programs began to grow. Directing the Intelligence Community to collect any information that would support the claims of weapons of mass destruction procurement by Dictator Saddam Hussein, few reports and sources emerged as what would be used as evidence to convince the American people that an invasion was necessary. These reports, and all evidence that had been collected prior to the invasion, was disclosed in a speech given by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in February of 2003. In this speech, he declared that there had been reliable sources which explained Saddam’s use of mobile biological weapon processing facilities, Saddam’s recent purchase of aluminum cylinders which indicated nuclear proliferation, and transcripts of Iraqi conversation that implied the dictator was attempting to conceal his weapons programs. The United States had believed fully that Saddam Hussein was in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that left it vulnerable to another attack comparable to September 11. Because of the intelligence failure of September 11, the Bush Administration was on high alert for other indications that had the potential to cause destruction on the level of the September 11 attacks, and was consequently attempting to secure any form of evidence it could to justify an invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein. This belief caused the Bush Administration and concurrent Intelligence Community officials to overlook the fact that much of the evidence supporting the belief of WMD possession had not been verified by intelligence officials, and also that other countries, such as Britain, had declared one of the primary sources a potential fabricator, with stories that were also not verified. Was the Bush Administration and Intelligence Community biased when considering evidence that indicated Saddam was in possession of WMD or WMD capabilities? The intent of this research paper will be to explore the overlooking of poor, unverified intelligence in order to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq, as well as what the underlying motivation for such an invasion may have been, had the Bush Administration been aware of its faulty intelligence. Literature Review On the surface, George Walker Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 seemed justified by the strong evidence that the United States and other countries had collected. This seemingly undeniable intelligence concluded that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed mobile biological labs and planned to begin constructing nuclear missiles. Below the surface, however, as indicated by the majority of the literature to be reviewed in this paper, intelligence analysts in the United States and Britain, as well as sources recruited by the intelligence agents overseas, consistently declared this to be false. If there was doubt to the plausibility of the intelligence that was being cited towards a declaration of war, why were these individuals’ concerns ignored? The following pieces of literature, collected from personal accounts within the Intelligence Community (IC) leading up to the invasion, as well as previous academic studies, case studies, and official reports, will be used to address the research of this paper. Support for the suggested invasion of Iraq grew significantly following then-Secretary of State Colin Powell’s United Nation (U.N.) presentation on February 6, 2003. In the speech, Powell cited the United States and its allies’ responsibilities to uphold the disarmament obligations as per U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. Using this as a baseline for U.S. involvement in Iraq, he began referencing an “accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior” that ultimately built the case for Congressional approval for the war to go forward (Powell 2003, 1). Powell began listing what could be shared with the United Nations, which included Saddam’s hiding of equipment from the U.S. inspectors, Iraq’s access to scientists which were assisting in weaponizing biological weapons, Saddam’s plans for nuclear weapon procurement, as well as Iraq’s ties to al Qaeda. Intelligence for Powell’s speech was provided from Iraqi sources, conversations monitored, and IMINT that suggested nuclear weapon building material. After painting the picture of an evil Iraq harboring terrorists and planning future WMD attacks on Americans, the truth about most of the intelligence was provided. Tyler Drumheller, author of On the Brink, and previous Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Europe division, wrote of Colin Powell’s speech and the days leading up to it as well as the entirety of the intelligence failure of the CIA. Drumheller was a skeptic of most of the intelligence collected to support invading Iraq, specifically the CIA’s reliance on Curveball, an Iraqi defector. In his book, he explains that the United States had not verified any information supplied to them by the defector, despite warnings from Germany, whom had been the country to initially question him. Drumheller and others, after previewing the U.N. speech to be given by Powell, declared much of it unverified and incomplete, and had informed the speech writing committee. Not only did the speech remain the same despite the inadequate and stretched intelligence, but the intelligence was not verified until after the invasion, which Drumheller also discusses in his book. Nigel West, an author of intelligence and national security matters, published his article “Curveball Chaos” following the release of Drumheller’s book On the Brink. West (2007) was driven by Drumheller’s book to further research the failures of the Intelligence Community, declaring the majority of the quick-to-act mentality was due to the Commission’s Report on September 11, which was released in 2003. West explains that the Central Intelligence Agency was utilizing Curveball’s reports since he defected in 1998 to a German refugee camp, despite the German intelligence agency, the BND, declaring him unreliable due to his “crazy, unstable, and out of control” nature, as well as his potential alcoholism (West 2007, 528). West also mentions that prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Central Intelligence Agency was denied interviewing access, and was relying solely on German and British reports forwarded through the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). David Mitchell and Tansa George Massoud (2009) discussed the Bush Administration’s failure to effectively analyze intelligence in their article “Anatomy of Failure: Bush’s Decision-Making Process and the Iraq War.” The authors of this article support the claim that there was important information overlooked by the Bush Administration, leading to the invasion of Iraq despite inadequate intelligence. Among these failures, the authors specifically discuss the lack of debate, the selective intelligence process, and a flawed plan of invasion, which is a failure in a different matter. The authors analyze the decision making process of the Bush Administration, and conclude that intelligence was ignored due to a combination of presidential management, bureaucratic politics, and the compliance of key players, ultimately leading to flawed decisions of an ill-informed Congress. Similarly, Richard Betts (2007) of the Political Science Quarterly discussed the failures of intelligence as compared to the failures of September 11 (9/11), introducing that the mistakes, despite billions of dollars spent annually on intelligence within the United States, was likely due to naturally occurring human error. Betts links the failure of Iraq to the failure of September 11 as comparing too little collection and sharing of 9/11 to the excessive sharing and reliance on intelligence, as occurred in Iraq. Betts states that “the more dots there are, the more ways they can be connected – and which way is correct may become evident only when it is too late” (2007, 594). Betts argues that pre-war intelligence was accurate and efficient, to include the aftermath of a U.S. invasion, yet the Bush Administration, in the post-9/11 mindset joined with the post-Gulf War discovery of WMD facilities in Iraq hidden from Western intelligence, was focused primarily on weaponry reports, which were inaccurate. Other reports suggest that the Bush Administration was holding onto whatever evidence necessary to “sell the Iraq War,” as discussed in Masters and Alexander’s article “Prospecting for War: 9/11 and Selling the Iraq War,” published in 2008. The authors base their article off of the claim that the Iraq War involved a process of issue-framing, described as “a manner where elites emphasize ‘a subset of potentially relevant considerations when constructing their opinions’” (Alexander and Masters 2008, 434). This article also links the failure of 9/11 to the acceptance of the invasion of Iraq as per the prospect theory, stating that Bush’s administration utilized the American’s lost sense of security to build a case for invasion. The authors declare that the war was likely sold to the people under the guise of terrorist affiliation due to the administration’s many pre-9/11 advocates of removing Saddam Hussein. A study conducted by the Midwestern Political Science Association found support for these theories when public support for President Bush and the war was analyzed. The study showed that high receptivity to the war was directly correlational to rhetoric utilized, which included demonizing Iraq. Similar studies were conducted with the intent of determining whether the Bush Administration deliberately misled the country into agreeing with going to war with Iraq. Despite the many that argue for this, empirical data is lacking, as pointed out by one study by Scott Bonn in 2011. Of the many studies Bonn conducted, one specifically illustrates the relationship between public support for the war in Iraq and the presidential rhetoric used, measured by 24 polls taken over the course of three years. The conclusion of this study indicated that the public support for the war increased following each new method of rhetoric utilized by the president. In this sense, it could be suggested that the Bush Administration’s rhetoric did induce a moral panic in the United States. The suggestion that the Bush Administration successfully coerced its nation into believing the terrorist and weapons of mass destruction rhetoric must be supported by motivations in terms of why the Bush Administration would need to resort to utilizing false, or unverified, intelligence. Charles-Philippe (2015) published an article in Politics and Policy, which describes a method of policy change in reference to the Bush Administration’s goals, stating that a “[political] entrepreneur adeptly manipulates the bureaucratic systems and processes,” as measured by the ability for one to get their way when faced with opposing viewpoints (Charles-Philippe 2015, 173). The article offers a case study of the resulting regime change in Iraq, highlighting the importance of the window of opportunity (9/11), ideas to win the hearts and minds (national security), and the skills to coerce support (intelligence). By promoting false intelligence, policy change was supported and the invasion of Iraq was initially justified. Authors such as De Castro and Teixeira (2013) also bring this technique to light, albeit referencing the Bush Doctrine and the implementation of democracy by force as a motivation to get Congressional approval for the invasion. With the preceding literature as a baseline for Bush’s intelligence failures, motivations for the invasion of Iraq, and the ignorance of intelligence that did not support his desires, the legality of these prospects can be assessed. Robert Kuttner and Paul Starr published an article in 2002 titled “The Reckless Rush to War,” which suggested suspicion towards coerced support for the war in Iraq. The authors promote the lack of evidence that tied Iraq to al Qaeda prior to the invasion and criticize Bush’s immediate motion of asking the United Nations for support of the invasion. The United Nation’s initial hesitation for agreeing to the invasion, as the authors discuss, led to increased rhetoric and the drive to produce intelligence that prove, without a doubt, that Saddam was in possession of WMD’s imposing a national security risk. To build off of this conversation, Francis Boyle, a Professor of International Law, explained the significance of achieving a justification of war despite the lack of evidence against Iraq that linked it to September 11. Having exhausted the options of the War Powers Resolution, as was done in Bush Sr.’s presidency in the Gulf War, and the failure of achieving formal authorization from the Security Council, President Bush had to resort to Congress for an authorization of a use of force against Iraq. To win Congressional approval for this authorization, as mentioned by previous authors, appropriate rhetoric had to be used in conjunction with intelligence to support it. Boyle (2002) declared that the United States would have to “come up now with this doctrine of preemptive attack” for Iraq, as they did with the claims of weapons of mass destruction and a threat of national security. Literature exists on a wide plane in regards to the initial invasion of Iraq. The Bush Administration had been accused of purposefully using faulty evidence to support an invasion of Iraq with the primary motivations of ousting Saddam Hussein, as some were approving of even prior to 9/11. With the attacks of September 11, the Administration was given the opportunity to link Iraq and gain support of Americans. Gaps in the literature will be connected with the analysis of this paper, to attempt to determine whether the Bush Administration knowingly utilized unverified intelligence in the attempt to gain support and Congressional approval of the use of force in Iraq. Methodology and Theoretical Framework Research for this paper is conducted with the understanding and expectation that much of the necessary readings for a proper evaluation of the research topic are still classified. To confront this dilemma, a wide variety of scholarly articles will be used, as well as assessing what is unclassified, with specific usage of the Intelligence Community databases on respective websites available. Information for analysis of this research paper will be collected via deductive reasoning with regards to the hypothesis of this paper; the Bush Administration and Intelligence Community of the post-September 11 era analyzed intelligence based solely off what was wanted to be seen, with little to no regard for the unverified and faulty intelligence it based the invasion of Iraq off of. Additionally, research will be done to try to understand what the Bush Administration’s motivations for an invasion of Iraq would have been, had it known about the faulty intelligence it collected, and whether this intelligence was simply a mask for underlying incentives. Variables will be tested based on two premises: the Bush Administration and Intelligence Community was biased in adherence to certain intelligence that was collected because it genuinely believed Iraq had capabilities to fabricate a September 11-scale attack on the U.S.; and the Bush Administration knew the intelligence collected was not strong enough to prove Saddam had WMD capabilities and yet used it solely for gaining the American support of another invasion during this War on Terrorism. To compare these two hypotheses, the independent variables assessed will be the intelligence collected, to include both supportive evidence as well as evidence that indicated Saddam had no WMD capabilities nor supported terrorism. Dependent variables will be addressed as how the Bush Administration and respective Intelligence Community officials deciphered and utilized the intelligence collected. The dependent variables will indicate whether the administration seemed biased in how it analyzed the intelligence collected; if the intelligence chosen as actionable – supporting Saddam’s WMD – was chosen more often than evidence that prove that there were no WMD in Iraq, it could suggest a bias within the intelligence gathering process. There are two theories that will be used to further guide the research of this paper, and both theories relate to its respective hypothesis. First, the Just War Theory will be used to guide the paper in terms of the United States seeking out a justifiable reason to go to war with Iraq. This theory states that each country has its right to go to war based on self-defense, response to aggressive behavior, but only when the decision had been made by the legitimate authority of the state, and after all peaceful remedies had been exhausted (Kauppi and Viotti 1987). In the event the United States genuinely believed that it was at risk for a WMD attack by Saddam Hussein, this theory can be used to guide the research into what peaceful remedies had been utilized and exhausted, and what intelligence was included in authoritative analysis and the ultimate justifying vote by Congress declare war. In this case, it would be likely to observe only evidence supporting Iraq’s WMD program being presented to Congress, with little mention of the fact that the intelligence is hardly affective or legitimate. This would present Congress with a just reason to declare war, or authorize military action, but also presents the research with evidence of a bias. Additionally, the theory of Interventionism can be used in the event of underlying motivations by the Bush Administration is uncovered. The Interventionism theory describes the justifications for interfering with another polity, characterized by the use of force, or the threat of the use of force, with the ultimate end goal of implementing a country’s political ideology on another. This theory could guide the research if the belief that the Bush Administration knew there were no WMD in Iraq, and was hiding additional alternative motives that were kept hidden to the people of the United States, such as intervening with the Iraqi dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and implementing democratic ideals on the Arabs of the region. Additionally, interventionism can be used to guide other goals of an intervening society, including culture, religion, lifestyles, economics, and business (Moseley 2002). Information will be collected with no bias towards either theory or hypothesis of this paper, yet solely on the variables discussed. By the conclusion of this paper, it will be determined whether the Bush Administration and Intelligence Community conducting the collection of information was biased in ignoring facts that would have proven what intelligence they had to be false or fabricated. Additionally, in the event information was ignored, reasons for ignoring this information will have been presented and assessed, determining whether the dismissal of intelligence was intentional or not. As a base-line of specific intelligence used as justification for the Iraq invasion, this paper will adhere to former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s United Nations speech given in February of 2003, because it was this speech that prompted Congressional support for the invasion later that year. Analysis and Findings Colin Powell began his speech in 2003 with reference to the disarmament obligation of Iraq as per the 1441 U.N. Security resolution. This resolution allowed for Iraq to have a final chance to comply with disarming its nation of all weapons of mass destruction and methods to procure or create such weapons, enhancing the disarmament process declared by resolution 687 in 1991. Following the unanimous adoption of U.N. resolution 1441 in 2002, Iraq was allotted 30 days to provide the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a “complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles… including… programmes it claims are for purposes not related to weapons production or material” (U.N. Resolution 1441 2002, 3). Following Iraq’s declaration, the United Nations would permit UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors to assess the country’s weapons facilities at any place and any time. At no point in the Resolution does it give restriction to countries feeling at risk of the threat of Iraq WMD possession to act in the interest of its national security. Referenced in the speech was also the lack of compliance with Resolution 687 passed in 1991 following the Gulf War which, as a ceasefire agreement, also called for the disarmament of Iraq, yet declared that any infringements of this resolution must be dealt with in a peaceful manner and the use of force was only justified following an attack conducted by Iraq. Colin Powell states in his speech that Iraq had been found guilty of a material breach, alluding to ballistic weapons programs discovered and moderate evidence of the country restarting its uranium enrichment programs (Rajguru 2014). Prior to Secretary of State Powell’s speech, IAEA’s Director General stated that the IAEA had “to date found no evidence of plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq,” a claim which was only supplemented by UNMOVIC Executive Chairman’s conclusion that ballistic missile and missile program destruction was currently underway (Thielmann 2013). With regards to Saddam’s chemical and biological weapons programs, the inspectors also concluded in 2002 that there were no stockpiles or active programs to be found. Where, then, did Colin Powell’s speech gain its intelligence from? The decision to invade Iraq relied heavily on human intelligence (HUMINT) collected over the decade prior to September 11, as well as the two years following the attack. Reliance on HUMINT ranged from supporting other evidence of weapons programs – to include biological, chemical, nuclear, and long-range ballistic – to connecting Iraq to terrorist networks such as al Qaeda. Powell (2003) cites multiple times that the evidence supporting his claims were from Iraqi defectors, commanding officers, and others of unspecified relationships. Supporting HUMINT evidence, the United States also utilized imagery intelligence (IMINT) from satellite imagery systems of specific areas of interest in Iraq. Also cited in his speech are multiple communications between Iraqi commanders collected via signals intelligence (SIGINT) throughout the course of the inspectors’ investigations. The lack of measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), which is gathered by measuring characteristics of sources such as sampling soil or detection with machines, was also briefed by Powell as being a result of the Iraqi’s ability to move their clandestine laboratories as well as their strategy of shaving the topsoil of suspected chemical facilities prior to the inspectors’ arrival. Saddam’s Restarted Nuclear Program As early as 1991, following the Gulf War, a defector disclosed information of Saddam Hussein’s “massive clandestine nuclear weapons programme” consisting of various methods of enriching uranium (Powell 2003). This claim was almost directly following the IAEA inspectors declaring that the state did not have a nuclear weapon program. Additionally, a defector disclosed in 1995 that Iraq had initiated a program to build crude nuclear weapons, which violated U.N. Resolution 687. This defector also informed intelligence officials that Saddam only lacked fissile material, and was attempting to fabricate methods of enriching uranium, as supported by his attempts to acquire aluminum tubes, reported by up to 11 different countries. The claims that Saddam was restarting his nuclear program were often referenced to information known of his pre-Gulf War program, which supported the argument of the United States in that his regime had been capable in the past, and was certainly capable towards the future, despite the strict sanctions emplaced by the United Nations following the Gulf War. In addition to the HUMINT supportive of Iraq’s nuclear programs, there had also been communications intercepted via signals intelligence (SIGINT) beginning in the 2000’s that suggested Saddam was attempting to purchase magnet production plants from neighboring countries, as well as machines capable of balancing gas centrifuges, aiding to what was concluded by the U.S intelligence officials to be a billion-dollar investment of the Iraqis. Proposed SIGINT also suggested that Saddam had been keeping his nuclear scientists within close vicinities of the regime, disallowing them to leave the country and increasing their pay as an incentive to stay with the regime. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, the United States intelligence community concluded that the combination of the HUMINT disclosures of Saddam maintaining his nuclear weapons programs, as well as the intercepted communications of negotiations among neighboring countries for purchasing magnet production plants and aluminum tubes, was evidence enough to justifying the belief that Saddam was in possession of, or on the verge of, nuclear weapons. As is now known, the invasion of Iraq led to no evidence indicating that Saddam Hussein was restarting his nuclear weapons program. Although this was discovered in hindsight, there were indications that Saddam had never restarted his program following the U.N. Resolution 687 of 1991 within the intelligence collected prior to the invasion. In 2003, following the invasion, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was sent as a multi-national force to locate the weapons of mass destruction that the Intelligence Community’s evaluation had indicated. In a report of the Central Intelligence Agency in 2004, it is stated that “the ISG found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the [nuclear] program.” In this report, the CIA highlights key intelligence prior to the invasion, and what had discounted this intelligence post-invasion. Indications that suggested Iraq’s attempt to restart its programs, such as the purchasing of the magnet production plants and aluminum tubes, were also discredited following the ISG’s inspections post-invasion. Specifically, the ISG investigated the magnet production lines at al Tahadi and did declare that the pre-1991 nuclear programs did utilize similar magnets, but also stated that the investigation could not dispute Iraq’s claim that the magnet usage was for routine industrial and military use (CIA 2004). Additionally, the SIGINT collected containing communications of the al Tahadi processing plant purchasing magnet production lines were not further evaluated, which, had it been evaluated prior to Powell’s speech in 2003, would have determined that although Iraq had been trying to purchase these plants, no contract was completed. Additionally, the magnet production contract that had been proposed did not conform to the standard densities required for use in centrifuges. One of the strongest pieces of evidence supporting the claim that Iraq was attempting to restart its nuclear program was the purchasing of aluminum tubes in vast quantities. Some U.S. officials did support that these could be used to aid in fissile material production. The Department of Energy, which is responsible for the United States’ centrifuge enrichment program, denied that these tubes would be purposeful in a centrifuge, and had the support of the Department of State in attempting to remove the aluminum tubes as evidence for Saddam’s nuclear program (Albright 2003). It wasn’t until the Iraq Survey Group released its report after the invasion that the United States issued the claim: “Baghdad’s interest in high-strength, high-specification aluminum tubes… is best explained by its efforts to produce 81-mm rockets” (CIA 2004). After admitting a faulty link between the aluminum tubes and a nuclear usage, the ISG concluded that the bureaucratic momentum made abandoning the tubes as evidence nearly impossible. Biological Weapons Programs Saddam Hussein’s biological weapons program development was based largely on the claims of a defector that had fled from Iraq in 1998, dubbed Curveball by the Intelligence Community. Curveball claimed that he had witnessed the secrecies of the Saddam regime, stating that the reason the United Nations inspectors have not found any evidence of biological weapons manufacturing was because of Iraq’s use of mobile biological weapons facilities. Curveball initially came to the German BND to report his claims of mobile laboratories, whom had then forwarded this information to the United States as early as 2000. Curveball’s claims were trusted by the United States because of his ability to report major events that occurred in Iraq during what he claimed to have been his employment as a chemical engineer for Saddam. Because of his long-term involvement in obtaining and issuing the U.S. and its ally’s intelligence regarding Saddam and his biological weapons program, Curveball has been credited for most of the biological weapons intelligence collected prior to the invasion. There were, however, three additional human sources that the U.S. relied on for intelligence relative to biological weapons, each providing a single report of unidentified vehicles (West 2007). Reliance on Curveball and the other three human sources was seemingly blind towards the warnings of not only officials within the United States’ Intelligence Community, but also the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the German BND as well. Both foreign intelligence services warned that Curveball’s reports have not been verified prior to forwarding them to the United States. In fact, it wasn’t until after the invasion of Iraq that the CIA was able to interview Curveball, and during this time his reports were checked for reliability. It was after this verification process that it was discovered the majority of his reporting did not align. For example, his claim that he had witnessed a deadly biological weapons accident was not in accordance with his travel records, which evidenced that he was not in the country at the time of the accident (Drumheller 2006). Similarly, where he had reported a mobile facility track had been was, in fact, a wall directly through the area. A brief review of Curveball’s claims indicated that the majority of the information supplied as situational evidence was available via open source, and when questioned about details after the invasion, his stories began to crumble. According to the report of the Presidential Commission chaired by Laurence H. Silberman and Charles Robb, “Curveball was completely unable or unwilling to explain these discrepancies. The CIA concluded that Curveball had fabricated his reporting, and the CIA and Defense HUMINT recalled all of it” (2005, 269). It was also reported that the two of the three other sources were labelled fabricators, and the third reported a mobile hydrogen production built to fuel weather balloons as an unknown mobile facility (Drumheller 2006, 104). Iraq’s Chemical Weapons It is no secret that Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons on not only his own people but also the people of Kurdistan in the past. Powell’s speech informed the people of America that Saddam has currently (as per 2003) unaccounted for up to 550 mustard shells, 30,000 empty munitions as well as “enough precursors to increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents” (Powell 2003). Because of the fact that Saddam took years to admit to his chemical weapon possession prior to the Gulf War, there was very little trust that the United States had put in Saddam to properly declare and destroy of his stockpiles. Like the biological weapons, the Intelligence Community claimed the reason that there had been no chemical weapons processing facilities found after the Gulf War was due to the dual-purpose laboratories utilized by the Iraqis, which would make it increasingly difficult for inspectors to discover prohibited facilities. Intelligence relative to chemical weapon production was supplemented by IMINT of satellite pictures of facilities with decontamination vehicles on standby. Additionally, communications were intercepted by Iraq’s Second Republican Guard commanders discussing “nerve agents” and to refer to the wireless instructions, potentially signifying concern of spying and a method of preparing stockpiles for U.N. inspectors. From the time of the invasion to the U.S. withdrawal of troops in 2011, an estimated 5,000 chemical weapons were found in Iraq. Ironically, although these munitions were found, it was not released to the public until 2014 after a Freedom of Information Act was filed for the release of the reports. As per the released report, coalition forces recovered 4,996 – filled and unfilled – pre-Desert Storm chemical munitions, as well as 420 chemical munitions discovered between April 2009 and March 2011, albeit 393 of the rounds were nonviable due to degradation or intentional drilling (NGIC Assessment 2011). Withholding this information from the public had been attributed to speculation of embarrassment from the Bush Administration as well as the fact that the majority of the chemical weapons discovered were designed by the United States. It has been reported that the discovery of the 5,000 chemical warheads did not support the reason for the invasion of Iraq – the threat of mass production and stockpiles of chemical agents – because the shells dated back to the 1980’s and had been dormant for some two decades. The satellite imagery of dual-purpose processing plants were also investigated after the invasion of Iraq. The Iraq Survey Group determined that there had been no indications of chemical production after the imposition of U.N. Resolution 687 in 1991, yet kept its chemical industry arranged in such a way that it would conserve the knowledgebase needed to restart the chemical weapons program following the lifting of sanctions (CIA 2007). The ISG found evidence that dual-purpose processing equipment was being tested, yet the lack of sufficient evidence to prove that, without a doubt, Iraq was testing weapons-grade chemicals is ambiguous at best. The ISG narrowed its search from 104 Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs) to 24, utilizing the satellite imagery to determine which supply points had what was thought to be decontamination vehicles or spill-control equipment in place (CIA 2007b). Of the inspected ASPs, the ISG located no new stockpiles of chemical munitions, neglecting to support the Bush Administration’s claim of production and stocking of these WMD. Iraq’s Support of al Qaeda Colin Powell addresses Saddam Hussein’s link to terrorist networks in his 2003 United Nations speech as well, insisting that Iraq had been harboring a terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who was evidenced to be associated with Osama bin Laden of al Qaeda – the purported fabricators of the 9/11 plot and the reason for the Afghanistan invasion. Zarqawi had been linked to training camps in northern Iraq and had thought to been a poison-specialist aiding the Taliban and al Qaeda networks in training operatives on explosive and poison production. Additionally, Zarqawi was supposedly linked to various safe-havens and operation points in the Baghdad region, aiding al Qaeda affiliated extremists with supplies, money, and movement throughout Iraq (Powell 2003). Despite Iraq’s denial of terrorist association and support, the United States Intelligence Community continuously claimed that Zarqawi’s presence in Baghdad and northern Iraq – evidenced by satellite imagery of his training camps – concluded the connection of Saddam to al Qaeda. In addition to the proposed evidence of Saddam’s support and cooperation with al Qaeda, the United States utilized previous terrorist associations and the link to Iraq, specifically Hamas, the Palestinian organization, and its office opened during 1999 in Baghdad, as well as the Palestinian Liberation Front receiving training in Baghdad. The link between Saddam and al Qaeda was also mentioned multiple times by President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, who had stated repeatedly, “[Saddam] has long established ties with al Qaeda” (Cheney 2004). Prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration had been supplied ample evidence that concluded that there were no ties between Iraq and terrorist organizations, let alone Iraq and the attacks of September 11. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) concluded in 2002 that “Iraq is unlikely to have provided bin Laden any useful [chemical or biological weapons] knowledge or assistance,” and the CIA concluded in 2003 that Hussein “viewed Islamic extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat,” acknowledging extremist presence in Iraq, yet discounting any support offered by Saddam (Cohn 2013). Charles Faddis and Mike Tucker, both CIA operatives that had operated in Northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan in 2002, reported that there “were Afghanistan-trained jihadists in the rugged mountains of northeastern Iraq… beyond the control of the Iraqi regime,” which gathered under the name Ansar al-Islam (Faddis, Tucker 2009). Powell declared in his U.N. speech that this jihadist network was an al Qaeda affiliate, but also mentioned that there were Zarqawi lieutenants and Baghdadi agents operating within this group. Powell did not mention that prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, which ousted the Taliban regime and caused al Qaeda extremists to flee the country, there were no extremists utilizing the safe haven of Northern Iraq and Kurdistan. The Center of Foreign Relations (CFR) reported on Zarqawi and his affiliation with al Qaeda and Iraq in 2006, concluding that “Zarqawi’s story has become one of the most powerful and enduring myths of the war on terror” (Teslik 2006). CFR reported that because of the United States’ reliance on Zarqawi as a primary source of evidence to the al Qaeda-link, “a man previously considered little more than a malcontent thug emerged as Iraq’s leading coordinator of terror” (Teslik 2006). Apart from Zarqawi’s differing faith than that of proposed affiliate Osama bin Laden, the former a fundamentalist Salafist and the latter a radical Sunni, Zarqawi repeatedly refused to join al Qaeda, instead forming a group dubbed Tawhid in the 1990’s. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the international call for Zarqawi’s capture, his name was released to the public and his influence grew, giving him power where he otherwise would not have had it. Outside of Zarqawi, the United States had little terrorist affiliation to rely on, save for the allowance of Hamas and the Palestinian Liberation Front to establish offices in Baghdad, both organizations which are now recognized as functioning Palestinian government organizations. Conclusion The United Nations speech of 2003 given by former Secretary of State Colin Powell laid out the evidence collected by the Intelligence Community that supported the Bush Administration’s path to war. Although the speech was convincing, with intelligence ranging from communication interceptions to satellite imagery, what was presented to the United Nations that February was biased not only on a human level, but also a bureaucratic level as well. It has been argued in the past that President Bush had the preconceived desire to invade Iraq and oust Dictator Saddam Hussein prior to the events of September 11. This claim could be supported by the intelligence failure of the justification of the Iraq invasion on nearly every level, in conjunction with the refusal of the United Nations Security Council to issue an authorization of war, leaving Bush to turn to Congress to issue an Authorization of the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq under the guise of self-defense. As per U.N. Resolution 1441, only a material breech or self-defense could authorize use of force against a foreign country, and only after all other means had been exhausted. Diplomatic solutions escaped President Bush and his administration, painting the picture of an imminent attack from Iraq and the need to “confront the worst threats before they emerge” (Bush 2002). Legally, however, Bush’s self-defense was not authorized due to Iraq’s lack of capacity for such an attack, as well as the legal doctrine binding the United Nations to attack others only when provoked. Aside from the bureaucratic motivations of the Bush Administration and the claims of some that the intelligence was used only to gain Congressional support for self-defense, there could have been other reasons behind the overwhelming intelligence failure that the 2003 invasion was based off of. Specifically, the Intelligence Community was acting with a mindset provoked by the attacks of September 11 and the intelligence failure of 2001 that revolved around a lack of communication between the intelligence agencies. In the aftermath of September 11, the IC was re-organized and more pressure was put on them to collect actionable intelligence, which at the time revolved around Bush’s claims of Saddam and Iraq being linked to the terror attacks and the desire to defend the country against another 9/11-scale attack. With the IC working in a post-crisis mindset, there is a heavy potential that many became over-focused on the task issued by George W. Bush – find the link. This over-focusing of the IC led to a lack of reality testing, a lack of accessibility to relevant sources and subject matter experts, and hasty decision-making based on efficiency and relevance. The inconsistencies with reality testing, or failure to acknowledge the results of reality testing, caused the administration to oversimplify the situation and isolate themselves to alternative possibilities of the intelligence being collected. Working in the post-crisis mindset and with the direction of the President of the United States to “find the link,” there is also a potential that the intelligence collected was done so on a selective basis, focusing purely on what evidence would support the United States’ claim of WMD and terrorism support, as opposed to collecting unbiased intelligence supporting and refuting the claims. This could also likely be due to a groupthink mindset of the intelligence analysts working within the Bush Administration, whom had a close-mindedness around the issues at hand, resulting in a minimization of counterarguments, conforming of major viewpoints and the pressure to remain loyal to the President, as opposed to issuing him the truth of the matter – Saddam was not capable of a WMD attack and did not harbor terrorist networks. Based on the information collected for this paper, however, the IC and the Bush Administration were offered opposing opinions and facts of the regime, and did not acknowledge it or was never forwarded the collected information because it did not support President Bush. This brings to light the political nature of intelligence collection in the post-9/11 mindset, where intelligence is collected based around assumptions, as opposed to assumptions being based around intelligence. Regardless of whether the intelligence was biased as per human error or bureaucratic motivations, Congress still made its decision to issue approval for military intervention in Iraq on an ill-informed basis. The decision to act against Saddam Hussein was due to the information presented to Congress which was based on the best available intelligence put forward by the IC and filtered by the Bush Administration. There is potential that the Bush Administrations’ underlying motivations for an invasion of Iraq – or the predetermined decision to invade – promoted a manipulation of Congress by only putting forward what information was needed to gain support for the intervention. Much of the supporting intelligence, they will come to discover, was false, fabricated, or forced. Gaps in this research paper are based around what information is still classified regarding the intelligence for the invasion, and additional research could be conducted on an international level, incorporating the roll of Germany and Britain in the invasion. Further research could also be conducted on what motivations the Bush Administration could have had for manipulating Congress to approve of the invasion, or why the Bush Administration would have had a preconceived desire to oust Saddam Hussein even before September 11. Did September 11 offer the opportunity for Bush to provide false intelligence to the American public and justify ousting the dictatorship in Iraq? Would the U.S. have invaded had September 11 never occurred, or Bush was never elected? This paper lays out the baseline for the intelligence utilized as support for the invasion of Iraq, and compares it to the post-invasion review of the intelligence and resulting conclusion that most of what was collected was false. Suggested in this paper was the purposeful manipulation of the intelligence presented to Congress in an effort to gain support for the invasion of Iraq on the pretense of an imminent threat, as well as the potentiality of human error which caused the enormous lapse in verified intelligence. References: Albright, David. 2003. “Iraq’s Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction.” ISIS-online. Accessed October 17, 2015. http://www.isis- online.org/publications/iraq/IraqAluminumTubes12-5-03.pdf Betts, Richard K. 2007. 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