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Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy

A debate about whether all children are entitled to an "equal" or an "adequate" education has been waged at the forefront of school finance policy for decades. In an era of budget deficits and harsh cuts in public education, I submit that it is time to move on.

ARTICLES TRANSCENDING EQUALITY VERSUS ADEQUACY Joshua E. Weishart* A debate about whether all children are entitled to an “equal” or an “adequate” education has been waged at the forefront of school finance policy for decades. In an era of budget deficits and harsh cuts in public education, I submit that it is time to move on. Equality of educational opportunity has been thought to require equal spending per pupil or spending adjusted to the needs of differently situated children. Adequacy has been understood to require a level of spending sufficient to satisfy some absolute, rather than relative, educational threshold. In practice, however, many courts interpreting their states’ constitutional obligations have fused the equality and adequacy theories. Certain federal laws express principles of both doctrines. And gradually, more advocates and scholars have come to endorse hybrid equality-adequacy approaches. Still, the debate persists over seemingly intractable conceptual precepts and their political and legal ramifications. Tracking the philosophical origins and evolution of equality and adequacy as legal doctrines, I explain the significance of their points of convergence and argue that the few points of divergence are untenable in practice. Equality of ed- * Visiting Assistant Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. This Article began as my M.Phil. thesis, so I need to thank my former supervisors at the University of Cambridge, Serena Olsaretti and Hallvard Lillehammer, for their thoughtful critiques of the philosophical arguments that laid the groundwork for this piece. I revised my thesis as part of a research project at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law. I am indebted to my then-professor, Goodwin Liu, who supervised that project and whose scholarship inspired me to continue to explore the subject long after. For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, I thank Gregory Bowman, Stephen Smith Cody, Jena Martin, William Rehee, and Matthew Titolo. For comments and suggestions on completed drafts and revisions, I thank Scott Bauries, Derek Black, Daniel Farber, Lisa Pruitt, and Stephen Sugarman. I am also grateful to the editors of the Stanford Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance and to Tai Shadrick for her superb research assistance. Finally, my wife Elizabeth deserves heartfelt appreciation for her continual support and for going above and beyond the call of duty in taking care of our newborn son Liam so that I could complete this Article. 477 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2288059