1998 On the Conceptual Foundations of Anti-Realism
Sanford Shiehvisibility
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On the Conceptual Foundations of Anti-Realism
1998
The central premise of Michael Dummett's global argument for anti-realism is the thesis that a speaker's grasp of the meaning of a declarative, indexical-free sentence must be manifested in her uses of that sentence. This enigmatic thesis has been the subject of a great deal of discussion, and something of a consensus has emerged about its content and justification. The received view is that the manifestation thesis expresses a behaviorist and reductive theory of meaning, essentially in agreement with Quine's view of language, and motivated by worries about the epistemology of communication. In the present paper I begin by arguing that this standard interpretation of the manifestation thesis is neither particularly faithful to Dummett's writings nor philosophically compelling. I then continue by reconstructing, from Dummett's texts, an account of the manifestation thesis, and of its justification, that differ sharply from the received view. On my reading, the thesis is motivated not epistemologically, but conceptually. I argue that connections among our conceptions of meaning, assertion, and justification lead to a conclusion about the metaphysics of meaning: we cannot form a clearly coherent conception of how two speakers can attach different meanings to a sentence without at the same time differing in what they count as justifying assertions made with that sentence. I conclude with some suggestions about how Dummett's argument for global anti-realism should be understood, given my account of the manifestation thesis.
The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings
Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 2009
Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts premise involves an assumption about the transparency of meaning and semantic externalism is often taken to undermine such transparency. Several notions of transparency and conveyability of meaning are distinguished and it is argued that, though the Dummettian argument for anti-realism presupposes only a weak connection between knowledge of meaning and understanding, even this much is not trivially true in light of semantic externalism, and that semantic externalism, if true, would thus represent a reason for rejecting the crucial assumption on which the Dummettian argument depends.
Realism and Antirealism
A Handbook of the Philosophy of Language (OUP, eds. E. Lepore and B. Smith), 2006
Meaning, Classical Logic and Semantic Realism
2010
I argue that there are two ways of construing Wittgenstein’s slogan that meaning is use. One accepts the view that the notion of meaning must be explained in terms of truth-theoretic notions and is committed to the epistemic conception of truth. The other keeps the notion of meaning and the truth-theoretic notions apart and is not committed to the epistemic conception of truth. I argue that Dummett endorses the first way of construing Wittgenstein’s slogan. I address the issue by discussing two of Dummett’s arguments against the realist truth-theoretic conception of meaning: the manifestation argument and the argument for the unintelligibility of classical logic. I examine the dialectic of those arguments and show that they rest on the assumption that meaning needs to be explained in terms of truth-theoretic notions.
The semantic anti-realist challenge : an exposition of the dispute between semantic realism and anti-realism
2002
During my studies of philosophy, there are three people whose lectures and works have greatly influenced and shaped my philosophical views.
MEANING-THEORETICAL CONDITIONS AND VERIFICATION: A Defense of Dummett against Tarski
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, 2024
In the upcoming article, we will explore a critique of Dummett’s towards Tarski that has often been overlooked or not fully appreciated. Dummett’s verificationist anti-realism serves as the foundation for the critique. According to this author, a theory of meaning for a particular language—which are found in a theory of harmony—determine the cir-cumstances in which the meaning of a sentence of the language can be theorized, or presented in a strategic and non-defeating theoretical de-piction of its possible assertion. These prerequisites create a mediating bridge between the statement of a sentence and its effects, defining the circumstances in which the incompatibility of “p” and “not-p” can be considered and projected. Tarski is criticized for his formal and mate-rial semantic theory of truth, which hides or masks the epistemic cir-cumstances by presenting them in a straightforward and codified man-ner in inductive principles.
The Tenability of Meaning Irrealism
2019
The Kripke-Wittgenstein (KW) sceptical argument, presented in Chapter 2 of Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), concludes that there are no meaning facts. While realism has been denied for a great many subject matters, the meaning irrealism motivated by KW’s argument has particularly farreaching consequences. This thesis is an investigation into some of these consequences, in an effort to determine what is at stake in accepting the argument as sound. In Chapter 2, I summarise the argument, assume that it is sound, and consider the consequences for one particular body of talk: discourse about meaning itself. Three models for characterising that discourse are canvassed: error-theory, non-factualism, and mere minimalism. The latter characterisation is made available by adopting the framework for realism debates proposed by Crispin Wright in Truth and Objectivity (1992), of which I give an exposition in Chapter 1. I find in Chapter 2 that the three models of meani...
On the Conceptual Foundations of Anti-Realism
Author(s): Sanford Shieh
Source: Synthese, Vol. 115, No. 1 (1998), pp. 33-70
Published by: Springer
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SANFORD SHIEH
ON THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF ANTI-REALISM*
for anti-realism
Dummett's
of Michael
The central premise
argument
global
a
sentence
indexical-free
of
of
the
that a speaker's
declarative,
grasp
meaning
thesis has been the subject
This enigmatic
must be manifested
in her uses of that sentence.
has emerged
about its content
of a consensus
and something
of a great deal of discussion,
ABSTRACT.
is the thesis
thesis expresses
view
is that the manifestation
The received
and justification.
in agreement
with Quine's
view
and reductive
essentially
theory of meaning,
communication.
of
about
the
worries
and motivated
epistemology
by
In the present
paper
is neither
thesis
I begin
festation
I then
a behaviorist
of
language,
of the mani
that this standard
interpretation
arguing
nor philosophically
to Dummett's
faithful
writings
of the
from Dummett's
texts, an account
reconstructing,
by
particularly
continue
by
view. On
that differ sharply from the received
its justification,
I argue that
not epistemologically,
but conceptually.
is motivated
the thesis
my
reading,
our conceptions
and justification
lead to a con
of meaning,
connections
assertion,
among
we cannot
form a clearly
coherent
of meaning:
about the metaphysics
clusion
conception
compelling.
manifestation
thesis,
and of
at the same time
can attach different meanings
to a sentence
without
of how two speakers
I conclude
that sentence.
made with
assertions
in what
they count as justifying
differing
anti-realism
should be
some suggestions
for global
about how Dummett's
with
argument
account
thesis.
of
the
manifestation
understood,
given my
In this paper
realism.
I will
discuss
Anti-realism,
Dummett's
anti
of Michael
is
is a program for interpreting
of logic, and resolving
these issues
the foundations
as is well-known,
sues inmetaphysics
and the philosophy
on the basis of a verificationist
The focus of my discus
view of meaning.
sion is the central premise of Dummett's
argument for this verificationist
view
of meaning:
of the meaning
of a sentence must be
subject's knowledge
'manifest' in the use she makes ofthat sentence, or must consist
a capacity to use that sentence in certain ways.
of possessing
A
(1)
I will
call this claim
the manifestation
thesis, and I will discuss two issues
The other is, how is it justified?
is, what does itmean?
to answering
and
these questions,
and
By
large I will confine myself
to
for
anti-realism.
is
little
how
it
used
will
about
argue
say relatively
in the lit
of anti-realism
unlike much of the existing discussions
Hence,
about
it. One
erature,
I shall not be attempting
to defend,
attack,
or evaluate Dummett's
views.
Synthese 115: 33-70, 1998.
*
?
1998 Kluwer
Academic
Publishers.
Printed
in the Netherlands.
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SANFORD SHIEH
34
I have two reasons for choosing
such a narrow focus. Firstly, answers
are surely necessary
to these questions
to understand
before it is possible
or
how the anti-realist
assess
to
to
is
work
its success
program
supposed
or failure. Secondly,
I would
that
argue
many of the existing discussions
of anti-realism
have
in fact made
than easier
to understand.
that comes
out of these discussions
This
the manifestation
thesis
harder
rather
is because
the interpretation
of the thesis
is inconsistent with a number of other
views
about meaning
that Dummett
holds. Given the foundational
role that
the manifestation
to my mind
thesis plays in anti-realism,
this fact shows
that Dummett's
anti-realist program has yet to be fully understood.
I do not claim
that my
to understand
thesis is the only
reading of the manifestation
it. Indeed, I think that perhaps
the best that
'right' way
theses coexist
in
might be said on this score is that several manifestation
Dummett's
work. So, my main purpose here is merely
to sketch one one
the foundations
of anti-realism.
This said, however,
way into understanding
I should mention
two things in favor of my account of the manifestation
thesis. Firstly, it squares with precisely
those of Dummett's
texts that more
of the thesis fail to account for. Secondly,
and more
interpretations
I
an
would
claim
that
my interpretation
importantly,
represents
attempt to
uncover the basic motivations
of Dummett's
and thus enables
anti-realism,
one to begin to grasp its philosophical
depth.
standard
The following
divides into three sections. In the first, Iwill present what
I call "the standard interpretation"
of anti-realism
and of the manifestation
is an amalgam
of existing discussions
of anti-realism,
and
thesis, which
show what I think is wrong with it.1 This motivates
of
my interpretation
the manifestation
I will present in the second section. In the
thesis, which
final section,
manifestation
I will
discuss
briefly
thesis and Dummett's
I. THE STANDARD
the relation
argument
my account
for anti-realism.
between
of the
INTERPRETATION OF ANTI-REALISM
core of anti-realism
is a negative
that what Dummett
thesis, namely,
calls the 'realist' conception
of meaning
is problematic.
This conception
of meaning
two claims:
consists of the following
The
(2)
The meaning
of the meaning)
of a
(or a central component
sentence
indexical-free
is the condition
in which
declarative,
it is true.
(3)
truth condition
of such a sentence can obtain (or fail to do
so), even if we, human speakers of the language of the state
of recognizing
that it
ment, are not capable, even in principle,
obtains (or fails to do so).
The
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
35
of language, and itwould
(2) is of course a familiar thesis in the philosophy
seem that whatever
about it is not peculiar to anti-realism.
is controversial
a view of
of realism; it expresses
(3) is part of Dummett's
interpretation
to various areas of discourse;
truth applicable
and, according
content of traditional
the non-metaphorical
it constitutes
mett,
claim about
to (3) realist truth conditions.
conforming
takes issue with the second
Anti-realism
Dummett
for what might
argues
Iwill
of entities.2
the mind-independence
of these
the central
be called
to Dum
realisms'
call truth conditions
theses.
Specifically,
thesis of anti-realism:
then the truth con
7/"meaning is identified with truth conditions,
cannot have the
statements
of
most
classes
ditions of
interesting
feature described by thesis (3).
(4)
Dummett
has several different
of these can be represented
Basis of Intuitionistic
Philosophical
known
of a ...
arguments for this thesis. The most well
set of claims from "The
by the following
(Dummett
Logic"
...
1978, 215-277).
be, or contain as an in
in the use made of it, lying
is not manifest
anything which
gredient,
that meaning:
who
mind
of
the
individual
in
the
apprehends
solely
use
to
the
made of the
be
about
if two individuals
agree completely
(i) The meaning
statement
cannot
then they agree about its meaning
statement,
of a statement
(ii) The reason is that the meaning
as an instrument of communication
between
powers of a chess piece
to the rules.
cannot
(iii) An individual
communicate:
or formula
consist
communicate
if one individual
some mental
solely
solely in its r?le
individuals,
just as the
in its r?le in the game according
what
associated
content,
where
consists
he cannot
with
be observed
to
amathematical
the association
symbol
did not lie in
of the symbol or formula, then he could not convey
by means of the symbol or formula, for his audience would
and would have no means of becoming
of the association
the use he made
that content
be unaware
aware of it.
is
of a particular
symbol or expression
which consists
that is, knowledge
knowledge,
frequently verbalizable
in the ability to state the rules in accordance with which the expression
or symbol is used ....
in
of meaning
consisted
(v) But to suppose that, in general, a knowledge
a
an
if
infinite
involve
would
verbalizable
grasp
regress:
knowledge
(iv)
[KJnowledge
of the meaning
in general,
in the abil
of an expression
the meaning
consisted,
to
for anyone
be impossible
then it would
ity to state its meaning,
of
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SANFORD SHIEH
36
learn a language who was
not already
equipped
with
a fairly extensive
language.
... constitutes
the understanding
of ...
which
that knowledge
(vi) Hence
... must be
implicit knowledge.
language
to
be ascribed
cannot, however, meaningfully
(vii) Implicit knowledge
to say in what the manifestation
someone unless it is possible
of that
there must be an observable
difference
consists:
between
knowledge
or capacities of someone who
and someone who is said to lack it.
the behaviour
is said to have
that knowl
edge
Hence
that a grasp of the meaning
of a ... state
it follows, once more,
(viii)
to use that statement
ment must,
in a
in general, consist of a capacity
certain
way
....
in what
the knowledge
of the condition
under
[I]t is quite obscure
a sentence
is true can consist, when
that condition
is not one
which
....
as obtaining
which
is always capable of being recognised
...
...
not effectively
the condition
is
decidable,
(x) [W]hen the sentence
in general, obtain for it to be true is not one which we are
which must,
(ix)
capable of recognising
a position
to do so.
whenever
it obtains,
or of getting
in
ourselves
a capacity
for acknowledging
which
any behaviour
(xi) Hence
displays
the condition
for its
the sentence as being true in all cases in which
as obtaining will fall short of being a full
truth can be recognised
of the condition
of the knowledge
for its truth ....
manifestation
cannot be a theory in which meaning
(xii) The [realistic] theory of meaning
is fully determined
1978, 216-225)
by use. (Dummett
I shall call the argument
expressed
in these claims
the argument
for
anti
realism.
account of the overall structure of this argument
is, I
following
To
it
The
all
divides
into
three
but
think,
parts.
begin with,
indisputable.
two sub-arguments
first two parts, claims (i)-(iii) and (iv)-(viii)
constitute
is
for precisely
the manifestation
thesis. The first sub-argument,
(i)-(iii),
that
is essentially
and
based on two claims: that meaning
communicable,
associated
communication
by a speaker with
requires that the meanings
The
sentences
be manifest
in her use of these
sentences.
I will
call
this sub
The
second
argument.
communicability
of meaning
on
two
claims:
that
knowl
is
also
based
(iv)-(vii)
linguistic
sub-argument,
of implicit
edge must be at least partly implicit, and that the ascription
an
a
account
to
that
of
how
she
manifests
subject requires
knowledge
argument
the essential
I will call this sub-argument
the argument from
the implic
knowledge.
The final sub-argument,
itness of linguistic knowledge.
(ix)-(xii),
attempts
to show that the realist conception
of meaning
does not satisfy the man
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
ifestation
sentence,
of an
the notion
employs
that
the
claim
only by
Dummett
thesis. Here
which
he explains
37
'undecidable'
sen
to 'undecidable'
If one attributes realist truth conditions
are
ones
are
not
"we
conditions
then
these
tences,
capable of
whenever
[they] obtain".
recognizing
(5)
The argument seems to go as follows. Firstly, a subject's behavior can only
as ... true in all cases
sentence[s]
display "a capacity for acknowledging
as obtaining".
can
for [their] truth
be recognised
in which
the conditions]
sentences described by (5), if
Secondly,
given the feature of 'undecidable'
is realist, no subject's behavior can
of such a sentence
the truth condition
of her knowledge
of that truth condition. Hence,
be "a full manifestation"
sentences with
of 'undecidable'
of the meanings
finally, the identification
realist
truth conditions
a tacit premise
might
be expressed
thesis. There
seems
to be
as follows:
subject's use of a statement consists of those aspects of her
for acknowledging
the truth
behavior
that display a capacity
that statement whenever
its truth
of the sentence used to make
A
(6)
as obtaining
can be recognised
condition
I will
the manifestation
violates
here, which
call this last sub-argument
the argument
against
realist
truth condi
tions.
Given
this account
structure
of the overall
of the argument
for anti
the manifestation
thesis
of what
realism, it is clear why an understanding
means
is critical for understanding
the argument
knew
has to be
why knowledge
of (6), and
of meaning
why (5) implies
ifest' knowledge
that the 'uses' of
then we would
for anti-realism.
'manifested'
'undecidable'
If we
in 'use', in the sense
sentences
fail to 'man
of their meanings,
see how
to work.
the argument is supposed
I turn now to present the standard interpretation
proper. Until further
is a
notice, I speak on its behalf. The starting point of this interpretation
natural assumption
about what Dummett means by 'manifestation'.
Con
sider the first definition
of the transitive
verb 'to manifest'
in The Oxford
to the eye or to the understanding;
reveal". One way to understand
this definition
"To make
evident
English Dictionary:
to show plainly, disclose,
stresses the phrase,
'make evident'.
that what manifests
something
is
is, one sense of 'to manifest'
is evidence for its presence. This is the sense
That
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SANFORD SHIEH
38
of "manifest"
that the standard
on this interpretation,
There must
(7)
statement,
And
the critical
claim
to Dummett.
attributes
interpretation
the manifestation
thesis means:
be evidence,
in the form of a subject's
for her grasp of its meaning.
for the argument
for anti-realism
Thus,
'use' of a
is:
'use' of an 'undecidable'
sentence cannot provide
subject's
for her knowledge
evidence
of its realist truth condition.
A
(8)
Note
that there clearly is support in Dummett's
text for this interpretation
For example,
in claim (ii) Dummett
"An indi
writes,
vidual cannot communicate
cannot
to communicate".
what he
be observed
This seems to say that, if someone
is to communicate
then
something,
her audience must have observational
evidence
for what she communi
of
'manifestation'.
cates. Also,
in claim (vii) Dummett
"there must be an observable
writes,
or
difference
between
the behaviour
of someone who
[has im
capacities
... lack[s] it".
and someone who
this
plicit] knowledge
Again,
suggests
that Dummett
implicit
Now
on observational
is insisting
evidence
for the possession
of
knowledge.
that we have
seen the standard interpretation
of 'manifestation',
I
turn to present the standard interpretation
of the argument for anti-realism.
I will begin with the argument against realist truth conditions.
Here I fol
low John McDowell
and Colin
McGinn.3
sense
their reading,
in order to
notion of the 'use' of a state
On
make
of this argument, Dummett's
with (6), must be understood
ment, which we have partially characterized
as really the Quinean
notion of physicalistically
describable
dispositions
to assent to or to dissent from sentences under suitable prompting.
Their
argument goes as follows. Given this account
of 'use', and given the identification
of meaning with truth conditions,
the
manifestation
thesis means
that the evidence
for someone's
knowledge
reconstruction
of Dummett's
of the truth condition
dispositions
be evidence
to verbal
of a sentence
must
be restricted
to her
(Quinean)
would
But, what behavioral
dispositions
a
of
the
truth
condition
of
sentence?
knowledge
behavior.
for someone's
It is hard to see that they could be anything other than dispositions
to assent
to and to dissent from that sentence, when
its truth condition
obtains, or
so.
to
we
do
if
can't
the
of
the truth
now,
But,
fails
recognize
obtaining
of a sentence,
the truth conditions
condition
But
our being able
there are no behavioral
without
then we
of
have these dispositions.4
surely wouldn't
sentences precisely
'undecidable'
could obtain
to recognize
dispositions
that they do so. So, it impossible
that
to serve as evidence
for a speaker's
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
association
of realist
truth conditions
with
these
sentences.
are not necessarily manifestable.
I turn to the standard interpretation
of the essential
Hence
39
realist
truth conditions
Now
communica
(1981). The
argument. Here again I follow McDowell
bility of meaning
stated premises. The first premise,
argument has two explicitly
expressed
a
over
statement
claim
is
that
the
of
is
and
above
(ii),
by
meaning
nothing
what
can be communicated
by claim
by one speaker to another. The second premise,
is
that communication
(iii),
requires one speaker to
another speaker associates
with
the statements
the
expressed
know what meaning
it is perhaps uncontroversial
latter makes. Now,
that knowledge
requires
and
it
is
also
that such justifi
justification;
perhaps
relatively
plausible
cation requires evidence.
So, the two explicit premises
imply that there
must be evidence
a
a statement.
for someone's
with
associating
meaning
thesis, i.e., they do
they do not by themselves
imply the manifestation
not show that the evidence
verbal behav
should be restricted to Quinean
But
ioral dispositions.
of the argument
Now,
leaves
on McDowell's
out
is the fact
statement
view, what the explicit
that Dummett
is an old-fashioned
assumes
foundationalist.
That is, Dummett
that, to count
epistemological
as knowledge,
a claim must be based on other evidentiary
claims that are
as
less problematic.
This foundationalist
certain, or at least epistemically
with
the
that
claims
about
sumption,
together
premise
(physicalistically
verbal dispositions
describable)
claims about meaning,
complete
are epistemically
less problematic
than
the essential communicability
of meaning
argument.5
the standard interpretation
of the argument from
Finally, I will discuss
the implicitness
of linguistic knowledge.
Here I follow Alexander
George
is motivated
about
view, this argument
(1987). On George's
by worries
the methodology
of
In particular,
takes
he
linguistic
theorizing.
Dummett's
to be to explain verbal behavior by at
to speakers of a language.
of
tributing knowledge
meaning
Dummett
also
that
of a theory of
However,
argues (claim (v))
knowledge
must
at
least in part, tacit knowledge.
The reason Dummett
be,
meaning
of the meanings
of expressions
consists of
gives is that if all knowledge
abilities to state these meanings,
to learn a language
then it is not possible
fundamental
of
without
project
theories
a language. So, in the present context, a subject's
of a theory of meaning means
that if we ask
implicit knowledge
she knows the part of the theory of meaning
that we claim she
already knowing
possessing
her whether
she won't be able to answer either way. Hence, we can't rely on
knows,
to decide whether our attributions of knowledge
her testimony
are correct.
This leads Dummett
to raise the question, what reason can we have to
think that an attribution of implicit knowledge
is correct? Another way of
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SANFORD SHIEH
40
that explains
is, how do know that it is tacit knowledge
putting this question
the linguistic behavior? Note
to George,
that this shows that, according
Dummett
is primarily
interested
in questions
about the epistemology
of
tacit knowledge
these questions.
attributions.
Itmeans
answer to
(vii) expresses Dummett's
can know whether
an attribution of tacit
Claim
that we
is correct
to evidence
in the form of verbal
only by appealing
are
that
of
the
verbal
behavior which
dispositions
independent
to
the tacit knowledge
is supposed
explain.
knowledge
behavioral
Now,
George's
interpretation
does not suffice to reach
clearly
so far commits
So
to a Quinean
of some
Dummett
this indicates
finishes
at this point, but this argument
thesis, because nothing
of linguistic behavior.
conception
the manifestation
the existence
in George's
gaps
account
of the
the implicitness
of linguistic knowledge.
But one can sup
account
with
the
that
McDowell
adds
plement George's
precisely
premises
to the text of the essential
of
That
argument.
communicability
meaning
the following
line of thought. Correct
is, one can attribute to Dummett
from
argument
are obviously
of tacit knowledge
items of knowledge
about
Dummett's
such
foundationalism,
speakers. Thus, given
epistemological
attributions must rest on claims about Quinean
in
behavioral
dispositions,
order to be correct.
attributions
To sum up, the standard
is as follows:
interpretation
of Dummett's
argument
for anti
realism
The essential
(I)
communicability
of meaning
argument.
Premises:
1. The meaning
communicated
2. Communication
of a statement
is nothing over and above what can be
by one speaker to another.
another
requires one speaker to know what meaning
associates
speaker
with
the statements
the latter makes
by uttering
sentences.
as knowledge,
that are certain,
a claim must be based on other evidentiary
or at least epistemically
less problematic.
are epis
4. Claims about physicalistically
describable
verbal dispositions
less problematic
than claims about meaning.
temically
3. To count
claims
Conclusion:
5. If someone
evidence,
to verbal
some meaning
with
in the form of her physicalistically
associates
behavior,
a sentence,
there must be
describable
dispositions
for this association.
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
(II)
from the implicitness
Argument
of linguistic
41
knowledge.
Premises:
aim of linguistic theory is to explain speakers' verbal behavior by
of a theory of meaning.
attributing to them knowledge
in abilities to
of expressions
consists
2. If all knowledge
of the meanings
1. One
to learn a language without
state these meanings,
then it is not possible
a
already knowing
language.
of a theory of meaning must be at least
3. Hence a speaker's knowledge
partly tacit; that is, her testimony does not suffice to decide whether an
is correct.
of a theory of meaning
attribution of knowledge
can be judged only
4. The correctness
of an attribution of tacit knowledge
to
in
the
form
of
verbal
behavior
that is inde
evidence
by appealing
pendent of the verbal behavior
to explain.
5. A correct
attribution
which
the tacit knowledge
is supposed
is an item of knowledge
of tacit knowledge
about
speakers.
Conclusion:
for attribu
6. Hence,
by steps 2 and 3 above, there must be evidence
to a speaker in the form of her
tions of tacit knowledge
of meaning
to verbal behavior.
describable
physicalistically
dispositions
The argument
(III)
realist
against
truth conditions:
Premises:
1. Legitimate
restricted
for judgements
evidence
about what a speaker means
to her dispositions
to verbal behavior, construed physicalis
tically.
2. The only behavioral
dispositions
sociating certain truth conditions
assent
to and to dissent
from
obtain, or fail to obtain.
sentence
3. If an 'undecidable'
ditions
could
obtain
without
that are evidence
with
a statement
sentences,
when
has
realist
our being
for someone's
is
as
are dispositions
to
their truth conditions
truth conditions,
able to recognize
these
con
that they
do.
4.
If this possibility
would be disposed
is realized
to assent
for an
'undecidable'
to it even when
sentence,
its truth conditions
no one
obtain.
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SANFORD SHIEH
42
5. Hence,
there are no behavioral
association
speaker's
to serve as evidence
for a
dispositions
truth conditions with an 'undecidable'
of realist
sentence.
Conclusion:
6. Realist
are not manifestable,
and the realist conception
is not a possible
of meaning.
conception
truth conditions
of meaning
con
Before
my account of the standard interpretation.
to
out
two
that
it
has
essential
features. Firstly, what
tinuing,
point
the manifestation
thesis are epistemological
in the
constraints,
justifies
sense.
The
fundamental
idea
this
thesis
if
is
that
following
underlying
a
must
is
the
of
to
it
be
know
statement,
something
meaning
possible
that a speaker associates
it with the statement. Hence,
the right account
This
concludes
I want
of
the meanings
gitimate evidence
statements
of
must
for a speaker's
of meaning must
So, an account
evidence for this association.
depend
association
depend
on our view
of meanings
of what
with
is le
sentences.
on epistemological
claims about
the standard view is that, for Dum
is just a set of Quinean dispositions
Secondly,
mett, the use of a linguistic expression
to exhibit verbal behavior,
and so the manifestation
thesis is a Quinean
behaviorist
restriction on allowable
evidence
for what someone means by
the sentences
she produces.
The justification
for this notion of 'use' is,
a
it
is
foundationalist
again, epistemological;
epistemology.
I turn now
to show why
of Dummett.
interpretation
tures of this interpretation
views about meaning.
the standard
The
reason
are, or seem
as an
is problematic
interpretation
is simply that the two defining fea
to be, inconsistent with Dummett's
in which
To begin with, consider the following
passage,
in philosophy:
innovation
acterizes Frege's fundamental
Because
philosophy
theory of meaning
us
Descartes
misled
having
only
perceived
part
as
has,
...
the
its first
if not
is the foundation
its only
task, the
of all philosophy,
into believing.
... starts
this. He
of philosophy
whose
greatness
Frege's
from meaning
by
results do not depend
consists,
taking
upon
char
Dummett
...
of meanings,
analysis
and not epistemology
in the first place,
the theory
those
of any
in his
as
of meaning
other
as
part,
the
but
which underlies all the rest. (Dummett 1981a, 659, emphasis mine)
the assumption
phy, this text goes
account
Dummett's
On
Secondly,
ical precisely
in philoso
innovation
accepts Frege's
that
the
standard
assumption
interpretation's
against
'results'.
of language depends on epistemological
that Dummett
throughout
Quine's
Dummett's
restriction
writings
of evidence
on Quine, he is highly crit
to behavioral
for meaning
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
43
of this criticism. Here Dum
I cite a characteristic
expression
dispositions.
to Quine's
the influence
mett is objecting
claim that we cannot distinguish
to assent
information on our dispositions
of meaning
from that of collateral
to sentences:
to be denied
that it is an integral part of what we learn when we learn to use
It is scarcely
reasons
for our own assertions....
of giving
the practices
that we should acquire
language
to characterize
in terms of speakers'
of language
the working
is attempting
Quine
entirely
...
sentences
to
to
under
certain
stimulations
dissent
from
assent
and
sensory
dispositions
. It
may
to distinguishing,
in respect of status,
in principle
is an obstacle
on the basis of evidence
statements
of this kind. But
stimulus-analytic
are spurious:
to the
for there is a great deal more
that such distinctions
that hardly
implies
to
use of language
assent
in
and
the registering
dissent
than merely
response
appropriate
of
be
that there really
between
different
sensory
stimuli....
Dummett
(Dummett
here clearly
1981a,
rejects
614;
mine)
emphases
the identification
of
'use' with Quinean
ver
bal dispositions.
Two isolated
substantial output do not, obvi
from Dummett's
passages
a decisive
refutation of any interpretation. Dummett may
ously, constitute
to adopt the standard interpretation,
be
inconsistent.
But,
given the
simply
an argument
is to attribute to Dummett
tensions just outlined,
that relies
on premises
he himself
rejects, and that seems to go against his view of
status of the theory of meaning.
this
So, if one accepts
seem at least somewhat odd that Dummett
is an anti
the foundational
itmust
interpretation,
realist. To my mind,
to polemic,
opposed
ing the argument
writings.
This
attempt
meaning
meaning
this shows
we now have
for anti-realism
is precisely
to develop
that if our interest
reason
as
is in understanding,
to look for a way of understand
that makes
overall
sense of Dummett's
I will
what I will do in the next section. Specifically,
an interpretation
of the essential
of
communicability
that coheres with
the aspects of Dummett's
view of
argument
that I have just presented.
II. THE MANIFESTATION
OF MEANING
I'll begin my reading of the essential
of meaning
communicability
a
ment by taking
text.
closer look at the structure of Dummett's
It is clear that claim (i) states two versions
of the conclusion
argu
to be
reached:
(a)
a statement
"The meaning
of...
manifest
in the use made of it",
cannot be
...
anything
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... not
SANFORD SHIEH
44
and,
"if two individuals
(b)
of the statement,
about the use
agree completely
then they agree about its meaning".
to be made
of the conclusion
the second formulation
interpretation,
same dispositions
as
two
the
have
if
the claim that
be taken
speakers
the same
then they associate
to assent to or to dissent from a sentence,
On
the standard
must
actual
it is not clear that this is Dummett's
it. However,
Dummett's
criticism
the
'use'.
Consider
passage containing
conception
I cited in the last section. Its first sentence
of Quine
suggests an account
of what Dummett means by 'use': "it is an integral part of what we learn
with
meaning
of
we
when
learn
reasons
giving
takes a central
to use language
that we should acquire
The suggestion
for our own assertions".
of
the practices
is that Dummett
to be giving reasons for our
part of the 'use' of language
I want to cite
own assertions,
or, as I shall put it, justifying our assertions.6
this account of use: "In general,
that confirms
another text of Dummett's
of a sentence will involve, as intrinsic to that understand
the understanding
on it, the ability to recognise
the validity of
consequent
ing and not merely
as
sentence
to
conclusion"
that
1979, 380,
(Dummett
arguments
leading
a
sentence
with
Dummett
identifies
Since
understanding
emphasis mine).
knowing
its meaning,
meaning
assertion
of a sentence
of the
I read this text as claiming
that knowledge
requires being able to recognize what justifies an
of it.
So, a provisional
with this conception
interpretation
of use is:
of version
(b) of the conclusion
that fits
as justifi
If two speakers agree in what they would recognize
same
to
a
the
then they attach
cations for
statement,
meaning
(9)
it.
For the moment,
ment
that meaning
of the conclusion
of the require
I shall take (9) to express my understanding
in use. The reason why this interpretation
be manifested
'would recognize'
is that what the phrase
is provisional
clearer, and this is not possible until we have
of the argument.
gone some way into my reconstruction
reason is",
text
Dummett's
of
Claim
(ii)
begins with the phrase, "The
not
is
But
it
for
the
conclusion.
that it gives the grounds
entirely
suggesting
these grounds are given solely by (ii), or by (ii) and (iii)
clear whether
these claims are independent. The standard
together; nor is it clear whether
claims. The
take
I
think,
(ii) and (iii) to be independent
interpretation must,
means
'manifestation'
Dummett
what
about
reason is, its assumption
by
receives no support in the text until (iii). That claim seems to express the
amounts
to needs
to be made
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
45
to communication,
is necessary
thereby suggesting
is invoking the notion of evidence. Thus the standard inter
while
(iii)
pretation must see (ii) as relating meaning with communication,
on
or
of
in
the
evidence,
manifestation,
requirement
independent
brings
communication.
idea that observation
that Dummett
But this reading
this claim Dummett
does
not account
feature of (ii). In
for the following
of a statement consists solely
between
and,
individuals",
this claim and the claim that
between
states that "the meaning
in its r?le as an instrument of communication
then, he goes on to draw an analogy
"the powers of a chess piece consist
to the rules". This
on what
itmeans
solely in its r?le in the game according
that
the analogy is supposed to shed light
surely suggests
to claim that "the meaning
of a statement consists solely
in its r?le as an instrument
of communication".
I shall
for my
is the point of departure
interpretation.
analogy
to
I
In
II.
shall
in
four
the
1,
try
stages.
spell out
develop
interpretation
a chess
a
statement
the
of
of
and
the meaning
the analogy between
powers
piece. In II.2, I shall give an account of certain features of the linguistic
This
or, rather, features of one aspect of the practice of
practice of assertion;
communi
of the essential
In II.3, I shall give a reconstruction
assertion.
the argument has,
argument. On this reconstruction
cability of meaning
as premises,
in the second stage, and,
identified
the features of assertion
as conclusion,
the claim that, if two speakers agree in what they would
as
for a statement, then they attach the same mean
recognize
justifications
come
back to the text, and show, on the basis of the
ing to it. In II.5, I'll
of the argument indicated in the third stage, how the relation
reconstruction
(I note here, for the sake of
(ii) and (iii) should be understood.
some
I
of
in
II.4
discuss
that
potential misunderstandings
completeness,
between
of II.3, and in II.6 the salient
and the standard one.)
the reconstruction
interpretation
differences
between
my
II. 1
The first task, in spelling out the analogy between
language and chess, is
a chess piece consist
sense
to
the
of
the
in
which
understand
powers
surely
to
In
the
order to do this, let
in
in
rules.
its
role
the
game according
solely
us ask: what
is the role of a chess piece in the game? A plausible
answer, I
a
in
is
the
which
allowed,
ways
player
by
the piece. This answer explains why the
think, is that its role is specified
by the rules of chess, to move
powers of a chess piece consist
the
solely in its role in the game. Given
as
serve
in
the
of
the
rules,
any object may
piece
question;
specification
serves as the piece does not matter. Put in
the intrinsic nature of what
another way: an object counts a chess piece in virtue of the rules, not of
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SANFORD SHIEH
46
so the power of a chess piece is not a property
intrinsic
of the
rather, it depends entirely on the specification
role of the piece in the game. Thus, I read the analogy between meaning
of a statement
is
and the powers of chess pieces as follows. The meaning
not a property
intrinsic to the objects used to make that statement. Rather,
its intrinsic
properties.
to the object;
And
depends entirely on the rules of communication.
in detail
To go any further here, it seems that we have to say something
seems
a
But
of
task.
this
about the rules
communication.
Which,
daunting
this meaning
to communica
linguistic actions we perform, belongs
take it that
rules, if any, govern these actions? Does Dummett
of a statement is to be specified by the rules governing
all the
of the innumerable
tion? What
the meaning
actions we
can perform with it in communication?
I believe,
to address
it is not necessary,
Fortunately,
the full range of
reason
as
we have seen,
The
these questions
is
that,
open up.
a central part of the 'use' of statements
of
is the justification
complexities
for Dummett
I take it that, for Dummett,
the
Hence,
are the making
to an account of meaning
of
of a statement depends entirely
assertions.
So the claim is that the meaning
on the ways
to
in which we are allowed, by the rules governing
assertion,
make an assertion with the statement.7
assertions
made
communicative
with
statements.
actions
central
seem that, in
exactly are we to make of this claim? It might
to get anywhere, we now have to give a detailed account of the rules
the linguistic practice of assertion. This may well appear to be
governing
an equally hopeless
task. One might
think that there is no one practice of
in which we engage, with its own precise rules. What
assertion
assertion
But what
order
to a large extent on the context
in which
the notion
is
depends
one
are
sense
to
contexts
it
in
which
that
is
There
makes
say
deployed.
that it is
required to make an assertion even though one did not believe
requires
true. There
would
assertion
which
are situations
to be entitled to make an assertion, one
in which,
to rule out certain possibilities,
and others in which
the same
so.
are
to
could be made without
do
in
There
situations
having
have
saying
something
true does not amount
tomaking
an assertion.
And
so on.
I take these points to be indisputable.
But I don't think that a detailed
of the rules governing
is required for an interpretation
assertion
I hold, rather, that the significance
of Dummett's
of taking the
argument.
on
one aspect
statements
to
the
of
is
of
rules
assertion
this:
depend
meaning
account
of our conception
of meaning
that
depends on features of certain contexts
as
an assertion
count
contexts
in which
is made.
these
Specifically,
sense to take individuals
are ones in which
contexts
to intend
it makes
we
to say something
true, and
so
it makes
sense
to inquire
after
the truth
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
47
or not it matters
to us to decide
that question.
of what we say, whether
to the argument
is suggested
That these are the situations which matter
an
as
account
to
assertion
"a general
of
Dummett's
by
activity
subject
the utterance of a sentence, except in special contexts,
convention whereby
as being carried out with the intention of uttering a true
is understood
sentence'.
of assertion"
my
1981a, 298) I shall henceforth
(Dummett
speak of "our practice
to indicate these occasions.8
This concludes
the first stage of
interpretation.
II.2
of our practice of assertion.
identify two general characteristics
The first is the fact that there are certain normative
conditions
attached
I shall now
to the making
sertion unless
of an assertion,
the conditions
such
that an action
apply. Dummett
thus: "the convention
governing
cannot
formulates
as an as
count
the conditions
in question
the making
of [assertions]
acts as correct and incorrect:
involves a classification
of such linguistic
...
an assertion
1981a, 357).9 A more
(Dummett
requires justification".
to
intuitive formulation,
due
Thomas Ricketts,
is this: "We cannot take
someone
to be making
in complete disregard of the correctness
assertions
to be play acting or
of what he asserts; such a person would be understood
words".
(Ricketts 1982, 78)
perhaps merely mouthing
thus:
formulated
may be more precisely
a speaker must recognize
in order to count as having made an assertion,
the legitimacy
of a request to produce grounds for the truth of the state
This
on assertion
condition
ment
asserted,
presented with
to withdraw
and be prepared
the assertion,
should she be
as showing that there
considerations
which
she recognizes
are not sufficient grounds for taking the statement as true, or that there
are actually grounds for taking the statement
to be false.10 Another way
an assertion,
a speaker must
of putting
it is that, to be taken as making
as correct or incorrect, by
take what she says to be subject to assessment
to what
reference
she would
count as justifying
it.11'12
of assertion
is central to what
I want
follows,
six points in elaboration.
on assertion does not require that the speaker actu
First, the condition
a justification
for what she asserts. If that were required, too
ally possess
our
cease to count as
of
assertions
would,
many
ungrounded
implausibly,
Since
this characteristic
to make
assertions.
The
condition
merely
requires that the speaker
of her assertions.
to the justification
the claim about assertion made
Second,
that to be able to use a sentence
in making
sensitivities
know
the conditions
under which
display
certain
is not
in the characterization
assertions
those assertions
is no more
are justified.
than to
So far the
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SANFORD SHIEH
48
is (i.e., counts as) using sentences
in asser
is only that //"someone
that conditions
of justification
tions, then she must acknowledge
apply to
is one necessary
it. That is, the claim is only that this acknowledgment
of assertion;
I've left it open whether
there are others. For this
condition
claim
I believe
the starting point of this argument doesn't beg the ques
insists on other necessary
conditions
tion against any position which
for
sentences
of
the
truth
conditions
of
the
used
in
assertion, e.g., knowledge
turn
out
other
it
that
these
assertions.
Of
conditions
course,
may
making
are incompatible
with the present condition.13
reason,
on assertion
also claim that this condition
is indepen
Third, I would
of
of
what
kinds
of
dent of any particular
evidence
theory
justification,
are required to justify which
or of the
or arguments
sorts of statements,
nature of the relation between
evidence
and what it justifies. At this point
the content of this claim cannot be fully clear, for exactly what role the
notion
of justification
plays in my interpretation
has been presented.
cannot
be specified
until
the ensuing argument
Note that all of these
last three points concern what I have not claimed.
this conception
of assertion as sub
Fourth, the intuition which underlies
to
normative
conditions
is
connected
with
Dummett's
characterization
ject
are distinguished
from other
that we should try to
by the convention
being governed
content holds good". (Dummett
utter only those whose descriptive
1981a,
as
as
I
claim
that
assertion
it
understand
the
this
were,
is,
356)
doubly
intentional, or doubly normative:
of
the convention
utterances
in ...
of assertion:
"assertions
one has to accept or acknowl
an assertion,
to make
one
to
correct or
be
that
aiming at saying something
ought
edge
one
at
in
of
whether
is
it.15
true,14 regardless
fact aiming
In order
(10)
cor
intuition is this: if someone
is really trying to say something
to
matter
to
her
whether
what
she
is
indeed
then
it
correct;
rect,
says
ought
so it ought to matter
to her whether
there are reasons to think that what
The
she says
to matter
is correct.
then it ought
Just as, if I am trying to go to Boston,
what I'm doing will take me to Boston.
This, I
someone
can
to
if
be
taken
be
the thought that
making
to me whether
take it, is behind
an assertion,
the legitimacy of a request to
then she ought to acknowledge
to acknowledge
If
she
she
fails
for
what
this, then
says.
produce grounds
it is unclear that she takes reasons to think that what she says is correct to
to do with what
acknowledges
if she is given
she is saying. And then it's unclear that she
that she should be trying to say something correct. Similarly,
reason to think what she says to be incorrect, but she doesn't
acknowledge
this to be aprima
have
anything
facie
reason
to 'take back' what
she says,
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
it is equally difficult
correctness
of what
to discern
in her the acceptance
of a concern with
49
the
she says.
of reasons
for believing
that what one says to be correct
Fifth, the notion
in terms of the notion of what is, or what counts as, a reason
is explained
as follows:
the norma
for someone. The latter notion can be characterized
we
have just given apply only to reasons
as
reasons. If someone gives reasons for
recognize
individual's
assertion
isn't correct, then the latter ought
these as reasons
assertion only if she would acknowledge
tive conditions
would
that the subject
thinking that an
to withdraw
her
against the truth
she says. The analogy here is that if I intend to go to Boston, but
to do so by foot, then the claim that the subway is on
have also decided
be a reason for me
strike would be irrelevant tomy intention, and wouldn't
of what
to change what I'm doing.
it may be thought that what counts as a reason for a speaker,
Now,
cannot be the right concept
to employ
in an account of assertion,
be
cause it fails to do justice to the distinction
between
speaker's meaning
to
and linguistic meaning.
Clearly a speaker may hold herself responsible
for using a language, without
appreciating what these
some
in fact
in
and
hence without
require
particular circumstance,
to
in
But
the language
accordance
those requirements.
nothing in the
conventional
norms
norms
using
idea of "what a speaker would
this: having made
such
accept" precludes
a commitment,
the speaker certainly would accept what conventionally
counts
as a reason, in preference
to what she infact
clear to her that there is a divergence.
accepts
as a reason,
if
it were made
these intuitive ideas thus: we conceive of asser
One might
summarize
tion as a species of rational action.16
Sixth, the notion of what counts as a reason for the truth of a statement
must be distinguished
from the notion of having, or being given reason to
it true. Clearly one can't have an argument, or be given an argument
a statement to be true, without
that one takes to be a reason for believing
as
a
reason.
But
Dummett
for
the converse fails. For, as he
it
such
counting
believe
as a proof of a statement of
interprets Frege, the latter counts the following
a
a
4F' is decidable
the form 'VxFx\ where
number theoretic predicate:
a
for
numeral
of
rFnn.
But
this
is
n,
which,
every
proof,
proof
according
we cannot, even in principle,
to Dummett,
as
either carry out or recognize
an
we
count
cannot
such.17 Hence Dummett's
argument that
Frege would
as a justification
in principle give or recognize
of a statement.
I can now make clear the problem with the provisional
characterization
of the manifestation
thesis ((9) above). The question
what
is,
exactly does
that a subject
'would
of a statement amount to? Given
the claim
as a justification
recognize'
something
the distinction
made
here between
just
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SANFORD SHIEH
50
as a justification
and being given a justification,
counting
something
in the following
clear that (9) should be understood
way. The claim
as
a
a subject would
is the claim
something
justification
recognize
she would
an appropriate
manifestation
(11)
The
it as a justification,
she would
argument,
count
thesis
that
and not the claim
that if she is given
it as a justification.
Hence
the
accept
as:
should be formulated
If two speakers
for a statement,
second
it is
that
feature
agree in what they would count as justifications
to it.
then they attach the same meaning
of assertion
is that there are at least
two ways
in
inmind here is the
an assertion may
I have
be disagreed with. What
are
fact
that
there
of dis
(at least) two categories
(perhaps quite obvious)
are
a
There
occasions
when
would
be
described
agreements.
disagreement
which
as merely
verbal,
substantive.
and others when
it would
be described
as genuine
or
of amerely verbal disagreement
may be brought out by the
of
the
so-called
(I
argument against skepticism.
example
'paradigm-case'
to forestall any confusion,
should say immediately,
that I don't endorse
The features
tries to show that when a skeptic seems to
this argument.) This argument
we
that
don't
know
that there are any physical
claim, say,
objects, what
a genuine disagreement
with what the so
she claims does not constitute
called 'ordinary man' believes;
and therefore, the skeptic's claim does not
The basis for this argument
threat to knowledge.
is that
pose a genuine
else
the
word
than
does
the
the skeptic means
something
by
'knowledge'
on
not
based
that
This
is
the
argument
showing
ordinary person.
skeptical
claim isn ft justified.
Indeed, it insists that the skeptical claim is justified,
to the word
but only given the meaning
the skeptic assigns
'knowledge'.
For
in the familiar
recital of Descartes,
the claim is
skeptical
example,
one
one
a
in
doesn't
know
that
is
front
of
that, say,
fire, because
sitting
one
one can't rule out the possibility
that
is dreaming. The reply would
be that what we ordinarily mean by 'know' does not require ruling out
of dreaming. We might mark this by saying that what the
the possibility
has
shown
is that we don't know* that we're sitting in front of the
skeptic
it is usually said) justifiably
claim that we
fire; but we can still (cheerfully,
sitting in front of the fire. Since the ordinary person means
else
something
by this word, for her, the claim expressed
by the sentence
uses
not
is
the skeptic
justified. The fact that the skeptic's claim is justified
does not conflict with the ordinary person's
taking the claim expressed
by
know
that we're
the skeptic's sentence not to be justified.
to show three things. First of all, it is clear that the
I take this example
that the skeptic and the ordinary person don't genuinely
basis for claiming
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
is that there is a difference
disagree
they mean
in what
51
by the sentence
in
question.
comes to
it seems that what this lack of genuine disagreement
Second,
to
is
the
in the example
is that each party
(verbal) disagreement
justified
in the attitude she adopts toward the claim that she takes to be expressed
by the sentence under (apparent) dispute, even though these attitudes are
is this. If one person takes
I mean by 'contrary attitudes'
contrary. What
an assertion made with a sentence
to be justified, or correct, and another
denies that the assertion she takes to be made with that very same sentence
is correct or justified, then they have contrary attitudes to the assertion each
to be made with a sentence.18 Note
that the reason of the second
an
correct
is
for denying
that such
assertion
could, but doesn't necessarily
to
have to, be that she takes the assertion of the negation of the sentence
takes
be justified. The important point is that, by using the notion of contrary
two subjects are genuinely
attitudes I want to avoid prejudging whether
or not.19 Let's provisionally
this to the following
generalize
disagreeing
claim:
if two
individuals
associate
different
then it is not ruled out that a situation
the same
could
circumstances,
justified
exactly
an assertion made with that sentence.
a sentence,
with
meanings
occur in which
in holding
they are, in
attitudes to
contrary
It is that not only is it the
third point is only implicit in the example.
in an alleged disagreement
could result
in meaning
that a difference
but
these
individuals
could
in both individuals
recognize
being justified,
The
case
that each
for anyone
the skeptic,
in holding
the attitude she holds. This
case argument:
if she
the
advancing
paradigm
what
she must take her grounds for maintaining
is justified
is important
is to engage
the ordinary
asserts, in face of the skeptic's apparent denial, to be something
skeptic counts as grounds. From this it seems to follow that one could
to maintain
a difference
in meaning
alone as a ground for continuing
in the face of a disagreement.
assertion
person
Before
continuing,
I summarize
the two features
of assertion
the
cite
an
just iden
tified:
(12)
an assertion,
a speaker must acknowl
To be taken as making
statement
she
is
is subject to assessment
that
the
making
edges
as correct or incorrect, by reference to what she would count as
justifying it.
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52
If two individuals
(13)
situation
mean
occur
could
i. they hold
SANFORD SHIEH
different
things by a sentence,
then a
in which
contrary
attitudes
to an assertion
made
with
that
toward
that
sentence,
ii. each
is justified
in holding
the attitude
she holds
that each
is justified
assertion,
and
iii. they can come to recognize
the attitude she holds.
in holding
II.3
I turn now
to a reconstruction
one
I begin with
of the argument for the manifestation
of the thesis:
It is not possible
for two subjects to agree
as justifications
for a statement while
(14)
thesis.
last reformulation
count
in what
they would
attaching different
to it.
meanings
This
slightly weaker version is implied by the previous version ((11) above);
but does not intuitionistically
imply it.20
The general form of the ensuing argument
is this. First I argue for the
of
three
claims:
and
(12)
(13) (the two features of
joint incompatibility
and
the
claim
that
assertion),
(15)
Let's
subjects agree in what they would count as justifications
to it.
for a statement but attach different meanings
Two
call the claim
that (15) represents
a genuine
the justi
possibility
(Note that (14) is just the
conception
fication-independent
of meaning.
claim it then follows that, if we
negation of (15).) From this incompatibility
and
the
of meaning
(13),
accept (12)
justification-independent
conception
is incoherent;
from this (14) follows.21
A
strategy
following
First,
two
for establishing
the incompatibility
claim
consists
of
the
steps.
show that if
speakers
agree
in what
count
as justifications
for an assertion
(from (15)),
and,
to make an assertion, one must take the statement one is mak
as correct or incorrect, by reference
to
to
be
ing
subject to assessment
one
as
count
what
would
it (from 12)),
justifying
in order
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
53
then
the speakers in question
of what they say.
Secondly,
share standards
for assessing
the correctness
if
two speakers
share standards
for assessing
the correctness
of what
they
say,
then
in every case of an alleged disagreement,
they can come to see that at
most one of them is right in holding
the attitude she holds with respect
to the assertion or assertions
involved in the disagreement.
Thirdly, from (13),
if two individuals
mean
then a situa
things by a sentence,
occur in which
they can come to
in holding
the attitude she holds in the
different
tion of apparent disagreement
that both are right
recognize
could
disagreement.
of the second step.
this contradicts
the conclusion
idea of this strategy is to use the features of assertion
So, the underlying
to pull the two components
of
of the justification
independent
conception
But
in opposite directions.
the most difficult part of carrying out such a strategy is the
Clearly
execution
of the second step. Indeed, what I shall offer in the sequel does
not amount to a proof of this second step. Rather, I will consider a number
in order to show that a rational inves
of cases of apparent disagreements,
meaning
would not have as an outcome
tigation of the sources of the disagreement
are right.22 (Naturally
this proceeds
that both parties to the disagreement
on the assumption
in
of complete
what
be
would
counted as
agreement
at issue.) Thus, the argument
for the assertion or assertions
justifications
a
I offer is not
among (12), (13) and (15); rather,
proof of incompatibility
it tries to show that we do not have a clear conception
of how they can
be compatible.
Thus, the case for the justification
independent
conception
I do not claim that the ensuing
of meaning
has yet to be made. A fortiori,
is a demonstration
of the manifestation
thesis. My aim is to es
argument
option; so that the burden of proof rests
to
these
aims, although I
relatively modest
Corresponding
in my selection of cases, I will not try to
have tried to be comprehensive
argue that no relevant case has been left out.
ar
One final prefatory note. The ensuing account of the manifestation
tablish
with
that the thesis
is the default
its denial.
gument
is rather abstract,
and thus misses
much
of its intuitive
attraction.
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SANFORD SHIEH
54
But,
in II.4 I hope
to remedy
this with
a more
intuitive
account
of
the
argument.
Finally I come to the argument proper.
two individuals,
Let us consider
call them A and B, who agree com
an assertion made with a
count as justifying
in what they would
pletely
a situation
S.
And
in
S but mean different
consider
sentence,
things by
A and B disagree over an assertion made with S, in the sense that
for the sake of definiteness,
they hold contrary attitudes to that assertion;
let's say that A makes an assertion with S, and B denies that that assertion
which
is justified.
By the first characteristic
of assertion, A and B, to be taken to be making
to be subject to as
statements
take the
assertions,
they are making
to what they would count as
sessment as correct or incorrect, by reference
must
to entertain,
them. On the possibility
we're attempting
these two
justifying
in what they would count as justifications
individuals agree completely
for
a statement.
It follows
in common a set of standards
that A and B possess
for assessing
Consider
whether
the assertion
now what would
of what
S expresses
is justified.
assess their ap
to
B
and
tried
happen
moment
for the
that it hasn't come to light
if A
parent difference,
assuming
that they mean different
things
are some possible
by S. The following
of
their
developments
dialogue.
is that A gives, as grounds
for her assertion
One possibility
of S, a
as
B
her
for
and
that
deductive
S, that
argument, n,
gives
grounds
denying
n is deductively
invalid. The assumption
is that A and B agree completely
on which
S. On the assumption
arguments
they would count as justifying
a
as
counts
S
for S, A
for
that a sound deductive
argument
justification
like classical
and
and B must agree on a criterion for validity; otherwise,
intuitionistic mathematicians,
they may disagree over the soundness of de
ductions
claim
of S and therefore
that they have
over what
a decision
justifies S. (This is, of course, not to
for validity;
it is only to claim
procedure
as
canonical
inferences
valid.) So, now, if
that they agree, say, on certain
to this
either A can show that n is valid, or B that it is invalid, by reference
one
would
of
their
assertions
then
it's
clear
that
criterion,
recognize
they
as justified, and the other not. In these cases,
A or B comes to realize that she was mistaken
neither
can demonstrate
not justified in her denial
A possibility
parallel
the situation
is that one of
about the validity of FL If
the validity of n, then it seems that S is
of S, so, again, not both A and B are justified.
to this is where A's ground for S is an induc
or refute
over the
let's assume
that there's no disagreement
Again
on
is
based.
Then
it seems
which
the
the
i.e.,
evidence,
argument
premises,
are:
A or
the
of
that the remaining
disagreement
possibilities
explaining
tive argument.
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
55
a mistake
B made
of inductive confirmation,
in applying
the methods
or,
leave open whether S is assertible.
for inductive confirmation
I shall leave the second case for later. The first case, it seems clear, is a
exactly parallel to the last case.
possibility
the criteria
for S
is that either A or B had access to evidence
possibility
the other hadn't. Here the basis of the criticism made by one of A
Another
which
or B of the other is not the other's reasoning,
but rather the evidence
she
on
on
the
of
evidence
S.
had. By assumption
Hence,
they agree
bearing
comes to light, they would come to see that one
here, once the evidence
of them is justified and the other not. But one might also say that if, e.g.,
to A arises because B has access to evidence which A, in
objection
her
making
judgment about S, didn't have, then A was, in absence of this
B's
evidence,
justified in asserting S. And so it seems that both A and B can
be justified
in her assertion. But, even though A might
say that she was
now
come
to light, she no
in
that
the
evidence
has
justified
asserting S,
longer can claim that she would be justified if she now asserts S. And so,
relative to the standards and evidence
shared
given a sense of justification
to
to
not
to
the
the
and
relative
what
is
available
by
parties
dispute,
only
one of them, only one of A and B can be justified.
Another possibility
is that A's grounds for S is an argument, n, relying
on some
set of claims
E. B on
hand, agrees that if all of E
but
claims
that some of ? is not well
justifies S,
justified,
on
the other hand, takes these claims to be fully justified. In
supported. A,
this case, in general, the investigation would proceed to these other claims,
where
the same process of inquiry as in the case of the original statement
were
the other
then n
could be conducted.
So this possibility
reduces to the others mentioned
never come
here. But one might
imagine that this process could potentially
an
to
one disagreement,
A and B are always
led to
end; in investigating
it seems that, at each point, neither A nor B can take her
another. Here
original claims to be justified
they are justified, conditional
tout court; rather, all they can say is that
on a decision
to their favor on the current
disagreement.
Another
is where
the statement under dispute
is observa
possibility
over
tional. For example,
A
B
and
the
"Dr.
statement,
suppose
disagree
on
Gustav Lauben's
hair is black". Suppose
who Dr. Lauben
is
they agree
and agree that in order to tell
(i.e., share criteria for identifying Lauben),
one has to see it, and, moreover,
can see Lauben
of the exchange.
Let's suppose also that they are agreed
are optimal
that the conditions
for perception
and that their perceptual
are
not
on what they
Then
organs
malfunctioning.
they agree completely
count as justifying
would
the statement; yet, while A looks at Lauben's
whether
his hair is black
at the moment
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SANFORD SHIEH
56
that it's black, B does so and claims
that it's not
share
for
hold
claims
would
both of
they
assessing
them to be justified in their claim, because we take someone's
perceptually
to be justified if she perceived
based judgment
the object in question,
and
as
here we're assuming
that nothing prevented A and B from perceiving,
hair
black.
and pronounces
The standards
to seeming to perceive, Lauben's
hair.
opposed
A
B
Another
is
where
and
for their
give different arguments
possibility
S
the
and
its
that
denial,
claims,
agree
arguments
justify, respectively,
are based. The case
and agree on all the claims on which
the arguments
as one in which
to which both disputants
the evidence
might be described
have access is conflicting. And one might
that
say
they would come to the
in their claims. But, again, if we're
conclusion
that they're both justified
the question relative to the common evidence, we would more
to decide
since the evidence
is not sufficient
the question,
that
likely say
that not both are justified.
neither is justified. So, again, it is recognized
is where A, say, bases her assertion on plausible
One final possibility
considering
and where B disagrees
that the argument A gives is plausi
reasoning,
to
that A is false, or give reasons for
without
able
demonstrate
ble,
being
finding it unlikely.
of the possibil
the upshot of the examination
One way of summarizing
over an assertion made with
ities is: if there is an apparent disagreement
a sentence, 5 between
two individuals who would count exactly the same
as
such an assertion,
then they will be able, in the
arguments
justifying
course of an analysis of their disagreement,
to arrive at the recognition
that
not both of the assertions
is correct,
except
if
over evidence,
(a) there is a brute disagreement
canons
assert
of
leave
it open whether S is legitimately
induction
the
(b)
ible, or,
are based on plausible
and their criteria of
(c) the assertions
reasoning,
plausibility
But
I would
diverge.
claim
that the notion
includes not only arguments which
and arguments which
inductively
as plausible
inductive evidence
counts
sent cases
of what
demonstrate
confirm
support for a statement,
an assertion.
legitimates
in which
the subjects
counts
agree
as justifying
a statement
the truth of the statement
it, but also criteria for what
about whether
and judgments
Thus
completely
(b) and (c) don't repre
in what they count as
a statement.
justifying
Note that the notion
way: whatever
the assertion;
in this
I just used might be described
of justification
reasons
an
assertion
for making
provides adequate
justifies
is characterized.
this adequacy
it is left open how precisely
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
is the answer
57
in discussing my account
the notion of justification
play in the account? We see now that all that is required of the notion of
to
for whatever
is that it be a placeholder
puts one in a position
justification
make an assertion. Note also that what I have tried to do in this argument
This
to the question
raised above
of assertion: what role does
of the first feature
as
of justification
the place of our conception
(understood
a
our
I
detailed
have
in
not,
above)
obviously,
provided
ordinary practices.
of this place. The reason is that I'm not trying to defend the
investigation
is to sketch
of meaning
essential communicability
our practices.
Now, the upshot of the examination
argument,
of cases
just sketch
their roots
in
can be put in this way:
over an assertion made
there is an apparent disagreement
count
a
two
individuals who would
with
sentence, S between
as justifying
such an assertion,
the same arguments
exactly
of their
then they will be able, in the course of an analysis
When
(15)
to arrive at the recognition
that not both of the
disagreement,
a
are
if
is
brute disagreement
there
assertions
correct, except
over evidence.
now is, is it possible
that, in these cases, A and B mean dif
of assertion,
the second characteristic
As
I've
described
5?
things by
in meaning,
when the dispute is merely
when there is a difference
verbal,
that both of
the speakers in question would be able to come to recognize
The question
ferent
toward the assertion made with S. It
in their attitudes
them are justified
in meaning
is compatible
of a difference
seems, then, that the possibility
over what justifies S only if there is a brute disagreement
with agreement
over evidence. Which,
it seems, is as it should be; for, in the case of the
of Dr. Lauben's hair, it seems natural to say that the people in
observations
don't mean
question
This
concludes
meaning
the same thing by 'black'.
of the essential
my reconstruction
communicability
of
argument.23'24
II.4
I turn now
to a more
intuitive
version
of the argument.
the conception
of as
underlying
the idea is that someone could
sertion as subject to normative conditions:
true unless she takes what she is
n't be taken to be trying to say something
to reasons for thinking that it is true. Thus, if there
saying to be responsive
Recall
the discussion
of the intuition
is a disagreement
parties involved
who
it ought to matter to the
of contrary assertions,
consisting
on the basis of reasons they would
to determine,
accept,
to determine who
is right. Now it seems plausible
that in an exchange
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SANFORD SHIEH
58
is right, the parties involved would put forth reasons for their claims; and,
either they would come upon some consideration
which one side accepts
but the other doesn't, or they will reach a point where
they find that they
about what justifies the statement under dispute.
In the
agree completely
latter situation, as I urged above, they would come to see, either that one of
them is justified, or that neither is. If neither is justified, nevertheless
each
reasons
have
which
her
assertion.
However,
might
legitimate
imagine that
this is not the case. Then, it seems, one or both would acknowledge
that she
to withdraw
her assertion. But if the justification
independent
of
is right, in such a situation these individuals may
conception
meaning
mean different
in question. Hence,
the one (or one
things by the sentence
of the ones) who would be required to withdraw
her assertion could cite a
as a basis for continuing
in meaning
to maintain
difference
her assertion,
is required
and be perfectly
right in doing so. The effect of this seems to be that,
the
standards
of our practice of assertion,
this speaker cannot
whereas,
by
an assertion at all, by the lights of this conception
be taken to be making
of
she
would
still
fall
within
the
of
hence
there's
assertion;
meaning
practice
a tension
this conception
and our conception
of assertion.
to
terms
an
in
illustrate this tension
of
try
example designed
to make the counter-intuitive
of this possibility
vivid.25
consequences
are
two
Consider
the following
There
called
Isabel
Archer
friends,
story.
and Kate Croy. One day, Archer says to Croy, "Ralph Touchett
lives on Elm
between
now
I will
or seemed
Street", and Croy disagreed,
talk about this (apparent) disagreement.
turns out
seen
that Archer's
reason
to disagree. But, being friends, they
In the course of the discussion,
it
for saying what she said is that she had
at this address, and had also seen, a number
of times, Touchett going into an apartment building on Elm Street at night
on the other hand,
and leaving it on the following morning.
Croy disagreed,
to Church
because
she heard from Touchett himself
that he had just moved
letters
sent to Touchett
Street.
we
that a true friend
thus, being true
count as
in what they would
and Croy agree completely
friends, Archer
reasons for and against saying, "Touchett
lives on Elm Street". But, even
in which
given this fact, we can, it seems, imagine various distinct ways
the conversation
between Archer and Croy could continue. For example,
Now
all know
is another
self;
to what Touchett himself
says than to what
they might give more weight
at
at the plausible
arrive
this
observe.
so,
And,
point, they might
they
reasons
for saying, "Touchett lives
that Archer had insufficient
conclusion
on Elm
to show
is sufficient
Street", while Croy's basis for disagreeing
one could also imagine
is not justified. Alternatively,
that the sentence
that
lies. He told Newman
"But I know that Touchett
Archer
responding,
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
59
in fact he was in Berlin"; and one could
last year in Paris, when
these
this
fact
that
for
two,
says. For the
outweighs what Touchett
imagine
let us settle on the first of these continuations
of their
sake of definiteness,
he spent
conversation.
even given all we know about the situation so
Suppose we assume,
far, that Archer and Croy still could mean different things by the sentence
it seems, we must
think that the
"Touchett
lives on Elm Street". Then,
a
is
of this tale. Archer
continuation
agrees that her
following
possible
reasons for asserting
to justify it. But, she
the sentence are not enough
Touchett does live on Elm Street". Now, Croy, in as
asks
tonishment,
her, "Why? Didn't we just agree that what you're going
on is not enough to show that Touchett
lives on Elm Street?". Archer says,
in return, "Yes, we agreed on that. And I still do agree with it. I don't have
says,
"Nevertheless
sufficient
reason
see, I don't mean
Elm Street' ".
to say that Touchett
lives on Elm Street But he does. You
the same thing as you do when I say, 'Touchett lives on
the essential communicability
of mean
underlying
is
that
there
is
about
the
story, if
ing argument
something
unsatisfactory
we left it at this point. Rather, we feel that some further continuation
of the
Part of the intuition
is required. How do we imagine Croy respond
story such as the following
to
the
last
that
Archer
said? Wouldn't
she naturally ask, "What
ing
thing
on Elm Street'? Is it that
do you mean,
when
'Touchett
lives
then,
you say
mean
someone
else by 'Touchett'? Or by 'Elm Street'? Or by 'live'?"
you
What
do we
think Archer
would
she said, "Oh,
naturally
say? Suppose
oneself
into
one's
existential
well, by
horizon, and
projecting
mean
a
I
How
would we
think,
you,
just physically
occupying
dwelling".
think the conversation would proceed from here? We know that Archer and
'live' Imean
in what they take to justify the things they say. So
Croy agree completely
here's a plausible
continuation.
if you mean that
Croy says, "I see. Well,
course
on
I
that
Elm
Street It is only
of
Touchett
lives
agree
by 'live', then,
on that street that he projects himself
into his existential horizon. But look,
we
are not really disagreeing,
then, are we? We're both right. In fact, don't
that
if,
'live',
you agree
you mean what I do, then you would be wrong
by
and Iwould be right?"
There
First,
are two points about this continuation
if it is natural, then we see that we
worth
noting.
failed to imagine the
to a sentence
different meanings
have
of these two people assigning
possibility
while agreeing completely
about what would justify it. The intuition un
the
essential
of meaning
is precisely
argument
derlying
communicability
we
as giving
that our imagination would
if
fail
Archer
similarly
imagined
any other answer
to Croy's
request
to specify
her meaning.
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SANFORD SHIEH
60
let us consider more closely why we take this continuation
of
Second,
the story to be intuitively compelling.
Archer
hadn't
said
that
she
Suppose
didn't mean
the same thing as Croy does by the sentence "Touchett
lives
on Elm Street". That is, suppose Archer
simply agreed that she hadn't
reason to say that Touchett
lives on Elm Street, but also insisted
seems to
In this case, Archer
that he does, without
giving any grounds.
reasons
have conceded
that Croy's grounds for disagreement
Archer
gives
for her to withdraw her assertion. So, unless she can come up with a ground
for doubting Croy's basis, or give a stronger reason for her assertion
than
sufficient
her assertion. And if
it, she ought to withdraw
Croy's basis for doubting
she doesn't,
then she seems to be acting irrationally.
Now, in the case we have been thinking about, Archer cites a difference
as a reason for continuing
to make the assertion
in meaning
she does. Our
sense
that this is not a satisfactory
I think, from the fol
ending derives,
fact.
We
don't
think
that
she has a different
that, simply by saying
lowing
in having a different meaning
succeeds
in mind, Archer
in mind.
meaning
a
It seems possible
she
has
that Archer's
that
in
different
plea
meaning
to escape having to withdraw
derives merely
from wanting
her asser
case
tion. So the question
in
what
which
the
Archer
does
is,
distinguishes
have a different meaning
inmind from the one in which
she doesn't?
It is
mind
hard to see how
the distinction
could be specified
means
like the following
lines: Archer genuinely
if she can make explicit how the difference
as a reason
we
have
for the assertion.
been
But we
that Archer
except along something
something different only
inmeaning
that she cites counts
see now
that there is a problem,
and Croy agree
their assertions.
since
in what
assuming
completely
they count as reasons for and against
I take the significance
of the argument to be this. Our concepts of mean
inmeaning
could result in a
ing and of justification
imply that a difference
a difference
In other words,
in meaning
in being justified.
difference
pro
a standard of being justified. But our concept of assertion, deriving
in discourse,
the picture of rationality
in
implies that being justified
an assertion
we
in terms of the standards set by what
is to be assessed
count as justifications
would
of it
otherwise we can make no sense of
the idea that we have reasons for what we say. Hence, we have difficulty
of a difference
in meaning
in the
forming a clearly coherent conception
vides
from
in what is counted as justification.
of a difference
And, the coher
in question
is coherence with our practice of assertion. Thus what the
of meaning
argument shows about the justification
independent
conception
we
as
can't explain
is not,
the standard interpretation would have it, that
absence
ence
how we
can know what
another
speaker means.
Rather,
the complaint
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is
ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
that, given our practice
of this meaning.
of assertion,
we
cannot
form a coherent
61
conception
II.5
between my interpretation
and the
finally, to note some differences
see the argument as addressing
standard one. First, the two interpretations
different philosophical
issues. On the standard interpretation,
the issue is,
what are the conditions
under which we know what a speaker means by a
Iwant,
the issue is: what are the conditions
under
interpretation,
at all with a sentence?
which a speaker associates
any distinctive meaning
can be put more
The difference
sharply. Given my view of this, namely,
that the conditions
in question are set by the arguments
the subject counts
sentence?
On my
as justifying
the sentence, we can still ask, what are the conditions
under
as justifying
which we know that a subject counts certain arguments
the
sentence?
the present inter
between
way of bringing out the difference
and the standard interpretation
is this. On the latter, we think that
a clear conception
to mean
of what it is for someone
something
Another
pretation
we have
were not manifested,
it would not be ac
by a statement; but, if meaning
to us; we could not be justified
in thinking that we knew what
cessible
someone meant. To borrow an image from Cora Diamond,
it is as if the
as hidden behind a line, the line
of this meaning
conceives
interpretation
of verbal behavior; but we take ourselves
to know quite well that it is some
or
the
that
is
the
behind
other
line, and our task is only to devise a
meaning
means of getting behind it, to find out what precisely
is the meaning
hidden
the present interpretation,
the claim is that we have no coherent
a
someone associates
there
such
conception
of
being
thing as the meaning
with a statement, unless she manifests
it in what she counts as justifying
there.26 On
the statement.
The philosophical
basis of the essential communicability
of
can
now
as
seen
to the epistemology
be
antecedent
of
argument
meaning
we
an
account
we
of
until
have
how
is
have
manifested,
meaning;
meaning
no means
of even raising the question
of evidence
for meaning,
for we
have no conception
of that for which we're demanding
evidence.
I want to make one final remark. Consider
again the first definition
would
'to manifest'
in The Oxford
"To make
evident
of
to the
English Dictionary:
The account of manifestation
that I have given
eye or the understanding".
can be seen as tacitly putting the emphasis
on understanding.
That is, on
of meaning
is (part of) what makes clear the
my view, the manifestation
coherent application
of our concept of meaning.
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SANFORD SHIEH
62
III.
In this section
account
I will
of manifestation
As we have
IN PLACE OF A CONCLUSION
comment,
very briefly, on the relation between my
and the argument against realist truth conditions.
seen in section
I, this argument aims to establish a problem
of the truth conditions
of 'undecidable'
if
sentences,
for the manifestation
truth is taken to be realist.
this argument,
to make any headway
at all in under
first give an account of Dummett's
notion
Dummettian
is notoriously
dif
'undecidability'
In order
one must
standing
of 'undecidability'.
Now,
to pin down, and I'm agnostic
ficult concept
about whether,
in the end,
it can be given a coherent explanation.
for
I shall
But,
present purposes,
without
for
that
Dummett
argument,
simply claim,
(16)
A
whether,
I will
or have
if we don't know whether,
can
to think that, we
justify it, and we don't know
or have no reason to think that, we can
falsify it.
sentence
no reason
is 'undecidable'
call sentences
that satisfy (16) 'Undecidable'.
The remainder of this
as provisional
on the assumption
be understood
that this
account of Undecidability
is coherent.
There are three important points about Undecidability
to be noted. First,
are not ones that we know we cannot either
sentences
Undecidable
justify
or falsify. Second,
from the definition
of undecidability
it follows
that we
to recognize
don't know whether we have the capacity
that an Undecidable
sentence is true, and we don't know whether we have the capacity to recog
section
should
that it is not true. Third, the conception
of the recognitional
capacities
to
sentences
Undecidable
to be
ismeant by Dummett
respect
common
realism and anti-realism.
Thus, the difference
ground between
nize
we have with
between
decidable
realism
and anti-realism,
are concerned,
sentences
as far as the truth conditions
is this. Realism
holds
of Un
that these
truth
like the truth condition
of any sentence, either obtains or fails
conditions,
to obtain. Hence
the following
is possible,
for all we know: we cannot
sentence
to
we
true
the
cannot
be
and
it to be not true,
recognize
recognize
sentence
true
or
the
is
not
true.
on the other
either
but, yet,
Anti-realism,
hand, holds that, given the capacities we have, it is not legitimate
that these conditions
either obtain or fail to obtain.
to assume
this account of the difference
between
realism and anti-realism
truth conditions,
it follows
that Dummett must take manifestation
of
to be given in terms of recognitional
of truth conditions
knowledge
capac
Given
over
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
he must
ities. Specifically,
to be this:
It is unclear
(17)
take what
how
is problematic
of knowledge
the realist view
capacities we have with re
can be used in an account of
the recognitional
sentence
to an Undecidable
spect
the concept
about
63
of the realist
truth conditions
of that
sentence.
to manifest
knowl
this suggests
that, in order for a set of capacities
a
the
the
of
truth
condition
of
sentence,
following
requirement must
edge
be satisfied:
And
We must
(18)
that the condition
be capable of recognizing
to do so) whenever
it does (or fails to do so).
(or fails
obtains
to the standard interpretation,
I clearly would not
Given my opposition
a
truth conditions:
the
construal
of
the
manifestation
of
accept
following
subject's having capacities
we can know we can know
(18)
satisfying
that she knows
to account
is required
the realist
for how
truth condition
of a
sentence.
But, in addition, I also hold that the argument against
tions cannot be derived by a straightforward
application
truth condi
of the manifesta
reason
I argued
is this. What
is that if two subjects associate
different meanings
as
the same arguments
with a sentence,
then they cannot count exactly
an
an
sentence.
identifica
made
with
that
assertion
Now, given
justifying
tion thesis established
in the last section.
realist
The
for in the last section
tion of meaning with truth conditions,
thesis about truth conditions:
(19)
The
account
connection
imply
the following
If two subjects associate
different
truth conditions
tence, then they cannot count the same arguments
an assertion made with that sentence.
as justifying
having
needed
association
the obtaining
requires, in addition
Counting
a sen
with
to get to (18), however,
requires a
of truth conditions
and capacity to recog
of truth conditions.
It is plausible
that this connection
of truth conditions
between
nize
(20)
this thesis must
to (19), also
different
different
arguments
recognitional
as justifying
an assertion
requires
capacities.
then we can argue against the manifestability
of real
If (20) is accepted,
as follows. Consider
an Undecidable
ist truth conditions
sentence to which
one subject associates
realist truth conditions
and another anti-realist
truth
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64
SANFORD SHIEH
conditions.
Now
assume,
is common
what
that these
ground
identical
for the two positions,
capacities with respect
subjects possess
recognitional
to this sentence.
Since
distinct
truth conditions
with
the
they associate
mean
different
sentence,
if, in order to count dif
they
things by it. Now
as justifications
ferent arguments
of an assertion made with this sentence,
the subject must have different
recognitional
capacities with respect to it,
our assumption
same
count
as justifying
that
the
implies
they
arguments
the assertion
in question. Hence,
mean
different
they can't
things by the
But there are two problems with this
sentence, and we get a contradiction.
argument.
One
is that (20) is far from obvious. Recall
the Fregean conception
I
a
sketched in the last section:
justification
proof that includes a proof,
of
for
every numeral n, of rFnn, counts as a proof of rVxFjcn. This would not
count as a proof for an anti-realist,
so there is a difference
between what
the realist and the anti-realist
counts as an argument for this Undecidable
and yet
sentence,
their recognitional
capacities
with
respect
to it are the
same.
The other problem
seems to show no more
is that this argument
than
that there cannot be a difference
in the truth conditions
that the realist
and the anti-realist
sentence. But it doesn't
associate with an Undecidable
tell us anything about what
realist ones or the anti-realist
these
ones.
truth conditions
are, whether
they're the
show that there is anything
truth conditions.
So it doesn't
about the notion of realist
problematic
These difficulties
with the argument
sketched above show, I hold, that
the problem that Dummett
in the manifestation
discerns
of truth conditions
does not derive solely from the general constraint on meaning
that is the
manifestation
is
the
relation
between
the
thesis.27 So what,
notion
then,
of manifestation
of the manifestation
thesis and the manifestation
of truth
I claim that the answer comes from reflecting on the general
conditions?
idea of manifestation
deriving
has to be manifested
Meaning
The
(21)
The
of application
in terms of concepts
conditions
be given
from my account of the manifestation
in use in the sense that
thesis.
of the concept of meaning must
to the use of language.
applying
essential
shows that the condition
of
argument
communicability
or
the
the
same,
notions,
application
associating
different, meanings
with a sentence,
is given in terms of the notion, counting an argument as a
Iwould claim hat what underlies
the argument
justification
of an assertion.
to show that the
is an argument attempting
against realist truth conditions
of
conditions
sentence,
showing
of application
of the notion, knowing
the truth condition
of a
can be given in terms of the notion, recognizing
as
something
that that truth condition obtains.
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
65
can be given in terms of recogni
Note that I claim that the conditions
not that they must be. The reason is that the argument,
tional capacities,
I hold, does not in fact show that realist truth conditions fail to be mani
of the conclusion
festable. This in fact fits, Iwould claim, with the wording
in
"it is quite obscure
of the argument
against realist truth conditions:
a sentence
is true can
under which
of the condition
what the knowledge
is not one which
that condition
when
consist,
as obtaining".
And
it fits with
recognised
anti-realism:
recently characterizes
is always capable of being
the terms in which Dummett
... the anti-realist
to be
to the realist. The realist claims
issues
which
is a challenge
an [Undecidable]
of
for
the
of
the
condition
truth
in possession
of a certain
conception
to him is to vindicate
this claim by explaining
statement....
The anti-realist's
challenge
consists.
that conception
in what possessing
1987, 223)
(Dummett
there
texts do not obviously
claim that realism is mistaken.
Rather, they
the
of the argument that, I hold, underlies
the conclusion
suggest precisely
the burden of proof is on realism,
argument against realist truth conditions:
realist truth
to produce a satisfactory
account of the concept of knowing
These
conditions.
NOTES
*
to thank
I wish
am particularly
Daniel
Dennett,
Richard
Hansen,
sons, Ofra
are due
all
on whom
I have
to the comments
Dummett,
Daniel
Heck,
Rechter,
to Neil
those
grateful
Michael
Jason
Tennant,
inflicted
and discussion
Gary
Ebbs,
Juliet
earlier
of
incarnations
of Nuel
Floyd,
Belnap,
Warren
Stanley
who
generously
made
available
Bracken,
Goldfarb,
John McDowell,
Massey,
referee
for Synthese.
and an anonymous
to me
Carsten
Charles
Gerald
Isaacson,
Par
thanks
Special
that
material
unpublished
Finally,
Glanzberg
single out Michael
substantially
improved
of this project.
his thorough
and, to my mind,
patient,
help at all phases
superhumanly
1
are: Appiah
is compiled
this interpretation
from which
Some
of the sources
the present
Imust
paper.
I
this essay;
William
for
1985
and 1986; Burgess 1984; Campbell 1982; Devitt 1983; Edginton, 1985; George 1984;
McDowell 1981;McGinn 1980; Tennant 1987;Weir 1985;Wright 1993, esp. 13-23.
2
For
a representative
in his 1978,
'Realism',
3 McDowell
statement
of
this
interpretation
of realism
see Michael
Dummett,
145-165.
1981 andMcGinn
1980. The former is perhaps the fullest statement of the
standard
interpretation.
4
It should be noted
to Dummett
sentence,
on attributing
does not depend
that the last two steps of this argument
to know
of a mathematical
the meaning
the requirement
that, for a speaker
to find
of that sentence
the truth condition
she has to be able, whenever
obtains,
a proof of that sentence,
the argument
of it. Rather,
that
is consistent
the condition
able
fails
to obtain,
to find
a refutation
to require of a speaker
taking Dummett
as such when
or refutation
she is 'presented'
a proof
to recognize
of
this view,
the 'presentation'
she be
one. On
and, whenever
with
the proof
or disproof
is the stimulus
only
with
that prompts
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SANFORD SHIEH
66
that she is 'presented'
of assent or dissent,
response
through her recognition
on
one
reasons
not
of
the
this
the proof or refutation.
Moreover,
view,
why we may
of the truth conditions
of 'undecidable'
the satisfaction
be able to recognize
(or otherwise)
her behavioral
with
not be possible
sentences
and so it might
is that their proofs may be infinitary,
for a finite
creature
to be 'presented'
with
their proofs.
5
to be quite different. My understanding
I take Quine's
of these motivations
motivations
are
at all de
derives
from Ricketts
motivations
1982. Whether
Quine's
epistemological
one
on whether
pends
takes his demand,
(at p. 124) as an epistemological
analyticity"
6
are familiar with Dummett's
who
Those
tion
an entire
on
the basis
of either
thesis,
to men
will note that I have failed
writings
that he discusses:
the drawing
of consequences
from the
on justification
two reasons
I have
for concentrating
rather
that an argument
for the manifestation
thesis can be
I have chosen
to focus on the notion
that lends
I hold
notion
of use,
as it stands.
too complicated
7
The centrality
1976, at section
1993a,
I take
that
for an account
of assertion
IV, Dummett
Dummett
especially,
8
I note
1981a,
at pp.
by philosophers
proceeding
an assertion.
by itself, constitute
the conditions
for making
say about
we would
It should
be noted
these
what
of meaning
5, Dummett
is explicitly
1981b,
is involved
that Dummett
are satisfied;
in this passage
a class
the issues
I want
that includes
And
she is asked, "What makes
you
passage".
that
if the first speaker
consideration
responds,
imply
I said what
I said for no reason at all", it still makes
asking.
rule out
on
depend
of
a request
grounds
on how
of
linguistic
to produce
for perceptually
understands
one
someone
said, during
in the beginning
the posi
say that?" Does
flat
"I don't
understand
what
sense to take her
perfect
that on any reasonable
the
construal,
is a legitimate
first
the
response
by
an assertion?
to me
Surely not. It seems
no
more
than
that
the
following
imply
I heard". That is to say, on my account,
for an
that's what
"Well,
having
grounds
to no more
amounts
for no reason at all. This does not
than not saying
something
would
speaker:
assertion
to explore
the class
is characterizing
as a sub-class.
assertions
for grounds.
in the legitimacy
of requests
Suppose
"The second violins were
all a semitone
of a concert,
the rallentando
position
2, and,
situations.
tion under
you're
to have made
in Dummett
1 and
of assertion
of the legitimacy
"recognition
to the making
of assertions.
really be essential
that there might
be no
consider
the position
Is such a position
inconsistent?
This depends
the intermission
stated
chapters
to deny nothing
of the insistence,
true does not,
that
ordinary
language,
saying
something
on which
are those in which
I concentrate
The occasions
an assertion
acts he calls "quasi-assertions",
10
It may
be wondered
whether
could
grounds"
For example,
based
assertions.
chapter
11-13.
this characterization
from
the claim
more
Another,
your
of
since most
of the issues that
argument.
straightforward
Secondly,
concern
the
between
these two aspects
of use do not directly
an argument
I have decided
not to further complicate
that is probably
from
manifestation
of
"a criterion
calls
to a relatively more
the interaction
arise
what
9
Ricketts
of use
dimension
of an assertion.
acceptance
than consequence.
since
First,
given
itself
of Carnap,
for what
demand.
father
that the reason
interesting,
asserts
(an officer)
or experience.
can be perceptual
in question
interaction
is that of a highly
says,
speaker who
pugnacious
not
believe
it.
It's
for you to ask
you
something,
just
case
"If
for
to me not. For, a plausible
It seems
Is he saying
inconsistent?
inter
grounds".
something
is saying
that the person whom
he is addressing
of the case is that the speaker
pretation
to request
is not in the appropriate
rather than that any request
(social)
position
grounds,
same
for grounds
is illegitimate.
Would
the speaker
the
say
thing to his father, or superior
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ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
officer?
then
My
11
What
himself?
about
sense
it make
Does
to think,
for him
67
"If I asserted
to consider
Imight
have
it. It's not for me
whether
just believe
the limits of mere pugnacity.
intuition
is that here we have gone beyond
Imust
is a way
in which
on assertion
merely
of her assertions;
There
conditions
this
characteristic
of
can
assertion
that the speaker display
require
to the claim
they do not amount
anything,
been
wrong".
be misconstrued.
certain
The
to the
sensitivities
that to know
the use of a
justification
statement
in assertion
under which
it is justified.
is no more
than to know
the conditions
12
of the practice
This feature of assertion
should be thought of as constitutive
of assertion.
if one takes it to be a norm of this practice,
then it is rather different
from certain other
Thus,
one can perform
an
a tie at dinner
is required by etiquette,
if wearing
example,
to dinner
the kind to which
the norm relates while
the norm, by going
breaching
to justification
one from
In contrast,
the requisite
sensitivities
lacking
disqualifies
norms.
For
action
of
tieless.
an assertion
making
altogether.
Whether
the notion
of constitutive
norm
is a large
is ultimately
coherent
cannot go into here. But see Cavell
and passim,
for a compelling
1969, 21-31,
13
to Gary Ebbs
to this clarification
I'm grateful
for discussion
of my
leading
assertion.
14
at this point
I use
in the
'true' and 'correct'
here, because,
interchangeably
zation
of assertion,
Dummett
not distinguish
between
188-201.
1993b,
does
see Dummett
the distinction
arises,
5
This formulation
is natural
allows
clearly
to characterize
assertion
requiring
that one
that one
accepting
as telling
oneself
the possibility
(a) requiring
as telling
the
oneself
represent
to be
how
one
For
his
account
of
characteri
account
of how
it
it explains
why
lying. Moreover,
a commitment
to its truth, or as (b)
truth. The
at correctness,
aiming
it is not clear
ought
the truth,
of
as
them.
I
topic that
defense.
could
commitment
if one
and
have
follows
accepted
from
even
doesn't
represent
this commitment.
so far is, I believe,
The account
of assertion
consistent
with
the subtle and com
given
over many
that Robert
Brandom
has been developing
years. See,
plex theory of assertion
in particular,
Brandom
1976,
1983, and 1994.
17
See Dummett
and 589ff,
for more
It is plausible
details.
1981a, 512-518,
that, on some
interpretations
the text. But
we
can
out the infinitary
in
described
proofs
the point that there is a distinction
between
a reason for taking it to be
for the truth of a statement,
and having
in principle
affect
I would
not,
as a reason
counts
what
of realism,
this does
carry
claim,
true.
18
I reached
the present
formulation
of the notion
of
comments
by Neil Tennant.
19
This formulation
is perhaps
liable to misunderstanding.
not rule out the possibility
that there be circumstances
different
things
by a statement
of
to emphasize
that it does
two speakers meaning
to the meanings
to the
they assigned
in accordance
would,
as a result
attitudes'
'contrary
I want
in which
statement, not be justified in holding contrary attitudes to it. This might happen if under
both
of meaning
of course),
assignment,
there isn't enough
evidence
assignments
each
claim
is the much
meaning,
happen.
20
I owe
21
Note
of
that
two
this point,
that
the three
more
and
to warrant
modest
speakers
a theoretical
ones for
claim (different
expressed
to the two meanings,
in some situation,
according
or the denial
either the assertion
of the claim. My
the statement
for which,
are
one
justified
the impetus
the argument
just
to absurdity,
claims
that
for the final
sketched
and
it could
happen,
in holding
consists,
concluding
when
contrary
reformulation,
of
formally,
the conditional
there
is a difference
attitudes,
not
to Neil
Tennant.
reducing
whose
that
in
it must
the conjunction
antecedent
is the
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68
SANFORD SHIEH
of two of the conjuncts,
and whose
is the negation
of the other
conjunction
consequent
It is thus an intuitionistically
not be, if the penultimate
valid argument.
It would
conjunct.
version
of the manifestation
thesis were
the conclusion.
I am grateful
to Neil Tennant
Again
this out.
for pointing
to note that I will not be
This may be the place
trying to show that there is never any gap
a speaker's
between
conditions
of an assertion
and her judgements
grasp of the justification
about whether
satisfies
It is certainly
these conditions.
any given fact or argument
plausible
as justifying
that two speakers may
count
an assertion
the same things
in fact
without
on whether
a given
set of reasons
does justify
it. The point of the argument
is to
agreeing
detail
what would
result from rational
of these disagreements.
The force of
investigations
the argument
then rests on the examination
cases.
of the individual
23
to me the following
to the foregoing
One
Gary Ebbs has suggested
argument.
objection
think
that
it
a
shows
that
the
of
in a sense in which
statement,
might
only
knowing
meaning
it is independent
of justification,
is not sufficient
for knowledge
of the conditions
under
it is justified.
And
that doesn't
show that there is anything
with
this concep
wrong
tion of meaning.
For a realist, grasp of meaning
would
have to be supplemented
by a theory
of justification
can be specified.
before
the justification
of the statement
So two speakers
have different
theories
of justification
and thereby
associate
different
conditions
of
may
which
a statement
with
to which
the same meaning.
Daniel
Moreover,
justification
they attach
out to me
Isaacson
has pointed
that one might
think that if knowledge
of the meaning
of a statement
did determine
what
is taken to justify
be
it, then we would
completely
to the following
an expert on, say,
claim. Consider
implausible
carbon-dating.
about the past differently
from a non-expert,
and so the thesis
justify a statement
us to claiming
would
commit
that she means
different
than the
something
by this statement
does. And
that is surely a counterintuitive
result.
non-expert
committed
She would
this view
However,
the argument
what
would
one
takes
of
the argument
derives
from
in meaning
that a difference
as justification
conditions.
This
is the view
be counted
a
misunderstanding.
is compatible
with
view
is independent
The
of
target
on
agreement
of the position
a difference
of meaning
is compatible
with
in what would
identity
as justification
conditions.
This
is clear if we formulate
in the
the two claims
on whether
be counted
we just argued for is that a difference
the thesis which
in meaning
way:
following
implies
a difference
in justification,
but nothing
is shown about the converse
of this; on the other
to be aimed at is the converse
the objection
takes the argument
claim
hand, the thesis which
in meaning
that identity
A difference
in justification.
in what would
be
implies
identity
as justification,
counted
of
a coherent
conception
condition.
to the present
is only a necessary
according
argument,
of a difference
in meaning.
It has not been claimed
condition
that
it's a
sufficient
24
It is worth
ment
should
do we
how
how the text of the essential
of meaning
considering
argu
communicability
be read, in light of the reconstruction
I've just given. The main
is,
question
seems
to say that unless meaning
understand
claim
is manifested
in
(iii), which
the audience
at communication
of an attempt
cannot know what meaning
the speaker
is trying to convey.
I suggest
the following
Since we only have a conception
interpretation.
someone
means
a conception
of what
in virtue of having
of what
she would
by a statement
count as justifying
we have no coherent
of
the
latter
idea of
it, independently
conception,
use,
any
such
if one
thing as
individual
association
a meaning
its possessing
associated
did not
with
lie in the use
for the individual
in question.
So
the claim
a ... symbol
or formula
some mental
content, where
he made
of [it], then he could not convey
that content
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
that
the
by
ON THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF ANTI-REALISM
means
or formula,
of the symbol
no means
have
would
should
aware
of
be unaware
would
and
any
of content
what
25
aware.
to become
someone
Note,
there can
to be communicated,
that
moreover,
be no such
since
thing
between
association
no conception
The audience
expression
linguistic
of any association.
to be conveyed,
and hence no conception
aware of the association
means
because
it could
of becoming
association
and
of the association
it
the purported
way. Where
we have
is not manifestable,
in the following
taken
be
content
for his audience
of becoming
69
mental
content
of any
no coherent
have
is no
there
as evidence
no
have
would
idea
of
notion
coherent
that this content
is
to communicate.
is trying
course of any dis
to depict
are clearly not meant
the inevitable
ensuing
dialogues
so I'm clearly not trying to show that all such investigations
about a disagreement;
a reasonable
are meant
to elicit intuitions
about what
as if on rails. The dialogues
proceed
claim is that these intuitions
course of investigation
would
be like. My
into a disagreement
The
cussion
with
dovetail
the connections
to spell
that I have tried
26
In Diamond
assertion
and justification
of meaning,
the concepts
among
accounts
of possible
in the more
abstract
disagreements.
Diamond
210. Unfortunately
of
here also writes
that Diamond
1991,
I note
Dummett.
out
to attribute
appears
this
claim
the anti-realist's
as
to
picture
the claim
to be
is behind
the veil; but she takes the claim
of what
form a conception
I'm advocating,
the
the veil. On the reading
of what
is behind
the inaccessibility
is
the point
of meaning.
is prior to inaccessibility
of the conception
Indeed,
unavailability
toWittgenstein.
attributes
She sees Wittgenstein's
close to a point which Diamond
rejoin
of an
claim
that we have no conception
der to an anti-realist's
(in her sense of anti-realist)
that one
can't
on
based
is that the [anti-realist's]
inaccessible
point
past state of affairs as follows:
"Wittgenstein's
in having
such
is involved
[of a past state of affairs] does not at all make clear what
picture
a conception".
(212)
27
can give an argu
that an anti-realist
the possibility
with
Of course
all this is consistent
different
ment,
only
for the rejection
from Dummett's,
of the manifestation
of the principle
of bivalence
on
the basis
requirement.
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in L.
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