Xenophon on Risks

Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 1 Reference: Günther, Sven, Xenophon on Risks, (2024), Global Business & Economics Anthology, ISSN:1553–1392, Volumes I & II, December 2024, pp 1-19. Copyright © 2024 by the Business & Economics Society International (B&ESI) DOI: 10.47341/GBEA.24121 Xenophon on Risks Sven Günther Institute for the History of Ancient Civilizations, Changchun, China Email: <[email protected]> / <[email protected]> Abstract Xenophon’s model of order had to face realities. The pressing military, political, social, and economic questions of the 4th century BC, a period of various transformations, brought about many uncertainties, risks, and dangers. Indeed, Xenophon’s oeuvre abounds with vocabulary related to fear and danger as well as with the respective antonyms from the word field of security & safety. Based on the discussion of modern heuristic distinctions between uncertainty, risk, and danger I argue that to some degree Xenophon was very aware of the differences between human-based calculation of risks and external, incalculable dangers that both became integrated into his model of comprehensive leadership. Keywords: Xenophon, risk management, danger, uncertainty, management, leadership. (*) Acknowledgements: For useful constructive comments and suggestions, I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers; all remaining errors are mine. Xenophon and his contemporaries lived in a world full of uncertainties of the near and far future. In our times, we are used to view and deal with uncertainties through the lens of risks.1 “Risks” in a strict, not popular or general sense of the word2 are hereby linked to human decisions within a human-made system, following the conceptualisation of Niklas Luhmann:3 risk is the potential (negative) consequence of a decision taken; while in Economics after the seminal work of Frank H. Knight “risks” are even more strictly defined as measurable or calculable (by natural condition or empiricism), and to be distinguished from “uncertainties:” for him, uncertainties potentially result in economic profit as they are not insurable, while risks can be balanced through – albeit costly and thus profit-lowering – insurances.4 Anyway, the origin of the term “risk” can be found in the medieval Latin resicum or risicum, etymologically either going back to classical Latin resecare, medieval Latin rixicare, Greek ῥίζα, or, as agreed by most scholars today, Arabic ‫ ِر ْزق‬rizq, meaning “sustenance,” “divine provision,” “blessings” vel sim.5 Indeed, it was first mainly used in a specific medieval contract partnership for commercial enterprises, usually overseas (and often to countries in the Islamic realm): the so-called commenda. Thereby the investing partner (commendator) provided the capital while the travelling partner (tractator) executed the commercial enterprise, that is, the maritime transport: in unilateral commenda, the commendator contributed the whole capital required and, consequently, received ¾ of the profit (hence, the tractator ¼) while bearing full liability for loss; in bilateral commenda, the commendator put up ⅔ of the necessary capital (and the tractator ⅓), the profit was split evenly, and potential loss ⅔ to ⅓. The appearance of “risk” was due to the emerging distinction between “dangers” coming from the environment, for instance, caused by God or sea (fortuna Dei et maris or similar expressions), and (negative) results of own, that is, human decisions. 6 Consequently, also Luhmann opposes “risk” (of decisions between “clearly distinguishable [alternatives] in respect of 2 Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 the possibility of loss occurring”) against external “danger” that cannot be related to human decisions but are caused externally by the environment on the system.7 This differentiation between risks and dangers/hazards8 which in modernity has led to a variety of discourses – for instance, one that aims at extinguishing dangers/hazards and attributing all uncertainties to risks, or the idea that for premodern societies there merely existed (natural) dangers which were passively accepted9 – is now of some importance for studies that deal with “contingency” in history. Contingency is, first of all, a philosophical concept within modal logic developed from ancient thinkers onwards. It means that a thing is possible in a specific way, or in another, or not at all: hence, necessity and impossibility are excluded. Contingency is not related to single events but to structures, orders, or statuses: while “chance” that alters or foils plans is – in the course of action or retrospect – seen as causeless, contingency is decision-generated and thus attributable or justifiable.10 Hence, the concept of contingency opens space for any actor to decide for one way or another, yet within a given, pre-structured, and everactualizing spectrum of possible actions. This spectrum of possible actions is established through the past actions of oneself but also other individuals within the same system of order;11 consequently, it also makes the concept of “risk” to be a human-made category of culture.12 Hence, contingency – and also the notion of risk – is highly dynamic and culture-/society- as well as person-specific since it emerges from the constant interaction between and entanglement of individuals, their (partaking in) organizations, and relation to institutions, as well as the related communicative acts and discourses that provide information for their decisions; it is thus highly “subjective” and has to be distinguished from “objective” measurements based on a – albeit often imagined and thus questionable – complete set of data or review ex eventu.13 At this point, we are at Johann G. Droysen’s conception of the human being that is a “totality in himself,” which, however, “develops only in the moral partnerships,” being formed by “moral potencies,” but in a way that Born into an already existent moral world – for the first child had father and mother – thus born to be conscious, free and responsible, each man for himself in these moral partnerships and using them as helps, builds his little world, the bee-cell of his ‘I.’ Each of these cells is conditioned and supported by its neighbor, and in turn conditions and supports. All together they form a restlessly growing building, conditioned and supported by the existence of its minute, yes, of its minutest parts. 14 As I have shown elsewhere, this is exactly what Sociology, Communication Studies, and AI Studies call “frames”.15 Hence, also the understanding and handling of “uncertainties” must be studied as a “frame” formed by each actor in exchange with his social groups and environment he lives in. Leaving aside here the crucial question of the extent to which a questioning of the own framework, and thus the contingency of itself, was possible for ancient (or is, for modern) persons,16 we shall turn to Xenophon’s world (of thought). Namely, how did he conceptualize and deal with uncertainties, especially in respect of his economic thoughts? Did he have a – however simplistic – idea of risk? Or were all uncertainties considered to be external dangers or even hazards one could not avoid in life since imposed from outside? The theme of uncertainty is indeed directly touched upon in several passages of Xenophon’s oeuvre. And, from first sight, he rather seems to deal with uncertainty by the traditional (and by scholars commonly supposed) way of asking the gods for help and direction. So right at the beginning of Hipparchicus, the cavalry commander’s “first duty is to sacrifice to the gods and pray them to grant you the thoughts, words and deeds likely to render your command most pleasing to the gods and to bring yourself, your friends and your city the fullest measure of affection and glory and advantage.”17 Having repeatedly urged to seek the favour of the gods in the instructional parts of this treatise 18 he returns to this scheme at the very end when he states with regard to war plots, that in these dangerous situations we would rarely know the outcome except for the all-knowing gods who shall consequently be approached for council.19 This consultation of gods as (last) refuge in uncertain situations is indeed an integrated theme frequently appearing in other Xenophontic works. Paradigmatic is the conversation between the young king-to-be Cyrus with his father Cambyses at the end of the first book of the Cyropaedia (Xen. Cyr. 1.6.44–46).20 Cambyses advises to never enter into any hazardous undertaking personally or with the army against divine signs since Cyrus should understand that human beings would act by conjecture, yet would not know from which practice chosen success derives (§ 44: … κατανοῶν ὡς ἄνθρωποι μὲν αἱροῦνται πράξεις εἰκάζοντες, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπὸ ποίας ἔσται αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀγαθά). He then turns to five lessons from history which many (πολλοὶ, 4x) have experienced (§ 45): he states that many seemingly (!) wise men have persuaded poleis to enter into a war from which those following the advice have suffered destruction; many have suffered badly from those individuals and poleis they had strengthened before; while many also harmed those who ought to be useful friends, and were later justly punished by them; many striving for more wealth have lost all in Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 3 their pursuit; and many after having gained the desired wealth have been ruined by it. Hence he concludes (§ 46) that “mere human wisdom does not know how to choose what is best any more than if any one were to cast lots and do as the lot fell” (ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἶδε τὸ ἄριστον αἱρεῖσθαι ἢ εἰ κληρούμενος ὅ τι λάχοι τοῦτό τις πράττοι) and that only the all-knowing gods, yet only if they are willing, reveal to someone they favour what ought to be done and what not.21 From these passages, it seems that also for Xenophon uncertainty only becomes “manageable” contingency through divinatory, mantic practices; what has been frequently argued by scholars for Greek antiquity. 22 However, that Xenophon’s view is more complex and nuanced becomes already obvious in his Hellenica. During the peace conference in Sparta in summer 371 BC,23 before the Battle of Leuctra, the Athenian politician and rhetor Callistratus as the last of three Athenian speakers advises the Lacedaemonians to join forces by way of a negative simile (Xen. Hell. 6.3.16–17): by advising against behaving like agonistai who were already successful several times and gained fame but could then not stop fighting until they were defeated and had even to end their training, or like dice-players who doubled the stake after one success and, in their majority, got financially ruined he proposes to both the Athenians and Spartans “never to engage in a contest of such a sort that we shall either win all or lose all” (§ 17: εἰς μὲν τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα μηδέποτε καταστῆναι, ὥστ᾽ ἢ πάντα λαβεῖν ἢ πάντ᾽ ἀποβαλεῖν); instead, while still in the status of strength and prosperity, both poleis should conclude friendship. This alleges a clear awareness of decision-based contingencies including a – however, unquantified – risk calculation. Thus, a more comprehensive contextualisation of the passages from both the Hipparchicus and the Cyropaedia seems necessary for better understanding Xenophon’s conceptualisation. In both works, mantic practice is actually closely linked to exactly recognising the boundaries of human knowledge (γνώμη), foresight (πρόνοια), and attentive care (ἐπιμέλεια): only if humans know what is in their sphere of acquirable knowledge, to foresee with their own mind, and to decide on their own they can approach the gods with questions about advice for those things outside their scope and sphere of action. In turn, showing due respect to the gods by worshipping them not only in time of need belongs to this recognition and, thus, results in divine support and is, in fact, one sign and facet of comprehensive, sound leadership. 24 Hence, in the Hipparchicus the aforementioned Xenophontic exhortation to worship the gods for proper advice frames the rather technical description of the tasks and duties of a cavalry commander in the main body of the text, moreover, is integral part of that instruction (see above). Furthermore, we should not forget that the gods are mentioned in two different aspects at the end of the treatise: one is the general “exhortation to work with” them (Xen. Eq. Mag. 9.8: ταῦτα δὲ πάντα θεῶν συνεθελόντων γένοιτ᾽ ἄν), the other the case of being often in danger, especially in times of war with mutual plots by the opponents, what can be rarely known (Xen. Eq. Mag. 9.8: … εὖ ἴστω ὅτι ἢν πολλάκις κινδυνεύῃ, ἧττον τοῦτο θαυμάσεται, καὶ ἤν γε κατανοῇ ὅτι, ὅταν πόλεμος ᾖ, ἐπιβουλεύουσι μὲν ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἐναντίοι, ὀλιγάκις δὲ ἴσασι πῶς ἔχει τὰ ἐπιβουλευόμενα). Thus, Xenophon uses exactly a situation of uncertainty for asking the gods when a rational risk calculation within the own sphere of influence is impossible. Lastly, when Xenophon speculates at the end that “we may suppose that they [sc. gods] are more ready to counsel those who not only ask what they ought to do in the hour of need, but also serve the gods in the days of their prosperity with all their might” 25 he shows that the divinatory practice is in fact integrated part of the technical instruction, that is, it must be learned, known, and used by any successful cavalry commander at the times and situations indicated by the author. 26 Exactly this scheme we also find in the Cyropaedia. Mere human (philosophical) wisdom (ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία, Xen. Cyr. 1.6.46; cf. § 45: οἱ δοκοῦντες σοφώτατοι) does not prevent people from deciding wrongly, neither in war nor in political or economic matters. It is, instead, the φρόνησις, that is, “intelligence relevant for practical application” that is essential, which can be acquired by learning of all what is possible to learn in a specific field. This included to know the limits of what can be learned. This is clearly expressed some paragraphs earlier, in fact right in the middle of the dialogue between Cambyses and young Cyrus and, again, connected to φρόνησις, not σοφία.27 The learning of all aspects of one’s field of expertise is one sign and facet of comprehensive, sound leadership qualities (cf. Xen. Cyr. 1.6.22), which the whole dialogue in fact is about, and for a commander and future political leader – as to be expected, we should say – includes, of course, the knowledge of when and how to ask the gods, again not only in situations of uncertainty (see the beginning of the dialogue: Xen. Cyr. 1.6.1–3). To know the sphere of own responsibility of decision-making, and the one where mantic must be applied is also addressed in the Memorabilia, as the Xenophontic Socrates is said to have distinguished between the two spheres (Xen. Mem. 1.1.7–9): carpentry, smithery, farming, ruling, their respective enquiry, as well as arithmetic, economics, and commandership can be learned and grasped by human judgment (γνώμη) (§ 7b), but for comprehensive leadership of house or polis one needs mantic practice (§ 7a: καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν μαντικῆς 4 Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι). For there are results that are out of your sphere of decision-making but depend on other, more distant, and thus uncertain factors or human actions: τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ καλῶς ἀγρὸν φυτευσαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις καρπώσεται, οὔτε τῷ καλῶς οἰκίαν οἰκοδομησαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις ἐνοικήσει, οὔτε τῷ στρατηγικῷ δῆλον εἰ συμφέρει στρατηγεῖν, οὔτε τῷ πολιτικῷ δῆλον εἰ συμφέρει τῆς πόλεως προστατεῖν, οὔτε τῷ καλὴν γήμαντι, ἵν᾽ εὐφραίνηται, δῆλον εἰ διὰ ταύτην ἀνιάσεται, οὔτε τῷ δυνατοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει κηδεστὰς λαβόντι δῆλον εἰ διὰ τούτους στερήσεται τῆς πόλεως. but the deepest secrets of these matters the gods reserved to themselves; they were dark to men. You may plant a field well; but you know not who shall gather the fruits: you may build a house well; but you know not who shall dwell in it: able to command, you cannot know whether it is profitable to command: versed in statecraft, you know not whether it is profitable to guide the state: though, for your delight, you marry a pretty woman, you cannot tell whether she will bring you sorrow: though you form a party among men mighty in the state, you know not whether they will cause you to be driven from the state. (Xen. Mem. 1.1.8) So one can learn and prepare within the own sphere of expertise and decision responsibility but cannot predict specific, contingent outcomes, namely, those which cannot be grasped by human γνώμη (§ 9a; cf. also 4.7.6). This shall, therefore, not lead to asking the gods about everything in the own field of expertise, but to learn to judge what must be ask by divination (§ 9b).28 The remarkable list of unpredictable outcomes that, again, also includes the economic sphere of action is now presenting examples exactly at the threshold of contingency planning: of course, you can plan in alternative scenarios within your own sphere of expertise (e.g., to prepare the farm field well by crop rotation or avoiding monoculture), but concrete future decisions by others (or by chance) outside your sphere (e.g., you might be driven out from your farm or you are simply not responsible for harvesting) are not fully plannable or manageable before they occur. Yet this does, and shall, not lead to consternation and inactivity in Xenophon’s mind! The divinatory help aside, it becomes the driving factor a) for learning all in your field of expertise as meticulously as possible, and b) to expand your fields of knowledge up to the own intellectual capabilities. Both is integrated part of becoming a sound, comprehensive leader, as is most visible in the Cyropaedia but also elsewhere in Xenophon’s oeuvre. In the Oeconomicus, for instance, the household leader must have managerial qualities in assigning tasks and duties to those capable, but also has to know (γιγνώσκειν) and understand (προνοεῖν) the right use of assets and must take diligent attention to and care of (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) this correct usage. However, as both belongs to the human sphere, “to some of the wise and careful they [sc. gods] grant prosperity, and to some deny it” (Xen. Oec. 11.8: … φρονίμοις δ᾽ οὖσι καὶ ἐπιμελέσι τοῖς μὲν διδόασιν εὐδαιμονεῖν, τοῖς δ᾽ οὔ …), hence Ischomachus’ practice of mantic as starting point for every his attempt to gain health, strength, good reputation in the polis, goodwill of the friends, honourable safety in war, and honourable increase of wealth (ibid., cf. § 9). 29 That this is not just the typical hazard and risk management from a pious man 30 by asking for divinatory intervention becomes clear from another passage in the Oeconomicus where Ischomachus advises his unnamed wife31 on the utmost importance of order. Besides other order-to-perfection organizations such as chorus, army, and military ship he employs the analogy of a Phoenician trade ship, which he claims to have seen with his own eyes, for illustrating the use of order (Xen. Oec. 8.11–16). Interviewing the assistant of the captain, who is not only seemingly knowing where every equipment has its place but is reviewing all of it in his free time, about what he is doing, he receives as a reply: ἐπισκοπῶ, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε, εἴ τι συμβαίνοι γίγνεσθαι, πῶς κεῖται, ἔφη, τὰ ἐν τῇ νηί, ἢ εἴ τι ἀποστατεῖ ἢ εἰ δυστραπέλως τι σύγκειται. (16) οὐ γάρ, ἔφη, ἐγχωρεῖ, ὅταν χειμάζῃ ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε μαστεύειν ὅτου ἂν δέῃ οὔτε δυστραπέλως ἔχον διδόναι. ἀπειλεῖ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς καὶ κολάζει τοὺς βλᾶκας. ἐὰν δὲ μόνον μὴ ἀπολέσῃ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτάνοντας, πάνυ ἀγαπητόν: ἐὰν δὲ καὶ πάνυ καλῶς ὑπηρετοῦντας σῴζῃ, πολλὴ χάρις, ἔφη, τοῖς θεοῖς. … “Sir,” he answered, “I am looking to see how the ship’s tackle is stored, in case of accident, or whether anything is missing or mixed up with other stuff. (16) For when God sends a storm at sea, there’s no time to search about for what you want or to serve it out if it’s in a muddle. For God threatens and punishes careless fellows, and you’re lucky if he merely refrains from destroying the innocent; and if he saves you when you do your work well, you have much cause to thank heaven.” Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 5 As the simile reveals, it is the meticulous preparation that gives you better chances to survive on such hazardous, but also potentially profitable business trip – very profitable as becomes clear by both the use of the Phoenician merchant ship stereotype and direct statement by Ischomachus (see Xen. Oec. 8.12; cf. 20.27–28).32 Indeed (not only) in the Oeconomicus, it is the applied and applicable knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of the designated fields of expertise (τέχνη) in combination with the rigorous care (ἐπιμέλεια) that results in detailed preparation and provision and thus tries to handle dangers and manage risks by foresightful understanding (φρόνησις) and judgment (γνώμη) what to do, and what not.33 Anyway, although one can be fully knowledgeable and attentive, both external dangers and own risky decisions, of course, arise. For both, the ancient Greek vocabulary mainly use words with the root κινδυν-, ῥίπτ- or the like,34 but also words of the semantic field “fear,” as well as the antonyms from the field of “security and safety,” in particular ἀσφάλεια,35 which – unlike the Latin se-curitas that first of all denotes freedom from care and only secondary takes the subjective “feeling of safety” or the more objective meaning “security” 36 – directly points to a stable, unshaken ground; however, both the Latin and Greek indicate with the prefix negation se- or ἀ- that this was not the normality. And also the modern terms “security” or “safety” are “reflexive concept[s]” as they build an “observation scheme” to calculate risks, yet rather cover that “every variant in a decision making repertoire … is risky, if only with the risk of not grasping certain opportunities … .” 37 Despite the frequent and predictable occurrence of these vocabularies in the context of warfare there are some economic aspects and principles to which they are applied in Xenophon’s works. At the beginning of the fourth chapter of the Symposium, the wealthy Athenian host Callias, being taught by sophists, claims to make people more just by giving them money for their needs (Xen. Symp. 4.1–4). In an obvious allusion to payments within the contemporary democratic Athenian regime he defends his practice against one of Socrates’ companions, Antisthenes, by stating that he does not only fill justice in their wallets but also in their souls as they can buy their necessities and thus refrain from taking the risk of committing crimes (Xen. Symp. 4.2: … οὐκ ἐθέλουσι κακουργοῦντες κινδυνεύειν). Despite the irony that is further developed in the following in the short dispute between both symposiasts – whereby Callias even employs a rather absurd simile from carpenters and architects building houses for others but living themselves in rented ones – the ascription of risk awareness to those benefitting from the donations reflects a basic understanding of the calculation of potential costs and gains of taking an alternative opportunity (potentially more money from wrongdoings vs. potential risk of accusation and punishment in case caught, including potential loss of [future] donations and opportunities). Anyway, his sophistic assumption is disproven in the following (although Socrates first seems to take side with him: Xen. Symp. 4.5): while Charmides takes pride in his poverty within the democratic framework as he does not need to fear anymore to lose his (former) wealth, neither from city’s demands nor by chance (Xen. Symp. 4.29–32), he nevertheless is very keen in taking risks (or even dangers?) (… ἀλλὰ μάλα φιλοκινδύνως ὑπομένω …) in case he can potentially acquire something (Xen. Symp. 33). This is carried to extremes by the following speech of Antisthenes who declares his frugal lifestyle with richness in soul as being wealthy (Xen. Symp. 4.34–44) and shows with several puns to Callias’ former claim that many men take any toil and risk/danger to enlarge their fortunes; and especially tyrants for the sake of money would commit crimes worse than any of those poor in real need (Xen. Symp. 4.35– 36; cf. Hiero 7.1–2); as would do adulterers though knowing about the risks of their doing as they would be perfectly aware of the laws and violence faced when caught in the act, as Socrates states in the conversation with Aristippus about self-control (ἐγκράτεια) in the Memorabilia (2.1.5). While good men would undertake toil and go into risks or dangers only within a well-established and well-guided framework.38 Moreover, Xenophon’s Socrates later on in the banquet seems to discuss risk taking and marginal gains with the Syracusan owner of the performers (Xen. Symp. 7.2–5): how to make the performance of both boy and girl most attractive for the audience, but least effortful, namely, instead of performing dangerous leaping into knives (boy) and reading and writing on a whirling potter wheel (girl)? The solution finally, however not really mutually agreed on by Socrates and the Syracusan, who has to conduct it, is to perform music and dance that is considered more suitable to the banquet situation, but lowers the immediate hazard (for the boy) and efforts (for both, boy and girl) significantly.39 Despite the frequent (leadership) discourse about how to make soldiers more ready to take toils and go into dangerous, hazardous situations (see also n. 38, above), considerations on whether to take the risk of attacking or not (Xen. Cyr. 3.3.17; 4.5.27; cf. 4.3.5; also cf. 1.4.10 for hunting), or on how to lower the military risks for the own side while increasing them for the enemy (Xen. Cyr. 3.3.18–19; cf. 8.1.45–48) in the Cyropaedia, there is an important, longer discourse on how to (financially) reward the taking of war dangers by sharing booty. The famous debate takes first place within the banquet context (Xen. Cyr. 2.2.18–27), is then continued the next day within the army assembled 6 Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 (Xen. Cyr. 2.3.2–16), and eventually aims at justifying the geometrical, proportional equality over the mere arithmetical one.40 Several surprising modifications of common frames can be noticed within the episode: from topdown decision to (seemingly) democratic decision about the mode of rewarding; from status to performance, embodied in the aristocratic ὁμότιμος Chrysantas who is said to be “neither large nor powerful to look upon, but preeminent in understanding” (Xen. Cyr. 2.3.5: … οὔτε μέγας οὔτε ἰσχυρὸς ἰδεῖν, φρονήσει δὲ διαφέρων …) and the Persian commoner (δημότης) Pheraulas who is eager to compete with the homotimoi. Among his arguments to share the booty according to performance is the (euphemistic) one that “we shall go into the trial not having at stake interests equal with theirs; for they have at stake a life of honour, which is the most happy of all, while we risk only a life of toil unhonoured, which I think is most burdensome” (§ 11: … παραβαλλόμενοι δὲ οὐκ ἴσα εἰς τὸν κίνδυνον ἴμεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτοι μὲν ἔντιμον, ὅσπερ μόνος ἥδιστος, βίον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐπίπονον μέν, ἄτιμον δέ, ὅσπερ οἶμαι χαλεπώτατος). This notion of a subjective valuing of “risks” – what was considered an important incentive of the wealthy ones to defend their “state” with and by all means – is, again, not turning into inactivity of the commoners in Xenophon’s model but serves as an argumentative starting point to even more actively engage in warfare as the proportional reward scheme across status groups would allow those who would perform better to be eventually better off; it thus could serve as a huge incentive: what Pheraulas sees as quite probable when he describes the hard training of commoners by necessity instead of (refined) education of the homotimoi (§§ 13–14).41 Hence, the traditional scheme of risk calculation (and potentially awareness) based on potential status loss is replaced by one that rewards calculation (and taking) of risks by exposing oneself to the dangers and hazards of warfare, namely, by setting it against potential performance gains, for the sake of the individual, but of course also the whole organization, that is, the army (cf. Xen. Cyr. 5.2.19; cf. also Hell. 3.5.12, where the Spartan allies Corinthians, Arcadians, and Achaeans against Athens are said not to have been rewarded for their sharing in military toils and dangers). The levelling and mitigation of safety concerns is key for understanding the economic distribution scheme that the Xenophontic Cyrus initiates between the Armenian king and the Chaldaeans (Xen. Cyr. 3.2.17–24). Both see the heights between their territories as potential danger and barrier for their dwelling and overall development if held by the other party (cf. Xen. Cyr. 3.2.1, 17), though they would be willing to give uncultivated land to the agricultural (Chaldaeans), and idle pasture land to the herding people (Armenians) for rents in return. The intended solution is that neither gets control over the heights but Cyrus, who with that move is enabled to control both sides (Xen. Cyr. 3.2.22, cf. 4).42 On the historical side, both the Anabasis and the Hellenica frequently address the uncertainties and contingent structures the different players, both individual and groups, had to face, again especially in terms of decisions in war(fare). The Anabasis generally touches on the organizational structures and transformational capabilities, managerial skills of the army’s leaders, communication strategies and participative elements, and ethical standards necessary to survive in a hostile environment with ever changing circumstances for the Greek mercenaries while following Cyrus the Younger and especially after his death on their march back home.43 Aside the already well-known “risk/danger and toil”-discourse the provisioning of the army is definitely the most pressing issue. At the beginning of Book 5 Xenophon advises the army assembled to take care that foraging in enemy’s land due to insufficient financial means and lack of a provisioning market does not result in unplanned, uncoordinated, and individual action which would be risking the state of the whole army; instead, he proposes several logistic measures to prevent dangerous situations and anticipate possible future constellations for the soldiers’ most important goal, namely, to return to Greece – most of which are approved by the soldiers, except for letting nearby settlements prepare the road infrastructure (Xen. Anab. 5.1.6–13), which Xenophon nevertheless ensures privately, seeing their imprudence, without their consent. Anyway, his rivals for the leadership of the army are reported to succeed in destroying Xenophon’s plan to become oikistēs of a colony in the Black Sea region, as they seem to convince the nearby cities of the Heracleans and Sinopans through their merchants to offer pay for buying provisions in order to ensure the immediate leave of the Greek mercenaries after the arrival of commissioned ships by framing it a considerable risk to have this army settled close to them (Xen. Anab. 5.6.19): though this arrangement later is not fulfilled from the side of the Heracleans – the Sinopans are not mentioned anymore – (Xen. Anab. 5.6.35), also later the commander Xenophon cannot convince his comrade soldiers to settle at the Kalpes Limen though described as most proper for a prosperous settlement in the only ekphrasis of this work (Xen. Anab. 6.4.1–8; 6.6.3–4).44 Also in the Hellenica, the risk-and-danger discourse abounds, but not only related to soldiers with their toils and dangers they have to face. Lysander’s friends spread that the newly appointed commanders are a great risk for the Spartan’s foreign policy as they are totally unexperienced (Xen. Hell. 1.6.4), likewise the Athenian Alcibiades is said to be the prime cause of past and possible future dangers for the city by some on his return in 407 BC (Xen. Hell. 1.4.17; he himself in danger and forced to ally with Spartans and Persians to lower it: 1.4.15). Frequently, economic Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 7 factors add to the calculation of politico-military decision-makers. While the Spartan commander Cleombrotus is advised to calculate in the risk of punishment if he does not attack the Thebans at Leuctra, the Theban leaders at the same time consider that other cities could defect from them and the people of Thebes could then turn against them and exile them due to lack of supply if they did not start fighting (Xen. Hell. 6.4.5–6); during the ally-negotiations between Sparta and Athens in 370 BC the second speech of the Phlian aristocrat Procles focuses on Athens natural outlay, expertise, and experience in respect of sea leadership that should align with the one on land on the side of the Spartans: actually, the Athenians would risk more due to their dependency on the sea, and thus should take the lead there (Xen. Hell. 7.1.7), and vice versa the Spartans on land (Xen. Hell. 7.1.11), to reach a solution “that is best for us all” (§ 11: τὰ κράτιστα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν; what is afterwards successfully countered by a certain Athenian politician Cephisodotus in favour of equal share in both, land and sea leadership);45 the Athenian Chares shortly afterwards supports the Phliasians in their attempt to procure supply as they are cut off from their normal resources and have increasing difficulties in ensuring their necessities but consider the dangers by being attacked on their way to markets (where they do not only wish to buy but also to get rid of those unable to fight) lower than the further lack of supply goods (Xen. Hell. 7.2.17–18); the leaders of the Arcadian League who paid the heavy-armoured soldiers called Eparites from the sacred treasury fear that they would be probably sentenced to death in course of the common euthyna-procedure due to the rising criticism of this (ab-)use of the treasury money in the assembly and, therefore, seek help from the Thebans with the innuendo that the Arcadians might otherwise switch to the Spartan side (Xen. Hell. 7.4.34). At last, we have to speak about how Xenophon discusses the stepping into seemingly risky economic businesses. The Xenophontic Socrates in the Memorabilia advises Diodorus to help Hermogenes who is currently running the risk of being ruined (Xen. Mem. 2.10). The money invested to save him is more than returned by having procured a loyal and helpful friend, and it is told by the widening of the frame of the economic maxim: “Good householders, you know, say that the right time to buy is when a valuable article can be bought at a low price; and in these times the circumstances afford an opportunity of acquiring good friends very cheap” (Xen. Mem. 2.4: οἱ μέντοι ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι, ὅταν τὸ πολλοῦ ἄξιον μικροῦ ἐξῇ πρίασθαι, τότε φασὶ δεῖν ὠνεῖσθαι: νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰ πράγματα εὐωνοτάτους ἔστι φίλους ἀγαθοὺς κτήσασθαι; cf. Xen. Cyr. 8.3.35–50). Important is here to point out that obviously Diodorus does himself not risk ruin by helping Hermogenes, but has the sum that the latter needs readily available for this “investment,” and that the friendship Hermogenes returns is not just an empty loyalty but lived “either by word or deed” (cf. § 6: … ὅ τι ἂν ἢ λέγων ἢ πράττων ὠφελοίη τε καὶ εὐφραίνοι Διόδωρον). That is different in the case of Aristarchus (Xen. Mem. 2.7; see also n. 38) who is in dire need of financial means to sustain the members of his oikos during the rule of the Thirty. To avoid that the oikos falls apart Socrates advises him to engage his female relatives into weaving work for selling the products – what runs against common aristocratic values of letting only lower status group doing so (cf. Xen. Mem. 2.7.6–7), but is not risky at all as the women are skilled and experienced and can thus be useful for the common good of the household (Xen. Mem. 2.7.8, 10), hence Aristarchus also can ensure financial means from loans for this new business (Xen. Mem. 2.7.12), something he could not achieve before (Xen. Mem. 2.7.2).46 The Oeconomicus, in fact, is then fully devoted to streamline all actors in the organization “oikos” to strive for the common good, whence uncertainties for the household significantly decrease as all apply their skills, experiences, and care to their assigned tasks and, therewith, to this overall goal (see also above). Consequently, those who take more toils and risks/dangers must be more rewarded than those who do not (Xen. Oec. 13.11) – what distinguishes them from those seeking mere profit without taking any toil and risks/dangers, and by dishonest means (cf. Xen. Oec. 14.10) – while the household leader must ensure that all are assigned, devoted, and rewarded accordingly by his knowledge and diligent care and makes the whole organization more resilient (cf. Xen. Oec. 6.7, the difference between landowners and craftsmen in times of war) and profitable.47 Hence, also Ischomachus’ father successfully endeavours into bringing uncultivated land to full crop and can sell it with high returns (Xen. Oec. 20.22–26), what is wittingly framed as φιλεργία and compared to the “love” of grain merchants and housebuilders for their goods or products – businesses that were traditionally thought not to be suitable aristocratic business activities (Xen. Oec. 20.27–29).48 The most comprehensive discourse about economic risk-taking, however, one can find in the Poroi. This is due to this treatise’s design of being a reply to pressing political questions after the devastating Social War (357–355 BC) for Athens,49 a situation which demanded a critical review of the former faults and a prospect of how to set up Athenian finances in a solid, resilient, and sustainable way. Basically, Xenophon proposes a return to an oikos-like structure of the polis which shall become an ever-growing organisation: the potential of the natural resources and human-made infrastructures as well as the human resources must be used in a more efficient and effective way, especially by a clear assignment, distribution, and reward-scheme from the leaders’ side. 50 It is noteworthy that both safety/security and risk/dangers are important principles throughout Xenophon’s proposal as Janet Powell has shown in Chapter 3 of her 8 Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 only online accessible PhD-thesis:51 especially by lowering the risks for non-Athenian entrepreneurs and systematically planning the exploitation of the Laureion silver mines in a non-risky way so that Athens eventually appears not to be re-establishing a threatening, ill-famed hegemony (archē) but a natural, trustworthy, and very welcomed just leadership (hēgemonia) in the seemingly chaotic Greek world of his time.52 For the non-Athenian entrepreneurs in Athens, the metics, being regarded as highly successful businessmen and thus beneficial to the polis both in terms of trade and taxes, should not be forced into the hazards of taking part in warfare as hoplites – a danger not only in itself but also an economic due to the absence from their crafts and homes (Xen. Vect. 2.2);53 instead and in addition to other measures of reward to keep them attracted to Athens (Xen. Vect. 2.6–7), they could be honoured with enlistment in the cavalry (cf. Xen. Eq. Mag. 9.6), an ingenious idea that would also remove them from the traditionally citizen-formed hoplites (cf. Xen. Vect. 2.3–4).54 For the (foreign) ship-owners and -merchants, Chapter 3 praises the Athenian harbour of Piraeus as “beautiful and save” haven against dangerous weather conditions (Xen. Vect. 3.1), while the economic risks arising from finding suitable return cargo are described as very low (Xen. Vect. 3.2) and those from settling commercial disputes shall be considerably lowered by rewarding most just and quick decisions (Xen. Vect. 3.3).55 Regarding the silver mines exploitation by leasing out publicly bought slaves, Xenophon invests a huge amount of his description in Chapter 4 to counter concerns over the economic risks of such endeavour, listed by Powell regarding risks for the polis of Athens, “(1) the silver in the Laurion might run out or lose value leading to the collapse of the whole industry; (2) the operators hiring slaves from the state might default on their payments; (3) the lessees of the mining slaves might steal the slaves; (4) the quantity and quality of the mine slaves available to be purchased might decline due to over-demand; (5) the operators might hire from other slave owners instead of the state; and (6) the state may not be able to find enough people to hire the slave labour,” and regarding risks for entrepreneurship, “(1) that the large number of additional slaves will lead to over-crowding; (2) that the tribes will create competition; and (3) that rivals will be envious of an operator’s success.” 56 As she has succinctly shown, Xenophon advises for different strategies to deal with the economic risks of his proposal and uses specific ways to communicate those strategies, using the full range of measures (risk sharing, mitigation, reduction, balancing, shifting, denial) and rhetorical devices.57 In particular the combination of both is interesting to explore as it shows how risks are framed by Xenophon. Two examples must suffice here. Regarding the Laureion silver mines, the state shall imitate the success of private mine owners (Xen. Vect. 4.14), while the private entrepreneurs who are shying away from the mining business at the moment, especially from the risk of undertaking new mine openings (Xen. Vect. 4.28–29) shall take the ten Athenian tribes as a model which, so Xenophon’s proposal, shall share the risks and fortunes of new mine openings (Xen. Vect. 4.30: … αἱ δὲ κοινωσάμεναι τὴν τύχην καινοτομοῖεν …) as it seems unlikely for him that no tribe will find any silver ore as the past experiences prove (Xen. Vect. 4.31: … τό γε μὴν πάσας ἀποτυχεῖν οὐδενὶ τῶν παρεληλυθότων ἐοικός). Likewise, private businessmen could share their fortunes to make the risk more calculable (Xen. Vect. 4.32: … οἷόν τε δὴ οὕτως καὶ ἰδιώτας συνισταμένους καὶ κοινουμένους τὴν τύχην ἀσφαλέστερον κινδυνεύειν. …) while they should not fear that the public enterprise through the tribes would harm them, or vice versa the private enterprises would harm the public (enterprise, or treasury?),58 but should think as being united σύμμαχοι who would eventually strengthen each other in business (ibid.). This military analogy employed should not be plainly criticized, though it is illogical from a mere rational viewpoint as more competitors do not naturally lead to the better off of all, but should also be understood in light of Xenophon’s socio-economic model as proposed in his treatise, namely, that all align with the common interest, as well as due to the then recent, negative military experience of the Athenians, that is, the Social War with the break-off of their allies, the symmachoi.59 Equally striking is the way the investment fund for the capital necessary to finance the different costly measures (cf. Xen. Vect. 3.6 with the turn from measures free of direct costs to those that need money investment) is framed (Xen. Vect. 3.6–11):60 the allusion to eisphora, war-taxes by using frequently the verb εἰσφέρειν (5x) or the noun εἰσφορά (1x) in this context – despite the question whether the investment fund was intended to be composed of compulsory taxes or should rather be seen as a voluntary epidosis-scheme61 – aims at reframing the concept loaded with the negative emotions on those contributions as they are normally considered dead-end investments without return (cf. Xen. Vect. 3.8). Therefor the return scheme is laid down in some detail with figures, and is equipped with the simile of the sea-loan (ναυτικόν) for those investing most (10 minae = 1,000 drachmae) as they get almost 20% return;62 for all and especially the lesser contributors the investment is alleged to be safe as it is in a “state, which is to all appearances the safest and most durable of human institutions” (Xen. Vect. 3.10: καὶ ταῦτα ἐν πόλει, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀσφαλέστατόν τε καὶ πολυχρονιώτατον εἶναι); while the contributions by foreigners and foreign entities are rewarded with honours as benefactors, not with money (Xen. Vect. 3.11). Hence, the economic risks to be taken Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 9 by Athenians is countered by alleging potential profits and safety, for non-Athenians by providing a possible balance in social distinction (that might eventually lead to further businesses: cf. Xen. Vect. 3.4 for the honours of ship-owners and -merchants); again, all different target groups become united, yet being addressed with their imagined specific notion of risk and its satisfactory management by fact or word. Conclusion To sum up, contrary to common scholarly opinions, there is a distinct concept of risks, and particular economic risks, in ancient Greece, at least in Xenophon’s oeuvre. Xenophon and his literary figures provide a clear idea about the contingent structures and uncertainties they lived in, and what was (not) in the scope and reach of human decisionmaking. The necessary, frequent decision-making, especially for (military) leaders, but to some degree and on lower level also their agents within a very hierarchical, perfectly designed socio-economic model Xenophon made the testing ground for their sound learning, foresightful knowing and understanding, and careful, active applying of their skills which had to include perpetual and proper divinatory and worship practices of gods in order to also integrate the unknowable, uncertain sphere somehow into that framework. Although we only rarely find concrete figures for risk calculation also this field of risk management is at times appearing in Xenophon’s work, mainly regarding military affairs but also by weighing influencing factors against each other in economic terms and affairs. The best example of how risks were not only identified but also counter by different strategies and rhetorical framing are indeed Xenophon’s Poroi. Yet, as this work incorporated Xenophon’s modelling of how a perfect system framed by philosophical principles63 which were made suitable for capitalistic, utilitarian behaviour shall be run in a nutshell, uncertainties of life but especially human-made risks were definitely thought to be manageable – by him and probably many others in the 4th century BC. Endnotes 1. For the modern self-reflexive “risk society,” see Beck (1992). Cf., e.g., Toner (2024), pp. 1–3 on the influence of Beck’s book on the academic risk-discourse. 2. For the general definition of risk by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), see ISO 31000:2018(E), Chapter 3.1: “risk: effect of uncertainty on objectives. Note 1 to entry: An effect is a deviation from the expected. It can be positive, negative or both, and can address, create or result in opportunities and threats. Note 2 to entry: Objectives can have different aspects and categories, and can be applied at different levels. Note 3 to entry: Risk is usually expressed in terms of risk sources (3.4), potential events (3.5), their consequences (3.6) and their likelihood (3.7).” Cf. S. Tranchard on URL: <https://www.iso.org/news/ref2263.html> (last accessed 15 March 2024): “Risk is now defined as the ‘effect of uncertainty on objectives’, which focuses on the effect of incomplete knowledge of events or circumstances on an organization’s decision making.” 3. Luhmann (1993), esp. pp. 16–17 and 21–22. Cf. Toner (2024), pp. 5–12. 4. Knight (1921), esp. pp. 19–20. 5. Cf. the discussion in Scheller (2017), pp. 307–308 (with further literature). 10 Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 6. See Scheller (2017) passim; for the distinction ibid., esp. p. 313. 7. Luhmann (1993), pp. 21–23, quote from p. 23. 8. Cf. Toner (2024), pp. 8–9 on the use of “hazard” to describe “‘a set of circumstances which may cause harmful consequences’,” in contrast to the more general “danger.” 9. Cf. Scheller (2017), pp. 306–307, who clearly shows that a distinction between dangers and risks already occurred in high and late medieval times. See also Toner (2024), pp. 1–3 (for modernity) and passim for ancient Rome; cf. below for discussion of ancient Greek practices. 10. For a workable definition of chance and contingency for ancient studies and application to the Late Roman Republic, see Walter (2009), esp. pp. 37–39. 11. Walter (2009), pp. 38–39. 12. See Toner (2024), pp. 10–12. 13. On this important differentiation for ancient perception of risks, see Powell (2015), p. 151. 14. Droysen (1897), pp. 33–34 (§ 47). 15. Günther (2022a). 16. Denied, e.g., by Makropoulos (2004), pp. 373–374, among others with reference to Christian Meier’s “Könnensbewußtsein” of the Greeks; see Meier (1978, cf. 1975); cf. Luhmann (1993), p. 8 (regarding risk): “Older civilizations had developed quite different techniques for dealing with analogous problems, and thus had no need for a word covering what we now understand by the term risk. Mankind had naturally always been preoccupied by uncertainty about the future. For the most part, however, one trusted in divinatory practices, which – although unable to provide reliable security – nevertheless ensured that a personal decision did not arouse the ire of the gods or of other awesome powers, but was safeguarded by contact with the mysterious forces of fate.” Cf. Scheller (2017), pp. 306– 307, who challenges this narrative widely spread in Sociology and, partly, History for the medieval times. 17. Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.1: πρῶτον μὲν θύοντα χρὴ αἰτεῖσθαι θεοὺς ταῦτα διδόναι καὶ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν, ἀφ᾽ ὧν θεοῖς μὲν κεχαρισμενώτατα ἄρξαις ἄν, σαυτῷ δὲ καὶ φίλοις καὶ τῇ πόλει προσφιλέστατα καὶ εὐκλεέστατα καὶ πολυωφελέστατα. All translations are taken from the Perseus Digital Library: < https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper> (last accessed 28 April 2024). Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 11 18. For this, see Agrimonti (2016), pp. 194–195 and 201. 19. Xen. Eq. Mag. 9.8–9. 20. For a detailed analysis, see Mueller-Goldingen (1995), pp. 131–133. Cf. Agrimonti (2016), pp. 202–203. 21. Cf. Xen. Cyr. 8.7.21. 22. See Beerden (2013), esp. pp. 195–222, seeing “risk” as “deeply rooted in [sc. modern] probalistic thought”(ibid., 199) by viewing antiquity as having neither an “emic” vocabulary nor an “etically” discoverable quantification of uncertainties: thus ancients used divination to get a glimpse of the future; cf. Eidinow 2007, pp. 13–25 and her conclusion (ibid., p. 233): “Using a theory of ‘risk’ that describes it as socially constructed, I have tried to bring to light some of the stories contained within these texts [sc. oracle texts from Dodona and katadesmoi], setting out to identify when, how, and why ordinary Greek men and women used these technologies to seek supernatural aid. Oracles and curses show us different expressions of and responses to risk and uncertainty in everyday life.” 23. On the peace conference and Athenian envoys as well as their reflection of Athenian foreign policy ideas, see Mosley (1962), cf. Ryder (1963). 24. On leadership and piety in Xenophon, see esp. Flower (2016). The topic of the facets and factors of comprehensive leadership in Xenophon cannot be touched upon in this context. 25. Xen. Eq. Mag. 9.9: … εἰκὸς δὲ μᾶλλον ἐθέλειν αὐτοὺς συμβουλεύειν τούτοις, οἳ ἂν μὴ μόνον ὅταν δέωνται ἐπερωτῶσι τί χρὴ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις θεραπεύωσιν ὅ τι ἂν δύνωνται τοὺς θεούς. 26. Cf. Christ (2020), pp. 129–130, for whom, however, it is mainly the cavalry commander’s managerial skill with human parties which makes him a successful (elite) leader within the democratic framework. 27. Xen. Cyr. 1.6.23: φρόνιμος δὲ περὶ τοῦ συνοίσειν μέλλοντος πῶς ἄν τις τῷ ὄντι γένοιτο; δῆλον, ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, ὅτι ὅσα μὲν ἔστι μαθόντα εἰδέναι, μαθὼν ἄν, ὥσπερ τὰ τακτικὰ ἔμαθες: ὅσα δὲ ἀνθρώποις οὔτε μαθητὰ οὔτε προορατὰ ἀνθρωπίνῃ προνοίᾳ, διὰ μαντικῆς ἂν παρὰ θεῶν πυνθανόμενος φρονιμώτερος ἄλλων εἴης: ὅ τι δὲ γνοίης βέλτιον ὂν πραχθῆναι, ἐπιμελόμενος ἂν τούτου ὡς ἂν πραχθείη. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι οὗ ἂν δέῃ φρονιμωτέρου ἀνδρὸς ἢ τὸ ἀμελεῖν. / “‘But how could one become really wise in foreseeing that which will prove to be useful?’ ‘Obviously, my son,’ said he, ‘by learning all that it is possible to acquire by learning, just as you learned tactics. But whatever it is not possible for man to learn, nor for human wisdom to foresee, that you may find out from the gods by the soothsayer's 12 Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 art, and thus prove yourself wiser than others; and if you know anything that it would be best to have done, you would show yourself wiser than others if you should exert yourself to get that done; for it is a mark of greater wisdom in a man to strive to secure what is needful than to neglect it.’” Cf. also § 22 for the use of φρόνιμος vel sim. Cf. MuellerGoldingen (1995), p. 115, who rather focuses on the aspect that human knowledge is limited, considering this the starting point for an epistemological reasoning of the divinatory practice, but at least acknowledges that “[d]ie vorgängige Forderung nach έπιστήμη im Bereich der Technai wird dadurch nicht außer Kraft gesetzt.” 28. On the rhetorical turn of Xenophon in the use of δαιμόνιον / δαιμονᾶν (“by divine power”) for disqualifying both extremes, namely, asking the gods about nothing or everything, see Gray (1998), pp. 30–31. 29. On this good, elite citizen scheme in the Oeconomicus, being characteristic feature of Xenophon’s oeuvre, see Christ (2020), esp. pp. 97–99. 30. So Pomeroy (1994), p. 310 (ad loc.). 31. On the discussion about Xenophon’s Ischomachus and a historical wealthy Athenian of that name, with a slandered wife named Chrysilla, see Pomeroy (1994), pp. 259–264; cf. Hobden (2017), pp. 168–173. Christ (2020), p. 79, n. 28, clearly distinguishes between the historical and literary persons. 32. On the use, see Pomeroy (1994), p. 287, who rightly concludes that the example is rather used for a male audience. See also Kronenberg (2009), pp. 61–62 for the allegories. 33. On the linkage between “care,” “provision,” and “risk” in literature from antiquity to modernity, see Wolf (2019). On the relation between ἐπιστήμη, the (applied/applicable) knowledge of a specific field of expertise, and τέχνη, the actual field, in the Oeconomicus, see, e.g., Xen. Oec. 1.4. Contra Föllinger (2002), p. 53, who views both as “bedeutungsgleich.” 34. Woodhouse (1910) s.v. risk, risky, pp. 717–718. 35. Woodhouse (1910) s.v. safe, safely, safety, p. 730 and s.v. secure, security, pp. 747–748. 36. On the semantics of securitas in antiquity, see Schrimm-Heins (1991), pp. 133–140. On securitas as sine cura in positive and negative sense, see also Luhmann (1993), p. 13. 37. Luhmann (1993), pp. 19–21, quotes from p. 20 and p. 21, respectively. Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 13 38. See Christ (2020), pp. 108–114 and the whole chapter on how Callias is designed as typical a-social, leisureenjoying Athenian elite that Xenophon aims to educate for taking responsibilities by becoming real kaloikagathoi in the democratic city. This is finally stressed by Socrates at the end of the Symposium (8.7–43) and includes a re-framing of pederasty as family-like love, whereby those following this un-bodily love take toil and risk for the good things’ sake, that is, for the polis (cf. Xen. Symp. 8.32): see Jordovic (2025 forthcoming). On kaloikagathoi taking toils and risks/dangers for the (common) good, often in exchange for praise etc., see, e.g., Xen. Ages. 1.36; 7.1; 11.9; Hiero 11.12, cf. Cyr. 1.5.12; 3.3.8, 10, 51; 4.2.39 for soldiers in war, 8.4.14 for Cyrus’ friends, 1.2.1 and 5.5.18 for Cyrus himself. On the (rational) willingness to obey to just order within which such performance is possible and which must be thus established by leaders as equal rational calculation, see Lowry 1987, pp. 57–59. For the contrary framework, see esp. Xenophon’s Hiero: the tyrant is never safe, even within his palace (2.10); he has even to calculate whether the citizens are more useful than potentially harmful to him and his rule (6.15, with the simile of a horse: cf. Re Equ. 3.12; 4.1; the opposite is Cyrus’ rule: Xen. Cyr. 8.1.45–48). In Xen. Mem. 2.7 it is Aristarchus feeling the burden from taking care of his female relatives in the household in the times of the tyrannic rule of the Thirty with less economic opportunities. This situation is described as dangerous by Socrates who envisions that the household-framework and the values constituting it (φιλία; χάρις) will fall apart (2.7.9) unless Aristarchus employs, better to say, values these women with weaving work that he consequently can sell for the sake of provisions for the whole oikos; for this episode, see also below. 39. On this calculus, see Figueira (2020), p. 282, n. 29; cf. Lowry (1987), p. 81. Cf. Xen. Hiero 1.12–13, the “risk calculation” by performers resulting in getting more money if performing at a tyrant’s court. 40. Analysis of the whole episode in Mueller-Goldingen (1995), pp. 138–148. 41. On the (alleged) participative scheme that rationalizes and rewards initiative and activity, yet within a strictly defined framework and is now not established – as to be expected – by a democratic but a autocratic regime, see Lowry (1987), pp. 67–68. The difference to the rewards with prizes in military training as ordered and arranged by Cyrus (ibid., p. 62; see Xen. Cyr. 1.6.18) is, in fact, pointed out by the Xenophontic Cyrus himself, Xen. Cyr. 2.2.19, as they consider booty acquired in battle and war as “common property” (ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἂν στρατευόμενοι κτήσωνται, κοινὰ οἶμαι ἑαυτῶν ἡγήσονται εἶναι). Hence, the decision about distribution must be adjusted to the “democratic” 14 Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 form, but the decisive body, the army, is de facto framed by the speeches of Cyrus and the following one by Chrysantas, and arguably the one of Pheraulas who later appears in Book 8 of the Cyropaedia as rich, but unhappy man who is helped to overcome the strict focus on financial wealth without utility (esp. Xen. Cyr. 8.3.35–50); see MuellerGoldingen (1995), pp. 146–148. 42. On the improvement of economic potential by this scheme, see Lowry (1987), pp. 64–66. 43. On Xenophon’s application of a leader-directed, Athenian-styled communicative and participative model to the Anabasis, see Christ (2020), pp. 153–183. On the managing of uncertainties, see the considerations by King (2011). 44. On both episodes, see the commentary by Lendle (1995), pp. 344–349 and 385–390, 402, respectively. On the play with Athenian political institutions (assembly) and political rhetoric throughout the Anabasis, see Christ (2020), pp. 153–183. In Xen. Anab. 4.6.16 the Spartan Cheirisophus responds to Xenophon’s allusion to his education (παιδεία) to cheat and steal (κλέπτειν) what is not prohibited by alleging the same for Athenian politicians in respect of public funds, though it is dangerous for them, and that the best do it most, and are those who seem to be deemed worthy to rule. This is remarkable in respect of behavioural and (new) institutional economics: while for the Lacedaemonians two competing institutional norms (stealing out of necessity as part of military paideia vs. punishment in case being caught in the act) (cf. Xen. resp. Lac. 2.6–9; Cyr. 6.1.31–33) form their way of “honorable stealing,” for the Athenians this is reportedly not the case as the “best” just make rational calculation of how to be better off in an institutional framework that allegedly does not efficiently and effectively punish embezzlement. On this episode and the later relation to the accusation of Xenophon to have financially benefitted from the relation to the Odrysian king Seuthes while mulcting his comrades of their pay (Xen. Anab. 7.6.9–10), see Christ (2020), pp. 157 and 177. 45. On the narratives of Procles’ two speeches as styled by Xenophon, see Baragwanath (2012), on the second speech esp. ibid., pp. 330–339. 46. On the frame of virtuous work across social boundaries, see Christ (2020), pp. 90–91. 47. However, man’s risky businesses of acquisition for and defense of the house outside is balanced by the wife’s protective character within the household (Xen. Oec. 7.25). 48. See Christ (2020), pp. 96–97. Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 15 49. On the much-debated date and place of composition, see the summary by Whitehead (2019), pp. 7–15. 50. On the connection to philosophical principles, see Schorn (2011). 51. Powell (2015), pp. 144–188. 52. See Xen. Vect. 5, culminating in 5.8: νῦν δέ γε διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχὴν παραπεπτωκέναι μοι δοκεῖ τῇ πόλει ὥστε καὶ ἄνευ πόνων καὶ ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ ἄνευ δαπάνης ἀνακτᾶσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ πειρᾶσθαι διαλλάττειν τὰς πολεμούσας πρὸς ἀλλήλας πόλεις, ἔστι δὲ συναλλάττειν, εἴ τινες ἐν αὑταῖς στασιάζουσιν. / “And now, owing to the confusion prevalent in Greece, an opportunity, I think, has fallen to the state to win back the Greeks without trouble, without danger, and without expense. For she has it in her power to try to reconcile the warring states, she has it in her power to compose the factions contending in their midst.” On the difference in leadership-framing as proposed in Xenophon’s Vectigalia but also his Hiero, see Farrell (2015). 53. Whitehead (2019), p. 59 (ad loc.) on the scholarly discussion about the reading of τῶν τέχνων (= crafts, or: τέκνων = children) καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν (= houses, or: οἰκέων = domestic affairs); ibid., p. 113 he correctly proposes to translate “danger” in relation to warfare (cf. Powell [2015], p. 177), yet the result of this military service or even death on the battlefield is de facto an avoidable “risk” to the businesses and households. 54. Cf. the commentary by Whitehead (2019), pp. 113–115 on these two paragraphs. On should see this, however, as essential part of Xenophon’s socio-economic model: every status group is assigned the particular place within the structure where it can serve best the overall purpose, that is, the flourishment of the polis. 55. See Powell (2015), pp. 175–176. On the hierarchy of the economically potential groups targeted, see Günther (2022b). 56. Powell (2015), pp. 162 and 168, respectively, and for both the following analysis of the related passages, ibid., pp. 161–173 and 177–178 (on foreigners in mining industry). Cf. at times the detailed commentary by Whitehead (2019) (ad loc.). 57. Powell (2015), pp. 184–186. 58. … ὡς ἢ τὸ δημόσιον οὕτω κατασκευαζόμενον παραλυπήσει τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ οἱ ἰδιῶται τὸ δημόσιον. While the first τὸ δημόσιον relates to κατασκευαζόμενον, the second one could also stand alone, then meaning “public treasury.” 16 Global Business & Economics Anthology, Volumes I & II, December 2024 59. For the criticism, see Whitehead (2019), pp. 215–216. 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