LANSA WORKING PAPER SERIES
Volume 2017 No 14
India’s National Food Security Act (NFSA):
Early Experiences
Raghav Puri
June 2017
About this paper
In September 2013, the Parliament of India passed the National Food Security Act (NFSA) that made
‘right to food’ a legal entitlement for approximately three-fourths of the rural population and half of the
urban population of India. Besides ensuring access to highly subsidised foodgrain, NFSA also made
maternity benefits and nutrition for children aged six months to 14 years a legal entitlement. While it is
too early to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of NFSA, this paper attempts to
document its rollout and to discuss important innovations and challenges emerging from NFSA’s early
experiences in different states and union territories (UTs).
The author would like to thank Dr. Jean Dréze and Dr. Reetika Khera for their feedback on the paper.
The author would also like to thank three anonymous referees for their comments and Dr. Bhavani R.V.
for her guidance. The paper benefitted immensely from inputs of participants at a workshop on food
security at the M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation in August 2016.
About LANSA
Leveraging Agriculture for Nutrition in South Asia (LANSA) is an international research partnership.
LANSA is finding out how agriculture and agri-food systems can be better designed to advance nutrition.
LANSA is focused on policies, interventions and strategies that can improve the nutritional status of
women and children in South Asia. LANSA is funded by UK aid from the UK government. The views
expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government's official policies. For more information see
www.lansasouthasia.org
2
Contents
List of Tables ....................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Acronyms............................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................ 6
Overview of NFSA ............................................................................................................................................................ 7
I. NFSA Provisions ......................................................................................................................................................... 7
II. Rollout of NFSA ........................................................................................................................................................ 10
I. Delay in Implementation ......................................................................................................................................... 10
2. Lack of Universal Maternity Benefits ................................................................................................................... 12
3. Impact of Fiscal Devolution on NFSA Implementation ................................................................................... 13
Findings from the Field ................................................................................................................................................... 16
I. NFSA Survey - 2016 ................................................................................................................................................ 16
2. J-PAL Process Monitoring of DBT in the TPDS - 2016 ................................................................................... 17
3. National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER) Study - 2015 ............................................... 17
4. Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Audit - 2015 ................................................................................ 19
5. NFSA Madhya Pradesh Survey - 2015 ................................................................................................................. 19
6. NFSA Bihar Survey - 2014 ...................................................................................................................................... 20
Innovations and Challenges ........................................................................................................................................... 22
I. Reducing Inclusion and Exclusion Errors - Identification of Beneficiaries................................................... 22
2. Benefits of Technology - COREPDS in Chhattisgarh ...................................................................................... 23
3. Limitations of Technology - Aadhaar and Biometrics in Rajasthan and Jharkhand ................................... 25
4. Going beyond Foodgrains - Pulses in the PDS .................................................................................................. 26
5. Cash of Food? Early Experiences from Puducherry and Chandigarh DBT Pilots ..................................... 27
Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................................... 28
References ......................................................................................................................................................................... 30
Appendix - TPDS Process ............................................................................................................................................. 33
3
List of Tables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Comparison of TPDS Provisions before and after NFSA
Important Dates
Timeline of NFSA Implementation
Budget Allocations for NFSA-Related Programme from 2011-12 to 2017-18
Change in TPDS Coverage after NFSA Rollout
Results from NFSA Survey (2016)
Purchase-Entitlement Ratios from NCAER Study (2015)
Leakage Estimates (in %) from NCAER Study (2015)
Summary of Studies from NFSA Implementation
Distribution of Subsidised Pulses through TPDS
4
Acronyms
AAY
APL
BPL
CAG
CFSA
COREPDS
FCI
FPS
DGRO
ICDS
ICRIER
IGMSY
INR
MDM
NCAER
NFSA
PDS
PEEP
PER
PoS
RPDS
SECC
SFC
TPDS
UID
UT
Antyodaya Anna Yojana
Above Poverty Line
Below Poverty Line
Comptroller and Auditor General
Chhattisgarh Food Security Act
Centralised Online Real-time Electronic Public Distribution System
Food Corporation of India
Fair Price Shop
District Grievance Redress Officer
Integrated Child Development Services
Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations
Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana
Indian Rupee
Mid-Day Meal
National Council for Applied Economic Research
National Food Security Act
Public Distribution System
Public Evaluation of Entitlement Programme
Purchase-Entitlement Ratio
Point of Sale
Revamped Public Distribution System
Socio-Economic Caste Census
State Food Corporation
Targeted Public Distribution System
Unique Identification
Union Territory
5
Introduction
The National Food Security Act (NFSA) that came into effect1 on July 5, 2013 aims to ensure “food and
nutritional security in human life cycle approach, by ensuring access to adequate quantity of quality food
at affordable prices to people to live a life with dignity” (GOI 2013). The Act provides a legal entitlement
(or the ‘right to food’) of subsidised foodgrain to 75 per cent of the rural population and 50 per cent of
the urban population of India. NFSA relies on four existing programmes to provide food and nutritional
security: the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), the Integrated Child Development Services
(ICDS), the Mid Day Meal (MDM) programme and the Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY).
While TPDS provides foodgrains to approximately 813.4 million Indians under NFSA, the ICDS and
MDM programmes ensure a free meal to all children aged six months to 14 years at the anganwadi
(childcare centres) and schools, respectively. The IGMSY programme provides all pregnant and lactating
mothers a maternity benefit of INR 6000.
While it is too early for a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of NFSA on food security, a review of
the experiences of various states/UTs in implementing the Act would be helpful to both document the
process and discuss important innovations and challenges emerging from these observations. For
instance, three UTs have opted for direct benefit transfers (DBT) of the food subsidy and findings from
preliminary studies provide a rare insight into how cash transfers (in lieu of in-kind food subsidies) work
in the Indian context. As NFSA is implemented by the states/UTs, there has been a proliferation of
eligibility criteria to select beneficiaries, methods of identification (using the socio-economic census data,
a self-declaration process or existing state-level data) and use of technology (biometric authentication,
smart cards or offline transactions). These state-level variations give us an opportunity to appreciate the
advantages and limitations of different approaches to improving the effectiveness of TPDS. This review
also discusses three major challenges faced by NFSA: first, the delay in implementation of the Act;
second, a lack of universal maternity entitlements and third, the impact of the recommendations of the
14th Finance Commission (that of fiscal devolution of taxes to the states) on NFSA-related programmes.
On November 1, 2016 (three and a half years after the Act came into effect), all states/UTs in India
either had implemented or were in the process of implementing NFSA. This report reviews the early
experiences of different states/UTs in rolling out the Act. The first part provides a brief overview of
NFSA by discussing the provisions of the Act and issues relating to its rollout. The second part
summarises findings from six studies conducted over the past three years in order to understand the
important issues associated with NFSA implementation. The third part highlights some of the
innovations and challenges in its functioning by looking at case studies from specific states/UTs. The aim
of this report is to provide the reader with an overview of what we know about the implementation of
NFSA.
1
The NFSA initially came into effect as an ordinance (National Food Security Ordinance, 2013) on July 5. It received
assent from the President of India on September 10, 2013 and came into effect retroactively from July 5, 2013.
6
Overview of NFSA
The National Food Security Act (NFSA), 2013 received assent from the President of India on September
3, 2013 after being in effect as an Ordinance since July 3, 2013. The Act aims to provide “food and
nutritional security in human life cycle approach, by ensuring access to adequate quantity of quality food
at affordable prices to people to live a life with dignity” (GOI 2013). The first part of this section
provides an introduction to NFSA by discussing important provisions of the Act that ensure food
security and the second part highlights key issues during its rollout.
I.
NFSA Provisions
The following are the important provisions of NFSA
1. Converting welfare benefits to legal entitlements
The most important provision of NFSA is that it makes ‘right to food’ a legal entitlement. According to
Article 42 of the Constitution of India, it is the “duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the
standard of living and to improve public health.” Providing the ‘right to food’ helps attain each of these
objectives.
2. Increase in coverage of the targeted public distribution system (TPDS)
Section 3(2) of NFSA extends the coverage of TPDS to 75 per cent of the rural population and 50 per
cent of the urban population. This is a major shift from the pre-NFSA coverage of TPDS, which was
limited to households living below the poverty line2 (BPL). However, it is important to note that many
states/UTs had expanded the coverage of their TPDS by introducing ‘State BPL’ categories that covered
households that were poor but did not meet the Central Government’s BPL ‘cut-off’ (Puri 2012). NFSA
also simplifies the different categories of beneficiaries from three3 in the pre-NFSA TPDS to two by
replacing the Above Poverty Line (APL) and BPL categories with a single ‘priority’ category and retaining
the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY). This is important as one of the major criticisms of the pre-NFSA
TPDS was the high diversion of foodgrains in the APL category (Dréze and Khera 2015c).
3. Uniform entitlement of 5 kg of foodgrains per person
Under Section 3(1) of NFSA, every person belonging to a priority household is entitled to receive five kg
of rice per person per month from TPDS. In the pre-NFSA period, all BPL households would receive 35
kg of foodgrain, irrespective of the number of members in each household. NFSA, however, accounts
for the differences in number of members in each household by making entitlements per person.
However, NFSA retains the pre-NFSA entitlements for the AAY households that will continue to
receive 35 kg of foodgrain per household.
2
In 2014-15, a person earning INR 47/day in urban areas and INR 32/day in rural areas was considered living below
the poverty line (Rangarajan 2014).
3
In the pre-NFSA TPDS, there were three categories of beneficiaries: Above Poverty Line (APL), Below Poverty Line
(BPL) and Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY). While BPL covered those living below the poverty line, the AAY targeted
the ‘poorest of poor’.
7
4. Reduction in prices of foodgrains
In the pre-NFSA period, the Central Government set the ‘central issue prices (CIP)’ for subsidised
foodgrains distributed through TPDS. The prices were INR 5.65, 4.15 and 3 for rice, wheat and coarse
grains, respectively. However, many state governments provided state subsidies to further reduce prices
(Chhattisgarh reduced the price of TPDS rice from INR 5.65/kg to INR 3/kg in 2007 and INR 2/kg in
2012).
According to Schedule I of NFSA, all eligible households shall be entitled to foodgrains at subsidised
prices not exceeding INR 3, 2 and 1 for rice, wheat and coarse grains, respectively, for the first three
years since the commencement of the Act. After the three-year period is over, the Central Government
may set prices that should not exceed the minimum support prices of each of the three foodgrains.
The figure in the Appendix traces the TPDS process and Table 1 gives a comparison of TPDS
provisions pre and post NFSA.
5. Identification of eligible households by state governments
Under section 10 (1a and 1b) of NFSA, state governments are required to identify households to be
covered under AAY and priority categories within a year from the commencement of NFSA and place
the list of identified eligible households in the public domain. This provision addresses the high
prevalence of inclusion and exclusion errors that were synonymous with the pre-NFSA TPDS due to its
reliance on the 2002 BPL survey for rural areas and the 2007 BPL survey for urban areas (as mentioned
earlier, some states did expand coverage of their TPDS beyond these BPL surveys through state
subsidies).
6. Nutritional support for women and children
Section 4 of NFSA makes it the Central Government’s responsibility to provide a free meal through
local anganwadis (childcare centres) and a maternity benefit of at least INR 6000 for pregnant and
lactating (until six months after childbirth) mothers.
NFSA also includes provisions for food entitlements for children aged six months to 14 years. Section 5
entitles all children aged 6 months to 6 years to a free meal at the anganwadis and a free mid-day meal
for all school-going children up to class VIII (or age 14). NFSA also states that these schools and
anganwadis will have facilities for cooking meals, and providing drinking water and sanitation.
7. Food security allowance
Section 8 of NFSA entitles all eligible persons to a food security allowance in case they are not provided
the entitled quantities of foodgrains or meals. This payment has to be made by the state government to
each person. The ‘Food Security Allowance Rules, 2015’ were notified by the Central Government on
January 21, 2015 and provide the norms for calculating and disbursing this allowance. The amount can be
calculated by multiplying the difference between 1.25 times the minimum support price (MSP) of the
relevant foodgrain for that marketing season and the prices specified in Schedule I of the Act, with the
quantity of non-supply. This amount has to be paid by the end of the third week of the month following
the month in which the foodgrain was not supplied (GOI 2015c).
8
8. Grievance redress mechanism and penalty
Sections 15 and 16 of NFSA require State Governments to appoint District Grievance Redress Officers
(DGROs) and constitute a State Food Commission (SFC) for the purpose of monitoring and reviewing
the implementation of the Act. Section 33 allows the State Commission to impose a penalty of not more
than INR 5000 on any public servant or authority found guilty of failing to provide relief recommended
by the District Grievance Redress Officer.
9. Cost of intra-state transportation and handling of foodgrains
Section 22 of NFSA lists the obligations of the Central Government in the implementation of the Act.
According to sub-section 4(d), it is the responsibility of the Central Government to provide financial
assistance to state governments for intra-state movement and handling of foodgrains (i.e. from the
Central Government warehouses in the states to the FPSs). This is a significant provision as it promotes
‘doorstep delivery’ of foodgrains, a TPDS reform that has been important and successful in states/UTs
where it was implemented in the pre-NFSA period.
10. Reforms of TPDS
Section 12 of NFSA makes it the responsibility of Central and State Governments to “progressively
undertake necessary reforms of the TPDS” such as:
doorstep delivery of foodgrains to FPSs
application of information and communication technologies with the aim of end-to-end
computerisation of TPDS
transparency of records
shifting management of FPSs from private owners to public bodies such as women’s
cooperatives
diversification of commodities distributed
leveraging Aadhaar for identification of beneficiaries
introducing programmes such as cash transfers and food coupons
Table 1 Comparison of TPDS provisions before and after NFSA
Provisions
Pre-NFSA
Post-NFSA
Coverage (by Central
BPL Population (29.5% in 2011-12)
813.4 million (75% in Rural Areas and 50%
Government)
in Urban Areas)
Selection Criteria
Below Poverty Line (BPL) Survey –
Determined by State Government
2002 (Rural) and 2007 (Urban)
Quantity of
APL
15 kg (depending on availability)
Excluded
Rations
BPL (Priority) 35 kg
5 kg per member
AAY (AAY)
35 kg
35 kg
Price of Food
APL
Rice – Rs. 8.30; Wheat – Rs. 6.10
Excluded
Items
BPL (Priority) Rice – Rs. 5.65; Wheat – Rs. 4.15;
Rice – Rs. 3; Wheat – Rs. 2; Coarse
(per kg)
Coarse Grains – Rs. 3
Grains – Rs.1
AAY (AAY)
Rice – Rs. 3; Wheat – Rs. 2
9
II.
Rollout of NFSA
The National Food Security Act was first rolled out as the National Food Security Ordinance (NFSO)
on July 5, 2013. Haryana became the first state to begin implementation on August 20, 2013. The
National Food Security Bill was eventually tabled in the Indian Parliament and received assent from the
President of India on September 10, 2013. In this section, three important issues regarding the rollout of
NFSA are discussed. These include the delay in the implementation of the Act, the lack of universal
maternity benefits and the impact of the fiscal devolution resulting from the recommendations of the
14th Finance Commission on NFSA-related programmes. Table 2 provides a detailed timeline of the
major events relating to the rollout of NFSA.
Table 2 Important Dates
Event
National Food Security Ordinance (NFSO) promulgated
Haryana becomes first state to start implementing NFSA
National Food Security Act passed by Lok Sabha
National Food Security Act (NFSA) receives assent from President of India
Press Note issued by Central Government indicating that ICDS, MDM and IGMSY will
deliver entitlements listed in Section 4, 5 and 6 in NFSA
June 30, 2014
First extension of NFSA deadline by three months till October 4, 2014
November 28, 2014 Second extension of NFSA deadline by six months till April 4, 2015
January 25, 2015
Food Security Allowance Rules, 2015 notified by the Central Government
March 20, 2015
Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2015 published – Section 3 (3) stated
that no new AAY households will be identified
April 4, 2015
Third extension of NFSA deadline by six months till September 30, 2015
August 21, 2015
Cash Transfer of Food Subsidy Rules, 2015 notified by Central Government
October 28, 2015
Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Amendment Order, 2015 published – Section
3 (3) limiting AAY removed
November 1, 2015
All States/UTs implementing NFSA (after Kerala and Tamil Nadu agree to implement NFSA)
December 31, 2016 Prime Minister announces maternal entitlement of INR 6000 for pregnant women under
IGMSY
Source: Compiled by author using information from http://pib.nic.in/newsite/AdvSearch.aspx
Date
July 5, 2013
August 20, 2013
August 26, 2013
September 10, 2013
February 11, 2014
1. Delay in implementation
According to Section 10(1b) of NFSA, State Governments were required to identify eligible households
“within such period not exceeding three hundred and sixty-five days from the commencement of the
Act.” However, one of the first setbacks was the delay in implementation due to the inability of state
governments to complete the identification process. Only 11 of the 36 states/UTs had started receiving
allocation of foodgrains under NFSA (i.e. based on the number of eligible NFSA households rather than
the pre-NFSA TPDS) from the Central Government by July 4, 2014. Of these, six states/UTs
(Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, the Punjab and Rajasthan) had completed the process
10
of identifying beneficiaries while the remaining five (Bihar, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and
Chandigarh) were still in the process of completing identification of beneficiaries (PIB 2013).
The Central Government, in a letter to all states/UTs that had failed to meet this deadline, extended it
by three months. However, none of the states/UTs were able to meet the new deadline and the Central
Government issued a second letter that further extended the deadline for identification of NFSA
beneficiaries by six months to April 4, 2015. To address this issue, the Minister of Consumer Affairs,
Food and Public Distribution invited Food Secretaries of all 25 states/UTs that were yet to begin NFSA
implementation to Delhi on December 24, 2014 to discuss their preparedness for implementing the Act.
Nine months after the second deadline for identification of beneficiaries had passed, only 11 of the 36
states/UTs had started implementing NFSA (PIB 2014). The Central Government, once again, extended
the deadline by six months to September 30, 2015.
During the third extension, two states/UTs (West Bengal and Lakshadweep) started implementation,
increasing the total number of NFSA states/UTs to 13. This number further increased to 18 states/UTs
as Tripura, Puducherry, Uttarakhand, Jharkhand and Telangana started implementing the programme in
September-October 2015. According to a CAG audit of the preparedness of states/UTs for the
implementation of NFSA, as of October 2015 only 18 states/UTs had implemented NFSA, covering only
51 per cent (415.7 million) of the 813.4 million eligible NFSA beneficiaries (CAG 2015, 8). The CAG
audit also noted that while 18 states/UTs had started the implementation, only eight had identified all
beneficiaries. The remaining 10 states/UTs had not completed the identification process —
approximately 54.34 million beneficiaries were yet to be identified and provided with their NFSA
entitlements (CAG 2015, 15).
Over the next nine months, 16 more states/UTs started implementation of NFSA. Tamil Nadu and
Kerala were the only states that had not started implementing the programme three years after the Act
came into effect. While the former was concerned about the extra financial burden that would be
imposed on its budget,4 the latter could not begin implementation due to the ongoing elections in May
2016. It was not until November 2016 that all states/UTs were implementing NFSA (PIB 2016b).
A major hurdle in effective implementation, especially in identifying the eligible beneficiaries, was the lack
of transparency in the Socio-Economic Caste Census (SECC) data. According to PUCL (2015), the
Central Government was “grossly negligent in releasing this data” which could have played a pivotal role
in identifying beneficiaries, considering this was the latest census data available. The SECC collected data
in all 640 districts of India — however, in February 2015 draft and final data was only available for 500
and 141 districts, respectively (PUCL 2015: 57). The limited availability of SECC data played an
important role in delaying the rollout of the Act by state governments.
Tamil Nadu has had a universal PDS and the implementation of NFSA – that does not provide APL foodgrain
allocation – would reduce its total foodgrain allocation from the Central Government.
4
11
The delay raises important questions regarding the inability of the states/UTs to deliver foodgrains to all
eligible beneficiaries under the Act within a year of it coming into effect. As highlighted in the public
interest petition filed by the Peoples’ Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) in May 2015, the validity of these
extensions provided by the Central Government are questionable. Section 10 of the Act makes it the
state government’s responsibility to ensure the identification of beneficiaries to allow for the
implementation of the Act (PUCL 2015). Millions of eligible beneficiaries in the 25 states/UTs that were
unable to implement the Act on time were denied their foodgrain entitlement for more than a year.
Table 3 provides a timeline indicating when states/UTs started implementing NFSA.
Table 3 Timeline of NFSA Implementation
States
Month-Year
Haryana
Sep-13
Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan
Oct-13
Punjab
Dec-13
Chhattisgarh, Karnataka
Jan-14
Chandigarh, Maharashtra
Feb-14
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh
Mar-14
Lakshadweep
Aug-14
West Bengal
Jun-15
Puducherry, Tripura
Sep-15
Jharkhand, Telangana, Uttarakhand
Oct-15
Odisha, Daman & Diu
Nov-15
Goa, Assam, Andhra Pradesh
Dec-15
Sikkim
Jan-16
Jammu & Kashmir, Andaman & Nicobar Islands
Feb-16
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Uttar Pradesh, Dadra & Nagar Haveli
Mar-16
Gujarat, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh
Apr-16
Nagaland
Jul-16
Kerala, Tamil Nadu
Nov-16
Source: Compiled by Author using information from http://dfpd.nic.in/regular.htm
2. Lack of universal maternity benefits
One of the important features of NFSA is its emphasis on the “life cycle” approach to nutrition. Section
4 requires the Central Government to provide all pregnant and lactating (until six months after
childbirth) mothers a hot meal at their local anganwadi and a cash entitlement of not less than INR 6000.
When NFSA came into effect on July 5, 2013, the Central Government’s Ministry of Women and Child
Development (MoWCD) already had a cash-based maternity entitlement programme in place — the
12
Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY). However, unlike the NFSA requirement that mandates
the Central Government to provide a universal maternity entitlement of not less than INR 6000 to all
pregnant and lactating women, this programme provided only INR 4000 to women in 53 “pilot”
districts. In September 2013, MoWCD increased the amount to INR 6000 to comply with NFSA but did
not expand the geographic coverage to make it universal.
According to Falcao and Khanuja (2016), MoWCD did announce a plan to expand the coverage of
IGMSY to 200 “high burden” districts in 2015-16, but did not provide adequate funds to make this
happen. The budget allocation for IGMSY was increased from INR 3580 million in 2014-15 to INR 4380
million in 2015-16: an increase of only INR 800 million for an extension in coverage from 53 to 200
districts in the same period (Falcao and Khanuja 2016). The intention to make this programme universal
was finally announced on December 31, 2016 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his postdemonetisation speech. However, there are still limitations to the universality of the maternity
entitlements. According to the IGMSY rules on the MoWCD website, maternity entitlements are only
provided for the first two live births, which is in contradiction with the provisions of the Act (Falcao and
Khanuja 2016).
3. Impact of fiscal devolution on NFSA implementation
The Government of India accepted the 14th Finance Commission’s recommendation to increase tax
devolution to states from 32 per cent to 42 per cent, starting April 2015 (PIB 2015). Accordingly, states
have begun receiving a larger share of the divisible pool of taxes. However, devolution of taxes was
accompanied by a change in the funding pattern of the existing 66 centrally- sponsored schemes (CSSs).
In 2016, the Central Government accepted recommendations of the ‘Sub-Group of Chief Ministers on
Rationalisation of CSS’ and reduced the number of CSSs from 66 to 30 (PIB 2016a). The Sub-Group
further recommended grouping CSSs under three groups: Core of Core (schemes that are for “social
protection and social inclusion”), Core (schemes where the Centre and states can work together) and
Optional (schemes that states can choose to implement).
These three groupings had major financial implications as Core of Core schemes would follow the
existing funding pattern and Core schemes would require states to fund 40 per cent of the expenditure
(10 per cent in the case of 11 mountainous states). Three important NFSA-related programmes — the
Mid-Day Meal (MDM), Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) and Maternity Benefits — were all
classified as Core schemes, implying that states would have to fund two-fifth of the expenditures
incurred in implementing these programmes (PIB 2016a). This move by the Central Government raises
two important concerns: first, should the Central Government exclude “legally mandated” programmes
from the Core of Core schemes and second, will the states be able to fund the extra costs using the
extra 10 per cent of taxes devolved to them.
Table 4 provides details of budget allocations made to the four main NFSA-related programmes: TPDS
(food subsidy), ICDS, Maternity Benefit and MDM. While the food subsidy has seen a considerable
increase owing to NFSA implementation starting 2014-15, ICDS and MDM have seen a slight decline.
13
Table 4 Budget Allocations for NFSA-Related Programmes (in INR
Millions) from 2011-12 to 2017-18
Total Food
ICDS
Maternity
Mid-Day
Year
Subsidy
Services
Benefit
Meal
2017-18 (BE)
1453386
152452
27000
100000
2016-17 (RE)
1351730
145606
6340
97000
2015-16
1394190
154331
2334
91449
2014-15
1176712
165523
3425
104466
2013-14
920000
163626
2319
109176
2012-13
850000
157116
821
108492
2011-12
728221
142662
2898
98907
Source: http://indiabudget.nic.in/ (Accessed on January 15, 2017)
BE – Budget Estimates; RE – Revised Estimates
Before moving to the next section that looks at findings from preliminary studies of NFSA
implementation, it is important to look at the impact of its rollout on coverage of TPDS. Table 5
provides TPDS coverage rates before and after the implementation of NFSA. Coverage rates are
calculated by dividing total ration cards (BPL/PHH and AAY) by the total number of households in each
state as per the 2011 Census for both pre-and post-NFSA periods.
The administrative data shows that, at the national level, coverage of TPDS increased from
approximately 15 per cent to 59 per cent. This is a large increase and reflects the impact of NFSA which
aims to increase its coverage to approximately 75 per cent of the rural population and 60 per cent of
urban population. Some states (such as Kerala and Tamil Nadu) have coverage over 100 per cent; while
this is not technically possible, the use of the only available data (Census 2011) underestimates the total
number of households pre- and post-NFSA, which causes the figures to be above 100 per cent. It is
important to note that the figures in Table 5 should be used to look at trends rather than absolute
values of change in coverage.
14
Table 5 Change in TPDS Coverage After NFSA Rollout
State
Pre-NFSA
Post-NFSA
Change
Total Ration % of Households Total Ration % of Households
Cards
Covered
Cards
Covered
Andhra Pradesh
215.51
102.51
198.19
94.27
-8.24
Arunachal Pradesh
0.99
36.59
1.79
66.05
29.46
Assam
19.06
29.75
58.74
91.69
61.94
Bihar
64.23
33.96
154.01
81.43
47.47
Chhattisgarh
18.75
33.18
50.99
90.24
57.05
Delhi
3.17
9.23
19.61
57.07
47.85
Goa
0.31
9.02
1.23
35.80
26.78
Gujarat
33.21
27.11
63.28
51.66
24.55
Haryana
12.86
26.47
29.40
60.53
34.05
Himachal Pradesh
5.14
34.65
6.98
47.03
12.38
Jammu and Kashmir
7.36
34.72
16.46
77.65
42.93
Jharkhand
23.94
38.27
51.70
82.66
44.38
Karnataka
97.79
73.21
109.25
81.79
8.58
Kerala
20.43
26.01
82.67
105.27
79.26
Madhya Pradesh
68.3
45.25
118.57
78.56
33.31
Maharashtra
70.52
28.88
148.28
60.72
31.84
Manipur
1.66
29.76
5.27
94.54
64.79
Meghalaya
1.83
33.39
4.22
77.01
43.62
Mizoram
0.68
30.51
1.37
61.39
30.88
Nagaland
1.24
31.31
2.84
71.61
40.30
Odisha
49.43
51.29
83.67
86.82
35.53
Punjab
4.68
8.49
28.64
51.94
43.45
Rajasthan
25.85
20.34
97.13
76.42
56.08
Sikkim
0.43
33.33
0.99
76.38
43.05
Tamil Nadu
195.43
105.50
202.86
109.51
4.01
Tripura
2.95
34.48
5.99
70.02
35.54
Uttar Pradesh
106.79
31.93
319.86
95.63
63.70
Uttarakhand
4.98
24.21
13.30
64.68
40.47
West Bengal
54.72
26.85
552.18
60.45
33.60
INDIA
373.67
14.98
2375.07
74.13
59.15
Figures based on Author’s Calculations using data from Website of Department of Food and Public Distribution
(Government of India) – latest data available was from 27 June, 2016
Notes: Percentage of Households Covered calculated using 2011 Census Household Numbers;
Households with Ration Cards includes BPL and AAY (pre-NFSA) and PHH and AAY (post-NFSA);
West Bengal distributes individual ration cards (and not households); Andhra Pradesh includes Telangana
15
Findings from the Field
The rollout of NFSA has led to a limited number of studies in the past two years (2015-2016). This
section discusses findings from some of the prominent studies that have been conducted. Table 9 gives
a summary of the different studies on NFSA implementation. While it is too early to give a verdict on
the ability of NFSA to achieve its objectives (that of ensuring food security in the country), these studies
provide preliminary insights into its functioning on the ground. Most studies focus on states/UTs that
were frontrunners in implementation such as Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha,
Rajasthan and West Bengal. Before delving into the findings of these studies, it is important to highlight
the commonly used metrics for measuring the outcomes of the Act:
Coverage: the number of eligible beneficiaries (depending on the criteria used by each
state/UT) covered by TPDS (or other programmes such as ICDS and MDM).
Purchase-Entitlement Ratio (PER): the amount of entitled foodgrain actually received by
the beneficiary (often expressed as a percentage).
Inclusion and Exclusion Errors: the number of ineligible beneficiaries covered by TPDS and
the number of eligible beneficiaries not covered by TPDS, respectively.
1. NFSA Survey – 2016
Between 1-10 June, 2016, student volunteers from the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT-Delhi)
conducted a survey of NFSA beneficiaries in six of the poorest states in India: Bihar, Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha and West Bengal. In each state, six villages were selected in two
districts (three in each district) and all households in these 36 villages were interviewed —
approximately 3600 households were interviewed. The results have been summarised in Table 6.
Table 6 Results from NFSA Survey (Dréze et al 2016)
Coverage
PER
Quality
PrePostPrePostRespondents reporting ‘good or
NFSA
NFSA
NFSA
NFSA
fair’
Bihar
64
83
68
84
58
Chhattisgarh
81
95
99
97
99
Jharkhand
50
76
78
84
91
Madhya Pradesh
55
84
49
98
72
Odisha
62
88
97
99
86
West Bengal
51
86
NA
95
57
Notes: Pre-NFSA PER figures from Public Evaluation of Entitlement Programmes (PEEP) 2013. Important to note that the
PERs of villages, though randomly selected, are not exactly comparable in the pre- and post-NFSA periods.
Source: Dréze et al (2016) and Dréze and Khera (2014)
State
Following are the findings from the survey:
NFSA implementation has considerably increased coverage of TPDS in all six states. While
Chhattisgarh already had a quasi-universal TPDS (with a coverage of 88 per cent in the pre16
NFSA period), the remaining six states saw coverage increase from approximately half of the
population to more than three-fourths of the population.
While PERs have increased relative to findings from a similar survey — the Public Evaluation of
Entitlement Programmes (PEEP) in 2013 — across all six states, Bihar and Jharkhand are lagging
behind in ensuring that entitled foodgrain reaches all intended beneficiaries.
2. J-PAL Process Monitoring of DBT in TPDS – 2016
The Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) conducted a process monitoring study of direct benefit transfers
(DBT) in TPDS in three Union Territories — Chandigarh, Puducherry and Dadra Nagara Haveli. DBT
(or cash transfers in lieu of foodgrains) was first introduced in Chandigarh and Puducherry in September
2015, followed by Dadra Nagar Haveli in March 2016. Section 12 of NFSA requires states to undertake
reforms of TPDS (one of which is replacing in-kind benefits with cash transfers) and these ‘DBT pilots’
provide, perhaps for the first time, a glimpse of how cash transfers would work.
The study was conducted in two periods: late 2015 (P1) and mid-2016 (P2). The main objective was to
assess the quality of programme implementation by quantifying beneficiary experiences. In P1, 5044
beneficiaries were sampled from the NFSA lists in Chandigarh (2498) and Puducherry (2546).
Approximately half the respondents reported not receiving their cash regularly and about 67 per cent
preferred in-kind transfers from TPDS over cash through DBT (J-PAL 2016: 5).
In P2, follow-up interviews were conducted with 998 respondents from Chandigarh and 1056
respondents from Puducherry. Another 1015 respondents were identified in Dadra Nagar Haveli and
added to the P2 sample. Of the 3069 respondents, 8 per cent reported receiving no payments in their
back accounts, 26 per cent reported receiving less than full payment and more than half reported
receiving full (or more) payment. According to J-PAL (2016), beneficiaries took 74 minutes more and
spent INR 84 more under DBT (collecting cash from bank and buying foodgrains from the market) than
TPDS. The study also found that beneficiaries had to spend additional money to buy the amount of
foodgrain they were getting from TPDS: INR 32 in Chandigarh, INR 120 in Puducherry and INR 28 in
Dadra Nagar Haveli.
3. National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER) Study – 2015
In 2014, Government of India’s Department of Food and Public Distribution requested the National
Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) to evaluate TPDS with the aim of assessing whether
state governments had addressed the weaknesses identified in previous studies. As NFSA had come into
effect in 2013, the study focused on six states: those that had implemented NFSA (Bihar, Chhattisgarh
and Karnataka) and those that were yet to implement the Act (Assam, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal).
The NCAER study consisted of two components: first, a household survey of 6734 beneficiaries and
1000 non-beneficiaries between October-December 2014 and second, a systems evaluation to measure
targeting errors (i.e. inclusion and exclusion errors) and the diversion (or leakage) of foodgrains from
TPDS.
17
Listed below are the main findings from the NCAER study:
Among the six states, Chhattisgarh has the highest Purchase-Entitlement Ratio (PER) in the APL
and BPL/Priority Households (PHH) categories. Though NFSA has abolished the APL category,
Chhattisgarh’s Food Security Act (CFSA) provides foodgrain to the ‘General’ category which is
similar to APL. PER is lowest in Assam and West Bengal in the BPL/PHH categories and
Chhattisgarh in the AAY category (see Table 7).
State
Table 7 Purchase-Entitlement Ratios from NCAER Study
APL
BPL/PHH
AAY
Entitlement
PER
Entitlement
PER
Entitlement
(kg)
(%)
(kg)
(%)
(kg)
10
66.5
35
83.5
35
5
89.8
35
15
96.8
35
96.6
35
30
90.4
35
10
51.6
35
93.1
35
PER
(%)
94.8
96.9
92.2
95.9
99.4
Assam
Bihar
Chhattisgarh
Karnataka
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
2
71.5
7
85.1
7
84.1
Notes: Bihar and West Bengal have individual entitlements; Chhattisgarh has a ‘General’ category that replaces
the APL category from the pre-NFSA period.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Table 4.8 from NCAER (2015)
While PER can only indicate leakage at the level of the beneficiary (as it measures the amount of
entitlement a beneficiary was able to purchase), leakage estimates take into account the whole
process of TPDS (i.e., it includes leakage taking place at various stages of the process). The study
finds a decrease in leakage (diversion) of foodgrain compared to estimates by Dréze and Khera
(2015) using the National Sample Survey data from 2011-12. Leakage was lowest in Chhattisgarh
(7 per cent), followed by Bihar (16 per cent) and Karnataka (17 per cent). Leakage was highest
among APL beneficiaries in Assam (70 per cent), Uttar Pradesh (35 per cent) and West Bengal
(39 per cent), the three non-NFSA states (see Table 8).
Table 8 Leakage Estimates (in %) from NCAER Study
Non-NFSA States
APL
BPL
AAY
Assam
70.7
36.8
12.1
Uttar Pradesh
35.3
32.9
5.1
West Bengal
38.6
28.2
10.6
NFSA States
Priority Households (PHH) and AAY
Bihar
16.3
Chhattisgarh
6.7
Karnataka
17.3
Notes: For NFSA states, PHH and AAY categories have been combined as foodgrain allocation
for both categories is made together.
Source: Adapted from Tables 6.4 and 6.5 from NCAER (2015)
18
4. Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Audit – 2015
The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India audited the preparedness of states/UTs for the
implementation of NFSA between July 2013 and March 2015. The main objective of the audit was to
assess the preparedness of selected states/UTs with respect to the following: first, identification of
eligible beneficiaries and issuing of ration cards; second, existence of required infrastructure (storage,
transportation and distribution); third, initiation of TPDS reforms (such as computerisation and
doorstep delivery of foodgrain) and finally, a functioning grievance redress system. The CAG selected
nine states/UTs for this purpose depending on the stage of NFSA implementation: fully implemented
(Chhattisgarh, Karnataka and Maharashtra), partially implemented (Delhi, Bihar and Himachal Pradesh)
and not implemented (Assam, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh). The study covered 84 blocks and 336 Fair
Price Shops (FPSs) across 42 districts in these nine states.
The CAG audit found the following:
Many states/UTs did not come up with new criteria to identify eligible beneficiaries but
‘stamped’ old BPL and AAY ration cards as new ‘priority’ and AAY households under NFSA.
This was the case in Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra (CAG 2015: 21). Not issuing
new ration cards also violates Section 13(1) of NFSA that requires ration cards to be issued
with the eldest woman as the head of the household.
Doorstep delivery of foodgrains was not taking place in Assam, Karnataka and Himachal
Pradesh. In Uttar Pradesh, only 15 of the 75 districts had doorstep delivery of foodgrains. In
Maharashtra, doorstep delivery was taking place only in tribal and drought- prone areas.
End-to-end computerisation of TPDS includes two components: component I requires
digitisation of ration cards, computerisation of supply chain management and setting up of
grievance redress mechanism while component II requires FPS automation by installing Point of
Sales (PoS) machines in all FPSs. The CAG audit found that only 26 states/UTs had ration card
digitisation, 14 had online allocation, 8 had online supply chain management, 26 had transparency
portals and 21 had online grievance redress systems.
Only six of the nine selected states/UTs had grievance redress systems in place. However, in
most cases they were not fully functional.
5. NFSA Madhya Pradesh Survey – 2015
Student surveyors from the Indian Institute of Technology - Delhi visited eight villages of Mandla and
Shivpuri districts in Madhya Pradesh to study the implementation of NFSA. These interviews were
conducted in June 2015 and involved revisiting 200 households that were interviewed two years
previously as part of the Public Evaluation of Entitlement Programmes (PEEP). Dréze and Khera (2015a)
mention three important findings from this survey:
19
NFSA has led to a “dramatic reduction” in exclusion errors as Madhya Pradesh had moved away
from the old BPL list to the new ‘Social Security Mission’ database. Among the many eligibility
criteria adopted by the state is the provision that all Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe
(ST) households are covered by NFSA. This was evident among the survey sample as all SC and
ST households had NFSA ration cards.
Improvement in the reliability and regularity of foodgrain distribution in all sample villages.
A large increase in the Purchase Entitlement Ratio (PER) — from 37 per cent during 2013
(PEEP) to 96 per cent in 2015.
Dreze and Khera (2015a) attribute this turnaround in the Madhya Pradesh TPDS to “broad coverage,
clear entitlements and low issue prices.” They also discuss three concerns expressed by respondents.
First, more than one-third of the households rated the quality of foodgrain as “poor.” Second, many
complained about having to pay bribes ranging from Rs. 100 to Rs. 2000 for getting their new NFSA
ration cards. Third, there were concerns about the regular updating of births and deaths in the Social
Security Mission database (as entitlements are now per capita as opposed to per household, the number
of members listed in the database determines the quantity of the foodgrain entitlement).
6. NFSA Bihar Survey – 2014
Dréze (2015) presents findings from a survey of approximately 1000 randomly selected households in
four districts of Bihar to evaluate the implementation of NFSA in the state. They found that 89 per cent
of the households were eligible for NFSA (which was close to the 86 per cent figure in the NFSA for
rural Bihar): of these 83 per cent had a new NFSA ration card, 4 per cent had their old AAY ration
cards and 13 per cent were yet to receive their new NFSA ration cards. The study also found that
households with ration cards were able to purchase 77 per cent of their foodgrain entitlements in the
previous month (November 2014).
According to Dréze (2015), the findings from this survey corroborate the leakage figures from the
National Sample Surveys (NSSs); in Bihar, leakage declined from 75 per cent in 2009-10 to 24 per cent
in 2011-12, according to the corresponding rounds of the National Sample Surveys. The survey also
found that using data from the Socio-Economic Caste Census (SECC) has considerably improved the
identification of beneficiaries as compared to the “notorious BPL list.”
This finding is further corroborated by a World Bank study in Bihar in March 2015 that interviewed
1091 households in 50 villages across 9 districts. The study found an average Purchase-Entitlement Ratio
of 80.29 per cent (Bhattacharya and Puri 2015). In most villages, beneficiaries were receiving 4 kg per
person foodgrain rather than the 5 kg per person requirement under NFSA, which explains the PER of
80 per cent.
20
No.
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
Table 9 Summary of Studies on NFSA Implementation
States/UTs Covered
Sample
Findings
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, 3600 (all households Chhattisgarh and Odisha continue doing well.
Madhya Pradesh, Odisha and West in six villages of two Madhya Pradesh sees major improvements.
Bengal
districts in each state) Bihar and Jharkhand lag behind.
J-PAL
Chandigarh, Puducherry and Dadra 5044 in Round 1 and Many DBT beneficiaries not receiving full amount of cash
Study
Nagar Haveli
2054 in Round 2
transfer in their bank accounts.
Beneficiaries reported taking more time (and paying more)
to purchase foodgrains compared to TPDS.
NCAER
NFSA (Bihar, Chhattisgarh and 6734 beneficiaries and Leakage estimates higher among non-NFSA states (especially
Study
Karnataka) and non-NFSA (Assam, 1000 non-beneficiaries APL and BPL categories).
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal)
CAG Audit Fully implemented (Chhattisgarh, 84 blocks and 336 Many states/UTs did not issue new ration cards (stamped
Karnataka
and
Maharashtra), FPSs in all nine states
old ration cards with ‘NFSA’).
partially implemented (Delhi, Bihar
More than half the states/UTs do not have online allocation
and Himachal Pradesh) and not
of foodgrains.
implemented (Assam, Jharkhand
Three of the nine sample states do not have doorstep
and Uttar Pradesh)
delivery of foodgrain
NFSA
Madhya Pradesh
200 households in 8 Large increase in PER (compared to 2013).
Survey
villages across two Exclusion errors low due to new ‘Social Security Mission’
districts
database and eligibility criteria that includes SCs and STs.
NFSA
Bihar
1000 households in 4 89 per cent of households had NFSA ration cards.
Survey
districts
Households could purchase 77 per cent of entitlement.
World
Bihar
1091 households in 50 PER for sample villages 80 per cent.
Bank Timevillages
across
9 Households report getting 4 kg foodgrain per person.
Motion
districts
Study
Title
NFSA
Survey
21
Innovations and Challenges
The governments of states/UTs play a pivotal role in the successful implementation of NFSA. They
decide the eligibility criteria, identify beneficiaries, distribute FPS licenses and ensure foodgrain reaches
all beneficiaries. Owing to the highly decentralised nature of NFSA, states/UTs have had varied
experiences during its implementation. This section discusses important innovations and challenges faced
in the process by highlighting cases from particular states/UTs.
1. Reducing Inclusion and Exclusion Errors — Identification of Beneficiaries
One of the main objectives of NFSA is to reduce the high inclusion errors that had become synonymous
with TPDS over the past decade. As most states had used BPL lists that relied on data collected in 2002
and 2007 for rural and urban areas, respectively, they were fraught with errors. NFSA came as an
opportunity to rectify this problem by allowing states/UTs to identify eligible beneficiaries by using more
recent data and new eligibility criteria. This led to a proliferation of eligibility criteria across states.
Broadly, there were three methods used by states:
1. Using recently collected data
This could include SECC data or a state-level database. In Bihar, the Department of Food and Civil
Supplies applied the state’s inclusion and exclusion criteria to the SECC data to select beneficiaries
under NFSA. In Madhya Pradesh, the State Social Security (Samagra Samajik Suraksha) Mission database
was used to identify beneficiaries. Following the identification process, new NFSA ration cards for all
beneficiaries were printed and distributed.
2. Using a self-declaration process
A self-declaration process requires all eligible beneficiaries to apply for the new NFSA ration card if they
meet the inclusion criteria decided by their state government. Two good examples of this approach
were that of Chhattisgarh and Odisha. In Odisha, the Department of Food Supplies and Consumer
Welfare published six inclusion and nine exclusion criteria to determine eligibility for NFSA.
All households meeting the following criteria in Odisha were included:
without shelter
with destitute living on alms
primitive tribal groups
with a widow pensioner
with 40 per cent or more disability
with a transgender person
22
All households meeting the following criteria were excluded:
owning a motorised vehicle
owning mechanised agricultural equipment
with a member who is a government employee
with a member earning more than INR 15000 a month (urban) or INR 10000 a month (rural)
with pensioners having a monthly income of more than INR 15000 (urban) or INR 10000 (rural)
with enterprises registered with the government
paying income tax
consuming an average of 300 units of energy a month
with three or more rooms with pucca (permanent) walls and roof
A self-declaration process, combined with a post-application verification procedure, helps circumvent
the problem of high exclusion errors when government agencies use existing data to identify
beneficiaries (as was the case with the old BPL survey data) by ensuring that all eligible beneficiaries have
an opportunity to apply. In the case of Odisha, all applications were digitised and deduplication was
carried out. The applicant database was also linked to external databases with information on exclusion
criteria in order to identify applicants who were not eligible (Satpathy 2016).
3. Using the old TPDS beneficiary database
As discussed above, NFSA provides a great opportunity to rectify the inclusion and exclusion errors
resulting from the use of old BPL lists. However, some states such as Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh,
Himachal Pradesh and Maharashtra have included all old TPDS beneficiaries (CAG 2015). Doing so
results in high inclusion errors due to two reasons: first, it includes non-poor households that were
incorrectly included in the old BPL lists and second, it includes households that were poor during the
BPL surveys conducted more than a decade ago but are not poor anymore.
2. Benefits of Technology — COREPDS in Chhattisgarh
With the Government of India putting a lot of emphasis on technological solutions to improve
programme delivery — especially through Jan Dhan Bank Accounts, Aadhaar and Mobile Phones (or
JAM) — there has been a renewed focus on “end-to-end computerisation” of TPDS. While most states
have computerised their procurement and transportation processes, the distribution process is still
manual. The distribution process here refers to the final transaction that takes place in TPDS between
the FPS and the beneficiary. A majority of states rely on ‘sales registers’ which are used to make manual
entries of these transactions (usually requiring the beneficiary to either sign or provide a thumb
impression to verify the transaction). However, these manual entries are often unverifiable as they can
be forged very easily. In fact, one of the main avenues of ‘leakage’ of foodgrain in TPDS is forging of sales
information by FPS managers (particularly when beneficiaries do not take their foodgrains for the month
—– common among APL households —– or when there are fake or ‘ghost’ ration cards).
In order to address this ‘last-mile delivery’ problem, Chhattisgarh’s Department of Food and Civil
Supplies launched the Centralised Online Real-time Electronic Public Distribution System (COREPDS)
23
that uses Point of Sale (PoS) machines and chip-based smart cards to record the transaction between
FPSs and beneficiaries. Unlike a conventional FPS, where transactions are recorded in a sales register,
COREPDS transactions are recorded online. When the beneficiary arrives at the FPS with her
COREPDS smart card, the FPS manager inserts the smart card into the PoS machine. The PoS machine
retrieves the information of the beneficiary from the server (the PoS machines have to be connected to
the internet) and allows the beneficiary to purchase the NFSA entitlements. Once the transaction is
complete, the beneficiary gets a receipt with details of the quantity purchased and price paid for each
item (Vaidya and Somashekhar 2013).
Other than ensuring that all transactions are captured by the TPDS information system, COREPDS
provides two benefits that have the potential to improve quality and reduce corruption. First, COREPDS
allows ‘portability of benefits’: i.e., as beneficiaries and FPS managers have smart cards and PoS machines,
respectively, beneficiaries can choose which FPS they want to purchase their NFSA entitlements from.
Not only does this provide beneficiaries with choice, but also increases competition among various FPSs.
One of the major criticisms of TPDS is the monopoly that FPS managers have over beneficiaries that are
‘attached’ to their FPS. With COREPDS, this ‘attachment’ ceases to exist as beneficiaries can choose to
purchase their NFSA entitlements from any FPS.
The second benefit, which plays an important role in streamlining the transportation and distribution
process, is that COREPDS provides real-time information of stock availability at each FPS to the State
Food Corporation (the government agency responsible for transporting foodgrain to all the FPSs). In the
conventional TPDS, the SFC provides TPDS foodgrains to all FPSs at the beginning of each month based
on the number of TPDS beneficiaries attached to each FPS. This leads to two problems: first, limited
storage at the FPS does not allow for proper storage of foodgrain and second, this incentivises
corruption as FPS managers make fake entries for the leftover foodgrain and sell it off in the open
market. Under COREPDS, there is real-time allocation of foodgrain based on the availability of stock at
each FPS. As and when each FPS sells half of its existing stock, an alert is sent to the respective FPS
managers to place an order for more stock (based on the information on the COREPDS server). Once
the order for more allocation is received, foodgrain is dispatched to the concerned FPS.
A recent evaluation by the World Bank found that while COREPDS had improved the functioning of
TPDS, there are concerns that need to be addressed before a similar system can be scaled up to rural
areas (COREPDS is only operational in urban areas of Chhattisgarh) and other states (Bhattacharya et
al. 2016). First, internet connectivity is crucial for the success of a COREPDS-like system. Second,
adoption of any new technology has to be preceded by extensive training of all stakeholders (especially
government agencies and FPS managers). Third, there is a need to carry out widespread awareness
campaigns to ensure all beneficiaries have the required information to be able to access and use new
technologies. Finally, for a system like COREPDS to work, the government has to invest in good quality
PoS machines and smart cards. It should also be mentioned that the Department of Food and Civil
Supplies of Chhattisgarh provided an option for offline transactions in case there were technical
difficulties. However, the concerned FPS manager had to get in touch with the Department for prior
approval to use this option.
24
3. Limitations of Technology — Aadhaar and Biometrics in Rajasthan and
Jharkhand
While COREPDS shows how technology can be used to improve the food distribution system by
providing choice to TPDS beneficiaries, ensuring timely delivery of foodgrains to FPSs and increasing
accountability of all stakeholders, it is important to ensure that new technologies do not create hurdles
in the effective implementation of NFSA. The adoption of Aadhaar for biometric identification of
beneficiaries in the Rajasthan TPDS illustrates the limitations of new technologies when adopted without
the necessary infrastructure and administrative preparedness.
Beginning in November 2015, the Government of Rajasthan installed Point of Sale (PoS) machines in
FPSs across seven districts and made biometric authentication mandatory for all purchases of NFSA
foodgrains. Yadav (2017) recounts her experiences from Ajmer and Baran districts where she met many
beneficiaries who were unable to purchase foodgrains due to “technical glitches.” These included four
problems: poor network leading to low internet connectivity (delaying distribution of foodgrains), errors
in capturing fingerprints during Aadhaar enrolment, changes in fingerprints due to abrasions, and
problems during “seeding” (i.e. linking of Aadhaar to NFSA ration card). Yadav (2017) also quoted the
Additional Director of UIDAI who said that fingerprints for 10 to 15 per cent of beneficiaries do not
match (similar to the experience in Andhra Pradesh) and they are in the process of introducing iris
scanners to address this problem.
Similar experiences have also emerged from Jharkhand, where the Department of Food and Public
Distribution introduced biometric authentication in all FPSs of Ranchi district in mid-2016 (Bhatnagar
2016). Data from July and August (2016) show that beneficiaries received only half their NFSA foodgrain
entitlements after the introduction of PoS machines. Once again, common problems included “faulty
seeding” (errors in data entry making authentication impossible), “biometric failure” (failure to recognise
beneficiaries’ fingerprints) and incorrect quantities being displayed in the PoS device due to errors in
data entry (ibid.).
It is important to mention that, in principle, the use of Aadhaar-based authentication can be very
beneficial in ensuring that the intended beneficiary benefits from NFSA. However, new technology can
only help improve the existing system if prerequisites exist. In the case of Aadhaar-enabled PoS
machines, basic requirements include high-speed internet, uninterrupted power supply, good quality PoS
device, training for all stakeholders involved in the TPDS process, careful seeding of data and, most
importantly, an effective grievance redress system. The experience in both states suggests that these
basic prerequisites were not in place before the new system was introduced.
It is also essential to highlight that there is no one particular way to introduce PoS machines in TPDS. A
note by the Government of Madhya Pradesh on their plan to introduce FPS automation discusses three
available options:
25
Online ASAR (Apni Suvidha Apna Ration): All FPSs will have a PoS machine that is
connected to the internet. Both, biometric authentication and transaction will take place in realtime with the Aadhaar and central TPDS server, respectively. Will be implemented in large cities
only. All beneficiaries in these cities can choose which FPS they want to purchase their NFSA
foodgrain entitlements from. Similar to COREPDS in Chhattisgarh.
Online non-ASAR: All FPSs will have a PoS machine and FPS managers will have to download
the list of all eligible households from the central server at the beginning of every month.
Transaction data will be uploaded to the central TPDS server at the end of the business day.
However, biometric authentication will take place in real-time through GPRS connectivity. No
choice available as customers will be “attached” to a particular FPS.
Offline Mode: All FPSs will have a PoS machine and the FPS managers will have to download
the list of all eligible households from the central TPDS server at the beginning of every month.
Transaction data will be uploaded to the central TPDS server once every week (when the FPS
manager will visit an area where there is network and connect the PoS device to the central
TPDS server). Beneficiaries will be identified using the SAMAGRA ID (which is a unique
household ID provided to all families in Madhya Pradesh).
The benefits of introducing different technologies depending on the availability of the prerequisites
discussed earlier allows for the efficient functioning of TPDS.
4. Going beyond Foodgrains — Pulses in the PDS
Though TPDS is an important source of foodgrain (rice and wheat) for a large part of India’s population,
there has often been criticism of its ability to go beyond food security and ensure nutritional security.
Over the past decade, many states/UTs have introduced subsidised pulses in TPDS with the aim of
providing a rich source of protein. Table 10 lists the type, quantities and prices of subsidised pulses for
these states/UTs. Pulses are an important source of protein and diversify the nutritional composition of
existing TPDS items that primarily consist of carbohydrates. NFSA, though promoting the distribution of
millets (in addition to rice and wheat), does not make any provision for distribution of pulses. However,
it does urge states to diversify commodities available through TPDS (GOI 2013).
Distribution of pulses by states/UTs in TPDS can have a positive impact on both beneficiaries and
farmers. While the former will benefit from the nutritional value of pulses, the latter can diversify the
crops they grow and increase agricultural incomes. With the prices of pulses reaching very high levels
over the past few years, it would be very beneficial for TPDS beneficiaries if they could purchase these
at subsidized rates.
26
State
Andhra Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Table 10 Distribution of Subsidised Pulses through the TPDS
Type of Pulse
Issue Price
Quantity (kg)
(INR/kg)
Red Gram
Kala Chana
Dal
Chana Dal or Masur
Whole Moong
50
5
10
20
50
1
2
2
Haryana
2.5
Himachal Pradesh
1
(for HH with >5 members)
Urad
35
1
Chana
25
1
(for HH with >3 members)
Punjab
Dal
20
0.5 per member
(max. 2.5 kg/family)
Tamil Nadu
Tur
30
1
Urad
30
1
Telangana
Red Gram
50
1
Source: Department of Food and Public Distribution Website (Accessed on January 15, 2017)
5. Cash or Food? Early Experiences from the Puducherry and Chandigarh
DBT Pilots
Over the past decade, many academics and policy makers have suggested replacing in-kind food
transfers with cash transfers as a way to address the issues of leakage and poor quality of foodgrain from
TPDS (Saini and Gulati 2015). The idea is simple: rather than going through the process of procurement,
transportation and distribution of foodgrains that in itself entails high costs, the government should
transfer an equivalent amount of cash in all beneficiaries’ bank accounts and let them buy the foodgrains
themselves. Though this sounds very efficient in principle, many have raised concerns about the negative
impacts of such a move on TPDS beneficiaries.
Khera (2016) presents findings from qualitative interviews with TPDS beneficiaries across nine states
that asked them about their preferences between foodgrains from TPDS and a hypothetical cash
transfer that allowed them to purchase the same quantity of foodgrains from the market. Approximately
67 per cent preferred food over cash — the figure ranged from 91.3 per cent in Andhra Pradesh (where
TPDS is functioning well) to 20.8 per cent in Bihar (where TPDS was “languishing”) when the survey was
conducted in the summer of 2011. According to Khera, the main reasons highlighted by respondents for
preferring food over cash included: food security (cash could be spent on non-food items), poorly
developed rural markets (irregular supply of foodgrains), limited access to banks (costs involved in
accessing far away banks), experience with other cash transfers (delays in payment and hassles in
accessing banks) and inflation (“what if the price of foodgrains increases?”).
27
This debate, as contentious as it is, relies heavily on hypothetical situations (or on the experience of
other cash transfer programmes such as old age, widow and disability pensions) making it difficult to
understand how cash transfers would actually work. With section 12(h) of NFSA encouraging
states/UTs to introduce “cash transfers and food coupons” as part of efforts to reform TPDS and the
Government of India notifying the ‘Cash Transfer of Food Subsidy Rules’ (Government of India 2015b),
states/UTs can now move from in-kind food transfers to cash. However, despite notification of the cash
transfer rules, no state has showed interest in replacing TPDS with cash transfers. As of early 2017, only
three Union Territories (UTs) had implemented direct benefit transfers (DBT) of the food subsidy.
In September 2015, Chandigarh and Puducherry became the first states/UTs to replace their TPDS with
DBT. Six months later, Dadra Nagar Haveli also replaced its TPDS with DBT. Findings from a study by JPAL (2016) of the first year of DBT implementation in the three UTs show that in all the cases many
beneficiaries did not receive a “significant proportion of total disbursement” with some “still receiving
zero per cent” of the benefit. The report also mentions that on average beneficiaries had to spend more
time and money to purchase foodgrains and often spend more than the cash transfer amount to
purchase the same quantity of foodgrains that they would purchase from TPDS. While any new
programme experiences teething troubles, beneficiaries not receiving their full benefit amount six
months after implementation is of concern. More importantly, if cash transfers of food subsidies are not
working in UTs that are predominantly urban and have relatively well-functioning markets, will they
work in rural areas of the country where more than three-fourths of TPDS beneficiaries live?
Conclusion
The rollout of NFSA, combined with a slew of TPDS reforms undertaken both before and because of
NFSA, is turning around a system that had become synonymous with corruption. While it is too early to
give a verdict on the impact of NFSA, preliminary studies of its implementation have shown an increase
in coverage of eligible beneficiaries, a decline in exclusion error, a rise in the purchase-entitlement ratio
(PER) and improvements in the transportation of foodgrains. States/UTs that have implemented reforms
such as doorstep delivery of foodgrains, end-to-end computerisation of TPDS (procurement,
transportation and distribution), simplifying eligibility criteria and improving grievance redress
mechanisms are reaping benefits in the form of more food security as well as political success.
Though NFSA has improved the general functioning of TPDS, several areas require more focus. As some
of the studies reviewed in this report suggest, various states/UTs have not implemented NFSA in letter
and spirit. To begin with, the delay in the implementation in most states/UTs was a major violation of
the Act. Many states/UTs did not issue new ration cards and some made all old TPDS beneficiaries
eligible for NFSA benefits. More importantly, states/UTs that did not use NFSA as an opportunity to
initiate TPDS reforms have been unable to reap all the benefits.
The long delay in providing universal maternity benefits has been a major infringement of NFSA.
Considering the Central Government already had a maternity benefit programme (IGMSY) in place in
28
200 districts, this lack of concern reflects its apathy towards maternal and child health. The two other
NFSA-related programmes — ICDS and MDM — also did not receive the required financial support
from the Central Government. NFSA requires the Central Government to ensure all anganwadis
(childcare centres) and schools have the required infrastructure to provide hot-cooked meals to
children. Instead, the Central Government has transferred the financial burden of these programmes on
the states/UTs by changing the fund pattern of these programmes.
As the first evidence of the experience of replacing in-kind food subsidies with cash transfers emerges,
states/UTs will have more information to make the decision on whether to adopt this path. The ‘direct
benefit transfer pilots’ in the three UTs shed light on the limitations of the effectiveness of cash transfers
in highly urban settings. In a country where more than 70 per cent of the population lives in rural areas,
it would be essential to ensure that the prerequisites for cash transfers exist.
Another important theme that emerges from this review is the different experiences states/UTs have
had with various technologies that are being adopted to improve TPDS. The aim of adopting new
technologies should be to improve the functioning of TPDS without leaving anyone worse off. However,
experience from some states/UTs show that the reliance on biometric authentication for ‘weeding out
fake ration cards’ requires basic infrastructure such as high speed internet connectivity, good quality
Point of Sales (PoS) machines and ease of use for all stakeholders’ involved. Forcing new technologies on
populations, without having the perquisites in place, can be more detrimental than beneficial to the
overall functioning of a system.
29
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Food
Corporation
of India (FCI)
Procures grain from farmers across the
country through FCI for central beneficiaries
Decentralised Procurement (DCP) – in states where local
production of grain is high – for central beneficiaries
State Food
Corporation (SFC)
Decentralized
Procurement
Transports State’s Share of Grains to FPSs
Transports Central Government’s Share of Grains to FPSs
Appendix – TPDS Process
Fair Price Shop
(FPS)
Procures grain from state farmers through
SFC for state beneficiaries
Coordinates procurement and
distribution of foodgrain from SFC to FPS
Selects and removes FPSs based on
inspection by Food Inspectors
Sells grains to consumers
Central Government (Ministry of
Food and Civil Supplies)
Finance central
beneficiaries
Determines benefits
for, and number of,
central beneficiaries
State Government (Department of
Food and Civil Supplies)
Finances expanded
coverage and
benefits
Determines eligibility
criteria for selecting
beneficiaries and FPSs
District Food Office
Selects central and
state beneficiaries
PDS Beneficiaries
33