The Masada Myth

Book Reviews Croizat says nothing of his certain disappointment at being passed over again for flag rank, but he returned from Vietnam and went directly into retired status. He says nothing about any disquiet he might have had about the war or tbe future of the Marine Corps, only that his family deserved a break from its life as military gypsies. He moved immediately to an analysis job at RAITO and later became a contractor and advisor in the security assistance business before real retirement in Califomia almost twenty years later. In this case both Odysseus and Penelope get to unpack their bags together. Joumey Among Warriors is a good book by a decent and courageous Marine officer who saw history being made and made some of it himself. One wishes he had written about it with the same candor and critical insight he surely brought to his work. Allan R. Millett The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel. By Nachman Ben-Yehuda. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996. ISBN 0-299-14830-0 (cloth). ISBN 0-299-14834-3 (paper). Photographs. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxi, 401. Ä60.00 cloth, «22.95 paper. Ben-Yehuda opens with a simple question: how does one develop a sociological interpretation for an important belief system that turns out to be a series of deceptive and very biased, even falsified, claims? The belief system he refers to is a myth created around the story of Masada and the Jewish fighters who committed suicide there at the end of the Great Jewish War against Rome in A.D. 73. The story, as Josephus tells it, is not one of heroism. The sicarii on Masada were simply an extremist group of terrorists who had never participated in the Jewish Revolt to begin with and had spent more time killing other Jews than fighting the Romans. Modem twentiethcentury Zionists, however, took the original story, eliminated the more embarrassing parts (like the massacre of Jews at Ein Gedi by the sicarii), then used the remaining core to constmct a "mythical narrative" of heroism, sacrifice, and national pride for modem Israelis. Ben-Yehuda thus joins the growing ranks of Israeli intellectuals, the so-called "myth wreckers," who in recent years have reconstructed the cherished stories utilized by secular Zionists to heroize Jewish historical figures. Ben-Yehuda begins by reiterating the historical "facts" as we know them from the historian Josephus. The narrative leaves no reader indifferent; it is both awesome and inspiring. But is it true? Academic debate concerning the reliability of Josephus has generated an immense hterature, and it has proven equally difficult to confirm his accotmt by means of archaeological evidence. Ironically, we are left with the only account we are ever hkely to have on this important event written hy a man considered one of the biggest 448 * THE JOtntNAL OF Book Reviews traitors in Jewish history. Ben-Yehuda does not try to confirm or deny the Josephan account. He is a sociologist, and as such, what he attempts to investigate is the mythical narrative that has been created in modem times by those who wished to turn the story into a moral object lesson for Jewish immigrants and native-bom Israelis. Ben-Yehuda focuses on the déviances from Josephus's account that were made to create the modern political myth of Masada. Ben-Yehuda carefully traces the creation of the myth by examining the literature of IsraeU youth groups in Palestine dating back to the 1920s. He then follows its development in the pre-State Jewish underground groups, the Israeli Army (IDF), and textbooks used in secondary schools and colleges. One "moral entrepreneur," Shmaria Guttman, played a decisive role in the development and transmission of the myth. Guttman believed it was essential for Jews to retum to Israel and create a new type of hard-working and determined Jew. This "new Jew" had to seek personal freedom and national liberty, and above all, to be connected to the land, ready tofightfor it—if necessary to die for it. Constructing Masada as a national symbol (a "suasive image") for this type of socialization seemed to Shmaria Guttman to be the natural thing to do. The excavations at Masada, conducted under Yigael Yadin in the 1960s, further disseminated the myth. Indeed, Moses Finlcy's review of Yadin's book offered the Masada excavations as a prime example of how archaeology can be used for pohtical purposes. The myth then found its way into the media, the tourist industry, and Israeli literature and art. Yet, not all Israelis were taken in by this image. Even as eminent a leader as David Ben-Gurion questioned the wisdom of educating people with a narrative that ends in suicide. Since all nations cultivate myths, why is so much effort being exerted to deconstruct this one? Ben-Yehuda, along with many other IsraeU intellectuals, believes the Masada mythical narrative has become an ideological burden and can no longer be viewed as a completely positive, problem-free symbol. In the 1940s, the Masada myth was useful because it helped a considerable number of Jews to develop a unique personal and national identity. In the 1960s, the predominant feeling of many IsraeUs was that of a siege mentality, and the events at Masada suited this world view. It was a perspective that emphasized the stand of a few against the many, in a garrison state, armed to the teeth, in the midst of afightfor its very survival against tremendous odds. The memory of the holocaust was still fresh in the 1950s, and this was revived in the 1960s when Adolph Eichmann was put on trial in Jemsalem. By the middle 1970s, however. Masada had become a symbol of what Israel did not want to become. Those leaders accused of having a "Masada complex," such as Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir, were seen as the chief obstacles to any kind of settlement in the Middle East. A "Masada complex" was no longer a positive or flattering expression, since it referred to a desperate and difficult mentality; it came to symboUze fanaticism and destruc- MILITARY HISTORY 449 Book Reviews tion. In such a view, Israel is forever on its own and alone. Ironically, this was exactly the way Josephtis viewed the sicarii. as isolated, extremist trouble-makers, not representative at all of the Jewish people. Israel, as a state, has now reached a level of maturity where such simplifications are no longer needed. What may look like myth-wrecking activity can also be interpreted as an expression of a process of social change. It is a sign of a healthy society that it no longer requires the use of such frightening and horrifying symbols for its self-identity. All nations cultivate myths, but as they mature, they can be released from the grip of these myths. As Ben-Yehuda points out, those who beheve in myths in a fanatic or zealous way need a psychiatrist, not an historian. This is a book by a sociologist, not an historian, but there is much food for thought here for scholars in both disciplines. It should stimulate discussion among students, professors, and general readers alike. Rose Mary Sheldon Virginia Military Institute Lexington, Virginia New Zealand and the Korean War, vol. 2, Combat Operations. Ian McGibbon. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. ISBN 0195583434. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. vii, 508. «85.00. This second volume in the official history of New Zealand involvement in the Korean War completes the series and complements the author's earlier treatment of the political and diplomatic dimensions of New Zealand involvement, published in 1992. Thefirstvoltune was widely regarded as one of the best books published on the defence policy of the jimior partner in the ANZUS alliance, and in his second volume McGibbon has more than matched the high standard set previously. New Zealand's contribution to the United Nations Command was small—two frigates and a 1,500-man ground force made up of afieldartillery regiment and a transport company—but New Zealand was one of the early contributors to the U.S.-led force and the commitment was maintained in one or other form beyond the war until final withdrawal in 1957. Throughout the war the New Zealanders worked as part of British Commonwealth formations, first with the 27th (subsequently 28th) Commonwealth Infantry Brigade and then, from July 1951, within the 1st British Commonwealth Division which spent the remainder of the war as part of the U.S. I Corps. As McGibbon notes, his country's war effort was facilitated by, its involvement in the Commonwealth arrangements (p. 326); combining the disparate Commonwealth contributions in this manner was both virtue and necessity. Commonwealth equipment, logistic arrangements and tactical and operational asstimptions were quite different from those of the Americans, and 450 • THE JOtmNAL OF